


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A SELECTION
OF
LEGAL MAXIMS,

Classified and Illustrated.

BY HERBERT BROOM, LL.D.

THE EIGHTH EDITION

BY
JOSEPH GERALD PEASE,

BARRISTER-AT-LAW ; B.A. (LOND.) ;

AND
HERBERT CHITTY,

BARRISTER-AT-LAW ; M.A. (OXON.).

Maxims are the condensed good sense of nations.—SIR J. MACKINTOSH.
*Juris præcepta sunt hæc ; honeste vivere, alterum non lædere, suum
cuique tribuere.*—I. 1. 1. 3.

LONDON :
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1911.

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PREFACE TO THE EIGHTH EDITION.

A SHORT account of Dr. Broom, the author of this work, who died in 1882, is given in the "Dictionary of National Biography." The book, as the biographer states, was first published in 1845, and obtained a wide circulation as an established text-book for legal students. Five editions were produced by Dr. Broom himself: there was a sixth edition two years after his death, prepared by Mr. Herbert F. Manisty and Mr. Charles Cagney: and a seventh, by Mr. Manisty and Mr. H. Chitty, appeared in 1900.

In his preface to the original edition, which is reprinted below, Dr. Broom explained the system adopted by him in arranging the legal maxims he selected for illustration, and gave the reasons which led to its adoption.

The main idea of the work is to present, under the head of "Maxims," certain leading principles of English law, and briefly to illustrate some of the ways in which those principles have been applied or limited, by reference to a sufficient number of reported cases. Many subjects are thus touched upon lightly, and no endeavour is made to produce an exhaustive digest of the case law upon any one subject, or to rival treatises devoted exclusively to particular branches of the law.

The aim of the present editors has been to maintain and carry out the author's idea. They have incorporated into the book a selected number of the recent decisions and

enactments which bear upon the principles discussed ; and, in order to give due weight to the fresh matter, they have occasionally rearranged or modified a portion of the old. But no attempt has been made to produce a new book.

J. G. P.

H. C.

INNER TEMPLE,
October 12th, 1910.

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.

IN the Legal Science, perhaps more frequently than in any other, reference must be made to first principles. Indeed, a very limited acquaintance with the earlier Reports will show the importance which was attached to the acknowledged Maxims of the Law, in periods when civilization and refinement had made comparatively little progress. In the ruder ages, without doubt, the great majority of questions respecting the rights, remedies, and liabilities of private individuals were determined by an immediate reference to such Maxims, many of which obtained in the Roman Law, and are so manifestly founded in reason, public convenience, and necessity, as to find a place in the code of every civilized nation. In more modern times, the increase of commerce, and of national and social intercourse, has occasioned a corresponding increase in the sources of litigation, and has introduced many subtleties and nice distinctions, both in legal reasoning and in the application of legal principles, which were formerly unknown. This change, however, so far from diminishing the value of simple fundamental rules, has rendered an accurate acquaintance with them the more necessary, in order that they may be either directly applied, or qualified, or limited, according to the exigencies of the particular case, and the novelty of the circumstances which present themselves. If, then, it be true, that a knowledge of first principles is at least as essential in Law as in other sciences, certainly in none

is a knowledge of those principles, unaccompanied by a sufficient investigation of their bearing and practical application, more likely to lead into grievous error. In the present Work I have endeavoured, not only to point out the most important Legal Maxims, but also to explain and illustrate their meaning; to show the various exceptions to the rules which they enunciate, and the qualifications which must be borne in mind when they are applied. I have devoted considerable time, and much labour, to consulting the Reports, both ancient and modern, and also the standard Treatises on leading branches of the Law, in order to ascertain what Maxims are of most practical importance, and most frequently cited, commented on, and applied. I have likewise repeatedly referred to the various Collections of Maxims which have heretofore been published, and have freely availed myself of such portions of them as seemed to possess any value or interest at the present day. I venture, therefore, to hope, that very few Maxims have been omitted which ought to have found place in a work like that now submitted to the Profession. In illustrating each Rule, those Cases have in general been preferred as examples in which the particular Maxim has either been cited, or directly stated to apply. It has, however, been necessary to refer to many other instances in which no such specific reference has been made, but which seem clearly to fall within the principle of the Rule; and whenever this has been done, sufficient authorities have, it is hoped, been appended, to enable the reader, without very laborious research, to decide for himself whether the application suggested has been correctly made, or not. In arranging the Maxims which have been selected as above mentioned, the system of Classification has, after due reflection, been adopted: first, because this arrangement appeared better calculated to render the Work, to some extent, interesting as a treatise exhibiting briefly the most important Rules of Law, and not merely useful

as a book of casual reference; and, secondly, because by this method alone can the intimate connection which exists between Maxims appertaining to the same class be directly brought under notice and appreciated. It was thought better, therefore, to incur the risk of occasional false or defective classification, than to pursue the easier course of alphabetical arrangement. An Alphabetical List has, however, been appended, so that immediate reference may be made to any required Maxim. The plan actually adopted may be thus stated:—I have, in the first Two Chapters, very briefly treated of Maxims which relate to Constitutional Principles, and the mode in which the Laws are administered. These, on account of their comprehensive character, have been placed first in order, and have been briefly considered, because they are so very generally known, and so easily comprehended. After these are placed certain Maxims which are rather deductions of reason than Rules of Law, and consequently admit of illustration only. Chapter IV. comprises a few principles which may be considered as fundamental, and not referable exclusively to any of the subjects subsequently noticed, and which follow thus: Maxims relating to Property, Marriage, and Descent; the Interpretation of Written Instruments in general; Contracts; and Evidence. Of these latter subjects, the Construction of Written Instruments, and the Admissibility of evidence to explain them, and also those Maxims which embody the Law of Contracts, have been thought the most practically important, and have therefore been noticed at the greatest length. The vast extent of these subjects has undoubtedly rendered the work of selection and compression one of considerable labour; and it is feared that many useful applications of the Maxims selected have been omitted, and that some errors have escaped detection. It must be remarked, however, that, even had the bulk of this Volume been materially increased, many important branches of Law to

which the Maxims apply must necessarily have been dismissed with very slight notice ; and it is believed that the reader will not expect to find, in a Work on Legal Maxims, subjects considered in detail, of which each presents sufficient materials for a separate Treatise. One question which may naturally suggest itself remains to be answered : For what class of readers is a Work like the present intended ? I would reply, that it is intended not only for the use of students purposing to practice at the Bar, or as attorneys, but also for the occasional reference of the practising barrister, who may be desirous of applying a Legal Maxim to the case before him, and who will therefore search for similar, or, at all events, analogous cases, in which the same principle has been held applicable and decisive. The frequency with which Maxims are not only referred to by the Bench, but cited and relied upon by Counsel in their arguments ; the importance which has, in many decided cases, been attached to them ; the caution which is always exercised in applying, and the subtlety and ingenuity which have been displayed in distinguishing between them, seem to afford reasonable grounds for hoping that the mere Selection of Maxims here given may prove useful to the Profession, and that the examples adduced, and the authorities referred to by way of illustration, qualification, or exception, may, in some limited degree, add to their utility.

* * * * *

HERBERT BROOM.

TEMPLE,
January 30th, 1845.

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Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet	748
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ALPHABETICAL

LIST OF LEGAL MAXIMS.

Throughout this list, Wingate's Maxims are indicated by the letter (W). Lofft's Reports (ed. 1790), to which is appended a very copious Collection of Maxims, are signified by the letter (L). The Grounds and Rudiments of Law (ed. 1751), by the letter (G); and Halkerstons's Maxims (ed. 1823), by the letter (H); the reference in the last instance only being to the number of the Page, in the others to that of the Maxim. Of the above Collections, as also of those by Noy (9th ed.), and Branch (5th ed.), use has, in preparing the following list, been freely made. Some few Maxims from the Civil Law have also been inserted, the Digest being referred to by the letter (D), as in the body of the Work.

The figures at the end of the line without the parentheses denote the pages of this Treatise where the Maxim is commented upon or cited, either in the text or in the notes.

	PAGE		PAGE
A COMMUNI observantiâ non est recedendum (W. 203).		(Jenk. Cent. 69).	
A verbis legis non est recedendum . 478		Actio personalis moritur cum personâ 697	
Ab abusu ad usum non valet consequentia (a).		Actio quælibet it suâ viâ (Jenk. Cent. 77).	
Absoluta sententiâ expositore non indiget (2 Inst. 533).		Actionum genera maxime sunt servanda (L. 460).	
Abundans cautela non nocet (11 Rep. 6) 521		Actor sequitur forum rei (Branch M. 4).	
Accessorium non ducit, sed sequitur, suum principale 354, 376		Actore nom probante absolvitur reus (Hob. 103).	
Accessorium non trahit principale . 381		Actori incumbit onus probandi (Hob. 103; 4 Rep. 71 b).	
Accusator post rationabile tempus non est audiendus, nisi se bene de omissione excusaverit (Moor, 817).		Actus curiæ neminem gravabit . 99	
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		Actus incæptus cujus perfectio pendet ex voluntate partium revocari potest: si autem pendet ex voluntate tertiæ personæ vel ex con-	

(a) In *Stockdale v. Hansard*, 8 A. & E. 116, Ld. Denman observed, that this maxim cannot apply

"where an abuse is directly charged and offered to be proved."

	PAGE		PAGE
tingenti revocari non potest (a)		Aliud est celare—aliud tacere . . .	618
(Bac. Max. reg. 20).		Aliud est possidere—aliud esse in	
Actus judicarius coram non iudice		possessione (Hob. 163).	
irritus habetur : de ministeriali		Allegans contraria non est audiendus	135,
autem a quocunque provenit ratum			244
esto (L. 458).		Allegans suam turpitudinem non est	
Actus legis nemini est damnosus . . .	102	audiendus (4 Inst. 279) . . .	566
Actus legis nemini facit injuriam . . .	102	Allegari non debuit quod probatum	
Actus legitimi non recipiunt modum		non relevat (1 Chan. Cas. 45).	
(Hob. 153).		Alterius circumventio alii non præbet	
Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit		actionem (D. 50, 17, 49).	
rea	256, 631	Ambigua responsio contra proferen-	
Ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt jura		tem est accipienda (10 Rep. 68).	
adaptantur	30	Ambiguus casibus semper præsumi-	
Ad proximum antecedens fiat relatio,		tur pro rege (L. 248).	
nisi impediatur sententia . . .	523	Ambiguitas verborum latens verifica-	
Ad questionem facti non respondent		tione suppletur, nam quod ex facto	
judices : ad questionem legis non		oritur ambiguum verificatione facti	
respondent juratores	82	tollitur	464
Ad questionem legis respondent		Ambiguitas verborum patens nullâ	
judices	733	verificatione excluditur (L. 249).	
Ædificare in tuo proprio solo non		Ambulatoria est voluntas defuncti	
licet quod alteri noceat	292	usque ad vitæ supremum exitum . . .	385
Æquitas sequitur legem (Branch		Angliæ jura in omni casu libertati	
M. 8).		dant favorem (H. 12).	
Æquum et bonum est lex legum.		Animus hominis est anima scripti (3	
Affectus punitur licet non sequatur		Bulstr. 67).	
effectus (9 Rep. 57 a).		A non posse ad non esse sequitur	
Affirmanti non neganti incumbit pro-		argumentum necessarie negative,	
batio (H. 9)	253	licet non affirmative (Hob. 336).	
Alienatio licet prohibeatur, consensu		Applicatio est vita regulæ (2 Bulstr.	
tamen omnium in quorum favorem		79).	
prohibita est potest fieri (Co. Litt.		Arbitramentum æquum tribuit	
98).		cuique suum (Noy, M. 248).	
Alienatio rei præfertur juri accres-		Argumentum ab auctoritate est for-	
cendi	344	tissimum in lege (Co. Litt. 254).	
Aliquid conceditur ne injuria remau-		Argumentum ab impossibili pluri-	
erit impunita quod alias non con-		mum valet in lege (Co. Litt. 92).	
cederetur (Co. Litt. 197).		Argumentum ab inconvenienti pluri-	
Aliquis non debet esse iudex in propriâ		mum valet in lege	149
causâ, quia non potest esse iudex		Argumentum a communiter acciden-	
et pars	95	tibus in jure frequens est . . .	32

(a) The law, observed Lord Bacon, makes this difference, that, if the parties have put it in the power of a third person, or of a contingency, to give a perfection to their act, then they have put it out of their own reach and liberty to revoke it; but where the completion of their act or contract

depends upon the mutual consent of the original parties only, it may be rescinded by express agreement. So, in judicial acts, the rule of the civil law holds, *sententia interlocutoria revocari potest*, that is, an order may be revoked, but a judgment cannot.—Bac. M. reg. 20.

PAGE	PAGE
Argumentum a divisione est fortissimum in jure (6 Rep. 60) (W. 71).	Causa proxima et non remota spectatur 181
Argumentum a majori ad minus negative non valet—valet e converso (Jenk. Cent. 281).	Caveat emptor; qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit 604,
Argumentum a simili valet in lege (Co. Litt. 191).	Caveat venditor (L. 328).
Assignatus utitur jure auctoris . . . 359	Certa debet esse intentio, et narratio, et certum fundamentum, et certa res quæ deducitur in judicium (Co. Litt. 303 a).
Aucupia verborum sunt iudice indigna (Hob. 343).	Certum est quod certum reddi potest 478
Audi alteram partem 91	Cessante causâ, cessat effectus . . . 129
A verbis legis non est recedendum . 478	Cessante ratione legis, cessa ipsa lex. 129
	Cessante statu primitivo, cessat derivativus 380
BELLO parta cedunt reipublicæ (cited 2 Russ. & My. 56).	Charta de non ente non valet (Co. Litt. 36 a).
Benedicta est expositio quando res redimitur a destructione (4 Rep. 26).	Chirographum apud debitorem repertum præsumitur solutum (H. 20).
Benignæ faciendæ sunt interpretationes, propter simplicitatem laicorum, ut res magis valeat quam pereat 410	Circuitus est evitandus.
Benigne faciendæ sunt interpretationes et verba intentioni debent inservire 410, 430, 498	Clausulæ inconsumptæ semper inducunt suspicionem 240
Benignior sententia, in verbis generalibus seu dubiis, est preferenda (4 Rep. 15).	Clausula generalis de residuo non ea complectitur quæ non ejusdem sint generis cum iis quæ speciatim dicta fuerint (L. 419).
Bonæ fidei possessor in id tantum quod ad se pervenerit, tenetur (2 Inst. 285).	Clausula generalis non refertur ad expressa (8 Rep. 154).
Bona fides non patitur, ut bis idem exigatur 266	Clausula vel dispositio inutilis per presumptionem vel causam remotam ex post facto non fulcitur . 521
Boni iudicis est ampliare jurisdictionem 65	Cogitationis poenam nemo patitur.
Boni iudicis est iudicium sine dilatione mandare executioni (Co. Litt. 289).	Cohæredes una persona censentur propter unitatem juris quod habent (Co. Litt. 163).
Boni iudicis est lites dirimere, ne lis ex lite oritur, et interest reipublicæ ut sint fines litium (4 Rep. 15).	Communis error facit jus . . . 115, 123
Bonus iudex secundum æquum et bonum iudicat, et æquitatem stricto juri præfert 66	Conditio beneficiæ quæ statum constituit, benignæ, secundum verborum intentionem, est interpretanda; odiosa, autem, quæ statum destruit, stricte, secundum verborum proprietatem, accipienda (8 Rep. 90).
	Conditio præcedens adimpleri debet priusquam sequatur effectus (Co. Litt. 201).
Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquatur 33	Conditiones quælibet odiosæ; maxime autem contra matrimonium et commercium (L. 644).

	PAGE		PAGE
Confirmare nemo potest priusquam jus ei acciderit (10 Rep. 48).		Cui licet quod majus non debet quod minus est non licere	142
Confirmatio omnes supplet defectus, licet id quod actum est ab initio non valuit (Co. Litt. 295 b).		Cujus est dare ejus est disponere . .	356
Consensus, non concubitus, facit ma- trimonium	386	Cujus est instituere ejus est abro- gare	680
Consensus tollit errorem	112	Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad cælum	309
Consentientes et agentes pari poenâ plectentur (5 Rep. 80).		Culpâ caret, qui scit, sed prohibere non potest (D. 50, 17, 50).	
Consentire matrimonio non possunt infra annos nobiles (5 Rep. 80).		Culpa est immiscere se rei ad se non pertinenti (D. 50, 17, 36).	
Constitutiones tempore posteriores potiores sunt his quæ ipsas præces- serunt	19	Cum duo inter se pugnancia repe- riuntur in testamento, ultimum ratum est	445
Constructio legis non facit injuriam	460	Cum in testamento ambigue aut etiam perperam scriptum est, benigne interpretari et secundum id quod credibile est cogitatum credendum est	433
Consuetudo ex certâ causâ rationabili usitata privat communem legem . .	716	Cum par delictum est duorum semper oneratur petitor	561
Consuetudo loci est observanda . .	715	Cum principalis causa non consistit, ne ea quidem quæ sequuntur, locum habent (D. 50, 17, 129, § 1).	
Consuetudo manerii et loci obser- vanda est (Branch M. 28).		Curia parlamenti suis propriis legi- bus subsistit	69
Consuetudo neque injuriâ oriri neque tollî potest (L. 340).		Cursus curiæ est lex curiæ	110
Consuetudo regni Angliæ est lex An- gliæ (Jenk. Cent. 119).			
Consuetudo semel reprobata non potest amplius induci (G. 53).		DAMNUM is dat qui jubet dare.	
Contemporanea expositio est optima et fortissima in lege	529	Damnum sentire non videtur qui sibi damnum dedit	223
Contra negantem principia non est disputandum (G. 57).		Damnum sentit dominus	611
Contra non valentem agere nulla cur- rit præscriptio	696	Damnum sine injuriâ esse potest (H. 12)	156
Conventio privatorum non potest publico juri derogare (W. 201).		Debile fundamentum fallit opus . .	147
Copulatio verborum indicat accepta- tionem in eodem sensu	447	Debita sequuntur personam debi- toris (H. 13).	
Corporalis injuria non recipit æsti- mationem de futuro	232	Debitor non præsumitur donare (a) (H. 13).	
Cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, concedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit	367	Debitorum pactionibus creditorum petitio nec tolli nec minui potest .	544
Cuilibet in suâ arte perito est creden- dum	727	Debitum et contractus sunt nullius loci (b) (7 Rep. 61).	

(a) See *Kippen v. Darley*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 203.

(b) See the notes to *Mostyn v. Fabrigas*, 1 Smith L. C.; Story, Conf. Laws, tit. "Contracts."

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Deficiente uno non potest esse hæres (G. 77).		Duo non possunt in solido unam rem possidere	359
De fide et officio iudicis non recipitur quæstio, sed de scientiâ sive sit error juris sive facti	70	EADDEM mens præsumitur regis quæ est juris, et quæ esse debet, præsertim in dubiis	40
De gratiâ speciali, certâ scientiâ, et mero motu; talis clausula non valet in his in quibus præsumitur principem esse ignorantem (1 Rep. 53)	41	Ea quæ commendandi causâ in venditionibus dicuntur si palam appareant venditorem non obligant	616
Delegata potestas non potest delegari	653	Ea quæ raro accidunt, non temere in agendis negotiis computantur (D. 50, 17, 64).	
Delegatus debitor est odiosus in lege (2 Bulstr. 148).		Ecclesia ecclesiæ decimasolvere non debet (Cro. El. 479).	
Delegatus non potest delegare	655	Ecclesia meliorari non deteriorari potest (a).	
De minimis non curat lex	118, 133	Ei qui affirmat, non ei qui negat, incumbit probatio	253
De non apparentibus, et non existentibus, eadem est ratio	131	Ejus est interpretari cujus est condere	122
Derivativa potestas non potest esse major primitivâ (W. 26).		Ejus nulla culpa est cui parere necesse sit	10
Deus solus hæredem facere potest, non homo	395	Electio semel facta non patitur regressum	582
Dies dominicus non est juridicus	15	Eodem ligamine quo ligatum est dissolvitur	687
Discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum	68	Eodem modo quo quid constituitur, eodem modo dissolvitur—destruitur (6 Rep. 53)	680
Divinatio, non interpretatio est, quæ omnino recedit a literâ (Bac. Max. reg. 3).		Ex antecedentibus et consequentibus fit optima interpretatio	440
Dolo malo pactum se non servabit	570	Exceptio probat regulam (11 Rep. 41) (b).	
Dolus versatur in generalibus	240	Exceptio rei judicatæ obstat quoties eadem quæstio inter easdem personas revocatur	267
Dolus circuitu non purgatur	188	Excusat aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus quod non operatur in civilibus	264
Dominium non potest esse in pendenti (H. 39).		Ex diuturnitate temporis omnia præsumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta	737
Domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium	336		
Dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa	240		
Donari videtur, quod nullo jure cogente conceditur (D. 50, 17, 82).			
Donatio non præsumitur (Jenk. Cent. 109).			
Donatio perficitur possessione accipientis (Jenk. Cent. 109).			

(a) Arg., *A.-G. v. Chomley*, 2 Eden, 313.(b) "Every exception that can be accounted for is so much a confirmation of the rule, that it has become a maxim, *exceptio probat regulam*," per*Ld. Kenyon*, C.J., 3 T. R. 722. See also, *Id.* 38; 4 T. R. 793; 1 East, 647, n.; per *Ld. Campbell*, C.J., 4 E. & B. 832; arg. *Lyndon v. Standbridge* 2 H. & N. 48.

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Ex dolo malo non oritur actio	569	Fortior est custodia legis quam hominis (2 Rol. Rep. 325).	
Executio juris non habet injuriam	108	Fortior et potentior est dispositio legis quam hominis	544
Ex facto jus oritur	82	Fractionem diei non recipit lex (L. 572)	109
Ex maleficio non oritur contractus	574	Frater fratri uterino non succedet in hæreditate paternâ	404
Ex multitudine signorum colligitur identitas vera	492	Fraus est celare fraudem (1 Vern. 240).	
Ex non scripto jus venit quod usus comprobavit	715	Fraus est odiosa et non præsumenda (Cro. Car. 550).	
Ex nudâ submissione non oritur actio (G. 143).		Fraus et dolus nemini patrocinari debent	245
Ex nudo pacto non oritur actio	583	Frequentia actûs multum operatur (4 Rep. 78) (W. 192).	
Ex pacto illicito non oritur actio	566	Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora (Jenk. Cent. 61) (W. 177) (G. 161).	
Expedit reipublicæ ne suâ re quis male utatur	289	Frustra legis auxilium quærit qui in legem committit	233, 245
Expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent (D. 50, 17, 195).		Frustra probatur quod probatum non relevat (H. 50).	
Expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt nihil operatur	519, 592	Furiosi nulla voluntas est	263
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius	464, 504	Furiosus absentis loco est (D. 50, 17, 124, § 1).	
Expressum facit cessare tacitum, 464, 504		Furiosus solo furore punitur	263
Extra territorium jus dicenti impune non paretur	81	Furtum non est ubi initium habet detentionis per dominum rei (3 Inst. 197).	
Ex turpi causâ non oritur actio 224, 569		GENERALE nihil certi implicat (W. 164).	
FACTUM a judice, quod ad officium ejus non pertinet, ratum non est (D. 50, 17, 170)	75	Generalia specialibus non derogant (Jenk. Cent. 120) (b)	20
Falsa demonstratio non nocet	483	Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda	500
Falsa demonstratione legatum non perimitur	498	Generalibus specialia derogant (H. 51)	
Falsa grammatica non vitiat chartam 534		Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quæ antea specialiter sunt comprehensa (8 Rep. 154).	
Falsus in uno falsus in omnibus (a).			
Favorabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur	559		
Fere secundum promissorem interpretamur	458, 459		
Fiat justitia ruat cælum (4 Burr. 2562).			
Fictio legis inique operatur alicui damnum vel injuriam	110		
Fictio legis neminem lædit	108		

(a) This maxim may properly be applied in those cases only where a witness speaks to a fact with reference to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake; see *per* Story, J., *The Santissima*

Trinidad, 7 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 338, 339.

(b) Cited *E. of Derby v. Bury Impt. Coms.*, L. R. 4 Ex. 226; *Kidston v. Empire Ins. Co.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 546.

PAGE	PAGE
Generalis regula generaliter est intel- ligenda (6 Rep. 65).	voluntas legis ex hoc colligi possit 439, 440
HABEMUS optimum testem confiten- tem reum (Fost. Cr. L. 243) (a).	In ambiguis orationibus maxime sententia spectanda est ejus, qui eas protulisset 432
Hæredi magis parcendum est (D. 31, 1, 47).	In Angliâ non est interregnum . . . 36
Hæreditas nihil aliud est quam successio in universum jus quod defunctus habuerit (D. 50, 17, 62).	In casu extremæ necessitatis omnia sunt communia 2
Hæreditas numquam ascendit . . . 401	Incaute factum pro non facto habetur (D. 28, 4, 1).
Hæres est aut jure proprietatis aut jure representationis (3 Rep. 40).	Incerta pro nullis habentur (G. 191).
Hæres est nomen juris, filius est nomen naturæ (Bac. M. reg. 11).	Incivile est, nisi totâ sententiâ perspectâ, de aliquâ parte judicare (G. 194) 485
Hæres legitimus est quem nuptiæ demonstrant 394	In consimili casu, consimile debet esse remedium (G. 195).
	In contractis tacite insunt quæ sunt moris et consuetudinis 656
Id certum est quod certum reddi potest 479	In conventionibus contrahentium voluntas potius quam verba spectari placuit 119
Idem est non esse et non apparere . 133	In criminalibus sufficit generalis malitia intentionis cum facto paris gradûs 264
Id possumus quod de jure possumus (G. 183).	In criminalibus voluntas pro facto non reputabitur 261
Id, quod nostrum est, sine facto nostro ad alium transferri non potest (D. 50, 17, 11).	Index animi sermo est 478
Ignorantia eorum quæ quis scire tenetur non excusat 222	In disjunctivis sufficit alteram partem esse veram 451
Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia juris non excusat 210	In eo, quod plus sit, semper inest et minus (D. 50, 17, 110).
Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire tenetur, neminem excusat . . . 210	In favorem vitæ libertatis et inno- centiæ omnia præsumuntur (L. 125).
Ignorantia legis neminem excusat 211, 228	In fictione juris semper æquitas existit 106
Imperitia culpæ adnumeratur (D. 50, 17, 132).	In generalibus latet error.
Impossibile nulla obligatio est . . 206	In judicio non creditur nisi juratis (Cro. Car. 64).
Impotentia excusat legem 203	In jure omnis definitio periculosa est.
In æquali jure melior est conditio possidentis 557	In jure non remota causa, sed prox- ima spectatur 168, 179
In ambigua voce legis ea potius accipienda est significatio quæ vitio caret, præsertim cum etiam	Injuria non excusat injuriam . . . 309

(a) In the various treatises upon the law of evidence will be found remarks as to the weight which should be attached to the confession of a party. Respecting the above maxim, I. d. Stowell has observed, that, "What is taken *pro confesso* is

taken as indubitable truth. The plea of guilty by the party accused shuts out all further inquiry. *Habemus confitentem reum* is demonstration, unless indirect motives can be assigned to it." *Mortimer v. Mortimer*, 2 Hag. 315.

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Injuria non præsumitur (Co. Litt. 232 b).		Invito beneficium non datur . . .	547
In majore summâ continetur minor (5 Rep. 115).		Ita semper fiat relatio ut valeat dispositio (6 Rep. 76).	
In maleficiis voluntas, non exitus, spectatur.			
In odium spoliatoris omnia præsumuntur	734	JUDICIUM a non suo giudice datum nullius est momenti . . .	75
In omnibus quidem, maxime tamen in jure, æquitas spectanda sit (D. 50, 17, 90).		Judicium redditur in invitum (Co. Litt. 248 b).	
In pari causâ possessor potior haberi debet	558	Judicis est judicare secundum allegata et probata (H. 73).	
In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis	561	Judicis est jus dicere, non dare (L. 42).	
In pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis	230, 561	Jura eodem modo destituuntur quo constituuntur	680
In pœnalibus causis benignius interpretandum est (D. 50, 17, 155, § 1).		Jura naturæ sunt immutabilia . . .	99
In præsentia majoris cessat potentia minoris	90	Jura sanguinis nullo jure civili dirimi possunt	405
In stipulationibus cum quæritur quid actum sit verba contra stipulationem interpretanda sunt	459	Jurenaturæ æquum est neminem cum alterius detrimento et injuriâ fieri locupletiores (D. 50, 17, 206).	
Intentio cæca mala (2 Bulstr. 179) .	467	Jus accrescendi inter mercatores locum non habet pro beneficio commercii	354
Intentio inservire debet legibus, non leges intentioni (Co. Litt. 314 b).		Jus constitui oportet in his quæ ut plurimum accidunt, non quæ ex inopinato	30
Interest reipublicæ ne maleficia remaneant impunita (Jenk. Cent. 31). (W. 140).		Jus ex injuriâ non oritur	578
Interest reipublicæ suprema hominum testamenta rata haberi (Co. Litt. 236 b).		Jus superveniens auctori accrescit successori (H. 76).	
Interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium 69, 75, 267, 689		LEGES et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis .	25
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus (8 Rep. 169).		Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant	18
Interpretatio chartarum benigne facienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat	410	Le salut du peuple est la supreme loi	2
In testamentis plenius testatoris intentionem scrutamur	423	Lex aliquando sequitur æquitatem (3 Wils. 119).	
In testamentis plenius voluntates testantium interpretantur	433	Lex Angliæ sine parlamento mutari non potest (2 Inst. 619) . . .	24
In toto et pars continetur (D. 50, 17, 113).		Lex beneficalis rei consimili remedium præstat (2 Inst. 689).	
		Lex citius tolerare vult privatum damnum quam publicum malum (Co. Litt. 125)	171
		Lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia	210

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Lex neminem cogit ostendere quod nescire præsumitur (L. 569).		Mandata licita strictam recipiunt interpretationem, sed illicita latam et extensam (Bac. Max. reg. 16) (c).	
Lex nil frustra facit	209	Mandatarius terminos sibi positos transgredi non potest (Jenk. Cent. 58).	
Lex non cogit ad impossibilia	201	Matrimonia debent esse libera (H. 86).	
Lex non debet deficere conquerentibus in iustitia exhibenda	153	Meliorem conditionem suam facere potest minor, deteriorem nequa- quam (Co. Litt. 337 b).	
Lex non favet votis delicatorum	301	Melior est conditio possidentis et rei quam actoris (4 Inst. 180)	558, 560
Lex non requirit verificari quod apparet curiæ (9 Rep. 54).		Misera est servitus, ubi jus est vagum aut incertum	123
Lex plus laudatur quando ratione probat	129	Mobilia sequuntur personam	339
Lex posterior derogat priori	19	Modus de non decimando non valet (L. 427).	
Lex rejicit superflua, pugnancia, incongrua (Jenk. Cent. 133, 140, 176).		Modus et conventio vincunt legem	537
Lex semper dabit remedium	153	Modus legem dat donationi	357
Lex semper intendit quod convenit rationi (Co. Litt. 78 b).		Mora debitoris non debet esse creditori damnosa	611
Lex spectat naturæ ordinem	209	Multa conceduntur per obliquum quæ non conceduntur de directo (6 Rep. 47).	
Licet dispositio de interesse futuro sit inutilis, tamen potest fieri decla- ratio præcedens quæ sortiatur effectum, interveniente novo actu	382	Multa in jure communi, contra ratio- nem disputandi, pro communi utilitate introducta sunt	125
Licita bene miscentur, formula nisi juris obstet (Bac. Max. reg. 24) (a).			
Linea recta semper præfertur trans- versali	403		
Locus regit actum (b).			
		NATURALE est quidlibet dissolvi eo modo quo ligatur	680
MAJUS dignum trahit ad se minus dignum	142	Necessitas inducit privilegium quoad jura privata	8
Mala grammatica non vitiat chartam	534	Necessitas publica major est quam privata	13
Maledicta expositio quæ corrumpit textum	478	Necessitas quod cogit, defendit	11
Malitia supplet ætatem	264	Nemo agit in seipsum	174
Malus usus est abolendus	718		

(a) "The law," says *Ld. Bacon*, "giveth that favour to lawful acts, that, although they be executed by several authorities, yet the whole act is good;" if, therefore, tenant for life and remainderman join in granting a rent, "this is one solid rent out of both their estates, and no double rent, or rent by confirmation:" *Bac. Max. reg. 24*; and if tenant for life and reversioner join in a lease for life reserving rent, this shall enure to the tenant for life only during his life, and afterwards to the reversioner. See *1 Crabb, Real Prop. 179*.

(b) Cited *arg. Hodgson v. Beauchesne*, 12 Moo.

P. C. C. 308; *Lloyd v. Guilbert*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115.

(c) A principal is civilly liable for those acts only which are within the scope of the agent's employment. But if a man incite another to do an unlawful act, he shall not, in the language of *Ld. Bacon*, "excuse himself by circumstances not pursued;" as if he command his servant to rob *I. D.* on *Shooter's Hill*, and he does it on *Gad's Hill*; or to kill him by poison, and he doth it by violence: *Bac. Max. reg. 16*; cited *Parkes v. Prescott*, L. R. 4 Ex. 169, 182.

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Nemo aliquam partem recte intelligere potest antequam tetum perlegit	452	in alterius injuriam	24
Nemo allegans turpitudinem suam est audiendus	566	Nemo præsimitur alienam posteritatem suæ prætulisse (W. 285).	
Nemo contra factum suum venire potest (2 Inst. 66).		Nemo punitur pro alieno delicto (W. 336).	
Nemo dat quod non habet	363, 624	Nemo sibi esse iudex vel suis jus dicere debet	94
Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto	274	Nemo tenetur ad impossibilia	204
Nemo debet bis vexari, si constat curiæ quod sit pre unâ et eâdem causâ	266	Nemo tenetur divinare (4 Rep. 28).	
Nemo debet esse iudex in propriâ causâ	94	Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare	761
Nemo debet locupletari alienâ jacturâ (a).		Neque leges neque senatus-consulta ita scribi possunt ut omnes, &c.	30
Nemo debet locupletari ex alterius incommodo (Jenk. Cent. 4).		Nihil aliud potest rex quam quod de jure potest (11 Rep. 74).	
Nemo de demo suâ extrahi debet	336	Nihil consensui tam contrarium est quam vis et metus (D. 50, 17, 116).	
Nemo ejusdem tenementi simul potest esse hæres et dominus (1 Reeves, Hist. Eng. L. 106).		Nihil in lege intolerabilius est eandem rem diverso jure censi (4 Rep. 93 a).	
Nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam tetum iterum atque iterum perlegerit	452	Nihil perfectum est dum aliquid restat agendum (9 Rep. 9 b).	
Nemo est hæres viventis	399	Nihil præscribitur nisi quod possidetur (5 B. & Ald. 277).	
Nemo ex alterius facto prægravari debet (See 1 Peth., by Evans, 133).		Nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum	150, 289
Nemo ex prepie dolo consequitur actionem	245	Nihil simul inventum est et perfectum (b) (Co. Litt. 230).	
Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest (D. 50, 17, 134, § 1)	693	Nihil tam conveniens est naturali æquitati quam unumquodque dissolvi eo ligamine quo ligatum est	679
Nemo patriam in quâ natus est exuere nec legeantiæ debitum ejurare possit	61	Nil consensui tam contrarium est quam vis atque metus	232
Nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet	361, 362, 624	Nil facit error nominis cum de corpore vel personâ constat	489
Nemo potest contra recordum verificare per patriam (2 Inst. 380).		Nil tam conveniens est naturali æquitati quam voluntatem domini volentis rem suam in alium transferre ratam haberi (I. 2, 1, 40).	
Nemo potest esse simul actor et iudex	95	Nimia subtilitas in jure reprobatur.	
Nemo potest esse tenens et dominus (Gilb. Ten. 142).		Non accipi debent verba in demonstrationem falsam quæ competunt in limitationem veram	496
Nemo potest mutare consilium suum		Non aliter a significatione verborum recedi oportet quam cum manifestum est aliud sensisse testatorem	433

(a) Cited by Bovill, C.J., *Fletcher v. Alexander*, L. R. 3 C. P. 381.

(b) Applied to a patent, Arg., *Re Newal & Elliot*, 4 C. B., N. S. 290.

	PAGE		PAGE
Non dat qui non habet	363	scripturas	481
Non debeo melioris conditionis esse, quam auctor meus, a quo jus in me transit (D. 50, 17, 175, § 1).		Non videntur qui errant consentire .	217
Non debet alteri per alterum iniqua conditio inferri (D. 50, 17, 74).		Non videtur consensum retinuisse si quis ex præscripto minantis aliquid immutavit	232
Non debet, cui plus licet, quod minus est non licere	142	Non videtur quisquam id capere, quod ei necesse est alii restituere (D. 50, 17, 51).	
Non decipitur qui scit se decipi (5 Rep. 6).		Noscitur a sociis	447
Non dubitatur, etsi specialiter venditor evictionem non promiserit, re evictâ, ex empto competere actionem	605	Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis .	24
Non est novum ut priores leges ad posteriores trahantur	19	Novatio non præsumitur (H. 109).	
Non ex opinionibus singulorum sed ex communi usu nomina exaudiri debent (D. 3, 10, 7, § 2).		Novum iudicium non dat novum jus sed declarat antiquum (10 Rep. 42).	
Non impedit clausula derogatoria quo minus ab eâdem potestate res dissolvantur a quâ constituuntur .	19	Nudi consensus obligatio contrario consensu dissolvitur	685
Non in tabulis est jus (10 East, 69).		Nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne	240
Non omnium quæ a majoribus nostris constituta sunt ratio reddi potest	127	Nullâ pactione effici potest ut dolus præstetur	543
Non possessori incumbit necessitas probandi possessiones ad se pertinere	558	Nullum simile est idem (G. 467) (c).	
Non potest adduci exceptio ejusdem rei cujus petitur dissolutio . .	133	Nullum tempus occurrit regi	53
Non potest probari quod probatum non relevat (a).		Nullus commodum capere potest de injuriâ suâ propriâ	137, 231, 233
Non potest rex gratiam facere cum injuriâ et damno aliorum . . .	50	Nullus videtur dolo facere qui suo jure utitur	103
Non potest videri desisse habere, qui nunquam habuit (D. 50, 17, 208).		Nunquam crescit ex post facto præteriti delicti æstimatio	29
Non quod dictum est, sed quod factum est, in jure inspicitur (Co. Litt. 36 a) (b).		Nuptias non concubitus, sed consensus, facit	386
Non quod voluit testator, sed quod dixit, in testamento inspicitur .	424		
Non solent quæ abundant vitare		OMNE jus aut consensus facit aut necessitas constituit aut firmavit consuetudo	538
		Omne majus continet in se minus .	141
		Omne quod solo inædificatur solo cedit	314
		Omne testamentum morte consummatum est	385
		Omnes licentiam habent his, quæ pro se indulta sunt, renunciare .	547
		Omnia præsumuntur contra spoliato-rem	733

(a) See *A.-G. v. Hitchcock*, 1 Exch. 91, 92, 102.(b) Cited *White v. Trustees of British Museum*, 6 Bing. 319; *Flott v. Genge*, 3 Curt. 175; *Croft v. Lumley*, 6 H. L. Cas. 722, per Martin, B.(c) Cited 2 Bla. Com., 21st ed., 162; Co. Litt. 3 a.; Arg., 1 M. & S. 172; per Buller, J., 3 T. R. 664. See, per Knight Bruce, L.J., *Boyse v. Rossborough*, 3 De G. M. & G. 846.

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Omnia præsumuntur rite et soleniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium	133, 737, 739	Persona conjuncta æquiparatur interesse proprio	405
Omnia quæ jure contrahuntur, contrario jure pereunt (D. 50, 17, 100).		Potestas suprema seipsam dissolvere potest, ligare non potest (Bac. Max. reg. 19).	
Omnia quæ sunt uxoris sunt ipsius viri (Co. Litt. 112 a).		Potior est conditio defendentis	578
Omnibus poenalibus judiciis et ætati et imprudentiæ succurritur	263	Potior est conditio possidentis	178
Omnis innovatio plus novitate perturbat quam utilitate prodest	121	Præsentia corporis tollit errorem nominis; et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis	491, 493
Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur	672	Præsumptio violenta valet in lege (Jenk. Cent. 56).	
Omnium contributione sarcitur quod pro omnibus datum est (4 Bing. 121).		Prior tempore, potior jure	279
Optima est legis interpretis consuetudo	726	Privatis pactionibus non dubium est non lædi jus cæterorum	544
Optima est lex quæ minimum relinquit arbitrio iudicis, optimus iudex qui minimum sibi	68	Privatorum conventio juri publico non derogat	541
Optimus interpretis rerum usus	714	Privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur	5
Optimus legis interpretis consuetudo	532	Privilegium non valet contra rem publicam	13
Origine propriâ neminem posse voluntate suâ eximi manifestum est	63	Probandi necessitas incumbit illi qui agit (I. 2, 20, 4).	
		Protectio trahit subjectionem, et subjectio protectionem	64
PACTA conventa quæ neque contra leges neque dolo malo inita sunt omnimodo observanda sunt	545	Quæ ab initio inutilis fuit institutio, ex post facto convalescere non potest (D. 50, 17, 210).	
Pacta dant legem contractui (H. 118).		Quæ accessionum locum obtinent extinguntur cum principales res peremptæ fuerint	381
Pacta quæ contra leges constitutionesque vel contra bonos mores fiunt, nullam vim habere, indubitati juris est	541	Quæ dubitationis tollendæ causâ contractibus inseruntur, jus commune non lædunt (D. 50, 17, 81).	
Pacta quæ turpem causam continent non sunt observanda	571	Quæ in curiâ regis acta sunt rite agi præsumuntur (3 Bulstr. 43).	
Pactis privatorum juri publico non derogatur	541	Quæ in testamento ita sunt scripta, ut intelligi non possint, perinde sunt ac si scripta non essent (D. 50, 17, 73, § 3.).	
Par in parem imperium non habet (Jenk. Cent. 174).		Quæ legi communi derogant stricto interpretantur (Jenk. Cent. 29).	
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Pater est quem nuptiæ demonstrant	395	Quæ non valeant singula juncta juvant	447
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(a) Cited *per* Parke, B., *Morgan v. Thomas*, 8 Exch. 304: see also 1 Bl. Com. 430.

(b) See *Louisville R. C. v. Litson*, 2 Howard (U.S.), R. 523.

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(a) Cited by Ld. Wensleydale, *Baird v. Fortune*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 151.

(b) See *Ditcher v. Denison*, 11 Moo. P. C. C. 343.

(c) See *Reg. v. Millis*, 10 Cl. & Fin. 534 (cited

post), where this maxim was applied; *A.-G. v. Dean of Windsor*, 8 H. L. Cas. 392; *Baker v. Lee*, *Id.* 512; *Beamish v. Beamish*, 9 H. L. Cas. 274, 338; per Ld. Campbell, *Dansey v. Richardson*, 3 E. & B. 723.

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(a) See 1 Bla. Com., 21st ed., 484.

(b) See *Kidston v. Empire Ins. Co.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 546; *Earl of Kintore v. Lord Inverary*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 522.(c) See 4 Bla. Com., 21st ed., 363; *Horwood v. Smith*, 2 T. R. 753.(d) See to this maxim, *Goddard's case*, 2 Rep. 4; per Bayley, J., *Styles v. Wardle*, 4 B. & C. 911; per Patteson, J., *Browne v. Burton*, 17 L. J. Q. B. 50; citing *Clayton's case*, 5 Rep. 1, and recognising*Steele v. Mart*, 4 B. & C. 272, 279; *Tupper v. Foulkes*, 6 C. B., N. S. 797. See, also, *Shaw v. Kay*, 1 Exch. 412; per Jarvis, C. J., *Davis v. Jones*, 17 C. B. 634; *Cumberlege v. Lawson*, 1 C. B., N. S. 709, 720; *Xenos v. Wickham*, 14 C. B., N. S. 435; *S. C.*, 13 Id. 385, L. R. 2 H. L. 296; *Kidner v. Keith*, 15 C. B., N. S. 35.

(e) 3 Bla. Com., 21st ed., 399; cited by Tindal, C. J., 1 Bing., N. C. 522. This maxim is taken from the Roman law, see C. 3, 1, 13, § 6.

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LEGAL MAXIMS.

CHAPTER I.

§ I.—RULES FOUNDED ON PUBLIC POLICY.

THE Maxims contained in this section being of general application and resulting so directly from the simple principles on which our social relations depend, it has been thought better to place them first in this collection,—as, in some measure, introductory to the more precise and technical rules which embody the elementary doctrines of English law.

SALUS POPULI SUPREMA LEX. (XII. Tables:—*Bacon, Max., reg. 12.*)—*Regard for the public welfare is the highest law.*

THIS phrase is based on the implied assent of every member of society, that his own individual welfare shall, in cases of necessity, yield to that of the community; and that his property, liberty, and life shall, under certain circumstances, be placed in jeopardy or even sacrificed for the public good (a). “There are,” said

(a) *Alibi diximus res subditorum fungitur, iis rebus uti, easque etiam sub eminenti dominio esse civitatis, perdere et alienare possit, non tantum ita ut civitas, aut qui civitatis vice ex summa necessitate, quæ privatis*

Buller, J. (*b*), "many cases in which individuals sustain an injury for which the law gives no action; as, where private houses are pulled down, or bulwarks raised on private property, for the preservation and defence of the kingdom against the king's enemies." Commentators on the civil law, indeed, have said (*c*), that, in such cases, those who suffer have a right to resort to the public for satisfaction; but no one ever thought that our own common law gave an action against the individual who pulled down the house or raised the bulwark (*d*). On the same principle, viz. that a man may justify committing a private injury for the public good, the pulling down of a house when necessary, in order to arrest the progress of a fire, is permitted by the law (*e*).

Likewise, in less stringent emergencies, the maxim is, that a private mischief shall be endured, rather than a public inconvenience (*f*); and, therefore, if a highway be out of repair and impassable, a passenger may lawfully go over the adjoining land, since it is for the public good that there should be, at all times, free passage along thoroughfares for subjects of the realm (*g*).

quoque jus aliquod in aliena concedit, sed ob publicam utilitatem, cui privatus cedere illi ipsi voluisse censendi sunt qui in civilem cœtum coierunt; Grotius de Jure Belli et Pac. Bk. 3, c. 20, s. 7, § 1.—*Le Salut du peuple est la suprême loi*; Mont. Esp. des Lois, L. XXVII. Ch. 23. *In casu extremæ necessitatis omnia sunt communia*; 1 Hale, P. C. 54.

(*b*) *Per* Buller, J., *Plate Glass Co. v. Meredith*, 4 T. R. 797; Noy, Max., 9th ed. 36; Dyer, 60 b; 12 Rep. 12, 13.

(*c*) See Puff. de Jure Nat. Bk. 8, c. 5, s. 7; Grotius de Jure Bell. et Pac. Bk. 3, c. 20, s. 7, § 2.

(*d*) *Per* Buller, J., 4 T. R. 797.

(*e*) Noy, Max., 9th ed. 36; 12

Rep. 12; Dyer, 36 b; Plowd. 322; Finch's Law, 39; *Russell v. Mayor of New York*, 2 Denio (U.S.), R. 461, 474; see *Carter v. Thomas*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 673; 62 L. J. M. C. 104.

(*f*) *Absor v. French*, 2 Show. 28; *Dawes v. Hawkins*, 8 C. B. N. S. 848, 856, 859; *per* Pollock, C.B., *A.-G. v. Briant*, 15 M. & W. 185.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Taylor v. Whitehead*, 2 Dougl. 749; *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Bullard v. Harrison*, 4 M. & S. 393; 16 R. R. 493; *Dawes v. Hawkins*, 8 C. B. N. S. 848; *Robertson v. Gantlett*, 16 M. & W. 296; *Campbell v. Race*, 7 Cushing (U.S.), R. 408. *Secus*, where dedication of road to public is not absolute; *Arnold v. Holbrook*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 96.

The principle underlying the maxim, as well as the limitations with which it is applied, is well illustrated by the following expressions of Cockburn, C.J.: "The power to erect a sea-wall or embankment as a protection against the sea, or from the influx of the tide in rivers, is one of those things which emanate from the prerogative of the Crown for the general safety of the public (*h*), and no doubt the ordinary right of property must give way to that which is done under that great prerogative authority for the protection and safety of the public, but only to the extent to which it is necessary that private rights or public rights should be sacrificed for the larger public purposes, the general common weal of the public at large" (*i*).

Upon the principle we are discussing, also depends the right of the State to interfere with and place a limit to rights of property for the purposes of revenue and the support of government (*k*). It is, however, a rule of law, Taxes, &c. which has been designated as a "legal axiom," that "no pecuniary burden can be imposed upon the subjects of this country, by whatever name it may be called, whether tax, due, rate, or toll, except upon clear and distinct legal authority, established by those who seek to impose the burden" (*l*).

In the familiar instance, likewise, of an Act of Parliament for promoting some specific undertaking of public utility, as a canal, railway, or paving Act, the legislature

Railway and other Acts.

(*h*) See *A.-G. v. Tomline*, 14 Ch. D. 53; 49 L. J. Ch. 377; *West Norfolk Farmers' Co. v. Archdale*, 16 Q. B. D. 754; 55 L. J. Q. B. 230.

(*i*) *Greenwich Bd. of W. v. Maudslay*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 397, 401.

(*k*) *Per* Ld. Camden, *Entick v. Carrington*, 19 How. St. Tr. 1066.

(*l*) *Per* Wilde, C.J., *Gosling v. Veley*, 12 Q. B. 407; see also S. C., 4 H. L. Cas. 727, 781, *per* Martin, B., and *per* Ld. Truro. "The law requires clear demonstration that a

tax is lawfully imposed." Judgm., *Burder v. Veley*, 12 A. & E. 247. "It is a well settled rule of law that every charge upon the subject must be imposed by clear and unambiguous language." *Per* Bayley, J., *Denn v. Diamond*, 4 B. & C. 245: 28 R. R. 237; *per* Bramwell, B., *A.-G. v. Ld. Middleton*, 3 H. & N. 138; see also *Oriental Bank v. Wright*, 5 App. Cas. 842; *A.-G. v. Beech*, [1899] A. C. 53; 68 L. J. Q. B. 130.

Railway and
other Acts.

will not scruple to interfere with private property, and will even compel the owner of lands to alienate them on receiving a reasonable compensation for so doing (*m*); but such an arbitrary exercise of power (*n*) is indulged with caution; the true principle applicable to such cases being, that private interests are never to be sacrificed to a greater extent than is necessary to secure a public object of adequate importance (*o*). The Courts, therefore, will not so construe an Act as to deprive persons of their estates and transfer them to others without compensation, in the absence of a manifest reason of policy for thus doing, unless they are so fettered by express statutory words as to be unable to extricate themselves, for they will not suppose that the legislature had such an intention (*p*). And "where an Act is susceptible of two constructions, one of which will have the effect of destroying the property of large numbers of the community and the other will not," the Courts will "assume that the legislature intended the latter" (*q*). Also, as it has been judicially observed, where large powers are entrusted to companies to carry their works through a great extent of country without the consent of the owners of the lands through which they are to pass, it is reasonable and just, that any injury to property which can be shown to arise from the prosecution of those works should be fairly

(*m*) As to the items recoverable in respect of depreciation of property under the Lands Clauses Act, 1845, see *Duke of Buccleuch v. Metr. Bd. of W.*, L. R. 5 H. L. 418; *Cowper Essex v. Acton L. B.*, 14 App. Cas. 153; 58 L. J. Q. B. 594.

(*n*) See *per* *Ld. Eldon*, 1 My. & K. 162; *Judgm.*, *Tawney v. Lynn & Ely R. Co.*, 16 L. J. Ch. 282; *Webb v. Manchester & Leeds R. Co.*, 4 My. & Cr. 116.

(*o*) See *Judgm.*, *Simpson v. Ld. Howden*, 1 Keen, 598, 599; *Lister v. Lobley*, 7 A. & E. 124.

(*p*) See *per* *Brett, M. R.*, *A.-G. v.*

Horner, 14 Q. B. D. 245, 257; 54 L. J. Q. B. 232; *per* *Ld. Abinger*, *Stracey v. Nelson*, 12 M. & W. 540, 541; *per* *Alderson, B.*, *Doe v. Manchester & Rossendale R. Co.*, 14 M. & W. 694; *Anon.*, Lofft., 442; *R. v. Croke*, Cowp. 29; *Clarence R. Co. v. G. North of England R. Co.*, 4 Q. B. 46.

(*q*) *Per* *Erle, C.J.*, *Chelsea Vestry v. King*, 17 C. B. N. S. 629; *cf. per* *Brett, M. R.*, *Plumstead Bd. of W. v. Spackman*, 13 Q. B. D. 878, 887; 53 L. J. M. C. 142; *Railton v. Wood*, 15 App. Cas. 363, 366; 59 L. J. P. C. 84.

compensated to the party sustaining it (r), and likewise it is required that the authority given should be strictly pursued and executed (s).

In accordance with the maxim under notice, it was held Example. that, where the commissioners appointed by a paving Act occasioned damage to an individual, without exceeding their jurisdiction, neither the commissioners nor the paviers acting under them were liable to an action, the statute under which the commissioners acted not giving them power to award satisfaction to individuals who happened to suffer; and it was observed, that some individuals suffer an inconvenience under all such Acts, but the interests of individuals must give way to the accommodation of the public (t)—*privatum incommodum publico bono pensatur* (u). And “where authority is given by the legislature to do an act, parties damaged by the doing of it have no legal remedy, but should appeal to the legislature” (x). Where, however, the terms of the statute are not imperative but permissive, and where it is left to the discretion of the persons empowered, to determine whether their general powers shall be put into execution or not, the inference is that the legislature intended that discretion to be exercised in strict conformity with private rights, and did not intend to confer licence to commit nuisances in any place which might be selected for the purpose (y).

(r) *Caledonian R. Co. v. Walker's Trustees*, 7 App. Cas. 259; *Metr. Bd. of W. v. M'Carthy*, L. R. 7 H. L. 243; 43 L. J. C. P. 885.

(s) See *Taylor v. Clemson*, 2 Q. B. 978, 1031; 11 Cl. & F. 610; *per* Ld. Mansfield, *R. v. Croke*, 1 Cowp. 26; *Ostler v. Cooke*, 13 Q. B. 143.

(t) *Plate Glass Co. v. Meredith*, 4 T. R. 794, and *Boulton v. Crowther*, 2 B. & C. 703; 26 R. R. 528; cited by Williams, J., *Pilgrim v. Southampton & Dorchester R. Co.*, 7 C. B. 228; *Wilson v. Mayor of New York*, 1 Denio (U.S.), R. 595, 598; see

Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29; 16 R. R. 563; cited 10 C. B. N. S. 777, 779; *Alston v. Scales*, 9 Bing. 3; 35 R. R. 502.

(u) Jenk. Cent. 85.

(x) See *per* Wilde, C.J., 7 C. B. 226; *Mayor of Liverpool v. Chorley Waterworks Co.*, 2 De G. M. & G. 852, 860; *Dixon v. Metr. Bd. of W.*, 7 Q. B. D. 418; 50 L. J. Q. B. 772; *L. B. & S. C. R. Co. v. Truman*, 11 App. Cas. 45; 55 L. J. Ch. 354.

(y) *Per* Ld. Watson, *Metr. Asylum Bd. v. Hill*, 6 App. Cas. 193, 213; 50 L. J. Q. B. 353

We shall hereafter have occasion to consider further the general principles applicable for interpreting statutes passed with a view to the carrying out of undertakings calculated to interfere with private property. We may, however, observe, in connection with our present subject, that the extraordinary powers with which railway and other like companies are invested by the legislature, are given to them "in consideration of a benefit which, notwithstanding all other sacrifices, is, on the whole, hoped to be obtained by the public;" and that, since the public interest is to protect the private rights of all individuals, and to save them from liabilities beyond those which the powers given by such Acts necessarily occasion, they must always be carefully looked to, and must not be extended further than the legislature has provided, or than is necessarily and properly required for the purposes which it has sanctioned (z). It is, moreover, important to notice the distinction which exists between public and private Acts, with reference to the obligations which they impose. For general and public Acts bind all the King's subjects; but of private Acts, meaning thereby not merely private estate Acts, but local and personal (a), as opposed to general public Acts, "it is said that they do not bind strangers, unless by express word or necessary implication the intention of the legislature to affect the rights of strangers is apparent in the Act; and whether an Act is public or private does not depend upon any technical considerations (such as having a clause or declaration that the Act shall be deemed a public Act), but upon the nature and substance of the case" (b). And private Acts passed for

Distinction
between
public and
private Acts.

(z) *Per* *Ld. Langdale, Colman v. Eastern Counties R. Co.*, 10 Beav. 14; *Loosemore v. Tiverton & N. Devon Ry.*, 22 Ch. D. 25. Cf. *per* *Bowen, L.J., Wandsworth Bd. of W. v. United Telephone Co.*, 13 Q. B. D. 904, 920: 53 L. J. Q. B. 457; *Mayor*

of Tunbridge Wells v. Baird, [1896] A. C. 434: 65 L. J. Q. B. 451.

(a) See *Cock v. Gent*, 12 M. & W. 234; *Shepherd v. Sharp*, 1 H. & N. 115.

(b) *Per* *Wigram, V.-C., Dawson v. Paver*, 5 Hare, 434 (citing

the benefit of an individual are construed strictly against him (c).

On the other hand, where a statute authorises the stopping up and diverting of a highway, and thus interferes with the rights of the public with a view to promoting the convenience of an individual, such provisions as the Act contains for ensuring compensation to the public must receive a liberal construction. "The rights of the public and the convenience of the individual constantly come into opposition;" in such cases "there may be sometimes vexatious opposition on the one hand, but there may be also on the other very earnest pursuit of individual advantage, regardless of the rights and convenience of the public. Full effect, therefore, ought to be given to provisions by which, while due concession is made to the individual, proper protection is also afforded to the public" (d).

Diversion of highway.

From the principle under consideration, and from the very nature of the social compact on which municipal law is theoretically founded, and under which every man, when he enters society, gives up part of his natural freedom, result those laws which, in certain cases, authorise the infliction of penalties, the privation of liberty, and even the destruction of life, with a view to put down crime, and to ensure the welfare of the public. Penal laws, however, should evidently be restrained within the narrowest limits which may be deemed compatible with these objects, and should be interpreted by the judges, and administered by the executive, in a mild and liberal spirit. Before any man is subjected to a penalty, a clear case for its imposition should be made out (e). A maxim is, indeed, laid down by

Criminal law.

Barrington's case, 8 Rep. 138 a, and *Lucy v. Levington*, 1 Ventr. 175).

[1892] A. C. 523.

(c) *Altrincham Union v. Cheshire Lines*, 15 Q. B. D. 597; *Scottish Drainage Co. v. Campbell*, 14 App. Cas. 142; *per* Ld. Macnaghten, *Herron v. Rathmines, &c., Comrs.*,

(d) *Reg. v. Newmarket R. Co.*, 15 Q. B. 703, 713.

(e) *Walsh v. Bp. of Lincoln*, L. R. 10 C. P. 533; 44 L. J. C. P. 244; *per* Ld. Essher, *Tuck & Sons v. Priester*, 19 Q. B. D. 629, 638; 56

Lord Bacon, which might at first sight appear inconsistent with these remarks; for he observes that the law will dispense with what he designates as the "*placita juris*," "rather than crimes and wrongs should be unpunished, *quia salus populi suprema lex*," and "*salus populi* is contained in the repressing offences by punishment," and, therefore, *recciditur a placitis juris potius quam injuriæ et delicta maneat impunita* (f). This maxim must, at the present day, be understood to apply only to those cases in which the judges are invested with a discretionary power to permit such amendments to be made, *e.g.*, in an indictment, as may prevent justice from being defeated by mere verbal inaccuracies, or by a non-observance of certain legal technicalities (g); and a distinction must, therefore, still be remarked between the "*placita*" and the "*regulæ*" *juris*, inasmuch as the law will rather suffer a particular offence to escape without punishment, than permit a violation of its fixed and positive rules (h).

NECESSITAS INDUCIT PRIVILEGIUM QUOAD JURA PRIVATA. (*Bac. Max., reg. 5.*)—*In the domain of Jus privatum necessity imports privilege.*

"The law chargeth no man with default where the act is compulsory and not voluntary, and where there is not a consent and election; and therefore if either there be an impossibility for a man to do otherwise, or so great a perturbation of the judgment and reason as in presumption of law man's nature cannot overcome, such necessity carrieth a privilege in itself" (i).

L. J. Q. B. 553; *per* Cave, J., *Crane v. Lawrence*, 25 Q. B. D. 152: 59 L. J. M. C. 110.

(f) *Bac. Max., reg. 12.*

(g) See 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, ss. 1, 24.

(h) *Bac. Max., reg. 12.* The doc-

trine of our law as to avoiding contracts on the ground that they are opposed to public policy will be considered later.

(i) *Bac. Max., reg. 5*, cited 1 T. R. 32; *Jenk. Cent.* 280.

Lord Bacon has in this passage fallen into the common error of opposing compulsory to voluntary action. The opposite to voluntary action is involuntary, and the very strongest forms of compulsion do not exclude voluntary action. A criminal walking to execution is under compulsion if any one can be said to be so, but his motions are just as much voluntary actions as if he were leaving his place of confinement to regain his liberty. That the law will hold no man responsible for an act, which is involuntary in the strict metaphysical sense, it is unnecessary to state (*k*). Involuntary action.

“Necessity,” said Lord Bacon, “is of three sorts: necessity of conservation of life; necessity of obedience; and necessity of the act of God or a stranger” (*l*). This division of the subject is scarcely logical, but it is convenient for the purpose of making some observations which bear upon the maxim under notice. As we shall see, some of his illustrations are by no means sound. Bacon's necessity.

1. To preserve one's life is, generally speaking, a duty; but it may be the plainest and highest duty to sacrifice it: war is full of instances in which it is a man's duty not to live, but to die; it is not correct to say that there is any absolute or unqualified necessity to preserve one's life (*m*). If two persons be shipwrecked together, and one of them, to escape death from hunger, kill the other for the purpose of eating his flesh, he is guilty of murder; and it is no defence that, when he did the act, he believed, upon reasonable grounds, that he had no other means of preserving his life (*n*). Lord Bacon seems to have thought that if two persons are in danger of drowning, and one of them get to a plank to keep himself above water, the other, to save his own life, may thrust him from it and so cause him to be drowned (*o*); but it is certainly not law that a Self-preservation.

(*k*) Hist. Cr. Law, Stephen, 1, 152.

14 Q. B. D. 287.

(*l*) Bac. Max., reg. 5; Noy, Max., 9th ed. 32.

(*n*) *Reg. v. Dudley*, 14 Q. B. D. 273; 54 L. J. M. C. 32.

(*m*) *Per* Ld. Coleridge, C.J.,

(*o*) Bac. Max., reg. 5.

man may save his life by killing an unoffending neighbour (*p*). He also suggests that hunger might be an excuse for theft; but the law is plainly otherwise (*q*).

Self-defence. Our law, however, does recognise that even homicide is sometimes excusable, when done to preserve life. If a man be wrongfully assailed, so that he be in danger of his life, and if then, having no other means of escape, he slay his assailant in self-defence, the homicide is excused (*r*). But, before proceeding to this extremity, a man ought generally to retreat as far as he safely can; and if two persons quarrel and fight, neither is regarded as defending himself, until he has in good faith fled from the fight as far as he can (*s*). Homicide, the result of a blow struck in a mutual fight, however begun, is therefore not usually excusable.

This doctrine of defence extends, moreover, to the leading civil and natural relations of life; and what a man is excused for doing in his own defence, a master or servant, a parent or child, a husband or wife is excused for doing, one in defence of the other (*t*). And it seems that, where the motive was to defend life, the question, according to our criminal law, is not whether the act was in fact necessary, but whether it was done in the reasonable belief that it was necessary: for instance, if a son honestly believe, on reasonable grounds, that his father is about to murder his mother, he is excused for acting upon that belief, though in fact ill founded (*u*).

Necessity of obedience to existing laws.

2. The duty to obey existing laws often furnishes excuse for an act, which of itself would be culpable (*x*). As, where the proper officer executes a criminal in strict conformity with his sentence, or where an officer of justice, or

(*p*) 14 Q. B. D. 286.

(*q*) 1 Hale, P. C. 54; see 14 Q. B. D. 385.

(*r*) Fost. Hom. 274 *et seq.*; see 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 7.

(*s*) 1 Hale, P. C. 481—483; see *Reg. v. Bull*, 9 C. & P. 22; *Reg. v.*

Knock, 14 Cox, C. C. 1; *Reg. v. Weston*, Id. 346.

(*t*) 1 Hale, P. C. 484; 4 Blac. Comm. 186.

(*u*) *Reg. v. Rose*, 15 Cox, C. C. 540.

(*x*) *Ejus vero nulla culpa est cui parerc necesse sit*; D. 50, 17, 169.

other person acting in his aid, in the legal exercise of a particular duty, kills a person who resists or prevents him from executing it (y). And where a known felony is attempted upon any one, not only the party assaulted may repel force by force, but his servant attending him, or any other person present, may interpose to prevent the mischief, and, if death ensue, the party so interposing will be justified (z). So, in executing process, a sheriff, it has been observed, acts as a ministerial officer in pursuance of the command he receives in the king's name from a court of justice, which command he is bound to obey. He is not a volunteer, acting from his own free will or for his own benefit, but is imperatively commanded to execute the king's writ. He is the servant of the law, and the agent of an overruling necessity; and if the service of the law be a reasonable service, he is (in accordance with the above maxim) justly entitled to expect indemnity (a), so long as he acts with diligence, caution, and pure good faith; and, it should be remembered, he is not at liberty to accept or reject the office at his pleasure, but must serve if commanded by the Crown (b).

"The law has always held the sheriff strictly, and with much jealousy, to the performance of his duty in the execution of writs, both from the danger there is of fraud and collusion with defendants, and also because it is a disgrace to the Crown and the administration of justice, if the king's writ remains unexecuted" (c). In this case, therefore, the rule of law usually applies,—*necessitas quod cogit defendit* (d); although instances do occur where the

(y) Fost. Hom. 270.

(z) Ibid. 274.

(a) For instance, by interpleader, as to which see *per* Maule, J., 3 C. B. 341, 342; *per* Rolfe, B., 15 M. & W. 197; *per* Alderson, B., 14 Id. 801.

(b) *Per* Vaughan, B., *Garland v. Carlisle*, 2 C. & M. 77; S. C., 4

Cl. & F. 701.

(c) Jugdm., *Howden v. Standish*, 6 C. B. 520. As to the sheriff's duty in respect of executing criminals capitally convicted, see *R. v. Antrobus*, 2 A. & E. 788.

(d) 1 Hale, P. C. 54; 2 C. & M. 77.

sheriff is placed in a situation of difficulty because he is the mere officer of the Court, and the Court is bound to see that suitors obtain the fruits of decisions in their favour (*e*).

Act of
stranger.

3. The actions of a third person do not, as a rule, afford a defence for an act in itself criminal, unless they are of such a nature as to make it strictly involuntary in the correct sense noticed at the beginning of this chapter. Thus, if A., by force, take the hand of B., in which is a weapon, and therewith kill C., A. is guilty of murder, but B. is excused; though, if merely a moral force be used, as threats, duress of imprisonment, or even an assault to the peril of his life, in order to compel him to kill C., this is no legal excuse (*f*).

Husband
and wife.

To the rule that the moral force of another is no excuse for a crime, there is one, and perhaps only one, exception. A wife who, in her husband's presence, and under his coercion, commits a crime, is, generally, excused, and when a wife has committed a crime in her husband's presence, it is presumed, until the contrary be proved, that she did it under his coercion; but this presumption is always rebuttable (*g*); and moreover the husband's coercion is never an excuse for crimes done by the wife in his absence (*h*).

There has been some uncertainty upon the question, for what crimes may the wife be excused upon the ground of her husband's coercion (*i*). The better opinion seems to be that she may be excused upon that ground for all crimes, including misdemeanors (*k*), except murder or treason, for

(*e*) See particularly *Stockdale v. Hansard*, 11 A. & E. 253; *Christopherson v. Burton*, 3 Exch. 160; *per Jervis, C.J., Gregory v. Cotterell*, 5 E. & B. 584; *Hooper v. Lane*, 6 H. L. Cas. 443.

(*f*) 1 Hale, P. C. 434; 1 East, P. C. 225.

(*g*) 1 Hale, P. C. 516; *Reg. v. Cohen*, 11 Cox, C. C. 99; *Reg. v.*

Torpey, 12 Cox, C. C. 45.

(*h*) 1 Hale, P. C. 45; *Reg. v. John*, 13 Cox, 100; *Brown's Case*, [1898] A. C. 234.

(*i*) See the cases collected in Archbold, Cr. Pl., 22nd ed., p. 29.

(*k*) See *R. v. Price*, 8 C. & P. 19; *Reg. v. Torpey*, 12 Cox, C. C. 45, 49; Stephen, Dig. Cr. L., 5th ed., § 31.

which she cannot be so excused on account of the heinousness of those crimes (*l*).

The reason, given by Lord Bacon, why the husband's coercion does not excuse the wife if she join him in committing treason, is because it is against the commonwealth; and he cites the maxims, *privilegium non valet contra rempublicam*, and *necessitas publica major est quam privata*. He seems to be on firm ground, when he observes, in respect of these maxims, that "death is the last and farthest point of particular necessity, and the law imposeth it upon every subject, that he prefer the urgent service of his prince and country before the safety of his life" (*m*).

SUMMA RATIO EST QUÆ PRO RELIGIONE FACIT. (*Co. Litt.*

341 *a.*) *The best rule is that which advances religion.*

This saying, which Coke cites to support the proposition that a parson cannot alienate his glebe to his successor's prejudice, is borrowed from the Roman law, where Papinian observes (*n*) that it ought never to be overlooked in *ambiguus religionum questionibus*.

Under this maxim Noy (*o*) states that if any general custom were "directly against the law of God," or if a statute were made directly contrary thereto—for instance, if it were enacted that no one should give alms to any object in ever so necessitous a condition—such custom or statute would be void; and similarly Blackstone (*p*) says that if any human law should enjoin us to commit an offence against the divine law, we are bound to transgress that human law. But such statements are not to be regarded as legal

(*l*) 1 Hale, P. C. 45, 47, 48; 1 Hawk. c. 1, s. 11, where robbery is also excepted; but see *Reg. v. Torpey, supra*; *Reg. v. Dykes*, 15 Cox, C. C. 771.

(*m*) Bac. Mex., reg. 5.

(*n*) Dig. 11, 7, 43. As to the rela-

tion of our ecclesiastical law to the civil law, see 6 App. Cas. 446.

(*o*) Noy, Max., 9th ed. 2, citing Doct. & Stud., 18th ed. 15, 16.

(*p*) 1 Bl. Comm. 43; cited 2 B. & C. 470; cf. Finch, L. 75, 76.

propositions. In deciding doubtful points of law our courts can give due weight to moral considerations; but where our law, whether by statute or otherwise, is clear, they are bound to administer the law as they find it, irrespective of opinions upon its morality (*q*); and there is no remedy but an appeal to Parliament for its reform.

With regard to foreign laws, however, when they are brought to their notice, the attitude of our courts is different. They do not feel compelled by what is called the comity of nations to violate our own laws, or the laws of God and nature, upon which our laws have been considered to be founded (*r*). For alleged wrongs committed abroad, actions do not lie in this country, if nothing has been done which our laws regard as an actionable wrong (*s*), nor can contracts, made abroad with reference to foreign laws, and legal thereunder, be enforced by action here, if the contracts conflict with what are deemed in England to be essential public or moral interests (*t*); or if they are to be performed in this country and the performance would according to our laws be illegal (*u*). Similarly, although actions can generally be maintained here upon foreign judgments (*v*), yet there have been cases in which our judges have refused to recognise such judgments on the ground that, in their opinion, they were given in violation of elementary principles of natural justice (*x*).

(*q*) "If it were mischievous in its operation and necessarily mischievous, it would, to my mind, be no argument, if the statute expressly authorised the thing;" *per* Ld. Halsbury, [1896] A. C. 467. "Our duty upon this occasion is to administer and not to make the law;" *per* Ld. Herschell, [1897] A. C. 460.

(*r*) See *per* Best, J., *Forbes v. Cochran*, 2 B. & C. 471; 26 R. R. 402.

(*s*) *Phillips v. Eyre*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 1, 28; 40 L. J. Q. B. 28.

(*t*) *Santos v. Illidge*, 6 C. B. N. S.

841; 8 Id. 861; *Grell v. Levy*, 16 Id. 73; *Kaufman v. Gerson*, [1904] 1 K. B. 591.

(*u*) *Rousillon v. Rousillon*, 14 Ch. D. 351; 49 L. J. Ch. 36; *Moulis v. Owen*, [1907] 1 K. B. 746; 76 L. J. K. B. 396.

(*v*) See cases collected in 2 Smith, L.C., 10th ed. 765 *et seq.*

(*x*) See *Simpson v. Fogo*, 32 L. J. Ch. 249; 29 Id. 657; *Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter*, L. R. 4 Eq. 62; *Meyer v. Ralli*, 1 C. P. D. 358.

DIES DOMINICUS NON EST JURIDICUS. (*Noy, Max. 2.*)—

Sunday is not a day for judicial or legal proceedings.

The Sabbath-day is not *dies juridicus*, for that day ought to be consecrated to divine service (*y*). The keeping one day in seven holy as a time of relaxation and refreshment, as well as for public worship, is, indeed, of admirable service to a state considered merely as a civil institution; and it is the duty of the legislature to remove, as much as possible, impediments to the due observance of the Lord's day (*z*). The Houses of Parliament indeed may, in case of necessity, sit on a Sunday (*a*); but the judges cannot do so, that day being exempt from all legal business by the common law (*b*).

It has been remarked by an eminent Judge that full Statute. effect should be given to laws passed for the purpose of preserving the sanctity of the day of rest (*c*). The principal of these, The Lord's Day Act, 29 Car. 2, c. 7, s. 1, enacts, that no tradesman, artificer, workman, labourer, or other person whatsoever, shall do or exercise any worldly labour, business, or work of his ordinary calling on Sunday (works of necessity and charity only excepted), and that every person of the age of fourteen years offending in the premises shall forfeit 5s. (*d*). The effect of which enactment

(*y*) Co. Litt. 135 a; Wing. Max. 5 (p. 7); Finch's Law, 7; arg. *Winsor v. Reg.*, 6 B. & S. 143, 164. Query whether the verdict in a criminal case can be taken and recorded on a Sunday? *Id*.

(*z*) See the preamble of 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 31.

(*a*) *Per* Sir Geo. Grey, Feb. 19, 1866, Hans. Parl. Deb., 3rd Series, vol. 181, p. 763.

(*b*) *Per* Patteson, J., 3 D. & L. 330; *per* Erle, C.J., *Mumford v. Hitchcocks*, 14 C. B. N. S. 369; *Fish v. Broket*, Plowd. 265; S. C., Dyer, 181 b; *Noy, Max.*, 9th ed. 2;

Mackalley's case, 11 Rep. 65 a; 3 & 4 Will. 4. c. 42, s. 43. See *R. S. C.*, 1883, O. LXIV., rr. 2, 3; and *Morris v. Richards*, 45 L. T. 210.

(*c*) *Per* Willes, J., *Copley v. Burton*, L. R. 5 C. P. 489, 493; 39 L. J. M. C. 141. See *Goldstein v. Vaughan*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 549; 66 L. J. Q. B. 380.

(*d*) Exceptions to the general rule are in certain cases allowed by statute, see *R. v. Younger*, 5 T. R. 449; 2 R. R. 638; *Reg. v. Whiteley*, 3 H. & N. 143; *Bullen v. Ward*, 74 L. J. K. B. 916.

is, that if a man, in the exercise of his ordinary calling (*e*), make a contract on a Sunday, that contract is void, so as to prevent a party, who was privy to what made it illegal, from suing upon it, but not so as to defeat a claim made upon it by an innocent party (*f*). A horse-dealer, for instance, cannot maintain an action upon a contract for the sale of a horse made by him upon a Sunday (*g*); though, if the contract be not completed on the Sunday, it will not be affected by the statute (*h*).

It has been decided that farmers and barbers are not included in the description "tradesman, artificer, workman or labourer or other person whatsoever", for "other person" means "other person ejusdem generis with those before enumerated" (*i*).

Where, in an action for breach of the warranty of a horse, it appeared that the defendant alone was exercising his ordinary calling, and the plaintiff did not know what his calling was, so that only the defendant had violated the statute, the Court held that it would be against justice to allow the defendant to take advantage of his own wrong, so as to defeat the rights of the plaintiff, who was innocent (*k*). For the like reason, in an action by the indorsee against the acceptor of a bill of exchange drawn on a Sunday (*l*), it was held that the plaintiff might recover, there being no

(*e*) See *R. v. Whitmarsh*, 7 B. & C. 596; *Smith v. Sparrow*, 4 Bing. 84; 29 R. R. 514; *Peate v. Dicken*, 1 Cr., M. & R. 422; *Scarfe v. Morgan*, 4 M. & W. 270.

(*f*) Judgm., *Fennell v. Ridler*, 5 B. & C. 408; 29 R. R. 278, explaining Sir J. Mansfield's remarks in *Drury v. De la Fontaine*, 1 Taunt. 135; 29 R. R. 278.

(*g*) *Fennell v. Ridler*, 5 B. & C. 406; 29 R. R. 279.

(*h*) *Bloxsome v. Williams*, 3 B. & C. 232; 27 R. R. 337; *Smith v. Sparrow*, 4 Bing. 84; 29 R. R. 514.

See also *Williams v. Paul*, 6 Bing. 653; 31 R. R. 512 (observed upon in *Simpson v. Nicholls*, 3 M. & W. 240); *Beaumont v. Brengeri*, 5 C. B. 301; *Norton v. Powell*, 4 M. & Gr. 42.

(*i*) *R. v. Silvester*, 33 L. J. M. C. 39; *Palmer v. Snow*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 725; 69 L. J. Q. B. 356.

(*k*) *Bloxsome v. Williams*, 3 B. & C. 232; 27 R. R. 337; cited 5 B. & C. 408, 409.

(*l*) A bill is not invalid by reason only that it bears date on a Sunday; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 13 (2).

evidence that it had been accepted on that day; but the Court said that, if it had been accepted on a Sunday, and such acceptance had been made in the ordinary calling of the defendant, and if the plaintiff had known these facts when he took the bill, he would be precluded from recovering on it, though the defendant would not be permitted to set up his own illegal act as a defence to an action by an innocent holder (*m*). A bill of exchange falling due on a Sunday is usually payable on the preceding day (*n*).

A person, however, can commit but one offence on the same day by exercising his worldly calling in violation of the statute of Charles; and if a justice convict him in more than one penalty for the same day, it is an excess of jurisdiction (*o*). By the Sunday Observance Prosecution Act, 1871, no proceeding can be instituted for an offence against the statute, except with the consent in writing of the chief officer of police of the district or of two justices (*p*).

The Sunday Observance Act, 1780 (*q*), imposes penalties for opening houses, rooms, or other places of entertainment, and conducting entertainments therein, on Sundays (*r*).

In addition to cases decided under the Lord's Day Act, we may refer to one of a somewhat different description, in which, however, the principle of public policy which dictated that statute was discussed. In this case a question arose as to the validity of a bye-law, by which the navigation of

(*m*) *Begbie v. Levi*, 1 Cr. & J. 180.

(*n*) See Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 14).

(*o*) *Crepps v. Durden*, Cowp. 640; cited 4 E. & B. 322. As to circumstances under which cumulative penalties may be recovered for separate acts, see *Milne v. Bale*, L. R. 10 C. P. 591; 44 L. J. C. P. 336; *Apothecaries Co. v. Jones*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 89.

(*p*) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 48, s. 1; and L.M.

see *Thorpe v. Priestnall*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 159; 66 L. J. Q. B. 248.

(*q*) 21 Geo III. c. 49.

(*r*) *Terry v. Brighton Aquarium Co.*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 306; 44 L. J. M. C. 173; *Girdlestone v. The Same*, 4 Ex. D. 107; 48 L. J. Ex. 373; *Reid v. Wilson*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 315; 64 L. J. M. C. 60. It was a matter of doubt whether the Crown had power to remit the whole or any part of the penalties, but the Remission of Penalties Act, 1875, expressly conferred the power.

a canal was ordered to be closed on every Sunday (works of necessity alone excepted). In support of this bye-law was urged the reasonableness of the restriction sought to be imposed thereby, and its conformity in spirit with enactments prohibiting Sunday trading; the Court, however, held that the navigation company had no power, under their Act, to make the bye-law, their power being confined to the making of laws for the government and orderly use of the navigation, and not extending to the regulation of moral or religious conduct, which must be left to the general law of the land, and to the laws of God (s). Railway companies are bound to deliver up luggage deposited at their luggage and cloak offices, on Sunday as on other days, unless protected by special conditions printed on the receipt tickets (t).

§ II.—RULES OF LEGISLATIVE POLICY.

In this section certain maxims are considered relating to the operation of statutes, and the leading canons of their construction. These maxims are: 1, that a later repeals an earlier and conflicting statute; 2, that laws should not have a retrospective operation; and 3, that enactments are framed with a view to ordinary rather than extraordinary occurrences. We shall hereafter have occasion to consider the rules applicable to the construction of statutes, and may for the present confine our attention to the three maxims of legislative policy just enumerated.

LEGES POSTERIORES PRIORES CONTRARIAS ABROGANT. (1 *Rep.* 25 b; 11 *Rep.* 62 b.)—*Later laws repeal earlier laws inconsistent therewith.*

Clausula
derogatoria.

The legislature which possesses the supreme power in the State, possesses, as incidental thereto, the right to

(s) *Calder & Hebble Nav. Co. v. Pilling*, 14 M. & W. 76. (t) *Stallard v. G. W. R. Co.*, 2 B. & S. 419.

change, modify, and abrogate the existing laws. To assert that one Parliament can by its ordinances bind another, would in fact be to contradict this plain proposition; if, therefore, an Act of Parliament contain a clause, "that it shall not be lawful for the King, by authority of Parliament during the space of seven years, to repeal this Act," such a clause, which is technically termed "*clausula derogatoria*," is void, and the Act may be repealed within seven years, for *non impedit clausula derogatoria quo minus ab eadem potestate res dissolvantur a quibus constituentur (u)*; and *perpetua lex est nullam legem humanam ac positivam perpetuam esse, et clausula quæ abrogationem excludit ab initio non valet (u)*. The principle thus set forth seems to be of universal application; and as regards our own Parliament, an Act may be altered, amended, or repealed in the same session in which it is passed (*v*).

It is, then, an elementary rule, that an earlier Act must give place to a later, if the two cannot be reconciled—*lex posterior derogat priori (x)*—*non est novum ut priores leges ad posteriores trahantur (y)*—and one Act may repeal another by express words or by implication; for it is enough if there be words which by necessary implication repeal it (*z*). But a repeal by implication is never to be favoured, and must not be imputed to the legislature without necessity (*a*), or strong reason (*b*), to be shown by the party imputing

Repeal by
implication.

(u) Bac. Max., reg. 19.

(v) Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 10.

(x) See Mackeld, Civ. L. 5.

(y) D. 1, 3, 26. *Constitutiones tempore posteriores potiores sunt his quæ ipsas præcesserant.* D. 1, 4, 4.

(z) *Per Willes, J., Great Central Gas Co. v. Clarke*, 11 C. B. N. S. 835. (S. C., 13 Id. 838.) In *Birkenhead Docks Trustees v. Laird*, 23 L. J. Ch. 457, Turner, L.J., is reported as saying that one private Act cannot repeal another except

by express enactment, but this dictum is not to be found in S. C., 4 D. M. & G. 732, and is perhaps slightly too wide. (See *Green v. The Queen*, 1 App. Cas. 513; *Altrincham Union v. Cheshire Lines*, 15 Q. B. D. 597.) It was, however, accepted by Byles, J., *Purnell v. Wolverhampton Waterworks Co.*, 10 C. B. N. S. 591.

(a) *Judgm., Dobbs v. Gr. Junction Waterworks Co.*, 9 Q. B. D. 158. (S. C., 9 App. Cas. 49.)

(b) *Per Id. Bramwell, G. W. R.*

it (c). It is only effected where the provisions of the later enactment are so inconsistent with or repugnant to those of the earlier, that the two cannot stand together; unless the two Acts are so plainly repugnant to each other that effect cannot be given to both at the same time a repeal cannot be implied; and special Acts are not repealed by general Acts unless there be some express reference to the previous legislation, or a necessary inconsistency in the two Acts standing together (d), which prevents the maxim *generalia specialibus non derogant* from being applied (e). For where there are general words in a later Act capable of reasonable application without being extended to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, then, in the absence of an indication of a particular intention to that effect, the presumption is that the general words were not intended to repeal the earlier and special legislation (f), or to take away a particular privilege of a particular class of persons (g). "The law will not allow the exposition to revoke or alter by construction of general words any particular statute, where the words may have their proper operation without it" (h).

An affirmative Act which gives a new right does not destroy an existing statutory right, unless the intention be apparent that the two rights should not co-exist (i); and

Co. v. Swindon R. Co., 9 App. Cas. 787, 809; 53 L. J. Ch. 1075.

(c) *Per Chitty, J., Lybbe v. Hart*, 29 Ch. D. 15.

(d) *Per A. L. Smith, J., Kutner v. Phillips*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 272, citing *Gregory's case*, 6 Rep. 19 b; *Middleton v. Crofts*, 2 Atk. 675; *Thorpe v. Adams*, L. R. 6 C. P. 125. See also *Thames Conservators v. Hall*, L. R. 3 C. P. 415; *Reg. v. Champneys*, 6 Id. 384.

(e) See *per Willes, J., Daw v. Metr. Bd. of W.*, 12 C. B. N. S. 178.

(f) *Per* Ld. Selborne, *Seward v.*

Vera Cruz, 10 App. Cas. 68, citing *Hawkins v. Gathercole*, 6 D. M. & G. 1.

(g) *Per* Ld. Blackburn, *Garnett v. Bradley*, 3 App. Cas. 969; see also *Rockett v. Chippingdale*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 293, 299; 60 L. J. Q. B. 782.

(h) *Lyn v. Wyn*, *Bridgman's Judgments*, 122, 127; cited L. R. 3 C. P. 421; 6 Id. 135; 1 Ex. D. 78. See *Re Smith's Estate*, 35 Ch. D. 595.

(i) *O'Flaherty v. M'Dowell*, 6 H. L. Cas. 142, 157.

where two Acts are merely affirmative, and the substance such that both may stand together, the later does not repeal the earlier, but they both have concurrent efficacy (*k*). Thus, if by one Act an offence be triable at quarter sessions, and another Act makes the same offence triable at assizes, without adding such express negative words as "and not elsewhere," the jurisdiction of the sessions remains, and the offence may be tried before either court (*l*). The general rule undoubtedly is that where an Act does not create a duty or offence, but only adds a remedy in respect of an existing duty or offence, it is to be construed as cumulative; but this rule must always be applied with due attention to the language of the particular Act (*m*). It is, for example, a well recognised principle that an Act describing the quality of an offence, or prescribing a particular punishment for it, is impliedly repealed by a later Act altering the quality of the offence, or prescribing some other punishment for it (*n*); and this principle seems not to be affected by the statutory enactment, whereby, when an act constitutes an offence under two Acts, the offender shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be liable to be prosecuted under either Act, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence (*o*). For that enactment can only apply where both Acts are in force (*p*).

It was a well-established rule, at common law, that when an Act was repealed without any saving clause, "it was to be considered, except as to transactions passed and closed (*q*),

Effect of
repeal.

(*k*) *Forster's case*, 11 Rep. 62; *Hill v. Hall*, 1 Ex. D. 411.

(*l*) 1 Blac. Com. 98. See *Reg. v. St. Edmund's, Salisbury*, 2 Q. B. 72; *Reg. v. JJ. of Suffolk*, Id. 85.

(*m*) Judgm., *Richards v. Dyke*, 3 Q. B. 268; cf. *per Willes, J., Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford*, 6 C. B. N. S. 356.

(*n*) Judgm., *Fortescue v. St. Matthew, Bethnal Green*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 177, citing *Davis's case*, 1

Leach, C. C. 271, and *Michell v. Brown*, 1 E. & E. 267; see also *Henderson v. Sherborne*, 2 M. & W. 239; *A.-G. v. Lockwood*, 9 Id. 391; *Robinson v. Emerson*, 4 H. & C. 355.

(*o*) Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 33.

(*p*) See *Keep v. St. Mary's, Newington*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 524.

(*q*) See, for instance, *Gwynne v. Drewitt*, [1894] 2 Ch. 616.

as if it had never existed (*r*). Accordingly where an indictment was drawn in a form sanctioned by an Act, but insufficient at common law, and before the trial the Act was repealed without any reference to depending prosecutions, the Queen's Bench arrested a judgment given against the defendants on such indictment (*s*). One consequence of this rule was that if nothing inconsistent with such an intention appeared, a repealed Act was revived by the repeal of the Act which had repealed it (*t*). In order, however, to avoid the constant repetition of saving clauses, Parliament has now provided new rules with regard to modern repealing Acts. A repealing enactment passed since 1850 is not to be construed as reviving any enactment previously repealed, unless words are added reviving that enactment (*u*); and if it substitutes provisions for the repealed enactment, the latter remains in force until the substituted provisions come into operation (*x*). And in the case of a repealing enactment passed since 1889, the repeal, unless the contrary intention appears, not only does not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal takes effect, nor affect anything done or suffered under the repealed enactment: but further does not affect any right or liability, acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder, or any penalty or punishment incurred for an offence committed against the repealed enactment, or any legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, liability, penalty or punishment; and the legal proceeding

(*r*) *Surtees v. Ellison*, 9 B. & C. 752, *per* Ld. Tenterden; cited 18 Q. B. 771; L. R. 3 Q. B. 338; 8 Id. 5. See *A.-G. v. Lamplough*, 3 Ex. D. 214. In the case of *temporary* Acts, the extent of the restrictions imposed and the duration of the provisions are matters of construction; *per* Parke, B., *Stevenson v. Oliver*, 8 M. & W. 241.

(*s*) *Reg. v. Denton*, 18 Q. B. 761.

(*t*) *The Bishop's case*, 12 Rep. 7; *Tattle v. Grimwood*, 3 Bing. 493, 496; *Hellawell v. Eastwood*, 6 Exch. 295.

(*u*) Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 66), s. 11 (1).

(*x*) Id. s. 11 (2). See *Levi v. Sanderson*, and *Mirfin v. Attwood*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 330; *Mount v. Taylor*, L. R. 3 C. P. 645; *Butcher v. Henderson*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 335.

may be enforced, and the penalty or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Act had not been passed (*y*).

It was a general rule of construction that when a statute was incorporated by reference into a second statute, the repeal of the first by a third did not affect the second (*z*). This rule, however, is now varied, as regards a repealing Act passed since 1889, which re-enacts with or without modification the provisions of the repealed Act; for references in other Acts to the repealed provisions are, unless the contrary intention appears, to be construed as references to the provisions re-enacted (*a*).

Before 1793, every Act, unless it contained a direction to the contrary, was considered to commence from the first day of the session of Parliament in which it was passed (*b*); but in 1793 it was enacted (*c*) that it should be the duty of the clerk of the Parliaments to indorse on every Act the day, month and year when the same receives the royal assent, and the date so indorsed on an Act is the date of its commencement (*d*) where no other commencement is therein provided. When, therefore, two Acts, passed in the same session, are repugnant or contradictory to each other, that which last received the royal assent now prevails, and has the effect of repealing the other wholly, or *pro tanto* (*e*). The same principle, moreover, applies where a proviso in an Act is directly repugnant to the enacting part; for in this case the proviso stands, and is held to be a repeal of the substantive enactment, as it speaks the last intention of the makers (*f*).

When Act
begins to
operate.

(*y*) Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 66), s. 38 (2). See *Heston U. D. C. v. Gout*, [1897] 2 Ch. 306; 66 L. J. Ch. 647; *Abbott v. Minister for Lands*, [1894] A. C. 425; *Re Brandon's Patent*, 9 App. Cas. 589.

(*z*) See *per Brett, L.J., Clarke v. Bradlaugh*, 8 Q. B. D. 69. (S. C., 8 App. Cas. 354.)

(*a*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 38 (1).

(*b*) *Patten v. Holmes*, 4 T. R. 660.

(*c*) 33 Geo. III. c. 13.

(*d*) See *Tomlinson v. Bullock*, 4 Q. B. D. 230 48 L. J. M. C. 95.

(*e*) *R. v. JJ. of Middlesex*, 2 B. & Ad. 818; 36 R. R. 758; *Paget v. Foley*, 2 Bing. N. C. 691.

(*f*) *A.-G. v. Chelsea Waterworks Co.*, Fitzgib. 195, cited 2 B. & Ad.

Common law
gives place
to statute.

Not merely does an old statute give place to a new one, but, where the common law and the statute differ, the common law gives place to the statute so far as they are repugnant (*g*). In like manner, an ancient custom may be abrogated by the express provisions of a statute; or where inconsistent with and repugnant to its positive language (*h*). But "the law and custom of England cannot be changed without an Act of Parliament, for the law and custom of England is the inheritance of the subject, which he cannot be deprived of without his assent in Parliament" (*i*).

Statutes, however, "are not presumed to make any alteration in the common law, further or otherwise than the Act does expressly declare; therefore in all general matters the law presumes the Act did not intend to make any alteration, for if Parliament had had that design they would have expressed it in the Act" (*j*).

NOVA CONSTITUTIO FUTURIS FORMAM IMPONERE DEBET, NON PRÆTERITIS. (2 *Inst.* 292.)—*A new law ought to be prospective, not retrospective, in its operations.*

General
principle of
legislation.

Retrospective laws are, as a rule, of questionable policy, and contrary to the general principle that legislation by which the conduct of mankind is to be regulated ought to deal with future acts, and ought not to change the character of past transactions carried on upon the faith of the then existing law (*k*). *Nemo potest mutare consilium suum in*

826; cf. *Re Watson*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 21; 62 L. J. Q. B. 80.

(*g*) Bac. Abr., 7th ed., "*Statute*" (*G*); per Alderson, B., in *Mayor of London v. R.*, 13 Q. B. 33, note (*d*); *Stevens v. Chown*, [1901] 1 Ch. 894, and authorities there referred to.

(*h*) *Merchant Taylors' Co. v. Truscott*, 11 Exch. 855; *Salters' Co. v. Jay*, 3 Q. B. 109; *Huxham v.*

Wheeler, 3 H. & C. 75; *Green v. The Queen*, 1 App. Cas. 513.

(*i*) 12 Rep. 29.

(*j*) Per Trevor, C.J., 11 Mod. 150; see also per Ld. Cairns, *River Wear Commrs. v. Adamson*, 2 App. Cas. 751; and per Bowen, L.J., *Rendall v. Blair*, 45 Ch. D. 155.

(*k*) Per Willes, J., *Phillips v. Eyre*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 23.

alterius injuriam (l) was a general maxim of the Roman law, which the civilians (m) specifically applied as a restriction upon the law-giver, in conformity with the principle that *leges et constitutiones futuris certum est dare formam negotiis, non ad facta præterita revocari: nisi nominatim et de præterito tempore et adhuc pendentibus negotiis cautum sit* (n). Accordingly, it has been said that every statute which takes away or impairs a vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, or imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective in its operation, and opposed to sound principles of legislation (o).

It is a general principle of our law that no statute shall be construed so as to have a retrospective operation, unless its language is such as plainly to require that construction; and this involves the subordinate rule that a statute is not to be construed so as to have a greater retrospective operation than its language renders necessary (p). Except in special cases, a new Act ought to be so construed as to interfere as little as possible with vested rights (q); and where the words admit of another construction, they should not be so construed as to impose disabilities not existing at the passing of the Act (r).

General principle of our law.

Moon v. Durden (s) is a leading case upon this subject. It was an action upon a wager, commenced before the

Moon v. Durden.

(l) D. 50, 17, 75.

(m) Taylor, Elem. Civ. Law, 168.

(n) Cod. 1, 14, 7; cited by Willes, J., *loc. cit. supra*.

(o) See *per* Story, J., 2 Gall. (U.S.) 139; and *per* Lopes, L.J., *Re Pulborough School Board*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 737. The rule as to *nova constitutio* was fully considered, and the authorities thereon reviewed by Kent, C.J., in *Dash v. Van Kleeck*, 7 Johns. (U.S.) 503 *et seq.*

(p) *Per* Lindley, L.J., *Lauri v. Renad*, [1892] 3 Ch. 421; 61 L. J. Ch. 580. Cf. *per* Bowen, L.J., *Reid v. Reid*, 31 Ch. D. 409. See also *Re Norman*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 369; *Allhusen v. Brooking*, 26 Ch. D. 559.

(q) *Per* Bowen, L.J., *loc. cit. supra*.

(r) *Per* Davey, L.J., *Re Pulborough School Board*, *supra*.

(s) 2 Exch. 22; followed in *Pettambersdass v. Thackoorseydass*, 7 Moo. P. C. 239.

passing of the Gaming Act, 1845 (*t*), which enacts that all contracts by way of wagering "shall be null and void," and that "no suit shall be brought or *maintained*" for recovering money alleged to be won upon a wager. This Act was passed while the action was pending, and the question was whether it operated to defeat the plaintiff's claim. The Court of Exchequer decided that it did not. "The language of the clause," said Parke, B., "if taken in its ordinary sense, as in the first instance we ought to take it, applies to all contracts, both past and future, and to all actions, both present and future, on any wager, whether past or future. But it is, as Lord Coke says, 'a rule and law of Parliament that regularly, *nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, non præteritis*.' This rule, which is in effect that enactments in a statute are generally to be construed to be prospective, and intended to regulate the future conduct of persons, is deeply founded in good sense and strict justice, and has been acted upon in many cases (*u*). . . . But this rule, which is one of construction only, will certainly yield to the intention of the legislature; and the question in this and in every similar case is, whether that intention has been sufficiently expressed." The judgments of Rolfe and Alderson, BB., were to the same effect; and it is safe to say that where a statute is passed while an action is pending, strong and distinct words are necessary to alter the vested rights of either litigant as they stood at the commencement of the action (*v*).

Vested rights.

(*t*) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109.

(*u*) He cited *Gilmore v. Shuter*, T. Jones, 108, where it was held that the Statute of Frauds did not affect actions upon verbal promises made before the statute came into force; *Edmonds v. Lawley*, 6 M. & W. 285, and *Moore v. Phillips*, 7 Id. 536, where it was decided that rights already vested in a bankrupt's assignee were not defeated by the

passing of the 2 & 3 Vict. c. 29.

(*v*) See *Midland R. Co. v. Pye*, 10 C. B. N. S. 179; *Marsh v. Higgins*, 9 C. B. 551; *Chappell v. Purday*, 12 M. & W. 303; *Hitchcock v. Way*, 6 A. & E. 943; *Paddon v. Bartlett*, 3 Id. 884. See also *Turnbull v. Forman*, 15 Q. B. D. 234; *Hough v. Windus*, 12 Id. 224; *Barton Regis Union v. Liverpool Overseers*, 3 Id. 295; *Young v. Hughes*, 4 H. & N. 76.

Moreover, in the absence of clear words to that effect, a statute will not be construed as taking away a vested right of action acquired before it was passed (*w*).

No suitor, however, has a vested interest in the course of procedure, or a right to complain, if during his litigation the procedure is changed, provided that no injustice be done (*x*). Alterations in the form of procedure are always retrospective, unless there be some good reason to the contrary (*y*); and so are alterations in the law of evidence in matters both civil and criminal (*y*).

Procedure
and evidence.

In *Colonial Sugar Refining Co. v. Irring* (*z*) the Judicial Committee advised that an Act of Parliament which took away the right of appeal to the King in Council was not retrospective, as the result of holding the contrary would be to deprive the appellant of a vested right to appeal to a higher tribunal. But in another case the Court for Crown Cases Reserved held that an Act which extended the time within which a prosecution might be commenced related to procedure only and was retrospective (*a*).

The maxim under consideration is only a guide where the intention of the legislature is obscure; it does not modify the clear words of a statute (*b*). For instance, in *Stead v. Carey* (*c*), the plaintiff, having obtained for his invention letters patent which by their terms were to

General
limitation
of rule.

(*w*) *Smithies v. National Association of Plasterers*, [1909] 1 K. B. 310; 78 L. J. K. B. 259; *Knight v. Lee*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 41; *Wright v. Greenroyd*, 1 B. & S. 758; *Jackson v. Woolley*, 8 E. & B. 787; *Williams v. Smith*, 4 H. & N. 559; *Waugh v. Middleton*, 8 Exch. 352; *Larpent v. Bibby*, 5 H. L. Cas. 481.

(*x*) *Per Mellish, L.J., Costa Rica v. Brianger*, 3 Ch. D. 69. Cf. *per Bowen, L.J., Turnbull v. Forman*, 15 Q. B. D. 238.

(*y*) *Per Ld. Blackburn, Gardner v. Lucas*, 3 App. Cas. 603. See *Wright*

v. Hale, 6 H. & N. 227; *A.-G. v. Sillem*, 10 H. L. Cas. 763; *Kimbray v. Draper*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 160; *Curtis v. Stovin*, 22 Q. B. D. 513; *The Ydun*, [1899] P. 236; 74 L. J. K. B. 450. For an instance of a good reason to the contrary, see *Pinhorn v. Souster*, 8 Exch. 138.

(*z*) [1905] A. C. 369; 74 L. J. P. C. 77.

(*a*) *R. v. Chandra Dharma*, [1905] 2 K. B. 335.

(*b*) *Per Bowen, L.J., Quilter v. Mapleson*, 9 Q. B. D. 677.

(*c*) 1 C. B. 496.

become void if the specification were not enrolled within four months, through inadvertence failed to procure such enrolment within that time. The specification having been subsequently enrolled, he obtained an Act of Parliament which, after reciting these facts, enacted that the letters patent should be considered to be as valid and effectual to all intents and purposes as if the specification had been enrolled within the four months. He then brought the action for an infringement of his patent against the defendant who, before the passing of the Act and whilst the patent had no validity by reason of the non-enrolment, had obtained letters patent for an improvement of the same invention. It was held that the plain words of the Act operated as a complete confirmation of the plaintiff's patent, although they imposed upon the defendant the hardship of having his patent destroyed by an *ex post facto* law.

*Reg. v.
Vine.*

Again, in *Reg. v. Vine* (*d*), where the question was whether the enactment that "every person convicted of felony shall for ever be disqualified from selling spirits by retail," affected a person convicted of felony before the passing of the Act, the Court held that it did affect him, and rendered his licence void. "The object of the enactment," said Cockburn, C.J., "is not to punish offenders, but to protect the public against public-houses being kept by persons of doubtful character. . . . On looking at the Act, the words used seem to import the intention to protect the public against persons convicted in the past as well as the future" (*e*).

Other cases have occurred in which Acts altering the law have been construed as retrospective (*f*); but they have

(*d*) L. R. 10 Q. B. 195.

(*e*) Lush, J., dissented, on the ground that the intention of the Act was not clear. In *Re Pulborough School Board*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 725, Lopes, L.J., stated that he preferred the reasoning of that Judge.

(*f*) See, for instance, *Hodgkinson*

v. Wyatt, 4 Q. B. 749; *Brooks v. Bockett*, 9 Id. 847; *Reg. v. St. Mary, Whitechapel*, 12 Id. 120; *Reg. v. Christchurch*, 12 Id. 149; *Mackenzie v. Sligo R. Co.*, 18 Id. 862; *A.-G. v. Bristol Waterworks Co.*, 10 Exch. 884; *Ansell v. Ansell*, 5 P. D. 138; *Re Williams*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 257.

generally turned, as it has been said (*g*), “on the peculiar wording of these Acts, which appeared to the Courts to compel them to give the law an *ex post facto* operation.” Statutes of limitations have been construed as affecting existing claims where an interval of time was allowed for their enforcement (*h*); and if the language admits of that construction, the Courts, looking at the object of an enactment, sometimes construe its remedial provisions retrospectively (*i*). The argument that an Act must not be so construed as to take away existing rights is inapplicable to Acts which are in their nature declaratory (*j*); and although, as a rule, words not requiring a retrospective operation ought not to be so construed, yet in all cases it is necessary to ascertain (from the language used) what the legislature meant (*k*).

It manifestly shocks our sense of justice that an act legal at the time when it was done should be made unlawful by a new enactment (*l*); and the injustice and impolicy of *ex post facto* (*m*) or retrospective legislation is most apparent in the case of new criminal laws. To these the maxim of Paulus (*n*), adopted by Lord Bacon (*o*), applies: *nunquam crescit ex post facto præteriti delicti æstimatio*. The law does not allow a later fact, a circumstance or matter subsequent, to extend or amplify an offence. Unless the intention of the legislature is clearly expressed to that effect, criminal offences are not to be created by giving a

Criminal cases.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Denman, 6 A. & E. 951.

(*h*) *Pardo v. Bingham*, L. R. 4 Ch. 735; *Cornill v. Hudson*, 8 E. & B. 429; *Reg. v. Leeds R. Co.*, 15 Q. B. 343, recognising *Towler v. Chatterton*, 6 Bing. 258, upon which see *per* Rolfe, B., 2 Exch. 36, and *per* Cresswell, J., 9 C. B. 569.

(*i*) See, for instance, *Quilter v. Mapleson*, 9 Q. B. D. 672; *Page v. Bennett*, 29 L. J. Ch. 398; *The Ironsides*, 1 Lush. Adm. 465.

(*j*) *Per* Pollock, B., A.-G. v. *Theobald*, 24 Q. B. D. 559, citing A.-G. v. *Hertford*, 3 Exch. 670.

(*k*) *Reynolds v. A.-G. for Nova Scotia*, [1896] A. C. 240, 244: 65 L. J. P. C. 16.

(*l*) *Per* Erle, C.J., 10 C. B. N. S. 191.

(*m*) As to this expression, see note, 2 Peters (U.S.) 683.

(*n*) D. 50, 7, 138, § 1.

(*o*) Bac. Max., reg. 8.

retroactive operation to statutes (*p*). There is a great difference between making an unlawful act lawful and making an innocent action criminal (*q*).

AD EA QUÆ FREQUENTIUS ACCIDUNT JURA ADAPTANTUR. (2 *Inst.* 137.)—*The laws are adapted to those cases which more frequently occur.*

Laws ought to be, and usually are, framed with a view to such cases as are of frequent rather than such as are of rare or accidental occurrence; or, in the language of the civil law, *jus constitui oportet in his quæ ut plurimum accidunt, non quæ ex inopinato* (*r*); for, *neque leges neque senatus-consulta ita scribi possunt ut omnes casus qui quandoque inciderint comprehendantur, sed sufficit ea quæ plerumque accidunt contineri* (*s*); laws cannot be so worded as to include every case which may arise, but it is sufficient if they apply to those things which most frequently happen. All legislation proceeds upon the principle of providing for the ordinary course of things (*t*), and to this principle frequent reference is to be found, in the reports, in answer to arguments, often speciously advanced, that the words of an Act cannot have a particular meaning, because in a certain contingency that meaning might work a result of which nobody would approve. In *Miller v. Salomons* (*u*) it was argued that Parliament could not have intended that a

(*p*) *Reg. v. Griffiths*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 145; 60 L. J. M. C. 93.

(*q*) *Per Chase, J.*, 3 Dallas (U.S.) 391, cited by Willes, J., L. R. 6 Q. B. 26.

(*r*) D. 1, 3, 3. See Ld. Camden's judgment in *Entick v. Carrington*, 18 How. St. Tr. 1061. Sir R. Atkyns observes that "laws are fitted *ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt*, and not for rare and extraordinary events and accidents." See his "Enquiry

into the Power of dispensing with Penal Statutes," cited 11 St. Tr. 1208. "The rule is *ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt leges adaptantur*;" *per Bramwell, B.*, 9 H. L. Cas. 52; *per Willes, J.*, 10 H. L. Cas. 429.

(*s*) D. 1, 3, 10.

(*t*) *Per Blackburn, J.*, *Maxted v. Paine*, L. R. 6 Ex. 132, 172; 40 L. J. Ex. 57.

(*u*) 7 Exch. 475; 8 Id. 778.

Jew, before sitting in the House of Commons, must use the words "on the true faith of a Christian," prescribed in the oath of abjuration of 6 Geo. 3, c. 53, because any person, refusing to take the same oath when tendered by two justices, would, under the 1 Geo. 1, st. 2, c. 13, be deemed to be a popish recusant, and would be liable to penalties as such; and to enforce these provisions against a Jew, it was said, would be the merest tyranny. But Baron Parke (*v*) thus replied to this argument:—"If in the vast majority of possible cases—in all of ordinary occurrence—the law is in no degree inconsistent or unreasonable, construed according to its plain words, it seems to me to be an untenable proposition, and unsupported by authority, to say that the construction may be varied in *every* case, because there is one possible but highly improbable one in which the law would operate with great severity, and against our own notions of justice. The utmost that can be reasonably contended is, that it should be varied in that particular case, so as to obviate that injustice—no further."

Another illustration of the maxim is afforded by *St. Margaret's Burial Board v. Thompson* (*x*). There the right of a parish sexton to enter and perform his functions upon burial ground formed under the Burial Act, 1852 (*y*) was contested, and it was urged that the Act could not be supposed to confer such an absolute right, because by the common law the rector could dismiss the sexton, or exclude him from the churchyard, in the event of his misconduct. The Court, however, considered that the Act should be construed as "framed with a view to the ordinary position of rector and sexton in respect of the latter's duties."

Where an insurance society obtained a private Act which enacted that all actions and suits might be commenced in the name of their secretary, as nominal plaintiff: it was held that this Act did not enable the secretary to petition,

(*v*) 7 Exch. 549.

(*y*) 15 & 16 Vict. c. 85, s. 32.

(*x*) L. R. 6 C. P. 445.

on behalf of the society, for a commission of bankruptcy against their debtor; for the expression "to sue," generally speaking, means to bring actions, and the legislature was providing for every-day and not for exceptional occurrences (z).

Again, when the construction was under consideration, of the Distress for Rent Act, 1737 (a) (which gives a remedy to a landlord, whose tenant has fraudulently removed goods from the demised premises, unless they have been *bonâ fide* sold to one not privy to the fraud); and it was urged that it ought to be implied that the landlord was not empowered by the statute to enter the close of a third person, or to break his locks, for the purpose of seizing the goods, unless he was a party to, or at least cognizant of, the fraudulent removal; and further that the breaking open of his gates without a previous request to open them was unjustifiable: the Court held that neither of these conditions need be observed as necessary to the exercise of the right given by the statute, "for, generally, goods fraudulently removed are not secreted in a man's close or house without his privy or consent. The legislature may be presumed to have had this (b) in their contemplation: *ad ea quæ frequentius accidunt jura adaptantur.*"

The reader will also find the maxim forcibly applied by Lord Blackburn in *Dixon v. Caledonian R. Co.* (c); and two other judgments (d) of the same great authority demonstrate that it has force, not only as a canon of construction of statute law, but also as a principle of the common law.

It is then true, that, "when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but do to those

Casus
omissus.

(z) *Guthrie v. Fisk*, 3 B. & C. 178. *Arg. A.-G. v. Jackson*, Cr. & J. 108; *Wing. Max.* 716. *Argumentum à communiter accidentibus in jure frequens est*, Gothofred, ad D. 44, 2, 6.

(a) 11 Geo. II. c. 19.

(b) *Williams v. Roberts*, 7 Exch. 618, 628; see *Thomas v. Watkins*, Id. 630.

(c) 5 App. Cas. 838.

(d) *Clarke v. Wright*, 6 H. & N. 862; *Dalton v. Angus*, 6 App. Cas. 818.

which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is *casus omissus*, and that the law intended *quæ frequentius accidunt*." "But," on the other hand, "it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, because it happens but seldom" (e). A *casus omissus* ought not to be created by interpretation save in some case of strong necessity (f). Where, however, a *casus omissus* does really occur, either through the inadvertence of the legislature (g), or on the principle *quod semel aut bis existit prætereunt legislatores* (h), the rule is, that the particular case thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute—*Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur* (i); "a *casus omissus*," observed Buller, J. (k), "can in no case be supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws."

(e) Vaugh. R. 373; *Fenton v. Hampton*, 11 Moore, P. C. 365; with which acc. *Doyle v. Falconer*, L. R. 1 P. C. 328.

(f) *Per* Ld. Fitzgerald, *Mersey Docks Board v. Henderson*, 13 App. Cas. 607.

(g) *Reg. v. Denton*, 5 B. & S. 821, 828; *Cobb v. Mid Wales R. Co.*,

L. R. 1 Q. B. 348, 349.

(h) D. 1, 3, 6.

(i) 5 Rep. 38. See *Robinson v. Cotterell*, 11 Exch. 476.

(k) *Jones v. Smart*, 1 T. R. 52; *per* Ld. Abinger, *Lane v. Bennett*, 1 M. & W. 73; arg. *Shepherd v. Hills*, 11 Exch. 64.

CHAPTER II.

MAXIMS RELATING TO THE CROWN.

THE principal attributes of the Crown are sovereignty or pre-eminence, perfection, and perpetuity; and these attributes are attached to the wearer of the crown by the constitution, and may be said to form his constitutional character and royal dignity. On the other hand, the principal duty of the sovereign is to govern his people according to law; and this is not only consonant to the principles of nature, of liberty, of reason, and of society, but has always been esteemed an express part of the common law of England, even when prerogative was at the highest. In this chapter are collected some of the more important technical rules, embodying the above general attributes of the Crown (*a*).

REX NON DEBET ESSE SUB HOMINE, SED SUB DEO ET SUB
LEGE, QUIA LEX FACIT REGEM. (*Bract. Lib. i. fo. 5*;
12 Rep. 65.)—*The king is under no man, yet he is under
God and the law, for the law makes the king.*

Two-fold
character
of the
sovereign.

The head of the state is regarded by our law in a two-fold character—as an individual liable like any other to the accidents of mortality and its frailties; also as a

(*a*) On the subject of this chapter, see further Allen on the Royal Prerogative, Chitty on the Prerogative of the Crown, particularly chaps. i., ii., xv., xvi.; Fortescue de Laud. Leg. Ang., by Amos, chap. ix.; Finch's Law, 81; Plowd. Com., chap. xi.; Bracton, bk. 1, chap. viii.

corporation sole (*b*), endowed with certain peculiar attributes, the recognition whereof leads to important consequences. Politically, the sovereign is regarded in this latter character, and is invested with various functions, which the individual, as such, could not discharge. "The person of the king," it has been said (*c*), "is by law made up of two bodies: a natural body, subject to infancy, infirmity, sickness, and death; and a political body, perfect, powerful, and perpetual." These two bodies are inseparably united together, so that they may be distinguished, but cannot be divided. More often, however, the sovereign would seem to be regarded by our law in his political than in his individual and natural capacity, and the attributes of his former are blended with those of his latter character. As conservator of the public peace, the Crown in any criminal proceeding represents the community at large, prosecutes for offences committed against the public, and can alone exercise the prerogative of pardoning. As the fountain of justice, no Court can have compulsory jurisdiction over the sovereign; an action for a personal wrong, therefore, will not lie against the king; for which rule, indeed, another more technical reason has been assigned—that the king cannot by his writ command himself to appear *coram judice*. As the dispenser of law and equity, the king is present in all his Courts; whence it is that he cannot be nonsuit in an action, nor does he appear by attorney (*d*).

The *Case of Prohibitions* (*e*) shows, however, that the king is not above the law, for he cannot in person assume to decide any case, civil or criminal, but must do so by his

The king is
beneath the
law.

(*b*) Mr. Allen, however, observed (Royal Prerog., p. 6), that "there is something higher, more mysterious, and more remote from reality in the conception which the law of England forms of the king than enters into the notion of a corporation sole."

(*c*) Bagshaw, Rights of the Crown of England, 29; Plowd. 212 a, 217 a, 238; Allen, Royal Pre. 26; Bac. Abr. Prerogative (E. 2).

(*d*) 1 Blac. Com. 270; Finch's Law (by Pickering), 82.

(*e*) *Prohibitions del Roy*, 12 Rep. 63; Plowd. 241, 553.

judges; the law being "the golden met-wand and measure to try the causes of the subjects, and which protected his majesty in safety and peace,"—the king being thus in truth, *sub Deo et lege*. This case shows also that an action will not lie against the Crown for a personal tort, for it is there laid down that "the king cannot arrest a man for suspicion of treason or felony, as others of his lieges may;" the reason given being that if a wrong be thus done to an individual, the party grieved cannot have remedy against the king. But although in these and other respects, presently to be noticed, the king is greatly favoured by the law, being exempted from the operation of various rules applicable to the subject, he is on the whole, and essentially, beneath not superior to it, theoretically in some respects above, but practically bound and directed by its ordinances (*f*).

REX NUNQUAM MORITUR. (*Branch, Max.*, 5th ed. 197.)—
The king never dies.

Immortality
ascribed
theoretically
to the king.

The law ascribes to the king, in his political capacity, an absolute immortality; and immediately upon the decease of the reigning prince in his natural capacity, the kingly dignity and the prerogatives and politic capacities of the supreme magistrate, by act of law, without any interregnum or interval, vest at once in his successor, who is, *co instante*, king, to all intents and purposes (*g*); and this is in accordance with the maxim of our constitution, *In Angliâ non est interregnum* (*h*). "It is true," said Lord Lyndhurst (*i*), "that the king never dies; the demise is

(*f*) See the Debate in the House of Lords on Life Peerages, Hansard, vol. 140, pp. 263 *et seq.* In *Howard v. Gosset*, 10 Q. B. 386, Coleridge, J., observed that "the law is supreme over the House of Commons, as over the Crown itself." See also

post, p. 39.

(*g*) 1 Blac. Com. 249.

(*h*) Jenk. Cent. 205. See Cooper's Account of Public Records, vol. 2, 323, 324; Allen, Royal Prerog. 44.

(*i*) *Visc. Canterbury v. A.-G.*, 1 Phill. 322.

immediately followed by the succession; there is no interval. The sovereign always exists; the person only is changed."

So tender, indeed, is the law of supposing even a possibility of the death of the sovereign, that his natural dissolution is generally called his demise—*demissio regis vel coronæ*—an expression which signifies merely a transfer of property; and when we speak of the demise of the Crown, we mean only that, in consequence of the disunion of the king's natural body from his body politic (*j*), the kingdom is transferred to his successor; and so the royal dignity remains perpetual (*k*). It has, doubtless, usually been thought prudent, when the sovereign is of tender years at the period of the devolution upon him of the royal dignity, to appoint a protector, guardian, or regent to discharge the functions of royalty for a limited time; but the very necessity of such extraordinary provision is sufficient to demonstrate the truth of that maxim of the common law, that in the king is no minority (*l*), for he has no legal guardian; and the appointment of a regent must, therefore, be regarded merely as a provision made by the legislature, to meet a special and temporary emergency (*m*).

It seems that the Duchy of Cornwall vests in the king's eldest son and heir apparent at the instant of his birth, without gift or creation, and as if minority could no more be predicated of him than of the sovereign himself (*n*).

The title of the sovereign is regulated by succession as well as descent, and if lands be given to the king and his "heirs," this word "heirs" includes the "successors" to the Crown, although on the demise of the sovereign, according to the course of descent recognised at the common law, the land might have gone in some other

(*j*) *Ante*, p. 35.

(*k*) 1 Blac. Com. 249.

(*l*) Bac. Abr. Prerogative (A.).

(*m*) 1 Blac. Com. 248; Plowd.

Com. 177, 234. And see 3 & 4 Vict. c. 52.

(*n*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, 1 Coop.

temp. Cottenham, 125.

channel. Hence, if the king die without issue male, but leaving two daughters, lands held to him and his heirs go to his eldest daughter as succeeding to the Crown; whereas, in the case of a subject, lands whereof he was seised would pass to his daughters, in default of male issue, as coparceners (*o*). Similarly, if real estate be given to the king and his heirs, and afterwards the reigning dynasty be changed, and another family be placed upon the throne, the land in question would go to the successor, and then descend in the new line (*p*). And a grant of land to the king for ever creates in him an estate of perpetual inheritance (*q*), whereas the like words would but give an estate for life to any of his subjects.

In regard also to personal property, the Crown is differently circumstanced from an individual or from a corporation sole; for, by the ordinary rule, such property does not, in the case of a corporation sole, go to the successor—in the king's case, by our common law, it does (*r*). And it is worthy of remark, that the maxim, "the king never dies," founded manifestly on notions of expediency, and on the apprehension of danger which would result from an interregnum, does not hold in regard to other corporations sole. Thus a parson, though clothed with the same rights and reputed to be the same person as his predecessor, is not deemed by our law to be continuously in possession of his office, nor is it deemed essential to the preservation of his official privileges that one incumbent should, without any interval of time, follow another. Such a corporation sole may, during an interval of time, cease to be visibly *in esse*, whereas the king never dies—his throne and office are never vacant.

Yet it would be an error to say that this fiction of the

(*o*) Grant on Corporations, 627.
See also 25 & 26 Vict. c. 37, and
36 & 37 Vict. c. 61, relating to the
sovereign's private estates.

(*p*) Grant, Corp. 627.
(*q*) 2 Blac. Com. 216.
(*r*) Grant, Corp. 626.

constitution as to the continuity of the Royal Person is always followed to its logical conclusions. One limitation is illustrated by *A.-G. v. Köhler* (s), where the question was discussed, whether money which by mistake had been paid to the Treasury during the reign of one sovereign, could be recovered under his successor; and it was held that the sovereign could not be responsible for money paid in error to and spent by a predecessor, which that predecessor might lawfully have disposed of for his own use, supposing it to have come rightfully to his hands.

REX NON POTEST PECCARE. (2 *Rolle, R.* 304.)—*The king can do no wrong.*

It is an ancient and fundamental principle of the English constitution, that the king can do no wrong (t). But this maxim must not be understood to mean that the king is above the laws, in the unconfined sense of those words, and that everything he does is of course just and lawful. Its true meaning is, First, that the sovereign, individually and personally, and in his natural capacity, is independent of and is not amenable to any other earthly power or jurisdiction; and that anything amiss in the condition of public affairs is not to be imputed to the king, so as to render him personally answerable for it to his people. Secondly, the maxim means, that the prerogative of the Crown extends not to do any injury, because, being created for the benefit of the people, it cannot be exerted to their prejudice; and it is therefore a fundamental general rule, that the king cannot sanction an act forbidden by law; so that, from this point of view, he is under, and not above the laws, and is bound by them equally with his subjects (u). If, then, the sovereign personally command

Meaning of maxim.

(s) 9 H. L. Cas. 654.

(t) *Rex quod est injustum facere non potest*; Jenk. Cent. 9, 308.

(u) Chitty, Prerog. 5; Jenk. Cent.

203. See Fortescue de Laud. Leg. Ang. (by Amos), 28.

an unlawful act to be done, the offence of the instrument is not thereby indemnified; for though the king is not himself under the coercive power of the law, yet in many cases his commands are under the directive power of the law, which makes the act itself invalid if unlawful, and so renders the instrument of execution thereof obnoxious to punishment (*x*). As in affairs of state the ministers of the Crown are held responsible for advice tendered to it, or even for measures which might possibly be known to emanate directly from the sovereign, so may the agents of the sovereign be civilly or criminally answerable for lawless acts done—if that may be imagined—by his command.

Grant from
Crown when
void.

The king, moreover, is incapable not only of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong. Whenever, therefore, it happens that, by misinformation or inadvertence, the Crown has been induced to invade the private rights of a subject,—as by granting a franchise to a subject contrary to reason, or in a way prejudicial to the commonwealth or a private person,—the law will not suppose that the king meant either an unwise or an injurious action, for *eadem mens præsumitur regis quæ est juris et quæ esse debet præsertim in dubiis* (*y*), but declares that the king was deceived in his grant; and thereupon such grant becomes void upon the supposition of deception either by or upon those agents whom the Crown has thought proper to employ (*z*). In like manner, also, the king's grants are void whenever they tend to prejudice the course of public justice (*a*). And, in brief, to use the words of a learned judge (*b*), the Crown cannot, in derogation of the right of the public, unduly fetter the exercise of the prerogative

(*x*) 1 Hale, P. C. 43, 44, 127. *Per* Coleridge, J., *Howard v. Gosset*, 10 Q. B. 386.

(*y*) Hobart, 154.

(*z*) 2 Blac. Com. 246; see *Gledstanes v. Earl of Sandwich*, 5 Scott,

N. R. 719; *R. v. Kempe*, 1 Ld. Raym. 49, 720; Finch's Law, 101; *Vigers v. Dean of St. Paul's*, 14 Q. B. 909.

(*a*) Chitty, Prerog. 385.

(*b*) See *per* Platt, B., 2 E. & B. 884.

which is vested in the Crown for the public good. The Crown cannot dispense with anything in which the subject has an interest (*c*), nor make a grant in violation of the common law (*d*), or injurious to vested rights (*e*). In this manner it is, that, while the sovereign himself is, in a personal sense, incapable of doing wrong, yet his acts may in themselves be contrary to law, and, on that account, be set aside by the law.

It must further be observed, that even where the king's grant purports to be made *de gratia speciali, certa scientia, et mero motu*, the grant will be void, if it appears to the Court that the king was deceived in the purpose and intent thereof: and this agrees with a text of the civil law, which says that the above clause *non valet in his in quibus præsumitur principem esse ignorantem*; therefore, if the king grant such an estate as by law he could not grant, forasmuch as the king was deceived in the law, his grant is void (*f*). Thus the Crown cannot by grant of lands create in them a new estate of inheritance, or give them a new descendible quality (*g*), and the power of the Crown is similarly restricted as regards the grant of a peerage or honour (*h*).

The above doctrine cannot, however, be extended to invalidate an act of the legislature, on the ground that it was obtained by a *suggestio falsi*, or *suppressio veri*. It would indeed be something new, as forcibly observed by Cresswell, J. (*i*), to impeach a statute by a plea stating that it was obtained by fraud (*k*).

Act of
Parliament.

In connection with this part of our subject, it is worthy

(*c*) *Thomas v. Waters*, Hardw. 443, 448.

(*d*) 2 Roll. Abr. 164.

(*e*) *R. v. Butler*, 3 Lev. 220; cited *per Parke, B.*, 2 E. & B. 894.

(*f*) *Case of Alton Woods*, 1 Rep. 53.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Chelmsford, *Wiltes*

Peerage, L. R. 4 H. L. 152.

(*h*) *Wiltes Peerage*, L. R. 4 H. L. 126; and see *Buckhurst Peerage*, 2 App. Cas. 20, 21, *per* Ld. Cairns.

(*i*) *Stead v. Carey*, 1 C. B. 516; see also *per* Tindal, C.J., *Id.* 522.

(*k*) See *McCormick v. Grogan*, L. R. 4 H. L. 96, *per* Ld. Westbury.

of remark, that the power which the Crown possesses of calling back its grants, when made under mistake, is not like any right possessed by individuals; for, when it has been deceived, the grant may be recalled notwithstanding any derivative title depending upon it, and those who have deceived it must bear the consequences (*l*).

Patent.

The doctrine just stated applies also in the case of a patent which has in some way improvidently emanated from the Crown. Thus, in *Morgan v. Seaward* (*m*), Parke, B., observed as follows: "That a false suggestion of the grantee avoids an ordinary grant of lands or tenements from the Crown, is a maxim of the common law, and such a grant is void, not against the Crown merely, but in a suit against a third person (*n*). It is on the same principle that a patent for two or more inventions, where one is not new, was held to be altogether void in *Hill v. Thompson* (*o*), and *Brunton v. Hawkes* (*p*); for although the statute (*q*) invalidates a patent for want of novelty, and consequently by force of the statute the patent would be void, so far as related to that which was old; yet the principle on which the patent has been held to be void altogether is, that the consideration for the grant is the novelty of all, and the consideration failing, or, in other words, the Crown being deceived in its grant, the patent is void, and no action maintainable upon it" (*r*).

The rule upon the subject now touched upon has been yet more fully laid down (*s*), as follows:—"If the king has

(*l*) Judgm., *Cumming v. Forrester*, 2 Jac. & W. 342.

(*m*) 2 M. & W. 544, cited arg. *Nichols v. Ross*, 8 C. B. 710; *Beard v. Egerton*, Id. 207; *Croll v. Edge*, 9 C. B. 486. See *Reg. v. Betts*, 15 Q. B. 540, 547.

(*n*) Citing *Travell v. Carteret*, 3 Lev. 135; *Alcock v. Cooke*, 5 Bing. 340; 30 R. R. 625.

(*o*) 8 Taunt. 375; 20 R. R. 488.

(*p*) 4 B. & Ald. 542; 23 R. R. 382.

(*q*) 21 Jac. 1, c. 3. See also 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57; 51 & 52 Vict. c. 50.

(*r*) "The Crown is deceived, if it grants a patent for an invention which is not new;" per Pollock, C.B., *Hills v. London Gaslight Co.*, 5 H. & N. 340.

(*s*) *Reg. v. Eastern Archipelago Co.*, 1 E. & B. 310, 337, 338; 2 E. & B. 856; *Willes Peerage*, L. R. 4 H. L. 126.

been deceived by any false suggestion as to what he grants or the consideration for his grant; if he appears to have been ignorant or misinformed as to his interest in the subject-matter of his grant; if the language of his grant be so general that you cannot in reason apply it to all that might literally fall under it; or if it be couched in terms so uncertain that you cannot tell how to apply it with that precision which grants from one so especially representing the public interest ought in reason to have; or if the grant reasonably construed would work a wrong, or something contrary to law; in these and such like cases the grant will be either wholly void or restrained according to circumstances; and equally so, whether the technical words, *ex certa scientia et mero motu*, be used or not. But this is held upon the very same principle of construction on which a grant from a subject is construed, viz., the duty of effectuating the intention of the grantor." To hold the grants valid or unrestrained in the cases just put, would be, as it is said, *in deceptione domini regis*, and not *secundum intentionem*. It must, however, at the same time be noted, that long modern possession will often make good and valid a title defective on account of vagueness or uncertainty in the original grant. This is effected by a presumption of a supplementary and confirmatory grant, so as to preserve the fiction of royal impeccability (*t*).

The principle that the king can do no wrong led to the institution of the Petition of Right, which is founded upon the theory that the king, of his own free will, graciously orders right to be done (*soit droit fait al partie*) (*u*). This proceeding is open to a subject in cases where his lands or goods or moneys have found their way into the possession of the Crown, and the purpose of the petition is to obtain

Petition of
Right.

(*t*) *Des Barres v. Shey*, 29 L. T. 592.

(*u*) 3 Blac. Com. 254—256. It has been said that the petition took

its origin under Edward I., and was substituted for a *præcipe* against the king; see 16 C. B. N. S. 356.

restitution, or, if that cannot be given, then compensation in money (*r*). It is also open to him for the purpose of recovering moneys due to him under a contract made on behalf of the Crown, as for goods supplied to the Crown or for the public service (*x*), or unliquidated damages for breaches of the contract (*y*), or moneys payable by servants of the Crown to the suppliant under a grant of the Crown (*z*). But it is not open to him in other cases; and he cannot thereby obtain compensation for a wrongful act done by a servant of the Crown in the supposed performance of his duties, or for a trespass (*a*), or the alleged infringement of letters-patent (*b*).

The maxims, *qui facit per alium facit per se* and *respondet superior*, have no application where the servants of the Crown commit a tort; what the sovereign does personally, the law presumes will not be wrong; what he does by command to his servants, cannot be wrong in him, for, if the command be unlawful, it is in law no command, and the servant is responsible for the unlawful act, the same as if there had been no command (*c*).

Procedure.

The procedure in Petition of Right is now regulated by the Petition of Right Act, 1860 (*d*), which was passed to simplify the procedure, but did not extend the remedy to new cases (*e*). The petition is left with the Home Secretary for the consideration of the King, who, if he think fit, may grant his fiat that right be done (*f*). Upon the fiat, for which no fee is payable (*f*), being obtained, a copy of the petition

(*v*) *Per curiam*, *Feather v. The Queen*, 6 B. & S. 257, 294: 35 L. J. Q. B. 200, 208.

(*x*) *Id.*

(*y*) *Thomas v. The Queen*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 31: 44 L. J. Q. B. 9; *Windsor & Annapolis R. Co. v. The Queen*, 11 App. Cas. 607: 55 L. J. P. C. 41.

(*z*) *Kildare County Council v. Regem*, [1909] 2 Ir. R. 199.

(*a*) *Tobin v. The Queen*, 6 B. & S. 257: 33 L. J. C. P. 199.

(*b*) *Feather v. The Queen*, *supra*.

See *Dixon v. London Small Arms Co.*, 1 App. Cas. 632.

(*c*) 16 C. B. N. S. 354, 360; *Viscount Canterbury v. The Queen*, 1 Phillips, 321.

(*d*) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34. For a succinct account of the earlier procedure, see 3 Blac. Com. 256. See further Chitty, *Prerog.* 340 *et seq.* It is well illustrated by *De Bode's case*, 8 Q. B. 208.

(*e*) 22 & 24 Vict. c. 34, s. 7, *ad fin.*

(*f*) S. 2.

and fiat, endorsed with the prescribed prayer, is left with the Treasury solicitor, and then the Crown has 28 days within which to answer, plead, or demur to the petition (*g*). The subsequent procedure resembles, in general, that of ordinary actions (*h*). But, though the Crown may have "discovery" from the suppliant (*i*), he cannot have it from the Crown (*k*); and if he obtain a judgment the ordinary methods of execution are not open to him.

Formerly, the judgment, if in his favour, was that of Judgment. ouster *le main*, or *amoveas manus*, or in full, *quod manus domini regis amoveantur et possessio restituatur petenti, salvo jure domini regis*: the last being always added, because no *laches* was ever imputed to the sovereign (*l*). By such judgment the Crown is instantly out of possession, so that there needs not the indecent interposition of his own officers to transfer the seizin from the king to the party aggrieved (*l*). Now, the Court may give judgment that the suppliant is entitled wholly or in part to the relief sought, or to such other relief as the Court may think right, and this judgment has the same effect as that of *amoveas manus* (*m*). Costs follow the rule prevailing in ordinary actions (*n*).

The right of a subject to the royal fiat has been much discussed. But it seems clear that, under the 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34, the Courts have no jurisdiction until the fiat has been obtained, and that its improper refusal would be a matter with which Parliament alone could deal. The Act evidently leaves a discretion to the Crown, and cases might be suggested in which interests of State would forbid the publication in open court of matters relied upon by the suppliant. On the other hand, notwithstanding the supplicating language of the petition, it never was the theory of

The royal fiat.

(*g*) Ss. 3—6.

(*h*) S. 7.

(*i*) *Tomline v. The Queen*, 4 Ex. D. 252 : 48 L. J. Ex. 453.

(*k*) *Thomas v. The Queen*, L. R.

10 Q. B. 44 : 44 L. J. Q. B. 9. Cf.

A.-G. v. Newcastle-upon-Tyne, [1897]

2 Q. B. 384 : 66 L. J. Q. B. 593.

(*l*) 3 Blac. Com. 257.

(*m*) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34, ss. 9, 10.

(*n*) S. 12. As to satisfaction, see further ss. 13, 14.

the Constitution that this remedy was one of pure grace and favour (*o*); it is substantially, as well as nominally, a petition of right (*p*); and the prayer is grantable *ex debito justitiæ*, being referred by many to the clause in Magna Charta, *nulli negabimus justitiam vel rectum*. "I am far from thinking," said Lord Langdale, "that it is competent to the king, or rather to his responsible advisers, to refuse capriciously, to put into a due course of investigation, any proper question raised on a petition of right. The form and application being, as it is said, to the grace and favour of the king appear no foundation for any such suggestion" (*q*). It is now the common practice of the Home Office to endorse "let right be done" as a matter of course, without even referring the case to the Attorney-General (*r*).

After the royal fiat has been obtained, the Crown may still raise the question whether the case is one in which petition of right may be brought, and this is usually raised by demurrer. The cases in which it may be brought have already been stated; but in considering whether it is applicable to a particular claim, it must be remembered that the petition never lies unless there has been the violation of a right, for which, but for the immunity from process with which the law surrounds the person of the sovereign, an action at law or in equity might be maintained.

Although a petition of right does not lie for a tort committed by servants of the Crown (*s*), yet the servants who commit it, whether spontaneously or by order of a superior

Torts by
servants of
the Crown.

(*o*) See *per* Bowen, L.J., 12 Q. B. D. 479.

(*p*) Chitty, Prerog. 345.

(*q*) *Ryves v. Duke of Wellington*, 9 Beav. 600; see also 3 Inst. 240, 2. Petition of right is a legal remedy which excludes *mandamus*; *Reg. v. Comrs. of Inland Rev.*, 12 Q. B. D. 461; 53 L. J. Q. B. 229.

(*r*) *Per* Jervis, C.J., *E. Archipelago*

Co. v. The Queen, 2 E. & B. 914. See, however, a pamphlet (published by V. & R. Stephens, 1863), on the case of Mr. Irwin, in which much interesting matter as to Petition of Right is collected.

(*s*) *Tobin v. The Queen*, 16 C. B. N. S. 310: 33 L. J. C. P. 83; *Feather v. The Queen*, 6 B. & S. 257: 30 L. J. Q. B. 200.

power, are answerable therefor in an ordinary action ; for the civil irresponsibility of the supreme power for tortious acts could not be maintained with any show of justice if its agents were not personally responsible (t), and that a servant of the Crown is liable to the subject for a trespass done even with the sanction of the highest authority of the State, “rests on principles which are too well settled to admit of question, and which are alike essential to uphold the dignity of the Crown on the one hand, and the rights and liberties of the subject on the other” (u). In *Madrazo v. Willes* (x), a captain of a British man-of-war who destroyed a Spanish trading ship wrongfully, but, as he believed, in performance of his duty, was held liable to the owners. Again, in *Walker v. Baird* (y), the captain of a British man-of-war, who destroyed a lobster factory on the coast of Newfoundland, was held liable to the owners, and it was decided that he could not justify an interference with private rights, not authorised by the legislature, under the provisions of a treaty made between the Crown and the French Government. In such actions the wrong-doers must be sued as individuals, and not in their official capacity (z). A superior official is not answerable for the act of his subordinates, unless it was substantially his own act (a).

It may be added that in some of our colonies actions against the Government in respect of tortious acts have been authorised by ordinance or colonial legislation (b).

(t) *Rogers v. Rajendoo Dutt*, 13 Moo. P. C. 236. *Nireaha Tamaki v. Baker*, [1901] A. C. 561 : 70 L. J. P. C. 66.

(u) *Per curiam*, *Feather v. The Queen*, *supra*.

(x) 3 B. & Ald. 353 ; 24 R. R. 422.

(y) [1892] A. C. 491 : 61 L. J. P. C. 92, where the Crown's rights in case of a treaty of peace were discussed.

(z) *Raleigh v. Goschen*, [1898] 1 Ch. 73.

(a) *Raleigh v. Goschen*, *supra* ;

Bainbridge v. Post Master General, [1906] 1 K. B. 178 : 75 L. J. K. B. 366. See *O'Byrne v. Hartington*, I. R. 11 C. L. 445, 453 ; and cf. L. R. 1 H. L. 124, 128.

(b) See *A.-G. of Strait Settlements v. Wemyss*, 13 App. Cas. 192 : 57 L. J. P. C. 62 ; *Farnell v. Bowman*, 12 App. Cas. 643 : 56 L. J. P. C. 72 ; *Hettihewage Siman Appu's case*, 9 App. Cas. 571 : 53 L. J. P. C. 72.

Contracts.

In the absence of some statutory provision to the contrary, servants of the Crown, civil as well as military, hold their offices only during the pleasure of the Crown, and though they be engaged for a fixed period, yet it is an implied term of the contract that they may be dismissed sooner if the Crown please (*c*). No petition of right therefore lies for their dismissal. Moreover, as a rule, they have no remedy against the agent of the Crown who engaged them; for, unless he has expressly agreed to be personally liable, a Crown agent is not answerable for breaches of contracts made by him in his public capacity, nor does he impliedly warrant his authority to make them (*d*). Where an agent of the Crown has, in his public capacity, made a contract which he had authority to make, the remedy for its breach by officials of the Crown is by petition of right (*e*), and not by action against the agent, for the Government revenues cannot be reached by a suit against a public officer (*f*).

Funds
received by
the Crown
through
treaty.

Questions have arisen with respect to claims to participate in funds which the Crown has acquired through war or treaty with foreign states. In *Baron de Bode's case* (*g*), the petition of right suggested that, under conventions with the French Government, the Crown had received moneys for the purpose of compensating its subjects whose property had been confiscated during the wars which followed the French Revolution. The petitioner, as one of such subjects, made a claim in respect of a sum which remained in the Treasury after the claims of others had been satisfied. It

(*c*) *Dunn v. The Queen*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 116: 65 L. J. Q. B. 279; and the cases there cited; see *Gould v. Stuart*, [1896] A. C. 575: 65 L. J. P. C. 82. *Young v. Waller*, [1898] A. C. 661: 87 L. J. P. C. 80: *Young v. Adams*, [1898] A. C. 469: 67 L. J. P. C. 75.

(*d*) *Dunn v. Macdonald*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 401, 555: 66 L. J. Q. B. 420.

(*e*) *Thomas v. The Queen*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 31: 44 L. J. Q. B. 9; see *Churchward v. The Queen*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 173. See, however, *Graham v. Commissioners of Works*, [1901] 2 K. B. 781: 70 L. J. K. B. 860.

(*f*) *Palmer v. Hutchinson*, 6 App. Cas. 619: 50 L. J. P. C. 62.

(*g*) 8 Q. B. 208: 13 Id. 380: 3 H. L. Cas. 449.

was held that as a statute had been passed, which provided a particular mode for the distribution of the moneys, the petitioners' rights depended entirely upon the effect of that statute. But the question was left open, whether, if the statute had not been passed, the Crown would have been answerable, as a trustee, for the moneys (*h*). This question was afterwards decided in the Crown's favour in *Rustomjee v. The Queen* (*i*). There a claim was made in respect of a sum paid to the Crown by the Emperor of China under the treaty of Nankin on account of debts due from Chinese to British merchants. The notion that the sovereign, by receiving moneys under a treaty, could become the agent of, or trustee for, any of his subjects was described by Cockburn, C.J., as wild and untenable; and Lord Coleridge said that, if the sovereign had failed to administer the moneys according to the stipulations of the treaty, the failure was one which Parliament might correct, but with which courts of law could not deal (*k*). A somewhat similar question arose in *Kinloch v. Secretary of State for India* (*l*) where an attempt was made to compel the defendant to account, as a trustee, for booty which the Queen by royal warrant had "granted" to "the Secretary of State for India in Council for the time being," "in trust" for the members of certain forces, amongst whom it was to be distributed according to a prescribed scale, all doubtful claims being determined by the Secretary unless the Queen should otherwise order. It was held that the warrant did not transfer the property, or create a trust enforceable in equity, and that no action lay against the defendant who was merely the agent of the Crown for a specific purpose.

Closely analogous to petition of right was the *Monstrans de droit* (*m*). This procedure was formerly employed when

Monstrans
de droit.

(*h*) See *per* Parke, B., 13 Q. B. 383.

(*i*) 1 Q. B. D. 487; 2 Id. 69; 45 L. J. Q. B. 249; 46 Id. 238.

(*k*) It was decided in this case

that the Crown could not plead the Statute of Limitations.

(*l*) 7 App. Cas. 619.

(*m*) Chitty, Prerog. 352.

the facts upon which the suppliant and the Crown relied had already been established, whether by commission, inquest of office, or otherwise, and the judgment of the Court was required as upon a special case. Although now obsolete, this procedure was once of great importance, and almost superseded that by petition (*n*).

Where title
of Crown
is indirectly
questioned.

Where the Crown is actually in possession of lands or chattels, we have seen that its title can be directly questioned only by petition of right. There sometimes arises a question between subject and subject in which the rights of the Crown may be indirectly involved, so that a judgment as between the parties will affect the interests of the Crown. In such cases, as for example in an action concerning the property of an outlaw, the Attorney-General must have notice of the proceedings, and be made a party, otherwise the Courts will not adjudicate. The necessity of making the Attorney-General a party also extends to cases where the sovereign is interested as *parens patrie*, or protector of the rights of his subjects, as for instance in actions concerning testamentary dispositions where the subject-matter is appropriated for general charitable purposes (*o*).

NON POTEST REX GRATIAM FACERE CUM INJURIA ET DAMNO ALIORUM. (3 *Inst.* 236.)—*The king cannot confer a favour on one subject to the injury and damage of others.*

It is an ancient and constant rule of law (*p*), that the king's grants are invalid when they destroy or derogate from rights, privileges, or immunities previously vested in another subject: the Crown, for example, cannot enable a subject to erect a market so near to the legally established

(*n*) 3 Blac. Com. 256.

(*o*) Id. 427.

(*p*) 3 *Inst.* 236: Vaugh. R. 338.
The maxim was cited by Talfourd,

J., in *Eastern Archipelago Co. v. The Queen*, 2 E. & B. 864. A similar doctrine prevailed in the civil law; see Cod. 7, 38, 2.

market of another as to be a disturbance thereof (*q*). Nor can the king grant the same thing in possession to one, which he or his progenitors have granted to another (*r*). If the king's grant, reciting that A. holds the manor of Blackacre for life, grants it to B. for life, the law implies that the second grant is to take effect after the determination of the first (*s*). And if the king, being tenant for life of certain land, grant it to one and his heirs, the grant is void, for the king has taken upon himself to grant a greater estate than he lawfully could grant (*t*).

On the same principle, the Crown cannot at common law (*u*) pardon an offence against a penal statute after information brought, for thereby the informer has acquired a private property in his part of the penalty. Nor can the king pardon a private nuisance while it remains undressed, or so as to prevent an abatement of it, though afterwards he may remit the fine; and the reason is that though the prosecution is vested in the Crown, to avoid multiplicity of suits, yet (during its continuance) this offence savours more of the nature of a private injury to each individual in the neighbourhood, than of a public wrong (*x*). So, if the king grant lands, forfeited to him upon a conviction for treason, to a third person, he cannot afterwards, by his grant, divest the property so granted in favour of the original owner.

(*q*) Chitty, Prerog. 119, 132, 386; *Re Islington Market Bill*, 3 Cl. & F. 513; 39 R. R. 32. See *G. E. R. Co. v. Goldsmid*, 9 App. Cas. 927; 54 L. J. Ch. 162.

(*r*) *Per* Cresswell, J., 1 C. B. 523; *arg. R. v. Amery*, 2 T. R. 565; 1 R. R. 538; Chitty, Prerog. 125. But a mere licence from the Crown, or a grant during the king's will, is determined by the demise of the Crown; *Id.* 400; see n. (*l*), *supra*.

(*s*) *Earl of Rutland's case*, 8 Rep. 56 b.

(*t*) *Case of Alton Woods*, 1 Rep. 44a.

(*u*) By 22 Vict. c. 32, the Crown may "remit, in whole or in part, any sum of money which, under any Act now in force, or hereafter to be passed, may be imposed as a penalty or forfeiture on a convicted offender, although such money may be, in whole or in part, payable to some party other than the Crown."

(*x*) *Vaugh. R.* 333.

NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURRIT REGI. (2 *Inst.* 273.)—*Lapse of time does not bar the Right of the Crown.*

In pursuance of the principle already considered, of the sovereign's incapability of doing wrong, the law also determines that in the Crown there can be no negligence or *laches*; and, therefore, it was formerly held, that no delay in resorting to his remedy would bar the king's right; for the time and attention of the sovereign must be supposed to be occupied by the cares of government, nor is there any reason that he should suffer by the negligence of his officers, or by their fraudulent collusion with the adverse party (*y*); and although, as we shall hereafter see, the maxim, *vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt* is a rule for the subject, yet *nullum tempus occurrit regi* is, in general, the king's plea (*z*). From this doctrine it followed, not only that the civil claims of the Crown sustained no prejudice by lapse of time, but that criminal prosecutions for felonies or misdemeanors might be commenced at any distance of time from the commission of the offence; and this is, to some extent, still law, though it has been qualified by the legislature in modern times; for instance, by the *Nullum Tempus Act* (*a*), in suits relating to landed property, the lapse of sixty years and adverse possession for that period operate as a bar even against the prerogative, in derogation of the above maxim (*b*), that is, provided the acts relied upon as showing adverse possession are acts of ownership done in the assertion of a right, and not mere

(*y*) Godb. 295; Hobart, 347; Bac. Abr., 7th ed., "*Prerogative*" (E. 6).

(*z*) Hobart, 347.

(*a*) 9 Geo. III. c. 16: amended by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 62. See also 21 Jac. 1, c. 14, which enables the defendant in an action of intrusion, if the Crown has been out of possession for twenty years to plead the general issue, *i.e.* to throw on the

Crown the burden of proving its title, and to retain possession until the title of the Crown is proved. See *Emmerson v. Maddison*, [1906] A. C. 569; 75 L. J. C. P. 109.

(*b*) See *Doe v. Morris*, 2 Scott, 276; *Goodtitle v. Baldwin*, 11 East, 488; 11 R. R. 249; and *A.-G. for British Honduras v. Bristowe*, 6 App. Cas. 143; 50 L. J. P. C. 15.

acts of trespass not acquiesced in on the part of the Crown (c). Again, although the Limitation Act, 1623 (21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3), does not bind the king (d), yet by s. 225 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, the Crown is barred, in informations in the nature of *quo warranto* for usurping corporate offices, by the lapse of twelve months; and different statutes have imported into our criminal jurisprudence various periods of limitation for crimes (e).

An important instance of the application of the doctrine, *nullum tempus occurrit regi*, presents itself where church preferment lapses to the Crown. Lapse is a species of forfeiture, whereby the right of presentation to a church accrues to the ordinary, by neglect of the patron to present, —to the metropolitan, by neglect of the ordinary,—and to the Crown, by neglect of the metropolitan: the term in which the title to present by lapse accrues from one of these parties to the other is six calendar months, after the expiration of which period the right becomes forfeited by the person neglecting to exercise it. But no right of lapse can accrue when the original presentation is in the Crown; and in pursuance of the above maxim, if the right of presentation lapses to the Crown, prerogative intervenes, and, in this case, the patron shall never recover his right till the Crown has presented; and if, during the delay of the Crown the patron himself presents, and his clerk is instituted, the Crown, by presenting another, may turn out the patron's clerk, or, after induction, may remove him by *quare impedit* (f), though if neither of these courses is adopted, and the patron's clerk dies incumbent, or is canonically deprived, the right of presentation is lost to the Crown (g).

(c) *Doe v. Roberts*, 13 M. & W. 520. "The Crown certainly may dedicate a road to the public, and be bound by long acquiescence in public user;" *per* Ld. Denman, *Reg. v. East Mark*, 11 Q. B. 882—883; see *Turner v. Walsh*, 6 App. Cas. 636.

(d) *Judgm., Lambert v. Taylor*, 4 B. & C. 151, 152; *Bac. Abr.*, 7th ed., "Prerogative" (E. 5).

(e) *Archbold, Cr. Pl.*, 22nd ed. 85—88.

(f) 6 Rep. 50.

(g) 2 *Blac. Com.* 450—452; cited

Again, if a bill of exchange be seized under an extent before it has become due, the neglect of the officer of the Crown to give notice of dishonour, or to make presentment of the bill, will not discharge the drawer or indorsers; and this likewise results from the general principle, that *laches* cannot be imputed to the Crown (*h*).

To high constitutional questions involving the prerogative, the maxim under our notice must doubtless be applied with much caution, for it would be dangerous and absurd to hold a power which has once been exercised by the Crown—no matter at how remote an epoch—has necessarily remained inherent in it, and we might vainly attempt to argue in support of so general a proposition. During the discussion in the House of Lords on life peerages, it was said that, although the rights and powers of the Crown do not suffer from lapse of time, nevertheless one of the main principles on which our constitution rests is the long-continued usage of Parliament, and that to go back for several centuries in order to select a few instances in which the Crown has performed a particular act by virtue of its prerogative before the constitution was formed or brought into a regular shape—to rely on such precedents, and to make them the foundation of a change in the composition of either House of Parliament, would be grossly to violate the principles and spirit of our constitution (*i*). But although the most zealous advocate of the prerogative could not by precedents, gathered from remote ages, shape successfully a sound constitutional theory touching the powers and privileges of the Crown, it would be far from correct to affirm that its rights can fall into desuetude, or, by mere non-user, become abrogated. For instance, assuming that the right of veto upon a bill which has

arg. *Storie v. Bp. of Winchester*, 9 C. B. 90; 17 C. B. 653; *Baskerville's case*, 7 Rep. 111; Bac. Abr., 7th ed., "*Prerogative*" (E. 6); Hobart, 166;

Finch's Law, 90.

(*h*) West on Extents, 28—30.

(*i*) Hansard, vol. 140, pp. 263 *et seq.*

passed through Parliament has not been exercised since 1707, none could deny that such a right is still vested in the Crown (*k*).

QUANDO JUS DOMINI REGIS ET SUBDITI CONCURRUNT JUS REGIS PRÆFERRI DEBET. (9 *Rep.* 129.)—Where the title of the king and the title of a subject concur, the king's title must be preferred (*l*).

In this case, *detur digniori* is the rule (*m*). Accordingly, if a chattel be bequeathed to the king and a subject jointly, the king shall have it, there being this peculiar quality inherent in the prerogative that the king cannot have a joint property with any person in one entire chattel, or such property as is incapable of division or separation; where the titles of the king and of a subject concur, the king takes the whole. The peculiarity of this doctrine, so favourable to the prerogative, may justify our giving a few illustrations of its operation. If the king, by grant or contract, become joint tenant with another person of a chattel real, he will *ipso facto* become entitled to the whole in severalty; if a horse be given to the king and a private person, the king shall have the sole property therein; if a bond be made to the king and a subject, the king shall have the whole penalty; if two persons own a horse jointly, or have a joint debt owing to them on bond, and one of them assign his part to the king, the king shall have the entire horse or debt; for it is not consistent with the dignity of the Crown to be partner with a subject, and where the king's title and that of a subject concur or are in conflict, the king's title is to be preferred (*n*). By applying this maxim to one possible state of facts, a curious result was arrived at: if one

King cannot be joint-owner of chattel.

(*k*) Hansard, vol. 140, p. 284.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 30 b.

(*m*) 2 Ventr. 268.

(*n*) 2 Blac. Com. 409; see Lindley on Partnership, 5th ed. 340, 583, n. (*l*).

of two joint tenants of a chattel was guilty of felony, the felony worked a forfeiture of one undivided moiety of the chattel to the Crown, who being thus in joint possession with a subject took the whole (o).

Execution
at suit of
Crown.

Further, the king's debts shall, in suing out execution, be preferred to that of every other creditor who had not obtained judgment before the king commenced his suit (p). The king's judgment formerly affected all land which his debtor had at or after the time of contracting the debt (q); but now no debts or liabilities to the Crown, incurred since 1st Nov., 1865, affect land as to a *bonâ fide* purchaser for valuable consideration or a mortgagee, whether with or without notice, unless before the conveyance or mortgage and the payment of the money, the writ or process of execution has been issued and registered (r).

Again, the rule is, that, where the sheriff seizes under a *fi. fa.*, and, after seizure, but before sale (s) under such writ, a writ of extent is sued out and delivered to the sheriff, the Crown is entitled to priority, and the sheriff must sell under the extent, and satisfy the Crown's debt, before he sells under the *fi. fa.* Nor does it matter whether the extent is in chief or in aid, *i.e.*, whether it is directly against the king's debtor, or brought to recover a debt due from some third party to such debtor; it having been the practice in ancient times, that, if the king's debtor was unable to satisfy the king's debt out of his own chattels, the king would betake himself to any third person who was indebted to the king's debtor (t), and would recover of such third person what he owed to the king's debtor, in order to

(o) See Plowd. 253; 33 & 34 Vict. c. 23 abolished forfeitures for felony.

(p) 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, s. 74. See also 32 & 33 Vict. c. 46; *Re Ben-tinck*, [1897] 1 Ch. 673; 66 L. J. Ch. 359.

(q) 13 Eliz. c. 4.

(r) Crown Suits, etc., Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 104), ss. 48, 49. As to the previous legislation on this subject, see Williams, *Real Prop.*, 8th ed. 85—87.

(s) See *R. v. Sloper*, 6 Price, 114.

(t) See *R. v. Larking*, 8 Price, 683.

get payment of the debt due from the latter to the Crown (*u*). The same principle applies where goods in the hands of the sheriff under a *fi. fa.*, and before sale, are seized by officers of the customs under a warrant to levy a penalty incurred by the defendant for an offence against the revenue laws (*x*); and where the Crown levies a distress upon goods after a subject has distrained upon them, but before he has completed his distress by sale (*y*).

In *Reg. v. Edwards* (*z*), decided under the former bankruptcy law, an official assignee having been appointed to a bankrupt's estate, later on the day of his appointment an extent issued at the suit of the Crown against the bankrupt for a Crown debt, and the question was which should have priority. The Court decided that where the title of the Crown and of the subject accrue on the same day, the king's title shall be preferred. The seizure under the extent, therefore, was upheld, and the title of the official assignee was ignored. This decision may, however, be supported on another principle, viz.: that "whether between the Crown and a subject, or between subject and subject, *judicial* proceedings are to be considered as having taken place at the earliest period of the day on which they are done" (*a*).

By section 150 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, the provisions of that Act relating to the remedies against the property of a debtor, the priorities of debts and the effect of a discharge bind the Crown (*b*): but in the case of a

Bankruptcy.

(*u*) *Giles v. Grover*, 36 R. R. 27; 9 Bing. 128, 191, recognising *R. v. Cotton, Parker*, 112; see *A.-G. v. Trueman*, 11 M. & W. 694; *A.-G. v. Walmsley*, 12 Id. 179; *Reg. v. Austin*, 10 Id. 693. As to the rights of a surety to the Crown, who has paid the debts of his deceased principal, see *Re Lord Churchill*, 39 Ch. D. 174.

(*x*) *Grove v. Aldridge*, 9 Bing. 428; 35 R. R. 589.

(*y*) *A.-G. v. Leonard*, 38 Ch. D. 622; 57 L. J. Ch. 860.

(*z*) 9 Exch. 32, 628.

(*a*) *Wright v. Mills*, 4 H. & N. 491; *Judgm.*, 9 Exch. 631; *Evans v. Jones*, 3 H. & C. 423; but see *Clarke v. Bradlaugh*, 7 Q. B. D. 151; 8 Id. 63; 50 L. J. Q. B. 678; 51 Id. 1; *Re North*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 264; 64 L. J. Q. B. 694.

(*b*) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 150.

colonial bankruptcy Act which contained no such express provision it was held that the Crown was entitled to preferential payment over all other creditors (*c*), and it seems clear that the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, except those expressly referred to in s. 150, do not bind the Crown (*d*). So, too, Crown debts have priority in administering the assets of a company in liquidation (*e*).

Goods of the
Crown privi-
leged from
distress.

The same principle is applied in the law of distress. The chattels of the Crown on land occupied by a subject are privileged from distress for rent. The title of the Crown as owner of the chattels is preferred to the rights which the landlord has by reason of their being on the land (*f*).

Sale in
market overt.

In connection with the maxim before us we may add that the king is not bound by a sale in market overt, but may seize to his own use his chattel although it has been sold in market overt (*g*).

ROY N'EST LIE PER ASCUN STATUTE, SI IL NE SOIT EXPRESSE-
MENT NOSME. (*Jenk. Cent.* 307.)—*The king is not bound by
any statute, if he be not expressly named to be so bound* (*h*).

Statement
of rule.

In general the king is not bound by a statute, unless mentioned expressly, or referred to by necessary implication (*i*); "for it is inferred, *primâ facie*, that the law made by the Crown, with the assent of the Lords and Commons, is made for subjects, and not for the Crown" (*j*); and the general rule is that "the Crown is never bound by a

(*c*) *Commissioners of Taxation for New South Wales v. Palmer*, [1907] A. C. 179; 76 L. J. P. C. 41.

(*d*) See *Ex parte Postmaster-General, re Bonham*, 10 Ch. D. 595; 48 L. J. Bk. 84.

(*e*) In *re Henley*, 9 Ch. D. 469.

(*f*) *Secretary of State for War v. Wynne*, [1905] 2 K. B. 845; 75 L. J. K. B. 25.

(*g*) 2 Inst. 718.

(*h*) *Jenk. Cent.* 307; *Wing, Max.* 1.

(*i*) In *re Henley*, 9 Ch. D. 469.

(*j*) *Per Alderson, B., A.-G. v. Donaldson*, 10 M. & W. 124, citing *Willion v. Berkley*, *Plowd.* 236; *De Bode v. The Queen*, 13 Q. B. 373, 5, 8. *Per* *Ld. Cottenham, Ledsam v. Russell*, 1 H. L. Cas. 697; *Doe v. Archbp. of York*, 14 Q. B. 81, 95.

statutory enactment unless the intention of the legislature to bind the Crown is clear and unmistakable" (*k*). Thus, upon the question what is the occupation of real property rateable under 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1, it has been observed (*l*) that "the only occupier of property exempt from the operation of the Act is the king, because he is not named in the statute; and the direct and immediate servants of the Crown, whose occupation is the occupation of the Crown itself, also come within the exemption. . . . No exemption is thereby given to charity or to public purposes beyond that which is strictly involved in the position that the Crown is not bound by the Act." So the prerogative of the Crown to remove into the High Court a cause which touches its revenue has not been affected by the County Court Acts (*m*). Nor does the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act (8 & 9 Vict. c. 18) affect the interests of the Crown (*n*). Neither was the prerogative of the Crown to plead and demur without leave to a petition of right affected by the Petition of Right Act, 1860 (*o*).

So, too, the Crown is not bound (except where expressly mentioned) by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Acts (*p*), nor by the Locomotives Act, 1865, which regulates the speed at which locomotives may proceed on highways (*q*), nor by the Public Health Act, 1875, or other Acts imposing

(*k*) *Per* Lindley, L.J., *Wheaton v. Maple & Co.*, [1893] 3 Ch. 64: 62 L. J. Ch. 963.

(*l*) *Per* Ld. Westbury, *Mersey Docks v. Cameron*, 11 H. L. Cas. 501, 503; *Reg. v. McCann*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 141, 145, 146.

(*m*) *Mountjoy v. Wood*, 1 H. & N. 58; *Stanley of Alderley (Lord) v. Wild*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 256: 69 L. J. Q. B. 318; *Ulmann v. Cowes Harbour Commissioners*, [1909] 2 K. B. 1: 78 L. J. K. B. 877.

(*n*) *Re Cuckfield Burial Board*, 19 Beav. 153; *Re Lowestoft Manor*, 24

Ch. D. 253: 53 L. J. Ch. 912. See also *Reg. v. Beadle*, 7 E. & B. 492.

(*o*) 23 & 24 Vict. c. 34. See *Tobin v. Reg.*, 14 C. B. N. S. 505: 16 Id. 310; *Feather v. Reg.*, 6 B. & S. 293.

(*p*) *In re Henley*, 9 Ch. D. 469, *ex parte Postmaster-General*, 10 Ch. D. 595: 48 L. J. Bk. 84. *Commissioners of Taxation for New South Wales v. Palmer*, [1907] A. C. 179: 76 L. J. P. C. 41; *re Oriental Bank Corporation, ex parte The Crown*, 28 Ch. D. 643: 54 L. J. Ch. 217.

(*q*) *Cooper v. Hawkins*, [1904] 2 K. B. 164: 73 L. J. K. B. 113.

pecuniary burdens on property (*r*) or restricting the use of property (*s*).

Rule, how
restricted.

It has been said that the rule above stated only applies where the property or peculiar privileges of the Crown are affected; and this distinction has been laid down, that though, where the king has any prerogative, estate, right, title, or interest, he shall not be barred of them by the general words of an Act, if he be not named therein (*t*); yet, if a statute be intended to give a remedy against a wrong, the king, though not named, shall be bound by it (*u*); and the king is impliedly bound by statutes passed for the public good, the preservation of public rights, and the suppression of public wrongs, the relief and maintenance of the poor, the general advancement of learning, religion, and justice, or for the prevention of fraud (*x*); and, though not named, he is bound by the general words of statutes which tend to perform the will of a founder or donor (*y*); and the king may likewise take the benefit of any particular Act, though he be not especially named therein (*z*).

But the later cases above referred to seem to indicate that the rule may be best expressed by saying that the Crown is not bound by any statute unless expressly mentioned, except where the Crown must have been

(*r*) *Re Hornsey U. D. C.*, [1902] 2 K. B. 73, and cases there cited.

(*s*) *Gorton Local Board v. Prison Commissioners*, [1904] 2 K. B. 165 n.

(*t*) *Magdalen College case*, 11 Rep. 74 b, cited Bac. Abr., "Prerogative" (E. 5): Com. Dig., "Parliament," R. 8. See the qualifications of this proposition laid down in Dwarr. Stats., 2nd ed. 523 *et seq.*

(*u*) *Willion v. Berkley*, Plowd. 239, 244. See the authorities cited arg. *R v. Wright*, 1 A. & E. 436 *et seq.*

(*x*) *Magdalen College case*, 11 Rep. 70 b, 72; Chitty, Prerog. 382.

(*y*) Vin. Abr., "Statutes" (E. 10), pl. 11; 5 Rep. 146; *Willion v. Berkley*, Plowd. 236.

(*z*) *R. v. Wright*, 1 A. & E. 447. In *A.-G. v. Radloff*, 10 Exch. 94, Pollock, C.B., observed that "the Crown is not bound with reference to matters affecting its property or person, but is bound with respect to the practice in the administration of justice." In *Clarke v. Bradlaugh*, 8 App. Cas. 358, Ld. Selborne thought that *express* words are not necessary to make a penalty originally appertaining to the Crown recoverable by popular action.

intended to be bound by necessary implication, because otherwise the statute would be meaningless (*a*). So neither the Statutes of Limitation, nor the Statute of Frauds, nor the Apportionment Act (*b*), bind the Crown (*c*), nor does a local Act imposing tolls and duties (*d*).

NEMO PATRIAM IN QUA NATUS EST EXUERE NEC LIGEANTIAE DEBITUM EJURARE POSSIT. (*Co. Litt.* 129 a.)—*A man cannot abjure his native country nor the allegiance which he owes to his sovereign.*

“The law of England, and of almost all civilised countries, ascribes to each individual at his birth two distinct legal states or conditions; one by virtue of which he becomes the subject of some particular country, binding him by the tie of natural allegiance, and which may be called his political *status*; another by virtue of which he has ascribed to him the character of a citizen of some particular country, and, as such, is possessed of certain municipal rights and subject to certain obligations: which latter character is the civil *status* or condition of the individual, and may be quite different from his political *status*. The political *status* may depend on different laws in different countries, whereas the civil *status* is governed universally by one single principle, namely, that of domicile, which is the criterion established by law for the purpose of determining civil *status*; for it is on this basis that the personal rights of the party, that is to say, the law which determines his majority or

(*a*) See *per* Day, J., in *Gorton Local Board v. Prison Commissioners*, [1904] 2 K. B. 165 n. And in addition to the cases above referred to, see *A.-G. for New South Wales v. Curator of Intestate Estates*, [1907] A. C. 519: 77 L. J. P. C. 114.

(*b*) *Rochester (Bishop) v. Le Fanu*, [1906] 2 Ch. 513: 75 L. J. Ch. 743.

(*c*) *Chitty, Prerog.* 366, 388; *R. v. Copland*, *Hughes*, 204, 230; *Vin. Abr.*, “*Statutes*” (E. 10).

(*d*) *Mayor of Weymouth v. Nugent*, 6 B. & S. 22, 35.

minority, his marriage, succession, testacy, or intestacy, must depend " (e).

Allegiance has been defined to be " a true and faithful obedience of the subject due to his sovereign " (f). And in the words of Mr. Justice Story, " allegiance is nothing more than the tie or duty of obedience of a subject to the sovereign under whose protection he is ; and allegiance by birth is that which arises from being born within the dominions and under the protection of a particular sovereign. Two things usually concur to create citizenship : first, birth locally within the dominions of the sovereign ; secondly birth within the protection and obedience, or, in other words, within the ligiance of the sovereign. That is, the party must be born within a place where the sovereign is, at the time, in full possession and exercise of his power, and the party must also, at his birth, derive protection from, and consequently owe obedience or allegiance to, the sovereign, as such, *de facto*. There are some exceptions, which are founded upon peculiar reasons, and which indeed illustrate and confirm the general doctrine " (g).

Allegiance is the tie which binds the subject to the Crown in return for that protection which the Crown affords to the subject, and is distinguished by our customary law into two species, the one natural, the other local. Natural allegiance is such as is due from all men born within the dominions of the Crown, immediately upon their birth ; and to this species of allegiance it is that the above maxim is applicable (h). It cannot be forfeited,

(e) *Per* Ld. Westbury, *Udny v. Udny*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. 457. See *Moorhouse v. Lord*, 10 H. L. Cas. 272 ; *Shaw v. Gould*, L. R. 3 H. L. 55.

(f) *Calvin's case*, 7 Rep. 5 ; S. C., Broom's Const. L. 4, and Note thereto, Id. 26 *et seq.*, where the cases which concern allegiance at common law, and the operation of

statutes affecting it, are considered. And see the stat. 21 & 22 Vict. c. 93 (and as to Ireland the stat. 31 & 32 Vict. c. 20), which enables a person to establish, under the circumstances specified in and as provided by the Act, his right to be deemed a natural-born subject.

(g) 3 Peters (U.S.) R. 155.

(h) Foster, Cr. Law, 184.

cancelled, or altered by any change of time, place, or circumstance, nor by anything but the united concurrence of the legislature. The natural-born subject of one prince cannot, by any act of his own, not even by swearing allegiance to another, put off or discharge his natural allegiance to the former (*i*) : *origine propriâ neminem posse voluntate suâ eximi manifestum est* (*k*) ; for this natural allegiance was intrinsic and primitive, and antecedent to the other, and cannot be divested without the concurrent act of that prince to whom it was first due (*l*). Hence, although a British subject may, in certain cases, forfeit his rights as such by adhering to a foreign power, he yet remains at common law always liable to his duties ; and if, in the course of such adherence, he violates the laws of his native country, he will be exposed to punishment when he comes within reach of her tribunals (*m*).

The tie of natural allegiance may, however, be severed with the concurrence of the legislature. For instance, upon the recognition of the United States of America, as free, sovereign, and independent, natural-born subjects of the English Crown adhering to the United States ceased to be subjects of the Crown of England, and became aliens incapable of inheriting lands in England (*n*).

While the Crowns of two countries are held by the same sovereign, the natives of the one country are not aliens in the other ; but when the union of the Crowns ends, the union of allegiance ceases, and the natives of the one country become aliens in the other, and have not the right to elect to which sovereign they will be subjects. The decision upon this latter point arose out of the

(*i*) See *per Jervis, C.J., Barrick v. Buba*, 16 C.B. 493 ; citing *Albrecht v. Sussmann*, 2 Ves. & B. 323 ; 13 R. R. 110.

(*k*) Cod. 10, 38, 4.

(*l*) See Foster, Cr. Law, 184 ; Hale, P. C. 68 ; Judgm., *Wilson v.*

Marryat, 8 T. R. 45, 1 B. & P. 430.

(*m*) 2 Steph. Com. 425.

(*n*) *Doe v. Acklam*, 2 B. & C. 779 ; 26 R. R. 544 ; *Doe v. Arkwright*, 5 C. & P. 575 ; 38 R. R. 851. The 33 Vict. c. 14, removed disabilities of foreigners in respect of property.

severance in 1837 of the Crown of Hanover from our Crown (*o*).

Local allegiance is such as is due from an alien, or stranger born, whilst he continues within the king's dominion and protection; but it is merely of a temporary nature, and ceases the instant such alien departs from this kingdom into another (*p*). For, as the prince affords his protection to an alien only during his residence in this realm, the allegiance of an alien is confined, in point of time, to the duration of such his residence, and, in point of locality, to the dominions of the British Empire (*q*); the rule being that *protectio trahit subjectionem et subjectio protectionem* (*r*), a maxim which extends not only to those who are born within the king's dominions, but also to foreigners who live within them, even though their sovereign is at war with this country, for they equally enjoy the protection of the Crown (*s*).

Naturaliza-
tion Act,
1870.

The Naturalization Act, 1870 (*t*), provides means whereby persons who were born British subjects may declare themselves aliens, and cease to be British subjects. It also enacts that any one who voluntarily becomes naturalized in a foreign country shall cease to be a British subject (*u*), while five years' residence in the United Kingdom or service under the Crown may, under certain conditions, make an alien a British subject (*x*).

(*o*) *Re Stepney Election*, 17 Q. B. D. 54; 55 L. J. Q. B. 331, where the *dicta* in *Calvin's case*, 7 Rep. 276, were not followed.

(*p*) 1 Blac. Com. 370.

(*q*) Chitty, Prerog. 16. See *Wolff v. Oxholm*, 6 M. & S. 92; 18 R. R. 313; *R. v. Johnson*, 6 East, 583; 8 R. R. 550.

(*r*) *Calvin's case*, 7 Rep. 5; *Craw*

v. Ramsay, Vaughan, 279; Co. Litt. 65 a.

(*s*) Chitty, Prerog. 12, 13.

(*t*) 33 Vict. c. 14; amended, 33 & 34 Vict. c. 102, 35 & 36 Vict. c. 39, 58 & 59 Vict. c. 43.

(*u*) See *Re Truport*, 36 Ch. D. 600; 57 L. J. Ch.

(*x*) See *Re Bourgoise*, 41 Ch. D. 310.

CHAPTER III.

§ I.—THE JUDICIAL OFFICE.

THE maxims contained in this section exhibit briefly the more important of those duties which attach to persons filling judicial offices, and discharging the functions which appertain thereto. It would have been inconsistent with the plan and limits of this volume to treat of such duties at greater length, and would not, it is believed, have materially added to its utility.

BONI JUDICIS EST AMPLIARE JURISDICTIONEM. (*Chanc. Prec.* 329.) *It is the duty of a judge to extend his jurisdiction.*

This maxim, as above worded and literally rendered, is erroneous. Lord Mansfield suggested that for the word *jurisdictionem*, *justitiam* should be substituted (a); and Sir R. Atkyns (b) had previously remarked: "it is indeed commonly said *boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem*; but I take that to be better advice which was given by Lord Chancellor Bacon to Mr. Justice Hutton upon the swearing him one of the Judges of the Court of Common Pleas,—that he should take care to contain the jurisdiction of the Court within the ancient mere-stones without removing the mark" (c).

Maxim how
to be under-
stood.

(a) "The true text is, *boni judicis est ampliare justitiam*, not *jurisdictionem*, as it has been often cited;" *per* Ld. Mansfield, 1 Burr. 304. 1430; and see *per* Cresswell, J., *Dart v. Dart*, 32 L. J. P. M. & A. 125.

(b) *Arg. R. v. Williams*, 13 St. Tr. vol. vii., p. 271. As on the one

The true maxim of our law is "to amplify its remedies, and, without usurping jurisdiction, to apply its rules, to the advancement of substantial justice" (*d*); the principle upon which our Courts act is, to enforce the performance of contracts not injurious to society, and to administer justice to a party who can make his claim to redress appear, by enlarging the legal remedy, if necessary, in order to do justice; for the common law is the birthright of the subject (*e*) and *bonus judex secundum æquum et bonum judicat, et æquitatem stricto juri præfert* (*f*). "I commend the judge," observed Lord Hobart, "that seems fine and ingenious, so it tend to right and equity; and I condemn them that either out of pleasure to show a subtle wit will destroy, or out of incuriousness or negligence will not labour to support, the act of the party by the art or act of the law" (*g*).

Money had
and received.

The old form of action for money had and received is peculiarly illustrative of the principle above set forth; the foundation of this action being that the plaintiff is in conscience entitled to the money sought to be recovered; and it has been observed that this kind of equitable action to recover back money which ought not in justice to be kept is very beneficial, and therefore much encouraged. It lies only for money which, *ex æquo et bono*, the defendant ought to refund (*h*). "The ground," observed Tindal, C.J., in

hand a judge cannot extend his jurisdiction, so, on the other hand, "the superior Courts at Westminster, and the judges, are not at liberty to decline a jurisdiction imposed upon them by Act of Parliament;" *Judgm. Furber v. Sturmeay*, 3 H. & N. 531.

(*d*) *Per* Ld. Abinger, *Russell v. Smyth*, 9 M. & W. 818; cited arg. *Kelsall v. Marshall*, 1 C. B. N. S. 255; see also *per* Ld. Mansfield, 4 Burr. 2239.

(*e*) *Per* Buller, J., 4 T. R. 344.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 24 b.

(*g*) Hobart, 125. Cf. *Id.* 277, "I do exceedingly commend the judges that are curious and almost subtle . . . to invent reasons and means to make acts according to the just intent of the parties, and to avoid wrong and injury which by rigid rules might be wrought out of the act." Cited by Turner, V.-C., *Squire v. Ford*, 9 Hare, 57.

(*h*) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Moses v. Macfarlane*, 2 Burr. 1012; *Litt v. Martindale*, 18 C. B. 314; *per*

Edwards v. Bates (i), "upon which an action of this description is maintainable, is that the money received by the defendants is money which, *ex æquo et bono*, ought to be paid over to the plaintiff. Such is the principle upon which the action has rested from the time of Lord Mansfield. When money has been received without consideration, or upon a consideration that has failed, the recipient holds it, *ex æquo et bono*, for the plaintiff" (j).

The power of allowing amendments of writs and pleadings, as to which the judges now have extensive powers (k), may likewise be instanced as one which is confided to them by the legislature, in order that it may be applied "to the advancement of substantial justice."

Power to amend.

The maxim under consideration of course applies with reference to the jurisdiction of a judge at chambers, and to the duties there discharged by him. The proceeding by application to a judge at chambers has been adopted by the Courts, under the sanction of the legislature, to prevent the delay, expense, and inconvenience which must ensue if application to the Court were, under all circumstances, indispensably necessary. A judge at chambers is usually described as acting under the delegated authority of the Court, and his jurisdiction differs from that of a judge sitting at nisi prius; in the former case the judge has a wider field for the exercise of his discretion, which appellate Courts are most reluctant to review, and with which they will only interfere where he is shown to have been clearly wrong (l). In a case, where it was held

Jurisdiction of judge at chambers.

Pollock, C.B., *Aiken v. Short*, 1 H. & N. 214; *Holt v. Ely*, 1 E. & B. 795; *Somes v. British Empire Shipping Co.*, 8 H. L. Cas. 338.

(i) 8 Scott, N. R. 414; S. C., 7 M. & Gr. 590.

(j) See *Martin v. Andrews*, 7 E. & B. 1; *Garton v. Bristol & Exeter R. Co.*, 1 B. & S. 112; *Baxendale v. G. W. R. Co.*, 14 C. B. N. S. 1: 16

Id. 137; *Roberts v. Aulton*, 2 H. & N. 482; *Barnes v. Braithwaite*, Id. 569; *per Smith, L.J., Phillips v. London School Board*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 447, 453.

(k) See Order XXVIII. of the Rules of the Supreme Court.

(l) *Inman v. Jenkins*, L. R. 5 C. B. 738; 39 L. J. C. P. 258. *Per* Id. Ellenborough, *Alner v. George*, 1

that a judge at chambers had jurisdiction to fix the amount of costs to be paid as the condition of making an order, the maxim to which we have here directed attention, was expressly applied. "As to the power of the judge to tax costs," remarked Vaughan, J., "if he is willing to do it, and can save expense, it is clear that what the officer of the Court may do, the judge may do, and *boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem, i.e., justitiam*" (m).

Qualification
of maxim.

Although necessarily many things, especially in the domain of procedure, are left to the discretion of our judges, the maxim is also observed in our jurisprudence, *optima est lex quæ minimum relinquit arbitrio judicis, optimus judex qui minimum sibi* (n)—that system of law is the best, which leaves least to the discretion (o) of the judge—that judge the best, who relies least on his own opinion. And although, where discretion is left to a judge, he is to a great extent unfettered in its exercise, Coke's definition still holds good, *discretio est discernere per legem quid sit justum* (o), and "discretion, when applied to a Court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and fanciful, but legal and regular" (p).

Therefore, if, in the presumed exercise of discretion, a judge has decided in a manner absolutely unreasonable and opposed to justice, his error will be corrected on appeal. "Whatever the law may have been before the Judicature Acts," said Jessel, M.R. (q), "the exercise of

Camp. 393. Cf. *per* Ld. Herschell, [1896] A. C. 475.

(m) *Collins v. Aron*, 4 Bing. N. C. 233, 235. See *Clement v. Weaver*, 4 Scott, N. R. 229, and cases cited *Id.* 231, n. (44).

(n) *Bac. Aphorisms*, 46. See *per* Wilmot, C.J. *Collins v. Blantern*, 2 Wilson, 341; *per* Buller, J., *Masler v. Miller*, 4 T. R. 344; 2 R. R. 399: affirmed in error, 2 H. Bla. 141;

Co. Litt. 24 b; *per* Tindal, C.J., 6 Scott, N. R. 180: 5 H. L. Cas. 785, 958.

(o) 4 Inst. 41, cited by Tindal, C.J., 6 Q. B. 700. See *Rooke's case*, 5 Rep. 99—100: 1 W. Bla. 152: 1 Burr. 570: 3 Bulstr. 128.

(p) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *R. v. Wilkes*, 2 Burr. 25, 39.

(q) *Reg. v. Mayor of Maidenhead*, 9 Q. B. D. 503: 51 L. J. Q. B. 448.

discretion is now the subject of appeal. It has been very truly said that a very strong case must be made out before the exercise of discretion can be overruled. The Court of Appeal must be satisfied that it has been wrongly exercised." Although there must be a clear case to justify the Court of Appeal in interfering with the discretion of the Court below, the discretion will be reviewed if it be exercised in consequence of an erroneous view of the law (r), or an obvious mistake of fact, or where it is impossible to say that there has been a reasonable exercise of discretion (s).

Further, there is no Court in England which is entrusted with the power of administering justice without restraint. That restraint has been imposed from the earliest times. And, although instances are constantly occurring where the Courts might profitably be employed in doing simple justice between the parties, unfettered by precedent or by technical rules, the law has wisely considered it inconvenient to confer such power upon those whose duty it is to preside in Courts of justice (t). Even the House of Lords is bound, upon a question of law, by its own previous decisions; for *interest reipublice ut sit finis litium* (u). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is, however, not strictly bound to follow an earlier decision of the Committee, and may dissent therefrom if, after examining the reasons, they find themselves forced to do so (t). Moreover, Parliament is not so fettered; for "certain it is that *Curia Parliamenti suis propriis legibus subsistit*" (x).

(r) *Hunt v. Chambers*, 20 Ch. D. 369; 51 L. J. Ch. 683.

(s) *Wigney v. Wigney*, 7 P. D. 182; 51 L. J. P. 62; *Wallingford v. Mutual Society*, 5 App. Cas. 685; 50 L. J. Q. B. 49; *Ormerod v. Todmorden Mill Co.*, 8 Q. B. D. 664; 51 L. J. Q. B. 348; *Berdan v. Greenwood*, 20 Ch. D. 767; *Crowther v. Elgood*, 34 Id. 691; *Re Smith*, [1893] 2 Ch. 1, 15.

(t) *Barton v. Muir*, L. R. 6 P. C. 134; 44 L. J. P. C. 19; *Tooth v. Power*, [1891] A. C. 284, 292; 60 L. J. P. C. 39.

(u) *London Street Tramways Co. v. London County Council*, [1898] A. C. 375.

(x) 4 Inst. 50. Some remarks as to the interpretation of statutes which might, perhaps, have been relevant under this maxim have

DE FIDE ET OFFICIO JUDICIS NON RECIPITUR QUÆSTIO, SED DE SCIENTIA SIVE SIT ERROR JURIS SIVE FACTI. (*Bac. Max., reg. 17.*)—*The honesty and integrity of a judge cannot be questioned, but his decision may be impugned for error either of law or of fact.*

General rule.
No action
lies against a
judge.

The law, said Lord Bacon, has so much respect for the certainty of judgments, and the credit and authority of judges, that it will not permit any error to be assigned which impeaches them in their trust and office, and in wilful abuse of the same (*y*). It is, moreover, a general rule of great antiquity, that no action will lie against a judge of record for any act done by him in the exercise of his judicial functions, provided such act, though done mistakenly, were within the scope of his jurisdiction (*z*). "The rule that a judicial officer cannot be sued for an adjudication according to the best of his judgment upon a matter within his jurisdiction, and also the rule, that a matter of fact so adjudicated by him cannot be put in issue in an action against him, have been uniformly maintained" (*a*).

"The doctrine," said Mr. Chancellor Kent (*b*), "which holds a judge exempt from a civil suit or indictment for any act done or omitted to be done by him sitting as judge, has a deep root in the common law. It is to be found in the earliest judicial records, and it has been steadily maintained by an undisturbed current of decision in the English Courts,

been postponed until Chap. VIII., which deals generally with that subject.

(*y*) *Bac. Max., reg. 17; Bushell's case*, Vaugh. 138—139; 12 Rep. 25; *per Holt, C.J., Groenvelt v. Burwell*, 1 Ld. Raym. 468; 1 Salk. 397.

(*z*) *Smith v. Boucher*, Cas. Temp. Hardw. 69; *Caldar v. Halket*, 3 Moo. P. C. 28, with which cf. *Gahan v. Lafitte*, 8 Id. 382; *Scott v. Stansfeld*, L. R. 3 C. P. 220; *Taafe v. Downes*,

Id. 36, n. (*a*); *Houlden v. Smith*, 14 Q. B. 841; *Judgm., Mostyn v. Fabrigas*, Cowp. 161; *Phillips v. Eyre*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 225, 229; *Pease v. Chaytor*, 1 B. & S. 658; *Hamilton v. Anderson*, Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 363.

(*a*) *Judgm., Kemp v. Neville*, 10 C. B. N. S. 549; *per Erle, C.J., Wildes v. Russell*, L. R. 1 C. P. 730.

(*b*) *Yates v. Lansing*, 5 Johnson (U.S.), R. 291; S. C. (in error), 9 Id. 396.

amidst every change of policy and through every revolution of their government. A short view of the cases will teach us to admire the wisdom of our forefathers, and to revere a principle on which rests the independence of the administration of justice."

This freedom from action at the suit of an individual, it has likewise been observed, is given by our law to the judges, not so much for their own sake as for the sake of the public, and for the advancement of justice, that, being free from actions, they may be free in thought and independent in judgment, as all who are to administer justice ought to be; and it is not to be supposed beforehand, that those who are selected for the administration of justice will make an ill use of the authority vested in them.

There is, however, an important distinction between the liability of judges of superior Courts and that of judges of inferior Courts. No action lies against a judge of a superior Court even though he has exceeded his jurisdiction. It is for him to determine his jurisdiction, and if he wrongly determines it his error can be called in question only by appeal, and not by action in the same or another Court of co-ordinate jurisdiction. No act of his done in his judicial capacity can be the foundation of an action against him, though he has acted oppressively, maliciously, and to the perversion of justice (*c*). The jurisdiction of an inferior Court, however, may always be called in question in a superior Court, and therefore if a judge of an inferior Court acts without jurisdiction his having done so may be determined in an action brought against him in another Court (*d*). Accordingly if a judge of an inferior Court in the execution of his office causes a trespass to be committed to the person or property of another by reason of his making an order without jurisdiction, an action lies against him for such trespass, provided he had knowledge, or means of

(*c*) *Anderson v. Gorrie*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 668.

(*d*) See *Taafe v. Downes*, 3 Moore P. C. 36 n.

knowledge of which he ought to have availed himself, of facts which showed his want of jurisdiction (*e*). So where it appeared on the face of a summons that a magistrate had no jurisdiction and he made an order notwithstanding, he was held liable in an action for the trespass committed in executing the order (*f*). But a judge of an inferior Court can only be made liable, if at all, for anything done within his jurisdiction, if he act maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. And as it is competent to him to decide the facts necessary to found his jurisdiction, his honest determination of those facts cannot be called in question in an action brought against him (*g*). In the imperfection of human nature, it is better that an individual should occasionally suffer a wrong, than that the general course of justice should be impeded and fettered by constant and perpetual restraints and apprehensions on the part of those who are to administer it. Corruption is quite another matter; so also are neglect of duty and misconduct. For these there is, and always will be, some due course of punishment by public prosecution (*h*), though not by action.

An action, then, does not lie against a judge, civil (*i*) or ecclesiastical (*j*), acting judicially in a matter within the

(*e*) *Per* Parke, B., *Calder v. Halket*, 3 Moore, P. C., at p. 77; *Houlden v. Smith*, 14 Q. B. 841.

(*f*) *Polley v. Fordham*, 91 L. T. 525; S. C., [1904] 2 K. B. 345.

(*g*) *Pease v. Chaytor*, 3 B. & S. 620; *Cave v. Mountain*, 1 M. & G. 257; *Somerville v. Mirehouse*, 1 B. & S. 652; *Pedley v. Davis*, 10 C. B. N. S. 492; *Gelen v. Hall*, 2 H. & N. 379. See also, as to justices of the peace, the Justices Protection Act, 1848 (11 & 12 Vict. c. 44).

(*h*) *Garnett v. Ferrand*, 6 B. & C. 625, 626; 30 R. R. 467; *Thomas v. Churton*, 2 B. & S. 475; Vaugh. R. 383. See *R. v. Johnson*, 6 East, 583, 7 East, 75; 8 R. R. 550, in

which case one of the judges of the Court of C. P. in Ireland was convicted of a libel. The judges are not liable to removal, except upon addresses of both Houses of Parliament; see 13 Will. 3, c. 2, and 1 Geo. 3, c. 23.

(*i*) *Dicas v. Ld. Brougham*, 6 C. & P. 249; *Kemp v. Neville*, 10 C. B. N. S. 523, where the action was brought against the Vice-Chancellor of Cambridge University; *Tinsley v. Nassau*, Mo. & Mal. 52; *Johnstone v. Sutton*, 1 T. R. 513; 1 R. R. 269; *per* Holt, C.J., 1 Ld. Raym. 468; *Garnett v. Ferrand*, 6 B. & C. 611; 30 R. R. 467.

(*j*) *Ackerley v. Parkinson*, 3 M.

scope of his jurisdiction (*k*). Nor can a suit be maintained against persons so acting with a more limited authority, as the steward of a Court baron (*l*), or commissioners of a Court of request; and, as already intimated, magistrates, acting in discharge of their duty, and within the bounds of their jurisdiction, are irresponsible even where the circumstances under which they are called upon to act would not have supported the complaint, provided that such circumstances were not disclosed to them at the time of their adjudication (*m*).

Having thus briefly stated the broad rule applicable to the right of action against persons invested with judicial functions, we may remark that there is one extensive class of cases which may, on a cursory observation, appear to fall within its operation, but which is, in fact, governed by a different, although not less important principle. We refer to cases in which the performance of some public duty is imposed by law upon an individual who, by neglecting or refusing to perform it, causes an injury to some other party; here, as a general rule, the injury occasioned by the breach of duty, without proof of *mala fides*, lays the foundation for an action for damages (*n*). This principle, moreover, applies where persons required to perform ministerial acts are at the same time invested with the judicial character, and in accordance therewith, in the celebrated

Distinction
to be observed
in applying
rule.

& S. 411, 425; 16 R. R. 317; *Beaurain v. Scott*, 3 Camp. 388; 14 R. R. 759.

(*k*) *Ib.* See *Wingate v. Waite*, 6 M. & W. 739, 746; *Hamilton v. Anderson*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 363.

(*l*) *Holroyd v. Breare*, 2 B. & Ald. 473; 21 R. R. 361; *Bradley v. Carr*, 3 Scott, N. R. 521, 528; *Carratt v. Morley*, 1 Q. B. 18; *Andrews v. Marris*, *Id.* 3; and cases there cited. *Morris v. Parkinson*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 163.

(*m*) *Pike v. Carter*, 3 Bing. 78; *Lowther v. Earl of Radnor*, 8 East, 113; *Brown v. Copley*, 8 Scott, N. R. 350; *Pitcher v. King*, 9 A. & E. 288; 2 Roll. Abr. 552, pl. 10.

(*n*) See *Barry v. Arnaud*, 10 A. & E. 646; cited *Mayor of Lichfield v. Simpson*, 8 Q. B. 65. *Per* *Ld. Brougham*, *M'Kenna v. Pape*, 1 H. L. Cas. 7; *Steel v. Shomberg*, 4 E. & B. 620; *Scott v. Mayor of Manchester*, 2 H. & N. 204.

Auchterarder case (o), the members of the presbytery were held liable, collectively and individually, to make compensation for refusing to take the presentee to a church on trial, as they were bound to do, according to the law of Scotland. The legislature, observed Lord Brougham, in that case, can, of course, do no wrong, and its branches are equally placed beyond all control of the law; and after explaining the immunity from liability of Courts of justice when exercising judicial functions or discretionary powers, he continued :—"But where the law neither confers judicial power, nor any discretion at all, but requires certain things to be done, every body, whatever be its name, and whatever other functions of a judicial or of a discretionary nature it may have, is bound to obey; and with the exception of the legislature and its branches, every body is liable for the consequences of disobedience; that is, its members are liable, through whose failure or contumacy the disobedience has arisen, and the consequent injury to the parties interested in the duty being performed" (p).

Appeal.

But although the honesty of a judge acting in his judicial capacity cannot be questioned, his errors may be corrected by appellate tribunals in all cases where the law allows of an appeal. In most civil causes there is a right of appeal, but not in all. For example, there can be no appeal from a judge, who has discretion as to costs, upon a question of costs, except by leave of the judge whose decision it may be desired to question (q). Again, in the case of County Courts there can be no appeal on a question of fact; nor, as a rule, except by leave of the judge who tried the action, on a question of law, where the plaintiff's claim does not exceed £20 (r).

(o) *Ferguson v. Earl of Kinnoul*, 9 Cl. & Fin. 251.

(p) *Per* Ld. Brougham, 9 Cl. & F. 289, 290, whose judgment has throughout an especial reference to

the subject of judicial liability. See *Gathercole v. Miall*, 15 M. & W. 319, 332, 338.

(q) Judicature Act, 1873, s. 49.

(r) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, ss. 120, 124.

The discretion to grant a new trial is a judicial discretion, not to be exercised arbitrarily; and a litigant who has obtained a judgment is entitled not to be deprived of it without very solid grounds: *interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium* (s).

QUI JUSSU JUDICIS ALIQUOD FECERIT NON VIDETUR DOLO MALO FECISSE, QUIA PARERE NECESSE EST. (10 Rep. 76.)

—A person who does an act by command of a judge is not considered to act from a wrongful motive, because it is his duty to obey (t).

When a Court has jurisdiction of a cause, and proceeds *General rule.* *inverso ordine*, or erroneously, the officer of the Court who executes according to its tenor (u) the precept or process of the Court, is not liable to an action (v). But when the Court has not jurisdiction of the cause, the whole proceeding is *coram non judice* (x), and actions lie against the officer without any regard to the precept or process; for in this case it is not necessary to obey one who is not judge of the cause, any more than it is to obey a mere stranger, for the rule is, *judicium a non suo judice datum nullius est momenti* (y).

(s) *Brown v. Dean*, [1910] A. C. 373.

(t) This maxim is derived from the Roman law; see D. 50, 17, 167, § 1.

(u) See *Munday v. Stubbs*, 10 C. B. 432.

(v) See *Prentice v. Harrison*, 4 Q. B. 852; *Brown v. Jones*, 15 M. & W. 191; *Judgm., Ex p. Story*, 8 Exch. 201. See *Cotes v. Michill*, 3 Lev. 20; *Moravia v. Sloper*, Willes, 30, 34.

(x) See *Tinniswood v. Pattison*, 3 C. B. 243. *Factum a judice quod*

ad officium ejus non pertinet ratum non est; D. 50, 17, 170.

(y) *Marshalsea case*, 10 Rep. 70; *Taylor v. Clemson*, 2 Q. B. 1014, 1015: 11 Cl. & F. 610; cited *Ostler v. Cooke*, 13 Q. B. 143, 162; *Morrell v. Martin*, 4 Scott, N. R. 313, 314; *Jones v. Chapman*, 14 M. & W. 124; *Baylis v. Strickland*, 1 Scott, N. R. 540; *Marshall v. Lamb*, 5 Q. B. 115; *Watson v. Boddell*, 14 M. & W. 57; *Thomas v. Hudson*, Id. 353; *Van Sandau v. Turner*, 6 Q. B. 773; *Lloyd v. Harrison*, 6 B. & S. 36. *Andrews v. Marries*, 1 Q. B. 3, 16,

Examples.
Gosset v.
Howard.

Accordingly, in *Gosset v. Howard* (z), it was held that the warrant of the Speaker of the House of Commons, having issued in a matter over which the House had jurisdiction, was to be construed on the same principle as a mandate or writ issuing out of a superior Court acting according to the course of common law, and that it afforded a valid defence to an action for assault and false imprisonment brought against the Serjeant-at-Arms, who acted in obedience to such warrant.

Stockdale v.
Hansard.

In this case it is observable that the matter in respect of which the warrant issued was admitted to be within the jurisdiction of the House, and it is peculiarly necessary to notice this, because, in the previous case of *Stockdale v. Hansard* (a), it was held to be no defence at law to an action for libel, that the defamatory matter was part of a document, which was, by order of the House of Commons, laid before the House, and thereupon became part of the proceedings of the House, and which was afterwards, by order of the House, published by the defendant. The decision in this case resulted from the opinion entertained by the Court that the privilege under which the defendant sought to justify the alleged wrongful act did not exist, and in consequence of this decision the Parliamentary Papers Act, 1840 (b), was passed, which enacts that all proceedings, whether by action or criminal prosecution, similar to the above, shall be stayed upon the production of a certificate of

17, recognised in *Carratt v. Morley*, Id. 29; and distinguished in *Dews v. Riley*, 11 C. B. 434, 444; *Levy v. Moylan*, 10 C. B. 189. As to the liability of the party at whose suit execution issued, or of his attorney, see *Carratt v. Morley*, *supra*; *Coomer v. Latham*, 16 M. & W. 713; *Ewart v. Jones*, 14 Id. 774; *Green v. Elgie*, 5 Q. B. 99; *Kinning v. Buchanan*, 8 C. B. 271; *Abley v. Dale*, 11 Id. 378, 389; *post*, p. 103,

n. (y). As regards the liability of ministerial officers, there is an important distinction between cases where there has been an adjudication and cases where there has been only an order, see *Foster v. Dodd*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 67, 76.

(z) 10 Q. B. 411. See *Ex p. Fernandez*, 10 C. B. N. S. 3: 6 H. & N. 717.

(a) 9 A. & E. 1.

(b) 3 & 4 Vict. c. 9.

the Chancellor or of the Speaker to the effect that the publication in question is by order of either House of Parliament, together with an affidavit verifying such certificate (c).

The case of a justification at common law by a constable under the warrant of a justice of the peace offers another illustration of the rule under consideration. If the warrant issued by the justice, in the shape in which it is given to the officer, is such that the party may lawfully resist it (d), or, if taken on it, will be released on habeas corpus, it is a warrant which, in that shape, the justice has no jurisdiction to issue, which, therefore, the officer need not obey, and which, at common law, on the principle above laid down, does not protect him against an action by the party injured (e). Where the cause is expressed but imperfectly, the officer may not be expected to judge as to the sufficiency of the statement; and, therefore, if the subject-matter be within the magistrate's jurisdiction, he may be bound to execute it, and, as a consequence, be entitled to protection; but where no cause is expressed, there is no question as to the want of jurisdiction (f).

Constable,—
liability of, at
common law.

"A rule," said Lord Denman, in *Reg. v. Stainforth* (g), "has been often recognised in respect of proceedings by magistrates, requiring all the facts to be stated which are necessary to show that a tribunal has been lawfully constituted and has jurisdiction. There is good reason for the

(c) *Entick v. Carrington*, 19 Howell, St. Tr. 1030, is the leading case in regard to the power of arresting the person, and seizing papers, under a Secretary of State's warrant. See *Leach v. Money*, *Wilkes v. Wood*, and *Entick v. Carrington*, Broom's Const. L. 525, 548, 558, and Note thereto, Id. 613 *et seq.*; *Foster v. Dodd*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 67.

(d) *Reg. v. Tooley*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296, 1302.

(e) As to the legality of an arrest

under a warrant which is not in possession of the constable, in felony and misdemeanor, see *Galliard v. Laxton*, 2 B. & S. 363, and *Reg. v. Chapman*, 12 Cox, C. C. 4.

(f) *Per Coleridge, J.*, 10 Q. B. 390. See in illustration of the above remarks, *Clark v. Woods*, 2 Exch. 395, and cases there cited.

(g) 11 Q. B. 75. See also *Reg. v. Inhab. of Totness*, Id. 80; *Agnew v. Jobson*, 14 Cox, C. C. 625.

rule where a special authority is exercised which is out of the ordinary course of common law, and is confined to a limited locality, as in case either of warrants for arrest, commitment, or distress, or of convictions, or orders by local magistrates where the duty of promptly enforcing the instrument is cast on officers of the law, and the duty of unhesitating submission on those who are to obey. It is requisite that the instrument so to be enforced and obeyed should show on inspection all the essentials from which such duties arise." A plea of justification by a constable acting under the warrant of a justice is accordingly bad by the common law, if it does not show that the justice had jurisdiction over the subject-matter upon which the warrant is granted.

Effect of 24
Geo. 2, c. 44.

By the Constables' Protection Act, 1750 (*h*), it is enacted that no action shall be brought against a constable, or a person acting by his order or in his aid, for anything done in obedience (*i*) to a warrant under the hand or seal of a justice, until demand shall have been made for the perusal and copy of such warrant, and the same refused or neglected for the space of six days after such demand; that in case, after such demand and compliance therewith (*j*), any action for any such cause be brought against such constable or person, without making the justice who signed or sealed the warrant a defendant, then, on proof of such warrant at the trial, the jury shall give their verdict for the defendant, notwithstanding any defect of jurisdiction in such justice; and if such action be brought against the justice and constable jointly, then, on proof of such warrant, the jury shall find for such constable, notwithstanding such defect of jurisdiction. And this Act applies as well where the justice has acted without jurisdiction, as where the warrant which he has granted is improper (*k*).

(*h*) 24 Geo. 2, c. 44, s. 6.

(*j*) *Jones v. Vaughan*, 5 East, 445;

(*i*) See *Bell v. Oakley*, 2 M. & S. 7 R. R. 736.
259; 15 R. R. 238.

(*k*) *Per* Ld. Eldon, *Price v.*

It should be observed, however, that the officer must show that he acted in obedience to the warrant (*l*), and can only justify that which he *lawfully* did under it (*m*); and where the justice cannot be liable, the officer is not entitled to the protection of the Act; for the Act was intended to make the justice liable instead of the officer: where, therefore, the officer makes such a mistake as will not make the justice liable, the officer cannot be excused.

Besides the last-mentioned Act, there are other enactments, which, on grounds of public policy, specially extend protection to persons who act *bonâ fide*, though mistakenly, in pursuance of their provisions; and as throwing light upon their practical operation, attention may be directed to *Hughes v. Buckland* (*n*), which was an action of trespass against the defendants, being servants of A., for arresting the plaintiff whilst fishing at night near the mouth of a river in which A. had a several fishery. At the trial, much evidence was given to show that A.'s fishery included the place where the plaintiff was arrested; the jury, however, defined the limits of the fishery so as to exclude that place by a few yards, but they also found that A., and the defendants, "*bonâ fide* and reasonably" believed that the fishery extended over that spot. It was held that the defendants were entitled to the protection of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 75 (*nn*), which was framed for the

Statutory
protection.

Messenger, 2 B. & P. 158; 5 R. R. 559; *Atkins v. Kilby*, 11 A. & E. 777.

(*l*) See *Hoye v. Bush*, 2 Scott, 418 R. 86.

(*m*) *Peppercorn v. Hoffman*, 9 M. & W. 618, 628.

(*n*) 15 M. & W. 346.

(*nn*) That section provided *inter alia* that "for the protection of persons acting in the execution of this Act" all actions brought "against any person for anything done in pursuance of this Act"

should be laid and tried in the county where the fact was committed. It was held that as in arresting the plaintiff the defendants acted *bonâ fide* in the belief that they were pursuing the Act of Parliament the action must be tried in the county where the arrest was made. The 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, is now repealed and many of its provisions are re-enacted in the Larceny Act, 1861. The Public Authorities' Protection Act, 1893

protection "of persons acting in the execution" of that Act, and doing anything in pursuance thereof. "The object of the clause," observed Pollock, C.B., "was to give protection to all parties who honestly pursued the statute. Now, every act consists of *time*, *place*, and *circumstance*. With regard to *circumstance*, it is admitted, that, if one magistrate acts where two are required, or imposes twelve months' imprisonment where he ought only to impose six, he is protected if he has a general jurisdiction over the subject-matter, or has reason to think he has. With respect to *time*, *Cann v. Clipperton* (o) shows that a party may be protected although he arrests another after the time when the statute authorises the arrest. *Place* is another ingredient; and I am unable to distinguish the present case from that of a magistrate who is protected, although he acts out of his jurisdiction. A party is protected if he acts *bonâ fide*, and in the reasonable belief that he is pursuing the Act" (p). And the proper question for the jury in a case such as that referred to is this:—"Did the defendant honestly believe in the existence of those facts which, if they had existed, would have afforded a justification under the statute?"—the belief of the defendant resting upon some reasonable grounds (q).

Territorial
limits of
jurisdiction.

Lastly, we may observe, that, when considered with reference to foreign communities, the jurisdiction of every Court, whether *in personam*, or *in rem*, must so far as

(56 & 57 Vict. c. 61), contains general provisions for the protection of persons doing any act "in pursuance, or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament."

(o) 10 A. & E. 188.

(p) "A thing is considered to be done in pursuance of a statute, when the person who does it is acting honestly and *bonâ fide*, either under the powers which the Act confers, or in discharge of the duties which it

imposes;" *per* Parke, B., *Jowle v. Taylor*, 7 Exch. 61; *Downing v. Capel*, L. R. 2 C. P. 461; *Poulsum v. Thirst*, Id. 449; *Whatman v. Pearson*, 3 Id. 422.

(q) *Per* Williams, J., *Roberts v. Orchard*, 2 H. & C. 774, as explained in *Leete v. Hart*, L. R. 3 C. P. 322, 324, 325; *Heath v. Brewer*, 15 C. B. N. S. 803; *Chamberlain v. King*, L. R. 6 C. P. 474; *Lea v. Facey*, 19 Q. B. D. 352; 56 L. J. Q. B. 536.

regards the compelling obedience to its decrees (*r*), necessarily be bounded by the limits of the kingdom in which it is established, and unless, by virtue of international treaties (*s*), such jurisdiction has been extended, it clearly cannot enforce process beyond those natural limits, according to the maxim, *extra territorium jus decenti impune non paretur* (*t*). Moreover, it is to be observed that, although the laws of a state *proprio vigore* have no force beyond its territorial limits, they are frequently permitted, by the courtesy of another, to operate in the latter, when neither that state nor its citizens will suffer inconvenience from the application of the foreign law (*u*). This is the principle of International Comity.

Municipal law may provide that proceedings may be instituted, and judgments and decrees lawfully pronounced, against natural-born subjects when absent abroad, and even against aliens who are not resident within the state when the subject-matter is peculiarly within the jurisdiction of the Courts. The conditions under which a writ will be allowed in this country to issue are regulated by Order XI. of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883.

Even Parliament, though its enactments may extend to the King's subjects while they are abroad (*r*), has no power to legislate for foreigners out of the dominions and beyond the jurisdiction of the British Crown (*w*). "It is clear," observed Parke, B., in *Jefferys v. Boosey* (*x*), "that the

(*r*) See *per* Ld. Cranworth, *Hope v. Hope*, 4 De G. M. & G. 345—346; *per* Ld. Herschell, *Brit. S. Africa Co. v. Companhia de Mocambique*, [1893] A. C. 624.

(*s*) See *Re Tivnan*, 5 B. & S. 645.

(*t*) D. 2, 1, 20; Story, *Confl. Laws*, § 539; arg. *Canadian Prisoners' case* (rep. by Fry), p. 48; *Reg. v. Lewis*, Dears. & B. 182; *Reg. v. Anderson*, L. R. 1 C. C. 161.

(*u*) *Per* Ruggles, C.J., *Hoyt v. Thompson*, 1 Selden (U.S.), R. 340.

As illustrating the maxim, *supra*, see *Re Mansergh*, 1 B. & S. 400.

(*v*) *Trial of Earl Russell*, [1901] A. C. 446; 70 L. J. K. B. 998; *re De Wilton*, [1900] 2 Ch. 481: 69 L. J. Ch. 717.

(*w*) *Lopez v. Burslem*, 4 Moore, P. C. 300, 305.

(*x*) 4 H. L. Cas. 815, 926. See *Macleod v. A.-G. for N. S. Wales*, [1891] A. C. 455: 60 L. J. P. C. 55; *Reg. v. Jameson*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 425: 65 L. J. M. C. 218; *Badische Fabrik*

legislature has no power over any persons except its own subjects, that is, persons natural-born subjects, or resident, or whilst they are within the limits of the kingdom. The legislature can impose no duties except on them; and when legislating for the benefit of persons, must *primâ facie* be considered to mean the benefit of those who owe obedience to our laws and whose interests the legislature is under a correlative obligation to protect."

AD QUÆSTIONEM FACTI NON RESPONDENT JUDICES: AD QUÆSTIONEM LEGIS NON RESPONDENT JURATORES. (8 Rep. 155.)—*It is the office of the judge to instruct the jury in points of law—of the jury to decide on matters of fact (y).*

The object in view on the trial of a cause is to find out, by due examination, the truth of the points in issue between the parties, in order that judgment may thereupon be given, and therefore the facts of the case must, in the first instance, be ascertained (usually through the intervention of a jury), for *ex facto jus oritur*—the law arises out of the fact (*z*). If the fact be perverted or misrepresented the law which arises thence will unavoidably be unjust or partial; and, in order to prevent this, it is necessary to set right the fact and establish the truth contended for, by appealing to some mode of probation or trial which the law of the country has ordained for a criterion of truth and falsehood (*a*).

v. Johnson, [1897] 2 Ch. 322: 66 L. J. Ch. 497; *Re Pearson*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 263: 61 L. J. Q. B. 585; *Colquhoun v. Heddon*, 25 Q. B. D. 129: 59 L. J. Q. B. 465; *Colquhoun v. Brooks*, 19 Q. B. D. 406: 57 L. J. Q. B. 70.

(y) Co. Litt. 295 b; 9 Rep. 13;

Bishop of Meath v. Marquis of Winchester, 3 Bing. N. C. 217: 4 Cl. & Fin. 557; *Bushell's case*, Vaugh. R. 149; *per* Ld. Westbury, *Fernie v. Young*, L. R. 1 H. L. 78.

(z) See for instance *Catterall v. Hindle*, L. R. 2 C. P. 368.

(a) 2 Inst. 49.

Before the Common Law Procedure Act, 1854 (*b*), all issues of fact in common law actions in the Superior Courts were decided by juries. But now many common law actions, as well as Chancery actions, in the High Court (*c*) and in County Courts (*d*), are tried by judges sitting without juries, and in such cases the judges have to find the facts as well as to decide the law. But even in these cases it is necessary to distinguish between the two functions of the judge; and the above maxim must retain considerable importance.

A few instances must suffice to show its application. Thus, there are two requisites to the validity of a deed: 1, that it be sufficient in law, on which the Court decides; 2, that certain matters of fact, as sealing and delivery, be duly proved, on which it is the province of the jury to determine (*e*); and where interlineations or erasures are apparent on the face of a deed, it is now the practice to leave it to the jury to decide whether the rasing or interlining was done before the delivery (*f*).

Examples showing application of rule.

Again, it is the duty of the Court to construe all written instruments (*g*) as soon as the true meaning of any words of art or commercial phrases used therein, and the surrounding circumstances, if any, have been ascertained as facts by the jury (*h*); and it is the duty of the jury to take the construction from the Court either absolutely, if there be no words to be construed or explained (*i*), as words of art

Written instruments.

(*b*) 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 1.

(*c*) R. S. C., Order XXXVI.

(*d*) County Court Rules—Order XXII.

(*e*) Co. Litt. 255 a; *Altham's case*, 8 Rep. 308; *Dr. Leyfield's case*, 10 Rep. 92, cited *Jenkin v. Peace*, 6 M. & W. 728.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 225 b. See *Doe v. Coombs*, 3 Q. B. 687; *Alsager v. Close*, 10 M. & W. 576.

(*g*) "The construction of a specification, like other written documents, is for the Court. If the terms used

require explanation, as being terms of art or of scientific use, explanatory evidence must be given, and with its aid the Court proceeds to the office of construction;" *per* Ld. Chelmsford, *Simpson v. Holliday*, L. R. 1 H. L. 320.

(*h*) Even where a written instrument has been lost, and parol evidence of its contents has been received, its construction is for the Court. *Berwick v. Horsfall*, 4 C. B. N. S. 450.

(*i*) See *Elliott v. South Devon R.*

or phrases used in commerce, and no surrounding circumstances to be ascertained,—or conditionally, when those words or circumstances are necessarily referred to them (*k*). The convenience of this course is apparent, for a misconstruction by the Court may be set right upon appeal or new trial, but a mistake by the jury is not easily corrected (*l*). Accordingly, the construction of a doubtful document given in evidence to defeat the Statute of Limitations is for the Court (*m*), and not for the jury; but if it be explained by extrinsic facts, from which the intention of the parties may be collected, they are for the consideration of the jury (*n*).

Mercantile
contracts.

With respect to mercantile contracts, the law is clearly explained by Lord Cairns in *Bowes v. Shand* (*o*). It is for the Court, when once it is in possession of the circumstances surrounding the contract, and of any peculiarity of meaning which may be attached by reason of the custom of the trade, to place the construction upon the contract; and it seems that the evidence of custom must be strong to

Co., 2 Ex. 725; *Bank of New Zealand v. Simpson*, [1900] A. C. 182.

(*k*) "Parcel or no parcel," is a question of fact for the jury, but the judge should tell the jury what is the proper construction of any documents which ought to be considered in deciding that question; *Lyle v. Richards*, L. R. 1 H. L. 222.

(*l*) Judgm., *Neilson v. Harford*, 8 M. & W. 823. *Per* Erskine, J., *Shore v. Wilson*, 5 Scott, N. R. 988; *Cheveley v. Fuller*, 13 C. B. 122. See *per* Maule, J., *Doe v. Strickland*, 8 C. B. 743—744; *Booth v. Kennard*, 2 H. & N. 84; *Bovill v. Pimm*, 11 Exch. 718; *Lindsay v. Janson*, 4 H. & N. 699, 704; *Parker v. Ibbetson*, 4 C. B. N. S. 346.

(*m*) *Chasemore v. Turner*, L. R. 10

Q. B. 500; 45 L. J. Q. B. 66; *Quincey v. Sharpe*, 1 Ex. D. 72; 45 L. J. Ex. 347 (Ex. Ch.); *Skeet v. Lindsay*, 2 Ex. D. 314; 46 L. J. Ex. 249; *Myerhoff v. Froelich*, 3 C. P. D. 333; 4 Id. 63; *Banner v. Berridge*, 18 Ch. D. 254; 50 L. J. Ch. 630.

(*n*) *Morrell v. Frith*, 3 M. & W. 402; *Doe v. Edmonds*, 6 M. & W. 295. See *Worthington v. Grimsditch*, 7 Q. B. 479; *Rackham v. Marriott*, 2 H. & N. 196; *Sidwell v. Mason*, 2 H. & N. 306; *Godwin v. Culling*, 4 Id. 373; *Cornforth v. Smithard*, 5 H. & N. 13; *Buckmaster v. Russell*, 10 C. B. N. S. 745; *Holmes v. Mackrell*, 3 C. B. N. S. 789; *Cockrill v. Sparkes*, 1 H. & C. 699; *Francis v. Hawkesley*, 1 E. & E. 1052.

(*o*) 2 App. Cas. 455; 46 L. J. Q. B. 561.

overrule the natural meaning of words of common parlance. This rule is based upon and limited by the principle which allows parol evidence to explain, but not to contradict, a written document, upon which basis also depends the function of a jury to put a meaning upon expressions in mercantile contracts, which, apart from mercantile usage, are obscure or meaningless (*p*). It may indeed be laid down generally, that although it is the province of the Court to construe a written instrument, yet where its effect depends not merely on the construction and meaning of the instrument, but upon collateral facts and extrinsic circumstances, the inferences to be drawn from them are to be left to the jury (*q*). And where a contract is made out partly by written documents and partly by oral evidence, the whole must be submitted to the jury so that they may determine what was the real contract, if any (*r*).

In actions for malicious prosecution the plaintiff has to prove, first, that he was innocent of the offence for which he was prosecuted, and that the prosecution ended in his favour (*s*); secondly, that there was a want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution (*t*); and thirdly, that the defendant instituted the prosecution maliciously, that is to say, from an improper motive, and not from the honest belief that the plaintiff was guilty and the desire to bring an offender to justice (*t*). The onus of establishing all these three points lies upon the plaintiff (*t*); but whereas

Malicious
prosecution.

(*p*) *Ashford v. Redford*, L. R. 9 C. P. 20; 43 L. J. C. P. 57.

(*q*) *Etting v. U. S. Bank*, 11 Wheaton (U. S.), R. 59.

As to the office of the jury in interpreting an ambiguous contract, see *Smith v. Thompson*, 8 C. B. 44.

(*r*) *Bolckow v. Seymour*, 17 C. B. N. S. 107; *Rogers v. Hadley*, 2 H. & C. 227.

The construction of a foreign

contract is for the Judge, who may avail himself, as far as necessary, of expert evidence; *Di Sora v. Phillips*, 10 H. L. Cas. 633.

(*s*) *Barber v. Lesiter*, 7 C. B. N. S. 175; 29 L. J. C. P. 161; *Castrique v. Behrens*, 30 L. J. Q. B. 163; *Basébé v. Matthews*, L. R. 2 C. P. 684; 36 L. J. M. C. 93. As to *ex parte* proceedings see *Steward v. Grommett*, 7 C. B. N. S. 191; 29 L. J. C. P. 170.

(*t*) *Abrath v. N. E. R. Co.*, 11 App.

the first and third points are matters to be left to the jury, the second has to be decided by the judge (*u*). If, however, any facts upon which the question whether there was want of reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution depends are in dispute, the jury have to find what the facts are, and the judge has to decide the question upon the facts as found by them (*u*). This arrangement has been sometimes described as productive of difficulty and confusion (*v*). In practice the judge often leaves the jury to find a general verdict, after explaining to them how his opinion on the question of reasonable and probable cause differs according to whether they take one or another view of the facts in dispute; but sometimes he first requires the jury to find the facts which specifically bear upon that question, and only submits to them the further question of malice if and when he has ruled that the want of reasonable and probable cause has been proved (*x*). Upon this question of malice, the fact that the defendant prosecuted without reasonable and probable cause is evidence from which the jury may infer that he acted maliciously; but it is not conclusive evidence, and if the jury think that he honestly believed in the plaintiff's guilt and acted upon that belief in prosecuting him, then the defendant, however hastily he may have proceeded, is nevertheless entitled to their verdict (*y*).

Libel.

The question of the respective functions of judge and jury in actions and prosecutions for libel was once very warmly canvassed, and was the subject of the Libel Act, 1792, popularly known as Fox's Act (*z*). This Act, which was

Cas. 247: 11 Q. B. D. 440: 52 L. J. Q. B. 352, 620.

(*u*) *Id.*; *Lister v. Perryman*, L. R. 4 H. L. 521: 39 L. J. Ex. 177; *Panton v. Williams*, 2 Q. B. 169: 10 L. J. Ex. 545.

(*v*) See the observations made in *Lister v. Perryman*, *supra*.

(*x*) The various methods of pro-

cedure are explained by Bowen, L. J., 11 Q. B. D. 458.

(*y*) *Brown v. Hawkes*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 718. As to the materiality of motive in this kind of action, see *per* Lords Watson and Herschell, in *Allen v. Flood*, [1898] A. C. 93, 125.

(*z*) 32 Geo. III. c. 60, s. 1.

occasioned by the State Trials in the reign of Geo. III., enacts (s. 1) that in trials for libel the jury may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty upon the whole matter put in issue, and shall not be directed or required to find the defendant guilty or not guilty merely on proof of publication (s. 2). The judge shall, according to his discretion, give his opinion upon the matters in issue (*a*) to the jury, who may (s. 3) find a special verdict. It is customary under this Act for the judge, whether in civil or criminal causes, to give a definition of libel to the jury, and then leave to them the entire question. He may, as a matter of mere advice, give his own opinion as to the nature of the publication, but is not bound to do so (*b*). It is his duty to say whether or not the writing complained of is capable of the meaning ascribed; but if satisfied of that, he must leave it to the jury to say whether it actually has that meaning (*c*). Again, it is for the judge to say whether a communication is privileged or not; but if the privilege is not an absolute one, as that enjoyed by witnesses in a cause, the further question remains whether it was made *bonâ fide* and without malice, and this is always for the jury (*d*). It is to be remembered that where this qualified privilege is established, the plaintiff has to prove malice on the part of the defendant. If he fail to give evidence beyond that of mere defamation, it is the duty of the judge to direct a verdict for the defendant (*e*).

Although the general principle is as laid down in the maxim under consideration, there are many exceptions to it (*f*). Thus, questions of reasonableness—reasonable cause,

Exceptions
to rule.

(*a*) *Baylis v. Lawrence*, 11 Ad. & E. 924.

(*b*) *Parmiter v. Coupland*, 6 M. & W. 108; *R. v. Watson*, 2 T. R. 106.

(*c*) *Sturt v. Bagg*, 10 Q. B. 908; *Hunt v. Goodlake*, 43 L. J. C. P. 54. As to slander, see *Hemmings v. Gasson*, E. B. & E. 346; and see

Bushell's case, Vaugh. R. 147; *Ewart v. Jones*, 14 M. & W. 774.

(*d*) *Stace v. Griffith*, L. R. 2 P. C. 420.

(*e*) *Taylor v. Hawkins*, 16 Q. B. 321; *Spill v. Maule*, L. R. 4 Ex. 232.

(*f*) Judgm., *Watson v. Quilter*, 11 M. & W. 767.

reasonable time, and the like—are, strictly speaking, matters of fact, even where it falls within the province of the judge or the Court to decide them (*g*), but are properly left to the judge, as requiring legal training for their appreciation. So, where a question arises as to the admissibility of evidence, the facts upon which its admissibility depends are to be determined by the judge, and not by the jury. If the opposite course were adopted, it would be equivalent to leaving it to the jury to say whether a particular thing were evidence or not (*h*). And the question whether a document comes from the proper custody or whether it is properly stamped must be decided by the judge, for the jury are not sworn to try any such issues (*i*).

No case.

If at the close of the plaintiff's case there is no evidence upon which the jury could reasonably and properly find a verdict for him, the judge ought to direct a verdict for the defendant (*l*). Formerly, if there were a *scintilla* of evidence in support of a case, the judge was held bound to leave it to the jury. But a course of decisions, many of which are referred to in *Ryder v. Wombwell* (*m*), "has established a more reasonable rule, viz., that in every case, before the evidence is left to the jury, there is a preliminary question for the judge, not whether there is literally no evidence, but whether there is any upon which a jury can properly

(*g*) See *per* Ld. Abinger, *Startup v. Macdonald*, 7 Scott, N. R. 280; Co. Litt. 566; *Burton v. Griffiths*, 11 M. & W. 817; *Graham v. Van Diemen's Land Co.*, 11 Exch. 101; *per* Crompton, J., *G. W. R. Co. v. Crouch*, 3 H. & N. 189; *Hogg v. Ward*, Id. 417; *Goodwyn v. Cheveley*, 4 H. & N. 681; *Brighty v. Norton*, 3 B. & S. 305; *Massey v. Sladen*, L. R. 4 Ex. 13; *Shoreditch Vestry v. Hughes*, 17 C. B. N. S. 137.

(*h*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Bartlett v. Smith*, 11 M. & W. 486; *Boyle v. Wiseman*, 11 Ex. 360.

(*i*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *Heslop v. Chapman*, 23 L. J. Q. B. 52; *Siordet v. Kuczynski*, 17 C. B. 251; *per* Pollock, C.B., *Sharples v. Rickard*, 2 H. & N. 57; *Tattersall v. Fearnly*, 17 C. B. 368. See to the judgment of Ld. Abinger in *Watson v. Quilter*, 11 M. & W. 760, for other instances in which under particular statutes or at common law questions of fact were for the Court.

(*l*) See *Fox v. Star Co.*, [1900] A. C. 19.

(*m*) L. R. 4 Ex. 32.

proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed" (n). But where there is conflicting evidence upon a question of fact, whatever may be the opinion of the judge as to the value of that evidence, he must leave the consideration of it for the jury (o).

Whenever mixed questions of law and fact arise in a case tried before judge and jury, it is the judge's duty to give to the jury such a direction upon the law as will enable them to understand its bearing upon the facts (p). If his direction be wrong in giving them a wrong guide, or imperfect in not giving them the right guide which it was his duty to give (p), and some substantial wrong or miscarriage be thus occasioned (q), the appellate Court, in a civil case (r), should order a new trial. But in cases where the verdict is so far against the weight of the evidence as to be unreasonable or perverse (s), and where the Court is satisfied that it has all the material facts before it, the Court of Appeal may now, on motion for a new trial, give judgment for the party in whose favour the verdict ought to have been given (t).

In conclusion, it may be observed that, though there is a tendency to dispense with juries in many purely civil actions, yet in cases of a criminal and quasi-criminal nature, most persons will probably still agree with Lord Hardwicke, that "it is of the greatest consequence to the law of England and to the subject that these powers of the judge and jury be kept distinct, that the judge determine the law, and the

(n) *Judgm., Giblin v. McMullen*, L. R. 2 P. C. 336.

(o) *Dublin & Wicklow Ry. v. Slattery*, 3 App. Cas. 1155.

(p) *Prudential Assurance Co. v. Edmunds*, 2 App. Cas. 487, 507, per Ld. Blackburn.

(q) R. S. C. 1883, O. XXXIX., r. 6; see *Bray v. Ford*, [1896] A. C. 44: 65 L. J. Q. B. 213.

(r) A new trial cannot be had in

a case of felony; *Reg. v. Bertrand*, L. R. 1 P. C. 520; *Reg. v. Murphy*, 2 Id. 35.

(s) See *Met. R. Co. v. Wright*, 11 App. Cas. 152: 55 L. J. Q. B. 401.

(t) R. S. C. 1883, O. LVIII., r. 4; *Alcock v. Hall*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 444: 60 L. J. Q. B. 416; *Toulmin v. Miller*, 17 Q. B. D. 603; but see S. C., 12 App. Cas. 746.

jury the fact; and if ever they come to be confounded it will prove the confusion and destruction of the law of England" (u).

IN PRÆSENTIA MAJORIS CESSAT POTENTIA MINORIS. (*Jenk. Cent.* 214.)—*In presence of the greater the power of the inferior ceases* (x).

This maxim has been usually (y) cited with special reference to the transcendent nature of the powers vested formerly in the Court of King's Bench, and now in the King's Bench Division of the High Court (z).

It is the function of this Court to keep all inferior jurisdictions within the bounds of their authority and to correct irregularities in their proceedings. It commands magistrates and others to do what their duty requires in every case where there is no other specific remedy. It protects the liberty of the subject by speedy and summary interposition. It takes cognizance both of criminal and civil causes; the former in what is called the Crown side, or Crown Office; the latter in the plea side of the Court (a). To it also appeal lies from some inferior criminal Courts.

To this supremacy of the Court of King's Bench may be attributed the fact that on its coming into any county the power and authority of other criminal tribunals therein situate were *pro tempore* suspended (b); *in præsentia majoris cessat potestas minoris* (c). It has been held (d), however, that the authority of a Court of Quarter Sessions, whether for a county or a borough, is not in law either determined

(u) *R. v. Poole*, Cas. tem. Hardw. 28.

(x) See the maxim, *Omne majus continet in se minus*, *post*, Chap. IV.

(y) See 10 Rep. 73 b; *Ld. Sanchez's case*, 9 Rep. 118 b; 2 Inst. 166.

(z) Judicature Act, 1873, s. 34.

(a) *Reg. v. Gillyard*, 12 Q. B. 530.

(b) 4 Inst. 73: see 25 Geo. 3, c. 18, s. 1.

(c) *Per Coleridge, J.*, 13 Q. B. 740.

(d) *Smith v. Reg.*, 13 Q. B. 738, 744.

or suspended by the coming of the judges into the county under their commission of assize, oyer and terminer, and general gaol delivery, though "it would be highly inconvenient and improper, generally speaking, for the magistrates of a county to hold their sessions concurrently with the assizes, even in a different part of the county."

§ II. THE MODE OF ADMINISTERING JUSTICE.

Having in the last section considered some maxims relating peculiarly to the judicial office, the reader is here presented with a few which have been selected in order to show the mode in which justice is administered in our Courts, and which relate rather to the rules of practice than to the legal principles observed there.

AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM. *No man should be condemned unheard.*

It has long been a received rule (c), that no one is to be condemned, punished, or deprived of his property in any judicial proceeding, unless he has had an opportunity of being heard (f). In the words of the moralist and poet—

Statement of Rule.

*Quicumque aliquid statuerit, parte inaudita altera,
Æquum licet statuerit, haud æquus fuerit (g).*

A writ of sequestration, therefore, cannot properly issue Examples.

(e) It is "an indispensable requirement of justice that the party who has to decide shall hear both sides, giving each an opportunity of hearing what is urged against him;" *per Erle, C.J.*, 16 C. B. N. S. 416.

(f) *Per Parke, B., Re Hammer-smith Rent-charge*, 4 Ex. 97; *per Ld. Campbell, Reg. v. Archbp. of Canterbury*, 1 E. & E. 559; *per Ld. Kenyon, Harper v. Carr*, 4 R. R. 440; 7 T. R.

275, and *R. v. Benn*, 6 Id. 198; *per Bayley, B., Capel v. Child*, 2 Cr. & J. 558 (see *Daniel v. Morton*, 16 Q. B. 198); *Bagg's case*, 11 Rep. 93 b; *R. v. Chancellor of University of Cambridge*, 1 Str. 557; *R. v. Gaskin*, 8 T. R. 209; 4 R. R. 633; *Reg. v. Saddlers' Co.*, 10 H. L. Cas. 404.

(g) *Seneca, Medea*, 195; cited 6 Rep. 52 a; 11 Rep. 99 a; 4 Ex. 97; 14 C. B. 165; 3 App. Cas. 624.

from the Consistory Court of the Diocese to a vicar who has disobeyed a monition from his bishop, without previous notice to the vicar to show cause why it should not issue; for the sequestration is a proceeding partly *in pœnam*, and no proposition is more clearly established than that "a man cannot incur the loss of liberty or property for an offence by a judicial proceeding until he has had a fair opportunity of answering the charge against him, unless, indeed, the legislature has expressly or impliedly given an authority to act without that necessary preliminary" (*h*).

An award made in violation of the above principle may be set aside (*i*); and the principle is binding upon the committee of a members' club when they expel a member for alleged misconduct (*j*).

No person should be punished for contempt of Court, which is a criminal offence, unless the specific offence charged against him be distinctly stated, and an opportunity of answering it be given to him (*k*). "The laws of God and man," said Fortescue, J., in *Dr. Bentley's case* (*l*), "both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any." And immemorial custom cannot avail in contravention of this principle (*m*).

In conformity also with the elementary principle under consideration, when a complaint has been made or an information exhibited before justice of the peace, the

(*h*) *Bonaker v. Evans*, 16 Q. B. 162, 171, followed, but distinguished in *Bartlett v. Kirwood*, 2 E. & B. 771. See *Daniel v. Morton*, 16 Q. B. 198; *Ex p. Hopwood*, 15 Id. 121; *Ex p. Story*, 8 Ex. 195; 12 C. B. 767, 775; *Reynolds v. Fenton*, 3 C. B. 187; *Mecus v. Thellusson*, 8 Ex. 638; *Ferguson v. Mahon*, 11 A. & E. 179; *Reg. v. Cheshire Lines Committee*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 344.

(*i*) *Thorburn v. Barnes*, L. R. 2 C. P. 384, 401; *Re Brook*, 16 C. B. N. S. 403.

(*j*) *Fisher v. Keane*, 11 Ch. D. 353; see *Baird v. Wells*, 44 Id. 661.

(*k*) *Re Pollard*, L. R. 2 P. C. 106, 120.

(*l*) *R. v. Chancellor of Cambridge*, 1 Str. 557; per Maule, J., *Abley v. Dale*, 10 C. B. 71; per Ld. Campbell, *Ex p. Ramshay*, 18 Q. B. 190; per Byles, J., 14 C. B. N. S. 194.

(*m*) *Williams v. Ld. Bagot*, 3 B. & C. 772.

accused person has due notice given him, by summons or otherwise, of the accusation against him, in order that he may have an opportunity of answering it (*n*).

A statute establishing a gas-light company enacted that if any person should neglect, for a period of ten days after demand, to pay rent due from him to the company for gas supplied, the rent should be recoverable by a warrant of justice and execution thereunder. A warrant issued by a justice under this Act, without previously summoning and hearing the party to be distrained upon, was held to be illegal, though a summons and hearing were not in terms required by the Act; for the warrant is in the nature of an execution; without a summons the party charged has no opportunity of going to the justice, and a man shall not "suffer in person or in purse without an opportunity of being heard" (*o*).

The Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855, s. 76, empowered the vestry or district board to alter or demolish a house where the builder had neglected to give notice of his intention to build seven days before proceeding to lay or dig the foundation. It was held that this enactment did not empower the board to demolish such building without first giving the party guilty of the omission an opportunity of being heard (*p*), for "a tribunal which is by law invested with power to affect the property of one of Her Majesty's subjects, is bound to give such subject an opportunity of being heard before it proceeds," and "that rule is of universal application and founded upon the plainest principles of justice" (*q*).

(*n*) Paley, Conv., 4th ed. 67, 93.
See *Bessell v. Wilson*, 1 E. & B. 489.

(*o*) *Painter v. Liverpool Gaslight Co.*, 3 A. & E. 433; *Hammond v. Bendyshe*, 13 Q. B. 869; *Reg. v. Totnes Union*, 7 Id. 690; *Bessell v. Wilson*, 1 E. & B. 489; *Gibbs v. Stead*, 8 B. & C. 528.

(*p*) *Cooper v. Wandsworth Board of Works*, 14 C. B. N. S. 180, cited by Byles, J., *Re Brook*, 16 Id. 419; *Hopkins v. Smethwick L. B.*, 24 Q. B. D. 712; 59 L. J. Q. B. 250.

(*q*) *Per Willes, J.*, 14 C. B. N. S. 170.

Although cases may be found in the books of decisions under particular statutes which at first sight seem to conflict with the maxim, it will be found on consideration that they are not inconsistent with it, for the rule, which is one of elementary justice, only requires that a man shall not be subject to final judgment or to punishment without an opportunity of being heard (*r*).

NEMO DEBET ESSE JUDEX IN PROPRIA SUA CAUSA. (12 *Rep.* 114.)—*No man can be judge in his own cause.*

Rule.

It is a fundamental rule in the administration of justice, that a person cannot be judge in a cause wherein he is interested (*s*); *nemo sibi esse judex vel suis jus dicere debet* (*t*); and, therefore, in the reign of James I., it was solemnly adjudged that the king cannot take any cause, whether civil or criminal, out of any of his Courts, and give judgment upon it himself; but it must be determined and adjudged in some Court of justice according to the law and custom of England; and “the judges informed the king that no king, after the Conquest, assumed to himself to give any judgment in any case whatsoever which concerned the administration of justice within this realm; but these were solely determined in the Courts of justice” (*u*), and *rex non debet esse sub homine sed sub Deo et lege* (*x*).

It is, then, a rule observed in practice, and of the application of which instances not unfrequently occur, that, where a judge is interested in the result of a cause, he

(*r*) *Re Hammersmith Rent-charge*, 4 Ex. 87, citing *Re Camberwell Rent-charge*, 4 Q. B. 151; *per* Alderson, B., 4 Ex. 95.

(*s*) *Per Cur.*, 2 Stra. 1173; Roll. Abr. Judges, Pl. 11; 4 H. L. Cas. 96, 240.

(*t*) C. 3, 5, 1.

(*u*) *Prohibitions del Roy*, 12 Rep.

63 (cited *Bridgman v. Holt*, 2 Show. P. Ca. 126); 4 Inst. 71. In *Gorham v. Bp. of Exeter*, 15 Q. B. 52; 10 C. B. 102; 5 Ex. 630, an argument based on the above maxim was vainly urged. See also *Ex p. Medwin*, 1 E. & B. 609; *R. v. Hoseason*, 14 East, 606.

(*x*) Fleta, fo. 2, c. 5; *ante*, p. 33.

cannot, either personally or by deputy, sit in judgment upon it (*y*). If, for instance, a plea allege a prescriptive right in the lord of the manor to seize cattle damage feasant, and to detain the distress until fine paid for the damages at the lord's will, this prescription will be void, and the plea bad; because it is against reason, if wrong be done any man, that he thereof should be his own judge (*z*); and it is a maxim of law, that *aliquis non debet esse iudex in propria causâ, quia non potest esse iudex et pars* (*a*); *nemo potest esse simul actor et iudex* (*b*); no man can be at once judge and suitor.

A leading case in illustration of this maxim is *Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal Co.* (*c*), where the House of Lords, following the unanimous opinion of the judges, held that the decrees of Lord Cottenham, L.C., in favour of the canal company were voidable and must be reversed, on the ground that when he made the decrees he was a shareholder of the company and this fact was unknown to the other parties to the suit. "It is of the last importance," said Lord Campbell, "that the maxim that 'no man is to be a judge in his own cause' should be held sacred. And that is not to be confined to a cause in which he is a party, but applies to a cause in which he has an interest. . . . We have again and again set aside proceedings in inferior tribunals, because an individual, who had an interest in a cause, took a part in the decision. And it will have a most salutary effect on these tribunals when it is known that this High Court of last resort, in a case in which the Lord Chancellor of

*Dimes v.
Grand Junction Canal
Co.*

(*y*) *Brooks v. Earl of Rivers*, Hardw. 503; *Earl of Derby's case*, 12 Rep. 114; *per Holt, C.J., Anon.*, 1 Salk. 396; *Worsley v. S. Devon R. Co.*, 16 Q. B. 539.

(*z*) Litt. § 212.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 141 a.

(*b*) See *Reg. v. G. W. R. Co.*, 13 Q. B. 327; *Reg. v. Dean of Rochester*, 17 Q. B. 1; followed in

Reg. v. Rand, L. R. 1 Q. B. 230, 233; *Re Ollerton*, 15 C. B. 796; *Re Chandler*, 1 C. B. N. S. 323.

(*c*) 3 H. L. Cas. 759; as to which see *L. N. W. R. Co. v. Lindsay*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 114; *Re Dimes*, 14 Q. B. 554; *Ellis v. Hopper*, 3 H. & N. 766; *Williams v. G. W. R. Co.*, Id. 869; *Lancaster & Carlisle R. Co. v. Heaton*, 8 E. & B. 952.

England had an interest, considered that his decree was on that account a decree not according to law, and should be set aside. This will be a lesson to all inferior tribunals to take care, not only that in their decrees they are not influenced by their personal interest, but to avoid the appearance of labouring under such an influence."

The opinion delivered by the judges in this case (*d*) shows, however, that the decision of a judge made in a cause in which he has an interest is, in a case of necessity, unimpeachable, *ex. gr.*, if an action were brought against all the judges of a Court in a matter over which that Court had exclusive jurisdiction (*e*), or where a judge commits for contempt of Court (*f*). Nor does the principle under consideration apply to avoid the award of a referee to whom, though necessarily interested in the result, parties have contracted to submit their differences (*g*), though ordinarily it is "contrary to reason that an arbitrator or umpire should be sole and uncontrolled judge in his own cause" (*h*).

Conformable to the general rule was a decision in the following case. Upon an appeal to the Quarter Sessions of the borough of Cambridge, by a water company against an assessment to the poor rate, the deputy recorder of the borough presiding, the rate was reduced; at the time of hearing the appeal the deputy recorder was a shareholder in the company, and although he had in fact sold his shares he had not completed the transfer; he was held incompetent to try the appeal (*i*).

In like manner, proceedings had before commissioners under a statute which forbade persons to act in that capacity when interested, have been adjudged void (*k*).

(*d*) 3 H. L. Cas. 787; citing Year Book, 8 Hen. 6, 19: 2 Roll. Abr. 93.

(*e*) *Per* Id. Cranworth, C., *Ranger v. G. W. R. Co.*, 5 H. L. Cas. 88. See *Ex p. Menhennet*, L. R. 5 C. P. 16.

(*f*) *Per* Field, J., *Reg. v. Bp. of St. Albans*, 9 Q. B. D. 454, 457.

(*g*) *Ranger v. G. W. R. Co.*, 5 H. L. Cas. 72.

(*h*) *Per* Parke, B., *Re Coombs*, 4 Ex. 841.

(*i*) *Reg. v. Recorder of Cambridge*, 8 E. & B. 637.

(*k*) *Reg. v. Aberdare Canal Co.*, 14 Q. B. 854.

Any direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject-matter of inquiry will disqualify a judge (*l*), and any interest, though not pecuniary, will have the same effect, if it be sufficiently substantial to create a reasonable suspicion of bias (*m*). Thus, a justice of the peace may be disqualified if he himself be a litigant in a matter before the Court (*n*), or a party in a similar matter (*o*); but he is not precluded from trying offences under the Cruelty to Animals Prevention Act, merely because he is a subscriber to the society formed for the purpose of enforcing the Act (*p*). Nor is a justice disqualified from acting as a member of the licensing committee by reason of his being a member of a temperance association organized to oppose the granting of licenses, or a shareholder in a brewery company which sells beer in the district (*q*). Nor is a justice disqualified from adjudicating upon a summons against a ratepayer in arrear merely because he is a member of a town council, whose officer took out the summons (*r*).

It may be generally stated that a justice, who is interested in a matter pending before the Court of Quarter Sessions,

(*l*) *Per* Blackburn, J., *Reg. v. Rand*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 232; *Reg. v. Gaisford*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 381: 61 L. J. M. C. 50. See *Reg. v. M. S. & L. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 336, 339; *Fobbing Commrs. v. The Queen*, 11 App. Cas. 449: 56 L. J. M. C. 1.

(*m*) *Allinson v. Gen. Council of Medical Education*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 750: 66 L. J. Q. B. 534; *Reg. v. Burton*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 468: 66 L. J. Q. B. 831; *Reg. v. Huggins*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 563: 64 L. J. M. C. 149.

(*n*) *Reg. v. Meyers*, 1 Q. B. D. 173.

(*o*) *Reg. v. Great Yarmouth JJ.*, 8 Q. B. D. 525: 51 L. J. M. C. 39.

(*p*) *Reg. v. Mayor of Deal*, 45 L. T. 439: 30 W. R. 154.

(*q*) *Rex v. Dublin JJ.*, [1904] 2 Ir. 75; *Rex v. Tempest*, 86 L. T. 585.

(*r*) *R. v. Handsley*, 8 Q. B. D. 383; 51 L. J. M. C. 137; where *R. v. Gibbon*, 6 Id. 168, was disapproved. *Sed aliter* if the justice is connected with the prosecution; *R. v. Milledge*, 4 Q. B. D. 332: 48 L. J. M. C. 139; *R. v. Lee*, 9 Q. B. D. 394; see *R. v. Huntingdon*, 4 Q. B. D. 522; *R. v. Farrant*, 20 Q. B. D. 58; and see *Rex v. Sunderland JJ.*, 70 L. J. K. B. 946: [1901] 2 K. B. 357, where justices, as members of a corporation interested, were held disqualified, because in the circumstances there was a real likelihood of bias.

may not take any part in the proceedings, unless indeed all parties know that he is interested and consent, either tacitly or expressly, to his presence and interference (s). In such a case it has been held that the presence of one interested justice renders the Court improperly constituted, and vitiates the proceedings; it is immaterial that there was a majority in favour of the decision, without reckoning the vote of the interested justice (t). And, on the same principle, where a grand jury at assizes threw out a bill preferred against a parish for non-repair of a road, the Court of Queen's Bench granted a criminal information against the parish, on the ground that two of the grand jurors were large landowners therein, and had taken part in the proceedings on the bill (u); for "it is very important that no magistrate, who is interested in the case before the Court, should interfere, while it is being heard, in any way that may create a suspicion that the decision is influenced by his presence or interference" (v).

The mere presence on the bench, however, of an interested justice during part of the hearing of a case, will not be deemed sufficient ground for setting aside an order of sessions made on such hearing, if it be shown that he took no part in the hearing, came into Court for a different purpose, and in no way influenced the decision (x).

Hobart, C.J., is reported to have said (y) that "even an

(s) *Reg. v. Cheltenham Commrs.*, 1 Q. B. 467; *Wakefield Board of Health v. W. Riding R. Co.*, 6 B. & S. 794; *Reg. v. W. Riding JJ.*, Id. 802. "Nothing is better settled than this, that a party aware of the objection of interest cannot take the chance of a decision in his favour, and afterwards raise the objection." *Per Cockburn, C.J.*, 6 B. & S. 802. See also *R. v. Great Yarmouth JJ.*, 8 Q.-B. D. 525: 51 L. J. M. C. 39.

(t) *Reg. v. Hertfordshire JJ.*, 6 Q. B. 753. See *R. v. Meyers*, 1

Q. B. D. 173; *Reg. v. London County Council*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 190: 61 L. J. M. C. 75: *R. v. Lancashire JJ.*, 75 L. J. K. B. 198.

(u) *Reg. v. Upton St. Leonard's*, 10 Q. B. 827. See *Esdaile v. Lund*, 12 M. & W. 734.

(v) *Per Wightman, J.*, *Reg. v. Suffolk JJ.*, 18 Q. B. 416, 421. See *Reg. v. Surrey JJ.*, 21 L. J. M. C. 195.

(x) *Reg. v. London JJ.*, 18 Q. B. 421 (e).

(y) *Day v. Savadge*, Hob. 85, 87, cited arg. 5 Exch. 671.

Act of Parliament made against natural equity, as to make a man a judge in his own case, is void in itself; for *jura nature sunt immutabilia* and they are *leges legum*." But although it is contrary to the general rule to make a person judge in his own cause, "the legislature can, and no doubt in a proper case would, depart from that general rule," and an intention to do so being clearly expressed, the Courts give effect to their enactment (z). And if a particular relation be created by statute between A. and B., and a duty be imposed upon A. to investigate and decide upon charges preferred against B., the maxim *nemo sibi esse judex vel suis jus dicere debet* would not apply (a).

Lastly, there is no ground whatever for saying that the governor of a colony cannot give his official consent to a legislative measure in which he may be individually interested. It might as well be asserted that the sovereign of these realms could not give assent to a bill in Parliament in which the sovereign was personally concerned" (b).

ACTUS CURIE NEMINEM GRAVABIT. (*Jenk. Cent.* 118.)—*An act of the Court shall prejudice no man.*

This maxim "is founded upon justice and good sense; and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law" (c). In virtue of it, where a case stands over for argument on account of the multiplicity of business in the Court, or for judgment from the intricacy of the

(z) *Per Blackburn, J., Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs*, L. R. 1 H. L. 110. See *Ex p. Workington Overseers*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 416; *Reg. v. Bolingbroke*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 347; 62 L. J. M. C. 180; *Reg. v. Henley*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 504; 61 L. J. M. C. 135.

The 40 Vict. c. 11, enacts that no judge of the superior Courts shall be disqualified from acting in any pro-

ceeding upon the ground that he is a ratepayer, or interested in a rating question.

(a) *Wildes v. Russell*, L. R. 1 C. P. 722, 747; *Reg. v. Bp. of St. Albans*, 9 Q. B. D. 454.

(b) *Phillips v. Eyre*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 244.

(c) *Per Cresswell, J.*, 12 C. B. 415.

question, the party ought not to be prejudiced by that delay, but should be allowed to enter up his judgment retrospectively to meet the justice of the case (*d*); and, therefore, if one party to an action die during a *curia advisari vult*, judgment may be entered *nunc pro tunc*, for the delay is the act of the Court, for which neither party should suffer (*e*).

In a case involving issues both of law and fact, the issues of fact were tried in August, 1843, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, and a rule for a new trial was discharged in Trinity Term, 1844; in the same term the demurrers were set down in the special paper, but did not come on for argument until May, 1845, when judgment was given upon them for the plaintiff. The plaintiff, having died in March, 1845, the Court made absolute a rule to enter judgment as of Trinity Term, 1844 (*f*). It may be here mentioned that the power of the Court to enter judgment *nunc pro tunc* does not depend upon statute (*g*). It is a power at common law, and, in accordance with the ancient practice of the Court, is adopted in order to prevent prejudice to a suitor from delay occasioned by the act of the Court (*h*).

Where, however, the delay is not attributable to the act of the Court, the above maxim does not apply (*i*).

(*d*) *Per* Garrow, B., 1 Y. & J. 372.

(*e*) *Cumber v. Wane*, 1 Stra. 425; *Moor v. Roberts*, 3 C. B. N. S. 844; *per* Tindal, C.J., *Harrison v. Heathorn*, 6 Scott, N. R. 797; *Toulmin v. Anderson*, 1 Taunt. 384; Jenk. Cent. 180. See *Lanman v. Ld. Audley*, 2 M. & W. 535; *Turner v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 17 Eq. 561; *Ecroyd v. Coulthard*, [1897] 2 Ch. 554; R. S. C. 1883, O. XLII., r. 3; O. XVII., r. 1.

(*f*) *Miles v. Bough*, 3 D. & L. 105; recognising *Lawrence v. Hodgson*, 1 Yo. & J. 368, and *Brydges v. Smith*,

8 Bing. 29; *Miles v. Williams*, 9 Q. B. 47.

(*g*) As to the effect of 17 Car. 2, c. 8, and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 139, see Archbold's Practice, 14th ed. 1029.

(*h*) *Evans v. Rees*, 12 A. & E. 167; *Miles v. Bough*, *supra*, and cases there cited; *Vaughan v. Wilson*, 4 B. N. C. 116; *Green v. Cobden*, 4 Scott, 486.

(*i*) *Freeman v. Tranah*, 12 C. B. 406; recognised in *Heathcote v. Wing*, 11 Ex. 358; *Fishmongers' Co. v. Robertson*, 3 C. B. 970.



The preceding examples will probably be sufficient to illustrate the general doctrine, which is equally founded on common sense and on authority, that the act of a Court of law shall prejudice no man; and in conformity with this doctrine, it has been observed, that, as long as there remains a necessity, in any stage of the proceedings in an action, for an appeal to the authority of the Court, or any occasion to call upon it to exercise its jurisdiction, the Court has, even if there has been some express arrangement between the parties, an undoubted right, and is, moreover, bound to interfere, if it perceives that its own process or jurisdiction is about to be used for purposes which are not consistent with justice (*k*).

Cases, however, have occurred, in which injury was caused by the act of a legal tribunal, as by the *laches* or mistake of its officer; and where, notwithstanding the maxim as to *actus curiæ*, the injured party was without redress (*l*).

Lastly, it is the duty of a judge to try the causes set down for trial before him, and yet, if he refused to hold his Court, although there might be a complaint in Parliament respecting his conduct, no action would lie against him (*m*). So, in the case of a petition to the Crown to establish a peerage, if, in consequence of the absence of peers, a committee for privileges could not be held, the claimant, although necessarily put to great expense, and perhaps exposed to the loss of his peerage by death of witnesses, would be wholly without redress (*n*). In the

(*k*) *Wade v. Simeon*, 13 M. & W. 647; *Thomson v. Harding*, 3 C. B. N. S. 254; *Sherborn v. Ld. Huntingtower*, 13 Id. 742; *Burns v. Chapman*, 5 Id. 481, 492.

(*l*) See *Grace v. Clinch*, 4 Q. B. 606; *Leech v. Lamb*, 11 Ex. 487; *Re Llanbeblig and Llandyffrydog*, 15 L. J. M. C. 92. In *Winn v. Nicholson*, 7 C. B. 824, however,

Coltman, J., remarked that "no doubt, the Court will correct the mistake of its own officer." See *Wilkes v. Perks*, 5 M. & Gr. 376; *Nazer v. Wade*, 1 B. & S. 728; *Morgan v. Morris*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 323; R. S. C. 1883, O. XXVIII. r. 11.

(*m*) *Ante*, pp. 70, *et seq.*

(*n*) Arg. 9 Cl. & F. 276.

above and other similar cases a wrong might be inflicted by a judicial tribunal, for which the law could supply no remedy.

ACTUS LEGIS NEMINI EST DAMNOSUS. (2 *Inst.* 287.)—*An act in law shall prejudice no man (o).*

A distinction has often been drawn, in accordance with this maxim, between the act of the law and the act of a party. Thus, where an advowson is owned by two patrons with the right to present in turn, the one loses his turn if he submit to a presentation usurped by the other, or by a stranger; but his turn is merely postponed to the next vacancy, if the Crown, having emptied the living, refill it by virtue of the prerogative; for this, being the act of the law, *nemini facit injuriam (p)*. Again, in the case of a lease with a condition for re-entry, the condition being entire was not apportionable, at common law (*q*), upon the reversion becoming severed by the act of the lessor; yet it was apportionable, if the severance arose by act of law (*r*). Similarly, an involuntary assignment by operation or compulsion of law is no breach of a covenant or condition in a lease against assignment (*s*).

If a person abuse an authority given by the law, he becomes a trespasser *ab initio*, as if he had never had that authority; which is not the case where an authority given by a party is abused (*t*); and this distinction has been

(o) 6 Rep. 68.

(p) *Keen v. Denny*, [1894] 3 Ch. 169; 64 L. J. Ch. 55; *Calland v. Troward*, 2 H. Bl. 324; 3 R. R. 389; *Grocers' Co. v. Archbp. of Canterbury*, 2 W. Bl. 769; Co. Litt. 378 a.

(q) See 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 12; 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 3.

(r) Co. Litt. 215 a; *Dumpor's case*, 4 Rep. 120 b.

(s) *Doe v. Carter*, 4 R. R. 536; 8 T. R. 57, 301 (execution); *Doe v. Smith*, 15 R. R. 660; 5 Taunt, 795 (bankruptcy); *Baily v. De Crespigny*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180 (exercise of statutory powers).

(t) *Six Carpenters' Case*, 8 Rep. 290. For certain statutory modifications of the rule, see notes to S. C., 1 Sm. L. C.

ascribed to the principle that the law wrongs no man :
actus legis nemini facit injuriam (u).

EXECUTIO JURIS NON HABET INJURIAM. (2 Inst. 482.)—*Legal process, if regular, does not afford a cause of action.*

It was a rule of the Roman law, as it is of our own, that if an action be brought in a Court which has jurisdiction upon insufficient grounds or against the wrong party, no injury is thereby done for which an action can be maintained—*Is qui jure publico utitur non videtur injuriæ faciendæ causâ hoc facere, juris enim executio non habet injuriam* (x); and *nullus videtur dolo facere qui suo jure utitur* (y), he is not to be esteemed a wrongdoer who merely avails himself of his legal rights. This is the primary meaning of the maxim. On the other hand, if an individual, under colour of the law, does an illegal act, or if he abuses the process of the Court to make it an instrument of oppression or extortion,

(u) Bac. Abr. Trespass (B.). For other examples of the maxim, see *Milbourn v. Ewart*, 5 T. R. 381, 385; *Nadin v. Battie*, 5 East, 146; 1 Prest. Abs. of Tit. 346.

(x) D. 47, 10, 13, s. 1; Hobart, 266; 11 Q. B. D. 690.

(y) D. 50, 17, 55.

In connection with this rule may be noticed the following cases :—If an individual prefer a complaint to a magistrate and procure a warrant to be granted upon which the accused is taken into custody, the complainant is not liable in trespass for the imprisonment, even though the magistrate had no jurisdiction; *Brown v. Chapman*, 6 C. B. 365, 376. One who mistakenly prefers a charge against another before a magistrate will not be liable in trespass for a remand judicially ordered by him; *Lock v. Ashton*,

12 Q. B. 871. See also *Freegard v. Barnes*, 7 Ex. 827. Nor is an execution creditor liable to a person whose goods have been wrongfully taken in execution for damage sustained by their sale under an interpleader order; *Walker v. Olding*, 1 H. & C. 621. The above and similar cases seem referable to the rule, *nullus videtur dolo facere qui jure suo utitur*.

On the other hand, a defendant who was taken in execution under a *ca. sa.* issued on a judgment for less than £20, without the order of the judge who tried the cause, could maintain an action of trespass against the plaintiff and his attorney; *Brooks v. Hodgkinson*, 4 H. & N. 712. See *Gilding v. Eyre*, 10 C. B. N. S. 592; *Huffer v. Allen*, L. R. 2 Ex. 15.

this is a fraud upon the law, by the commission of which liability will be incurred (z). In this, which is obviously a different sense, the leading maxim has also been applied.

In a leading case (a), illustrative of this latter proposition, the facts were as follows:—A *ca. sa.* was sued out against the Countess of Rutland, but the officers entrusted with the execution of the sheriff's warrant fearing a rescue, the plaintiff was advised to enter a feigned action in London, according to the custom, against the countess, to arrest her thereupon, and then to take her body in execution on the *ca. sa.* In pursuance of this advice, the Countess was arrested and taken to the Compter, "and at the door thereof the sheriff came, and carried the countess to his house, where she remained seven or eight days, till she paid the debt." It was held, however, that the arrest was not made by force of the writ of execution, and was, therefore, illegal; "and the entering of such feigned action was utterly condemned by the whole Court, for, by colour of law and justice, they, by such feigned means, do against law and justice, and so make law and justice the author and cause of wrong and injustice."

Again, in *Hooper v. Lane* (b) it was held in accordance with the spirit of the maxim under our notice, that if the sheriff, having in his hands two writs of *ca. sa.*, the one valid and the other invalid, arrest on the latter alone, he cannot justify the arrest under the valid writ. Nor can the sheriff, whilst a person is unlawfully in his custody by virtue of an arrest on an invalid writ, arrest that person on a good writ: "to allow the sheriff to make such an arrest while the party is unlawfully confined by him, would be to

(z) See *per* Pollock, C.B., *Smith v. Monteith*, 13 M. & W. 439; cf. *per* Ld. Watson, [1898] A. C. 731, 732. "The Court has a general superintending power to prevent its process from being used for the purpose of oppression and injustice;" *per*

Jervis, C.J., *Webb v. Adkins*, 14 C. B. 407. See *Alleyne v. Reg.*, 5 E. & B. 399; *McGregor v. Barrett*, 6 C. B. 262.

(a) *Countess of Rutland's case*, 6 Rep. 53.

(b) 6 H. L. Cas. 443.

permit him to profit by his own wrong (c) and therefore cannot be tolerated" (d).

We shall hereafter (e) have occasion to consider the general doctrine respecting the right to recover money paid under compulsion. We may, however, here observe that, where compulsion consists in an illegal restraint of liberty, a contract entered into by reason thereof is voidable. If a man is under duress of imprisonment, or if, the imprisonment being lawful, he is subjected to illegal force and privation, and in order to obtain his liberty, or to avoid such illegal hardship, he enters into a contract, he may allege this duress in avoidance of the contract; but an imprisonment is not sufficient duress to avoid a contract obtained through the medium of its coercion, if the party was in proper custody under the regular process of a Court of competent jurisdiction; and this distinction results from the rule of law, *executio juris non habet injuriam* (f).

Further, although, as elsewhere stated, an action will not lie to recover damages for the inconvenience occasioned to a party who had been sued by another without reasonable or sufficient cause (g), yet, if the proceedings in the action were against A., and a writ of execution is issued by mistake against the goods of B., trespass will clearly lie, at suit of the latter, against the execution creditor (h), or against his attorney, who issued execution (i); and where

(c) *Post*, Chap. V.

(d) *Per* Ld. Cranworth, 6 H. L. Cas. 551.

(e) See the maxim, *volenti non fit injuria*, *post*, Chap. V.

(f) 2 Inst. 482; *Stepney v. Lloyd*, Cro. Eliz. 646; *Anon.*, 1 Lev. 68; *Waterer v. Freeman*, Hobart, 266; *R. v. Southerton*, 6 East, 140; 8 R. R. 428; *Anon.*, Ayleyn, R. 92; 2 Roll. R. 301.

(g) *Per* Rolfe, B., 11 M. & W. 756; and cases cited under the

maxim *ubi jus, ibi remedium*, *post*, Chap. V.

(h) *Jarmain v. Hooper*, 7 Scott, N. R. 663; *Walley v. M'Connell*, 13 Q. B. 903; see *Riseley v. Ryle*, 11 M. & W. 16; *Collett v. Foster*, 2 H. & N. 356; *Churchill v. Siggers*, 3 E. and B. 929; *Roret v. Lewis*, 5 D. & L. 371; *Dimmack v. Bowley*, 2 C. B. N. S. 542.

(i) *Davies v. Jenkins*, 11 M. & W. 745; *Rowles v. Senior*, 8 Q. B. 677, and cases there cited.

an attorney deliberately directs the execution of a warrant, he, by so doing, takes upon himself the chance of all consequences, and will be liable in trespass if it prove bad (*k*). In cases similar to the above, however, the maxim as to *executio juris* is applicable, if at all, only in the secondary sense above noticed; because the proceedings actually taken are *not* sanctioned by the law, and therefore the party taking them, although acting under the colour of legal process, is not protected.

IN FICTIONE JURIS SEMPER ÆQUITAS EXISTIT. (11 Rep. 51.)—*Equity is the life of a legal fiction* (*l*).

The meaning of *fiction* in English law is not easily defined. *Fictio*, in the Roman system, was a technical form of pleading, a false averment by one party which the other was not allowed to traverse; *ex. gr.*, that a *peregrinus* was a Roman citizen (*m*). It is, therefore, defined by commentators as *nihil aliud quam legis adversus veritatem in re possibili ex justâ causâ dispositio* (*n*). The strict meaning of fiction in English jurisprudence is closely allied to *præsumptio juris et de jure*, or irrebuttable presumption of law. There is, however, this difference, that a presumption of law *de jure* assumes a fact which may or may not be true, but which is probably true; while in fiction the falsehood of the assumption is understood and avowed (*o*). *Super falso et certo fingitur, super incerto et vero jure sumitur*. Thus the *presumption* that a child under seven is *doli incapax* is probably true, but the *fiction* was almost certainly false that the plaintiff in former times suing

(*k*) *Green v. Elgie*, 5 Q. B. 99.

(*l*) 3 Bl. Com. 43; Co. Litt. 150 a;
10 Rep. 40 a; 11 Rep. 50 a.

(*m*) Mayne, Ancient Law, Ch. 2.

(*n*) Gothofred ad Dig. lib. 22, tit.

3, s. 3; *Sheffield v. Radcliffe*, 2 Rol. R. 502; Palm. 354; Finch, C. L. Bk. 1, c. 5.

(*o*) Best on Presumptions of Law, p. 24.

in the Court of Exchequer was an accountant to the Crown (*p*), and avowedly so that a contract made on the high seas had been made at the Royal Exchange in London (*q*). The object of fiction will be apparent if it be considered that every decision of a Court of justice involves a syllogism, of which the major premiss is a general proposition of law, the minor is supported by the facts of the particular case, and the conclusion is the decision of the Court. In the infancy of jurisprudence propositions of law were rigid, unbending rules, which lawyers were loth to qualify or weaken by exceptions. In order to arrive at that conclusion to the syllogism which justice obviously demanded, the *major* premiss was not touched, but by a fiction of law something was assumed in the *minor* which was avowedly not true. An examination of the older cases seems to show that fiction originally operated by an averment in the record, which, although known to be false, was for the purpose of doing substantial justice assumed to be true. It must, however, be remarked that fiction is frequently employed in a less accurate sense to include the extension by Courts of equity of rules of law (*r*). The modification of pleading in modern times has tended to diminish the operation of fiction strictly so called, although the effect of its former prevalence is probably ineradicable. The tendency to set out with truth and detail the actual facts of a case is incompatible with the use of fictitious averments, which are no longer necessary, when the rules of law are themselves modified and developed so as to meet

(*p*) 3 Bl. Com. 46.

(*q*) 3 Bl. Com. 107; 4 Inst. 134.

(*r*) The doctrine that "money to be laid out in land is to be treated as land," long established in Courts of equity, "is in truth a mere fiction;" see *per* Kelly, C.B., *Re De Lancey*, L. R. 4 Ex. 358; S. C., 5 Id. 102. So the doctrine that a deed executing a power refers back to the instru-

ment creating the power, so that the appointee takes under him who created the power, and not under him who executes it, has been called a fiction; and so it was considered in *Bartlett v. Ramsden*, 1 Keb. 570. See also *per* Ld. Hardwicke, *Duke of Marlborough v. Ld. Godolphin*, 2 Ves. Sen. 78, who explains the above proposition; *Clere's case*, 6 Rep. 17.

the ends of justice. The analogy between fiction and presumption *juris et de jure* has been already noticed. It may here be added, that while the latter may never be rebutted, and are absolute propositions of the law; of fiction, it has been said, "although it shall never be contradicted so as to defeat the ends for which it was invented, for every other purpose it may be contradicted" (s). It is not to be used at all, except "*ad conciliandam æquitatem cum ratione et subtilitate juris*" (t). Since equity is the life of legal fiction, where substantial justice does not require its interference, still more where it would suffer from its operation, fiction has no place (u). Fictions, therefore, are only to be made for necessity, and to avoid mischief (x), and must never be allowed to work prejudice or injury to an innocent party (y). *Fictio legis neminem lædit, nemini operatur damnum vel injuriam* (z).

Examples.

The following examples must suffice to illustrate the rule which we have been discussing. If a man disseise me, and during the disseisin cut down the trees growing upon the land, and afterwards I re-enter, I shall have an action of trespass against him, for after my regress the law, as against the disseisor and his servants, supposes the freehold always to have continued in me; but if my disseisor makes a feoffment in fee, gift in tail, or lease for life or years, and afterwards I re-enter, I shall not have trespass against those who came in by title; for this fiction of the law, that the freehold always continued in me, is moulded to meet the ends of justice, and shall not, therefore, have relation to make him who comes in by title a wrongdoer, but in this case I shall recover all the mesne profits against

(s) *Mostyn v. Fabrigas*, per Ld. Mansfield, Cowp. 177; per Bramwell, B., *A.-G. v. Kent*, 1 H. & C. 28.

(t) Socr. ad Pand. 22, 3, Voet. n. 19.

(u) *Johnson v. Smith*, 2 Burr. 962, per Ld. Mansfield; and see 10 Rep. 40, 89.

(x) 3 Rep. 30 a, *Butler and Baker's case*.

(y) Ibid. 29 b; 11 Rep. 51 a; 13 Rep. 21 a.

(z) 2 Rol. R. 502; Palmer, 354; also 3 Rep. 36 a.

my disseisor (*a*). It has also been held (*b*), that, though the customary heir of a copyhold cannot maintain trespass without entry, there is after entry a relation back to the time of accruing of the legal right to enter, so as to support an action for trespasses committed before such entry; this relation being "created by law for the purpose of preventing wrong from being punishable, upon the same principle on which the law has given it in other cases."

Again, although for some purposes the whole assizes are to be considered as one legal day, "the Court is bound, if required for the purpose of doing substantial justice, to take notice that such legal day consists of several natural days, or even of a fraction of a day." Evidence was therefore admitted to show that an assignment of his goods by a felon *bonâ fide* made for a good consideration after the commission day of the assizes, was in truth made before the day on which he was tried and convicted, and, on proof of such fact, the property was held to pass by the assignment (*c*).

Where it appeared that the writ was issued on the 2nd of July, and on the same day, but before the issuing of the writ, the cause of action arose, it was argued, on demurrer, that the issuing of the writ of summons being a judicial act, must be considered as having taken place, at the earliest moment of the day, and therefore before the cause of action accrued. It was held, however, that the Court could take cognizance of the fact, that the writ did not issue until after the act had been committed for which the penalty was sought to be recovered (*d*).

(*a*) *Liford's case*, 11 Rep. 51; Hobart, 98, cited by Coleridge, J., *Garland v. Carlisle*, 4 Cl. & F. 710.

(*b*) *Barnett v. Earl of Guildford*, 11 Ex. 19, 33.

(*c*) *Whitaker v. Wisbey*, 12 C. B. 44, 58, 59. See *Reg. v. Edwards*, and *Wright v. Mills*, cited *ante*, p. 57,

and the maxim *de minimis non curat lex, post*. There was formerly an analogous fiction relating to judgments, *Lyttleton v. Cross*, 3 B. & C. 317, 325; 27 R. R. 370; but now see R. S. C. 1883, O. XLI., r. 3.

(*d*) *Clarke v. Bradlaugh*, 8 Q. B. D. 63.

Still less will a legal fiction be raised so as to operate to the detriment of any person, as in destruction of a lawful vested estate, for *fiction legis inique operatur alicui damnum vel injuriam* (e). The law does not love that rights should be destroyed, but, on the contrary, for the supporting of them invents notions and fictions (f). And the maxim *in fictione juris subsistit æquitas* is often applied by our Courts for the attainment of substantial justice, and to prevent the failure of right (g). "Fictions of law," as observed by Lord Mansfield, "hold only in respect of the ends and purposes for which they were invented. When they are urged to an intent and purpose not within the reason and policy of the fiction, the other party may show the truth" (h).

CURSUS CURIÆ EST LEX CURIÆ. (3 Bulst. 53.)—*The practice of the Court is the law of the Court* (i).

"Every Court is the guardian of its own records and master of its own practice" (k); and where a practice has

(e) 3 Rep. 36; *per Cur.*, *Waring v. Dewbury*, Gilb. Eq. R. 223.

(f) *Per Gould, J.*, *Cage v. Acton*, 1 Ld. Raym. 516, 517.

(g) *Low v. Little*, 17 Johnson, R. (U.S.), 348.

(h) *Morris v. Pugh*, 3 Burr. 1243.

(i) "It was a common expression of the late Chief Justice Tindal, that the course of the Court is the practice of the Court;" *per Cresswell, J.*, *Freeman v. Tranah*, 12 C. B. 414.

"The power of each Court over its own process is unlimited; it is a power incident to all Courts, inferior as well as superior; were it not so, the Court would be obliged to sit still

and see its own process abused for the purpose of injustice." *Per Alderson, B.*, *Cocker v. Tempest*, 7 M. & W. 502, cited, *per Willes, J.*, *Stammers v. Hughes*, 18 C. B. 535.

(k) *Per Tindal, C.J.*, *Scales v. Cheese*, 12 M. & W. 687; *Gregory v. Duke of Brunswick*, 2 H. L. Cas. 415; *Mellish v. Richardson*, 36 R. R. 111; 1 Cl. & F. 221, cited *Newton v. Boodle*, 9 C. B. 529; *per Alderson, B.*, *Ex p. Story*, 8 Ex. 199; *Jackson v. Galloway*, 1 C. B. 280; *Reg. v. Denbighshire JJ.*, 15 L. J. Q. B. 335; *per Ld. Wynford*, *Ferrier v. Howden*, 4 Cl. & F. 32. But see *Fleming v. Dunlop*, 7 Cl. & F. 43.

existed it is convenient, except in cases of extreme urgency and necessity (*l*), to adhere to it, because it is the practice, even though no reason can be assigned for it (*m*); for an inveterate practice in the law generally stands upon principles that are founded in justice and convenience (*n*). Hence, if any necessary proceeding in an action be informal, or be not done within the time limited for it, or in the manner prescribed by the practice of the Court, it may sometimes be set aside for irregularity, for *via trita via tuta* (*o*); and the Courts of law will not sanction a speculative novelty without the warrant of any principle, precedent, or authority (*p*).

It has been remarked, moreover, that there is a material distinction between things required to be done by the common or statute law of the land, and things required to be done by the rules and practice of the Court. Anything required to be done by the law of the land must be noticed by a Court of appellate jurisdiction, but such a Court does not of necessity regard the practice of an inferior one (*q*). In matters of procedure and practice, as in matters of discretion, the practice of the House of Lords has been not to interfere with the decisions of Courts below, unless perfectly satisfied that they are based upon erroneous principles (*r*).

Lastly, even where the course of practice in criminal law has been unfavourable to the accused, and contrary to principles of justice and humanity, it has been held that

(*l*) See, for instance, *Finney v. Beesley*, 17 Q. B. 86.

(*m*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Bovill v. Wood*, 2 M. & S. 25: 15 East, 226; *per* Ld. Campbell, *Edwards v. Martyn*, 21 L. J. Q. B. 88; S. C., 17 Q. B. 693.

(*n*) *Per* Ld. Eldon, *Buck*, 279. See *per* Ld. Abinger, *Jacobs v. Layborn*, 11 M. & W. 690.

(*o*) *Wood v. Hurd*, 3 B. N. C. 45: 10 Rep. 142.

(*p*) See Judgm., *Ex p. Tollerton Overseers*, 3 Q. B. 799.

(*q*) *Per* Holroyd, J., *Sandon v. Proctor*, 7 B. & C. 806; cited arg., 11 M. & W. 455.

(*r*) *Per* Ld. Selborne, *Cowan v. Duke of Buccleugh*, 2 App. Cas. 344, 347.

such practice constitutes the law, and cannot be altered without the authority of Parliament (s).

CONSENSUS TOLLIT ERROREM. (2 Inst. 123.)—*The acquiescence of a party who might take advantage of an error obviates its effect.*

In accordance with this rule, if the venue in an action was laid in the wrong place, and this was done *per assensum partium*, with the consent of both parties, and so entered of record, it stood (t); and where, by consent of both plaintiff and defendant, the venue was laid in London, it was held, that no objection could afterwards be taken to the venue, notwithstanding it ought, under a particular Act, to have been laid in Surrey, for *consensus tollit errorem* (u). Consent cannot, however (unless by the express words of a statute), give jurisdiction (x), for mere nullity cannot be waived.

Doctrine of
waiver.

On the maxim under consideration depends also the important doctrine of waiver, that is, the passing by of a thing (y); a doctrine which is of wide application both in the science of pleading and in those practical proceedings which are to be observed in the progress of a cause from the first issuing of the writ to the ultimate signing of judgment and execution.

Pleading.

With reference to pleading, however, the rule, that an

(s) *Per* Maule, J., 8 Scott, N.R., 599, 600.

(t) *Fineux v. Hovenden*, Cro. Eliz. 664; Co. Litt. 126 a, and Mr. Hargrave's note (1); 5 Rep. 37; Dyer, 367. See *Crow v. Edwards*, Hob. 5. Local venues are now abolished for nearly all actions in the High Court; see R. S. C. Order XXXVI. r. 1: *Buckley v. Hull Docks Co.*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 93; 62 L. J. Q. B. 449; and s. 2 of the Public Authorities Protection Act (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61).

(u) *Furnival v. Stringer*, 1 B. N. C. 68.

(x) See *Andrewes v. Elliott*, 6 E. & B. 338 (recognised in *Tyerman v. Smith*, Ib. 719, 724); *Lawrence v. Wilcock*, 11 A. & E. 941; *Vansittart v. Taylor*, 4 E. & B. 910, 912; *British Wagon Co. v. Gray*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 35.

(y) Toml. Law. Dict. tit. *Waiver*. See *Earl of Darnley v. L. C. & D. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 H. L. 43; *Ramsden v. Dyson*, L. R. 1 H. L. 129, cited *post*.

error will be cured by the waiver of the opposite party, must be taken with considerable limitation ; a mere mistake in form is now of little moment, but in the time of Lord Holt such an error might have defeated a substantial case, and was condoned if the other party pleaded over to it (*z*). The effect of a demurrer was to admit the truth of all matters which were sufficiently stated in the pleading demurred to, a result which might be obviated by obtaining leave to plead and demur to the same matter. The equivalent of which can now be attained without leave by raising the point of law upon the pleadings (*a*). By pleading over, however, a party was not formerly considered to waive his right subsequently to take any substantial objection in law to the pleading of the other side. It is conceived that, under the system introduced by the Rules of 1883 (*b*), this must still be the case. For the judgment of the Court must ultimately be based upon and consistent with the record, and cannot give to a party that to which, upon his own showing, he is not in law entitled. It must not, however, be forgotten that the Courts now use the widest discretion in directing such amendments as may be necessary in order to determine the real question in controversy (*c*).

When applied to the proceedings in an action, waiver Practice. may be defined to be the doing something after an irregularity committed, and with a knowledge of such irregularity, where the irregularity might have been corrected before the act was done ; and it is essential to distinguish a proceeding which is merely irregular from one which is completely defective and void. In the latter case the proceeding is a nullity, which cannot be waived by any *laches* or subsequent proceedings of the opposite party.

(*z*) *Anon.*, 2 Falk. 519.

(*a*) Rules, 1883, O. XXV., r. 2.

(*b*) Except in cases where the defendant relies upon the Statute of Frauds or Limitations, which must

now, as formerly, be pleaded ; O. XIX., r. 15.

(*c*) Jud. Act, 1873, s. 24, sub-s. 7 ; Rules, 1883, O. XXVIII., r. 2.

Where, however, an irregularity has been committed, and where the opposite party knows of the irregularity, it is a fixed rule observed by all the Courts in this country, that he should come in the first instance to avail himself of it, and not allow the other party to proceed to incur expense. "It is not reasonable afterwards to allow the party to complain of that irregularity, of which, if he had availed himself in the first instance, all that expense would have been rendered unnecessary" (*d*) ; and, therefore, if a party, after any such irregularity has taken place, consents to a proceeding which, by insisting on the irregularity, he might have prevented, he waives all exceptions to the irregularity (*e*). This is a doctrine long established and well known, and extends so far, that a person may be materially affected in a subsequent criminal prosecution by proceedings to the irregularity of which he has, by his silence, waived objection (*f*).

Implied
assent.

It may appear in some measure superfluous to add, that the consent which cures error in legal proceedings, may be implied as well as expressed : for instance—where, at the trial of a cause, a proposal was made by the judge in the presence of the counsel on both sides, who made no objection, that the jury should assess the damages contingently, with leave to the plaintiff to move to enter a verdict for the amount found by the jury, it was held that both parties were bound by the proposal, and that the plaintiff's counsel was not therefore at liberty to move for a new trial on the ground of misdirection (*g*), for *qui tacite consentire*

(*d*) *Per* Ld. Lyndhurst, *St. Victor v. Devereux*, 14 L. J. Ch. 246.

(*e*) *Ex p. Alcock*, 1 C. P. D. 68 ; 45 L. J. C. P. 86 ; *Ex p. Yeatman*, 16 Ch. D. 283 ; 44 L. T. 260 ; *Beresford v. Geddes*, L. R. 2 C. P. 285 ; 36 L. J. C. P. 115 ; *Moseley v. Simpson*, L. R. 16 Eq. 226 ; 42 L. J. Ch. 739 ; *Ex p. Moore*, 2 Ch. D.

802 ; *Ex p. Morgan*, 2 Ch. D. 772 : 45 L. J. Bk. 36, *per* Brett, J.

(*f*) *Reg. v. Widdop*, L. R. 2 C. C. R. 3 : 42 L. J. M. C. 9.

(*g*) *Morrish v. Murrey*, 13 M. & W. 52. *Booth v. Clive*, 10 C. B. 827 ; *Hughes v. G. W. R. Co.*, 14 C. B. 637. See also *Harrison v. Wright*, 13 M. & W. 816.

videtur (h), the silence of counsel implied their assent to the course adopted by the judge, and "a man who does not speak when he ought shall not be heard when he desires to speak" (i).

So too a new trial will not be granted on the ground that the judge did not direct the jury, or that he did not leave a question to the jury, if the party's counsel had an opportunity of asking him to do it and abstained from asking for it (j). So too irregularity in the form of a writ, as by misjoinder of causes of action which can only be joined with leave, is waived by the defendant's taking a fresh step in the action with knowledge of the irregularity (k).

COMMUNIS ERROR FACIT JUS. (4 *Inst.* 240.)—*Common error sometimes passes current as law.*

The law so favours the public good, that it will in some cases permit a common error to pass for right (l); as an instance of which may be mentioned the case of common recoveries, which were fictitious proceedings introduced by a kind of *pia fraud* to elude the statute *de Donis*, and which were at length allowed by the Courts to be a bar to an estate

Rule and example.

(h) *Jenk. Cent.* 32. See *Judgm., Gosling v. Veley*, 7 Q. B. 455; *Houldsworth v. Evans*, L. R. 3 H. L. 263.

(i) 2 *Comstock* (U.S.), R. 281. See *Martin v. G. N. R. Co.*, 16 C. B. 179, 196—197; *Perry v. Davis*, 3 C. B. N. S. 769; *Beaudry v. Mayor of Montreal*, 11 Moo. P. C. 399.

(j) *Per Halsbury, L.C.*, in *Nevill v. Fine Art and General Insurance Co.*, [1897] A. C. at p. 76: 64 L. J. Q. B. 681.

(k) *Lloyd v. Great Western Dairies Company*, [1907] 2 K. B. 727; 76 L. J. K. B. 924. Cf. *Smuthwaite v. Hannay*, [1894] A. C. 494: 62 L. J.

Q. B. 737; and see R. S. C. Order LXX., r. 2, and cases thereon.

(l) *Noy, Max.*, 9th ed., p. 37; 4 *Inst.* 240; *per Blackburn, J.*, *Reg. v. Sussex JJ.*, 2 B. & S. 680, and *Jones v. Taping*, 12 C. B. N. S. 846, 847; S. C., 11 H. L. Cas. 290; *Waltham v. Sparkes*, 1 Ld. Raym. 42. See also the remarks of Ld. Brougham in *Phipps v. Ackers*, 9 Cl. & F. 598 (referring to *Cadell v. Palmer*, 10 Bing. 140), and in *Earl of Waterford's Peerage claim*, 6 Cl. & F. 172; also in *Devaynes v. Noble*, 2 Russ. & My. 506; 15 R. R. 151; *Janvrin v. De la Mare*, 14 Moo. P. C. C. 334.

tail, so that these recoveries, however clandestinely introduced, became by long use and acquiescence a legal mode of conveyance whereby tenant in tail might dispose of his lands (*m*).

Rule must
be qualified.

However, the above maxim, although well known, must be applied with very great caution. "It has been sometimes said," observed Lord Ellenborough, "*communis error facit jus* ; but I say *communis opinio* is evidence of what the law is—not where it is an opinion merely speculative and theoretical, floating in the minds of persons ; but where it has been made the groundwork and substratum of practice " (*n*). So it was remarked by another distinguished judge (*o*), that he hoped never to hear this rule insisted upon, because it would be to set up a misconception of the law in destruction of the law ; and, in another case, it was observed that "even *communis error*, and a long course of local irregularity, have been found to afford no protection to one *qui spondet peritiam artis* " (*p*). Some useful remarks on the application of the above maxim were made also by Lord Denman, delivering judgment in the House of Lords, in a well-known case, involving important legal and constitutional doctrines ; and in the course of this judgment his lordship observed that a large part of the *legal opinion* which has passed current for law falls within the description of "law taken for granted ;" and that, "when in the pursuit of truth, we are obliged to investigate the grounds of the law, it is plain, and has often been proved by experience, that the mere statement and re-statement of a doctrine—the mere repetition of the *cantilena* of lawyers—cannot make it law, unless it can be traced to some

(*m*) Noy, Max., 9th ed., pp. 37, 38 ; Plowd. 33 b.

(*n*) *Isherwood v. Oldknow*, 3 M. & S. 396, 397 ; 16 R. R. 305, cited in *Treharne v. Layton*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 459, 463 : 44 L. J. Q. B. 202 ; *Gar-*

land v. Carlisle, 2 Cr. & M. 95 ; Co. Litt. 186 a.

(*o*) Mr. Justice Foster ; cited by *Ld. Kenyon, R. v. Eriswell*, 3 T. R. 725.

(*p*) 6 Cl. & F. 199.

competent authority, and if it be irreconcilable to some clear legal principle" (q).

The foregoing remarks may be thus exemplified : A general understanding had prevailed, founded on the practice of many years, that if patented inventions were used in a department of the public service, the patentees would be remunerated by the officers of the Crown administering such department, as though the use had been by private individuals. In numerous instances, patentees had been paid for the use of their inventions in the public service, and even the legal advisers of the Crown appeared to consider the right as settled. There was, further, little doubt that on the faith of the practice inventors had, at great expense of time and money, perfected inventions, in the expectation of deriving part of their reward from the use of their inventions in the public service. It was, nevertheless, held that the language of the patent should be interpreted according to its legal effect, irrespective of the practice (r).

But where a decision of the Courts, originally wrong, or an erroneous conception of the law, especially of real property, has been made, for a length of time, the basis upon which rights have been regulated and arrangements as to property made, the maxim, *communis error facit jus*, may be applied (s). Indeed, this is strictly in accordance with the view of Lord Ellenborough, above cited, and it will be found that, where the Courts of justice have declined to correct misconceptions of long standing, the reluctance

(q) *Ld. Denman's judgment in O'Connell v. Reg.*, edited by Mr. Leahy, p. 28. See also the allusions to *Hutton v. Balme*, and *Reg. v. Millis*, Id., pp. 23, 24. And see *per Pollock*, C. B., 2 H. & N. 139.

(r) *Feather v. Reg.*, 6 B. & S. 289, 292. See 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 27, whereby the law has been altered in favour of the practice.

(s) *Davidson v. Sinclair*, 3 App.

Cas. 788, *per Ld. Blackburn*; and see his remarks in *Dalton v. Angus*, 6 App. Cas. 812 : 50 L. J. Q. B. 689. As to errors of conveyancers, see *per Ld. Blackburn, Brownlie v. Campbell*, 5 App. Cas. 948; and *Campbell v. Campbell*, Id. 815; and as to mercantile contracts in daily use, see *per Ld. Esher, London Founders' Association v. Clarke*, 20 Q. B. D. 581.

has been due to a wholesome fear of interference with rights based upon them (*t*).

DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX. (*Cro. Eliz.* 353.)—*The law does not concern itself about trifles.*

Courts of justice generally do not take trifling and immaterial matters into account (*u*), except under peculiar circumstances, such as the trial of a right, or where personal character is involved (*v*); they will not, for instance, take notice of the fraction of a day, except in cases where there are conflicting rights, for the determination of which it is necessary that they should do so (*x*); as, for instance, in a claim for demurrage of a ship, in which case it has been expressly held that a fraction of a day counts for a day (*y*).

Now trial
when the
damages are
small.

A familiar instance of the application of this maxim occurred likewise in the rule observed by the Courts at Westminster, not to grant new trials at the instance of either party, on the ground of the verdict being against evidence, where the damages were less than £20 (*z*). As remarked by Lord Kenyon (*a*), "where the damages are

(*t*) See *post*, *omnis innovatio*, &c., and *Bain v. Fothergill*, L. R. 7 H. L. 158, 208, *per* Ld. Hatherley; and see the dissenting judgment of Fletcher Moulton, L.J., in *Dean v. Brown*, [1909] 2 K. B. 573, 78 L. J. K. B. 840.

(*u*) Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 284; *per* Sir W. Scott, 2 Dods. Adm. R. 163; *Graham v. Berry*, 3 Moo. P. C. C. N. S. 223.

(*v*) *Joyce v. Metr. Bd. of Works*, 4 L. T. 81.

(*x*) Judgm., 14 M. & W. 582; *per* Holt, C.J., 2 Ld. Raym. 1095; *Reg. v. St. Mary, Warwick*, 1 E. & B. 816; *Wright v. Mills*, 4 H. & N. 488, 493, 494; *Evans v. Jones*, 3 H. & C. 423; *Page v. Moore*, 15 Q. B. 684—

686; *Clarke v. Bradlaugh*, 8 Q. B. D. 63; *Campbell v. Strangeways*, 3 C. P. D. 105; 37 L. J. M. C. 6. In case of copyright, see *Boosey v. Purday*, 4 Exch. 145; *Chatterton v. Cave*, L. R. 10 C. P. 573.

(*y*) *Commercial S. S. Co. v. Boulton*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 346.

(*z*) *Branson v. Didsbury*, 12 A. & E. 631; *Manton v. Bales*, 1 C. B. 444; *Macrow v. Hull*, 1 Burr. 11; *Burton v. Thompson*, 2 Burr. 664; *Apps v. Day*, 14 C. B. 112; *Hawkins v. Alder*, 18 C. B. 640; see *Allum v. Boulbee*, 9 Exch. 738, 743; *per* Maule, J., 11 C. B. 653.

(*a*) *Wilson v. Rastall*, 4 T. R. 753; 2 R. R. 515. See *Vaughan v. Wyatt*, 6 M. & W. 496, 497; *per* Parke, B.,

small, and the question too inconsiderable to be retried, the Court have frequently refused to send the case back to another jury. But wherever a mistake of the judge has crept in and swayed the opinion of the jury, I do not recollect a single case in which the Court have ever refused to grant a new trial."

Again, a bequest of such parts of the testator's plate as the legatee shall select entitles the legatee to take the whole; he might select the whole except one article of no value, and the maxim *de minimis* applies (*b*).

In further illustration of the maxim, *de minimis non curat lex*, we may observe that there are some injuries of so little consideration in the law that no action will lie for them (*c*); for instance, in respect to tithe, the principle which may be extracted from the cases appears to be, that for small quantities of corn, involuntarily left in the process of raking, tithe would not be payable, in the absence of any particular fraud or intention to deprive the parson of his full right. Where however a farmer pursued such a mode of harvesting barley, that a considerable quantity of rakings was left scattered after the barley was bound into sheaves, the Court held that tithe was payable in respect of these rakings, although no actual fraud was imputed to the farmer, and although he was careful to leave as little rakings as possible in that mode of harvesting the crop (*d*).

Trifling
injuries.

It may be observed, however, that for an injury to real

Trespass to
realty.

Twigg v. Potts, 1 Cr. M. & R. 93; *Lee v. Evans*, 12 C. B. N. S. 368; *Mostyn v. Coles*, 7 H. & N. 872, 876. In *Haine v. Davey*, 4 A. & E. 892, a new trial was granted for misdirection, though the amount in question was less than £1. See *Poole v. Whitcomb*, 12 C. B. N. S. 770.

(*b*) *Arthur v. Mackinnon*, 11 Ch. D. 385.

(*c*) See *per Powys, J., Ashby v. White*, 2 Ld. Raym. 944, answered by Holt, C.J., *Id.* 953; *Whitcher v.*

Hall, 5 B. & C. 269, 277; 2 Bla. Com., 21st ed. 262, where the rule respecting land gained by alluvion is referred to the maxim treated of in the text. The maxim applies "only with respect to gradual accretions not appreciable except after the lapse of time;" *per Pollock, C.B.*, 2 H. & N. 138; and in *Ford v. Lacey*, 7 Id. 155.

(*d*) *Glanville v. Stacey*, 6 B. & C. 543.

property incorporeal, an action may be supported, however small the damage; a commoner may maintain an action for an injury to the common, though his proportion of the damage amount only to a farthing (*e*).

Where trifling irregularities or even infractions of the strict letter of the law are brought under the notice of the Court, the maxim *de minimis non curat lex* is of frequent practical application (*f*). It has, for instance, been applied to support a rate, in the assessment of which there were some comparatively trifling omissions of established forms (*g*). So, with reference to proceedings for an infringement of the revenue laws (*h*), Sir W. Scott observed that "the Court is not bound to a strictness at once harsh and pedantic in the application of statutes. The law permits the qualification implied in the ancient maxim, *de minimis non curat lex*. Where there are irregularities of very slight consequence, it does not intend that the infliction of penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the deviation were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice, would weigh little or nothing on the public interest, it might properly be overlooked."

Indictment
for misde-
meanor.

Lastly, in an indictment against several for a misdemeanor all are principals, because the law does not descend to distinguish different shades of guilt in this class of offences (*i*).

(*e*) *Pindar v. Wadsworth*, 2 East, 154; 6 R. R. 412. See 22 Vin. Abr. "Waste" (N.); *Harrop v. Hirst*, L. R. 4 Ex. 43, and other cases cited *post*, Chap. V.

(*f*) See in connection with criminal liability for a nuisance, *Reg. v. Charlesworth*, 16 Q. B. 1012; *Reg. v. Betts*, *Id.* 1022; *Reg. v. Russell*, 3 E. & B. 942.

(*g*) *White v. Beard*, 2 Curt. 493. But where the amount of a poor-rate at so much in the pound on the

assessable value of premises involves the fraction of a farthing, a demand by the overseer of the whole farthing is excessive and illegal; *Morton v. Brammer*, 8 C. B. N. S. 791, 798, citing *Baxter v. Faulam*, 1 Wils. 129.

(*h*) *The Reward*, 2 Dods. Adm. R. 269, 270.

(*i*) For a statutory application of the maxim to trifling offences punishable on summary conviction, see 42 & 43 Vict. c. 49, s. 16.

OMNIS INNOVATIO PLUS NOVITATE PERTURBAT QUAM UTILITATE PRODEST. (2 *Bulstr.* 338.)—*Every innovation occasions more harm by its novelty, than benefit by its utility.*

It has been an ancient observation in the laws of England, that, whenever a standing rule of law, of which the reason, perhaps, could not be remembered or discerned, has been wantonly broken in upon by statutes or new resolutions, the wisdom of the rule has in the end appeared from the inconveniences that have followed the innovation (*k*); and the sages of the law have therefore always suppressed new and subtle inventions in derogation of the common law (*l*).

It is, then, an established rule to abide by former precedents, *stare decisis*, where the same points come again in litigation, as well to keep the scale of justice steady, and not liable to waver with every new judge's opinion, as also because, the law in that case being solemnly declared, what before was uncertain and perhaps indifferent, is now become a permanent rule, which it is not in the breast of any subsequent judge to alter according to his private sentiments; he being sworn to determine, not according to his own private judgment (*m*), but according to the known laws of the land—not delegated to pronounce a new law, but to maintain the old (*n*)—*jus dicere et non jus dare* (*o*).

(*k*) 1 Black. Com. 60. See Ram's Science of Legal Judgment, 112 *et seq.*

Lord Bacon tells us in his Essay on Innovations, that, "as the births of living creatures at first are ill-shapen, so are all innovations which are the births of time."

(*l*) Co. Litt. 282 b, 379 b; *per* Grose, J., 1 M. & S. 394.

(*m*) See *per* Ld. Camden, 19 Howell, St. T. 1071; *per* Williams, J., 4 Cl. & F. 729; *per* Best, C.J., *Newton v. Cowie*, 4 Bing. 241; 29 R. R. 541; *per* Alderson, B., 4 Ex. 806.

(*n*) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, 5 T. R. 682, 6 Id. 605; and 8 Id. 239; *per* Grose, J., 18 East, 321; 9 Johnson (U.S.), R. 428; *per* Ld. Hardwicke, C., *Ellis v. Smith*, 2 Ves. Jun. 16.

(*o*) 7 T. R. 696; 1 B. and B. 563; Ram's Science of Legal Judgment, 2; arg. 10 Johnson (U.S.), R. 566; "My duty," says Alderson, B., in *Miller v. Salomons*, 7 Ex. 543, "is plain. It is to expound and not to make the law—to decide on it as I find it, not as I may wish it to be;" and see *per* Coltman, J., 4 C. B. 560—561.

"The province of the legislature is not to construe but to enact, and their opinion, not expressed in the form of law as a declaratory provision would be, is not binding on Courts whose duty is to expound the statutes they have enacted" (p); for the maxim of the Roman law, *ejus est interpretari cujus est condere* (q), does not under our constitution hold.

Our common-law system, as remarked by a learned judge, consists in the applying to new combinations of circumstances those rules of law which we derive from legal principles and judicial precedents (r); and for the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency, and certainty, we must apply those rules, where they are not plainly unreasonable and inconvenient, to all cases which arise, and we are not at liberty to reject them, and to abandon all analogy to them, in those to which they have not yet been judicially applied, because we think that the rules are not as convenient and reasonable as we ourselves could have devised. "It appears to me to be of great importance to keep this principle of decision steadily in view, not merely for the determination of the particular case, but for the interests of law as a science" (s).

Accordingly where a rule has become settled law, it is to be followed, although some possible inconvenience may grow from a strict observance of it, or although a satisfactory reason for it is wanted, or although the principle and the policy of the rule may be questioned (t). If, as

Settled law
must not be
disturbed.

(p) Judgm., 14 M. & W. 589.

(q) See Tayl. Civ. L., 4th ed. 96.

(r) As to the value of precedents, Palgr. Orig. Auth. King's Council, 9, 10. "An unnecessary departure from precedents, whether it spring from the love of change, or be the result of negligence or ignorance on the part of the pleader, ought not to be encouraged. It can only lead to useless litigation, delay, and ex-

pense." See *per Cur.*, *Austin v. Holmes*, 3 Denio (U.S.), R. 224.

(s) *Per Parke, J.*, *Mirehouse v. Rennell*, 1 Cl. & F. 546. "When the law has become settled, no speculative reasoning upon its origin, policy, or expediency, should prevail against it;" 3 Denio (U.S.), R. 50.

(t) *Per Tindal, C.J.*, *Mirehouse v. Rennell*, 8 Bing. 557; 36 R. R. 139, 179. See the authorities cited,

has been observed, there is a general hardship affecting a general class of cases, it is a consideration for the legislature, not for a Court of justice. If there is a particular hardship from the particular circumstances of the case, nothing can be more dangerous or mischievous than upon those particular circumstances to deviate from a general rule of law (*u*); "hard cases," it has repeatedly been said, are apt to "make bad law" (*x*), and *misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum* (*y*)—obedience to law becomes a hardship when that law is unsettled or doubtful; which maxim applies with peculiar force to questions respecting real property; as, for instance, to family settlements, by which provision is made for unborn generations; "and if, by the means of new lights occurring to new judges, all that which was supposed to be law by the wisdom of our ancestors, is to be swept away at a time when the particular limitations are to take effect, mischievous indeed will be the consequence to the public" (*z*).

It is for considerations such as those just noticed that the Courts are reluctant to upset former decisions which, although anomalous, have been accepted by the public as the basis of their transactions for a length of time, a rule embodied in the maxim, *communis error facit jus* (*a*). It

Ram's Science of Legal Judgment, 33—35, and *Smith v. Doe*, 7 Price, 509; S. C., 2 B. & B. 599; 22 R. R. 19; *Ralston v. Hamilton*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 405, *per* Ld. Westbury.

(*u*) *Per* Ld. Loughborough, 2 Ves. Jun. 426, 427; *per* Tindal, C.J., *Doe v. Ludlam*, 7 Bing. 180; *per* Pollock, C.B., *Reg. v. Woodrow*, 15 M. & W. 412; *per* Wilde, C.J., *Kepp v. Wiggett*, 16 L. J. C. P. 237; S. C., 6 C. B. 280.

(*x*) See 4 Cl. & F. 378; *per* Coleridge, J., 4 H. L. Cas. 611. "It is necessary that Courts of justice should act on general rules,

without regard to the hardship which in particular cases may result from their application;" *Judgm.*, 4 Exch. 718. See also *Judgm.*, 3 Exch. 278.

(*y*) 4 Inst. 246; *Shepherd v. Shepherd*, 5 T. R. 51, n. (*a*); 2 Dwar. Stats. 786; *Bac. Aphorisms*, vol. 7, p. 148; *arg.* 9 Johnson (U.S.), R. 427, and 11 Peters (U.S.), R. 286.

(*z*) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, *Doe v. Allen*, 8 T. R. 504. See *per* Ashurst, J., 7 T. R. 420, and see *per* Brett, L.J., *Ahearn v. Bellman*, 4 Ex. D. 210; 48 L. J. Ex. 681.

(*a*) See *ante*, p. 115, and cases there referred to.

is pointed out by Lord Hatherley in *Bain v. Fothergill* (b) that the House of Lords has frequently acted upon the mistaken practice of conveyancers, and will regard the necessity for following previous decisions as more imperative where the common dealings of mankind are in question (c).

With respect to matters which do not affect existing rights to any great degree, but tend principally to influence *future* transactions, it is for similar reasons generally considered more important that the rule of law should be settled, than that it should be theoretically correct (d).

When rule
does not
hold.

The judicial rule—*stare decisis* (e)—does, however, admit of exceptions, where the former determination is most evidently contrary to reason. But, even in such cases, subsequent judges do not pretend to make a new law, but to vindicate the old one from misrepresentation. For, if it be found that the former decision is manifestly absurd or unjust, it is declared, not that such a sentence was *bad law*, but that it was *not law*; that is, that it is not the established custom of the realm, as has been erroneously determined (f).

We may appropriately conclude these remarks by observing that, whilst on the one hand innovation on settled law is to be avoided, yet “the mere lateness of time at which a principle has become established is not a strong argument against its soundness, if nothing has been previously decided inconsistent with it, and it be in itself consistent with legal analogies” (g). Nay, it is even true that “a froward retention of custom is as turbulent a thing as an innovation; and they that reverence too much old times are but a scorn to the new” (h).

(b) L. R. 7 H. L. p. 158 at p. 209.

(c) Upon a question of law the H. of L. is bound by its own decisions; see [1898] A. C. 375.

(d) See *per* Ld. Cottenham, *Lozon v. Pryse*, 4 My. & Cr. 617, 618.

(e) As to which, see *Gifford v. Livingston*, 2 Denio (U.S.), R. 392—393.

(f) 1 Black. Com. 60. For an

example of a long course of decisions being overruled as contrary to reason, see *Mills v. Armstrong*, 13 A. C. 1; 57 L. J. P. 65.

(g) Judgm., *Gosling v. Veley*, 7 Q. B. 441; *per* Ld. Denman, 10 Q. B. 950.

(h) Bacon's Essays, “Of Innovations.”

CHAPTER IV.

RULES OF LOGIC.

THE maxims immediately following are placed together, and intitled "Rules of Logic," because they result from simple processes of reasoning. Some of them, indeed, may be considered as axioms, the truth of which is self-evident, and consequently admit of illustration only. A few examples have in each case been given, showing how the particular rule has been held to apply, and other instances of a like nature will readily occur to the reader (a).

UBI EADEM RATIO IBI IDEM JUS. (*Co. Litt.* 10 a.)—*Like reason doth make like law* (b).

The law consists, "not in particular instances and precedents, but in the reason of the law, and *ubi eadem ratio idem jus*" (c); for "reason is the life of the law; nay, the common law itself is nothing else but reason; which is to be understood of an artificial perfection of reason, gotten by long study, observation, and experience, and not of every man's natural reason" (d). The following instance serves to show how the maxim may be practically applied. At a time when almost all written engagements were by deed, it was established, as a general rule, that it is a good

Illustration
of rule.

(a) The title of this division of the subject has been adopted from Noy's *Maxims*, 9th ed., p. 5.

(b) *Co. Litt.* 10 a.

(c) *Ashby v. White*, 2 *Ld. Raym.* 957, *per Holt*, C.J.

(d) *Co. Litt.* 97 b.

defence to an action to enforce a deed, that after its execution it was altered without the defendant's privity in a material point (*e*). The reason of this rule is that "no man shall be permitted to take the chance of committing a fraud, without running any risk of losing by the event when it is detected" (*f*), and, therefore, in *Master v. Miller* (*g*) it was decided that the rule was not to be confined to deeds, but must be extended to cases where other instruments have been materially altered, for instance, bills of exchange (*h*); for *ubi eadem ratio ibi idem jus*. And accordingly the rule has since been applied also to the material alteration of Bank of England notes (*i*), as well as of written contracts not under seal, such as guarantees (*k*), charter-parties (*l*), bought and sold notes (*m*), and building contracts (*n*); and in a case where the validity of an order to detain a person of unsound mind was in question, it was laid down that any tampering with a document of that kind, by materially altering it, would impair its validity and deprive any person professing to act under it of any protection from it (*o*). It may be added that, as there is a presumption against fraud or wrong, interlineations and erasures in a deed are, until the contrary be proved, presumed to have been made before its execution; whereas, since a testator may alter his will after its execution

(*e*) *Pigot's case*, 11 Rep. 26 b; not followed, as regards immaterial alterations; *Aldous v. Cornwell*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 573. The cases upon the alteration of instruments are collected in the notes to *Master v. Miller*, 1 Sm. L. C.

(*f*) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, 4 T. R. 329.

(*g*) 2 R. R. 399; 4 T. R. 320; 2 H. Bl. 140.

(*h*) As to these, and promissory notes, and cheques, see now 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, ss. 61, 73, 89.

(*i*) *Suffell v. Bank of England*, 9 Q. B. D. 555; *Leeds Bank v. Walker*, 11 Id. 84.

(*k*) *Davidson v. Cooper*, 11 M. & W. 778; 13 Id. 343; *Ellesmere Brewery Co. v. Cooper*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 75; 65 L. J. Q. B. 173.

(*l*) *Crookewit v. Fletcher*, 1 H. & N. 893.

(*m*) *Powell v. Divett*, 15 East, 29; 13 R. R. 358; *Mollett v. Wackerbarth*, 5 C. B. 181.

(*n*) *Pattinson v. Luckley*, L. R. 10 Ex. 330.

(*o*) *Lowe v. Fox*, 12 App. Cas. 206. 214; 56 L. J. Q. B. 480. For the case of the alteration of the record, in an action, see *Sutker v. Neale*, 1 Exch. 468.

without fraud or wrong, it is necessary to prove affirmatively that alterations in a will were made before its execution (*p*).

There are, however, some things, for which, as Lord Coke observed, no reason can be given (*q*): and with reference to which the words of the civil law hold true—*non omnium quæ a majoribus constituta sunt ratio reddi potest* (*r*); and, therefore, we are compelled to admit that, in the legal science, *qui rationem in omnibus quæerunt rationem subvertunt* (*s*). It is, indeed, sometimes dangerous to stretch the invention to find out legal reasons for what is undoubted law (*t*); and this observation applies peculiarly to the mode of construing an Act, in order to ascertain and carry out the intention of the legislature: in so doing, the judges will bend and conform their legal reason to the words of the Act, and will rather construe them literally, than strain their meaning beyond the obvious intention of Parliament (*u*). The spirit of the maxim prefixed to these remarks, here, however, manifestly prevails; for, as we read in the Digest (*x*), *non possunt omnes articuli singillatim aut legibus aut senatûs-consultis comprehendî: sed cum in aliquâ causâ sententia eorum manifesta est, is, qui jurisdictioni præest, ad similia procedere atque ita jus dicere debet. Nam, ut ait Pedius, quotiens lege aliquid unum vel alterum introductum est, bona occasio est, cætera, quæ tendunt ad eandem utilitatem, vel interpretatione, vel certe jurisdictione suppleri.*

Caution
necessary in
reasoning.

Further, although it is laid down that the law is the perfection of reason, and that it always intends to conform thereto, and that what is not reason is not law, yet this

Qualification
of general
proposition.

(*p*) *Doe v. Catomore*, 16 Q. B. 745;
Doe v. Palmer, Id. 747; *Re Adamson*,
L. R. 3 P. & D. 253. As to inter-
lineations in wills, see *Re Cadge*,
L. R. 1 P. & D. 543. As to erasures,
&c., in affidavits, see R. S. C. 1883,
O. XXXVIII., r. 12.

(*q*) *Hix v. Gardiner*, 2 Bulstr.
196; cited, arg., *Leuckhart v. Cooper*,
3 Bing. N. C. 104.

(*r*) D. 1, 3, 20.

(*s*) 2 Rep. 75 a.

(*t*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Ellis v. Griffith*, 16 M. & W. 110.

(*u*) T. Raym. 355, 356; *per* Ld. Brougham, *Leith v. Irvine*, 1 My. & K. 289. As to the mode of construing Acts of Parliament, see further, *post*, Chap. VIII.

(*x*) D. 1, 3, 12, and 13.

must not be understood to mean, that the particular reason of every rule in the law can at the present day be always precisely assigned: it is sufficient if there be nothing in it flatly contradictory to reason, and then the law will presume that the rule in question is well founded; *multa in jure communi*, as Lord Coke observed, *contra rationem disputandi, pro communi utilitate introducta sunt* (y)—many things have been introduced into the common law, with a view to the public good, which are inconsistent with sound reason. *Quod vero contra rationem juris receptum est, non est producendum ad consequentias* (z).

Reasonable-
ness of
custom.

The maxim cited from Lord Coke is peculiarly applicable when the reasonableness of an alleged custom has to be considered: in such a case, it does not follow, from there being now no apparent reason for such custom, that there never was (a). If, however, it be in tendency contrary to the public good, or prejudicial to the many and beneficial only to a particular person, such custom is and must be repugnant to the law of reason, for it cannot have had a reasonable origin (b).

Again, a clerk who has held preferment in one bishopric is not, on being presented to a living in another bishopric, bound, as a condition precedent to his examination on the question of fitness, to produce letters testimonial and commendatory from his former bishop; if such a rule existed a door would thus be opened to arbitrary and capricious proceedings, rendering the title of the clerk and the right of the patron dependent on the will of the prior bishop; such a conclusion would be at variance with reason, and therefore repugnant to what is called "the policy of the law" (c).

(y) Co. Litt. 70 b. *Multa autem jure civili contra rationem disputandi pro utilitate communi recepta esse innumerabilibus rebus probari potest*; D. 9, 2, 51, § 2.

(z) D. 1, 3, 14.

(a) Arg. *Tyson v. Smith*, 9 A. & E.

406, 416.

(b) Judgm., 9 A. & E. 421, 422. See further as to the reasonableness and validity of a custom, *post*, Chap. X.

(c) *Bp. of Exeter v. Marshall*, L. R. 3 H. L. 17, 54.

We may conclude these remarks by calling to mind the well-known saying: *lex plus laudatur quando ratione probatur* (*d*)—then is the law most worthy of approval, when it is consonant to reason; and with Lord Coke we may hold it to be generally true, “that the law is unknown to him that knoweth not the reason thereof, and that the known certainty of the law is the safety of all” (*e*).

CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS CESSAT IPSA LEX. (*Co. Litt.* 70 *b*).—*Reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself* (*f*).

For instance, a Member of Parliament is privileged from arrest during the session (*ff*), in order that he may discharge his public duties, and the trust reposed in him; but the reason of this privilege ceases at a certain time after the termination of the parliamentary session, because the public has then no longer an immediate interest in the personal freedom of the individuals composing the representative body, and *cessante causâ cessat effectus* (*g*).

Examples:
Privilege
from arrest.

Again, where trees are excepted out of a demise, the soil itself is not excepted, but sufficient nutriment out of the land is reserved to sustain the vegetative life of the trees, for, without that, the trees which are excepted cannot subsist; but if, in such a case, the lessor fells the trees, or by the lessee's license grubs them up, then, according to the above rule, the lessee shall have the soil (*h*).

Trees excepted from demise.

(*d*) 1 Inst. Epil., cited by Ld. Kenyon, *Porter v. Bradley*, 3 T. R. 146; 1 R. R. 675; and *Dalmer v. Barnard*, 7 T. R. 252; arg. *Doe v. Ewart*, 7 A. & E. 657.

Davis v. Powell, Willes, 46, cited arg. 8 C. B. 786.

(*e*) 1 Inst. Epil. “Certainty is the mother of repose, and therefore the common law aims at certainty;” *per* Ld. Hardwicke, 1 Dick. 245.

(*ff*) *Re Armstrong*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 327.

(*f*) 7 Rep. 69; *per* Willes, C.J.,

(*g*) See arg. *Cas. temp. Hardw.* 32; *Gowdy v. Duncombe*, 1 Exch. 430.

(*h*) *Liford's case*, 11 Rep. 49, cited *Hewitt v. Isham*, 7 Exch. 79, and *post*, Chap. VI., s. 3.

Common
pur cause de
vicinage.

The same principle applies where a right exists of common *pur cause de vicinage*: a right depending upon a general custom and usage, which appears to have originated, not in any actual contract, but in a tacit acquiescence of all parties for their mutual benefit. This right does not, indeed, enable its possessor to put his cattle at once on the neighbouring waste, but only on the waste which is in the manor where his own lands are situated; and it seems that the right of common of vicinage should be considered merely as an excuse for the trespass caused by the straying of the cattle, which excuse the law allows by reason of the ancient usage, and in order to avoid the multiplicity of suits which might arise where there is no separation or inclosure of adjacent commons (i). But the parties possessing the respective rights of common, may, if they please, inclose against each other, and, when they have done so, the right of common *pur cause de vicinage* is no longer an excuse to an action of trespass if the cattle stray; for *cessante ratione legis cessat lex* (k).

Law as to
validity of
marriage.

As regards the consent of parents to the marriage of their minor children, it has been observed (l) that “any analogy which existed between marriages by banns and marriages by notice to the registrar has been effaced—the attempt at securing that consent in marriages to the latter class by publicity relinquished—and the procurement of actual consent substituted in the same manner as had always been used in marriages by licence. There is no reason, therefore, why those decisions which have hitherto only been applied to marriages by banns, and which have their foundation in the necessity for securing that publicity through which it is the object of banns to reach the parents’ consent, should be

(i) *Jones v. Robin*, 10 Q. B. 581, 620. See also *Clarke v. Tinker*, Id. 604; *Prichard v. Powell*, Id. 589.

(k) 4 Rep. 38; Co. Litt. 122 a; *Finch*, Law, 8; *per Powell*, J., *Broomfield v. Kirber*, 11 Mod. 72;

Gullett v. Lopes, 13 East, 348; *Judgm. Wells v. Percy*, 1 Bing. N. C. 556, 566; *Heath v. Elliott*, 4 Bing. N. C. 388.

(l) *Holmes v. Simmons*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 528.

applied to marriages in which that consent is otherwise attained and secured. *Cessante ratione cessat et lex.*"

Another illustration is afforded by the rule, which, through neglect of the principle under discussion, has often been misunderstood, viz., that a person may not make felony the foundation of a civil action. This can be true only where the felon himself is defendant or a necessary party, and the claim is founded on the felony. "The rule is founded on a principle of public policy, and where the *public policy ceases to operate*, the rule shall cease also and the familiar phrase, 'The action is merged in the felony' is not at all times literally true" (m).

DE NON APPARENTIBUS ET NON EXISTENTIBUS EADEM EST RATIO.

(4 Rep. 47 a : 5 Id. 5 b.)—*That which does not appear will not be presumed to exist* (n).

This "well-established maxim in legal proceedings," which "is founded on principles of justice as well as of law" (o), applies where a party seeks to rely upon any deeds or writings which are not produced in Court, and the loss of which is not accounted for or supplied in the manner which the law prescribes ; for in this case they should be treated, as against such party, as if non-existent (p).

Maxim, how applied.

On the consideration of a special verdict, the Court will neither assume a fact not stated therein nor draw inferences of facts necessary for the determination of the case from other statements contained therein (q).

Special verdict.

In reading an affidavit also, the Court will look solely at the facts deposed to, and will not presume the existence of

(m) *Per* Ld. Tenterden, *Stone v. Marsh*, 6 B. & C. 551, 564 ; 30 R. R. 420. See the subject further discussed, *post*, p. 171.

(n) See *per* Buller, J., *R. v. Bp. of Chester*, 1 T. R. 404 ; 1 R. R. 237 ; *per* Cockburn, C.J., *Reg. v.*

Walcot Overseers, 2 B. & S. 560.

(o) See 12 Howard (U.S.), R. 253.

(p) Bell's Dict. of Scotch Law, 287.

(q) *Tancred v. Christy*, 12 M. & W. 316 ; *Caudrey's case*, 5 Rep. 5.

additional facts in order to support the allegations made in it. To the above, therefore, and similar cases, occurring not only in civil, but also in criminal proceedings, the maxim *quod non apparet non est* (*r*) is emphatically applicable: that which does not appear must be taken in law as if it were not (*s*).

Bond.

In an action by two commissioners of taxes (*t*) on a bond against the surety of a tax-collector, appointed under 43 Geo. 3, c. 99, it appeared that the Act contained a proviso that no such bond should be put in suit against the surety for any deficiency, other than what should remain unsatisfied after sale of the collector's lands under the powers given to the commissioners by the Act; it further appeared that, at the time when the bond was put in suit, the obligor had lands within the jurisdiction of the plaintiffs, but of which they had no notice or knowledge: it was held that seizure and sale of lands of the collector, of the existence of which the commissioners had no notice or knowledge, was not a condition precedent to their right to proceed against the surety; this conclusion resulting, as was observed, from the sound principle contained in the above maxim (*u*).

Notice of dishonour.

So, where a notice of dishonour of a bill of exchange described the bill generally as "Your draft on A. B.," the Court held, on motion for a nonsuit, that if there were other bills or drafts to which the notice could refer, it was for the defendant to show such to be the fact; and that as he had not done so the above maxim applied; for, inasmuch as it did not appear that there were other bills or notes, the Court could not presume that there were any (*x*).

Increase *per alluvionem*.

Again, the increase *per alluvionem* is described to be when the sea, by casting up sand and earth by degrees, increases

(*r*) 2 Inst. 479; Jenk. Cent. 207.

(*s*) Vaugh. R. 169.

(*t*) *Gwynne v. Burnell*, 6 Bing. N.

C. 453; S. C., 1 Scott, N. R. 711:
7 Cl. & F. 572.

(*u*) *Per Vaughan, J.*, 6 Bing. N.

C. 539; S. C., 1 Scott, N. R. 798.

(*x*) *Shelton v. Braithwaite*, 7 M. &

W. 436; *Bromage v. Vaughan*, 9

Q. B. 608; *Mellersh v. Rippen*, 7
Exch. 578.

the land, and shuts itself within its previous limits (*y*). In general, the land thus gained belongs to the Crown, as having been a part of the very *fundus maris*; but if such alluvion be formed so imperceptibly and insensibly, that it cannot by any means be ascertained that the sea ever was there—*idem est non esse et non apparere*, and the land thus formed belongs as a perquisite to the owner of the land adjacent (*z*).

Lastly, it has been suggested (*a*) that “there is a distinction between process of superior and inferior Courts; in the former, *omnia præsumuntur rite esse acta* (*b*), in the latter the rule *de non apparentibus et non existentibus eadem est ratio* applies.” Process of Court.

NON POTEST ADDUCI EXCEPTIO EJUSDEM REI CUIUS PETITUR DISSOLUTIO. (*Bac. Max., reg. 2.*)—*A matter, the validity of which is at issue in legal proceedings, cannot be set up as a bar thereto.*

Where the legality of some proceeding is the matter in dispute between two parties, he who maintains its legality, and seeks to take advantage of it, cannot rely upon the proceeding itself, as a bar to the adverse party. It is obvious that to do so would involve the logical fallacy of *petitio principii*, and would in many cases preclude all redress to an aggrieved party. “It were impertinent and contrary in itself,” said Lord Bacon, “for the law to allow of a plea in bar of such matter as is to be defeated by the same suit, for it is included; and otherwise a man could never arrive at the end and effect of his suit” (*c*).

(*y*) See *Gifford v. Lord Yarborough*, 5 Bing. 163; 27 R. R. 305.

(*z*) Hale, *De Jure Maris*, pt. 1, c. 4, p. 14; *R. v. Ld. Yarborough*, 9 B. & C. 96, 106; 27 R. R. 292; S. C., 1 Dow & Cl. 178. This right has also been referred to the principle, *de minimis non curat lex*; arg., 3 B. and C. 99.

(*a*) Arg. *Kinning v. Buchanan*, 8 C. B. 286.

(*b*) A presumption which appears to be sound, *per* Ld. Chelmsford, L. R. 5 H. L. 234, 248; see *post*, Chap. X.

(*c*) *Bac. Max., reg. 2*; *Pusey v. Desbourvie*, 3 P. Wms. 317.

Instances :
Attainder.

A few instances will suffice to show the application of this rule. If a man was attainted and executed, and the heir brought error upon the attainder, it would have been bad to plead corruption of blood by the same attainder ; otherwise the heir would have been without remedy ever to reverse the attainder (*d*). So, although a person attainted could not be permitted to sue for any civil right in a Court of law, yet he might take proceedings, and would be heard, for the purpose of reversing his attainder (*e*).

On the same principle, although a party in contempt is not generally entitled to take any proceeding in the cause, he will nevertheless be heard if his object be to get rid of the order or other proceeding which placed him in contempt, and he is also entitled to be heard for the purpose of resisting or setting aside for irregularity any proceedings subsequent to his contempt (*f*). And where a man does not appear on a vicious proceeding, he is not to be held to have waived that very objection which is a legitimate cause of his non-appearance (*g*).

Appeal.

Where the judge of an inferior Court had illegally compelled a plaintiff who appeared to be nonsuited, and upon a bill of exceptions being brought, the nonsuit was entered on the record, the defendant was not allowed to contend that the entry on record precluded the plaintiff from showing that he had refused to consent to the nonsuit, for that would have been to set up as a defence the very thing which was the subject of complaint,—a course prohibited by the above maxim (*h*). So, the judgment or opinion of the Court

(*d*) *Bac. M.*, reg. 2; *Loukes v. Holbeach*, 4 Bing. 420, 424, commented on, *Byrne v. Manning*, 2 Dowl. N. S. 403. Attainder was abolished by the Forfeiture Act, 1870, s. 1.

(*e*) See 1 Taunt. 84, 93.

The same principle applies in the case of proceedings to reverse outlawry; *Jenk. Cent.* 106; *Finch*,

Law, 46; *Matthews v. Gibson*, 8 East, 527; *Craig v. Levy*, 1 Exch. 570.

(*f*) *Per* Ld. Cottenham, *Chuck v. Cremer*, 1 Coop. 205; *King v. Bryant*, 3 My. & Cr. 191. See 1 Daniell, Ch. Pr., 3rd ed. 354 *et seq.*

(*g*) *Per* Knight Bruce, V.-C., 15 L. J. Bankr. 7.

(*h*) *Strother v. Hutchinson*, 4

below cannot, with propriety, be cited as an authority on the argument, because such judgment and opinion are then under review (*i*).

The maxim seems also to apply, when the matter of the plea is not to be avoided in the same but in a different suit : and, therefore, if a writ of error was brought to reverse an outlawry in any action, outlawry in another action did not bar the plaintiff in error ; for otherwise, if the outlawry was erroneous, it could never be reversed (*k*) ; the general rule, however, was that an outlaw could not enforce any proceeding for his own benefit (*l*).

Extension of rule.

ALLEGANS CONTRARIA NON EST AUDIENDUS. (*Jenk. Cent.* 16.)—

He is not to be heard who alleges things contradictory to each other.

This elementary rule of logic, which is frequently applied in our Courts of justice, will receive occasional illustration in the course of this work. We may for the present observe that it expresses, in other language, the trite saying of Lord Kenyon, that a man shall not be permitted to “blow hot and cold” with reference to the same transaction, or insist, at different times, on the truth of each of two conflicting allegations, according to the promptings of his private interest (*m*).

Bing. N. C. 83, 90 ; distinguished in *Corsar v. Reed*, 17 Q. B. 540.

(*i*) See *per Alexander*, C.B., *R. v. Westwood*, 7 Bing. 83 ; 33 R. R. 24 ; *per North*, C.J., *Barnardiston v. Soame*, 6 St. Tr. 1094. See also, in further illustration of the maxim, *Masters v. Lewis*, 1 Ld. Raym. 57.

(*k*) *Jenk. Cent.* 37 ; *Gilb. For.* Rom. 54. See *Bac. Max.*, reg. 2.

(*l*) *Per Parke*, B., *Reg. v. Lowe*, 8 Exch. 698. See *Re Pyne*, 5 C. B. 407 ; *Davis v. Trevanion*, 2 D. & L. 743 ; *Walker v. Thelluson*, 1 Dowl.

N. S. 578. Outlawry is now practically obsolete ; see *Archbold's Practice*, 13th ed., vol. ii. p. 1081.

(*m*) See *Wood v. Dwarries*, 11 Exch. 493 ; *Andrews v. Elliott*, 5 E. & B. 502 ; *Tyerman v. Smith*, 6 E. & B. 719 ; *Morgan v. Couchman*, 14 C. B. 100 ; *Humblestone v. Welham*, 5 C. B. 195 ; *Williams v. Thomas*, 4 Exch. 479 ; *Taylor v. Best*, 14 C. B. 487 ; *Reg. v. Evans*, 3 E. & B. 363 ; *Williams v. Lewis*, 7 E. & B. 929 ; *Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. Slipper*, 11 C. B. N. S. 493 ; *Elkin v. Baker*, Id.

In *Cave v. Mills* (n), the maxim under notice was applied. The plaintiff was surveyor to trustees of turnpike roads; as such surveyor it was his duty to make all contracts, and to pay the sums due for the repair of the roads, he being authorised to draw on the treasurer to a certain amount. His expenditure, however, was not strictly limited to that amount, and in the yearly accounts presented by him to the trustees a balance was generally claimed as due to him, and was carried to the next year's account. Accounts were thus rendered by him for three consecutive years showing certain balances due to himself. These accounts were allowed by the trustees at their annual meeting, and a statement based on them of the revenue and expenditure of the trust was published as required by 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, s. 78. The trustees, moreover, believing the accounts to be correct, paid off with monies in hand a portion of their mortgage debt. The plaintiff afterwards claimed a larger sum in respect of payments which had in fact been made by him, and which he ought to have brought into the accounts of the above years, but had knowingly omitted. It was held that he was estopped from recovering the sums thus omitted, for "a man shall not be allowed to blow hot and cold—to affirm at one time and deny at another—making a claim on those whom he has deluded to their disadvantage, and founding that claim on the very matters of the delusion. Such a principle has its basis in common sense and common justice, and whether it is called 'estoppel,' or by any other name, it is one which Courts of law have in modern times most usefully adopted."

526, 543; *Green v. Sichel*, 7 C. B. N. S. 747; *Pearson v. Dawson*, E. B. & E. 448; *Haines v. East India Co.*, 11 Moo. P. C. 39; *Smith v. Hodson*, 4 T. R. 211, 217; *Brewer v. Sparrow*, 7 B. & C. 310; *Lythgoe v. Vernon*, 5 H. & N. 180; see *Rice v. Reed*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 54.

and allow proceedings to go on against him to judgment, and then to ask the Court to interfere on his behalf on the ground that his name was misspelt; *Churchill v. Churchill*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 486.

(n) 7 H. & N. 913. See *Van Has-selt v. Sack*, 13 Moo. P. C. C. 185.

A man is not entitled to stand by

The doctrine of *estoppel*, at any rate by deed and *in pais*, Estoppel. is in great measure a development of the principle expressed in this maxim. Indeed, the learned author of Smith's Leading Cases, who was the first to reduce to any system the many applications of the theory of estoppel, seems to connect estoppel by *record* also with the present maxim. He defines estoppel generally (o) as a conclusive admission, or something which the law treats as equivalent to an admission.

It is impossible within the limits of this work to give a satisfactory account of estoppel. The reader is referred to Smith's Leading Cases (p), and the maxim *nullus commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria* (q), where some account will be found of *estoppel in pais*. There are, however, cases in which estoppel operates to preclude a person from contradicting that which has been accepted and acted upon as truth and fact by others, under circumstances which do not constitute wilful and culpable deception. Such cases are referable to the present maxim rather than to that just cited. An illustration of this is afforded by *Prentice v. London Building Society* (r). In that case to an action by a transferee of shares against the trustees of the society, the trustees pleaded that the matter was a dispute between the society and a person claiming on account of a member, and one that ought to be settled by arbitration. It appeared at the trial that the shares in question had been forfeited by the defendants to make good a debt due from an absconding secretary who had transferred them to the plaintiff. It was accordingly held that as the trustees denied the right of the plaintiff to be a member of the society, they were estopped from saying that the dispute was one with a member.

So where a seller has recognised the right of his buyer to dispose of goods remaining in the actual possession of the

(o) 2 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 744.

(p) *Duchess of Kingston's case*.

(q) *Post*, p. 240.

(r) L. R. 10 C. P. 679; see also

Smith v. Baker, L. R. 8 C. P. 35;

42 L. J. C. P. 155.

seller, he cannot defeat the right of a person claiming under the buyer on the ground that no property passed to the latter by reason of the want of a specific appropriation of the goods (s). Nor can an individual who has procured an act to be done sue as one of several co-plaintiffs for the doing of that very act (t). Where a party accepts costs under a judge's order, which, but for such order, would not at that time be payable, he cannot afterwards object that the order was made without jurisdiction (u). And if A. agrees with B. to pay him so much per ton for manufacturing and selling a substance invented and patented by B., it is not competent to A., having used the invention by B.'s permission, to plead in answer to an action for monies due in respect of such use that the patent was void and the licence given superfluous (x). And a licensee of a patent cannot in any way question its validity during the continuance of the licence (y). A person cannot act under an agreement and at the same time repudiate it (z).

Again, "where a person is charged as a member of a partnership, not because he is a member, but because he has represented himself as such, the law proceeds on the principle, that if a person so conducts himself as to lead another to imagine that he fills a particular situation, it would be unjust to enable him to turn round and say that he did not fill that situation. If, therefore, he appeared to the party who is seeking to charge him to be a partner, and represented himself as such, he is not allowed afterwards to say that that representation was incorrect, and that he was

(s) *Woodley v. Coventry*, 2 H. & C. 164.

(t) *Brandon v. Scott*, 7 E. & B. 234.

(u) *Tinkler v. Hilder*, 4 Exch. 187. See *Wilcox v. Odden*, 15 C. B. N. S. 837; *Freeman v. Read*, 9 C. B. N. S. 301.

(x) *Lawes v. Purser*, 6 E. & B.

930. See *Harrup v. Bayley*, 6 E. & B. 218.

(y) *Clark v. Adie*, 2 App. Cas. 423; 46 L. J. Ch. 585.

(z) *Crossley v. Dixon*, 10 H. L. Cas. 293, 310. See also *Morrison v. Universal Marine Ins. Co.*, L. R. 8 Ex. 40, 197; 42 L. J. Ex. 115.

not a partner" (a). So a person cannot in the same transaction buy in the character of principal and charge the seller for commission as his agent (b). And a person acting professedly as agent for another, may be estopped from saying that he was not such agent (c). Also it seems a true proposition that "where parties have agreed to act upon an assumed state of facts, their rights between themselves depend on the conventional state of facts, and not on the truth" (d), and it is not competent to either party afterwards to deny the truth of such statement (e).

So, where rent, accruing due after the expiration of a notice to quit, is paid by the tenant and accepted by the landlord, that is an act of the parties which evidences an intention that a tenancy should be considered as subsisting (f). So, if there be a distress, the distrainor affirms by a solemn act that a tenancy subsists; and it is not competent to him afterwards to deny it (g).

In like manner, the maxim under consideration applies, in many cases, to prevent the assertion of titles inconsistent with each other, and which cannot contemporaneously take effect (h). And it is laid down that "a person who has a power of appointment, if he chooses to create an estate or a charge upon his estate by a voluntary act, cannot afterwards use the power for the purpose of defeating that voluntary act;" and if a bond be given to the Crown under 33 Hen. 8, c. 39, binding all lands over which the obligor has at the

(a) *Per Rolfe, B., Ness v. Angas*, 3 Exch. 813. See 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 14.

(b) *Salomons v. Pender*, 3 H. & C. 639.

(c) *Rogers v. Hadley*, 2 H. & C. 227.

(d) Blackb. Contr. Sale, 163. As e.g. a valued policy in Marine Insurance; which, however, does not effect estoppel for purposes collateral to the contract, *per* Ld. Selborne, *Burnand v. Rodocanachi*,

7 App. Cas. 333, 335: 50 L. J. Q. B. 284.

(e) *M'Cance v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 3 H. & C. 343.

(f) See *Tayleur v. Wildin*, L. R. 3 Ex. 303.

(g) *Per* Maule, J., *Blyth v. Denmet*, 13 C. B. 181; *per* Crompton, J., *Ward v. Day*, 4 B. & S. 353: 5 Id. 359; and see *per* Ld. Brougham, *Clayton v. A.-G.*, 1 Coop. (Rep. temp. Cottenham), 124.

(h) 1 Swanst. 427, note.

time of executing the bond a disposing power, the giving such bond is to be deemed a voluntary act on the part of the obligor, so that he cannot, by afterwards exercising the power, defeat the right of the Crown (*i*).

No one shall
derogate
from his
own grant.

Closely allied with the principle of the decisions just noticed, is the rule of law that "a man shall not derogate from his own grant," as an illustration of which may be cited the case of *Saint v. Pilley* (*j*), where it was held that the surrender of a term by a trustee in bankruptcy could not defeat the right of one who had previously bought the fixtures, but had, without *laches*, allowed them to remain upon the premises. And where a man parts with land, knowing that it is intended to erect substantial buildings upon it, he will not be allowed afterwards to use his adjoining land so as to injure those buildings (*k*). Further, if a stranger begins to build on land, supposing it to be his own, and the real owner, perceiving his mistake, abstains from setting him right, and leaves him to persevere in his error, a Court of equity will not afterwards assist the real owner asserting his title to the land (*l*).

Election.

The principle, moreover, underlies the doctrine known in England as that of *election*, and in Scotland as *approbate* and *reprobate* (*m*), which is thus explained by Lord Cairns: "Where a deed or will professes to make a general disposition of property for the benefit of a person named in it, such person cannot accept a benefit under the instrument, without at the same time conforming to all its provisions, and renouncing every right inconsistent with them (*n*).

(*i*) *Reg. v. Ellis*, 4 Exch. 652, 661: 6 Id. 921.

(*j*) L. R. 10 Ex. 137: 44 L. J. Ex. 33.

(*k*) *Siddons v. Short*, 2 C. P. D. 572: 46 L. J. C. P. 795.

(*l*) *Ramsden v. Dyson*, L. R. 1 H. L. 129, 141, 168; see 9 App. Cas. 710; 35 Ch. D. 696.

(*m*) *Codrington v. Codrington*, L.

R. 7 H. L. 854, 861: 45 L. J. Ch. 660; see 31 Ch. D. 474.

(*n*) As instances of which doctrine see *Talbot v. Earl of Radnor*, 8 My. & K. 252; *Messenger v. Andrews*, 4 Russ. 473; 28 R. R. 156; *Cooper v. Cooper*, L. R. 7 H. L. 53; for "Approbate and Reprobate" see *Kerr v. Wauchope*, 1 Bligh, 121; 20 R. R. 1.

Lastly, where a witness in a Court of justice makes contradictory statements relative to the same transaction, the rule applicable in determining the degree of credibility to which he may be entitled obviously is, *allegans contraria non est audiendus*.

OMNE MAJUS CONTINET IN SE MINUS. (5 Rep. 115.)—
The greater contains the less (o).

On this principle, if a debtor tender more than he owes, it is good, and the creditor ought to accept so much of the sum tendered as is due (*p*). But if he tender a bank-note or coin of a larger amount than the sum due, requiring change, that is not a good tender, for the creditor may be unable to take what is due and return the balance (*q*); though if the creditor knows the amount due, and is offered a larger sum, and, without any objection on the ground of change, merely makes a collateral objection, the tender is good (*r*). Where, however, a party has separate demands for unequal sums against several persons, an offer of one sum for the debts of all, not distinguishing the claims against each, is not a valid tender, and will not support a plea by one of the debtors, that *his* debt was tendered (*s*).

Tender of
larger sum
than due.

(*o*) Finch, Law, 21; D. 50, 17, 113, 110, pr.

(*p*) *Wade's case*, 5 Rep. 115; *Dean v. James*, 4 B. & Ad. 546.

A demand of a larger sum than is due may be good as a demand of the lesser sum; *Carr v. Martinson*, 1 E. & E. 456.

See, as another instance of the maxim, *Rylands v. Kreitman*, 19 C. B. N. S. 351.

(*q*) *Betterbee v. Davis*, 3 Camp. 70; 13 R. R. 755; *Robinson v. Cook*, 6 Taunt. 336; 16 R. R. 624; *Blow v. Russell*, 1 C. & P. 365. See *Read*

v. Goldring, 2 M. & S. 86; 14 R. R. 594.

(*r*) *Per* Ld. Abinger, *Bevans v. Rees*, 5 M. & W. 308; *Black v. Smith*, Peake, 121; 3 R. R. 661; *Saunders v. Graham*, Gow, R. 121; *Douglas v. Patrick*, 3 T. R. 683; 1 R. R. 793. See *Hardingham v. Allen*, 5 C. B. 793; *Ex p. Danks*, 2 De G. M. & G. 936.

(*s*) *Strong v. Harvey*, 3 Bing. 304, 313. See also *Douglas v. Patrick*, *supra*. Tender of part of an entire debt is bad; *Dixon v. Clark*, 5 C. B. 365; *Searles v. Sadgrave*, 5 E. & B.

The maxim admits of familiar illustration in the power which a tenant in fee-simple possesses over the estate held in fee; for he may either grant to another the whole of such estate, or charge it in any manner he think fit, or he may create out of it any less estate or interest; and to the estate or interest thus granted he may annex such conditions, not repugnant to the rules of law as he pleases (*t*). In like manner, a man having a power may do less than such power enables him to do; he may, for instance, lease for fourteen years under a power to lease for twenty-one (*u*); or, if he have a licence or authority to do any number of acts for his own benefit, he may do some of them and need not do all (*x*). In these cases, the rule of the civil law applies: *non debet cui plus licet quod minus est non licere* (*y*): or, as it is usually expressed in our books, *cui licet quod majus non debet quod minus est non licere* (*z*)—he who has authority to do the more important act shall not be debarred from doing that of less importance; a doctrine founded on common sense, and of general application, not only with reference to the law of real property, but likewise to that of principal and agent, as we shall hereafter see. On this principle, moreover, if there be a custom within any manor that copyhold lands may be granted in fee-simple, by the same custom they are grantable to one and the heirs of his body for life, for years, or in tail (*a*). So, if there be a custom that copy-hold lands may be granted for life, by the same custom they may be granted *durante*

639. So is a tender clogged with a condition; *Finch v. Miller*, 5 C. B. 428; *Bowen v. Owen*, 11 Q. B. 130; see *Greenwood v. Sutcliffe*, [1892] 1 Ch. 1; 61 L. J. Ch. 59.

(*t*) 1 Prest. Abstr. Tit. 316, 377.

(*u*) *Isherwood v. Oldknow*, 3 M. & S. 382; 16 R. R. 305. See an instance of syllogistic reasoning founded on the maxim, *Johnstone v. Sutton*, 1 T. R. 519; 1 R. R. 269.

(*x*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Isherwood v. Oldknow*, 3 M. & S. 392; 16 R. R. 305.

(*y*) D. 50, 17, 21.

(*z*) 4 Rep. 23; also *majus dignum trahit ad se minus dignum*; Co. Litt. 355 b; 2 Inst. 307; Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 26; Finch, Law, 22.

(*a*) 4 Rep. 23; Wing. Max., p. 206.

viduitate, but not *e converso*, because an estate during widowhood is less than an estate for life (*b*).

The doctrine of merger may also be specified in illustration of the maxim now before us, for “when a less estate and a greater estate, limited subsequent to it, coincide and meet in one and the same person without any intermediate estate, the less is immediately annihilated; or in the law phraseology is said to be merged, that is sunk or drowned in the greater; or to express the same thing in other words, the greater estate is accelerated so as to become at once an estate in possession” (*c*)

Merger.

Further, it is laid down as generally true, that, where more is done than ought to be done, that portion for which there was authority shall stand, and the act shall be void *quoad* the excess only (*d*); *quando plus fit quam fieri debet, ridetur etiam illud fieri quod faciendum est* (*e*): as in the instance of a power above referred to, if a man do more than he is authorised to do under the power, it shall be good to the extent of his power. Thus, if he have power to lease for ten years, and he lease for twenty, the lease for the twenty years shall in equity be good for ten years of the twenty (*f*).

Extension of principle.

So, if the grantor of land is entitled to certain shares only of the land granted; and if the grant import to pass more shares than the grantor has, it will nevertheless pass those shares of which he is the owner (*g*). Where also there is a custom that a man shall not devise any greater estate than for life, a devise in fee will be a good devise for life, if the devisee will claim it as such (*h*).

Lastly, in criminal law the principle above exemplified sometimes applies. Whenever a person is indicted for an

Criminal law.

(*b*) Co. Copyholder, s. 33; Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 25. See another example, 9 Rep. 48.

(*c*) 2 Black. Com. 326—327.

(*d*) Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 25.

(*e*) 5 Rep. 115.

(*f*) See *Bartlett v. Rendle*, 3 M. & S. 99; 15 R. R. 426; *Doe v. Matthews*, 5 B. & Ad. 298; 39 R. R. 485.

(*g*) 3 Prest. Abstr. Tit. 35.

(*h*) Gr. & Rud. of Law, p. 242.

offence which includes in it an offence of minor extent and gravity of the same class, he may be convicted of such minor offence. Thus on an indictment for murder he may be convicted of manslaughter (*i*) and on an indictment for "unlawfully and maliciously wounding" he may be found guilty of a common assault (*j*). But it is only by virtue of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1851 (*k*), that where a person has been indicted for a crime, a jury may find him guilty of an attempt to commit the same crime.

QUOD AB INITIO NON VALET IN TRACTU TEMPORIS NON CONVALESCIT. (*Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 16: Dig. 50, 17, 29, 210.*)—*That which was originally void, does not by lapse of time become valid.*

Importance
of rule in
practice and
pleading.
General
application.

This rule is one of general importance in practice, in pleading, and in the application of legal principles to the occurrences of life (*l*). Instances in which it applies will be found to occur in various parts of this work, particularly in that which treats of the law of contracts. The following cases have here been selected, in order to give a general view of its application in different and distinct branches of the law.

Lease.

If a bishop makes a lease of lands for four lives, which is contrary to the 13 Eliz. c. 10, s. 3, and one of the lives falls in, and then the bishop dies, yet this lease will not bind his successor, for those things which have a bad beginning cannot be brought to a good end (*m*). So, if a

(*i*) Archbold, Crim. Ev., 23rd ed., p. 215.

(*j*) *Reg. v. Taylor*, L. R. 1 C. C. 194, 196. See *Reg. v. Hodgkiss*, Id. 212.

(*k*) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 9.

(*l*) See instances of the application of this rule in the case of marriage with a deceased wife's sister, *Fenton v. Livingstone*, 3 Macq. Sc. App.

Cas. 497, 555; of the surrender of a copyhold, *Doe v. Tofteld*, 11 East, 246; 10 R. R. 496; of a parish certificate, *R. v. Upton Gray*, 10 B. & C. 807; *R. v. Whitchurch*, 7 B. & C. 573; of an order of removal, *R. v. Chilverscoton*, 8 T. R. 178.

(*m*) *Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 16.* See *Doe v. Collinge*, 7 C. B. 939; *Doe v. Tanriere*, 12 Q. B. 998.

man seised of lands in fee make a lease for twenty-one years, rendering rent to begin presently, and the same day he make a lease to another for the like term, the second lease is void; and even if the first lessee surrender his term to the lessor, or commit any act of forfeiture of his lease, the second lessee shall not have his term, because the lessor at the making of the second lease had nothing in him but the reversion (*n*).

Again, in the case of a lease for years, there is a distinction between a clause by which, on a breach of covenant, the lease is made absolutely void, and a clause which merely gives the lessor power to re-enter (*o*). Under the former clause, if the lessor make a legal demand of the rent, and the lessee refuse to pay, or if the lessee be guilty of any breach of the condition of re-entry, the lease is *void* and absolutely determined, and cannot be set up again by acceptance of rent due after the breach, or by any other act; but under the latter clause the lease is only *voidable*, and may be affirmed by acceptance of rent accrued afterwards, or other act, provided the lessor had notice of the breach of condition at the time; and it is undoubted law that, though an acceptance of rent or other act of waiver may make a voidable lease good, it cannot make valid a deed (*p*) or a lease which was void *ab initio* (*q*).

Where a remainder is limited to A., the son of B., he having no such son, and afterwards a son is born to him, whose name is A., during the continuance of the particular estate, he will not take by this remainder (*r*). Remainder,
&c.

So, where uses are raised by a deed which is itself void,

(*n*) *Smith v. Stapleton*, Plowd. 432; Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 16.

(*o*) The distinction has ceased to be of importance owing to the construction now placed, where possible, upon forfeiture clauses; see *Davenport v. The Queen*, 3 App. Cas. 115, 128; and *post*, p. 234.

(*p*) See *De Montmorency v. Devereux*, 7 Cl. & F. 188.

(*q*) *Doe v. Banks*, 4 B. & Ald. 401; 23 R. R. 318; Co. Litt. 215 a; *Jones v. Carter*, 15 M. & W. 719.

(*r*) Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 17; 2 Black. Com. 320—321.

as in the instance of the conveyance of a freehold *in futuro*, the uses mentioned in the deed cannot arise (*s*). When the estate to which a warranty is annexed is defeated, the warranty is also defeated (*t*); and when a spiritual corporation to which a church is appropriate is dissolved, the church is disappropriated (*u*).

So, where a living becomes vacant by resignation or canonical deprivation, or if a clerk presented be refused for insufficiency, these being matters of which the bishop alone is presumed to be cognizant, the law requires him to give notice thereof to the patron (*v*); otherwise he can take no advantage by way of lapse; neither in this case shall any lapse accrue to the metropolitan or to the Crown, for the first step fails—*quod non habet principium non habet finem* (*x*), it being universally true that neither the archbishop nor the Crown shall present by lapse, but where the immediate ordinary might have collated by lapse within the six months, and has exceeded his time (*y*).

Qualification
of rule.

Aider by
verdict.

An important qualification of the rule expressed by the maxim we have been discussing is effected by the doctrine of aider by verdict. When an averment which is necessary for the support of a pleading is improperly stated, and the verdict on an issue involving that averment is found, if it appears to the Court after verdict, that the issue could not have been determined without proof of the averment, the defective averment, which might have been fatal on demurrer, is cured by the verdict (*z*). This principle is applicable in criminal proceedings, but is now of no

(*s*) Arg., *Goodtitle v. Gibbs*, 5 B. & C. 714; 29 R. R. 366.

(*t*) Litt. s. 741, and Butler's note, (1); Co. Litt. 389 a; but this may with more propriety be referred to the maxim, *sublato principali tollitur adjunctum*; Ibid.

(*u*) Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 20.

(*v*) See *Bp. of Exeter v. Marshall*, L. R. 3 H. L. 17; 37 L. J. C. P. 331.

(*x*) Wing. Max., p. 79; Co. Litt. 345 a.

(*y*) 2 Black. Com. 452; Co. Litt. 345 a.

(*z*) *Heyman v. Regina*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 105, per Blackburn, J.; and see *Jackson v. Pesked*, 1 M. & S. 234; 14 R. R. 417; 1 Wms. Saund. 228, 1.

practical importance in civil proceedings (a). Aider by verdict does not, however, extend to a case where a necessary averment is totally omitted (b). In such cases the more general rule applies, *debile fundamentum fallit opus* (c). A still more marked qualification of the leading maxim is afforded by cases where an act done contrary to the express direction or established practice of the law will not be found to invalidate the subsequent proceedings, and where, consequently, *quod fieri non debet factum valet* (d).

Further exceptions.

Banwen Iron Co. v. Barnett (e) seems to fall within the class of cases to which the maxim just cited applies. There a certificate of complete registration had been granted under the 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, s. 7, although the deed of settlement omitted some of the requisite provisions: and it was held that a shareholder could not, in answer to an action against him for calls, object that the certificate had been granted upon the production of an insufficient deed.

The case of *Reg. v. Lord Newborough* (f) also illustrates this exception to the maxim. The question was as to the payment of special constables by a county treasurer, neither the appointment of these constables, nor the order for their payment, having been made in accordance with the requirements of 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. 41. It was urged *quod fieri non debet factum valet*, and this view was adopted by Lush, J., who decided that, as the order for payment had been acted upon, the account allowed, and the money paid, the proceedings should not be re-opened.

(a) *Reg. v. Aspinall*, 2 Q. B. D. 48; 45 L. J. M. C. 229.

(b) *Per Brett, J.*, *Ibid.*, p. 58.

(c) *Finch, Law*, 14, 36; *Wing. Max.* 113, 114. See, also, the judgment, *Davies v. Lowndes*, 8 Scott, N. R. 567, where the above maxim is applied.

(d) *Gloss. in 1, 5, Cod. 1, 14. Pro infectis*: D. 1, 14, 3; *Wood, Inst.*

25; 5 Rep. 38. As will be seen hereafter, this and the leading maxim have frequent application in the case of contracts. See *McCallan v. Mortimer*, 6 M. & W. 58; 7 M. & W. 20; 9 M. & W. 640.

(e) 8 C. B. 406, 433.

(f) L. R. 4 Q. B. 585; see also *per Blackburn, J.*, *Winsor v. Reg.*, 6 B. & S. 183.

Conformably to the principle on which that case was decided, the maxim, *quod fieri non debet factum valet*, will in general be found to apply wherever a form has been omitted which ought to have been observed, but of which the omission is *ex post facto* immaterial (*g*). It frequently happens that a particular act is directed to be done by one clause of a statute, and that the omission of such act is, by a separate clause, declared immaterial to the validity of subsequent proceedings. In all such cases it is true, that what ought not to have been done is valid when done. Thus, residence in the parish before proclamation was directed by 26 Geo. 2, c. 33, "for the better preventing of clandestine marriages," as a requisite preliminary to a marriage by banns; but if this direction, although material for carrying out the object of that Act, was not complied with, the marriage was nevertheless valid, for the legislature expressly declared that non-observance of this direction should, after the marriage had been solemnised, be immaterial (*h*). The applicability of this maxim, in regard to the validity of a marriage irregularly solemnised, was also discussed in *Beamish v. Beamish*, which will hereafter more conveniently be noticed (*i*).

Lastly, it is said, that "void things" may nevertheless be "good to some purpose" (*h*); as if A., by indenture, let B. an acre of land in which A. has nothing, and A. purchase it afterwards, this will be a good lease (*l*); and the reason is, that what, in the first instance, was a lease by estoppel only (*m*), becomes subsequently a lease in

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, 6 Cl. & F. 708; arg. 9 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 478. "There is a known distinction between circumstances which are of the essence of a thing required to be done by an Act of Parliament, and clauses merely directory." *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *R. v. Loxdale*, 1 Burr. 447, adopted by Tindal, C.J., *Southampton Dock Co. v. Richards*, 1 Scott, 239.

(*h*) See *per* Ld. Brougham, 6 Cl. & F. 708 *et seq.*

(*i*) 5 Irish C. L. Rep. 136: 6 Id. 142; 9 H. L. Cas. 274.

(*k*) Finch, Law, 62.

(*l*) Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 17, and authorities cited, Id. n. (*a*).

(*m*) See *Cuthbertson v. Irving*, 4 H. & N. 742, 754: 6 Id. 135; *Duke v. Ashby*, 7 Id. 600.

interest, and the relation of landlord and tenant will then exist as perfectly as if the lessor had been actually seised of the land at the time when the lease was made (*n*).

ARGUMENTUM AB INCONVENIENTI PLURIMUM VALET IN LEGE.

(*Co. Litt.* 66 *a.*)—*An argument drawn from inconvenience is forcible in law (o).*

It has been stated, under a preceding maxim (*p*), that where the law is clearly defined, its strict letter will not be departed from because inconvenience or hardship may result from its strict observance. Yet, in cases where the law is not clear, or where the circumstances give rise to doubt, the Courts frequently allow their decision to be determined by such considerations (*q*).

Thus, arguments of inconvenience are sometimes of great value upon the question of intention. If there be in any instrument equivocal expressions, and great inconvenience must necessarily follow from one construction, it is strong to show that such construction is not according to the true intention of the grantor; but where there is no equivocal expression in the instrument, and the words used admit only of one meaning, arguments of inconvenience prove only want of foresight in the grantor. This reasoning was applied in *Glyn v. East and West India Dock Co.*, where the meaning of the expression in bills of lading, "the one being accomplished, the other to stand

(*n*) *Blake v. Foster*, 8 T. R. 487; 5 R. R. 419; *Stokes v. Russell*, 3 T. R. 678; 1 R. R. 732; *per* Alderson, B., 6 M. & W. 662; *Webb v. Austin*, 8 Scott, N. R. 419; *Par-geter v. Harris*, 7 Q. B. 708; Co. Litt. 47 b; 1 Platt on Leases, 53, 54; Bac. Abr. Leases (o).

(o) Co. Litt. 97, 152 b. As to the argument *ab inconvenienti*, see

per Sir W. Scott, 1 Dods. 402; *per* Ld. Brougham, 6 Cl. & Fin. 671; 1 Mer. 420; *Sheppard v. Phillimore*, L. R. 2 P. C. 450, 460.

(*p*) *Omnis innovatio, &c.*

(*q*) *Per* Heath, J., 1 H. Bla. 61; *per* Dallas, C.J., 7 Taunt. 527: 8 Id. 762; *per* Holroyd, J., 3 B. & C. 181; Judgm., *Doe v. Acklam*, 2 B. & C. 798; 26 R. R. 544.

void," was discussed (r). But because a man has been wanting in foresight, the Courts cannot make a new instrument for him : they must act upon the instrument as it is made (s). And generally, if there be any doubts what is the law, judges solve such doubts by considering what will be the good or bad effects of their decision ; but if the law is clear, inconveniences afford no argument of weight : the legislature alone can remedy them (t). And, hence, the doctrine, that *nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum* (u), which is frequently advanced by Sir E. Coke, must certainly be received with some qualification, and must be understood to mean, that against the introduction or establishing of a particular rule or precedent inconvenience is a forcible argument (x).

Public inconvenience.

This argument *ab inconvenienti*, moreover, is, under many circumstances, valid to this extent, that the law will sooner suffer a private mischief than a public inconvenience,—a principle which we have already considered. It is better to suffer a mischief which is peculiar to one, than an inconvenience which may prejudice many (y).

Argument, how applied in interpreting statutes.

Lastly, in construing an Act, the same rule applies. If the words used by the legislature, in framing any particular clause, have a necessary meaning, it is the duty of the Court to construe the clause accordingly, whatever may be the inconvenience of such a course (z). Where a statute

(r) 7 App. Cas. 591· and see *per* Jessel, M.R., *Bottomley's case*, 16 Ch. D. 686.

(s) *Per* Sir J. Leach, *A.-G. v. Duke of Marlborough*, 3 Madd. 540; 18 R. R. 273; *per* Burrough, J., *Deane v. Clayton*, 7 Taunt. 496; 18 R. R. 553; *per* Best, C.J., *Fletcher v. Lord Sondes*, 3 Bing. 590; 30 R. R. 32.

(t) *Per* Ld. Northington, *Pike v. Hoare*, 2 Eden, 184; *per* Abbott, C.J., 3 B. & C. 471. See Vaughan,

R. 37, 38.

(u) Co. Litt. 66 a; cited *per* Pollock, C.B., 4 H. L. Cas. 145, and *per* Ld. Truro, Id. 195.

(x) Ram, *Science of Legal Judgment*, 57.

(y) Co. Litt. 97 b, 152 b; Hobart, 224; *salus populi*, &c.; *ante*.

(z) *Per* Erle, J., *Wansey v. Perkins*, 8 Sc. N. R. 969; *per* Parke, J., *Mirehouse v. Rennell*, 1 Cl. & F. 546; 36 R. R. 179; Wilberforce on Stat. Law, Chap 3.

is imperative no reasoning *ab inconvenienti* should prevail. But, unless it is very clear that violence would be done to the language of the Act by adopting any other construction, any great inconvenience which might result from that suggested, may certainly afford fair ground for supposing that it could not be what was contemplated by the legislature, and will warrant the Court in looking for some other interpretation (a).

Although, according to Lord Bacon (b), judges ought above all things to remember the conclusion of the Roman Twelve Tables, *salus populi suprema lex*, and that laws, unless they be in order to that end, are but things captious and not well inspired, he reminds them elsewhere that their function is to interpret, and not to make the law.

(a) Judgm., *Doe v. Norton*, 11 M. & W. 928; Judgm., *Turner v. Sheffield R. Co.*, 10 Id. 434. (b) Essay "Of Judicature;" see *per Pollock*, C.B., 4 H. L. Cas. 152.

CHAPTER V.

FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES.

MANY of the principles set forth in this chapter are of such general application that they may be considered as exhibiting the very foundations on which the legal science rests. To these established maxims the remark of Sir W. Blackstone (Com., 21st ed., vol. i., p. 68) is peculiarly applicable:—Their authority “rests entirely upon general reception and usage, and the only method of proving that this or that maxim is a rule of the common law, is by showing that it hath been always the custom to observe it.” It would, indeed, be highly interesting to trace from a remote period, and through successive ages, the gradual development of these principles, to observe their primitive and more obvious meaning, and to show how they have been applied by the “living oracles” of the law to meet the increasing exigencies of society, and those complicated facts which are the result of commerce, civilization, and refinement. Such an inquiry would, however, be too extensive to be compatible with the plan of this work; our object, therefore, in the following pages, is limited to exhibiting a series of the elementary rules of law, accompanied by occasional references to the civil law, and a sufficient number of cases to exemplify the meaning and qualifications of the maxims cited.

These will be found to comprise the following important principles: that where there is a right there is a remedy; that the law looks not at the remote, but at the immediate

cause of damage: that the act of God shall not, by the instrumentality of the law, work an injury: that the law does not compel the performance of that which is impossible to be done: that ignorance of the law does not afford an excuse, although ignorance of facts does: that a party shall not convert that which was done by himself, or with his assent, into a wrong: that a man shall not take advantage of his own tortious act: that the abuse of an authority given by law shall, in some cases, have a retrospective operation in regard to the liability of the party abusing it: that the intention, not the act, is regarded by the law: and that a man shall not be twice vexed in respect of the same cause of action.

UBI JUS IBI REMEDIUM.—*There is no wrong without a remedy (a).*

Jus signifies here “the legal authority to do or to demand something” (b); and *remedium* may be defined to be the right of action, or the means given by law, for the recovery or assertion of a right. According to this elementary maxim, whenever the common law gives a right or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy (c): *lex semper dabit remedium* (d). If a man has a right, he must, it has been observed, “have a means to vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the exercise and enjoyment of it; and, indeed, it is a vain thing to imagine a right without

Jus and remedium defined.

(a) *Lex non debet deficere con- querentibus in justitia exhibenda*: the law wills that, in every case where a man is wronged and endamaged, he shall have remedy; Co. Litt. 197 b.

(b) Mackeld. Civ. Law, 6.

(c) 3 Blac. Comm. 123.

(d) Jacob, Law Dict., title,

Remedy. “Upon principle, whenever the common law imposes a duty, and no other remedy can be shown to exist, or only one which has become obsolete or inoperative, the Court of Queen’s Bench will interfere by mandamus;” Judgm., 12 A. & E. 266. See *R. v. Leicester Guardians*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 632.

a remedy, for want of right and want of remedy are reciprocal" (e).

It appears, then, that *remedium*, although sometimes used as synonymous with *actio*, has, in the above maxim, a more extended signification than the word "action" in its modern sense. An "action" is, in fact, one peculiar mode pointed out by the law for enforcing a remedy, or for prosecuting a claim or demand, in a Court of justice—*action n'est autre chose que loyall demande de son droit* (f); an action is merely the legitimate mode of enforcing a right, whereas *remedium* must here be understood to signify rather the right of action, or *jus persequendi in judicio quod sibi debetur* (g), which is in terms the definition of the word *actio* in the Roman law (h).

Action on
the case.

The maxim *ubi jus ibi remedium* has been considered so valuable, that it led to the invention of the form of action called an action on the case; for the statute of Westminster 2 (i), which was only in affirmance of the common law on this subject, and was passed to quicken the diligence of the clerks in the Chancery, who were too much attached to precedents, enacted that, "whensoever, from thenceforth a writ shall be found in the Chancery, and in a like case, falling under the same right and requiring like remedy, no precedent of a writ can be produced, the clerks in Chancery shall agree in forming a new one; and if they cannot agree, it shall be adjourned till the next Parliament, where a writ shall be framed by consent of the learned in the law, lest it happen for the future that the Court of our Lord the King be deficient in doing justice to the suitors."

Novelty of
complaint.

The principle adopted by Courts of law accordingly is, that the novelty of the particular complaint alleged in an action

(e) *Per* Holt, C.J., *Ashby v. White*, 2, c. 1.

2 Ld. Raym. 953; *per* Willes, C.J., (g) I. 4, 6, pr.

Winsmore v. Greenbank, Willes, 577; Vaugh. R. 47, 253.

(h) See Phillimore, *Introductio* to Rom. L., 61.

(f) Co. Litt. 285 a; Mirror, Bk.

(i) 13 Edw. I. c. 24.

on the case is no objection, provided that an injury cognisable by law be shown to have been inflicted on the plaintiff (*k*) ; in which case, although there be no precedent, the common law will judge according to the law of nature and the public good (*l*). It is, however, important, to observe this distinction, that, where cases are new in principle, it is necessary to have recourse to legislative interposition in order to remedy the grievance ; but where the case is only new in the instance, and the sole question is upon the application of a principle recognised in the law to such new case, it will be just as competent to Courts of justice to apply the principle to any case that may arise two centuries hence as it was two centuries ago (*m*).

In accordance with the spirit of the maxim, *ubi jus ibi remedium*, it was held, in a case usually cited to illustrate it, that a man who has a right to vote at an election for members of Parliament, may maintain an action against the returning officer for maliciously refusing to admit his vote, though his right was never determined in Parliament, and though the persons for whom he offered to vote were elected (*n*) ; and in answer to the argument, that there was no precedent for such an action, and that to establish such a precedent would lead to multiplicity of actions, Lord Holt observed that “ if men will multiply injuries, actions must be multiplied too, for every man that is injured ought to have his recompense.”

Ashby v. White.

It is true, therefore, that, in trespass and for torts

General principle.

(*k*) *Per* Pratt, C.J., *Chapman v. Pickersgill*, 2 Wils. 146 ; *Novello v. Sudlow*, 12 C. B. 177, 190 ; and see *per* Coleridge, J., *Gosling v. Veley*, 4 H. L. Cas. 768 ; *Catchpole v. Ambergate R. Co.*, 1 E. & B. 111.

(*l*) Jenk. Cent. 117.

(*m*) *Per* Ashhurst, J., *Pasley v. Freeman*, 3 T. R. 63 ; 1 R. R. 634 ; *per* Park, J., 7 Taunt. 515 ; *Fletcher*

v. Ld. Sondes, 3 Bing. 550 ; 30 R. R. 32.

(*n*) *Ashby v. White*, 2 Ld. Raym. 938 ; 1 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 240. Proof of malice was necessary to support the action, because the officer had, from his position, a qualified privilege ; see *post*, pp. 158, 173 ; and see *Cullen v. Morris*, 2 Stark. 577, 587 ; 20 R. R. 742 ; *Tozer v. Child*, 7 E. & B. 377.

generally, new actions may be brought as often as new injuries and wrongs are repeated (o).

*Damnum
absque
injurîâ.*

There is, however, a large class of cases in which a damage is sustained, but a damage not occasioned by anything which the law esteems an injury. Such damage is termed *damnum absque injuriâ*, and for that no action can be maintained: the maxim, *ubi jus ibi remedium*, does not apply; for there is no *jus*, no legal right to demand that the act which causes the damage shall not be done, and therefore there is no *remedium* (p). It may seem a hardship upon the person suffering the damage that he is without remedy; but by that consideration the Courts ought not to be influenced. Hard cases, it has frequently been observed, are apt to introduce bad law (q).

Malice.

Before mentioning instances of *damnum absque injuriâ*, we must refer to the very important principle of our law, that an act lawful in itself is not actionable because it is done from ill-will or other bad motive: *damnum absque injuriâ* remains *damnum absque injuriâ*, although the *damnum* is inflicted intentionally (r). Our law does not take into account motive as constituting an element of civil wrong. Any invasion of the civil rights of another person is in itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair its necessary or natural consequences, in so far as these are injurious to the person whose rights are infringed, whether the motive which prompted it be good, bad or indifferent. But the existence of a bad motive, in the case of an act which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a

(o) *Hambleton v. Veere*, 2 Wms. Saund. 171 b (1); cited by *Ld. Denman*, *Hodsoll v. Stallebrass*, 11 A. & E. 306.

(p) See *Pryce v. Belcher*, 4 C. B. 866; 3 *Id.* 58, where the maxim, *ubi jus ibi remedium*, was much considered.

(q) *Per Rolfe, B.*, 11 M. & W. 116.

(r) *Allen v. Flood*, [1898] A. C. 1; 67 L. J. Q. B. 119; *Bradford Corporation v. Pickles*, [1895] A. C. 587; 64 L. J. Ch. 759. *Per Ld. Macnaghten* in *Quinn v. Leatham*, [1901] A. C. 495, 509; 70 L. J. P. C. 76.

civil wrong for which reparation is due. Malice, in common acceptation, means ill-will against a person, but, in its legal sense, it means a *wrongful* act done *intentionally* without just cause or excuse. The root of the principle is that, in any legal question, malice depends, not upon any evil motive which influenced the mind of the actor, but upon the illegal character of the act which he contemplated and committed (s).

Probably the only exception to this principle is the action for malicious prosecution, in which an evil motive is an essential ingredient; but, as Lord Herschell points out, this is an exceptional case justified "because it was thought men might otherwise be too much deterred from enforcing the law and that this would be disadvantageous to the public" (t). Actions for libel and slander appear at first sight to be another exception. But that is not really so. The law never regards such acts as legal: it merely excuses them in certain circumstances for reasons of public policy. It is always wrongful falsely to defame, but the law excuses the act, and renders it privileged from action, if it is done in the honest endeavour to discharge a duty which the law recognises (u). Proof of malice, in the sense of improper motive, is required, not to show that the act was wrongful, but to show that the act was not privileged. Such proof is not essential to the maintenance of the action, unless the wrongful act was done under circumstances from which the law would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, infer that it was privileged (v).

As instances of persons who cause *damnum absque injuriâ*,

(s) See *per* Ld. Watson, [1898] A. C., pp. 92, 94.

(t) *Per* Ld. Herschell in *Allen v. Flood*, [1898] A. C. 125: 67 L. J. Q. B. 119.

(u) There must be an actual, not merely an imagined duty; *Hebditch v. MacIlwaine*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 54:

63 L. J. Q. B. 587.

(v) See *per* Ld. Watson, [1898] A. C. 93; *per* Ld. Herschell, *Id.* 125, 126. As to the *onus probandi* in actions for libel, see *Jenoure v. Delmege*, [1891] A. C. 73: 60 L. J. P. C. 11.

Instances of
*damnum
absque
injurid.*

we may mention the man who establishes a rival school, which draws away the scholars from a school previously established (*w*); or builds a bridge over a river, which causes loss of traffic to a ferry-owner (*x*): the traders who by concerted action, but without the use of illegal means, acquire the business formerly enjoyed by other traders (*y*): the person who by lawful means induces a servant to determine lawfully his contract of service or not to enter a contract of service (*z*). But to molest a person in the carrying on of his business, or to interfere with his mode of doing it, by unlawful means such as threats, violence, intimidation, or conspiracy, is actionable if it results in damage (*a*), except in so far as protection is given to these acts by the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (*b*).

Other instances of *damnum absque injuriâ* arise where a person by his want of care causes damage to another to whom he owes no duty to take care (*c*), or without negligence or intention accidentally inflicts personal injuries on another (*d*). Such also are the cases of the farmer who omits to cut the thistles naturally growing upon his land, in consequence of which they spread into his neighbour's land (*e*): the landowner who erects upon his land buildings obstructing his neighbour's prospect (*f*), or cutting off from

(*w*) Y. B. 11 Hen. 4, f. 47, pl. 21.

(*x*) *Hopkins v. G. N. R. Co.*, 2 Q. B. D. 224: 46 L. J. Q. B. 265: *Dibden v. Skirrow*, [1908] 1 Ch. 41: 77 L. J. Ch. 107.

(*y*) *Mogul SS. Co. v. McGregor*, [1892] A. C. 25; 61 L. J. Q. B. 295.

(*z*) *Allen v. Flood*, [1898] A. C. 1; 67 L. J. Q. B. 110.

(*a*) *Quinn v. Leatham*, [1901] A. C. 495: 70 L. J. P. C. 76, and see the earlier cases fully discussed in *Allen v. Flood*, [1898] A. C. 1, especially the opinion of Hawkins, J.

(*b*) 6 Edw. VII. c. 47.

(*c*) *Le Lievre v. Gould*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 491: 62 L. J. Q. B. 353; *Lane v. Cox*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 415: 66 L. J. Q. B. 193. *Earl v. Lubbock*, [1905] 1 K. B. 253, 74 L. J. K. B. 121, following *Winterbottom v. Wright*, 10 M. & W. 109.

(*d*) *Stanley v. Powell*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 86: 66 L. J. Q. B. 52.

(*e*) *Giles v. Walker*, 24 Q. B. D. 656: 59 L. J. Q. B. 416.

(*f*) *Aldred's case*, 9 Rep. 58; see *per* Ld. Blackburn, 6 App. Cas. 824.

his neighbour's house light (*g*), or air (*h*), to which the neighbour had no legal right: the landowner who appropriates water percolating in undefined channels within his land, and thus prevents its flow into his neighbour's land (*i*); or who erects upon the border of his land barriers against floods, causing them to flow on to his neighbour's land (*k*). But from these last examples we must distinguish that of the landowner who appropriates water which flows through his land in a defined surface channel, and to the flow of which his neighbour is entitled (*l*): or who, by cutting trenches in his land, causes floods, which have already settled therein, to flow away on to his neighbour's land (*m*). For these acts produce an injury for which an action lies.

It has been laid down as a fundamental principle that "it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for such interference" (*n*), and if such interference is committed knowingly and results in damage, an action lies (*o*). So, it is actionable (if damage results) knowingly to induce a servant to break a contract of service (*p*); and

Procuring
breach of
contract.

(*g*) *Tapling v. Jones*, 11 H. L. Cas. 290; 34 L. J. C. P. 342; *Russell v. Watts*, 10 App. Cas. 590; 55 L. J. Ch. 158; *Broomfield v. Williams*, [1897] 1 Ch. 602; 66 L. J. Ch. 305.

(*h*) *Webb v. Bird*, 13 C. B. N. S. 841; 31 L. J. C. P. 335; *Bryant v. Lefever*, 4 C. P. D. 172; 48 L. J. C. P. 380; *Chastey v. Ackland*, [1897] A. C. 155; [1895] 2 Ch. 389; 66 L. J. Q. B. 522; 64 Id. 523.

(*i*) *Bradford Corporation v. Pickles*, [1895] A. C. 587; 64 L. J. Ch. 759.

(*k*) *R. v. Pagham Commrs.*, 8 B. & C. 355; 32 R. R. 406; *Nield v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 10 Ex. 4.

(*l*) *Gr. Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar*, L. R. 6 Ch. 483.

(*m*) *Whalley v. L. & Y. R. Co.*, 13 Q. B. D. 131; 53 L. J. Q. B. 285.

(*n*) *Per* Ld. Macnaghten in *Quinn v. Leatham*, [1901] A. C. 510; 70 L. J. P. C. 76.

(*o*) *Quinn v. Leatham*, *ubisupra*; *Lumley v. Gye*, 2 E. & B. 216; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463; *Bowen v. Hull*, 6 Q. B. D. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305; *Temperton v. Russell*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 715; 62 L. J. Q. B. 412; *Glamorgan Coal Co. v. South Wales Miners Federation*, [1905] A. C. 239; 74 L. J. K. B. 525; *Read v. Friendly Society of Stonemasons*, [1902] 2 K. B. 732; 71 L. J. K. B. 994; *Giblan v. Labourers' Union*, [1903] 2 K. B. 600; 72 L. J. K. B. 907; *Smithies v. National Association of Plasterers*, [1909] 1 K. B. 310; 78 L. J. K. B. 259.

(*p*) *Lumley v. Gye*, 2 E. & B. 216; 22 L. J. Q. B. 463.

the rule is not confined to contracts of personal service, but applies to all contractual rights, such, for instance, as a contract for the supply of goods (*q*). The Trade Disputes Act, 1906, has, however, largely restricted the scope of this principle, in cases where the acts are done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute (*r*).

Removal of
lateral sup-
port to land.

In certain cases the same act may cause sometimes *damnum absque injuriâ*, sometimes *injuria*. Thus, if a man, by digging in his own land, cause his neighbour's house to fall down, it depends upon the circumstances whether he is answerable for the damage. His neighbour is entitled to lateral support for his house, if he has enjoyed the support openly, peaceably and continuously for twenty years (*s*); but in the absence of an express or implied grant, he is not entitled to it for a newly-erected house (*t*); and therefore the question whether there is any liability may turn merely upon the age of the house. It must be noticed, however, that, unless he has granted away the right, the neighbour is entitled to have his land in its natural unencumbered state left unaffected by the removal of the lateral support, and not the less so because he has recently built a house upon the land. Hence, an actionable injury is done to him if the removal of the support causes a subsidence to the land, not attributable to the weight of the house, and in such case the damage done to the house, though newly erected, is recoverable as being consequential upon the injury (*u*). It may be added that it is the subsidence

(*q*) *Bowen v. Hall*, 6 Q. B. D. 333; 50 L. J. Q. B. 305; *Temperton v. Russell*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 715; 62 L. J. Q. B. 412.

(*r*) 6 Edw. VII. c. 47, ss. 1 & 3. See also s. 4 as to the general immunity of Trades Unions from liability in tort; and *Conway v. Wade*, [1909] A. C. 506; 78 L. J. K. B. 1025.

(*s*) *Angus v. Dalton*, 6 App. Cas.

740: 50 L. J. Q. 689.

(*t*) "The right to support of buildings" must be founded upon prescription or grant, express or implied; per Willes, J., *Bonomi v. Backhouse*, 1 E. B. & E. 655 (S. C., 9 H. L. Cas. 503; 34 L. J. Q. B. 181); cited by Ld. Selborne, 6 App. Cas. 795.

(*u*) *Browne v. Robins*, 4 H. & N. 186; 28 L. J. Ex. 250; *Hamer v.*

which grounds the cause of action, not the removal of the support, and therefore a fresh cause of action arises upon a second subsidence, due to the same excavation as was the first (*r*). It is the subsidence, not the pecuniary loss, which gives the cause of action (*w*).

An act which would be an injury at common law is sometimes merely *damnum absque injuriâ* owing to the provisions of a statute. If a statute directs or authorises acts, it is not wrongful to do them: if damage results, it is just that there should be compensation, and that is often provided for by the statute, but no action lies for what is *damnum absque injuriâ*: the only remedy is to seek such compensation as the statute provides: and this is the case whether the acts be authorised for a public purpose or for a private profit (*x*). The legislature, however, when it authorises persons to do acts which would be wrongful at common law, usually does not exempt them from the duty to take reasonable care that in doing the acts they do no unnecessary damage (*x*); and therefore, though they are not liable to an action for such damage as necessarily arises notwithstanding that they observe that duty (*y*), yet, for damage done in breach of that duty they have no statutory protection (*z*). They must strictly pursue their statutory powers, and for acts which are injuries at common law and which are not legalised by their statute, they are liable to a common law action (*a*). Statutes which legalise

Acts
authorised
by statute.

Knowles, 6 H. & N. 454: 30 L. J. Ex. 102.

(*v*) *Darley Main Colliery Co. v. Mitchell*, 11 App. Cas. 127: 55 L. J. Q. B. 529; *West Leigh Colliery Co. v. Tunncliffe and Hampson*, [1908] A. C. 27: 77 L. J. Ch. 102.

(*w*) See *per* Collins, J., *A.-G. v. Conduit Colliery Co.*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 301, 312: 64 L. J. Q. B. 207.

(*x*) *Per* Ld. Blackburn, *Mersey Dock Trustees v. Gibbs*, L. R. 1 H. L. 93, 112.

(*y*) *Vaughan v. Taff Vale R. Co.*, 5 H. & N. 679: 29 L. J. Ex. 247; *Hammersmith R. Co. v. Brand*, L. R. 4 H. L. 171: 38 L. J. Q. B. 265; *L. B. & S. C. R. Co. v. Truman*, 11 App. Cas. 45: 55 L. J. Ch. 354.

(*z*) *Geddis v. Bann Reservoir Co.*, 3 App. Cas. 430.

(*a*) *Jones v. Festiniog R. Co.*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 733: 37 L. J. Q. B. 214; *Powell v. Fall*, 5 Q. B. D. 597: 49 L. J. Q. B. 428; *Metrop. Asylum*

acts and provide for compensation for damage done thereby are generally construed as providing compensation only for acts which are lawful by reason of the statutes and which would have been actionable injuries if the statutes had not been passed (*b*). In so far as they do not provide compensation, there is no remedy for damage caused by the acts which they have legalised (*c*).

Injury to
right imports
damage:

Although *damnum absque injuriâ* is a matter of frequent occurrence, yet *injuria absque damno* may be said to be unknown to our law; for "a damage is not merely pecuniary, but an injury imports a damage when a man is thereby hindered of his right" (*d*). Thus if a debtor, being in execution on final process (*e*), escaped for ever so short a time, the creditor, who had a right to the debtor's body every hour until the debt was paid, could maintain an action against the sheriff without proof of pecuniary damage (*f*). Similarly, on the ground that an injury has been done, proof of pecuniary damage is unnecessary for the maintenance of an action by a customer against his banker who, having received funds for the purpose, wrongfully dishonours the customer's cheque (*g*), or by a client against his solicitor who compromises a suit contrary to instructions (*h*), or by a tenant against his landlord who

District v. Hill, 6 App. Cas. 193; 50 L. J. Q. B. 353; *Shelfer v. City of London E. L. Co.*, [1895] 1 Ch. 287; 64 L. J. Ch. 216.

(*b*) *Broadbent v. Imperial Gas Co.*, 7 D. M. & G. 436; 7 H. L. Cas. 600; 26 L. J. Ch. 276; 29 Id. 377; *Caledonian R. Co. v. Walker's Trustees*, 7 App. Cas. 259, 298; see *Cowper Essex v. Acton L. B.*, 14 App. Cas. 153; 58 L. J. Q. B. 594.

(*c*) *Hammersmith R. Co. v. Brand*, and *L. B. & S. C. R. Co. v. Truman*, *supra*; *A.-G. v. Metr. R. Co.*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 384.

(*d*) *Per Holt, C.J., Ashby v. White*, 2 Ld. Raym. 955.

(*e*) See 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62.

(*f*) *Williams v. Mostyn*, 4 M. & W. 145, 153; *Clifton v. Hooper*, 468. See L. R. 1 Q. B. 502; L. R. 1 C. P. 403; 7 C. B. N. S. 487.

(*g*) *Marzetti v. Williams*, 35 R. R. 329; 1 B. & Ad. 415, where nominal damages were recovered; *Rolin v. Steward*, 14 C. B. 595, where the jury gave substantial damages; see *Larios v. Gurety*, L. R. 5 P. C. 346, 357.

(*h*) *Godefroy v. Jay*, 7 Bing. 413; 33 R. R. 528; *Fray v. Voules*, 1 E.

levies an excessive distress for arrears of rent (*i*). It must be noticed, however, that, whilst in some cases, of which these last-mentioned are examples, a man has an absolute right to demand that some act shall be done, or not done, there are other cases in which he has not that right, but only the qualified right to demand that no damage shall be done to him by the act, or its omission. In these cases there is no injury, if there be no damage, and damage is said to be the gist of the action. Thus the recklessness of a driver upon the highway gives no cause of action to a person who does not suffer actual damage therefrom: though an innkeeper be bound to guard his guest's goods at the inn (*j*), his want of care is not actionable, unless it leads to loss: fraud without damage will not support an action of deceit (*k*): no action lies against a landlord who, though he distrains for more rent than is due, only seizes goods which do not exceed in value the rent actually due (*l*): a judgment creditor who sues the sheriff for neglecting to levy under (*m*), or for making a false return to (*n*), a writ of *fi. fa.* must prove actual damage: a father cannot maintain an action for the seduction of his daughter whilst in his service (*o*), unless some actual loss of service accrues (*p*).

but damage may be necessary to constitute injury.

There are three kinds of damage known to the law, Malicious prosecution. damage to a man's fame, damage to his person, and damage to his property (*q*). An ordinary civil action

& E. 839, 848; see *Butler v. Knight*, L. R. 2 Ex. 109.

(*i*) *Chandler v. Doulton*, 3 H. & C. 553.

(*j*) See *Calye's case*, 8 Co. Rep. 32; 1 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 119.

(*k*) 3 Bulstr. 95; 3 T. R. 56; 9 App. Cas. 195; 14 Id. 363.

(*l*) *Tancred v. Leyland*, 16 Q. B. 669; *Glynn v. Thomas*, 11 Exch. 870; *French v. Phillips*, 1 H. & N. 564.

(*m*) *Hobson v. Thellusson*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 642.

(*n*) *Stimson v. Farnham*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 175.

(*o*) See *Terry v. Hutchinson*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 599.

(*p*) *Eager v. Grimwood*, 1 Exch. 61; *Hedges v. Tagg*, L. R. 7 Ex. 288. But if any such loss be proved, exemplary damages may be given.

(*q*) *Per Holt, C.J., Savill v. Roberts*, 1 Ld. Raym. 378.

nowadays involves a successful defendant in none of these, for any extra costs incurred by him beyond those awarded are not to be ascribed to the litigation, and therefore the bringing of an ordinary action, however maliciously, and however great the want of reasonable and probable cause, does not support a subsequent action for malicious prosecution (*r*). A person's fame, however, is damaged not only when strictly criminal proceedings are commenced against him for an alleged offence (*s*), but also when bankruptcy proceedings are instituted against him; and so is the credit of a trading company when a petition is presented to wind it up, and therefore an action lies if such proceedings be taken maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause (*t*). It must be noticed, however, that the action cannot be maintained, unless the proceedings upon which it is founded have been annulled (*u*).

Damages
when
nominal.

Having stated that, when a right has been invaded, an action for damages generally lies (*x*), although no damage has been actually sustained, we may observe that the principle on which many such cases proceed is that it is material to the preservation of the right itself, that its invasion should not pass with impunity; and in these cases, therefore, *nominal* damages only are sometimes awarded, because their recovery sufficiently vindicates the plaintiff's right: as, for instance, in trespass *quare clausum fregit*, which is maintainable for a wrongful entry on the

(*r*) See the judgments in *Quartz Hill Co. v. Eyre*, 11 Q. B. D. 674: 52 L. J. Q. B. 488. Legal damage must be shown in order to sustain such action; *Cotterell v. Jones*, 11 C. B. 713; 21 L. J. C. P. 2; see *Wyatt v. Palmer*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 106; 68 L. J. Q. B. 709.

(*s*) See *Rayson v. S. London Tramways Co.*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 304: 62 L. J. Q. B. 598.

(*t*) *Quartz Hill Co. v. Eyre*, *supra*.

See *The Walter D. Waller*, [1898] P. 202; 62 L. J. P. 88.

(*u*) *Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley*, 10 App. Cas. 210; 54 L. J. Q. B. 449.

(*x*) This proposition is more fully stated and illustrated in *Blofeld v. Payne*, 4 B. & Ad. 410; 38 R. R. 270; *Rogers v. Nowill*, 5 C. B. 109; *Wells v. Watling*, 2 W. Bl. 1233; *Pindar v. Wadsworth*, 2 East, 154; 6 R. R. 412.

land of another, though there be no real damage, because repeated acts of going over the land might be used as evidence of a title to do so, and thereby the right of the plaintiff might be injured; or in an action by a commoner for an injury done to his common, in which action evidence need not be given of the exercise of the right of common by the plaintiff (*y*). Where a riparian owner had built an obstruction out from his bank into the stream, the Court ordered its removal although no immediate damage could be described nor any actual loss predicated to the owner of the opposite bank (*z*).

It is not, indeed, by any means true, as a general proposition, that the actual damage offers in an action *ex delicto*, the proper measure of damages to be given; for instance, my neighbour may take from under my house coal, which I had no means of getting at, and yet I may recover the value, notwithstanding I have sustained no real damage (*a*); and other cases might readily be instanced showing that such an action may be maintainable without evidence being adduced of pecuniary loss or *damnum* to the plaintiff (*b*); as in cases of libel and slander, where the words are actionable *per se*, the jury are at liberty to

(*y*) *Per* Taunton, J., 1 B. & Ad. 426; *Wells v. Watling*, 2 W. Bl. 1233; 1 Wms. Saunds. 346 a, note: cited by Martin, B., and Kelly, C.B., *Harrop v. Hirst*, L. R. 4 Ex. 43, 45, 47.

(*z*) *Birkett v. Morris*, L. R. 1 H. L. Sch. 47. See *Siddons v. Short*, 2 C. P. D. 572; 46 L. J. G. P. 795, as to injunctions being granted where actual injury has not been sustained but is apprehended.

(*a*) See *per* Maule, J., *Clow v. Brogden*, 2 Scott, N. R. 315, 316; *per* Ld. Denman, *Taylor v. Henniker*, 12 A. & E. 488, 492; which case is overruled by *Tancred v. Leyland*, 16 Q. B. 669; *Pontifex v. Bignold*, 3

Scott, N. R. 309; *Collingridge v. Royal Exchange Ass.*, 3 Q. B. D. 173; 47 L. J. Q. B. 32.

(*b*) *Embrey v. Owen*, 6 Exch. 653; *Dickinson v. Grand Junction Canal Co.*, 7 Exch. 282; *Northam v. Hurley*, 1 E. & B. 665, recognised in *Whitehead v. Parks*, 2 H. & N. 870; *Rolin v. Steward*, 14 C. B. 595; *Matthews v. Discount Corp.*, L. R. 4 C. P. 228. In reference to the question whether substantial damage must be proved, the wording of a statute may be material; *ex. gr.*, see *Rogers v. Parker*, 18 C. B. 112; *Medway Navigation Co. v. Earl of Romney*, 9 C. B. N. S. 575.

give substantial damages, although no actual damage be proved (c).

Limitations
to maxim,
ubi jus ibi
remedium.

The maxim, *ubi jus ibi remedium*, has its limitations; and there are various cases in which either the maxim does not apply, or at least the remedy for the wrong is not a civil action for damages.

Injuries to
community.

Where an act is a grievance to the entire community, the mode of punishing the wrong-doer is usually by indictment or by information at the suit of the Attorney General, suing on behalf of the public (d). But an individual who has suffered a particular damage beyond that suffered by the public may sometimes maintain an action in respect thereof.

Highways.

Thus, if A. dig a trench across the highway, that is the subject of an indictment; and for the obstruction of his passage along the highway B. cannot maintain an action (e). But if the trench obstruct B.'s access to the highway from his own lands (f), or if B., while using the highway with ordinary care (g), has sustained harm by falling into the trench, that is particular damage for which an action lies (h). It would, however, be untrue to say that, where a wrong is done to the community, an individual who suffers particular damage always has a remedy by action. For if particular damage be suffered by a highway being out of repair, no action lies against the highway authority who ought to have repaired it; since highway authorities, entrusted with the performance of the duties which originally fell upon the inhabitants of parishes, are not civilly liable for mere nonfeasance (i). And it is doubtful whether

(c) *Tripp v. Thomas*, 3 B. & C. 427.

(d) Co. Litt. 56 a; per Holt, C.J., 2 Ld. Raym. 955; per Ld. Westbury, L. R. 2 H. L. 203; per Channell, B., *Harrop v. Hirst*, L. R. 4 Ex. 47.

(e) *Winterbottom v. Lord Derby*, L. R. 2 Ex. 316; 36 L. J. Ex. 194.

(f) *Fritz v. Hobson*, 14 Ch. D.

542; 49 L. J. Ch. 321; following *Rose v. Groves*, 5 M. & G. 613; *Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co.*, 1 App. Cas. 662; 46 L. J. Ch. 68.

(g) *Butterfield v. Forrester*, 11 East, 59; 10 R. R. 433.

(h) See also, *Benjamin v. Storr*, L. R. 9 C. P. 400; 43 L. J. C. P. 162.

(i) *Cowley v. Newmarket L. B.*,

persons bound to repair a highway *ratione tenuræ* (*k*) are civilly liable for particular damage sustained by their default (*l*). Water companies and public authorities, however, which, under their statutory powers, place apparatus in the highway, are liable, if, by reason of the want of repair of such apparatus itself, damage happens to a person using the highway; though they are not liable for damage caused by the apparatus becoming a danger owing to the want of repair of the highway in which it is placed (*m*).

It is, indeed, an important rule that the law gives no private remedy for anything but a private wrong; and that, therefore, no action lies for a public or common nuisance; and the reason is that, the damage being common to all the subjects of the Crown, no one individual can ascertain his particular proportion of it, or if he could, it would be extremely hard if every subject in the kingdom were allowed to harass the offender with separate actions (*n*). This rule applies where a statute prohibits the doing of a particular act affecting the public. Unless the statute provides to the contrary, no cause of action can arise, upon the prohibited act being done, in favour of a private person who suffers therefrom no peculiar damage beyond that which all the Queen's subjects suffer by the infringement of the law (*o*). Moreover, if the act be prohibited under a penalty, *prima facie* the Crown alone has the right to sue for the penalty, and if a private person sue for it, the onus lies upon him to

Public
nuisance.

[1892] A. C. 345; 62 L. J. Q. B. 65; *Thompson v. Mayor of Brighton*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 332; 63 L. J. Q. B. 181.

(*k*) As to this liability, see *Reg. v. Barker*, 25 Q. B. D. 213; 59 L. J. M. C. 105.

(*l*) See *Rundle v. Hearle*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 83, where the *dicta* in favour of their liability are cited. As to *Borough of Bathurst v. Macpherson*, there cited, see *Sydney v. Bourke*, [1895] A. C. 433. The latter case

overruled *Hartnall v. Ryde Commrs.*, 4 B. & S. 361.

(*m*) *Chapman v. Fylde Waterworks Co.*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 599; 64 L. J. Q. B. 15; *Thompson v. Mayor of Brighton*, *supra*, and cases there cited in the judgment of A. L. Smith, L.J.

(*n*) Co. Litt. 56 a; 1 Chitty, Gen. Pr. Law, 10.

(*o*) See *per* Pollock, C.B., *Chamberlaine v. Chester & Birkenhead R. Co.*, 1 Exch. 876—877.

show that the statute has conferred upon him the right to do so (*p*).

Damage too remote.

It frequently happens that when a wrongful act has been done to a person, he suffers a damage, but, although he may have a cause of action for the wrongful act, yet he cannot found any claim for compensation upon that particular damage, because the connection between such damage and the wrongful act is insufficient: the damage is too remote. *In jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur* (*q*).

Damages in action on contract.

In actions on contract the damages recoverable are such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as arising naturally, *i.e.*, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may be reasonably supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it (*r*).

Damages in action of tort.

Similar principles are applicable in actions of tort. Generally speaking, a wrong-doer is responsible only for the natural and ordinary consequences of his wrongful act or such as he should have known were likely to arise (*s*). Thus, it is a breach of duty in a railway company to allow their carriages to be overcrowded; but theft, though facilitated by overcrowding, is not its natural and ordinary consequence; and the company is not liable to one passenger, if his purse be stolen by another in an overcrowded carriage; the damage is too remote (*t*). But it must not be supposed that one wrong-doer is never answerable for

(*p*) *Bradlaugh v. Clarke*, 8 App. Cas. 354, 358.

(*q*) Bac. Max., reg. 1; see *per* Blackburn, J., L. R. 9 Q. B. 267.

(*r*) Judgm., *Hadley v. Baxendale*, 9 Exch. 341, 354: 23 L. J. Ex. 179; see *Horne v. Midland R. Co.*, L. R. 8 C. P. 131: 42 L. J. C. P. 59; *Hydraulic Engineering Co. v. McHaffie*, 4 Q. B. D. 670; *Grébert-Borgnis v. Nugent*, 15 Id. 85: 54

L. J. Q. B. 511; *Hammond v. Bussey*, 20 Q. B. D. 79: 57 L. J. Q. B. 58. See *post*, p. 187.

(*s*) *Sharp v. Powell*, L. R. 7 C. P. 253: 41 L. J. C. P. 95; *Victorian Rail. Commrs. v. Coultas*, 13 App. Cas. 222, 57 L. J. P. C. 69; see *Wilkinson v. Downton*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 57: 66 L. J. Q. B. 493.

(*t*) *Cobb v. G. W. R. Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 459: 62 L. J. Q. B. 335.

consequences resulting in some measure from the intervention of another. If a collision between two omnibuses occur through the negligence of both the drivers, the proprietor of each vehicle is responsible for the damage which results to a passenger of either (*u*). If A. wrongfully place a spiked barrier upon a carriage way, and then B. remove it improperly on to the adjacent footpath, A. is liable for the damage done by the spikes to C. whilst lawfully using the path at night (*v*). If the driver of a horse and cart negligently leaves them unattended in the street, his master is liable for the natural results of the horse and cart being wrongfully set in motion by a person who might have been expected to do that act (*w*). The question here is whether the wrongful act of the defendant or his servant was the effective cause of the damage done; and this must generally be treated as a question of fact (*x*).

In an action for slander, if the words are not actionable *per se* (*x*), special damage must be proved (*y*). It has been thought that if, by reason of the slander, a third person does some act, which, even if the slander had been true, would have been illegal, that can never be treated as special damage (*z*). But this doctrine has been frequently criticised (*a*), and the better opinion seems to be that of Lord Wensleydale, that to make a slander actionable by reason of special damage, the consequence must be such as, taking human nature as it is, with its infirmities, and

Act of third person causing the damage.

(*u*) See *The Bernina*, 13 App. Cas. 1: 12 P. D. 58: 57 L. J. P. 65.

(*v*) *Clark v. Chambers*, 3 Q. B. D. 327: 47 L. J. Q. B. 427.

(*w*) *Engelhart v. Farrant*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 240: 68 L. J. Q. B. 122.

(*x*) They are such, at common law, if they falsely impute a criminal offence or contagious disease, or disparage the plaintiff in the way of his office, profession or trade: see Odgers on Libel, 3rd ed., pp. 59

et seq. By 54 & 55 Vict. c. 51, they are such, if they impute unchastity or adultery to a woman or girl.

(*y*) Such damage, therefore, is the cause of action; see *per* Bramwell, L.J., 7 Q. B. D. 437.

(*z*) *Vicars v. Wilcocks*, 8 East 1; 9 R. R. 361; 2 Sm. L. C., 10th ed. 507.

(*a*) See the cases collected in the notes to *Vicars v. Wilcocks*, 2 Sm. L. C., 10th ed. 512 *et seq.*

having regard to the relation between the parties concerned, it might fairly and reasonably have been anticipated and feared would follow from the slander (*b*). When a wrongful act is committed, damages may in some cases be recovered in tort even though the immediate cause is the voluntary act of a third person, as where the defendant kept a dog which he knew to be savage and the dog was let loose by a third person and bit the plaintiff (*c*). And in case of breach of contract damages immediately caused by the intervening criminal act of a third person are recoverable if they can be shown to be a natural consequence of the breach of contract (*d*).

Public policy. There are some cases in which, although a wrongful act has been done, yet, on grounds of public policy, an action will not lie. We have already adverted to the qualified privilege which may excuse a slander, libel, or prosecution instituted without reasonable and probable cause (*e*); and some wrongful acts are absolutely privileged. The immunities from action, which are enjoyed by the Crown (*f*), and by judges of Courts of record (*g*), have been mentioned elsewhere. No action lies against a member of Parliament for slanders uttered in Parliament (*h*); or against an advocate for slanders uttered in the course of a judicial inquiry (*i*);

(*b*) *Lynch v. Knight*, 9 H. L. Cas. 577, 600; cited by Brett, L.J., 11 Q. B. D. 414; see also 6 Q. B. D. 338. The cases in which special damage may be provided upon the repetition of the slander by third persons are summed up in *Speight v. Gosnay*, 60 L. J. Q. B. 231.

(*c*) *Baker v. Snell*, [1908] 2 K. B. 825; 77 L. J. K. B. 1090.

(*d*) *De La Bere v. Pearson, Ltd.*, [1908] 1 K. B. 280; 77 L. J. K. B. 380.

(*e*) *Ante*, p. 157.

(*f*) *Ante*, p. 39. See also *Reg. v. Commissioners of Treasury*, L. R.

7 Q. B. 387; 41 L. J. Q. B. 178.

(*g*) *Ante*, p. 70.

(*h*) *R. v. Abingdon*, 1 Esp. 228; *Dillon v. Balfour*, 20 L. R. Ir. 600; *Bradlaugh v. Gossett*, 12 Q. B. D. 271; 53 L. J. Q. B. 209. As to the qualified privilege of county councillors, see *Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 431; 61 L. J. Q. B. 409.

(*i*) *Munster v. Lamb*, 11 Q. B. D. 588; 52 L. J. Q. B. 726; *Mackay v. Ford*, 5 H. & N. 792; 29 L. J. Ex. 404. See also *Pedley v. Morris*, 61 L. J. Q. B. 21; *Lilley v. Roney*, Id. 727.

or against a witness in legal proceedings for defamation or perjury (*j*). A subordinate military officer has no remedy by action against his superior officer who defames him in an official report upon his conduct (*k*); or who injures him by an act done in the course of discipline and under powers legally incident to the position of the superior officer (*l*). In these cases malice does not take away the privilege; for the law will rather suffer a private mischief than a public inconvenience (*m*).

By the Trade Disputes Act, 1906 (*n*), certain immunities are given (i) in respect of acts done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute (*o*); and (ii) in favour of Trades Unions and their officers. By section 1, an act done in pursuance of a conspiracy is, if done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not actionable, unless such act would be actionable if done without conspiracy; section 3 prevents actions being brought, on the ground of inducing a breach of contract or interference with business, for any act done in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute; and section 4 confers on trades unions absolute immunity from actions "in respect of any tortious act alleged to have been committed by or on behalf of the trade union."

Trade Dis-
putes and
Trades
Unions.

It has been thought that, in order to prevent the compounding of felonies, there is some rule of law against the maintenance of an action for a wrong, amounting to a felony, before the criminal prosecution of the felon; and upon this ground, in *Wellock v. Constantine* (*p*), Willes, J., nonsuited a servant, who sued her master for a rape, for which he had not

Where the
act is
felonious.

(*j*) *Seaman v. Netherclift*, 2 C. P. D. 53: 46 L. J. C. P. 128; and the cases there cited.

(*k*) *Dawkins v. Ld. Paulet*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94: 39 L. J. Q. B. 53.

(*l*) *Johnstone v. Sutton*, 1 T. R. 510; 1 R. R. 269.

(*m*) 1 T. R. 513; *per* Mellor, J.,

L. R. 5 Q. B. 116.

(*n*) 6 Edw. VII. c. 47.

(*o*) As to the meaning of these words see *Conway v. Wade*, [1908] 2 K. B. 844: 78 L. J. K. B. 14; and S. C. in H. L., [1909] A. C. 506.

(*p*) 2 H. & C. 146: 32 L. J. C. P. 285.

been indicted, and the nonsuit was upheld by a majority in the Court of Exchequer (*q*). Subsequently, however, in *Wells v. Abraham* (*r*), the Court of Queen's Bench refused to disturb a verdict for the plaintiff in an action of trover for a brooch, although the defendant, who had stolen the brooch, had not been prosecuted for the theft; and in that case, and afterwards in *Ex parte Ball* (*s*), and *Midland Insurance Co. v. Smith* (*t*), the questions whether the supposed rule existed, and, if so, how it could be applied, was much discussed. The result of this discussion seems to be that it is doubtful whether there is any rule on the subject (*u*), but that, if there is, it is only to the effect that, where a prosecution can be, and ought to be instituted, the Court itself may, in its discretion, summarily stay the action (*v*): the defendant cannot take advantage of the rule either by demurrer (*x*) or by plea (*y*), or, indeed, insist upon it in any other manner; for if the maxim, *nemo allegans suam turpitudinem est audiendus* (*z*), applies at all, it must, it seems, always affect the defendant.

Although the law on this point can hardly be said to be completely settled, yet it is well established that the rule, if any, only obtains in actions against the felon by his immediate victim; and does not extend to actions consequent

(*q*) Pollock, C.B., and Bramwell, B. (Martin, B., diss.). The judgment is unsatisfactory; see *per* Blackburn, J., L. R. 7 Q. B. 562; and *per* Bramwell, L.J., 10 Ch. D. 671.

(*r*) L. R. 7 Q. B. 554: 41 L. J. Q. B. 306, where the judges were all of opinion that there ought not to have been a nonsuit.

(*s*) 10 Ch. D. 667: 48 L. J. Bank. 57, where Bramwell, L.J., enumerated the ways in which the rule, if any, might be stated, and pointed out the difficulties against each.

(*t*) 6 Q. B. D. 561: 50 L. J. Q. B. 329. Most of the earlier authorities

are collected in these three cases; but see also *per* Perryn, B., 1 H. Bl. 588; *per* Romilly, M.R., *Chowne v. Baylis*, 31 L. J. Ch. 787; *per* Sir W. Scott, *The Hercules*, 2 Dods. 375—376; and cases cited in 1 Sm. L. C., 10th ed. 279.

(*u*) See particularly *per* Blackburn, J., L. R. 7 Q. B. 559 *et seq.*

(*v*) See *per* Cockburn, C.J., and Blackburn, J., in *Wells v. Abraham*; *per* Cave, J., *Roope v. D'Avigdor*, 10 Q. B. D. 412.

(*x*) *Roope v. D'Avigdor*, *supra*.

(*y*) *Lutterell v. Reynell*, 1 Mod. 282.

(*z*) 10 Ch. D. 672: 6 Q. B. D. 571.

upon the felony, but brought against (a) or by (b) any other person. It does not form any impediment to an action for assault, battery, or libel, which might be made the subject of a prosecution for misdemeanor; and Lord Campbell's Act (c) expressly provides that an action may be maintained under that Act, although death has been caused under such circumstances as amount in law to felony (d). Moreover, it is clear that the liability to an action cannot of itself furnish any answer to an indictment for fraud (e).

Hitherto, we have been considering the maxim, *ubi jus ibi remedium*, mainly in relation to common law rights. We must now advert briefly to its application to rights conferred by statute. There are, it has been said (f), three classes of cases in which a statutory liability may be established. One is, where a liability existing at common law is affirmed by a statute which gives a special remedy different from that which exists at common law: there, unless the words of the statute expressly or by necessary implication (g) take away the common law remedy, either that or the statutory remedy may be pursued at election. The second is, where the statute gives the right to sue merely, but provides no particular form of remedy: there a person can only proceed by action at common law. The third is, where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a particular remedy for enforcing it: there the remedy provided by the statute must be followed; for it is a rule of law that

Breaches of
statute.

(a) *White v. Spettigue*, 13 M. & W. 603; 14 L. J. Ex. 99; *Lee v. Bayes*, 18 C. B. 599; 25 L. J. C. P. 249; *Stone v. Marsh*, 6 B. & C. 551; 30 R. R. 420; *Marsh v. Keating*, 1 Bing. N. C. 198; 37 R. R. 75.

(b) *Ex p. Ball*, 10 Ch. D. 667; 48 L. J. Bank. 57; *Appleby v. Franklin*, 17 Q. B. D. 93; 55 L. J. Q. B. 129; see also *Osborn v. Gillett*, L. R. 8 Ex. 88; 42 L. J. Ex. 52.

(c) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, amended 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95.

(d) S. 1.

(e) *Judgm., Reg. v. Kenrick*, 5 Q. B. 64, 65.

(f) *Per Willes, J., Wolverhampton Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford*, 6 C. B. N. S. 356.

(g) *Great Northern Fishing Co. v. Edgehill*, 11 Q. B. D. 225.

an action will not lie for the infringement of a right created by a statute, where another specific remedy for its infringement is provided by that statute (*h*). There may, however, be a further remedy by injunction (*i*).

With regard to cases which do not fall within either the first or the third of these classes, no general rule can be laid down upon the question whether a person who suffers damage from the breach of a statutory duty can maintain an action in respect of such damage: the question must be decided in each case upon the language and object of the particular statute (*k*). It has been held, however, that where a statute creates a duty with the object of preventing a particular mischief, a person who suffers a totally different mischief from a breach of that duty cannot maintain an action therefor (*l*); and it has been laid down, with regard to statutory duties, that for mere nonfeasance no action lies except in the case of a duty owed to the plaintiff and negligently omitted (*m*).

The principles of the common law are often applied to determine whether an action lies against persons who have statutory duties to perform. Thus, it has been held that, if their duties are discretionary, they have a qualified privilege, which does not exist in the case of purely ministerial duties (*n*), and that they are not liable for errors in the exercise of their discretion when committed without malice (*o*). Moreover, a statutory duty may be of such a

(*h*) *Stevens v. Jeacocke*, 11 Q. B. 731, 741: 17 L. J. Q. B. 163; *Peebles v. Oswaldtwistle U. D. C.*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 625: 66 L. J. Q. B. 392; *Barracrough v. Brown*, [1897] A. C. 615: 66 L. J. Q. B. 672.

(*i*) *Cooper v. Whittingham*, 15 Ch. D. 501: 49 L. J. Ch. 752.

(*k*) *Atkinson v. Newcastle Waterworks Co.*, 2 Ex. D. 441: 46 L. J. Ex. 775; *Saunders v. Holborn D. B. of W.*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 64, 68: 64 L. J.

Q. B. 101; *Groves v. Ld. Wimborne*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 402: 67 L. J. Q. B. 862.

(*l*) *Gorris v. Scott*, L. R. 9 Ex. 125; cf. *Ward v. Hobbs*, 4 App. Cas. 13.

(*m*) See *per Lopes, L.J.*, *Robinson v. Workington*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 619, 623.

(*n*) *Pickering v. James*, L. R. 8 C. P. 489: 42 L. J. C. P. 217.

(*o*) *Partridge v. Gen. Council of Medical Education*, 25 Q. B. D. 90:

character that, if such construction be permissible, the statute will be construed as imposing no liability where failure to perform it has not arisen from the want of reasonable care (*p*).

By way of conclusion to this subject, we may refer the reader to the Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (*q*), for certain privileges enjoyed by persons when sued for any act done in the intended execution of a statute, or of any public duty or authority, or for any neglect or default in the execution of the same. Public authorities.

QUOD REMEDIO DESTITUITUR IPSA RE VALET SI CULPA ABSIT.

(*Bac. Max., reg. 9.*)—*That which is without remedy avails of itself, if there be no fault in the party seeking to enforce it.*

There are certain extra-judicial remedies as well for real as personal injuries, which are furnished by the law, where the parties are so peculiarly circumstanced as to make it impossible to apply for redress in the usual and ordinary methods. “The benignity of the law is such,” observed Lord Bacon, “that, when, to preserve the principles and grounds of law, it deprives a man of his remedy without his own fault, it will rather put him in a better degree and condition than in a worse; for if it disable him to pursue his action, or to make his claim, sometimes it will give him the thing itself by operation of law without any act of his own; sometimes it will give him a more beneficial remedy” (*r*). Rule explained.

On this principle depended the doctrine of remitter, which, before the abolition of real actions, applied where Doctrine of remitter.

59 L. J. Q. B. 475; *Tozer v. Child*, 7 E. & B. 377; 25 L. J. Q. B. 337. C. P. 157; *Bateman v. Poplar D. B. of W.*, 37 Ch. D. 272; 57 L. J. Ch. 579.

(*p*) *Hammond v. St. Pancras Vestry*, L. R. 9 C. P. 316; 43 L. J. (*q*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 61. (*r*) *Bac. Max., reg. 9*; 6 Rep. 68.

one who had the true property, or *jus proprietatis*, in lands, but was out of possession, and had no right to enter without recovering possession by real action, had afterwards the freehold cast upon him by some subsequent and, of course, defective title. In such case he was remitted by operation of law to his ancient and more certain title, and the right of entry which he had gained by a bad title was held to be, *ipso facto*, annexed to his own inherent good one, so that his defeasible estate was utterly defeated and annulled by the instantaneous act of law, without his participation or consent (*s*). The reason of this was, because he who possessed the right would otherwise have been deprived of all remedy; for, as he himself was in possession of the freehold, there was no person against whom he could bring an action to establish his prior right; and hence the law adjudged him to be in by remitter, that is, in the like condition as if he had lawfully recovered the land by suit (*t*). There could, however, according to the above doctrine, be no remitter where issue in tail was barred by the fine of his ancestor, and the freehold was afterwards cast upon him; for he could not have recovered such estate by action, and, therefore, could not be remitted to it (*u*). Neither will the law supply a title grounded upon matter of record; as if a man be entitled to a writ of error, and the land descend to him, he shall not be in by remitter (*x*). And if land is expressly given to any person by Act of Parliament, neither he nor his heirs shall be remitted, for he shall have no other title than is given by the Act (*y*).

Doe v.
Woodroffe.

In *Doe v. Woodroffe*, which went by writ of error before the Exchequer Chamber and House of Lords (*z*), the law

(*s*) See Vin. Ab., "*Remitter*;"
Shep. Touch., by Preston, 156, n.
(82), 286.

(*t*) Finch, Law, 19; 3 Bl. Com.
20; Litt., s. 661.

(*u*) 3 Bl. Com. 20. See also Bac.
Max., vol. 4, p. 40.

(*x*) Bac. Max., reg. 9 *ad finem*.

(*y*) 1 Rep. 48.

(*z*) 2 H. L. Cas. 811; 15 M. & W.

of remitter was much considered, and several important points were decided, which are here stated shortly. H. W., being tenant in tail in possession of certain lands, with the reversion to the heirs of her late husband, executed a deed-poll in 1735, which operated as a covenant to stand seised to the use of her only son, G. W., in fee. G. W. afterward, and during his mother's lifetime, suffered a recovery of the lands to the use of himself in fee. He died in 1779, without issue, having by his will devised the lands in fee to trustees in trust to pay an annuity to his nephew, and subject thereto to his great-nephew, W. B., for life, with certain remainders over. The trustees entered into and held possession until the death of the annuitant in 1790, when they gave possession to W. B., who continued in possession of the entirety until his own death in 1824; and did various acts showing that he claimed under the will. Upon these facts it was decided, 1st, that the base fee created by the deed-poll, did not, upon H. W.'s death, become merged in the reversion in fee in G. W., as the estate tail still subsisted as an intermediate estate: 2ndly, that G. W. was not remitted to his title under the estate tail, the recovery suffered by him having estopped him: 3rdly, that W. B., although taking by the Statute of Uses, was capable of being remitted, as the estate tail had not been discontinued: 4thly, that the acts done by W. B. did not amount to a disclaimer by him of the estate tail, as a party cannot waive an estate to which he would be remitted, where the remitter would enure to the benefit of others as well as himself: 5thly, that the right of entry first accrued on the death of G. W., in 1779, when there was first an available right of entry; and, consequently, that the entry by W. B. in 1790 was not too late; and, 6thly, that the entry and remitter of W. B. in 1790, did not operate to remit A. W. (his co-parcener) to the other

769; cited by Rolfe, B., *Spotswood v. v. Milbourn*, L. R. 2 Ex. 235; and *Barrow*, 5 Exch. 113; and in *Cowan arg. Tarleton v. Liddell*, 17 Q. B. 406.

moiety of the estate; the Court observing, with reference to this last point, that possession of land by one parcener cannot, since the 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, be considered as the possession of a co-parcener, and, consequently, that the entry of one cannot have the effect of vesting the possession in the other (a).

Retainer.

The principle embodied in the above maxim likewise applies in the case of *retainer* (b), that is, where a creditor is made executor or administrator to his debtor. If a person indebted to another makes his creditor his executor, or if such creditor obtains letters of administration to his debtor, in these cases the law gives him a remedy for his debt, by allowing him to *retain* so much as will pay himself before any other creditor whose debts are of *equal* degree. This, be it observed, is a remedy by the mere act of law, and grounded upon this reason, that the executor cannot, without an evident absurdity, commence a suit against himself (c) as representative of the deceased to recover that which is due to him in his own private capacity; but having the whole personal estate in his hands, so much as is sufficient to answer his own demand is, by operation of law, applied to that particular purpose (d): and, in this case, the law, according to the observation of Lord Bacon above given, rather puts him in a better degree and condition than in a worse, because it enables him to obtain payment before any other creditor of equal degree has had time to commence an action. An executor *de son*

(a) Judgm., 15 M. & W. 769.

(b) Bac. Max., reg. 9; arg. *Thomson v. Grant*, 1 Russ. 540 (a). But the principle of retainer is by some writers referred to the maxim, *potior est conditio possidentis*. See 2 Wms. Exors., 5th ed. 937 (n); 2 Fonblan. Eq., 5th ed. 406 (m).

(c) A man cannot be at once *actor* and *reus* in a legal proceeding: *nemo agit in seipsum*; Jenk. Cent. 40.

See in illustration of this rule, *Simpson v. Thompson*, 3 App. Cas. 279; *per* Best, C.J., 4 Bing. 151; *Faulkner v. Lowe*, 2 Exch. 595 (the authority of which case is questioned by Williams, J., *Aulton v. Atkins*, 18 C. B. 253); *Rose v. Poulton*, 2 B. & Ald. 822; 36 R. R. 761.

(d) 3 Bl. Com. 18; see *Re Rhoades*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 347; 68 L. J. Q. B. 804.

tort is not, however, allowed to retain, for that would be contrary to another rule of law, which will be hereafter considered—that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong (*e*).

IN JURE NON REMOTA CAUSA SED PROXIMA SPECTATUR. (*Bac. Max., reg. 1.*)—*In law the immediate, not the remote, cause of any event is regarded.*

“It were infinite for the law to consider the causes of causes, and their impulsions one of another; therefore it contenteth itself with the immediate cause, and judgeth of acts by that, without looking to any further degree” (*f*). The above maxim, thus paraphrased by Lord Bacon, although of general application (*g*), is, in practice, often cited with reference to that particular branch of the law which concerns marine (*h*) insurance; and we shall, therefore, in the first place, illustrate it by briefly adverting to some cases connected with that subject.

How paraphrased by Lord Bacon.

It is a well-known rule, that in order to entitle the assured to recover upon his policy, the loss must be a direct and not too remote a consequence of the peril

Marine insurance. Perils of sea, &c.

(*e*) 3 Bl. Com. 19; see *Thomson v. Harding*, 2 El. & B. 630.

(*f*) Bac. Max., reg. 1; cited in *Sneesby v. L. & Y. R. Co.*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 267; 1 Q. B. D. 42; 45 L. J. Q. B. 1; *Babcock v. Montgomery County Mutual Ins. Co.*, 4 Comst. (U.S.), R. 326.

(*g*) As to remote damage and the liability of one who is the *causa causans*, see *ante*, p. 164. See *per* Ld. Mansfield, *Wadham v. Marlow*, 1 H. Bla. 439, n.; 9 R. R. 456.

(*h*) In *Marsden v. City & County Ass. Co.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 232, the same principle was applied to an insurance on plate glass in a shop front; in *Everett v. London Ass.*, 19

C. B. N. S. 126, it was applied to an insurance against fire, the damage having been directly caused by an explosion of gunpowder; in *Fitton v. Acc. Death Ins. Co.*, 17 Id. 122, to an insurance against death by accident. For a striking illustration of the principle, see *Winspear v. Accidental Ins. Co.*, 6 Q. B. D. 42; 50 L. J. Q. B. 292. Other cases which illustrate the principle are *Stanley v. Western Insurance Co.*, L. R. 3 Ex. 71; *In re Murdof*, [1903] 1 K. B. 584; 72 L. J. K. B. 362; and *In re Etherington v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Accident Insurance Co.*, [1909] 1 K. B. 591; 78 L. J. K. B. 684.

insured against; and that if the proximate cause of the loss sustained be not reducible to some one of the perils mentioned in the policy, the underwriter is not liable (*i*). If, for instance, a merchant vessel is taken in tow by a ship of war, and thus exposed to a tempestuous sea, the loss thence arising is probably attributable to the perils of the sea (*k*). And where a ship meets with sea damage, which checks her rate of sailing, so that she is taken by an enemy, from whom she would otherwise have escaped, the loss is to be attributed to the capture, not to the sea damage (*l*). So, the underwriters are liable for a loss arising immediately from a peril of the sea, or from fire, but remotely from the negligence of the master and mariners (*m*); and, where a ship, insured against perils of the sea was injured by the negligent loading of her cargo by natives on the coast of Africa, and, being pronounced unseaworthy, was run ashore in order to prevent her from sinking and to save the cargo, the Court held, that the rule *causa proxima non remota spectatur* must be applied, and that the immediate cause of loss, viz., the stranding, was a peril of the sea (*n*).

The maxim under consideration was discussed in *Dudgeon*

(*i*) *Taylor v. Dunbar*, L. R. 4 P. C. 206. The common law rule is thus expressed in the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 41), s. 55:—"The insurer is liable for any loss proximately caused by a peril insured against, but . . . he is not liable for any loss which is not proximately caused by a peril insured against."

(*k*) *Hagedorn v. Whitmore*, 1 Stark. N. P. C. 157. See *Grill v. Gen. Iron Screw Collier Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 476.

(*l*) Judgm., *Livie v. Janson*, 12 East, 653; 11 R. R. 513; citing *Green v. Elmslie*, Peake, N. P. C. 212; 3 R. R. 693; *Hahn v. Corbett*, 2 Bing. 205; 27 R. R. 590.

(*m*) *Walker v. Maitland*, 5 B. & Ald. 171; 24 R. R. 320; *Busk v. R. E. A. Co.*, 2 B. & Ald. 73; 20 R. R. 350; per Bayley, J., *Bishop v. Pentland*, 7 B. & C. 223; 31 R. R. 177; *Phillips v. Nairne*, 4 C. B. 343, 350—351. See *Hodgson v. Malcolm*, 2 N. R. 336; Judgm., *Waters v. Louisville Ins. Co.*, 11 Peters (U.S.), R. 220, 222, 223; *Columbine Ins. Co. v. Lawrence*, 10 Id.; *Patapsco Ins. Co. v. Coulter*, 3 Id. 222; *Gen. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sherwood*, 14 Howard (U.S.), R. 351.

(*n*) *Redman v. Wilson*, 14 M. & W. 476; *Laurie v. Douglas*, 15 Id. 746; *Corcoran v. Gurney*, 1 E. & B. 456.

v. *Pembroke* (o). There a ship insured under a time policy (which does not create an implied warranty of the seaworthiness of the ship at the inception of the risk) was lost under circumstances which showed that the vessel was unseaworthy at the time of the loss, and would not have been lost but for her unseaworthiness, but the immediate cause of her destruction was the violent action of the winds and waves operating from without on the hull. It was contended by the underwriters that this did not amount to a loss by perils of the sea within the meaning of the policy; but the House of Lords held that it did, on the ground that a long course of decisions had established that *causa proxima et non remota spectatur* is the maxim by which these contracts of insurance are to be construed, and that any loss caused immediately by perils of the sea is within the policy, though it would not have occurred but for the concurrent action of some other cause which is not within it.

Where a ship, being delayed by perils of the sea from pursuing her voyage, was obliged to put into port to repair, and, in order to defray the expenses of such repairs, the master having no other means of raising money, sold part of the goods, and applied the proceeds in payment of these expenses, the Court held that the underwriter was not answerable for this loss, for the damage was to be considered, according to the above rule, as not arising *immediately* from, although in a remote sense it might be said to have been brought about by, a peril of the sea (p).

A policy of insurance on bags of coffee on a voyage from Rio to New Orleans and thence to New York, contained the following exception: "Warranted free from capture, seizure, and detention, and all the consequences thereof, or of any

(o) 2 App. Cas. 284: 46 L. J. Ex. 409. See *Reischer v. Borwick*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 548: 63 L. J. Q. B. 753.

(p) *Powell v. Gudgeon*, 5 M. & S. 431, 436; 17 R. R. 385; recognised

Sarguy v. Hobson, 4 Bing. 131; 26 R. R. 251; *Gregson v. Gilbert*, cited Park, Mar. Insur., 8th ed. 138. See also *Bradlie v. Maryland Ins. Co.*, 12 Peters (U.S.), R. 404, 405.

attempt thereat, and *free from all consequences of hostilities.*" The ship, whilst on her voyage, ran ashore and was eventually lost south of Cape Hatteras. It appeared that at Cape Hatteras, until the secession of the Southern States of America, a light had always been maintained, and that the light had for hostile purposes been extinguished by the Confederates whilst in possession of the adjacent country. If the light had been maintained the ship might have been saved. Whilst she was ashore, part of the coffee was saved by certain officers acting on behalf of the Federal Government, and a further part might in like manner have been got ashore but for the interference of the Confederate troops, in consequence of which the residue of the cargo was wholly lost. The question arose—had the goods, or any part of them, been lost by perils of the sea, or by perils from which they were by the policy warranted free? The Court held that the insurers were liable as for a partial loss in respect of the coffee which remained on board incapable of being saved, the proximate cause of the loss being a peril of the sea—but that as to so much of the coffee as was got ashore, and as to so much as would have been saved but for the interference of the troops, this was a loss by a consequence of hostilities, in respect of which the insurers were not liable (*q*).

The preceding cases, conjointly with those below cited, in which the maxim before us has, under different states of facts, been applied (*r*), sufficiently establish the general proposition, that, in order to recover for a loss on a maritime policy, the loss must have been directly occasioned by some

(*q*) *Ionides v. Universal Marine Ins. Co.*, 14 C. B. N. S. 259; cited *per* Willes, J., *Marsden v. City & County Ass. Co.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 240; *Lloyd v. Gen. Iron Screw Collier Co.*, 3 H. & C. 284; *Sully v. Duranty*, Id. 270; *Cory v. Burr*, 8 App. Cas. 393.

Dent v. Smith, L. R. 4 Q. B. 414, is important in reference to the

subject *supra*.

(*r*) *Naylor v. Palmer*, 8 Exch. 739; S. C. (affirmed in error), 10 Exch. 382, where the loss resulted from the piratical act of emigrant passengers; *M'Swiney v. Royal Exchange Ass. Co.*, 14 Q. B. 634, 646, which is observed upon *per* Cur., *Chope v. Reynolds*, 5 C. B. N. S. 651, 652.

peril insured against (s). It is not enough that the loss has happened indirectly through a peril insured against; the loss must be occasioned by a peril insured against acting immediately on the thing insured. A policy in the ordinary form insured a cargo against capture and restraint of princes; the captain, the ship being under convoy, was told that if he entered the port of his destination the vessel would be lost by confiscation, and was ordered by the commander of the convoy to proceed to another port; which he did, and there sold the cargo for a nominal sum. The underwriters on the above principle were held not liable (t).

Again, it may, in general, be said, that everything which happens to a ship in the course of her voyage, by the immediate act of God, without the intervention of human agency, is a peril of the sea (u); for instance, if the ship insured is driven against another by stress of weather, the injury which she thus sustains is admitted to be direct, and the insurers are liable for it; but if the collision causes the ship injured to do some damage to the other vessel, both vessels being in fault, a positive rule of the Court of Admiralty (v) requires that the damage done to both ships be added together, and that the combined amount be equally divided between the owners of the two; and, in such a case, if the ship insured has done more damage than she has received, and is consequently obliged to pay the balance, this loss can neither be considered a necessary nor a proximate effect of the perils of the sea. It grows out of a provision of the law of nations, and cannot be charged upon the underwriters (w).

(s) See also, *per* Story, J., *Smith v. Universal Ins. Co.*, 6 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 185; *per* Ld. Alvanley, *Hadkinson v. Robinson*, 3 B. & P. 388; 7 E. R. 786; *Phillips v. Nairne*, 4 C. B. 343.

(t) *Hadkinson v. Robinson*, 3 B. & P. 388; 7 E. R. 786; *Halhead v.*

Young, 6 E. & B. 312.

(u) Park, *Mar. Insur.*, 8th ed. 136.

(v) Now observed in all the Courts.

(w) *De Vaux v. Salvador*, 4 A. & E. 420, 431; the decision in which case is controverted, 14 Peters (U.S.), R. 111; but agreed to by Mr. Phillips in his *Work on Insurance*,

Maxim—
how qualified in insurance cases.

Assured cannot take advantage of his own wrongful act.

The maxim before us, however, is not to be applied in the class of cases above noticed, if it would contravene the manifest intention of the parties and the fundamental rule of insurance law that the assurers are not liable for a loss occasioned by the wrongful act of the assured (*x*). “It is a maxim,” says Lord Campbell (*y*), “of our insurance law and of the insurance law of all commercial nations that the assured cannot seek an indemnity for a loss produced by his own wrongful act. The plaintiffs said truly that the perils of the seas must still be considered the proximate cause of the loss, but so it would have been if the ship had been scuttled or sunk by being wilfully run on a rock.” The misconduct of the assured need not, in order to exempt the insurers from liability, be the direct and proximate cause, the *causa causans*, of the loss; if his misconduct is the efficient cause of the loss, the assured will be disentitled to recover. And this rule is now expressed in the Marine Insurance Act, 1906 (*z*), which declares that “the insurer is not liable for any loss *attributable* to the wilful misconduct of the assured.”

But this rule does not apply to the merely negligent act of the assured or his servants (*a*). If ballast is thrown overboard by the negligent and improper, though not barratrous, act of the master and crew, whereby the ship becomes unseaworthy and is lost by perils of the sea, which otherwise she would have overcome, the underwriters will be liable (*b*). And where a loss arises through the negligence of the captain in not having a pilot on board at any

Vol. 2, § 1416. See *per* Ld. Campbell, *Dowell v. Gen. Steam Nav. Co.*, 5 E. & B. 195; *per* Sir W. Scott, 2 Dods. 85; *per* Ld. Selborne, 7 App. Cas. 800.

(*x*) Judgm., 6 E. & B. 948—949; and Marine Insurance Act, 1906, s. 55 (2).

(*y*) *Thompson v. Hopper*, 6 E. & B. 937.

(*z*) S. 55 (2).

(*a*) *Trinder, Anderson & Co. v. Thames, &c., Ins. Co.*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 114; 67 L. J. Q. B. 666; Marine Insurance Act, 1906, s. 55 (2).

(*b*) *Sadler v. Dixon*, 8 M. & W. 895; cited *Wilton v. R. Atlantic Mail Steam Co.*, 10 C. B. N. S. 465.

intermediate stage of the voyage or on entering the port of destination (except where required by the positive provisions of an Act of Parliament), the underwriters will not be discharged from their liability, if such loss be proximately caused by the perils insured against, and the master and crew were originally competent (*c*).

The question whether a loss is caused by one of the excepted perils in a bill of lading is governed by the same principle with this modification, that if the goods are not carried with reasonable care, and are lost by an excepted peril, such as a peril of the sea, the shipowner is responsible, although the excepted peril is the proximate cause of the loss, if the loss would not have occurred but for his negligence. This rule, however, does not result from any departure from the general principle laid down in the maxim *causa proxima non remota spectatur*, but is rested on the ground that, upon the true construction of a bill of lading in the ordinary form, the shipowner is excused from liability for such loss only as is caused by an excepted peril without negligence on his part—or, to put it in another way, that he cannot take advantage of the exceptions unless he has taken all reasonable care to avoid their consequences (*d*).

Exceptions
in bills of
lading.

The maxim under consideration is also applied to actions founded on negligence. The plaintiff must generally prove that the defendant's negligence was the proximate and not merely a remote cause of the damage (*e*). It is not, however, applied quite so strictly as in actions on policies of insurance, and it is perhaps more correct to say that the plaintiff must make out that the damage is the natural and probable result of the defendant's negligence (*f*). The

Maxim ap-
plied in
actions for
negligence.

(*c*) Arnold's Marine Ins., 5th ed. 24; and *Siordet v. Hall*, 4 Bing. 607; 29 R. R. 651.

(*d*) See *The Xantho*, 12 App. Cas. 503; *Hamilton, Fraser & Co. v. Pandorf*, 12 App. Cas. 518; 57 L. J. Q. B. 2 K. B. 348; 76 L. J. K. B. 891.

(*e*) *Hadwell v. Righlon*, [1907]
(*f*) *Sharp v. Powell*, L. R. 7

distinction is most noticeable in cases where the act of a stranger has intervened between the negligence of the defendant and the event causing the damage. In such cases, even though the act of the stranger is the proximate cause, the plaintiff recovers if he makes out that the defendant's negligence was "an effective cause" of the damage (*g*).

When the contributory negligence of the plaintiff is relied on as a defence, it is not enough for the defendant to show that the plaintiff's negligence only remotely caused the damage (*h*). As Lord Selborne said: "Great injustice might be done if in applying the doctrine of contributory negligence to a case of this sort, the maxim *causa proxima, non remota, spectatur* were lost sight of" (*i*).

Maxim applies in determining the measure of damages.

The maxim as to remoteness has an important application in connection with the measure of damages (*j*): the question which in practice most frequently presents itself being whether a particular item of damage is properly referable to the cause of action alleged and proved. The general

C. P. 253; 41 L. J. C. P. 91; *Harris v. Mobbs*, 3 Ex. D. 268; *Bailiffs of Romney Marsh v. Trinity House*, L. R. 5 Ex. 204; L. R. 7 Ex. 247; 39 L. J. Ex. 163.

(*g*) *Clark v. Chambers*, 3 Q. B. D. 327; 47 L. J. Q. B. 427; *Halestrap v. Gregory*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 561; 64 L. J. Q. B. 415; *Englehart v. Farrant*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 240; 66 L. J. Q. B. 122; and compare *McDowell v. G. W. Ry. Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 331; 72 L. J. K. B. 652; *Burrows v. March Gas Co.*, L. R. 7 Ex. 96; 41 L. J. Ex. 46; *De La Bere v. Pearsons, Ltd.*, [1908] 1 K. B. 280.

(*h*) *Radley v. L. & N. W. Ry. Co.*, 1 App. Cas. 754; 46 L. J. Ex. 573, and cases there discussed.

(*i*) *Spaight v. Tedcastle*, 6 App. Cas. 217, 219.

(*j*) With respect to damages in

general, it has been said that they are of three kinds: 1st, nominal damages, which occur in cases where the judge is bound to tell the jury only to give such; as, for instance, where the seller brings an action for the non-acceptance of goods, the price of which has risen since the contract was made; 2ndly, general damages, which are such as the jury may give when the judge cannot point out any measure by which they are to be assessed except the opinion and judgment of a reasonable man; 3rdly, special damages, which are given in respect of any consequences reasonably or probably arising from the breach complained of; *per* Martin, B., *Prehn v. Royal Bank of Liverpool*, L. R. 5 Ex. 99, 100. See *The Mediana*, [1900] A. C. 116—118.

rule for our guidance upon this subject where the action is founded on contract or in tort has already been adverted to (*k*). Upon the question of remoteness of damage there is no difference in principle between actions on contract and those in tort (*l*).

The principle upon which special damage is sometimes recoverable for the breach of a contract is that enunciated in the second branch of the well-known rule, with regard to the measure of damages, laid down in *Hadley v. Baxendale* (*m*). That rule is as follows:—“Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either (1) arising naturally, *i.e.*, according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or (2) such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. If the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. On the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case; and of

(*k*) *Supra*, p. 168.

105, 114.

(*l*) *The Notting Hill*, 9 P. D.

(*m*) 9 Exch. 341, 355.

this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them."

With regard to the second branch of the above rule, Fry, L.J., observed in *Hammond v. Bussey* (n) that there were four questions to be answered in order to see whether the special damages claimed were recoverable under it: (1) What are the damages which actually resulted from the breach of contract? (2) Was the breach of contract made under any special circumstances, and, if so, what were they? (3) What at the time of making the contract was the common knowledge of both parties? and (4) What may the Court reasonably suppose to have been in the contemplation of the parties as the probable result of a breach of the contract, assuming the parties to have applied their minds to the contingency of there being such a breach?

Rule does not apply to transaction founded in fraud.

The maxim, *in jure non remota causa sed proxima spectatur*, does not apply to any transaction originally founded in fraud or covin; for the law will look to the corrupt beginning, and consider it as one entire act, according to the principle, *dolus circuitu non purgatur* (o)—fraud is not purged by circuitry (p); but this principle must be taken with a qualification in cases where the term *dolus* is used to signify deceit. In actions of deceit, in order to make the defendant liable, some connection must be shown between the party deceiving and the party deceived, as that the deception was practised by the defendant upon the plaintiff, or upon a third person with the knowledge or intent that it would or should be acted upon by the plaintiff (q).

(n) 20 Q. B. D. 79, 100. See *Agius v. G. W. Colliery Co.*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 413.

(o) "*Dolus* here means any wrongful act tending to the damage of another;" Judgm., 6 E. & B. 948. "There can be no *dolus* without a breach of the law;" per Willes, J., *Jeffries v. Alexander*, 8 H. L. Cas. 637, and in *Thompson v. Hopper*, E.

B. & E. 1047; see also *per* Bramwell, B., Id. 1045; *per* Williams, J., Id. 1054; [1898] 2 Q. B. 127; *Fitzjohn v. Mackinder*, 9 C. B. N. S. 505, 514.

(p) Bac. Max., reg. 1; Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 12; Tomlin's Law Dict., tit. "*Fraud*."

(q) See *Peek v. Gurney*, L. R. 6 H. L. 377; 43 L. J. Ch. 19; *Barry v. Croskey*, 2 J. & H. 117—118, 123;

Neither does the above maxim, according to Lord Bacon, ordinarily hold in criminal cases, because in them the intention is matter of substance, and, therefore, the first motive, as showing the intention, must be principally regarded (*r*). As, if A., of malice prepense, discharge a pistol at B., and miss him, whereupon he throws down his pistol and flies, and B. pursues A. to kill him, on which he turns and kills B. with a dagger; in this case, if the law considered the immediate cause of death, A. would be justified as having acted in his own defence; but looking back, as the law does, to the remote cause, the offence will amount to murder, because committed in pursuance and execution of the first murderous intent (*s*).

Nor in criminal cases.

Nevertheless, an indictment will sometimes fail to be sustainable on the ground of remoteness (*t*). For instance, if trustees of a road neglect to repair it in pursuance of their statutory powers, and one passing along the road is accidentally killed by reason of the omission to repair, the trustees are not indictable for manslaughter, for "not only must the neglect, to make the party guilty of it liable to the charge of felony, be personal, but the death must be the immediate result of that personal neglect (*u*). It seems, however, that it is no defence to an indictment for manslaughter that the deceased was guilty of negligence and so contributed to his own death, if the death of the deceased is shown to have been caused in part by the negligence of the prisoner (*v*).

Andrews v. Mockford, [1896] 1 Q. B. 372; 65 L. J. Q. B. 302.

(*r*) Bac. Max., vol. iv., p. 17.

(*s*) Bac. Max., reg. 1.

(*t*) See *Reg. v. Bennett*, Bell, C. C. 1, where fireworks kept by the prisoner in contravention of 9 & 10 Will. 3, c. 7, s. 1, either accidentally or through negligence of his servants exploded, and, setting fire to a neighbouring house, caused a person's death. Held, that the illegal act in keeping the fireworks was too

remotely connected with the death to support an indictment for manslaughter.

(*u*) *Reg. v. Pocock*, 17 Q. B. 34, 39; *Reg. v. Hughes*, Dears. & B. 248. See also *Reg. v. Gardner*, Dears. & B. 40, with which cf. *Reg. v. Martin*, L. R. 1 C. C. 56; *Reg. v. Clerk of Assize of Oxford Circuit*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 370.

(*v*) *R. v. Swindall*, 2 C. & K. 230; *R. v. Jones*, 11 Cox, 544; *R. v. Rew*, 12 Cox, 355.

ACTUS DEI NEMINI FACIT INJURIAM. (2 *Bla. Com.* 122.)—
The law holds no man responsible for the act of God.

General
rule.

Duties are either imposed by law or undertaken by contract, and the ordinary rule of law is that when the law creates a duty, and the party is disabled from performing it without any default of his own by the act of God, the law excuses him, but when a party by his own contract creates a duty upon himself he is bound to make it good, notwithstanding any accident by inevitable necessity (*x*).

Meaning of
act of God.

The act of God, which is the antithesis of the act of man, generally means an inevitable accident due directly and exclusively to natural causes without human intervention, and an accident so due is considered to be inevitable if it be such that it would be unreasonable, under all the circumstances of the case, to expect a person to foresee and prevent it, or to resist or avert its consequences (*y*). The phrase is often used of the distinctive forces of nature, such as storms and floods, and is applicable to these, though they be not unique, if they be extraordinary and such as could not reasonably be anticipated (*z*). It is also used of such an event as a person's death or his incapacity to act through illness.

Repair of
sea-walls.

Where the owner of land fronting the sea is under a prescriptive liability (*a*) to maintain a wall against its incursion, the doctrine that the act of God excuses usually applies to, and limits, the liability: so that if he has kept the wall in repair sufficient to resist ordinary storms, but

(*x*) *Paradine v. Jane*, Aleyn, 26; *Nichols v. Marsland*, 2 Ex. D. 1, 4: 46 L. J. Ex. 174.

(*y*) *Nugent v. Smith*, 1 C. P. D. 423: 45 L. J. C. P. 697; *Forward v. Pittard*, 1 T. R. 27, 33; 1 R. R. 142. See also 14 Q. B. D. 574.

(*z*) *Nitro-phosphate Co. v. L. & St.*

Katharine Docks Co., 9 Ch. D. 503, 516; see *Brabant v. King*, [1895] A. C. 632: 64 L. J. P. C. 161.

(*a*) There is no liability at common law to maintain a sea-wall for the benefit of neighbours; *Hudson v. Tabor*, 2 Q. B. D. 298: 46 L. J. Q. B. 463.

the wall be overthrown without his default by an extraordinary tempest, the burden of repair falls, not exclusively upon him, but upon all the landowners of the level (*b*). As the liability is prescriptive, its extent depends upon the usage proved, and the evidence may establish that a landowner is liable to repair damage done by an extraordinary tempest (*c*); but in the absence of proof of this more extensive liability, the liability is limited to the maintenance of the wall in a state to resist ordinary seas (*d*). The burden of repairing damage done to the wall by extraordinary seas, nevertheless, falls upon the landowner if the wall was not in proper repair and the want of repair occasioned the damage (*e*).

The benefit of the excuse that damage was due to the act of God is, it seems, not lost by reason of a default which does not contribute to the damage. The owners of a dock connected by an artificial channel with a tidal river neglected to build their river wall to the requisite height, and an extraordinary tide flooded the dock, and the floods escaped and damaged neighbouring premises. It was suggested by the dock-owners that even if they had fulfilled their duty, part of the damage would, nevertheless, have been done, and must have been treated as due entirely to the act of God. It was held that the dock-owners were not answerable for that part of the damage, if capable of being severed from the part to which their breach of duty contributed (*f*).

Immaterial
default.

The extent of a liability imposed by statute is always a question of construction. Where a statute imposed upon the owner of any vessel damaging a pier liability for the

Statutory
liabilities.

(*b*) *Keighley's case*, 10 Co. Rep. 139; *R. v. Somerset Commrs.*, 8 T. R. 312; 4 R. R. 659; *Reg. v. Fobbing Commrs.*, 11 App. Cas. 449: 56 L. J. M. C. 1.

(*c*) *Reg. v. Leigh*, 10 A. & E. 398.

(*d*) *Reg. v. Fobbing Commrs.*, *supra*.

(*e*) *R. v. Essex Commrs.*, 1 B. & C. 477; 25 R. R. 467.

(*f*) *Nitro-phosphate Co. v. L. & St. Katharine Docks Co.*, 9 Ch. D. 503.

damage, and it appeared that the aim of the statute was not to create a new liability, but to fix the owner with the common law liability notwithstanding that his vessel might be in charge of persons for whose conduct he would not be answerable at common law, it was held that an owner was not liable for damage occasioned by the act of God. A violent storm compelled the crew to abandon the vessel and drove the abandoned vessel against the pier (*g*).

Artificial
reservoir.

The maxim under consideration is illustrated by the case of a person who for his private purposes constructs an artificial lake upon his land. By so doing he incurs the duty to prevent an escape of the waters to his neighbour's damage. This duty, however, does not extend to an escape due, without default, to the act of God, for instance, to an extraordinary rainfall, which could not reasonably have been anticipated, and which bursts the banks of the lake, though made and maintained with all reasonable care (*h*).

Fire.

Similarly, if a man make a fire in his house or field, he must see it does no harm or answer the damage if it does, but he is excused if the fire be spread by the act of God, as by a sudden irresistible storm (*i*). At the common law there was a presumption of negligence against a man upon whose premises a fire originated (*j*). By the 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 86 (*k*), no action lies, except upon a contract between landlord and tenant, against a person upon whose premises a fire accidentally begins for any damage done thereby. This provision does not extend to fires kindled intentionally or by negligence (*l*); but it probably rebuts the common law presumption.

(*g*) *River Wear Commrs. v. Adamson*, 2 App. Cas. 743.

(*h*) *Nichols v. Marsland*, 2 Ex. D. 1: 46 L. J. Ex. 174.

(*i*) *Tubervil v. Stamp*, 1 Salk. 13: 1 Ld. Raym. 264; see *Black v. Christchurch Co.*, [1894] A. C. 48: 63 L. J. P. C. 32.

(*j*) *Per* Ld. Tenterden, 2 B. & Ad.

958; see 1 Roll. Abr. 1.

(*k*) It has been held that the section is of general application; *Filliter v. Phippard*, 11 Q. B. 347; but see *Westminster Fire Office v. Glasgow Soc.*, 13 App. Cas. 699, as to s. 83.

(*l*) *Filliter v. Phippard*, *supra*.

The burning of a house by negligence is waste (*m*); but Waste.
it is not waste, or the waste is excusable, if the house be burnt by lightning or prostrated by tempest without the tenant's default (*n*). Notwithstanding the decision in *Davies v. Davies* (*o*), it may perhaps be doubted whether a tenant for years of a house who has not contracted to do any repairs is under obligation to rebuild the house if overthrown without his default by an extraordinary tempest.

The liability of a tenant for years, however, is generally Landlord
fixed by an express contract. A general covenant by the and tenant.
tenant to keep the premises in repair obliges him to repair damage done by accidental fire or by lightning, tempest or other unavoidable contingency (*p*), and therefore special provisions regarding such contingencies are often introduced into leases for the tenant's protection (*q*). In the absence of a special contract, the rule is that the landlord is not bound to repair (*r*); nor is he bound, in the event of a fire against which he is insured, to expend money he may have received from the insurance office in reinstating the premises (*s*).

The destruction of demised buildings by fire or by the Rent.
act of God does not absolve the lessee from liability to pay rent, notwithstanding that neither he nor the lessor be bound to restore them (*t*), and the rent continues to be

(*m*) Co. Litt. 53 b. As to burning by accident, see 14 Geo. 3, c. 78, s. 86, *supra*; *Nugent v. Cuthbert*, Sugd. Law of Pr., 475, 479; *White v. M'Cann*, 1 Ir. R. C. L. 205.

(*n*) 2 Roll. Abr. 820; Bac. Abr., "Waste" (E.); see *Paradine v. Jane*, Aleyn, 27; *Rook v. Worth*, 1 Ves. sen. 462; *Simmons v. Norton*, 7 Bing. 647, 648; 33 R. R. 588.

(*o*) 38 Ch. D. 499; 57 L. J. Ch. 1093; see *Re Cartwright*, 41 Ch. D. 532.

(*p*) *Chesterfield v. Bolton*, 2 Comyns, 627; *Bullock v. Dommitt*, 6 T. R. 650; 3 R. R. 300; *Pym v.*

Blackburn, 3 Ves. 34; *Clark v. Glasgow Co.*, 1 Macq. 663; see *Yates v. Dunster*, 11 Exch. 15.

(*q*) See *Saner v. Bilton*, 7 Ch. D. 815; 47 L. J. Ch. 267; *Manchester Warehouse Co. v. Carr*, 5 C. P. D. 507; 49 L. J. C. P. 809.

(*r*) *Gott v. Gandy*, 2 E. & B. 845; 23 L. J. Q. B. 1; *Bayne v. Walker*, 3 Dow, 233; 15 R. R. 53.

(*s*) *Leeds v. Cheetham*, 1 Sim. 146; 27 R. R. 181; *Lofft v. Dennis*, 1 E. & E. 474.

(*t*) *Paradine v. Jane*, Aleyn, 26; *Monk v. Cooper*, 2 Stra. 763; *Belfour v. Weston*, 1 T. R. 310; 1 R. R. 210;

payable, unless there was an express stipulation to the contrary (*u*). In *Izon v. Gorton* (*x*), where the upper floors of a warehouse were let to a tenant from year to year, it was held that the tenancy and the liability to rent continued, although the premises were destroyed by accidental fire and were wholly untenanted until rebuilt, and that the entry of the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding them was not an eviction. To determine his liability in such a case a tenant from year to year should give a proper notice to quit.

Eviction by
act of God.

It has been said, indeed, that a tenant for years may have the rent apportioned if, without his default, he be evicted from part of the demised land by the act of God, as by an irruption of the sea whereby the land becomes a permanent part of the open sea. But an invasion of waters over which the tenant will have exclusive rights is not an eviction; nor is the destruction by fire of all that stands upon the lands, for the subsequent use of the lands is not thereby entirely lost (*y*).

Absolute
contracts.

With regard to contracts, the general rule is that a person who contracts absolutely to do a thing not naturally impossible is not excused for non-performance because of being prevented by the act of God (*z*). Thus, where a contractor built a bridge across a river under an agreement which bound him to keep it in repair during a fixed term, and during that term the bridge was destroyed by an extraordinary flood, it was held that he was liable to rebuild it (*a*). It is sometimes said that the act of God excuses the breach of contract, but this is inaccurate, and what is really

Hare v. Groves, 3 Anst. 687; 4 R. R. 835; *Baker v. Holtzaffel*, 4 Taunt. 45; 13 R. R. 556; 18 Ves. 115; *Marshall v. Schofield*, 52 L. J. Q. B. 58.

(*u*) See *Bennett v. Ireland*, E. B. & E. 326.

(*x*) 5 Bing. N. C. 501; see *Surplice v. Farnsworth*, 8 Scott. N. R. 307;

Packer v. Gibbins, 1 Q. B. 421; *Upton v. Townsend*, 17 C. B. 30.

(*y*) 1 Roll. Abr. 236; Bac. Abr. "Rent" (M. 2).

(*z*) Judgm., *Lloyd v. Guibert*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 115, 121; citing *Paradine v. Jane*, Aleyn, 26.

(*a*) *Brecknock Co. v. Pritchard*, 6 T. R. 750; 3 R. R. 335.

meant is that it is not within the contract that non-performance if due to the act of God should be treated as a breach (*b*). For instance, when it is said that "if a lessee covenants to leave a wood in as good a plight as the wood was at the time of the lease, and afterwards the trees are blown down by tempest, he is discharged of his covenant" (*c*), what is meant is that the covenant was intended to relate only to the lessee's own acts, and not to an event beyond his control and producing effects not in his power to remedy (*b*).

Contracts, then, are not always to be construed as absolute; and, as a general rule, where the parties must have contemplated the continuing existence of a specific thing as the foundation of their contract, and there is no warranty that the thing will continue to exist, a condition ought to be implied that impossibility arising from the accidental destruction of the thing shall excuse performance (*d*). Thus, where a contractor agreed to fit up a building with machinery, and during the progress of the work the building was accidentally destroyed by fire, it was held that he was excused from proceeding with the contract (*e*). The Sale of Goods Act, 1893, recognises this rule by providing that where there is an agreement to sell specific goods, and subsequently the goods, without any fault of the seller or buyer, perish before the risk passes to the buyer, the agreement is thereby avoided (*f*).

Upon the same principle, where it ought to be inferred that the happening of some future event was contemplated as the sole foundation of a contract, the contract is dissolved

(*b*) *Baily v. De Crespigny*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 180, 185.

(*c*) 1 Co. Rep. 98 a.

(*d*) *Judgm., Taylor v. Caldwell*, 3 B. & S. 826; 32 L. J. Q. B. 164, and see *Nicholl and Knight v. Ashton*, [1901] 2 K. B. 126; 70 L. J. K. B. 600.

(*e*) *Appleby v. Myers*, L. R. 2 C. P.

651; 36 L. J. C. P. 331; see *Turner v. Goldsmith*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 544; 60 L. J. Q. B. 247.

(*f*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 7; see *Howell v. Coupland*, 1 Q. B. D. 258; 46 L. J. Q. B. 147; *Elphick v. Barnes*, 5 C. P. D. 321; 49 L. J. C. P. 698; *Chapman v. Withers*, 20 Q. B. D. 824; 57 L. J. Q. B. 457.

if, without the fault of either party, that event does not happen. This principle was applied in several cases arising out of the postponement of King Edward's coronation. Thus, where a flat was taken in Pall Mall for certain days with the sole object of viewing the coronation procession, it was held that the contract was dissolved when it was announced that the procession would not take place (g).

Contracts for
personal
services.

A contract for personal services is not, as a rule, an absolute contract, but is generally subject to an implied condition that the servant's inability to serve, if due to illness, shall not be a breach (h). The servant's illness therefore does not usually entitle the master to determine the contract; but the master may have an implied right to determine it in the event of an illness which renders the servant permanently incapable of serving (i), or of an illness which frustrates the object of the contract (j), or goes to the root of the contract (k). While the contract remains in force, the servant's right to his wages generally remains intact (l). It is, as a rule, an implied term of a contract for personal services that the death of either party shall put an end to it, and the rule applies to an engagement expressed to be for a fixed term (m) or to continue until determined by notice (n).

(g) *Chandler v. Webster*, [1904] 1 K. B. 493; 73 L. J. K. B. 401; and see *Krell v. Henry*, [1903] 2 K. B. 740; 72 L. J. K. B. 794; *Herne Bay Steamboat Co. v. Hutton*, [1904] 2 K. B. 683; 72 L. J. K. B. 879; *Civil Service Co-operative Society v. General Steam Navigation Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 756; 72 L. J. K. B. 933.

(h) *Boast v. Firth*, L. R. 4 C. P. 1; 38 L. J. C. P. 1; *Robinson v. Davidson*, L. R. 6 Ex. 269; 40 L. J. Ex. 172.

(i) See *Cuckson v. Stones*, 1 E. &

E. 248; 28 L. J. Q. B. 25.

(j) *Per Bramwell, B., Jackson v. Union Marine Ins. Co.*, L. R. 10 C. P. 141.

(k) *Poussard v. Spicrs.*, 1 Q. B. D. 410; 45 L. J. Q. B. 621; see *Bettini v. Gye*, 1 Q. B. D. 183; 45 L. J. Q. B. 209.

(l) *Cuckson v. Stones*, *supra*; K. v. *Raschen*, 36 L. T. 38.

(m) *Whincup v. Hughes*, L. R. 6 C. P. 78; 40 L. J. C. P. 104.

(n) *Farrow v. Wilson*, L. R. 4 C. P. 744; 38 L. J. C. P. 326.

Where a contract to do work or render services has been partially performed, but further performance is excused by the act of God, the contract is not thereby rescinded *ab initio* (o). As a rule, each party retains rights which by the terms of the contract he had already acquired (o), but neither is subject to liabilities which, having regard to those terms, had not already arisen (p). For instance, sums which had accrued due for the work actually done remain payable (o), or, if already paid, are not recoverable (q); but no claim can be maintained in respect of sums which were to be paid only upon the completion of the work, and in the case of a special contract to do the entire work for one entire sum payable upon its completion, the contractor cannot recover any compensation for the work actually done (p).

Effect of non-completion of contract.

Conditions, as well as contracts, ought sometimes to be construed as not absolute. Thus it is laid down that where the condition of a bond is possible at the time of making it, and before it can be performed the condition becomes impossible by the act of God, the obligation is saved (r); and the reason seems to be that as the condition is for the obligor's benefit he is not to be deprived of that benefit by the act of God. For the same reason it has also been said that if the condition be in the disjunctive, with liberty to the obligor to do either of two things at his election, and both are possible at the time of making the bond, and afterwards one of them becomes impossible by the act of God,

Conditions of bonds.

(o) *Stubbs v. Holywell R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ex. 311; 36 L. J. Ex. 166; *Chandler v. Webster*, [1904] 1 K. B. 493; 73 L. J. K. B. 401.

(p) *Appleby v. Myers*, L. R. 2 C. P. 651; 36 L. J. C. P. 331; *Krell v. Henry*, [1903] 2 K. B. 740; 72 L. J. K. B. 794.

(q) *Anglo-Egyptian Co. v. Rennie*, L. R. 10 C. P. 271, 571; 44 L. J. C. P. 130; see also *Whincup v.*

Hughes, L. R. 6 C. P. 78; 40 L. J. C. P. 104; *Civil Service Co-operative Society v. General Steam Navigation Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 756; 72 L. J. K. B. 933.

(r) Co. Litt. 206 a; Roll. Abr. 449, 451; Com. Dig. "Condition," D. 1, L. 12; 2 Bl. Com. 340; *per Williams, J.*, *Brown v. Mayor of London*, 9 C. B. N. S. 747; see S. C., 13 Id. 828.

the obligor shall not be bound to perform the other (s). But it has been denied that this is true as a universal proposition, and in *Barkworth v. Young* (t), Kindersley, V.-C., after reviewing the authorities, expressed the opinion that in each case the intention of the parties to the bond must be considered, and that "if the Court is satisfied that the clear intention of the parties was that one of them should do a certain thing, but he is allowed at his option to do it in one of two moods, and one of these modes becomes impossible by the act of God, he is bound to perform it in the other mode."

Condition in
a devise or
conveyance.

In a devise or conveyance of lands, on a condition annexed to the estate conveyed, which is possible at the time of making it, but afterwards becomes impossible by the act of God, there, if the condition is precedent, no estate vests, because the condition cannot be performed; but, if subsequent, the estate becomes absolute in the grantee, for the condition is not broken (u). Thus, where a man enfeoffed another, on the condition subsequent of re-entry, if the feoffor should within a year go to Paris about the feoffee's affairs, but feoffor died before the year had elapsed, the estate was held to be absolute in the feoffee (x). So, where a man devised his estate to his daughter, on a condition subsequent that she should marry his nephew on or before her attaining twenty-one years; but the nephew died young, and the daughter was never required, and never refused to marry him, but, after his death, and before attaining twenty-one, married; it was held that the condition was unbroken, having become impossible by the act of God (y).

(s) Com. Dig. "Condition," D. 1; *Laughter's case*, 5 Rep. 22; see per Crompton, J., 4 E. & B. 974.

(t) 4 Drewry, 1: 26 L. J. Ch. 153.

(u) Com. Dig. "Condition," D. 1; Co. Litt. 206 a; and Mr. Butler's note (1); Id. 218 a, 219 a.

(x) Co. Litt. 206 a.

(y) *Thomas v. Howell*, 1 Salk. 170: 4 Mod. 67; *Aislabie v. Rice*, 8 Taunt. 459; 18 R. R. 230; see per Parke, B., 4 H. L. C. 120. As to *Dawson v. Oliver Massey*, 2 Ch. D. 753, see *Re Brown*, 18 Ch. D. 61.

By the custom of the realm, common carriers are bound to receive and carry goods for a reasonable reward, to take due care of them in their passage, to deliver them safely and within a reasonable time (*z*), or in default thereof to recompense the owner for loss, damage, or delay happening while the goods are in their custody. Where, however, such loss, damage, or delay arises from the act of God, as storms, tempests, and the like, the maxim under consideration applies, and the loss falls upon the owner, and not upon the carrier (*a*). And so, if the thing is lost partly by reason of its own inherent vice and partly in consequence of the act of God, the carrier is not liable (*b*); in this case *res perit suo domino* (*c*).

Liability of
common
carrier.

For damage occasioned by accidental fire resulting neither from the act of God nor of the king's enemies, a common carrier is responsible (*d*). But where an injury is sustained by a passenger, from an inevitable accident (*e*), the coach-owner is not liable, provided there were no negligence in the driver (*f*). And the breach of a contract to convey a passenger, if caused by *vis major*, seems to be excusable (*g*), the principle being that a carrier of

(*z*) *Taylor v. G. N. R. Co.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 385.

(*a*) *Amies v. Stevens*, Stra. 128; *Trent Navigation v. Wood*, 3 Esp. 127; *per Powell, J., Coggs v. Bernard*, 2 Ld. Raym. 910, 911; *per Tindal, C.J., Ross v. Hill*, 2 C. B. 890; *Walker v. British Guarantee Society*, 18 Q. B. 277, 287.

(*b*) *Nugent v. Smith*, 1 C. P. D. 423; 45 L. J. C. P. 697.

(*c*) As to this maxim, see Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 857; *Appleby v. Myers*, L. R. 2 C. P. 651, 659, 660; *Bayne v. Walker*, 3 Dow, 233; 15 R. R. 53; *Paine v. Meller*, 6 Ves. 349; *Bryant v. Busk*, 4 Russ. 1; 28 R. R. 1; *Logan v. Le Mesurier*, 6 Moo. P. C. C. 116

(*d*) Story on Bailments, 5th ed., s. 528; *Collins v. Bristol & Exeter R. Co.*, 1 H. & N. 517; *Liver Alkali Works v. Johnson*, L. R. 9 Ex. 338.

(*e*) As to the meaning of this word, see *Fenwick v. Schmalz*, L. R. 3 C. P. 313; *Readhead v. Midland R. Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 379; *Richardson v. G. E. R. Co.*, L. R. 10 C. P. 486, 493; 1 C. P. D. 342.

(*f*) *Aston v. Heaven*, 2 Esp. 533; *per Parke, J., Crofts v. Waterhouse*, 3 Bing. 321; 28 R. R. 631. See *Sharp v. Grey*, 9 Bing. 457; 35 R. R. 601; *Perren v. Monmouthshire R. Co.*, 11 C. P. 855.

(*g*) *Per* Id. Campbell, C.J., *Denton v. G. N. R. Co.*, 25 L. J. Q. B. 129; S. C., 5 E. & B. 860;

passengers, unlike a carrier of goods, does not warrant or insure their safety, but contracts merely to take all reasonable care, including in that term the use of skill and foresight (*h*).

Death.

The following case may also be noticed as applicable to the present subject, and as showing that death, which is the act of God, shall not be allowed to prejudice an innocent party if such a result can be avoided. Lessor and lessee, in the presence of lessor's attorney, signed an agreement that a lease should be prepared by lessor's attorney, and paid for by lessee. The lease was prepared accordingly, but was never executed, owing to the death of the lessor, who had only a life estate in the land to be demised. It was held that the lessor's attorney was entitled to recover from lessee the charge for drawing the lease, for it was known to all the parties that the proposed lessor had only a life estate; and the non-execution of the lease was owing to no fault of the attorney, who ought not, therefore, to remain unpaid (*i*).

The case of *Reg. v. Justices of Leicestershire* (*k*), where a mandamus was issued to Quarter Sessions to hear an appeal against a bastardy order, offers another apt illustration of the maxim before us. It appeared that the appellant, having entered into the proper recognizances, posted, in pursuance of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 10, s. 3, a written notice of his having done so, addressed to the mother of the child;

Briddon v. G. N. R. Co., 28 L. J. Ex. 51; *Great Western R. Co. of Canada v. Braid*, 1 Moo. P. C. C. 101, and cases there cited. See *Kearon v. Pearson*, 7 H. & N. 386.

(*h*) *Readhead v. Midland R. Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 379, 381, with which compare *Liver Alkali Works v. Johnson*, L. R. 9 Ex. 338; 43 L. J. Ex. 216, as to the liability of a carrier of goods, and *Randall v. Newson*, 2 Q. B. D. 102; 46 L. J.

Q. B. 257, as to the obligation of a vendor of a chattel bought for a specific purpose.

(*i*) *Webb v. Rhodes*, 3 Bing. N. C. 732.

For another illustration of the above maxim, see *Morris v. Matthews*, 2 Q. B. 293. See also *per* Best, C.J., *Tooth v. Bagwell*, 3 Bing. 375.

(*k*) 15 Q. B. 88.

three days, however, before this notice was posted, the woman had died, and upon that ground the Sessions refused to hear the appeal, considering that the appellant had not complied with the requirements of the Statute. But the Queen's Bench held that as the duty of the appellant to give the notice was cast upon him by the law, not by his own contract, he was excused from performing that duty, since it had become impossible by the act of God (*l*).

The above general rule must, however, be applied with due caution (*m*). Thus, where, after the indictment—arraignment—the jury charged—and evidence given on a trial for a capital offence, one of the jurymen became incapable, through illness, of proceeding to verdict, the court of oyer and terminer discharged the jury, charged a fresh jury with the prisoner, and convicted him, although it was argued that *actus Dei nemini nocet*, and that the sudden illness was a Godsend, of which the prisoner ought to have the benefit (*n*).

Rule—where
inapplicable.

Lastly, illness of a material witness is a sufficient ground to excuse a plaintiff in not proceeding to try, and so would be the death of one of two co-defendants, no suggestion of it having been made on the record, the trial being thus suspended by the act of God (*o*).

LEX NON COGIT AD IMPOSSIBILIA. (*Co. Litt.* 231 *b.*)—*The law does not compel a man to do that which he cannot possibly perform.*

This maxim, or, as it is also expressed, *impotentia excusat legem* (*p*), is intimately connected with that last considered, and must be understood in this qualified sense, that

Meaning of
rule, and
examples
of its
application.

(*l*) See also, in further illustration of the maxim as to *actus Dei*, *Newton v. Boodle*, 3 C. B. 795.

(*m*) *Ld. Raym.* 433.

(*n*) *R. v. Edwards*, 4 Taunt. 309, 312; 13 R. R. 601.

(*o*) *Pell v. Linnell*, L. R. 3 C. P. 441. As to the modern practice upon the death of a defendant see *R. S. C.*, O. XVII.

(*p*) *Co. Litt.* 29 *a*.

impotentia excuses when there is a necessary or invincible disability to perform the mandatory part of the law, or to forbear the prohibitory (*q*). It is akin to the maxim of the Roman law, *nemo tenetur ad impossibilia*, which, derived from common sense and natural equity, has been adopted and applied by the law of England under various and dissimilar circumstances.

The law itself and the administration of it, said Sir W. Scott, with reference to an alleged infraction of the revenue laws, must yield to that to which everything must bend, to necessity; the law, in its most positive and peremptory injunctions, is understood to disclaim, as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling to impossibilities, and the administration of laws must adopt that general exception in the consideration of all particular cases. "In the performance of that duty, it has three points to which its attention must be directed. In the first place, it must see that the nature of the necessity pleaded be such as the law itself would respect, for there may be a necessity which it would not. A necessity created by a man's own act, with a fair previous knowledge of the consequences that would follow, and under circumstances which he had then a power of controlling, is of that nature. Secondly, that the party who was so placed, used all practicable endeavours to surmount the difficulties which already formed that necessity, and which, on fair trial, he found insurmountable. I do not mean all the endeavours which the wit of man, as it exists in the acutest understanding, might suggest, but such as may reasonably be expected from a fair degree of discretion and an ordinary knowledge of business. Thirdly, that all this shall appear by distinct and unsuspected testimony, for the positive injunctions of the law, if proved to be violated, can give way to nothing but the clearest proof of the necessity that compelled the violation" (*r*).

(*q*) Hobart, 96.

(*r*) *The Generous*, 2 Dods. 323, 324.

It is, then, a general rule which admits of ample practical illustration, that *impotentia excusat legem*; where the law creates a duty or charge, and the party is disabled to perform it, without any default in him, and has no remedy over, there the law will in general excuse him(s): and though impossibility of performance is in general no excuse for not performing an obligation which a party has expressly undertaken by contract, yet when the obligation is one implied by law, impossibility of performance is a good excuse. Thus in a case in which consignees of a cargo were prevented from unloading a ship promptly by reason of a dock strike, the Court, after holding that in the absence of an express agreement to unload in a specified time there was implied obligation to unload within a reasonable time, held that the maxim "*lex non cogit ad impossibilia*" applied, and Lindley L.J., said, "We have to do with *implied* obligations, and I am not aware of any case in which an obligation to pay damages is ever cast by implication upon a person for not doing that which is rendered impossible by causes beyond his control" (i).

The maxim under notice may be exemplified by reference Mandamus. to the law of mandamus. A writ of mandamus issuing to a railway company, enjoining them to prosecute works in pursuance of statutory requirements, supposes the required act to be possible, and to be obligatory when the writ issues; and, in general, the writ suggests facts showing the obligation, and the possibility of fulfilling it(u); though, where an obligation is shown to be incumbent on the company, the onus of proving that it

(s) *Paradine v. Jane*, Aleyn, 27; cited *per* Lawrence, J., 8 T. R. 267. See *Evans v. Hutton*, 5 Scott, N. R. 670, and cases cited, *Id.* 681.

(t) *Hick v. Rodocanachi*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 626, 638; 61 L. J. Q. B. 42.

(u) *Reg. v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 16 Q. B. 864, 884; *Reg. v. Ambergate*

R. Co., 1 E. & B. 372, 381. See *Reg. v. York & N. Midland R. Co.*, 1 E. & B. 178, 858; *Reg. v. G. W. R. Co.*, *Id.* 253, 874; *Reg. v. S. E. R. Co.*, 4 H. L. Cas. 371; *Reg. v. L. & Y. R. Co.*, 1 E. & B. 228, 873 (a); *Tapping on Mandamus*, 359.

is impossible lies upon those who contest the demand of fulfilment (*x*); if they succeed in doing so, the doctrine applies that "on mandamus, *nemo tenetur ad impossibilia*" (*y*). Upon the same principle, where an order had been made by the Board of Trade upon a railway company requiring the company to carry a turnpike road across the railway, the Court refused a mandamus to compel the company to carry out the order upon proof that the company had no funds, was practically defunct, and was not in a position to obey the writ if granted (*z*).

Contracts impossible of performance.

If, however, as already stated, a person, by his own contract, absolutely engages to do an act, it is deemed to be his own fault and folly that he did not thereby expressly provide against contingencies, and exempt himself from responsibility in certain events: in such case, therefore, that is, in the instance of an absolute contract, the performance is not excused by an inevitable accident or other contingency, although not foreseen by nor within the control of the party (*a*). Thus, where a builder admitted that he had contracted to complete within a fixed time, not only specified works, but also extra works if ordered, it was held that his failure to fulfil his contract within the fixed time was not excusable on the ground that it was impossible for him to carry out within that time an order to do the extra works (*b*). And, if the condition of a bond be impossible

(*x*) *Reg. v. York, N. & B. R. Co.*, 16 Q. B. 886, 904; *Reg. v. G. W. R. Co.*, 1 E. & B. 774.

(*y*) *Per* Ld. Campbell, *Reg. v. Ambergate R. Co.*, 1 E. & B. 380; See *Reg. v. Coaks*, 3 Id. 249.

(*z*) *Re Bristol & N. Somerset R. Co.*, 3 Q. B. D. 10: 47 L. J. Q. B. 48.

(*a*) *Per* Lawrence, J., *Hadley v. Clarke*, 8 T. R. 267; *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Atkinson v. Ritchie*, 10 East, 533, 534; 10 R. R. 372; *Marquis of Bute v. Thompson*, 13 M. & W. 487; *Hills v. Sughrue*, 15

Id. 253, 262; *Jervis v. Tomkinson*, 1 H. & N. 195, 208; *Spence v. Chadwick*, 10 Q. B. 517, 528; *Schilizzi v. Derry*, 4 E. & B. 873; *Hale v. Rawson*, 4 C. B. N. S. 85; *Adams v. Royal M. S. Packet Co.*, 5 Id. 492; *Turner v. Goldsmith*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 544: 60 L. J. Q. B. 247.

(*b*) *Jones v. St. John's College*, L. R., 6 Q. B. 115. See *Dodd v. Churton*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 562: 66 L. J. Q. B. 477.

at the time of making it, the condition alone is void and the bond stands single and unconditional (c).

When performance of the condition of a bond becomes impossible by the act of the obligor, such impossibility forms no answer to an action on the bond (d): for "in case of a private contract, a man cannot use as a defence an impossibility brought upon himself" (e). But the performance of a condition is excused by the default of the obligee, as by his absence when his presence is necessary for the performance (f), or by his doing any act which renders it impossible for the obligor to perform his engagement (g). And, indeed, it may be laid down generally, as clear law, that, if there is an obligation defeasible on performance of a certain condition, and the performance of the condition becomes impossible by the act of the obligee, the obligor is excused from the performance of it (h).

Impossible
condition.

It seems, however, that the performance of a condition precedent, on which a duty attaches, is not excused, where the prevention arises from the act or conduct of a mere stranger. If a man covenant that his son shall marry the covenantee's daughter, her refusal to marry does not discharge the covenantor from making pecuniary satisfaction (i). If A. covenant with C. to enfeoff B., A. is not released from his covenant by B.'s refusal to accept livery of seisin (k).

(c) Co. Litt. 206 a: *Sanders v. Coward*, 15 M. & W. 48; *Judgm., Duvergier v. Fellows*, 5 Bing. 265; 34 R. R. 578. See also *Dodd*, Eng. Lawy. 100.

(d) *Judgm., Beswick v. Swindells*, 3 A. & E. 883.

(e) *Per Ld. Campbell, Reg. v. Caledonian R. Co.*, 16 Q. B. 28.

(f) Com. Dig. "Condition" L. 4, 5; cited, *per Tindal, C.J., Bryant v. Beattie*, 4 Bing. N. C. 263.

(g) Com. Dig. "Condition," L. 6; *per Parke, B., Holme v. Guppy*,

3 M. & W. 389; *Thornhill v. Neats*, 8 C. B. N. S. 831, 846; *Russell v. Da Bandeira*, 13 Id. 149, 203, 205. See *Roberts v. Bury Commrs.*, L. R. 4 C. P. 759.

(h) *Judgm., Hayward v. Bennett*, 3 C. B. 417, 418 (citing Co. Litt. 206 a); S. C., 5 C. B. 593.

(i) *Perkins*, s. 756.

(k) Co. Litt. 209 a; *per Ld. Kenyon, Cook v. Jennings*, 7 T. R. 384; 4 R. R. 468, and *Blight v. Page*, 3 B. & P. 296, n.; 6 R. R. 795, n. See *Lloyd v. Crispe*, 5 Taunt. 249;

Impossible
considera-
tion.

Further, where the consideration for a promise is such that its performance is utterly and naturally impossible, such consideration is insufficient, for no benefit can, by any implication, be conferred on the promisor (*l*), and the law will not notice an act the completion of which is obviously ridiculous and impracticable. In this case, therefore the maxim of the Roman law applies: *impossibilium nulla obligatio est* (*m*). Moreover, a promise is not binding, if the consideration for it be of such a nature, that it was not in fact or law in the power of the promisee, from whom it moved, to complete such consideration, and to confer on the promisor the full benefit meant to be derived therefrom (*n*). Thus, if a man contract to pay money in consideration that another has contracted to do certain things, and it turn out before anything is done under the contract, that the latter was incapable of doing what he engaged to do, the contract is at an end: the party contracting to pay his money is under no obligation to pay for a less consideration than that for which he has stipulated (*o*). But if a party by his contract lay a charge upon himself, he is bound to perform the stipulated act, or to pay damages for the non-completion (*p*), unless the subject-matter of the contract were at the time manifestly and essentially impracticable; for the *improbability* of the performance does not render the promise void, because the contracting party is presumed to know whether the completion of the duty he undertakes be within his power; and, therefore, an engagement upon a sufficient consideration for the performance

14 R. R. 744; Bac. Abr., "Conditions," Q. 4; cited *Thornton v. Jenyns*, 1 Scott, N. R. 66.

(*l*) *Chanter v. Leese*, 4 M. & W. 295; *per* Holt, C.J., *Courtenay v. Strong*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1219.

(*m*) D. 50, 17, 185; 1 Pothier, Oblig., pt. 1, c 1, s. 4, § 3; 2 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 6th ed. 763.

(*n*) *Harvey v. Gibbons*, 2 Lev. 161; *Nerot v. Wallace*, 3 T. R. 17.

(*o*) *Per* Ld. Abinger, 4 M. & W. 311.

(*p*) See *Thornborow v. Whitacre*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1164; *Pope v. Bavidge*, 10 Exch. 73; *Hale v. Rawson*, 4 C. B. N. S. 85, 95; *Jones v. St. John's College*, *supra*.

of an act, even by a third person, is binding, although the performance of such act depends entirely on the will of the latter (*q*). Neither is the promisor excused, if the performance of his promise be rendered impossible by the act of a third party (*r*); though, if an exercise of public authority render impossible the further performance of a contract which has been in part performed, the contract is, *ipso facto*, dissolved (*s*); but an insurance company who had undertaken, having the option to do so, to reinstate insured premises which had been damaged by fire, were held not to be excused from their contract by reason of the public authorities subsequently taking down the premises as dangerous, on account of defects not caused by the fire (*t*).

It is a principle of law that if by any act of one of the parties the performance of a contract is rendered impossible, the other party may, if he choose, rescind the contract; and it is sufficient that the contract cannot be performed in the manner stipulated, though it could be performed in some other manner not very different (*u*). And if a party, by his own act, disables himself from fulfilling his contract, he thereby makes himself at once liable for a breach of it, and dispenses with the necessity of any request to perform it by the party with whom the contract has been made (*x*); and this is in accordance with the important rule of law, which we shall presently consider, that "a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong" (*y*).

(*q*) 1 Pothier, Oblig., pt. 1, c. 1, s. 4, § 2; *McNeill v. Reid*, 9 Bing. 68.

(*r*) *Thurnell v. Balbirnie*, 2 M. & W. 786; *Brogden v. Marriott*, 2 Bing. N. C. 473.

(*s*) *Melville v. De Wolf*, 4 E. & B. 844, 850; *Esposito v. Bowden*, Id. 963, 976.

(*t*) *Brown v. Royal Ins. Co.*, 1 E. & E. 853.

(*u*) *Panama Telegraph Co. v. India Rubber Telegraph Works, L.*

R. 10 Ch. 532 : 45 L. J. Ch. 121.

(*x*) *Hochster v. De la Tour*, 2 E. & B. 678; *Danube R. Co. v. Xenos*, 13 C. B. N. S. 825; *Lewis v. Clifton*, 14 C. B. 245; arg. *Reid v. Hoskins*, 6 E. & B. 960—961 : 5 Id. 737 : 4 Id. 982; *Avery v. Bowden*, 5 E. & B. 722 : 6 Id. 953. See *Jonassohn v. Young*, 4 B. & S. 300; *Synge v. Synge*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 466 : 63 L. J. Q. B. 202.

(*y*) *Post*, p. 233.

Impossibility
by change of
the law.

Impossibility may, however, be created by a change of the law. That which a party has contracted to do may become illegal or impossible without violating the provisions of some Act of Parliament passed since the making of the contract. In such cases performance of the contract is excused (*a*).

Covenant
may be
repealed by
statute.

Again, we find it laid down that "where H. covenants not to do an act or thing which was lawful to do, and an Act of Parliament comes after and compels him to do it, the statute repeals the covenant. So, if H. covenants to do a thing which is lawful, and an Act of Parliament comes in and hinders him from doing it, the covenant is repealed. But, if a man covenants not to do a thing which then was unlawful, and an Act comes and makes it lawful to do it, such Act of Parliament does not repeal the covenant." If, before the expiration of the running days allowed by a charter-party for loading, the performance by the shipper of his contract becomes, by virtue of an Order in Council, illegal, he is discharged (*b*).

So too when a Prussian subject was bound by charter-party to discharge a cargo at a French port and by reason of the outbreak of war between those countries and the nature of the cargo (which was contraband of war) it became illegal for him to perform his contract, he was held discharged (*c*).

Additional
examples.

The following are additional illustrations of the maxim before us. An appellant who had applied to justices to state a case under 20 & 21 Vict. c. 43, received the case

(*a*) *Bailey v. De Crespigny*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 626; *Brown v. Mayor of London*, 9 C. B. N. S. 726; 13 C. B. N. S. 828; and see *Manchester, Sheffield and Lincolnshire Ry. v. Anderson*, [1898] 2 Ch. 394.

(*b*) *Reid v. Hoskins*, 6 E. & B. 953. *Avery v. Bowden*, Id. 953, 962. See *Esposito v. Bowden*, 4 E. & B. 963; 7 Id. 763; 1 B. & S. 194; *Pole v.*

Cetcovitch, 9 C. B. N. S. 430. Parties may by apt words bind themselves by contract as to any future state of the law; per Maule, J., *Mayor of Berwick v. Oswald*, 2 E. & B. 665; S. C., 5 H. L. Cas. 856; *Mayor of Dartmouth v. Silly*, 7 E. & B. 97.

(*c*) *The Teutonia*, L. R. 4 P. C. 171; 41 L. J. Adm. 57.

from them on Good Friday, and transmitted it to the proper Court on the following Wednesday. It was held that he had complied sufficiently with the requirement of the Act, directing him to transmit the case within three days after receiving it; for, the offices of the Court having been closed from Friday till Wednesday, it was impossible to transmit the case sooner (*d*). Again, where an appeal against an order of an assessment committee had to be made to the next Sessions, it was held that the next Sessions meant the next practicable Sessions, and not necessarily the next Sessions immediately after the date of the order, as the latter construction would not have afforded the aggrieved party time to consider whether he would appeal or not (*e*).

To several maxims in some measure connected with that above considered, it may, in conclusion, be proper briefly to advert. First, it is a rule, that *lex spectat naturæ ordinem* (*f*), the law regards the order and course of nature, and will not force a man to demand that which he cannot recover (*g*). Thus, where the thing sued for by tenants in common is in its nature entire, as in a *quare impedit*, or in detinue for a chattel, they must of necessity join in the action, contrary to the rule which in other cases obtains, and according to which they must sue separately (*h*). Secondly, it is a maxim of our legal authors, as well as a dictate of common sense, that the law will not itself attempt to do an act which would be vain, *lex nil frustra facit*, nor

*Lex spectat
naturæ
ordinem.*

*Lex nil
frustra facit.*

(*d*) *Mayer v. Harding*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 410, where Mellor, J., says that where a statute requires a thing to be done within any particular time, such time may be circumscribed by the fact of its being impossible to comply with the statute on the last day of the period so fixed.

(*e*) *Reg. v. Surrey JJ.*, 6 Q. B. D. 100; 50 L. J. M. C. 10.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 197 b.

(*g*) Litt. s. 129; Co. Litt. 194 b.

(*h*) Litt. s. 314; cited *Marson v. Short*, 2 Bing. N. C. 120.

"One tenant in common cannot be treated as a wrong-doer by another, except for some act which amounts to an ouster of his co-tenant, or to a destruction of the common property." *Per Smith, J., Jacobs v. Seward*, L. R. 4 C. P. 329, 330.

to enforce one which would be frivolous—*lex neminem cogit ad vana seu inutilia*,—the law will not force any one to do a thing vain and fruitless (*i*).

IGNORANTIA FACTI EXCUSAT,—IGNORANTIA JURIS NON EXCUSAT.

(*Gr. and Rud. of Law*, 140, 141.)—*Ignorance of fact excuses—ignorance of the law does not excuse* (*k*).

Rule derived
from Roman
law.

Ignorance may be either of law or of fact. If the heir is ignorant of the death of his ancestor, he is ignorant of a fact; but if, being aware of the death, and of his own relationship, he is nevertheless ignorant that certain rights have thereby become vested in himself, he is ignorant of the law (*l*). Such is the example given to illustrate the distinction between *ignorantia juris* and *ignorantia facti* in the civil law, where the general rule is thus laid down: *regula est, juris quidem ignorantiam cuique nocere, facti vero ignorantiam non nocere* (*m*)—ignorance of a material fact may excuse a party from the legal consequences of his conduct; but ignorance of the law, which every man is presumed to know, does not afford excuse—*ignorantia juris, quod quisque scire tenetur, neminem excusat* (*n*).

Presumption
of legal
knowledge.

With respect to this “presumption of legal knowledge,”

(*i*) *Per* Kent, C.J., 3 Johnson (U.S.), R. 598; 5 Rep. 21: Co. Litt. 127 b, cited 2 Bing. N. C. 121; Wing. Max., p. 600: *R. v. Bp. of London*, 13 East, 420 (a); 12 R. R. 399; *per* Willes, J., *Bell v. Midland R. Co.*, 10 C. B. N. S. 306.

(*k*) “It is said *ignorantia juris haud excusat*, but in that maxim the word *jus* is used in the sense of denoting general law, the ordinary law of the country.” “When the word *jus* is used in the sense of denoting a private right, that maxim has no application.” *Per* Ld. Westbury, *Cooper v. Phibbs*, L. R. 2 H. L.

170. See also *Allcard v. Walker*, [1896] 2 Ch. 369, 381: 65 L. J. Ch. 660.

(*l*) D. 22, 6, 1. The doctrines of the Roman law upon the subject are shortly stated in 1 Spence's Chan. Juris. 632—633.

(*m*) D. 22, 6, 9 pr.; Cod. 1, 18, 10. The same rule is laid down in the Basilica, 2, 4, 9. See Irving's Civil Law, 4th ed. 74.

(*n*) 2 Rep. 3 b; 1 Plowd. 349; *per* Ld. Campbell, 9 Cl. & F. 324; *per* Erle, C.J., *Pooley v. Brown*, 11 C. B. N. S. 575; *Kitchin v. Hawkins* L. R. 2 C. P. 22.

we may observe that, although ignorance of the law does not excuse persons, so as to exempt them from the consequences of their acts, as, for example, from punishment for a criminal offence (*o*), or from damages for breach of contract, yet the law takes notice that there may be a doubtful point of law of the true solution of which a person may be ignorant; and it is quite evident that ignorance of the law often in reality exists (*p*). It would, for instance, be absurd to assert that every person is acquainted with the practice of the Courts; although, in such a case, there is a presumption of knowledge to this extent, that *ignorantia juris non excusat*, the rules of practice must be observed, and a deviation from them may entail consequences detrimental to the suitor (*q*). It is, therefore, in the above qualified sense alone that the saying, that "all men are presumed cognisant of the law" (*r*), must be understood.

The following case illustrates the above general rule, and likewise shows that our Courts recognise the existence of doubtful points of law, since the adjustment of claims involving them is allowed to be a good consideration for a promise (*s*), and to sustain an agreement between litigating parties. The widow, brother, and sister, of an American

(*o*) *Post*, p. 221.

(*p*) "The maxim is *ignorantia legis neminem excusat*, but there is no maxim which says that for all intents and purposes a person must be taken to know the legal consequences of his acts;" *per* Lush, J., L. R. 3 Q. B. 639; see also *per* Ld. Alverstone, C.J., and Channell, J., in *Harse v. Pearl Life Co.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 92 (reversed on appeal, [1904] 1 K. B. 558).

In reference to the equitable doctrine of election, Ld. Westbury observed that, although "it is true as a general proposition that knowledge of the law must be imputed to every person," "it would be too

much to impute knowledge of this rule of equity." *Spread v. Morgan*, 11 H. L. Cas. 602. See also *Noble v. Noble*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 691, 693.

(*q*) See *per* Maule, J., *Martindale v. Falkner*, 2 C. B. 719, 720; cited by Blackburn, J., *Reg. v. Mayor of Tewkesbury*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 635; *per* Willes, J., *Poole v. Whitcomb*, 12 C. B. N. S. 775; *per* Ld. Mansfield, *Jones v. Randall*, 1 Cowp. 40; *per* Coltman, J., *Sargent v. Gannon*, 7 C. B. 752; *Edwards v. Ward*, 4 Id. 315. See also *Newton v. Belcher*, 12 Q. B. 921; *Newton v. Liddiard*, Id. 925.

(*r*) Gr. & R. of the Law, 141.

(*s*) *Per* Maule, J., 2 C. B. 720. See *Wade v. Simeon*, 1 C. B. 610.

who died in Italy, leaving considerable personal estate in the hands of trustees in Scotland, agreed, by advice of their law agent, to compromise their respective claims to the succession, by taking equal shares. The widow, after receiving her share, brought an action in Scotland to rescind the agreement, on the ground that she had thereby sustained injury, through ignorance of her legal rights and the erroneous advice of the law agent: there was, however, no allegation of fraud against him or against the parties to the agreement. It was held that, although the fair inference from the evidence was that she was ignorant of her legal rights, and would not have entered into the agreement had she known them, yet, as the extent of her ignorance and of the injury sustained was doubtful, and there was no proof of improper conduct on the part of the agent, she was bound by his acts, and affected by the knowledge which he was presumed to have of her rights, and was therefore not entitled to disturb the agreement (*t*). "If," remarked Lord Cottenham, in this case, "it were necessary to show knowledge in the principal, and a distinct understanding of all the rights and interests affected by the complicated arrangements which are constantly taking place in families, very few, if any, could be supported."

It is, then, a true rule, if understood in the sense above assigned to it, that every man must be taken to be cognisant of the law; for otherwise, as Lord Ellenborough observed, there is no saying to what extent the excuse of ignorance might be carried: it would be urged in almost every case (*u*); and, from this rule, coupled with that as to ignorance of fact, are derived the two important propositions:—1st, that money paid with full knowledge of the facts, but through ignorance of the law, is generally not

(*t*) *Stewart v. Stewart*, 6 Cl. & F. 911; *Clifton v. Cockburn*, 3 My. & K. 99; see Cod. 1, 18, 2; *Teede v. Johnson*, 11 Exch. 840.

(*u*) *Bilbie v. Lumley*, 2 East, 469; 6 R. R. 479; Preface to Co. Litt.; *Gomery v. Bond*, 3 M. & S. 378.

recoverable, if there be nothing unconscientious in the retaining of it; and, 2ndly, that money paid in ignorance of the facts is recoverable, provided there was no *laches* in the party paying it, and there was no ground to claim it in conscience (*x*).

In a leading case on the first of these rules, the facts were these. The captain of a king's ship brought home in her public treasure upon the public service, and treasure of individuals for his own emolument. He received freight for both, and paid one-third of it, according to the usage in the navy, to his admiral; but, upon discovering that the law did not compel captains to pay to admirals one-third of the freight, he brought an action to recover the money from the admiral's executrix. It was held that he could not recover the private freight, because the whole of that transaction was illegal; nor the public freight, because he had paid it with full knowledge of the facts, although in ignorance of the law, and because it was not against conscience for the executrix to retain it (*y*).

Money paid
with know-
ledge of
facts.
Brisbane v.
Dacres.

The following case may also here be noticed. A., tenant to B., received notice from C., a mortgagee of B.'s term, that the interest was in arrear, and requiring payment to C. of the rent then due. A., notwithstanding this notice, paid the rent to B. and was afterwards compelled, by

(*x*) See notes to *Marriott v. Hampton*, 2 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 421; *Wilkinson v. Johnston*, 3 B. & C. 429; 27 R. R. 393; *per* Ld. Mansfield, *Bize v. Dickason*, 1 T. R. 286, 287; *Platt v. Bromage*, 24 L. J. Ex. 63. See *Lee v. Merrett*, 8 Q. B. 820, observed upon in *Gingell v. Purkins*, 4 Exch. 723, recognising *Standish v. Ross*, 3 Exch. 527.

(*y*) *Brisbane v. Dacres*, 5 Taunt. 143; 14 R. R. 718; *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Billie v. Lumley*, 2 East, 470; 6 R. R. 479; *Cumming v. Bedborough*, 15 M. & W. 438; *Brams-*

ton v. Robins, 4 Bing. 11; 29 R. R. 493; *Stevens v. Lynch*, 12 East, 38; *per* Ld. Eldon, *Bromley v. Holland*, 7 Ves. 23; 6 R. R. 58; *Lowry v. Bourdieu*, Dougl. 468; *Gomery v. Bond*, 3 M. & S. 378; *Lothian v. Henderson*, 3 B. & P. 420; 7 R. R. 829; *Dew v. Parsons*, 2 B. & Ald. 562; 21 R. R. 404. See *arg. Gibson v. Bruce*, 6 Scott, N. R. 309; *Smith v. Bromley*, cited 2 Dougl. 696, and 6 Scott, N. R. 318; *Atkinson v. Denby*, 6 H. & N. 778; 7 Id. 934.

distress, to pay it again to C. It was held, that the money, having been paid to B. with full knowledge of the facts, could not be recovered back (z).

Mistake of fact.

The second rule, regarding the recovery of money paid in genuine ignorance or forgetfulness of facts (a), was thus lucidly stated by Parke, B. (b) : "Where money is paid to another under the influence of a mistake, that is, upon the supposition that a specific fact is true which would entitle the other to the money, but which fact is not true, and the money would not have been paid if it had been known to the payer that the fact was untrue, an action will lie to recover it back, and it is against conscience to retain it; though a demand may be necessary in those cases in which the party receiving the money may have been ignorant of the mistake."

Means of knowledge of facts.

The case in which the general rule was thus stated was the first of a series which decided that a person can recover money paid by him under a genuine mistake of fact, although at the time of the payment he had means of knowing the real facts, of which he carelessly omitted to avail himself (c). An inference that facts were actually known to a person may in some cases fairly be drawn from evidence which shows that he possessed the means of knowing them; but "there is no conclusive rule of law that because a party has the means of knowledge he has the knowledge itself" (d); for "if the possibility or even probability of actual knowledge should be considered as legal proof of knowledge, as a *presumptio juris et de jure*, the presumption might in some cases, be contrary to the fact, and such a rule might work injustice" (e).

(z) *Higgs v. Scott*, 7 C. B. 63.
See *Wilton v. Dunn*, 17 Q. B. 294.

(a) D. 12, 6, 1.

(b) *Kelly v. Solari*, 9 M. & W. 54, where many earlier cases on the subject are cited.

(c) *Townsend v. Crowdy*, 8 C. B.

N. S. 477, 493, and cases there collected.

(d) *Per Tindal, C.J., Bell v. Gardiner*, 4 M. & Gr. 11; cited by Ld. Blackburn, *Brownlie v. Campbell*, 5 App. Cas. 952.

(e) *Per Ld. Tenterden, Harratt v.*

The general rule, which we have stated in the words of Parke, B., limits the right to recover money paid under a mistake of fact to cases in which the money would not have been paid if the real facts had been known to the payee. For "if, indeed, the money is intentionally paid, without reference to the truth or falsehood of a fact, the plaintiff meaning to waive all inquiry into it, and that the person receiving shall have the money at all events, whether the fact be true or false, the latter is certainly entitled to retain it" (*f*).

Waiver of inquiry as to facts.

If A. pay money to B., supposing him to be the agent of C., to whom he owes the money, and B. be not the agent, the money may be recovered back (*g*). If A. and B. are settling an account, and, in summing up the items, make a mistake which leads A. to pay B. £100 too much, A. may recover the money. Such cases illustrate the principle, that no man should by law be deprived of his money which he parted with under a mistake of fact, and which it is against justice that the receiver should retain (*h*).

Examples of general rule.

It is not, however, every mistake of fact made by a person when he pays money that supports an action to recover it: the mistake must relate to the payee's title to receive the money, and it must be shown that upon the supposed facts he had a right to the money, upon the real facts no right (*i*). A banker, in honouring a cheque, pays the money in discharge of the holder's right against the drawer; that right is not affected by the state of the drawer's account at the bank: consequently, the banker's mistake as to the state of that account does not render the holder liable to return the money (*k*). Again, a third person pays a debt in ignorance

Mistake must concern payee.

Wise, 9 B. & C. 712, 717; 33 R. R. 300.

(*f*) *Per Parke*, B., 9 M. & W. 59; see *per Willes*, J., 8 C. B. N. S. 490; *per Williams*, J., *Id.* 494.

(*g*) Cf. *Walter v. James*, L. R. 6 Ex. 124.

(*h*) See *per Kelly*, C.B., L. R. 4 Ex. 197.

(*i*) See *per Parke*, B., 9 M. & W. 58; *per Bramwell*, B., 1 H. & N. 215; *per Williams*, J., 32 L. J. C. P. 33.

(*k*) *Chambers v. Miller*, 13 C. B.

of facts not affecting the creditor's right against the debtor : it is immaterial that the payer, had he known the facts, would have perceived that payment of the debt did not benefit himself (*l*). On the other hand, if an agent, having received his principal's money with directions to pay it to A., inadvertently pays it to B., the error affects B.'s title to the money, and the agent can generally recover it (*m*).

Effect of
alteration
in payee's
position.

Again, as a rule, no liability to repay money paid under a mistake of fact arises until the payee has notice of the mistake, and the notice must reach him before an alteration in his position has rendered it unjust that he should be called upon to return the money (*n*). The fact that the payee has spent the money before notice is not of itself a good answer to the payer's demand (*o*) ; but under special circumstances the demand may be defeated by showing that before notice the payee paid away the money without reasonable prospect of recall ; for if, by reason of the relation between the parties, the mistake was a breach of duty owed by payer to payee, and the mistake was the proximate cause of the payee parting with the money, the payer must bear the loss occasioned by his breach of duty (*p*). Moreover, it is a rule respecting bills of exchange which have been paid upon a signature afterwards discovered to be a forgery, that the money, when once paid to an innocent holder, is not recoverable from him if he receive no notice of the forgery on the day of payment : a later notice finds him with his remedy against other parties to the bill either lost or impaired (*q*).

Payment of
forged bills.

N. S. 125 ; see also *Pollard v. Bank of England*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 623.

(*l*) *Aiken v. Short*, 1 H. & N. 210.

(*m*) *Colonial Bank v. Exchange Bank*, 11 App. Cas. 84 : 55 L. J. P. C. 14.

(*n*) *Freeman v. Jeffries*, L. R. 4 Ex. 189 ; see *Colonial Bank v. Exchange Bank*, *supra*.

(*o*) *Standish v. Ross*, 3 Exch. 527, 534 ; see also *Newall v. Tomlinson*, L. R. 6 C. P. 405.

(*p*) *Skyring v. Greenwood*, 4 B. & C. 281 ; 28 R. R. 264 ; *Deutsche Bank v. Beriro*, 73 L. T. 669 ; see *Durrant v. Ecclesiastical Commrs.*, 6 Q. B. D. 234.

(*q*) *Cocks v. Masterman*, 9 B & C.

It has been stated (*r*) to be a general rule, that “in matters connected with the administration of justice, where a mistake is discovered before any further step is taken, the Court interferes to cure the mistake, taking care that the opposite party shall not be put to any expense in consequence of the application to amend the error.” In some cases, also, where at the time of applying to the Court, the applicant is ignorant of circumstances material to the subject-matter of his motion, he may be permitted to open the proceedings afresh; for instance, under very peculiar circumstances the Court re-opened a rule for a criminal information, it appearing that the affidavits on which the rule had been discharged were false (*s*). And in furtherance of justice the Court has been known to set aside a judgment by default, at the instance of a plaintiff, on the ground of a mistake in the amount claimed, although that amount and the costs of the action had been paid since the judgment (*t*).

Mistakes in procedure.

Moreover, if money has been paid to an officer of a Court by a mistake, whether of fact or of law, the Court will generally entertain an application for an order for its repayment, if feasible (*u*).

In Courts of equity, as well as of law, the two-fold maxim under consideration is admitted to hold true; for, on the one hand, it is a general rule, in accordance with the maxim of the civil law, *non videtur qui errant consentire* (*x*), that equity will relieve where an act has been done, or contract made, under a mistake, or ignorance of a material fact (*y*); and, on the other hand, it

Rule is true also in equity.

902; 33 R. R. 365; *London & R. P. Bank v. Bank of Liverpool*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 7; 65 L. J. Q. B. 80.

(*r*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *Emery v. Webster*, 9 Exch. 242, 246, which well illustrates the proposition in the text.

(*s*) *R. v. Eve*, 5 A. & E. 780; *Bodfield v. Padmore*, Id. 785, n.

(*t*) *Cannan v. Reynolds*, 5 E. & B. 301. See *Hammond v. Scofield*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 453.

(*u*) *Ex p. Simmonds*, 16 Q. B. D. 308; *Re Opera Ltd.*, [1891] 2 Ch. 154.

(*x*) D. 50, 17, 116, § 2.

(*y*) 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 12th ed. 138. See *Scott v. Littledale*, 8 E. &

is laid down as a general proposition, that in Courts of equity ignorance of the law shall not affect agreements, nor excuse from the legal consequences of particular acts (*z*); and this proposition seems to be fully borne out by the authorities (*a*), if by ignorance of the law is meant ignorance of some well-established rule of law, and not ignorance of such a matter as the true construction of a doubtful grant (*b*). But, while a Court of equity will not, in general, relieve against a mistake in a contract which was a mistake in law and not in fact (*c*), there are cases in which the Court does not hold itself strictly bound by this rule, and considers it has power to relieve against mistakes in law if there be any equitable ground which makes it, under the particular facts of the case, inequitable that the party benefited by the mistake should retain the benefit (*d*); and the line between mistakes in law and mistakes in fact is not so sharply drawn in Courts of equity as in Courts of common law (*e*).

The following are instances where Courts of equity have refused to relieve against a mistake in law. A deed of appointment under a settlement was executed absolutely, without reserving a power of revocation which he settlement authorised; this omission was made through a mistake in law, on the supposition that the deed of appointment, being a voluntary deed, was therefore revocable;

B. 815; *Simmons v. Heseltine*, 5 C. B. N. S. 554, 565.

If parties contract under a mutual mistake and misapprehension as to their relative and respective rights, the agreement thus made is liable to be set aside in equity as having proceeded upon a common mistake; *Cooper v. Phibbs*, L. R. 2 H. L. 149, 170.

(*z*) 1 Fonbl. Eq., 5th ed. 119, note.

(*a*) 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 12th ed. 138. *Midland G. W. R. Co. v.*

Johnson, 6 H. L. Cas. 798, illustrates the text.

(*b*) *Beauchamp v. Winn*, L. R. 6 H. L. 234; 22 W. R. 193.

(*c*) *Midland G. W. R. Co. v. Johnson*, 6 H. L. Cas. 798

(*d*) *Stone v. Godfrey*, 5 D. M. & G. 90; *Ex p. James*, L. R. 9 Ch. 609; 43 L. J. Bank. 107; *Rogers v. Ingham*, 3 Ch. D. 351, 357; 46 L. J. Ch. 322.

(*e*) *Daniel v. Sinclair*, 6 App. Cas. 181; 50 L. J. P. C. 50.

relief was refused by the Court (*f*). So, where two are jointly bound by a bond, and the obligee releases one, supposing, erroneously, that the other will remain bound, the obligee will not be relieved in equity upon the mere ground of his mistake of the law, for *ignorantia juris non excusat* (*g*).

It is, however, well settled that a Court of equity will relieve against a mistake or ignorance of fact; and in several cases, which are sometimes cited as exceptions to the general rule as to *ignorantia juris*, it will be found that there was a mistake or a misrepresentation of fact sufficient to justify a Court of equity in interfering to give relief (*h*). In a leading case (*i*), illustrative of this remark, a freeman of the city of London bequeathed £10,000 to his daughter upon condition that she should release her orphanage part together with all her claim to his personal estate by virtue of the custom of the city (*j*) or otherwise. Upon her father's death, the daughter accepted the legacy, and executed the release, her brother having first informed her that she had it in her election either to have an account of her father's personal estate, or to claim her orphanage part. Upon a bill afterwards filed on the daughter's behalf against the brother, who was executor under the will, Lord Talbot expressed an opinion (*k*) that the release should be set aside, and the daughter be restored to her orphanage share, which amounted to £40,000. This opinion seems to have rested, in part, on the ground that the daughter had not been informed of the actual amount to which she would be entitled under the custom,

(*f*) *Worrall v. Jacob*, 3 Meriv. 256, 271.

(*g*) *Harman v. Cam*, 4 Vin. Abr. 387, pl. 3; 1 Fonbl. Eq., 5th ed. 119, note.

(*h*) The reader is referred to 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 12th ed., Chap. V., p. 138, where the cases are

considered.

(*i*) *Pusey v. Desbouvrie*, 3 P. Wms. 315. See also *M'Carthy v. Decaix*, 2 Russ. & M. 614; 37 R. R. 250.

(*j*) See Pulling, Laws and Customs of London, 180 *et seq.*

(*k*) The suit was compromised.

and did not appear to know that she was entitled to have an account taken of her father's personal estate, and that when she should be fully apprised of this, and not till then, she was to make her election; and it is a rule that a party is always entitled to a clear knowledge of the funds between which he is to elect before he is put to his election (*l*). In like manner it was held, in a case which is frequently cited with reference to this subject, that, where a person agrees to give up his claim to property in favour of another, such renunciation will not be supported if, at the time of making it, he was ignorant of his legal rights and of the value of the property renounced, especially if the party with whom he dealt possessed, and kept back from him, better information on the subject (*n*).

Upon an examination, then, of the cases which have been relied upon as exceptions to the general rule (*n*) observed by Courts of equity, some, as in the instances above mentioned, may be supported upon the ground that the circumstances disclosed an ignorance of fact as well as of law, and in others there will be found to exist either actual misrepresentation, undue influence, mental imbecility, or that sort of surprise which equity regards as a just foundation for relief. It is, indeed, laid down broadly that, if a party, acting in ignorance of a plain and settled principle of law, is induced to give up a portion of his property to another, under the name of a compromise, a Court of equity will grant relief; and this proposition may be illustrated by the case of an heir-at-law, who, knowing that he is the eldest son, nevertheless agrees, through ignorance of the law, to divide undivided fee-simple estates

(*l*) 3 P. Wms. 321 (*x*).

(*m*) *McCarthy v. Decaix*, 2 Russ. & M. 614; 37 R. R. 250; *Smith v. Pincombe*, 3 Mac. & Gor. 653; *Fane v. Fane*, L. R. 20 Eq. 698.

(*n*) Bearing upon the subject touched upon in the text, see *per* Sir

J. Leach, *Cockerill v. Cholmeley*, 1 Russ. & My. 418, 424, 425; affirmed 1 Cl. & F. 60; 36 R. R. 16; see S. C., 3 Russ. 565, where the facts are set out at length; *Marq. of Breadalbane v. Marq. of Chandos*, 2 My. & Cr. 711; 4 Cl. & F. 43.

of his ancestor with a younger brother, such an agreement being one which would be held invalid by a Court of equity. Even in so simple a case, however, there may be important ingredients, independent of the mere ignorance of law, and this very ignorance may well give rise to a presumption of imposition, weakness, or abuse of confidence, which will give a title to relief; at all events, in cases similar to the above, it seems clear that the mistake of law is not, *per se*, the foundation of relief; but is only the medium of proof by which some other ground of relief may be established, and on the whole it may be safely affirmed that a mere naked mistake of law, unattended by special circumstances, will furnish no ground for the interposition of a Court of equity, and that the present disposition of such a Court is rather to narrow than to enlarge the operation of exceptions to the above rule (o).

As bearing on the subject under consideration, it may be observed that in cases where a purchaser seeks to avoid specific performance of a contract of purchase, on the ground of a mistake of fact, he can only do so provided he shows that the mistake was mutual to both parties; or that he entered into the bargain under a mistake of fact which, although not contributed to by the other party, would inflict a hardship amounting to injustice if the Court held him to his bargain (p); or where the mistake was one to which the other party contributed, in other words if the party seeking relief was misled by any act of the vendor into making the bargain (q).

Mistake of fact—when a ground to refuse specific performance.

In criminal cases the maxim as to *ignorantia facti* applies when a man, intending to do a lawful act, does that which is unlawful. In this case there is not that conjunction

Criminal cases.

(o) See 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 12th ed. 131 *et seq.*; *per* Ld. Cottenham, C., *Stewart v. Stewart*, 6 Cl. & F. 964—971. See also Spence, Chanc. Juris. 633 *et seq.*

(p) *Tamplin v. James*, 15 Ch. D. 215, 221.

(q) *Goddard v. Jeffries*, 51 L. J. Ch. 57.

between the deed and the will which is necessary to form a criminal act; but, in order that he may stand excused, there must be an ignorance or mistake of fact, and not an error in point of law. If a man, intending to kill a burglar under circumstances which would justify him in so doing, by mistake kills one of his own family, this is no criminal act; but if a man thinks he has a right to kill an excommunicated person wherever he meets him, and does so, this is wilful murder. For a mistake in point of law, which every person of discretion not only may, but is bound and presumed to know, is, in criminal cases, no sort of defence (r). *Ignorantia eorum quæ quis scire tenetur non excusat* (s).

Lastly, every man is presumed to be cognisant of the statute law of this realm, and to construe it aright; and if an individual infringe it through ignorance, he must, nevertheless, abide by the consequences of his error: it is not competent to him, to aver, in a Court of justice, that he has mistaken the law, this being a plea which no Court of justice is at liberty to receive (t). Where, however, the passing of a statute could not have been known to an accused at the time of doing an act thereby rendered criminal, the Crown would probably think fit, in case of conviction, to exercise its prerogative of mercy (u).

(r) 4 Blac. Com. 27; Doct. and Stud., Dial. ii. c. 46. A plea of ignorance of the law was rejected in *Lord Vaux's case*, 1 Bulstr. 197. See also *Re Barronet*, 1 E. & B. 1, 8.

(s) Hale, Pl. Cr. 42. "The law is administered upon the principle that every one must be taken conclusively to know it without proof that

he does know it;" *per* Tindal, C.J., 10 Cl. & F. 210.

(t) *Per* Sir W. Scott, *The Charlotte*, 1 Dods. R. 392; *per* Ld. Hardwicke, *Middleton v. Croft*, Stra. 1056; *per* Pollock, C.B., *Cooper v. Simmons*, 7 H. & N. 717; *The Katherine*, 30 L. J., P. M. & A. 21.

(u) *R. v. Bailey*, Russ. & Ry. 1; *R. v. Esop*, 7 C. & P. 456.

VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA. (*Wing. Max.* 482.)—*Damage suffered by consent is not a cause of action (v).*

In actions founded on tort the leave and licence of the plaintiff to do the act complained of usually constitutes a good defence by reason of the maxim *volenti non fit injuria (x)*; and, as a rule, a man must bear loss arising from acts to which he assented (*y*). Thus it was settled law that in an action of *crim. con.* the husband's consent to the wife's adultery went in bar of the action, whereas his improper conduct, not amounting to consent, only went in reduction of damages (*z*); and this doctrine now applies to the husband's claim, by petition in the Divorce Division (*a*), for damages on the ground of adultery with his wife (*b*). Upon the same principle, a husband has no right to turn his wife away on account of her adultery at which he connived: he cannot complain of that to which he was a willing party (*c*). Nor is it contrary to this principle that an indictment lies for an illegal prize-fight notwithstanding the consent of the combatants; for the party complaining of the breach of the peace is the Crown (*d*). It has, indeed, been said that even in action for an assault it is no defence to allege that the parties fought by consent, if the fight was unlawful (*e*); but it does not follow that either of the consenting parties to an unlawful fight can recover damages;

Consent bars right of action.

(v) *Damnum sentire non videtur qui sibi damnum dedit*, D. 50 17, 204; see C. 2, 4, 34: C. 3, 28, 35. See also Plowd. 501: 1 E. & E. 148: 30 L. J. Ch. 769.

(x) Bullen & Leake, Prec., 3rd ed. 740.

(y) 4 Bing. N. C. 142 (cited 2 Scott, N. R. 257); Yelv. 142 (cited 1 Selden (U.S.), R. 12); 1 Curtis (U.S.) R. 101.

(z) *Duberley v. Gunning*, 4 T. R. 651, 657; 3 R. R. 664; see the maxim cited, 1 Hag. Cons. 146; 3

Hag. Ec. 57; 2 Curt. 213; Rob. Ec. 158.

(a) Under the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857 (20 & 21 Vict. c. 85), s. 33.

(b) *Bernstein v. Bernstein*, [1898] P. 292, 304: 63 L. J. P. 3; see also 32 L. J. P. 213: 11 P. D. 100: 14 P. D. 45.

(c) *Wilson v. Glossop*, 20 Q. B. D. 354, 358: 57 L. J. Q. B. 161.

(d) *Reg. v. Coney*, 8 Q. B. D. 534, 553.

(e) *Boulter v. Clarke*, Bull, N. P. 16; see 8 Q. B. D. 538.

for, even if their consent, being illegal, be a nullity, it may well be that the action would be dismissed by reason of the maxim *ex turpi causa non oritur actio* (f).

Actions for
personal
injuries.

The maxim *volenti non fit injuria* has been often cited, and sometimes applied, in favour of defendants sued for damage for personal injuries; for instance it was so applied against a man who was hurt by a spring-gun while he trespassed in a wood after being warned by the owner that there were spring-guns set in it (g); and it seems that, as a rule, the application of the maxim is justifiable if the plaintiff received his injuries under circumstances leading necessarily to the inference that he encountered the risk of them freely and voluntarily and with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk: in other words, if the real cause of the plaintiff running the risk and receiving the injuries was his own rash act (h). Whether the maxim ought to be applied in a particular case is often a question rather of fact than law (i).

General rule.

No breach
of duty.

This question, we may notice, hardly arises unless the facts disclose some breach by the defendant of a duty owed by him to the plaintiff; for if the injuries arose out of a risk in respect of which the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff, or in respect of which the defendant fulfilled such duty as he owed, the action fails, whether or not the plaintiff ran the risk voluntarily, since the defendant has done him no wrong (k). A defence founded on the maxim is akin to a defence of contributory negligence, with which we deal elsewhere (l).

(f) *Post*, Chap. IX.

(g) *Hott v. Wilkes*, 3 B. & Ald. 304; 22 R. R. 400; see *Bird v. Holbrook*, 4 Bing. 628; 29 R. R. 657; *Jordin v. Crump*, 8 M. & W. 782; *Barnes v. Ward*, 9 C. B. 392; *Wootten v. Dawkins*, 2 C. B. N. S. 412; *Harrold v. Watney*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 320; 67 L. J. Q. B. 771.

(h) See *Thomas v. Quartermaine*,

18 Q. B. D. 685; 56 L. J. Q. B. 340; *Yarmouth v. France*, 19 Q. B. D. 647; 57 L. J. Q. B. 7; *Smith v. Baker*, [1891] A. C. 325; 60 L. J. 683.

(i) *Per* Lindley, L.J., 19 Q. B. D. 659.

(k) See *per* Ld. Herschell, *Members v. G. W. R. Co.*, 14 App. Cas. 192.

(l) See maxim, *respondeat superior*, Chap. IX.

It is to be observed that the leading word of the maxim Knowledge. is not *scienti*, but *volenti*: there are degrees of knowledge, and even full knowledge that an act is dangerous does not necessarily render the act, if done, a voluntary act (*m*). For instance, if by my misconduct towards a man he be placed in a situation which only leaves him a choice between perilous courses, I am liable for the consequences of whichever course he takes: his knowledge of the risk run by his taking that course is immaterial (*n*). It seems safe, however, to say that where the choice lies between bearing a small temporary inconvenience and escaping from it by an obviously dangerous act, the maxim may be applied if the latter course be knowingly adopted (*o*). On the other hand, a man's ignorance of a risk does not necessarily render his act which exposes him to the risk involuntary.

The following points may be mentioned in connection Instances. with the foregoing remarks. If a man enter premises as a bare licensee, he runs at his own peril, as a rule, any risk, whether apparent or not, which arises out of the condition of the premises or the business carried on there (*p*). But if a man enter premises for business purposes at the express or implied invitation of the occupier, it is, as a rule, at the occupier's peril that the man is exposed to any unusual risk which so arises, unless the risk be obvious or fully known to him, or one of which he has been clearly warned (*q*). Wrong-doers who endanger the use of a highway are, as a rule, responsible for injuries thereby caused to a person using it with some knowledge of the danger, but doing no act which, having regard to

(*m*) See 18 Q. B. D. 696, *per* Bowen, L.J., who gives illustrations.

(*n*) See *per* M. Smith, J., L. R. 4 C. P. 742.

(*o*) *Adams v. L. & Y. R. Co.*, L. R. 4 C. P. 739; see *Gee v. Metr. R. Co.*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 161.

(*p*) See *Hounsell v. Smith*, 7 C. B. N. S. 731; *Gautret v. Egerton*, L. R. 2 C. P. 371; *Ivay v. Hedges*, 9 Q. B. D. 80; *Batchelor v. Fortescue*, 11 Id. 474.

(*q*) See *Indermaur v. Dames*, L. R. 1 C. P. 274; 2 Id. 311.

that knowledge, can be considered unreasonable (*r*); and the same general rule obtains in favour of passengers at railway stations (*s*). Upon the true construction of a statute, a duty thereby imposed upon one person to prevent another from being subjected to a particular danger may be so imperative that little short of a wilful intention to injure himself can deprive the latter of his remedy for an injury resulting from the former's breach of his duty (*t*).

Master and
servant.

The great controversy regarding the application of the maxim has arisen in actions brought by workmen against their employers (*u*). We shall deal with such actions more fully under the maxim *respondeat superior*. It is sufficient to point out here that in its application to questions between employer and employed, the maxim "generally imports that the workman, either expressly or by implication, agreed to take upon himself the risks attendant upon the particular work which he was engaged to perform, and from which he has suffered injury. The question which has to be considered most frequently is not whether he voluntarily and rashly exposed himself to injury, but whether he agreed that, if injury should befall him, the risk was to be his and not his master's. When his acceptance or non-acceptance of the risk is left to implication, the workman cannot reasonably be held to have undertaken it, unless he knew of its existence and appreciated or had the means of appreciating its danger." And the mere fact of his continuing at his work with such knowledge and appreciation does not necessarily imply his acceptance of the risk. Whether it has that effect or not depends "to a considerable extent upon the nature of the

(*r*) *Clayards v. Dethick*, 12 Q. B. 439; *Laz v. Darlington*, 5 Ex. D. 28.

(*s*) *Osborne v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 21 Q. B. D. 220.

(*t*) See *Clarke v. Holmes*, 7 H. & N.

937; *Baddeley v. Granville*, 19 Q. B. D. 423.

(*u*) See particularly the cases cited, *ante*, p. 224, n. (*h*).

risk, and the workman's connection with it, as well as upon other considerations which must vary according to the circumstances of each case" (*x*).

The maxim is sometimes cited in cases where a person consents by the terms of a binding contract to give up rights which he might otherwise assert (*y*). A railway company usually owes a duty to a passenger to take reasonable care of him, but he cannot demand such care if he expressly agree in consideration of a free pass to travel at his own risk (*z*). The powers of a railway company to escape by contract from liability for damage done to goods by the company's default are somewhat abridged by the Railway and Canal Traffic Acts (*a*), but a special contract, not vitiated by those Acts, for the carriage of goods at a lower rate at the owner's risk deprives him of the usual right to have the goods carried safely (*b*).

Contracts.

Again, where a local Act gave to any person aggrieved by orders of commissioners a right of appeal against the orders, the maxim was applied to defeat an appeal of a person who had concurred in a resolution pursuant to which the order he appealed from was made (*c*).

Appeals.

An important application of the maxim is to the case of a person seeking to recover money which he has paid, but which was not legally due from him. The general rule is that a person who has paid money which he was not under legal obligation to pay cannot recover it if he paid it voluntarily and with full knowledge of the facts (*d*). For example, he cannot maintain an action to recover money so paid by

Voluntary payments.

(*x*) *Per* Ld. Watson, [1891] A. C. 355. See *Williams v. Birmingham, &c., Co.*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 338.

(*y*) Cf. the maxim, *modus et conventio vincunt legem*, *post*.

(*z*) *McCawley v. Furness R. Co.*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 57.

(*a*) See, for instance, *Dickson v. G. N. R. Co.*, 18 Q. B. D. 176.

(*b*) *G. W. R. Co. v. McCarthy*, 12 App. Cas. 218; see further, 1 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 217 *et seq.*

(*c*) *Harrup v. Bayley*, 6 E. & B. 224.

(*d*) *Remfry v. Butler*, E. B. & E. 887, 897 (as to which case, see *London Founders' Ass. v. Clarke*, 20 Q. B. D. 576).

him in discharge of a debt which was barred by the Statute of Limitations (*e*), or of a debt which was void by reason of his infancy (*f*). In these instances it may be said that he was under a moral, though not a legal, duty to pay, and the rule promotes natural justice. But the rule extends to cases in which there was no moral consideration for the payment. Thus, if the occupying tenant of lands, after discharging the property tax assessed thereon, omits to make the authorised deduction out of his next payment of rent, he cannot, in the absence of an express agreement (*g*), recover from his landlord the sum which he might have deducted: it is a voluntary payment (*h*). This case is closely allied to several which have been already mentioned under the maxim *ignorantia legis non excusat* (*i*).

Payments
under illegal
compulsion.

A payment of money which is not due is not, however necessarily voluntary by reason that it is made with full knowledge of the facts. It is not voluntary if it be made upon the unjust demand of a person who, abusing the advantages his position gives him, wrongfully refuses a man his legal rights except upon the condition that the demand be complied with. A pawnbroker refuses to return goods pledged to him unless he be paid more than he has the right to claim: the party entitled to redeem, having tendered the lesser sum actually due (*j*), and having been then forced to pay the larger sum wrongfully demanded, can recover the excess he paid for the purpose of getting back the goods: the maxim *volenti non fit injuria* does not apply (*k*). The like law holds where goods are wrongfully

(*e*) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Bize v. Dickason*, 1 T. R. 287; *per* De Grey, C.J., *Farmer v. Arundel*, 2 W. Bl. 825.

(*f*) *Valentini v. Canali*, 24 Q. B. D. 166; 59 L. J. Q. B. 74.

(*g*) *Lamb v. Brewster*, 4 Q. B. D. 607.

(*h*) *Cumming v. Bedborough*, 15

M. & W. 438; *Denby v. Moore*, 1 B. & Ald. 128; 18 R. R. 444.

(*i*) *Ante*, p. 210.

(*j*) See *Ashmole v. Wainwright*, 2 Q. B. 845; *Parker v. Bristol & E. R. Co.*, 6 Exch. 702.

(*k*) *Astley v. Reynolds*, 2 Stra. 915.

detained under an unfounded claim of lien (*l*): where railway companies refuse to carry goods which they are bound to carry, or to deliver goods after carriage, until they be paid more than they are entitled to charge (*m*): where a landowner, having distrained cattle damage feasant and put them into his private pound, extorts, as the price of their restoration, an exorbitant sum for the damage done (*n*): where a mortgagee exacts more than is due to him by a threat that unless it be paid he will sell the mortgaged premises (*o*): and generally wherever money is paid under pressure of an untenable demand made *colore officii* (*p*). In these and the like cases (*q*) the proper course is to pay what is unjustly demanded under a protest showing that there is no intention to give up the right (*r*); and the general rule is that, though, in order to avoid a contract by reason of duress, it must be duress of a man's person, not of his goods (*s*), yet where money is paid simply to obtain possession of goods wrongfully obtained, it may be recovered, for the payment is not voluntary (*t*).

The cases show that where a person acting, or purporting to act, as agent for another compels the payment of money on an illegal ground, he may be sued for the money, though he has already paid it over to his principal, unless it was expressly paid to him for his principal's use: he is responsible for his own illegal act (*u*). But it is otherwise where

Recovery of money from agent.

(*l*) *British Empire Co. v. Sones*, 8 H. L. Cas. 338; *Tamvaco v. Simpson*, L. R. 1 C. P. 363.

(*m*) *Parker v. G. W. R. Co.*, 7 M. & Gr. 253; *Parker v. Bristol & E. R. Co.*, 6 Exch. 702; *L. & N. W. R. Co. v. Evershed*, 3 App. Cas. 1029 (as to which case see [1892] 2 Q. B. 229).

(*n*) *Green v. Duckett*, 11 Q. B. D. 275; 52 L. J. Q. B. 435.

(*o*) *Close v. Phipps*, 7 M. & Gr. 586; *Fraser v. Pendlebury*, 31 L. J. C. P. 1.

(*p*) *Steele v. Williams*, 8 Exch.

625; *Traherne v. Gardner*, 5 E. & B. 913; *Hooper v. Exeter*, 56 L. J. Q. B. 457; see *Slater v. Burnley*, 59 L. T. 636.

(*q*) See, for an instance of payment of a bill to save credit, *Kendal v. Wood*, L. R. 6 Ex. 243.

(*r*) See *per* Tindal, C.J., *Valpy v. Manley*, 1 C. B. 603.

(*s*) *Skeate v. Beale*, 11 A. & E. 983; see *Wakefield v. Newbon*, 6 Q. B. 276.

(*t*) *Oates v. Hudson*, 6 Exch. 346.

(*u*) *Snowdon v. Davis*, 1 Taunt. 359; *Parker v. Bristol & E. R. Co.*, and *Steele v. Williams*, *supra*.

an agent has merely received money for his principal and paid it to him without notice that it was wrongfully obtained (*v*).

Payment
under illegal
contract.

The question under what circumstances money paid under an illegal contract can be recovered will be discussed hereafter, under the maxim *in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis* (*x*); but we may point out that the position of the parties to the contract may be such that neither that maxim nor the maxim *volenti non fit injuria* should be applied to defeat the recovery of money paid under it (*y*).

Payments
under pres-
sure of legal
process.

Again, the general rule is that money paid under the pressure of legal process cannot be recovered, and this rule usually prevents the recovery of money paid to satisfy a demand, whether valid or not, after legal proceedings have been commenced to enforce the demand (*z*): it is immaterial that the money was paid under a mistake of fact (*z*), or in ignorance of the real facts (*a*), or with a protest that the money was not due (*b*). This rule, however, does not extend to cases in which money has been extorted under "colourable legal process." A foreigner, ignorant of our language, was arrested, under a writ of *habeas corpus*, for a fictitious debt of £16,200: to obtain his release he paid £500, agreeing that it should be "a payment in part of the writ:" the writ was afterwards set aside for a trivial irregularity, and thereupon an action was brought to recover the £500: the jury found that the defendant knew that he had no claim against the plaintiff, and upon this finding it was held that the money was recoverable (*c*). In this

(*v*) *Owen v. Cronk*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 265; cf. *Ellis v. Goulton*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 350.

(*x*) *Post*, Chap. IX.

(*y*) See *Atkinson v. Denby*, 6 H. & N. 778: 7 Id. 934; *Re Lenzberg*, 7 Ch. D. 650; *Jones v. Merionethshire Soc.*, [1892] 1 Ch. 173.

(*z*) *Moore v. Fulham Vestry*,

[1895] 1 Q. B. 399: 64 L. J. Q. B. 226.

(*a*) *Hamlet v. Richardson*, 9 Bing. 644: 35 R. R. 650.

(*b*) *Brown v. McKinnally*, 1 Esp. 279.

(*c*) *De Cadaval v. Collins*, 4 A. & E. 858.

case, the arrest, though made under colour of legal process, was illegal by reason of the defendant's knowledge that his claim was groundless: an action might have been brought against him for damages for malicious arrest (*d*); and it seems that money paid as the price of obtaining release from an illegal arrest is generally recoverable, either as money had and received or as special damages for the false imprisonment, not only if the money was not due from the plaintiff (*e*), but even if he was under a liability to pay the money or some part of it (*f*): *à fortiori*, it is recoverable if the arrest was not merely illegal, but malicious, and there was no such liability. Where, however, a person who is in lawful custody pays money voluntarily and with full knowledge of the facts as the price of his release, he cannot recover it back (*g*).

This principle was followed in a case where, though money was paid under compulsion of legal process, the payee had not acted *bonâ fide*. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for work and labour done, and by mistake credited the defendant with a sum of £75 as paid on account and sued for the balance. After issue of the writ the defendant paid the balance claimed and took a receipt in full discharge, although he knew there had been a mistake. It was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover this £75 from the defendant in another action as money allowed in account under a mistake of fact (*h*).

It is important here to notice the binding effect, as between the parties thereto, of a judgment, valid on the face of it, so long as the judgment stands. To avoid a seizure under an execution for £100, issued upon a judgment signed

Binding
effect of
judgments.

(*d*) See the judgment in *Daniels v. Fielding*, 16 M. & W. 200.

(*e*) *De Mesnil v. Dakin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 18.

(*f*) *Clark v. Woods*, 2 Exch. 395; *Norton v. Monckton*, 43 W. R. 350; see also *Pitt v. Coomes*, 2 A. & E.

459. The maxim *nemo commodum capere potest de injuria sua propria* seems applicable.

(*g*) *Viner v. Hawkins*, 9 Exch. 266.

(*h*) *Ward & Co., v. Wallis*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 675; 69 L. J. Q. B. 423.

against him for that sum, a man pays the sum in full; while the judgment or the writ of execution stands, he cannot, except in a proceeding to set it aside (*i*), allege that the judgment was signed, or the execution issued, maliciously and without probable cause, for a sum which (by reason, for instance, of what he had previously paid), exceeded what was really due (*j*). The general rule is that no action for malicious prosecution lies until the result of the prosecution has shown that there was no ground for it (*k*).

The authorities already cited, however, sufficiently establish the position, that money paid under compulsion of fraudulent legal process, which has been set aside, or of wrongful pressure exercised upon the party paying it, can generally be recovered back; and it only remains to add, that, *à fortiori*, money is recoverable which was paid, and that an instrument may be avoided which was executed, under threats of personal violence, duress, or illegal restraint of liberty (*l*); and this is in strict accordance with the maxims laid down by Lord Bacon: *non videtur consensus retinuisse si quis ex præscripto minantis aliquid immutavit* (*m*), and *corporalis injuria non recipit æstimationem de futuro* (*n*).

Intentional
wrong-doer.

It is worthy of observation that the maxim *volenti non fit injuria* does not deprive even an intentional wrong-doer of the benefit of a law framed on grounds of public policy. Thus, a person who intentionally trespasses on horseback may be sued in trespass, but the horse cannot, while it is

(*i*) See *Wyatt v. Palmer*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 106; cf. 10 Q. B. 168.

(*j*) *Huffer v. Allen*, L. R. 2 Ex. 15; *De Medina v. Grove*, 10 Q. B. 152, 172.

(*k*) *Metropolitan Bank v. Pooley*, 10 App. Cas. 210, 216.

(*l*) As to what may constitute duress, see *per* Ld. Cranworth, *Boyse*

v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Cas. 45; *Cumming v. Ince*, 11 Q. B. 112; *Powell v. Hoyland*, 6 Exch. 67; *Edward v. Trevellick*, 4 E. & B. 59.

(*m*) Bac. Max., reg. 22. *Nil consensui tam contrarium est quam vis atque metus*, D. 50, 17, 116.

(*n*) Bac. Max., reg. 6.

being ridden, be distrained damage feasant, the reason being that its seizure would probably provoke a breach of the peace (o).

NULLUS COMMODUM CAPERE POTEST DE INJURIA SUA PROPRIA.

(Co. Litt. 148 b.)—No man can take advantage of his own wrong.

It is a maxim of law, recognised and established, that no man shall take advantage of his own wrong (*p*); and this maxim, which is based on elementary principles, is fully recognised in Courts of law and of equity, and, indeed, admits of illustration from every branch of legal procedure. The reasonableness of the rule being manifest, we proceed at once to show its application by reference to decided cases; and, in the first place, we may observe that a man shall not take advantage of his own wrong to gain the favourable interpretation of the law (*q*): *frustra legis auxilium quærit qui in legem committit* (*r*); wherefore, A. shall not have an action of trespass against B., who lawfully enters to abate a nuisance caused by A.'s wrongful act (*s*); nor shall an executor *de son tort* obtain that assistance which the law affords to a rightful executor (*t*). So if A., on whose goods a distress has been levied, by his own misconduct prevent

Rule stated.

Examples.

(o) *Field v. Adames*, 12 A. & E. 649; *Storey v. Robinson*, 6 T. R. 138; 3 R. R. 137; *Bunch v. Kennington*, 1 Q. B. 679; cf. *Sunbolf v. Alford*, 3 M. & W. 248; *Gaylard v. Morris*, 3 Exch. 695.

(p) *Per* Ld. Abinger, *Findon v. Parker*, 11 M. & W. 680; *Daly v. Thompson*, 10 Id. 309; *Malins v. Freeman*, 4 Bing. N. C. 395, 399; *per* Best, J., *Doe v. Bancks*, 4 B. & Ald. 409; 23 R. R. 318; Co. Litt. 1 48 b; Jenk. Cent. 209; 2 Inst. 713; D. 50, 17, 134, § 1.

It "is contrary to all legal principle" that "the plaintiff can take advantage of his own wrong;" *per* Willes, J., *Ames v. Waterlow*, L. R. 5 C. P. 55. See also *Dean of Christchurch v. Duke of Buckingham*, 17 C. B. N. S. 391.

(q) 1 Hale, P. C. 482.

(r) 2 Hale, P. C. 386.

(s) Dodd. 220, 221. See *Perry v. Fitzhove*, 8 Q. B. 757.

(t) See *Carmichael v. Carmichael*, 2 Phill. 101; *Paull v. Simpson*, 9 Q. B. 365.

the distress from being realised, A. cannot complain of a second distress as unlawful (*u*). So B., into whose field cattle have strayed through defect of fences which he was bound to repair, cannot distrain such cattle damage feasant in another field, into which they have got by breaking through a hedge which he had kept in good repair, because B.'s negligence was *causa sine quâ non* of the mischief (*x*). So if a man be bound to appear on a certain day, and before that day the obligee put him in prison, the bond is void (*y*).

Construction
of contracts.

It is contrary to justice that a party should avoid his own contract by his own wrong. Accordingly, "in a long series of decisions the Courts have construed clauses of forfeiture in leases, declaring in terms, however clear and strong, that they shall be void on breach of conditions by the lessees, to mean that they shall be voidable only at the option of the lessors. The same rule of construction has been applied to other contracts, where a party bound by a condition has sought to take advantage of his own breach of it to annul the contract;" and it is applicable even where the legislature has imposed the condition, unless the scope and purpose of the enactment be so opposed to the rule that it ought not to prevail (*z*).

Landlord and
tenant.

The following instances also serve further to illustrate the same general principle. If tenant for years fell timber-trees, they will belong to the lessor; for the tenant cannot, by his own wrongful act, acquire a greater property in them than he would otherwise have had (*a*). Where the lessee is evicted by title paramount from part of the lands demised, he will have to pay a rateable proportion for the remainder (*b*); whereas if he be evicted from part of the

(*u*) *Lee v. Cooke*, 3 H. & N. 203.

(*x*) *Singleton v. Williamson*, 7 H. & N. 410.

(*y*) *Noy, Max.*, 9th ed., p. 45;
arg. *Williams v. Gray*, 9 C. B. 737.

(*z*) *Davenport v. The Queen*, 3

App. Cas. 128, 129. See the authorities there cited.

(*a*) *Wing. Max.*, p. 574.

(*b*) *Smith v. Malings*, Cro. Jac. 160. See *Mayor of Poole v. Whitt*, 15 M. & W. 571; *Selby v. Browne*, 7 Q. B. 632.

lands by his landlord, no apportionment, but a suspension of the whole rent, takes place, except where the king is landlord; and there is no suspension, if the eviction has followed upon the lessee's own wrongful act, as for a forfeiture, but an apportionment only (*c*). And it is a well-known rule, that a lessor or grantor cannot dispute, with his lessee or grantee, his own title to the land which he has assumed to demise or convey (*d*). Nor can a grantor derogate from his own grant (*e*).

It is moreover a sound principle that he who prevents a thing from being done shall not avail himself of the non-performance he has occasioned. If the absence of an insurance by the landlord be a condition of the tenant's liability to insure, the landlord cannot charge the tenant with a default occasioned by his own untrue representation that he himself has insured (*f*). Where a doctor has bought a practice on the terms of his paying to the vendor a share of the earnings to be made therein during the next four years, he cannot rely upon the absence of any such earnings, if that be due to his wilful abandonment of the business, and if it be an implied term of the contract that he should carry it on (*g*).

Default in
performance
of contract.

An insurance company agreed with A. that he and B. should be their joint agents at Glasgow, and that if they should displace B. from the agency they would pay A. a certain sum; they subsequently sold their business, and it was held that by so doing they displaced B. within the

(*c*) *Walker's case*, 3 Rep. 22; Wing. Max., p. 569. See *Boodle v. Campbell*, 8 Scott, N. R. 104.

(*d*) Judgm., *Doe v. Horne*, 3 Q. B. 766; cited *per* Alderson, B., 15 M. & W. 576.

(*e*) 2 Shepp. Touchst. by Preston, 286. As to the canons of construction applicable to grants by the Crown, see *A.-G. v. Ewelme Hospital*,

17 Beav. 366; 22 L. J. Ch. 846; and between private individuals, *Booth v. Alcock*, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 663; 42 L. J. Ch. 557; *Taylor v. Corporation of St. Helens*, 6 Ch. D. 264; 46 L. J. Ch. 857.

(*f*) See Judgm., *Doe v. Gladwin*, 6 Q. B. 963.

(*g*) *M'Intyre v. Belcher*, 14 C. B. N. S. 654.

meaning of the agreement (*h*). If a manufacturer has agreed with a person to employ him as sole agent for the sale of his goods for a definite period and at a fixed commission, his wilful abandonment of his business is no excuse for the non-fulfilment of his agreement (*i*). But, to bind the manufacturer to continue his business, he must agree to employ the agent therein either expressly or by necessary implication from the terms actually expressed (*k*).

Tender.

Again, where a creditor refuses to tender sufficient in amount, and duly made, he cannot afterwards, for purposes of oppression or extortion, avail himself of such refusal; for, although the debtor still remains liable to pay whenever required so to do, yet the tender operates in bar of any claim for damages and interest for not paying or for detaining the debt, and also of the costs of an action brought to recover the demand (*l*).

Confusion of goods.

According to the same principle, if articles of unequal value are mixed together, producing an article of a different value from that of either separately, and, through the fault of the person mixing them, the other party cannot tell what was the original value of his property, he must have the whole (*m*). "At law," said Lord Redesdale, in *Bond v. Hopkins* (*n*), "fraud destroys rights—if I mix my corn with another's he takes all (*o*); but if I induce another to mix his corn with mine, I cannot then insist on having the whole, the law in that case does not give me his corn." So, where the plaintiff, pretending title to hay standing

(*h*) *Stirling v. Maitland*, 5 B. & S. 840, 853; see 38 Ch. D. 603, 604.

(*i*) *Turner v. Goldsmith*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 544: 60 L. J. Q. B. 247.

(*k*) *Rhodes v. Forwood*, 1 App. Cas. 256; *Hamlyn v. Wood*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 488: 60 L. J. Q. B. 734.

(*l*) See *per Williams, J., Smith v. Manners*, 5 C. B. N. S. 636.

(*m*) *Per* Ld. Eldon, *Lupton v. White*, 15 Ves. 442; 10 R. R. 94. See

Colwill v. Reeves, 2 Camp., N. P. C. 575; *Warde v. Eyre*, 2 Bulstr. 323.

(*n*) 1 Scho. & Lefr. 433.

(*o*) In *Aldridge v. Johnson*, 7 E. & B. 899, Ld. Campbell observes, "Where the owner of such articles as oil or wine mixes them with similar articles belonging to another, that is a wrongful act by the owner for which he is punished by losing his property."

on defendant's land, mixed some of his own with it, it was held that the defendant thereby became entitled to the hay (*p*). A malting agent represented to his principals that some barley which he had upon his premises had been bought by him for them, and thereby induced them to make him payments to cover the price of the barley; as a matter of fact, only part of the barley had been bought by him for his principals, but he had mixed it with his own so that the two portions could not be separately distinguished; the agent having become bankrupt, his trustee claimed to hold the whole of the barley against the principals on the ground that the part bought for them could not be identified, but it was held that he was not so entitled, as no man can take advantage of his own wrong (*q*).

By the mixture of bales of cotton on board ship, and their becoming undistinguishable by reason of the action of the sea, and without the fault of their respective owners, these parties become tenants in common of the cotton in proportion to their respective interests; but such a result follows only in those cases where, after the adoption of all reasonable means to identify or separate the goods, it has been found impracticable to do so (*r*).

Again, where a party was sued by a wrong name, and suffered judgment to go against him, without attempting to rectify the mistake, he could not afterwards, in an action against the sheriff for false imprisonment, complain of an execution issued against him by that name (*s*); and, if any instrument is executed under an assumed name, the party so executing it is bound thereby in the same manner as if he had executed it in his true name (*t*). “So, if a

(*p*) Popham, 38, pl. 2.

(*q*) *Harris v. Truman*, 7 Q. B. D. 340: 9 Id. 964: 51 L. J. Q. B. 338.

(*r*) *Spence v. Union Marine Ins. Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 427. See *Webster v. Power*, L. R. 2 P. C. 69.

(*s*) *Fisher v. Magnay*, 6 Scott, N.

R. 588; *Morgan v. Bridges*, 1 B. & Ald. 647. See *De Mesnil v. Dakin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 18; *Kelly v. Lawrence*, 3 H. & C. 1.

(*t*) 13 Peters (U.S.), R. 428. See

man, having an opportunity of seeing what he is served with, wilfully abstains from looking at it, that is virtually a personal service" (*u*) ; and, where one of the litigating parties takes a step after having notice that a rule has been obtained to set aside the proceedings, he does so in his own wrong, and the step so taken will be set aside (*x*).

Trespass
to land.

A wrong-doer ought not to be permitted to make a profit out of his own wrong (*y*) ; and therefore, if a person for his own purposes uses another's land, as by tipping thereon refuse from a colliery, without the landowner's leave, he ought to pay compensation for such user, and the measure of damages is not merely the diminution in value of the land (*z*).

Intention.

No man is allowed to take advantage of his own wrong ; far less of his wrong intention which is not expressed (*a*). Nothing can be better settled than this, that "where a man does an act which may be rightfully performed, he cannot say that that act was intentionally and in fact done wrongly. A man who has a right of entry cannot say he committed a trespass in entering. A man who sells the goods of another as agent for the owner cannot prevent the owner from adopting the sale, and deny that he acted as agent for the owner. It runs throughout our law, and we are familiar with numerous instances in the law of real property. A man who grants a lease believing he has sufficient estate to grant it, although it turns out that he has not, but has a power which enables him to grant it, is not allowed to say he did not grant it under the power. Wherever it can be done rightfully, he is not allowed to

Judgm., *Trueman v. Loder*, 11 A. & E. 594—595.

(*u*) *Per Tindal, C.J., Emerson v. Brown*, 8 Scott, N. R. 222.

(*x*) *Per Pollock, C.B., Tiling v. Hodgson*, 13 M. & W. 638.

(*y*) *Per Ld. Hatherley*, L. R. 6

Ch. 761 ; *per Chitty, J.*, [1896] 1 Ch. 899.

(*z*) *Whitwham v. Westminster, &c., Co.*, [1896] 2 Ch. 538.

(*a*) *Per Willes, J.*, 14 C. B. N. S. 653.

say, against the person entitled to the property or the right, that he has done it wrongfully" (b).

The foregoing examples have been selected, in order to show how the rule, which they serve to illustrate, has been applied to promote justice, in various and dissimilar circumstances. The maxim under review applies also with peculiar force to that extensive class of cases in which fraud has been committed by one party to a transaction, and is relied upon as a defence by the other. We do not propose to consider how formerly a Court of equity dealt with fraud or interfered to give relief from it: but we may state the principle upon which that Court invariably acted, namely—that the author of wrong, who has put a person in a position in which he had no right to put him, shall not take advantage of his own illegal act, or, in other words, shall not avail himself of his own wrong (c).

A party cannot take advantage of his own fraud.

In a leading case on the subject of fraud (d), the facts were that A. owed B. 400*l.*, and also owed C. 200*l.*; C. brought an action of debt against A., and, pending the writ, A., being possessed of chattels of the value of 300*l.*, in secret made a general deed of gift of all his chattels, real and personal, to B., in satisfaction of his debt, but nevertheless remained in possession of the chattels, some of which he sold; he also shorn the sheep, and marked them with his own mark. Afterwards C. obtained judgment, and issued a *fi. fa.* against A., and the question arose, whether the gift was fraudulent and of no effect by virtue of 13 Eliz. c. 5. It was determined, for the following

Twyne's case.

(b) *Per* Jessel, M.R., *Re Hallett's Estate*, 13 Ch. D. 727.

(c) *Per* Ld. Cottenham, *Hawkins v. Hall*, 4 My. & Cr. 281.

(d) *Twyne's case*, 3 Rep. 80 (with which cf. *Evans v. Jones*, 3 H. & C. 423); *Graham v. Furber*, 14 C. B. 410, 418; *Tarleton v. Liddell*, 17 Q. B. 390; *Fermor's case* (3 Rep. 77), is also a leading case to show

that the Courts will not sustain or sanction a fraudulent transaction. In that case it was held, that a fine fraudulently levied by lessee for years should not bar the lessor; and see the law on this subject stated by Tindal, C.J., in *Davies v. Lowndes*, 5 Bing. N. C. 172. See also *Wood v. Dixie*, 7 Q. B. 892.

reasons, that the gift was fraudulent within the statute:—1, it had the signs and marks of fraud, because it was general, without excepting the wearing-apparel, or other necessities of the donor; and it is commonly said, that *dolosus versatur in generalibus* (*e*)—a person intending to deceive deals in general terms; a maxim, we may observe, which has been adopted from the civil law, and has been frequently cited in our Courts (*f*); 2, the donor continued in possession and used the goods as his own, and by reason thereof traded with others, and defrauded them (*g*); 3, the gift was made in secret, and *dona clandestina sunt semper suspiciosa* (*h*)—clandestine gifts are always open to suspicion; 4, it was made pending the writ; 5, there was a trust between the parties, for the donor possessed the goods and used them as his own, and fraud is always clad with a trust, and a trust is the cover of fraud; and 6, the deed stated that the gift was made honestly, truly, and *bonâ fide*, and *clausulæ inconsuetæ semper inducunt suspicionem*: unusual clauses excite suspicion.

In the foregoing case, it will be observed that the transaction was invalidated on the ground of fraud, according to the principle, that a wrongful or fraudulent act shall not be allowed to conduce to the advantage of the party who committed it; *nul prendra advantage de son tort demesne* (*i*).

Estoppel
in pais.

The doctrine of estoppel *in pais*, which has often been applied, is obviously referable to the principle set forth in the maxim before us, and has been defined as follows. If

(*e*) Wing. Max. 636; 2 Rep. 34; 2 Bulstr. 226; 1 Roll. R. 157; Moor, 321; *Mace v. Cammel*, Loft, 782.

(*f*) *Auchterarder Presbytery v. Earl of Kinnoull*, 6 Cl. & F. 698, 699; *Spicot's case*, 5 Rep. 58.

(*g*) Cited *per* Ld. Mansfield, *Worseley v. Demattos*, 1 Burr. 482; *Martindale v. Booth*, 3 B. & Ad. 498; 37 R. R. 485. See this sub-

ject considered in the Note to *Twyne's case*, 1 Smith, L. C. 11th ed., 1.

(*h*) Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 152; *Latimer v. Batson*, 4 B. & C. 652; *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Leonard v. Baker*, 1 M. & S. 253.

(*i*) 2 Inst. 713; Branch, Max., 5th ed., p. 141.

a man, by his words or conduct, wilfully endeavours to cause another to believe in a certain state of things which the first knows to be false, and if the second believes in such state of things and acts upon his belief, he who knowingly made the false statement is estopped from averring afterwards that such a state of things did not exist at the time: again, if a man, either in express terms or by conduct, makes a representation to another of the existence of a certain state of facts which he intends to be acted upon in a certain way, and it be acted upon in that way, in the belief of the existence of such a state of facts, to the damage of him who so believes and acts, the first is estopped from denying the existence of such a state of facts: and thirdly, if a man, whatever his real meaning may be, so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take his conduct to mean a certain representation of facts, and that it was a true representation, and that the latter was intended to act upon it in a particular way, and he, with such belief, does act in that way to his damage, the first is estopped from denying that the facts were as represented (k).

It has, in accordance with the principle of estoppel *in pais*, been laid down that if a stranger begins to build on land supposing it to be his own, and the real owner, perceiving his mistake, abstains from setting him right, and leaves him to persevere in his error, the real owner will not afterwards be allowed to assert his title to the land so as to deprive the stranger of the buildings erected by him (l).

The cases illustrative of the doctrine of estoppel *in pais* are numerous, and reference here can only be made to a few of the leading authorities. In *Pickard v. Sears* (m),

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| (k) <i>Carr v. L. & N. W. R. Co.</i> ,
L. R. 10 C. P. 307: 44 L. J. C. P.
109; <i>M'Kenzie v. British Linen Co.</i> ,
6 App. Cas. 82; <i>Pickard v. Sears</i> ,
6 A. & E. 469; <i>Compania Naviera</i> | <i>Vasconzada v. Churchill & Sim</i> ,
[1906] 1 K. B. 237: 75 L. J. K. B. 94.
(l) <i>Ramsden v. Dyson</i> , L. R. 1
H. L. 129.
(m) 6 A. & E. 469. |
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which was an action of trover, the goods in question were seized, while in the actual possession of a third party, under an execution against him, and were sold to the defendant; no claim was made by the plaintiff after the seizure, and he consulted with the execution creditor as to the disposal of the goods, without mentioning his own claim, after he knew of the seizure and of the intention to sell: it was held that a jury might properly infer from the plaintiff's conduct that he had authorised the sale or had in fact ceased to be the owner. In *Gregg v. Wells* (n), it was held that the owner of goods, who stands by, and voluntarily allows another to treat them as his own, whereby a third person is induced to buy them, cannot recover them from the buyer. "A party who negligently or culpably stands by, and allows another to contract on the faith and understanding of a fact which he can contradict, cannot afterwards dispute that fact in an action against the person whom he has himself assisted in deceiving."

The principle on which such cases are decided was well explained in *Freeman v. Cooke* (o), and the expression, in *Pickard v. Sears*, "where one by his words or conduct wilfully causes another to believe the existence of a certain state of things," was stated to mean, "if not that the party represents that to be true which he knows to be untrue, at least that he *means* his representation to be acted upon, and that it is acted upon accordingly; and if, whatever a man's real intention may be, he so conducts himself that a reasonable man would take the representation to be true, and believe that it was meant that he should act upon it, and did act upon it as true, the party making the representation

(n) 10 A. & E. 90, 98. See *Doe v. Groves*, 10 Q. B. 486; *Nickells v. Atherstone*, Id. 944, 949; and see *Farquharson v. King*, [1901] 2 K. B. 697; 70 L. J. K. B. 985.

(o) 2 Exch. 654, 663—664; see *Miles v. McIlwraith*, 8 App. Cas. 120, where the above statement of the law was approved by Ld. Blackburn.

would be equally precluded from contesting its truth; and conduct by negligence or omission, where there is a duty cast upon a person by usage of trade or otherwise to disclose the truth, may often have the same effect. As, for instance, a retiring partner omitting to inform his customers of the fact in the usual mode, that the continuing partners were no longer authorised to act as his agents, is bound by all contracts made by them with third persons, on the faith of their being so authorised. . . . In truth, in most cases to which the doctrine in *Pickard v. Sears* is to be applied, the representation is such as to amount to the contract or licence of the party making it" (p).

An important limitation to the doctrine of estoppel *in pais* was laid down by the House of Lords in *Jorden v. Money* (q), namely, that there must be a misrepresentation of existing facts, and not of a mere intention; this distinction, which is now well recognised (r), is illustrated by *Williams v. Stern* (s). There a loan repayable by instalments was secured by a bill of sale over the debtor's goods. An instalment having fallen due, the debtor asked for time, and the creditor gave him a week; yet he seized the goods only three days later. It was held he had a right to seize them, as his promise to wait was not a misstatement of an existing fact, nor was it founded on any consideration to make it binding (s).

Furthermore, a person who has expressly made a verbal representation, on the faith of which another has acted, shall not afterwards be allowed to contradict his former statement, in order to profit by that conduct which it has

*Allegans
contraria
non est
audiendus.*

(p) See *per* Ld. Chelmsford, 6 H. L. Cas. 656. See also in illustration of the text, *Martyn v. Gray*, 14 C. B. N. S. 824; *Stephens v. Reynolds*, 5 H. & N. 513; *Gurney v. Evans*, 3 Id. 122; *Summers v. Solomon*, 7 E. & B. 879; *Ramazotti v. Bowring*, 7 C. B. N. S. 857;

Castellani v. Thompson, 13 C. B. N. S. 105, 121—122.

(q) 5 H. L. Cas. 185.

(r) See *Bank of Louisiana v. First Nat. Bank of New Orleans*, L. R. 6 H. L. 352: 43 L. J. Ch. 269.

(s) 5 Q. B. D. 409.

induced (*t*). Whenever an attempt is made in the course of legal proceedings to violate this principle, the law replies in the words of a maxim which we have already cited (*u*), *allegans contraria non est audiendus*, and, by applying the doctrine of estoppel therein contained, prevents the unjust consequences which would otherwise ensue (*x*). We may, therefore, lay it down as a general rule, applicable alike in law and equity, that a party shall not entitle himself to substantiate a claim, or to enforce a defence, by reason of acts or misrepresentations which proceeded from himself, or were adopted or acquiesced in by him after full knowledge of their nature and quality (*y*): and further, that where misrepresentations have been made by one of two litigating parties, in his dealings with the other, a Court of law will either decline to interfere, or will so adjust the equities between them, as to prevent an undue benefit from accruing to that party who is unfairly endeavouring to take advantage of his own wrong (*z*).

If, therefore, the acceptor of a bill of exchange at the time of acceptance knew the payee to be a fictitious person, he shall not take advantage of his own fraud; but a *bonâ fide* holder may recover against him on the bill, treating it as payable to bearer (*a*): and, generally, a person will not

(*t*) *Trickett v. Tomlinson*, 13 C. B. N. S. 663.

(*u*) *Ante*, p. 135. See also *Cannam v. Farmer*, 3 Exch. 698; *Hallifax v. Lyle*, Id. 446; *Fairhurst v. Liverpool Adelphi Loan Association*, 9 Exch. 422; *Standish v. Ross*, 3 Exch. 527; *Freeman v. Steggall*, 14 Q. B. 202; *Morgan v. Couchman*, 14 C. B. 100; *Dunston v. Paterson*, 2 C. B. N. S. 495.

(*x*) *Price v. Carter*, 7 Q. B. 838; *Reg. v. Mayor of Sandwich*, 10 Q. B. 563, 571; *Banks v. Newton*, 11 Q. B. 340; *Petch v. Lyon*, 9 Q. B. 147, and cases there cited; *Braithwaite v. Gardiner*, 8 Q. B. 473. See *Dresser*

v. Bosanquet, 4 B. & S. 460, 486.

(*y*) *Vigers v. Pike*, 8 Cl. & F. 562.

(*z*) See *Harrison v. Ruscoe*, 15 M. & W. 231, where an unintentional misrepresentation was made in giving notice of the dishonour of a bill; *Rayner v. Grote*, Id. 359, where an agent represented himself as principal (citing *Bickerton v. Burrell*, 5 M. & S. 383); *Humble v. Hunter*, 12 Q. B. 310; *Schmaltz v. Avery*, 16 Q. B. 655; *Cox v. Hubbard*, 4 C. B. 317, 319; *Cooke v. Wilson*, 1 C. B. N. S. 153.

(*a*) *Gibson v. Minet*, 1 H. Bla. 569; 1 R. R. 754; see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 7 (3).

be allowed as plaintiff in a Court of law to rescind his own act, on the ground that such act was a fraud on another person, whether the party seeking to do this has sued in his own name or jointly with such other person (b).

Further, we may remark that the maxim which precludes a man from taking advantage of his own wrong is, in principle, closely allied to the maxim, *ex dolo malo non oritur actio*, which is likewise of general application, and will be treated of hereafter in the Chapter upon Contracts. The latter maxim is, indeed, included in that above noticed; for it is clear, that since a man cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong, he will not be allowed to found a claim upon his own iniquity: *nemo ex proprio dolo consequitur actionem*; and, as before observed, *frustra legis auxilium quaerit qui in legem committit* (c).

Further
remarks.

Nevertheless, the principal maxim under our notice, and likewise the kindred rule, *fraus et dolus nemini patrocinarī debent* (d), are sometimes qualified in operation by the maxim cited at a former page (e): *quod fieri non debet factum valet* (f). "Fraud renders any transaction voidable at the election of the party defrauded; and if, when it is avoided, nothing has occurred to alter the position of affairs, the rights and remedies of the parties are the same as if it had been void from the beginning; but if any alteration has taken place, their rights and remedies are subject to the effect of that alteration" (g). This may be

Principal
maxim, how
qualified.

(b) *Per* Ld. Tenterden, *Jones v. Yates*, 9 B. & C. 538; 33 R. R. 258; *Sparrow v. Chisman*, Id. 241; *Wallace v. Kelsall*, 7 M. & W. 264; which cases are recognised, *Gordon v. Ellis*, 8 Scott, N. R. 305; *Brandon v. Scott*, 7 E. & B. 234; *Husband v. Davis*, 10 C. B. 645. See *Heilbut v. Nevill*, L. R. 4 C. P. 354.

(c) The following cases also illustrate the maxim, that a man shall not be permitted to take advantage

of his own wrong or default; respecting the right to costs, *Pope v. Fleming*, 5 Exch. 249; the enrolment of memorial of an annuity, *Molton v. Camroux*, 4 Exch. 17; an action against the sheriff for an escape, *Arden v. Goodacre*, 11 C. B. 371, 377.

(d) 3 Rep. 78 b.

(e) *Ante*, p. 148.

(f) Cited *per* Martin, B., and Wilde, B., 6 H. & N. 787, 792.

(g) *Per* Blackburn, J., 10 H. L.

illustrated by *Reg. v. Saddlers' Co. (h)*. By the charter of this company, the warden and assistants were empowered to elect assistants from the freemen, and to remove any for ill-conduct or other reasonable cause, and to make bye-laws for the good government of the body in general and its officers. A bye-law was made, "that no person who has become insolvent, shall hereafter be admitted a member of the court of assistants, unless it be proved to the satisfaction of the court that such person, after his insolvency, has paid his creditors in full." D. being otherwise qualified, but being insolvent, was elected an assistant, and after his election, of which he was not aware, but before his admission, he made to the agents of the wardens and assistants a statement, false to his own knowledge, that he was solvent; he was then admitted, and exercised the office of assistant. The bye-law being adjudged good, it was further held, that the mere statement of a falsehood by D. did not nullify his election, and that D. could not be legally removed from his office by the wardens and assistants without being heard in his defence (i).

In *Hooper v. Lane (k)*, which strikingly illustrates the rule that "no man shall take advantage of his own wrong," various instances were put by Bramwell, B. (l), showing that the rule "only applies to the extent of undoing the advantage gained, where that can be done, and not to the extent of taking away a right previously possessed." The instances adduced are as follows. "If A. lends a horse to B., who uses it, and puts it in his stable, and A. comes for it, and B. is away and the stable locked, and A. breaks it open and takes his horse, he is liable to an action for the trespass to the stable; and yet the horse could not be got

Cas. 420—421; citing *Clarke v. Dickson*, E. B. & E. 148; and *Fere v. Hill*, 15 C. B. 207.

(h) 10 H. L. Cas. 404.

(i) See the maxim, *Audi alteram partem*, ante, p. 91.

(k) 6 H. L. Cas. 443; *Ockford v. Freston*, and *Chapman v. Freston*, 6 H. & N. 466, 472, 480, 481.

(l) 6 H. L. Cas. 461. See also *per* Bowen, L.J., 39 Ch. D. 206.

back, and so A. would take advantage of his own wrong. So, though a man might be indicted at common law for a forcible entry, he could not be turned out if his title were good. So, if goods are bought on a promise of cash payment, the buyer, on non-payment, is subject to an action, but may avail himself of a set-off and the goods cannot be gotten back. So, if I promise a man I will sell him more goods on credit if he pays what he already owes, and he does so, and I refuse to sell, I may retain the money. So, if I force another from a fishing-ground at sea, and catch fish, the fish are mine."

The maxim, moreover, according to the opinion of the same learned judge, "is never applicable where the right of a third party is to be affected. . . . Can one man by his wrongful act to another deprive a third of his right against that other ? . . . A. obtains goods from B. under a contract of sale, procured by A. from B. by fraud. A. sells to C. ; C. may retain the goods (*m*). Surely A. might recover the price from C. at which he sold to him ; yet he would in so doing take advantage of his own wrong. So, if my lessee covenants at the end of his term to deliver possession to me, and in order to do so forcibly evicts one to whom he had sub-let for a longer term, and I take possession without notice, surely I can keep it ; at least, at the common law I could. So, if a sub-lessee at an excessive rent purposely omits to perform a covenant, the performance of which would be a performance of the lessee's covenant to his lessor, and by such non-performance the lessee's covenant is broken, and the first lessor enters and avoids the lease and evicts the sub-lessee, the sub-lessee may defend himself against a claim for rent by his lessor (*n*) ; yet there he takes advantage of his own wrong, because of the right of the third person. So, if I sell goods, the property not to pass till payment or tender, and the vendee has a week

(*m*) *White v. Garden*, 10 C. B. 919. (*n*) *Logan v. Hall*, 4 C. B. 598.
Cf. *Lindsay v. Cundy*, 3 App. Cas. 459.

in which to pay, and during that week I resell and deliver to a third person, no action is maintainable against me as for a detention or conversion, but only for non-delivery; yet there I take advantage of my own wrong, because the right of a third party has accrued " (o).

Upon the same principle of protecting the rights of third parties acquired *bonâ fide* under a fraudulent transaction, a shareholder in a company who has been induced to take shares by the fraud of the company cannot avoid the contract and have his name removed from the register after an order for the winding-up of the company has been made, nor after a petition for winding-up has been presented on which an order is subsequently made (p), because of the intervening rights of the creditors accruing under the order.

ACTA EXTERIORA INDICANT INTERIORA SECRETA. (8 Rep. 291.)—

Acts indicate the intention.

*The Six
Carpenters'
case.*

The law, in some cases, judges of a man's previous intentions by his subsequent acts; and, on this principle, it was resolved in a well-known case, that, if a man abuse an authority given him by the law, he becomes a trespasser *ab initio*, but that if he abuse an authority given him by the party, he does not. The reason assigned for this distinction is that, where a general licence is given by the law, the law judges by the subsequent act with what intent the original act was done; but where the party himself gives a licence, he cannot for any subsequent cause punish that which is done by his own licence. In the latter case, therefore, the abuse alone is punishable (q).

(o) *Per* Bramwell, B., 6 H. L. Cas. 461—462.

(p) *Oakes v. Turquand*, L. R. 2 H. L. 325; 36 L. J. C. P. 949; *Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank*, 5 App. Cas. 317.

(q) *The Six Carpenters' case*, 8 Rep. 290; 1 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 132. See *Jacobsohn v. Blake*, 6 M. & Gr. 919; *Peters v. Clarkson*, 7 Id. 548; *Webster v. Watts*, 11 Q. B. 311; *North v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, 14 C. B.

For instance, the law gives authority to a traveller to enter a common inn to seek refreshment (*r*) ; to the owner of land to distrain beasts thereon damage feasant, to detain them until satisfaction made (*s*) ; and to the commoner to enter upon the common to see his cattle. But, if the traveller at the inn commits a trespass, or if the landowner after distraining works or kills the distress, or if the commoner cuts down a tree, the law adjudges that he entered or distrained for the specific purpose of committing the particular injury, and because the act which demonstrates the intention is a trespass, he is adjudged a trespasser *ab initio* (*t*) ; or, in other words, the subsequent illegality shows that the party contemplated an illegality all along, so that the whole becomes a trespass (*u*).

This doctrine bore hard upon landlords when distraining for rent, and therefore for their relief the 11 Geo. 2, c. 19 (*x*), has provided that where a distress is made for rent justly due, and an irregularity or unlawful act is afterwards done, the distress is not to be deemed unlawful, nor the party distraining a trespasser *ab initio*, but satisfaction for the special damage sustained (*y*) may be recovered by action (*z*) unless tender of amends be made before action brought. Like provisions are contained in the 17 Geo. 2, c. 38, s. 9, with regard to a distress for money justly due for the relief of the poor.

Distress for rent :

or poor rate.

The 11 Geo. 2, c. 19, does not, it must be observed, render either the entry to distrain or the distress legal if

N. S. 132 ; *per* Erle, J., *Ambergate R. Co. v. Midland R. Co.*, 23 L. J. Q. B. 17, 20 ; Wing, Max., p. 108.

(*r*) See *Lamond v. Richard*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 541 : 66 L. J. Q. B. 315.

(*s*) See *Layton v. Hurry*, 8 Q. B. 811 ; *Gulliver v. Cosens*, 1 C. B. 788 ; *Green v. Duckett*, 11 Q. B. D. 275 : 52 L. J. Q. B. 435.

(*t*) 8 Rep. 291 ; Wing, Max., p. 109 ; *Oxley v. Watts*, 1 T. R. 12 : 1

R. R. 193 ; *Bagshaw v. Goward*, Cro. Jac. 147.

(*u*) *Per* Littledale, J., *Smith v. Egginton*, 7 A. & E. 176.

(*x*) See ss. 19, 20.

(*y*) See *Rogers v. Parker*, 18 C. B. 112 : 25 L. J. C. P. 220 ; *Lucas v. Tarleton*, 3 H. & N. 116 : 27 L. J. Ex. 246.

(*z*) See *Winterbourne v. Morgan*, 11 East, 395 ; 10 R. R. 532.

the entry be effected in an unlawful manner (*a*). Nor does it protect from the doctrine of trespass *ab initio* a landlord who distrains upon goods not distrainable by law (*b*). A limit, however, has been set to the doctrine itself in cases where several chattels are seized; for the seizure of one chattel which is seizable by law is not rendered unlawful by the wrongful seizure of another chattel; and consequently a landlord who distrains upon goods some of which are distrainable, but others not, is a trespasser *ab initio* only as regards the latter (*c*).

Seizure of
several
chattels.

Similarly, where several beasts are distrained damage feasant, the subsequent abuse of one does not invalidate the seizure of the others (*d*). On the other hand, both the entry by the lord of a manor to seize a beast as a heriot, and the seizure, are rendered unlawful by the wrongful seizure therewith of an additional beast, for to make the entry good it must be good with reference to the seizure (*e*).

Sheriffs and
gaolers.

A sheriff who enters premises to execute a writ of *fi. fa.* becomes a trespasser by remaining thereon for a longer time than is reasonable for that purpose, and the trespass may be alleged as commencing when the reasonable time expired (*f*). His delay to withdraw, however, does not invalidate his previous seizure of goods under the writ (*g*), nor does it render him a trespasser *ab initio* (*h*). There are authorities which seem to support the contrary proposition (*i*); but it seems that they must be treated now as overruled. A gaoler by detaining a prisoner beyond

(*a*) *Attack v. Bramwell*, 3 B. & S. 520: 32 L. J. Q. B. 146.

(*b*) *Harvey v. Pocock*, 11 M. & W. 740: 12 L. J. Ex. 434.

(*c*) *Harvey v. Pocock*, *supra*.

(*d*) *Dod v. Monger*, 6 Mod. 215.

(*e*) *Price v. Woodhouse*, 1 Exch. 559.

(*f*) *Playfair v. Musgrove*, 14 M. & W. 239: 15 L. J. Ex. 26; *Ash v. Dawnay*, 8 Exch. 237: 22 L. J. Ex.

59; *Lee v. Dangar*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 231: 2 Id. 337: 61 L. J. Q. B. 780.

(*g*) *Lee v. Dangar*, *supra*; see also *Percival v. Stamp*, 9 Exch. 167: 23 L. J. Ex. 25.

(*h*) See *per* Denman, J., [1892] 1 Q. B. 242.

(*i*) *Reed v. Harrison*, 2 W. Bl. 1218; *Aitkenhead v. Blades*, 5 Taunt. 198.

the time at which he ought to be discharged becomes a trespasser (*k*), but not, it appears, a trespasser *ab initio*, because it would be unreasonable to assume that he contemplated that illegality when he first received the prisoner (*l*). It is, probably, for the like reason that a sheriff does not become a trespasser *ab initio* by remaining too long upon premises. For that reason he does not become such by demanding fees to which he is not entitled, and also because such demand is not a trespass (*m*).

The point actually decided in the *Six Carpenters' case* Non-feasance. was that trespass does not lie against a guest at an inn for non-payment of his bill, because a mere non-feasance, not being a trespass, cannot make a man a trespasser *ab initio* (*n*). The importance of the doctrine of trespass *ab initio* was much diminished when the old forms of action were abolished.

With respect to the proposition that the abuse of a Implied licence. licence given by the party does not make a man a trespasser *ab initio*, it may be noticed that if a person wrongfully take my goods and place them on his own close I may enter for the purpose of recaption (*o*), and that the reason given is that I have an implied licence from the wrong-doer (*p*). For the like reason, if my neighbour has wrongfully placed his goods upon my close, I may enter his for the purpose of there depositing them for his use (*q*), or if his cattle have trespassed on to my close, I may drive them back on to his (*r*), and in neither case am I bound to

(*k*) *Moone v. Rose*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 486; 38 L. J. Q. B. 286.

(*l*) *Smith v. Egginton*, 7 A. & E. 167, 176, *per* Littledale, J.

(*m*) *Shorland v. Govett*, 5 C. B. 485, 489, *per* Bayley, J.; see also *Lee v. Dangar*, *supra*.

(*n*) See *West v. Nibbs*, 4 C. B. 172, 187; 17 L. J. C. P. 150; *Jacobsohn v. Blake*, 6 M. & Gr. 919; 13 L. J. C. P. 81; *Gardner v. Campbell*, 15 Johnson (U.S.), 401.

(*o*) Vin. Abr., "Trespass" (I. a.);

Patrick v. Colerick, 3 M. & W. 483; *Burridge v. Nicholls*, 6 H. & N. 383; 30 L. J. Ex. 145.

(*p*) *Per* Parke, B., 3 M. & W. 485; see *per* Littleton, J., Y. B. 9 Ed. IV. 35, where the distinction is drawn between a wrongful taking and a detention after bailment.

(*q*) *Rea v. Sheward*, 2 M. & W. 424.

(*r*) *Tyrringham's case*, 4 Rep. 38 b.

distrain damage feasant. If my horse has been distrained and impounded, I may nevertheless retake it upon the distrainor removing it from the pound and wrongfully working it (*s*); and, generally, if a trespasser take my goods by force from my actual possession, I may, after demand and refusal, use force sufficient to defend my right and to recover them (*t*).

On the other hand, the mere fact that my goods are upon my neighbour's land does not justify my entry thereon to recover them (*u*); nor does the fact that they were placed there by a trespasser who had wrongfully taken them from me (*v*); except, perhaps, in cases where he has feloniously stolen them (*x*), or has taken them to an inn, fair or common (*y*).

It has been said that if my fruit tree hang over my neighbour's land, I may enter his land to gather up the fruit which falls on to it (*z*); but, as I ought not to permit my tree to hang over his land (*a*), this proposition may be doubted. It has been also said that if my tree be blown down by the wind, I may enter the land on to which it falls to retake it (*b*); but, even if that be true (*c*), I may not enter my neighbour's land without leave to retake a

(*s*) *Smith v. Wright*, 6 H. & N. 551.

(*t*) *Blades v. Higgs*, 11 H. L. Cas. 621.

(*u*) *Anthony v. Haney*, 8 Bing. 186; 34 R. R. 670; see *Williams v. Morris*, 8 M. & W. 488.

(*v*) 3 Blac. Comm. 4, 5, citing *Higgins v. Andrewes*, 2 Roll. Rep. 55, 208; 2 Roll. Abr. 564; see *per* Tindal, C.J., and Park, J., 8 Bing. 192, 193; and Com. Dig., "Pleader" (3 M. 39), citing Cro. Eliz. 246.

(*x*) *Ibid.*; see also *Webb v. Beavan*, 6 M. & Gr. 1055. As to entering to search for stolen goods, see *Toplady v. Sealey*, 2 Roll. Abr. 565.

(*y*) 3 Blac. Comm. 5.

(*z*) Vin. Abr., "Trespass" (L. a : 6), citing Latch, 120, *per* Doderidge, J.

(*a*) *Lemmon v. Webb*, [1895] A. C. 1; 64 L. J. Ch. 205; *Smith v. Giddy*, [1904] 2 K. B. 448; 73 L. J. K. B. 894.

(*b*) Vin. Abr., "Trespass" (H. a, 2: 11), citing Latch, 13; *per* Crew, C.J., who cites Y. B. 6 Ed. IV. 7; Bac. Abr., "Trespass" (F.), citing Bro. Tresp. 213 (*qu.*, for 310, where the reference is to Y. B. 6 Ed. IV. 7, *per* Choke, J.).

(*c*) See Story, Bailments, 83 a.

tree which has fallen there through my negligence in cutting it (*d*).

RES IPSA LOQUITUR (*the thing speaks for itself*).

The onus of proving negligence lies upon the party who alleges it, for *ei qui affirmat, non ei qui negat, incumbit probatio* (*e*); and, to establish a case to be left to the jury, he must prove the negligence charged affirmatively, by adducing reasonable evidence of it (*f*). As a rule, the mere proof that an accident has happened, the cause of which is unknown, is not evidence of negligence (*g*).

Under special circumstances, indeed, the mere fact that an accident has happened may be *primâ facie* evidence of negligence, casting upon the party charged with it the onus of proving the contrary, for owing to the nature of the accident, *res ipsa loquitur*. Thus, where a ship in motion collides with a ship at anchor the collision is, generally, *primâ facie* evidence of negligence in the management of the former (*h*), and where two trains of the same railway company collide, the burden of proving that the collision was not due to their servants' negligence falls upon the company (*i*). Similarly, it was held that a *primâ facie* case of negligence was established by evidence that while the plaintiff was lawfully passing under the doorway of the defendants' premises a bag of sugar fell upon him from a crane fixed above the door (*k*), or that while he was lawfully passing along a highway, he was

(*d*) See the authorities cited *supra*, n. (*b*); and 8 Bing. 192, *per* Tindal, C.J.

(*e*) *Per* Ld. Halsbury, 12 App. Cas. 45.

(*f*) *Per Curiam*, 3 H. & C. 601.

(*g*) *Per* Bovill, C.J., *Simpson v. Lond. Gen. Omnibus Co.*, L. R. 8 C. P. 390, 392: 42 L. J. C. P. 112.

(*h*) *The Annot Lyle*, 11 P. D. 114: 55 L. J. Adm. 62; *The Indus*, 12 P. D. 46: 56 L. J. Adm. 88.

(*i*) *Carpue v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co.*, 5 Q. B. 747; *Skinner v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co.*, 5 Exch. 787.

(*k*) *Scott v. London Dock Co.*, 3 H. & C. 596: 34 L. J. Ex. 220.

struck by a brick falling from the defendants' railway bridge (*l*), or by a barrel tumbling out of an upper window of their shop (*m*). For where an accident happens from an inanimate object, which does not ordinarily happen if the persons who have the management of it use proper care, it may sometimes be inferred, in the absence of any explanation from them, that it happened through their want of care (*n*).

The general rule, however, is that where the evidence adduced is equally consistent with the absence as with the existence of negligence in the defendant, the case ought not to be left to the jury (*o*); and the maxim, *res ipsa loquitur*, ought not to be applied unless the facts proved are more consistent with negligence in the defendant than with a mere accident (*p*). It is not enough, it has been said, for the plaintiff to show that he has sustained an injury under circumstances which may lead to a suspicion that there may have been negligence on the part of the defendant, but he must give evidence of some specific act of negligence (*q*).

Accordingly, where damage is done by a horse bolting in the street, the bolting is not in itself evidence of negligence; for it is indisputable that a horse sometimes becomes unmanageable from fright or other cause without want of care or skill in the person who has charge of it (*r*).

(*l*) *Kearney v. L. B. & S. C. R. Co.*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 411: 6 Id. 759: 40 L. J. Q. B. 285.

(*m*) *Byrne v. Boadle*, 2 H. & C. 722; see also *Briggs v. Oliver*, 4 H. & C. 403; and *per* Ld. Halsbury, [1891] A. C. 335.

(*n*) 3 H. & C. 601. The rule is not strictly limited to inanimate things. Where a dog was given into the sole custody of a person as bailee and the dog was lost whilst in his custody, the maxim applied to throw on him the burden of

showing circumstances negating negligence (*Phipps v. New Claridges Hotel, Ltd.*, 22 Times, L. R. 49).

(*o*) *Cotton v. Wood*, 8 C. B. N. S. 568: 29 L. J. C. P. 333.

(*p*) *Crisp v. Thomas*, 63 L. T. N. S. 756; see also *Smith v. Midl. R. Co.*, 57 Id. 813.

(*q*) *Per Willes, J.*, 16 C. B. N. S. 692.

(*r*) *Hammack v. White*, 11 C. B. N. S. 588: 31 L. J. C. P. 129; *Mansoni v. Douglas*, 6 Q. B. D. 145: 50 L. J. Q. B. 289; see also *Holmes*

Again, the maxim ought not to be applied to evidence of an unexplained accident, if the evidence is as consistent with the cause of the accident having been the victim's own negligence, as with its having been that of the defendant. For instance, if a railway company be sued by a widow under Lord Campbell's Act, evidence that her husband's dead body was found on the lines near a level crossing, having been apparently run over by a passing train, is insufficient; for it is not to be presumed that persons are careful when crossing lines; nor is it sufficient to give evidence of acts of negligence, if it remains merely conjectural whether these acts were the cause of the accident (s).

For this reason the decision in *Fenna v. Clare* (t) is perhaps open to criticism. There the only evidence for the plaintiff, a child of tender years, was that she was found on the highway near a spiked wall which was a nuisance, with injuries consistent either with her having stumbled against the spikes while lawfully using the highway, or with her having wrongfully climbed on to the wall (u); yet it was held that the case was properly left to the jury.

In conclusion, it may be observed that, in deciding in any particular case whether the maxim, *res ipsa loquitur*, should be applied, the reported facts of other cases are of little value; each case must be decided upon its own facts.

v. *Mather*, L. R. 10 Ex. 261: 44 L. J. Ex. 176.

(t) [1895] 1 Q. B. 199: 64 L. J. Q. B. 238.

(s) *Wakelin v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, 12 App. Cas. 41: 56 L. J. Q. B. 258; see *Smith v. S. E. R. Co.*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 178: 65 L. J. Q. B. 219.

(u) See, however, *Harrold v. Watney*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 320: 67 L. J. Q. B. 771.

ACTUS NON FACIT REUM NISI MENS SIT REA. (3 *Inst.* 107.)—

“*The intent and the act must both concur to constitute the crime.*” (7 T. R. 514, *per* Lord Kenyon, C.J.)

Two leading cases upon this maxim of our criminal law are *Reg. v. Prince* (*v*) and *Reg. v. Tolson* (*w*). The points actually decided in these cases are mentioned below, but the reader is advised to consult the judgments delivered therein upon the general relation of *mens rea* to crime. In the latter case Stephen, J., though he criticised the above maxim, yet pointed out that the full definition of most crimes contains expressly or by implication a proposition as to a state of mind; that the mental element is often marked by the word “maliciously,” “fraudulently,” “negligently,” or “knowingly,” and that competent age, sanity, and some degree of freedom from some kinds of coercion are assumed to be essential to criminality, though not introduced into the statutory definitions of particular crimes (*x*); while with regard to felony, of which it is said that “it is always accompanied by an evil intention” (*y*), Hawkins, J., defined the term “feloniously” as meaning “with a mind bent on doing wrong, or, as it has been sometimes said, with a guilty mind” (*z*).

General rule. Having regard to the judicial opinions expressed in the above cited cases, and also in later cases, some of which will be referred to shortly, it seems not inaccurate to say that, as a general rule of our law, a guilty mind is an essential ingredient of crime, and that this rule ought to be borne in mind in construing all penal statutes.

Its limitations. The rule, however, is not inflexible, and a statute may relate to such a subject-matter and may be so framed as to make an act criminal whether or not there has been any

(*v*) L. R. 2 C. C. R. 154: 44
L. J. M. C. 122.

(*w*) 23 Q. B. D. 164: 58 L. J.
M. C. 97.

(*x*) 23 Q. B. D. 187.

(*y*) Hawk. P. C., bk. 1, c. 25, s. 3;

see L. R. 1 C. C. R. 289.

(*z*) 23 Q. B. D. 193, 194.

intention to break the law or otherwise to do wrong. There is a large body of municipal law in the present day which is so conceived. Whether a statute should be construed in that sense or as subject to an implied qualification that there must be a guilty mind depends, not entirely upon its language, but also upon its subject-matter, and the various circumstances that make the one construction or the other reasonable, including the nature of the punishment imposed for its infringement (*a*). As an instance of an offence to which a guilty mind is not essential, it may be mentioned that a dealer in tobacco is liable to penalties under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 93, s. 3, for having in his possession adulterated tobacco, although ignorant of the adulteration (*b*).

At common law, an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances which, if true, would make the act for which a man is indicted an innocent act, is a good defence, this defence being embodied in the maxim under consideration (*c*). Accordingly, where a woman is indicted for bigamy, it is a good defence that she believed on reasonable grounds that her husband was dead (*d*), or, where a publican is charged with supplying liquor to a constable on duty, that he similarly believed that the constable was off duty (*e*). Yet, there are several classes of cases to which the doctrine does not apply (*f*), and it has its limitations. It has been held that a prisoner charged, under the Offences against the Person Act, 1861 (*g*), with unlawfully taking an unmarried girl under the age of sixteen out of the possession and against the will of her father is not to be excused merely because he believed that the girl was over that

Mistake or
ignorance
of fact.

(a) See *per* Wills, J., 23 Q. B. D. 172—176, citing several cases in support of this view of the law.

(b) *Reg. v. Woodrow*, 15 M. & W. 404.

(c) *Per* Cave, J., 23 Q. B. D. 181.

(d) *Reg. v. Tolson*, *supra*.

(e) *Sherras v. De Rutzen*, [1895]

1 Q. B. 918 : 64 L. J. M. C. 218. Cf. *Bank of N. S. Wales v. Piper*, [1897] A. C. 383, 390 : 66 L. J. P. C. 73.

(f) See the cases collected in *Sherras v. De Rutzen*, *supra*; and *Hobbs v. Winchester Corporation*, [1910] 2 K. B. 471.

(g) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 25.

age (*h*). One of the grounds, however, for that decision was that, notwithstanding such belief, the prisoner intended to do and did a wrongful or immoral act, and not an innocent act, when he took the girl away (*i*). Moreover, as has been already stated, it may be proper to construe a penal statute as intending that ignorance of a material fact shall not excuse the doing of the act thereby prohibited. Thus, it is an offence for a publican to sell intoxicating liquor to a person who is in fact drunk, and the publican's ignorance of that fact is no excuse (*k*). He can commit the offence of delivering such liquor to a child under fourteen in a vessel not corked and sealed, though he honestly believes it is corked and sealed (*l*).

Master and
servant.

Again, a person may be guilty of an offence of selling milk adulterated with water under s. 6 of the Sale of Food and Drugs Act, 1875 (*m*), although the water has been added by his servant without his knowledge or authority, or by a stranger without his knowledge or authority, and without any default or negligence on his part or the part of any servant of his (*n*). As a general rule, which is founded upon our maxim, a master is not criminally responsible for acts done by his servant without his knowledge, and the condition of the servant's mind is not to be imputed to the master (*o*). But this rule is not absolute, for a man may be indicted for a public nuisance upon his

(*h*) *Reg. v. Prince*, *supra*.

(*i*) See *per* Wills and Cave, JJ., 23 Q. B. D. 179—181.

(*k*) *Cundy v. Le Cocq*, 13 Q. B. D. 207: 53 L. J. M. C. 125.

(*l*) *Brooks v. Mason*, [1902] 2 K. B. 743: 72 L. J. K. B. 19; *cp. Emary v. Nolloth*, [1903] 2 K. B. 264.

(*m*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 63.

(*n*) *Parker v. Alder*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 20: 68 L. J. Q. B. 7; *Brown v. Foot*, 61 L. J. M. C. 110: 66 L. T. 649; see also *Betts v. Armistead*, 20

Q. B. D. 771: 57 L. J. M. C. 100; *Dyke v. Gower*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 220: 61 L. J. M. C. 70; see too *Coppen v. Moore*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 306: 67 L. J. Q. B. 689; and *Christie, Manson & Woods v. Cooper*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 522: 69 L. J. Q. B. 708, cases on offences under the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887.

(*o*) *Chisholm v. Doulton*, 22 Q. B. D. 736: 58 L. J. Q. B. 133; *Massey v. Morriss*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 412: 63 L. J. M. C. 185.

premises caused by the acts of his servants without his knowledge (*p*); and where a penal statute has been infringed by servants and criminal proceedings are taken against the master, although it lies upon the prosecutor to establish the master's liability, yet the question whether he is liable turns necessarily upon what is the true construction to be placed upon the statute (*q*). And in several cases the statute has been construed against the master. For instance, a publican has been held guilty of the offence of supplying liquor to a constable on duty, although it was supplied without his knowledge by his servant (*r*).

It often happens that where it is necessary to prove a man's intention, evidence of overt acts is sufficient, because every man is deemed *primâ facie* to intend the necessary, or even natural or probable consequences of his acts (*s*). Thus, upon an indictment for setting fire to a mill with intent to injure the occupiers, it was held that, as such injury was a necessary consequence of firing the mill, the intent to injure might be inferred from the act (*t*). So, in order to constitute the crime of murder, which is always stated in the indictment to be committed with malice aforethought, it is unnecessary to show that the prisoner had any enmity to the deceased; nor is proof of absence of ill-will any defence, when it is proved that the killing was intentional, and done without justification or excusable cause (*u*).

Evidence of
intention.

(*p*) *Reg. v. Stephens*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 702; 35 L. J. Q. B. 251; see *A.-G. v. Tod Heatley*, [1897] 1 Ch. 560; 66 L. J. Ch. 275.

(*q*) *Coppen v. Moore* (No. 2), [1898] 2 Q. B. 306, 313; 67 L. J. Q. B. 689.

(*r*) *Mullins v. Collins*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 292; 43 L. J. M. C. 67; with which cf. *Newman v. Jones*, 17 Q. B. D. 132; 55 L. J. M. C. 113. See other instances collected in *Coppen v. Moore*, *supra*; and see *Anglo-American Oil Co. v. Manning*, [1908] 1 K. B. 536; 77 L. J. K. B. 205.

(*s*) *Per* Ld. Campbell, 9 Cl. & F. 321; *per* Littledale, J., *R. v. Moore*, 3 B. & Ad. 188; 37 R. R. 383, and *Reg. v. Lovett*, 9 C. & P. 466; *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *R. v. Dixon*, 3 M. & S. 15; 15 R. R. 381 (cited *Reg. v. Hicklin*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 375); *R. v. Harvey*, 2 B. & C. 261, 264, 267; *Reg. v. Martin*, 8 Q. B. D. 54; *Reg. v. Halliday*, 61 L. T. N. S. 701.

(*t*) *R. v. Farrington*, Russ. & Ry. 207.

(*u*) *Per* Best, J., 2 B. & C. 268.

And it is, as a general proposition, true, that if an act manifestly unlawful and dangerous be done deliberately, the mischievous intent will be presumed, unless the contrary be shown (*v*). If a man knowingly utters a forged instrument as a genuine one, the intent to defraud the party to whom he utters it is a necessary inference (*w*).

Drunkenness. Although drunkenness, as a general rule, is no excuse for crime, yet it may be a circumstance to be taken into consideration where the question is with what intention an act was done; for a person may be so drunk as to be incapable of forming any intention (*x*). In a case where a woman was charged with attempting to commit suicide, Jervis, C.J., said: "If the prisoner was so drunk as not to know what she was about, how can you say that she intended to destroy herself?" (*y*). In a trial for murder where the evidence was that the prisoner was drunk when he committed the offence, Lord Coleridge, J., directed the jury that "if the mind at that time is so obscure by drink, if the reason is dethroned and the man is incapable therefore of forming that intent (*i.e.* the intent to kill or inflict serious injury), it justifies the reduction of the charge from murder to manslaughter;" and this direction was held right (*z*).

Murder. In cases of murder the degree of provocation which will reduce the offence to manslaughter and negative malice aforethought has been elaborately considered in the authorities given below (*a*), and may be briefly summed up thus: "if the act was done while smarting under provocation of such a character and so recent that the prisoner might reasonably be considered at the time not to be master of his reason, then the crime is manslaughter; but if the act was

(*v*) 1 East, P. C. 231.

(*w*) *R. v. Hill*, 2 Mood. C. C. 30;
8 C. & P. 274.

(*x*) *Per Patteson, J., Reg. v. Cruse*,
8 C. & P. 546.

(*y*) *Reg. v. Moore*, 3 C. & K. 319.

(*z*) *Rex v. Meade*, [1909] 1 K. B.

895; 78 L. J. K. B. 476.

(*a*) *Stedman's case*, Fos. 292; *R. v. Fisher*, 8 C. & P. 182; *R. v. Walters*, 12 St. Tr. 113; *R. v. Thomas*, 7 C. & P. 817; *R. v. Kirkman*, 8 C. & P. 115.

done with premeditation, in a spirit of revenge, or under such circumstances that he ought to be considered master of his reason at the time when the act was done, then the crime is murder" (b).

It is a rule, laid down by Lord Mansfield, which has been said to comprise all the principles of previous decisions upon the subject, that so long as an act rests in bare intention, it is not punishable by our law; but when an act is done, the law judges not only of the act itself, but of the intent with which it was done; and if the act be coupled with an unlawful and malicious intent, though in itself the act would otherwise have been innocent, yet, the intent being criminal, the act likewise becomes criminal and punishable (c).

Bare
intention.

It is accordingly important to distinguish an attempt (d) from a bare *intention*; for the former a man may be made answerable; but not for the latter. The "will is not to be taken for the deed," unless there be some external act which shows that progress has been made in the direction of it, or towards maturing and effecting it. If there be an attempt, if there be something tangible and ostensible of which the law can take hold, which can be alleged and proved, there is nothing offensive to our ideas of justice in declaring it to be punishable. Hence, an attempt to commit a felony is, in many cases, a misdemeanor; and the general rule is, that "an attempt to commit a misdemeanor is a misdemeanor, whether the offence is created by statute, or was an offence at common law" (e). Moreover, under various statutes, attempts to commit particular offences are indictable and

Attempt.

(b) See further on the subject, Stephen's Digest of the Crim. Law (1877), p. 147.

(c) *R. v. Scofield*, cited 2 East, P. C. 1028; *Dugdale v. Reg.*, 1 E. & B. 435, 439.

(d) Which Dr. Johnson defines to be an "essay" or "endeavour" to

do an act: Dict. *ad verb.* See *Reg. v. M'Pherson*, Dears. & B. 197; *Reg. v. Cheeseman*, L. & C. 140; *Reg. v. Duckworth*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 83.

(e) *Per Parke, B., R. v. Roderick*, 7 C. & P. 795.

punishable, and the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 9, enables a jury to convict of the attempt upon an indictment for commission of the substantive offence, wherever the evidence suffices to establish the one though not the other (*f*).

A man who, by an overt act, attempts to commit a particular crime, but fails to commit it, may be convicted of the attempt, notwithstanding that the failure was inevitable. For instance, if he put his hand into another's pocket, intending to steal whatever he may find in it, he may be convicted of the attempt to steal although there was nothing in the pocket (*g*).

Remoteness.

It is worthy of remark that in *Reg. v. Eagleton* (*h*), the Court, after observing that, although "the mere intention to commit a misdemeanor is not criminal, some act is required to make it so," added, "we do not think that all acts towards committing a misdemeanor are indictable. Acts remotely leading towards the commission of the offence are not to be considered as attempts to commit it, but acts immediately connected with it are." The doctrine of "remoteness," already commended on (*i*), has here, consequently, an important application.

Our law, with a view to determining the intention, sometimes couples together two acts which were separated the one from the other by an appreciable interval of time, and ascribes to the later act that character and quality which undeniably attached and was ascribable to the earlier; and the doctrine of relation is also occasionally brought into play to determine the degree of guilt of an offender. Thus, if A., whilst engaged in the prosecution of a felonious act, undesignedly causes the death of B., A. may be convicted of murder, the felonious purpose conjoined with the

(*f*) See *Reg. v. Hapgood*, L. R. C. 471.

1 C. C. 221; 39 L. J. M. C. 83.

(*g*) *Reg. v. Brown*, 24 Q. B. D. 357, 359; 59 L. J. M. C. 47; *Reg. v. Ring*, 61 L. J. M. C. 116; which cases overrule *Reg. v. Collins*, L. &

C. 515. See *Reg. v. Roberts*, Id. 539; *Reg. v. Gardner*, Dears. & B. 40, with which compare *Reg. v. Martin*, L. R. 1 C. C. 56.

(*i*) *Ante*, pp. 179, 189.

homicide being held to fill out the legal conception of that crime (*j*). So, in *Reg. v. Riley* (*k*), a felonious intent was held to relate back, and couple itself with a continuing act of trespass, so as, taken in connection with it, to constitute the crime of larceny.

Having thus briefly discussed the general rule, that "there must be as an essential ingredient in a criminal offence some blameworthy condition of mind" (*l*), it remains to add that such condition of mind cannot justly be imputed to persons who, by reason of their mental imbecility, or immature years, are "under a natural disability of distinguishing between good and evil" (*m*); the maxims of our own, as of the civil law, upon this subject, being, *in omnibus pœnalibus judiciis et ætati et imprudentiæ succurritur* (*n*), and *furiosi nulla voluntas est* (*o*).

With regard to insanity, the rule is that every person is presumed to be sane until the contrary be proved, and that to establish the defence of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of committing the act charged, the defendant "was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of mind, as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing what was wrong" (*p*).

The question whether a criminal intention may be ascribed to an infant depends upon the infant's age. An infant under seven years of age cannot be guilty of felony, for the law presumes that he is *doli incapax*, and against this presumption no averment can be received (*q*). An infant above seven but under fourteen years, *primâ facie*,

(*j*) Fost. Disc. Hom. 258, 259; Crim. L. Com., 1st Rep. 40, 41.

(*k*) Dears. 149; see also *Reg. v. Ashwell*, 16 Q. B. D. 190; 55 L. J. M. C. 65.

(*l*) *Per Cave, J.*, 22 Q. B. D. 741.

(*m*) 1 Hawk. P. C. 1.

(*n*) D. 50, 17, 108.

(*o*) D. 50, 17, 5; D. 1, 18, 13, § 1. *Furiosus furore solum punitur*; 4 Blac. Comm. 24.

(*p*) *R. v. M'Naghten*, 10 Cl. & F. 210.

(*q*) *Marsh v. Loader*, 14 C. B. N. S. 535; 1 Hale, P. C. 27, 28.

is *doli incapax*, but the maxim, *malitia supplet ætatem* (*r*), applies: malice, or the intention to do a wrongful act, makes up for the want of mature years. Accordingly, this presumption of incapacity may, generally, be rebutted by strong and pregnant evidence of a mischievous discretion, but the evidence ought to be strong and clear beyond all doubt and contradiction (*s*). Two questions should be left to the jury, first whether the infant committed the acts charged, and, secondly, whether he had at the time a guilty knowledge that he was doing wrong (*t*). It is, however, an irrebuttable presumption of law that a boy under fourteen years of age cannot, by reason of physical inability, commit rape or any offence of carnal knowledge (*u*). Yet for aiding and abetting such offence he may be found guilty as a principal in the second degree (*x*), and he may be convicted of an indecent assault (*y*).

In the case of an infant who has attained fourteen years of age, there is no presumption that he is *incapax doli*, and his acts are subject to the same rule of construction as the acts of an adult (*z*). He may be convicted of larceny as a bailee (*a*).

Connected with the subject of criminal intention are two important rules relative thereto; the first is, *in criminalibus sufficit generalis malitia intentionis cum facto paris gradûs*—if the malefactor conceive a malicious intent in the execution of which he does harm to another person he is equally guilty, although he had no intention of doing that particular person an injury (*b*). The second is, *excusat*

(*r*) Dyer, 104 b.

(*s*) 4 Blac. Comm. 23, 24; Hale, P. C. 26, 27.

(*t*) *R. v. Owen*, 4 C. & P. 236.

(*u*) *Reg. v. Waite*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 600; 61 L. J. M. C. 187.

(*x*) 1 Hale, P. C. 630; *R. v. Eldershaw*, 3 C. & P. 396.

(*y*) *Reg. v. Williams*, [1893] 1

Q. B. 320; 62 L. J. M. C. 69.

(*z*) 1 Hale, P. C. 25. As to his liability for misdemeanor, see 4 Blac. Comm. 22; *R. v. Sutton*, 3 A. & E. 597.

(*a*) *Reg. v. McDonald*, 15 Q. B. D. 323.

(*b*) *Reg. v. Smith*, Dears. 559.

aut extenuat delictum in capitalibus quod non operatur in civilibus—in capital cases the law is in favour of life, and will not punish with death unless a malicious intention appear (c); but it is otherwise in civil actions, where the intent may be immaterial if the act done were injurious to another (d); of which rule a familiar instance occurs in the liability of a sheriff, who, by mistake, seizes under a *fi. fa.* the goods of the wrong person. So, an action for the infringement of a patent “is maintainable in respect of what the defendant *does*, not of what he *intends*” (e); the patentee is not the less prejudiced because the invasion of his right was unintentional (f).

One case, in which the principle *in favorem vite*, adverted to by Lord Bacon, was considered, may here be noticed, since it involves a point of considerable importance. It was decided by the House of Lords, on writ of error from the Court of Queen’s Bench in Ireland, that the privilege of peremptory challenge on the part of the prisoner extends to all felonies, whether capital or not; and it was observed by Wightman, J., commenting on the position, that the privilege referred to is allowed only *in favorem vite*, and did not extend to cases where the punishment is not capital, that it would seem that the origin of the privilege in felony may have been the capital punishment usually incident to the quality of crime; but that the privilege was, at all events, annexed to the quality of crime called felony, and continued so annexed in practice in England (at least down to the time when the question was raised), in all cases of felony, whether the punishment was capital or not (g).

(c) Bacon’s Maxims, reg. 7.

(d) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, 2 East, 103—104.

(e) *Stead v. Anderson*, 4 C. B. 806, 834; *Lee v. Simpson*, 3 C. B. 871, cited judgm., *Reade v. Conquest*, 11 C. B. N. S. 492.

(f) *Per* Shadwell, V.-C., *Heath v. Unwin*, 15 Sim. 552; S. C., 5 H. L. Cas. 505.

(g) *Gray v. Reg.*, 11 Cl. & F. 427; *Mulcahy v. Reg.*, L. R. 3 H. L. 306. The right of peremptory challenge by the Crown was much

In all criminal cases whenever upon the evidence given a reasonable doubt as to the prisoner's guilt or innocence is raised, the best rule is to incline to an acquittal. *Tutius semper est errare in acquietando quam in puniendo, ex parte misericordie, quam ex parte justitie* (h).

NEMO DEBET BIS VEXARI PRO UNA ET EADEM CAUSA.

(5 Rep. 61.)—It is a rule of law that a man shall not be twice vexed for one and the same cause (i).

Roman law.

By the Roman law, as administered by the prætors, an action might be defended by showing such acts as might induce the prætor, on equitable grounds, to declare certain defences admissible, the effect of which, if established, would be not, indeed, to destroy the action *ipso jure*, but to render it ineffectual by means of the "exception" thus specially prescribed by the prætor for the consideration of the judge to whose final decision the action was referred. The class of exceptions just adverted to included the *exceptio rei judicatæ*, from which our own law presumably derived the plea of judgment recovered (k). The *res judicata* was in fact, a result of the definitive sentence or decree of the judge, and was binding upon, and in general unimpeachable by, the litigating parties (l); and this was expressed by the well-known maxim, *res judicata pro veritate accipitur* (m), which, however, it must be understood, applied only when the same question as had already been judicially decided was again raised between the same parties, the rule

considered in *Mansell v. Reg.*, 8 E. & B. 54.

(h) 2 Hale, P. C. 290.

(i) 5 Rep. 61. *Bona fides non patitur ut bis idem exigatur*; D. 50, 17, 57.

(k) See 1 Cl. & F. 435; Phillimore, Rom. L. 43.

(l) Brisson. ad verb. *Res.*; Pothier, ad D. 42, 1, pr.

(m) D. 50, 17, 207.

being *exceptionem rei judicatæ obstare quoties eadem quæstio inter easdem personas revocatur* (n).

In our own law, the plea of judgment recovered at once suggests itself as analogous to the "*exceptio rei judicatæ*" above mentioned, and as directly founded on the general rule that "a man shall not be twice vexed for the same cause." "If an action be brought, and the merits of the question be discussed between the parties, and a final judgment (o) obtained by either, the parties are concluded, and cannot canvass the same question again in another action, although, perhaps, some objection or argument might have been urged upon the first trial, which would have led to a different judgment (p). In such a case, the matter in dispute having passed in *rem judicatam*, the former judgment, while it stands, is conclusive between the parties, if either attempts, by commencing another action, to re-open that matter; and for this rule two reasons are always assigned: the one, public policy, for *interest rei publicæ ut sit finis litium*; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be twice vexed for the same cause (q).

Doctrine of
our law as to
res judicata.

(n) D. 44, 2, 3; Pothier, ad D. 44, 1, 1, pr.

(o) See *Langmead v. Maple*, 18 C. B. N. S. 255; *Nouvion v. Freeman*, 15 App. Cas. 1: 59 L. J. Ch. 337. A judgment or sentence "is a judicial determination of a cause agitated between real parties; upon which a real interest has been settled. In order to make a sentence, there must be a real interest, a real argument, a real prosecution, a real defence, a real decision. Of all these requisites, not one takes place in the case of a fraudulent and collusive suit. There is no judge: but a person invested with the ensigns of a judicial office is misemployed in listening to a fictitious cause proposed to him; there is no party litigating, there is no

party defendant, no real interest brought into question;" *per Wedderburn, S.-G.*, arg. in *Duchess of Kingston's case*, 20 Howell, St. Tr. 478; adopted by *Ld. Brougham, Earl of Bandon v. Becher*, 3 Cl. & F. 510. As to fictitious special cases, see *Doe v. Duntze*, 6 C. B. 100; *Bright v. Tyndall*, 4 Ch. D. 189.

(p) *Per Ld. Kenyon, Greathead v. Bromley*, 7 T. R. 456; 4 R. R. 490. See *Ld. Bagot v. Williams*, 3 B. & C. 235; 27 R. R. 340; *Jewsbury v. Mummery*, L. R. 8 C. P. 56; *Hall v. Levy*, 10 Id. 154; *Shoe Machinery Co. v. Cutlan*, [1896] 1 Ch. 667; 65 L. J. Ch. 314.

(q) *Lockyer v. Ferryman*, 2 App. Cas. 519.

A party who relies upon the doctrine of *res judicata* "must show either an actual merger or that the same point has already been decided between the same parties" (r). Our subject may therefore be divided into two branches: merger of cause of action, and estoppel by matter of record, with both of which we propose briefly to deal.

Merger of
cause of
action.

The doctrine of merger was thus clearly stated in the well-known judgment in *King v. Hoare* (s). "If there be a breach of contract, or wrong done, or any other cause of action by one against another, and judgment be recovered in a Court of record, the judgment is a bar (t) to the original cause of action, because it is thereby reduced to a certainty, and the object of the suit attained so far as it can be at that stage; and it would be useless and vexatious to subject the defendant to another suit for the purpose of obtaining the same result. Hence the legal maxim, *transit in rem judicatam*: the cause of action is changed into matter of record, which is of a higher nature, and the inferior remedy is merged in the higher. This appears to be equally true, where there is but one cause of action, whether it be against a single person or several. The judgment of a Court of record changes the nature of that cause of action, and prevents it being the subject of another suit, and the cause of action, being single, cannot be afterwards divided into two."

In accordance with this exposition of the law, the general rule (u) is that a judgment, without satisfaction, recovered against one of two joint debtors (x), or one of two joint

(r) *Per Willes, J., Nelson v. Couch*, 15 C. B. N. S. 108.

(s) 13 M. & W. 494, 504.

(t) It must be pleaded; *Edevain v. Cohen*, 43 Ch. D. 188.

(u) See 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 11; see also R. S. C., O. 13, r. 4; O. 14, r. 5; *Weall v. James*, 68 L. T. 515; *McLeod v. Power*, [1898] 2 Ch. 295.

(x) *King v. Hoare, supra*; *Hammond v. Schofield*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 453; *Hoarc v. Niblett*, Id. 781: 60 L. J. Q. B. 565. As to partnership debts, see 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 9; cf. *Kendall v. Hamilton*, 4 App. Cas. 504; *Re Hodgson*, 31 Ch. D. 177: 55 L. J. Ch. 241.

wrongdoers (*y*), may be pleaded as a bar to a subsequent action against the other. This rule, however, does not apply where the liability for a debt is several as well as joint, for then a judgment against one of the debtors is not a bar to an action against the other upon his several liability, until the judgment has been satisfied (*z*); and if one of two joint debtors give his cheque for the debt, an unsatisfied judgment upon the cheque does not bar an action for the debt against the other debtor, for the cause of action is not the same (*a*).

The question whether a defendant is being vexed again for the *same* cause of action depends, not upon technical considerations, but upon matter of substance (*b*). One test of identity is that the same evidence will support both actions (*c*). In *Brunsdon v. Humphrey* (*d*), the defendant had damaged the plaintiff's cab, and also caused him personal injuries, by the same act of negligence. Having sued for and recovered damages in respect of the cab, the plaintiff sued again for the personal injuries. The majority in the Court of Appeal, applying the above test, held that the second action was not barred. While fully recognising the rule that where there is but one cause of action damages must be assessed once for all, they considered that since two distinct rights of the plaintiff had been infringed, he had a separate cause of action in respect of each of those rights.

Meaning of
"same cause
of action."

Although the cause of action is the same, yet to constitute the former recovery a bar, "the circumstances must be such that the plaintiff might have recovered in the former suit that which he seeks to recover in the second" (*e*). The

Further
remedy.

(*y*) *Brinsmead v. Harrison*, L. R. 7 C. P. 547 : 41 L. J. C. P. 19.

(*z*) *Bermondsey Vestry v. Ramsey*, L. R. 6 C. P. 247 : 40 L. J. C. P. 206.

(*a*) *Wegg-Prosser v. Evans*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 108 : 64 L. J. Q. B. 1.

(*b*) 14 Q. B. D. 148.

(*c*) 2 W. Bl. 831 : 2 B. & P. 71 : 31 L. J. Ch. 350.

(*d*) 14 Q. B. D. 141 : 53 L. J. Q. B. 476 ; cf. *Macdougall v. Knight*, 25 Q. B. D. 1 : 59 L. J. Q. B. 517.

(*e*) *Per Willes, J.*, 15 C. B. N. S. 109 ; *Midland R. Co. v. Martin*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 172 : 62 L. J. Q. B. 517. See *Wright v. London Gen. Omnibus Co.*, 2 Q. B. D. 271.

defendant's ship having negligently run down the plaintiff's ship at sea, the plaintiff, by proceeding *in rem* in Admiralty, obtained a sale of the defendant's ship and received the sum thereby realised; but as this sum compensated him only for a portion of his loss, he then brought a common law action for damages for the recovery of the residue, and it was held that the Admiralty decree was not a bar to the action (*f*).

Vexatious
litigation.

When a party to litigation seeks improperly to raise again the identical question which has been decided by a competent Court, a summary remedy may be found in the inherent jurisdiction which our Courts possess of preventing an abuse of process (*g*). Moreover, the legislature has provided means for preventing further abuse of process by any person who has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings without reasonable ground (*h*). Although it is not a good defence in law to an action brought in this country that another action between the same parties for the same cause is pending in a foreign country, yet the Court here will interfere to protect the defendant from such double litigation if it be shown that it is in fact vexatious (*i*).

Estoppel by
record.

The distinction between merger and estoppel by record was thus explained by Lord Ellenborough in *Outram v. Morewood* (*k*). "It is not the recovery, but the matter alleged by the party, and upon which the recovery proceeds, which creates the estoppel. The recovery of itself in an action of trespass is only a bar to the future recovery of damages for the same injury: but the estoppel precludes parties and privies from contending to the contrary of that point, or matter of fact, which having been once distinctly put in issue by them, or by those to whom they are privy in

(*f*) *Nelson v. Couch*, 15 C. B. N. S. 99.

(*g*) *Stephenson v. Garnett*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 678: 67 L. J. Q. B. 447.

(*h*) 59 & 60 Vict. c. 51.

(*i*) *McHenry v. Lewis*, 22 Ch. D. 397; *Peruvian Guano Co. v. Bockwoldt*, 23 Id. 225; *The Christiansborg*, 10 P. D. 141: 54 L. J. A. 84.

(*k*) 3 East, 345, 354.

estate or law (*l*), has been, on such issue joined, solemnly found against them." "According to the practice of every Court, after a matter has once been put in issue and tried, and there has been a finding or a verdict upon that issue, and thereupon a judgment, such finding and judgment are conclusive between the same parties on that issue. In all Courts it would be treated as an estoppel" (*m*).

A judgment by consent, or by default (*n*), however, raises an estoppel no less than does a judgment which results from a decision of the Court after a matter has been fought out to the end (*o*). A judgment by consent is intended to put a stop to litigation between the parties, and a reasonable interpretation should be given to it, in order to prevent questions which were really involved in the action from being litigated again (*p*).

Judgment by consent.

The following rules relative to judgments being given in evidence in civil suits are taken from the famous opinion of the judges, delivered by De Grey, C.J., in the *Duchess of Kingston's case* (*q*). They were prefaced by a reference to the principle, on which the limitation of estoppel *per rem judicatam* to parties and privies depends, embodied in the maxim, *res inter alios acta alteri nocere non potest* (*r*).

Rules laid down in *Duchess of Kingston's case*.

(*l*) See *Mercantile, &c., Co. v. River Plate, &c., Co.*, [1894] 1 Ch. 578: 63 L. J. Ch. 366; *Young v. Holloway*, [1895] P. 87.

(*m*) Judgm., *Finney v. Finney*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 484. See *Conradi v. Conradi*, Id. 514; *Butler v. Butler*, [1894] P. 25; *Ruck v. Ruck*, [1896] P. 152; *Humphries v. Humphries*, [1910] 2 K. B. 531.

(*n*) *Huffer v. Allen*, L. R. 2 Ex. 15.

(*o*) *Re S. American Co.*, [1895] 1 Ch. 37: 63 L. J. Ch. 803; *The Belcairn*, 10 P. D. 161: 55 L. J. P. 3; *Ribble Joint Committee v. Croston U. D. C.*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 251: 66 L. J. Q. B. 384; see *G. N.-W. Central R. Co. v. Charlebois*, [1899] A. C. 114.

(*p*) *Per* Ld. Herschell, [1895] 1 Ch. 50. If parties consent to the withdrawal of a juror, no future action can be maintained for the same cause; *Gibbs v. Ralph*, 14 M. & W. 805; see *Strauss v. Francis*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 379: 35 L. J. Q. B. 133.

(*q*) 20 Howell, St. Tr. 537: 2 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 731.

(*r*) See *post*, Chap. X. This maxim applies where a party sues first in one capacity, and then in another, and as a different person in law; see *Leggott v. G. W. R. Co.*, 1 Q. B. D. 599: 45 L. J. Q. B. 557; *Re Deeley's Patent*, [1895] 1 Ch. 687: 64 L. J. Ch. 480.

1. "The judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, as a plea, a bar, or, as evidence, conclusive, between the same parties, upon the same matter, directly in question in another Court." That is to say, as later authorities show, it is conclusive as evidence, if pleaded in bar: but if not so pleaded, it is not conclusive, unless there has been no opportunity of pleading it (s).

2. "The judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another Court, for a different purpose."

3. "But neither the judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within the jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognisable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment." For a judgment "is final only for its own proper purpose and no further" (t).

Collusive
proceedings.

In the *Duchess of Kingston's case*, in which these three rules were enunciated, the Duchess, being indicted for bigamy, sought to rely upon a sentence against her marriage with her husband, pronounced in a suit between them for jactitation of marriage; this sentence had been obtained by fraud and collusion, and the judges were unanimously of opinion that proof that it had been so obtained wholly destroyed the effect of such sentence. And it may be safely laid down that the maxim, *nemo debet bis vexari pro eadem causâ*, can never be relied upon where the former proceedings were fraudulent and collusive. For instance, in *Girdlestone v. Brighton Aquarium Co. (u)*, which was an action to

(s) *Vooght v. Winch*, 2 B. & Ald. 662; 21 R. R. 446; *Doe v. Huddart*, 2 C. M. & R. 316; *Doe v. Wright*, 10 A. & E. 763; *Magrath v. Hardy*, 4 Bing. N. C. 782; *Feversham v. Emerson*, 11 Exch. 385.

(t) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, 3 East, 357; *per* Bruce, V.-C., *Barry v.*

Jackson, 1 Y. & C. 585, 595 (see *per* Ld. Selborne, 6 Q. B. D. 304); *Hobbs v. Henning*, 17 C. B. N. S. 826. See also *Concha v. Concha*, 11 App. Cas. 541; 29 Ch. D. 268.

(u) 3 Ex. D. 187; 4 Id. 107; 48 L. J. Ex. 373.

recover a penalty incurred by keeping the Aquarium open on a Sunday, the defendants pleaded a judgment already recovered for the same penalty by another informer; but the plaintiff replied, and proved at the trial, that this judgment was recovered by covin and collusion between the parties thereto, who had previously agreed that such judgment should not be enforced; and it was therefore held that such fictitious judgment was no bar to the action.

It may be further observed that a judgment of a Court in a matter which is beyond its statutory jurisdiction does not operate as an estoppel (*v*).

The maxim *nemo debet bis vexari pro unâ et eâdem causâ* Criminal law. expresses a great fundamental rule of our criminal law, which forbids that a man should be put in jeopardy twice for one and the same offence. It is the foundation of the special pleas of *autrefois acquit* and *autrefois convict* (*x*). When a criminal charge has been once adjudicated upon General rule. by a Court of competent jurisdiction, that adjudication is final, whether it takes the form of an acquittal or a conviction, and it may be pleaded in bar of a subsequent prosecution for the same offence, whether charged with or without matters of mere aggravation, and whether such matters relate to the intent with which the offence was committed or to the consequences of the offence (*y*). Provided that the adjudication be by a Court of competent jurisdiction, it is immaterial whether it be upon a summary proceeding before justices or upon a trial before a jury (*z*).

Accordingly, a man, who has been indicted for an offence and acquitted, may not be indicted again for the same offence, provided that the first indictment were such that he could have been lawfully convicted upon it by proof of the facts alleged in the second indictment; and if he be thus Previous acquittal.

(*v*) *Toronto Railway v. Toronto Corporation*, [1904] A. C. 809: 73 (*y*) *Reg. v. Miles*, 24 Q. B. D. 423, 431: 59 L. J. M. C. 56.
L. J. P. C. 120. (*z*) *Id.*; *Wemyss v. Hopkins*, L. R. 10 Q. B. 378, 381.

(*x*) 2 Hawk. P. C., c. 35, s. 1; c. 36, s. 10.

L.M.

indicted again, his plea of *autrefois acquit* is a good bar to the indictment. The true test by which to decide whether a plea of *autrefois acquit* is a sufficient bar in any particular case is, whether the evidence necessary to support the second indictment would have been sufficient to procure a legal conviction upon the first (*a*). Thus an acquittal upon an indictment for the murder may be pleaded to an indictment for the manslaughter of the same person, and an acquittal upon an indictment for burglary and larceny to an indictment for the larceny of the same goods; for in either of these cases the prisoner might have been convicted, on the first indictment, of the offence charged in the second (*b*).

Previous
conviction.

Similarly, the plea of *autrefois convict* operates to bar a second indictment after the prisoner has been prosecuted to conviction for what is substantially the same offence (*c*). *Nemo debet bis puniri pro uno delicto* (*d*); and it is an established principle that out of the same state of facts a series of prosecutions against a prisoner is not to be allowed (*e*); for instance, upon this ground a conviction for obtaining credit for goods by false pretences bars a further indictment for larceny of the same goods (*f*). The pleas of *autrefois convict* and *autrefois acquit*, however, apply "only where there has been a former judicial decision on the same accusation in substance;" and therefore where, after a summary conviction for an assault, the victim of the assault died, it was held that an indictment for manslaughter still lay against his assailant (*g*).

Abortive
trial.

Although our law forbids that a man should be again put in peril, after his conviction or acquittal upon a verdict given by a jury on a good indictment on which he could be legally convicted: yet an abortive trial without a verdict is no legal

(*a*) Arch. Cr. Pl., 22nd ed. 155.

L. T. 668: 24 T. L. R. 873.

(*b*) 2 Hale, P. C. 245, 246.

(*f*) Reg. v. King, [1897] 1 Q. B.

(*c*) Arch. Cr. Pl., 22nd ed. 159.

214: 66 L. J. Q. B. 87.

(*d*) 4 Rep. 43.

(*g*) Reg. v. Morris, L. R. 1 C. C. R.

(*e*) Reg. v. Eltrington, 1 B. & S. 90.

688, 696; Welton v. Tanenbarne, 99

bar to a second trial either on the same or a fresh indictment; for instance, the jury, if unable to agree upon a verdict, may be discharged, and another jury be summoned (*h*). Moreover, the conviction or acquittal of a party is strictly, not by the verdict of the jury, but by the judgment of the Court thereon (*i*), and a plea of *autrefois convict* could not be founded upon a judgment of conviction after the reversal of that judgment for error (*k*).

The dismissal at petty sessions of a bastardy summons is no bar in law to a second summons, for it is not an adjudication (*l*). But an order of quarter sessions, quashing an affiliation order made at petty sessions, is an adjudication whereby a second bastardy summons is barred (*m*).

The legislature has frequently recognised the maxim under review; for instance, after a trial upon an indictment for committing an offence, another indictment for attempting to commit it is forbidden by the same enactment as allows a verdict of guilty of the attempt to be found upon the earlier indictment (*n*). Again, it has been enacted that where an act or omission constitutes an offence under two or more Acts, or both under an Act and at common law, the offender shall, unless the contrary intention appears, be liable to be punished under either or any of those Acts or at common law, but shall not be liable to be punished twice for the same offence (*o*).

Statutory
recognition of
maxim.

It is important to notice how narrow are the limits within which a conviction operates as a judgment *in rem*. A judgment of conviction on an indictment for forging a

(*h*) *Winsor's case*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 289, 390.

(*i*) See *per Tindal*, C.J., 7 M. & Gr. 504, 505.

(*k*) *Reg. v. Drury*, 18 L. J. M. C. 189.

(*l*) *Reg. v. Gaunt*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 466; see *Williams v. Davies*, 11 Q. B. D. 74.

(*m*) *Reg. v. Glynn*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 16. But it is not a bar to an action for seduction brought by the master of the woman, because it is *res inter alios acta*; *Anderson v. Collinson*, [1901] 2 K. B. 107; 70 L. J. K. B. 620.

(*n*) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 9.

(*o*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 33.

cheque is conclusive, as between all persons, as to the prisoner being a convicted felon, but it is not even admissible evidence of the forgery in a subsequent action on the cheque (*p*).

(*p*) See *per* Blackburn, J., L. R. [1896] 2 Q. B. 462.
4 H. L. 434; cited by Smith, L.J.,

CHAPTER VI

ACQUISITION, ENJOYMENT, AND TRANSFER OF PROPERTY.

THIS chapter contains three sections, treating respectively of the acquisition, enjoyment, and transfer of property. In connection with the first of these subjects, one maxim only has been considered, which sets forth the principle, that title is acquired by priority of occupation; a principle so extensively applicable that the following pages give little more than a mere outline of a course of investigation, which, if pursued in detail, would prove alike interesting and instructive. It is, indeed, only proper to observe *in limine*,—since, from the titles which have been selected with a view of showing the mode of treatment adopted, much more might be expected in the ensuing pages than has been attempted,—that a succinct statement of only the more important of the rights, liabilities, and incidents annexed to property is here offered; so that a perusal of the contents of this chapter may prove serviceable in recalling the attention of the *practitioner* to the application and illustration of principles with which he must necessarily be already familiar; and may, without wearying his attention, direct the *student* to sources of information whence may be derived more copious supplies of knowledge.

§ I.—THE MODE OF ACQUIRING PROPERTY.

QUI PRIOR EST TEMPORE POTIOR EST JURE. (*Co. Litt.* 14 a.)—*He has the better title who was first in point of time.*

Title by
priority of
occupation

The title of the finder to unappropriated land or chattels must evidently depend either upon the law of nature, upon international law, or upon the laws of that particular community to which he belongs. According to the law of nature, there can be no doubt that priority of occupancy alone constitutes a valid title: *quod nullius est id ratione naturali occupanti conceditur* (a); but this rule has been so much restricted by the advance of civilization, by international laws, and by the civil and exclusive ordinances of each separate state, that it is now of little practical application. It is, indeed, true, that an unappropriated tract of land, or a desert island, may legitimately be seized and reduced into possession by the first occupant, and, consequently, that the title to colonial possessions may, and in some cases, does, in fact, depend upon priority of occupation. But within the limits of this country, and between subjects, it is apprehended that the maxim which we here propose to consider, has no longer any direct application as regards the acquisition of title to reality by entry and occupation. It is, moreover, a general rule, that whenever the owner or person actually seised of land dies intestate and without heir, the law vests the ownership of such land either in the Crown (b), or in the subordinate lord of the fee, by escheat (c); and this is in accordance with the spirit of the ancient feudal doctrine expressed in the maxim, *quod nullius est, est domini regis* (d).

(a) D. 41, 1, 3; I. 2, 1, 12.

(b) So, "there is no doubt that, by the law of the land the Crown is entitled to the undisposed-of personal estate of any person who happens to die without next of kin;" 14 Sim.

18; *Robson v. A.-G.*, 10 Cl. & F. 497; *Dyke v. Walford*, 5 Moore, P. C. 434.

(c) 2 Blac. Com. 244.

(d) Fleta, lib. 3; Bac. Abr., "Prerogative" (B).

On the maxim, *prior tempore, potior jure*, may depend, however, the right of property in treasure trove, in wreck, derelicts (e), waifs, and estrays, which being *bona vacantia*, belong by the law of nature to the first occupant or finder, but which have, in some cases, been annexed to the supreme power by the positive laws of the state (f). "There are," moreover, "some few things which, notwithstanding the general introduction and continuance of property, must still unavoidably remain in common; being such that nothing but an usufructuary property is capable of being had in them; and therefore they still belong to the first occupant during the time he holds possession of them, and no longer. Such (among others) are the elements of light, air, and water, which a man may occupy by means of his windows, his gardens, his mills, and other conveniences. Such, also, are the generality of those animals which are said to be *feræ naturæ*, or of a wild and untameable disposition (g); which any man may seize upon and keep for his own use or pleasure. All these things, so long as they remain in possession, every man has a right to enjoy without disturbance; but, if once they escape from his custody or he voluntarily abandon the use of them, they return to the common stock, and any man else has an equal right to seize and enjoy them afterwards" (h).

So, the finder of a chattel lying apparently without an

(e) Goods are "'derelict' which have been voluntarily abandoned and given up as worthless, the mind of the owner being alive to the circumstances at the time;" *per* Tindal, C.J., *Legge v. Boyd*, 1 C. B. 112.

(f) The reader is referred for information on these subjects to 2 Comby Broom & Hadley, Chap. XXVI.

(g) See *Rigg v. Earl of Lonsdale*, 1 H. & N. 923; 11 Exch. 654;

followed in *Blades v. Higgs*, 12 C. B. N. S. 501; *Morgan v. Earl of Abergavenny*, 8 C. B. 768; *Ford v. Tynte*, 31 L. J. Ch. 177; *Hannam v. Mockett*, 2 B. & C. 934; 26 R. R. 591; *Ibbotson v. Peat*, 3 H. & C. 644.

(h) 2 Blac. Com. 14; Wood, Civ. L., 3rd ed. 82; *Holden v. Smallbrooke*, Vaugh. 187. See *Acton v. Blundell*, 12 M. & W. 324, 333; Judgm., *Embrey v. Owen*, 6 Exch. 369, 372; *Chasemore v. Richards*, 2 H. & N. 168; 7 H. L. Cas. 349.

owner, may, by virtue of the maxim under notice, acquire a special property therein (i). But chattels lying upon private lands are, *primâ facie*, in the possession of the owner of the land, and he is therefore entitled to them, in the absence of a better title elsewhere (k).

As against a wrong-doer, mere right to possession constitutes a valid title, and the wrong-doer cannot set up *jus tertii* against one whose claim to the goods in question rests on possession and nothing more (l).

Primogeni-
ture.

In accordance with the maxim, *qui prior est tempore potior est jure*, the rule in descents is, that amongst males of equal degree the eldest inherits land in preference to the others, unless, indeed, there is a particular custom to the contrary; as in the case of gavelkind, by which land descends to all the males of equal degree together; or borough English, according to which the youngest son succeeds on the death of his father; or burgage tenure, which prevails in certain towns, and is characterised by special customs (m). Where A. had three sons, and D., the youngest, died, leaving a daughter, E., and then A. purchased lands in borough English, and died, it was held, in accordance with the custom, that the lands should go to E. (n). The right of primogeniture above-mentioned does not, however, exist amongst females, and, therefore

(i) *Armory v. Delamirie*, 1 Stra. 504 (cited, *White v. Mullett*, 6 Exch. 7; and distinguished in *Buckley v. Gross*, 3 B. & S. 564; *Bridges v. Hawkesworth*, 21 L. J. Q. B. 75. See also *Waller v. Drakeford*, 1 E. & B. 749; *Mortimer v. Cradock* (C. P.), 7 Jur. 45; *Merry v. Green*, 7 M. & W. 623.

"There is no authority," however, "nor sound reason for saying that the goods of several persons which are accidentally mixed together thereby absolutely cease to be the property of their several

owners, and become *bona vacantia*;" *Spence v. Union Marine Ins. Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 438. See *ante*, p. 236.

(k) *S. Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 44.

(l) *Jeffries v. G. W. R. Co.*, 5 E. & B. 806; *Glenwood Lumber Co. v. Phillips*, [1904] A. C. 405, 410; 73 L. J. P. C. 62.

(m) 2 Blac. Com. 83, 84. See *Muggleton v. Barnett*, 1 H. & N. 282; 2 Id. 653.

(n) *Clements v. Scudamore*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1024.

if a person dies possessed of land, leaving daughters only, they take jointly as co-parceners (o).

The maxim now under consideration usually determines the rights of persons who make conflicting claims to real property. At law the general rule clearly is that different conveyances of the same lands take effect according to their priority in time, and that prior possession is of no avail against prior title. Equity follows the law, and, where the legal estate is outstanding in a first unsatisfied mortgagee, of two subsequent equitable incumbrancers he who is prior in time is prior in equity (p). Equitable incumbrancers are ranked, as a rule, according to the dates of their securities: *Qui prior est tempore potior est jure*; the first grantee is *potior*, that is *potentior*; he has a better and superior, because a prior, equity (q).

The maxim, however, is, in our law, subject to an important qualification, that "where equities are equal, the legal title prevails." Equality here means, not equality in point of time, but the absence of circumstances rendering the conduct of one of the rival claimants less meritorious. Equitable owners who are upon an equality in this respect may struggle for the legal estate, and he who obtains it, having then both law and equity on his side, is in a better position than he who has equity only. This doctrine is not confined to tacking mortgages, but applies in favour of all equitable owners or incumbrancers for value without notice of prior equitable interests, who get in the legal estate from persons committing no breach of trust in conveying it to them (r). A later incumbrancer, who purchases without notice, and who afterwards acquires the legal estate, may hold it, as a rule,

(o) 2 Blac. Com. 187, 356, 385. In *Godfrey v. Bullock*, 1 Roll. 623, n. (3); cited 2 Ld. Raym. 1027; the custom was, that, in default of issue male the eldest daughter should have the land.

(p) *Jones v. Jones*, 8 Sim. 641—643.

(q) *Phillips v. Phillips*, 4 D. F. & J. 215; 31 L. J. Ch. 325.

(r) *Bailey v. Barnes*, [1894] 1 Ch. 25, 36, 37; 63 L. J. Ch. 73.

against one whose equitable title is prior in point of time; and the mere fact that he has notice of the prior equitable incumbrance when he acquires the legal estate is immaterial (s).

Tacking.

This doctrine of the protection given by the legal estate (t) enables a legal mortgagee, who makes further advances upon the security of the mortgaged property, to "tack" as against mesne incumbrancers of which he had no notice when he made such advances; and also enables an equitable mortgagee, who afterwards acquires the legal estate, to "tack" as against prior equitable mortgagees of whom he had no notice when he took his own equitable mortgage. This right of tacking, whereby priority is gained, never arises unless the legal estate is held or acquired; one equitable incumbrance cannot be tacked to another, for "in all cases where the legal estate is outstanding, the several incumbrances must be paid according to their priority in time" (u); and it is essential to the right to tack a later incumbrance as against an earlier that the latter be taken without notice of the earlier (v).

Mortgagee
and tenant.

A mortgagee may, (subject to the Conveyancing Act, 1881) (w), eject, without notice to quit, a tenant who claims under a lease from the mortgagor, granted *after* the mortgage, and without the mortgagee's privity; for the tenant stands in the place of the mortgagor, and the possession of the mortgagor cannot be considered as holding out a false appearance, since it is of the very nature of the transaction that the mortgagor should continue in possession; and

(s) *Taylor v. Russell*, [1892] A. C. 244, 255, 259: 61 L. J. Ch. 657.

(t) The doctrine no longer affects lands in Yorkshire; see 47 & 48 Vict. c. 54, s. 16. It was temporarily abolished by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 7; but that section was repealed by 38 & 39 Vict. c. 87, s. 129.

(u) *Brace v. Duchess of Marlborough*, 2 P. Wms. 491, 495.

(v) *Hopkinson v. Rolt*, 9 H. L. Cas. 514: 34 L. J. Ch. 468. See further as to tacking, *Marsh v. Lee*, 1 Wh. & T., L. C. in Eq.

(w) 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 18.

whenever one of two innocent parties must be a loser, then the rule applies, *qui prior est tempore, potior est jure*. If, in the instance just given, one party must suffer, it is he who has not used due diligence in looking into the title (*x*).

With regard to equitable interests in personal property, the general rule is that an assignee for value, who, at the date of the assignment to him, had no notice of an earlier assignment, obtains priority by giving notice, to the person who has legal dominion over the fund, before notice is given by the earlier assignee: a rule which applies generally to assignments of choses in action, or of such interests in real estate as can only reach the hands of the beneficiary or assignor in the shape of money, but not to assignments of an equitable interest in real estate, such as an equity of redemption (*y*). If the fund be in Court, a stop-order is equivalent to notice (*z*). If the notices be given contemporaneously, then the assignments take effect according to their dates (*a*).

Choses in
action.

The above rule as to gaining priority by notice does not, however, apply as between the assignees for value of equitable rights in shares of companies governed by the Companies Clauses Consolidation Act, 1842, or the Companies (Consolidation) Act, 1908, for such companies are relieved by statute from the duty of taking any notice of equitable rights in their shares (*b*); except, indeed, in so far as such notice affects their own right of charging the shares with debts due from the shareholder (*c*). Consequently, where two persons claim title to shares registered in the name of a third, the earlier title usually prevails, and not that of which the company first had notice (*d*).

Shares.

(*x*) *Keech v. Hall*, Dougl. 21.

(*y*) *Ward v. Duncombe*, [1893] A.C. 369, 384, 390: 62 L. J. Ch. 881; and cases there collected.

(*z*) *Mack v. Postle*, [1894] 2 Ch. 449, 455: 63 L. J. Ch. 593.

(*a*) *Calisher v. Forbes*, L. R. 7 Ch. 109.

(*b*) *Société General v. Walker*, 11 App. Cas. 20: 55 L. J. Ch. 169; *Powell v. L. & Provincial Bank*, [1893] 2 Ch. 555: 62 L. J. Ch. 795.

(*c*) *Bradford Bank v. Briggs*, 12 App. 29: 56 L. J. Ch. 364.

(*d*) *Moore v. N. W. Bank*, [1891] 2 Ch. 599: 60 L. J. Ch. 627.

Bills of sale.

If two or more bills of sale be given, comprising the same chattels, their priority generally depends now upon the order of date, not of their execution, but of their registration (*e*). Thus an earlier bill of sale, whether absolute or by way of security, if not registered, cannot prevail against an absolute bill of sale, given later, but registered (*f*). But a bill of sale given by way of security is void, except as against the grantor, in respect of chattels of which the grantor is not the "true owner" at the time of the execution of the bill of sale (*g*), and therefore it cannot acquire priority, through registration, over an earlier absolute bill of sale, not registered (*h*). This reasoning, however, does not apply as between two absolute bills of sale, or two bills of sale given by way of security (*i*). A person who buys goods by a bill of sale and leaves the seller in possession of the goods, now runs the risk of the seller delivering the goods, under a sale or pledge, to a person receiving them in good faith and without notice of the previous sale (*k*).

Transfers
of ships.

Assignments of ships and shares therein are not affected by the Bills of Sale Acts (*l*), but are regulated, as regards registered British ships, by the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894 (*m*). If there are more mortgages than one registered in respect of the same ship or share, the mortgagees, notwithstanding any express, implied or constructive notice, are entitled in priority, one over the other, according to the date at which each mortgage is recorded in the register book, and not according to the date of each mortgage itself (*n*).

(*e*) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31, s. 10.

(*f*) *Conelly v. Steer*, 7 Q. B. D. 520; *Lyons v. Tucker*, Id. 523: 50 L. J. Q. B. 661; see also 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, s. 8.

(*g*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43, s. 5.

(*h*) *Tuck v. Southern Counties Deposit Bank*, 42 Ch. D. 471.

(*i*) *Thomas v. Searles*, [1891] 2

Q. B. 408; 60 L. J. Q. B. 722.

(*k*) See 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45, s. 8; 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 25 (1).

(*l*) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31, s. 4; see *Gapp v. Bond*, 19 Q. B. D. 200: 56 L. J. Q. B. 438.

(*m*) 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, ss. 24—46.

(*n*) Id. s. 33; see *Black v. Williams*, [1895] 1 Ch. 408; *Barclay &*

Bottomry bonds form an exception to the rule. If bonds are given at different periods of a voyage, and the value of the ship is insufficient to discharge them all, the last in point of date is entitled to priority of payment, because the last loan furnished the means of preserving the ship, and without it the former lenders would have entirely lost their security—*salvam fecit totius pignoris causam* (o).

Bottomry
bonds.

The respective rights of execution creditors *inter se* must often be determined by applying the maxim as to priority. Where two writs of execution against the same person are delivered to the sheriff, his duty is to execute both, giving priority to that which first came to his hands (p); unless, indeed, the earlier writ be void as against the later, in which case he must disregard the earlier in favour of the later (q). For instance, where goods seized under a *fi. fa.* founded on a judgment fraudulent against creditors remain in the sheriff's hands, or are capable of being seized by him, he ought to sell, or seize and sell, such goods under a subsequent writ of *fi. fa.* founded on a *bonâ fide* debt (r). Where, moreover, a party is in possession of goods apparently the property of a debtor, the sheriff who has a *fi. fa.* to execute is bound to inquire whether the party in possession is so *bonâ fide*, and, if he find that the possession is held under a fraudulent or an unregistered (s) bill of sale, he is bound to treat it as null and void, and levy under the writ (t).

Priority of
execution.

A writ of *fi. fa.* or other writ of execution against goods, binds the property in the goods of the execution debtor as

Co., Ltd. v. Poole, [1907] 2 Ch. 284: 76 L. J. Ch. 488.

(o) *Abbott, Shipping*, 14th ed. 196.

(p) *Dennis v. Whetham*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 345: 43 L. J. Q. B. 129.

(q) See *per Cave, J.*, 14 Q. B. D. 969.

(r) *Christopherson v. Burton*, 3 Exch. 160; *Shattock v. Carden*, 6

Exch. 725; *Inrray v. Magnay*, 11 M. & W. 267; *Drewe v. Lainson*, 11 A. & E. 529.

(s) See *Ex p. Blaisberg*, 23 Ch. D. 254.

(t) *Lovick v. Crowder*, 8 B. & C. 135, 137; *Warmoll v. Young*, 5 B. & C. 660, 666. See, also, the cases cited, Arg., 12 M. & W. 664.

from the time when the writ is delivered to the sheriff to be executed ; but subject to the rule that the writ does not prejudice the title to such goods acquired by a person in good faith, and for valuable consideration, unless he had, when he acquired his title, notice that such writ, or any other writ by virtue whereof the debtor's goods might be seized or attached, had been delivered to and remained unexecuted in the hands of the sheriff (*u*).

Patents.

We may observe that the law relative to patents and to copyright is referable to the maxim as to priority. With respect to patents, the general rule is that the original inventor of a machine, who has first brought his invention into actual use, is entitled to priority as patentee, and that consequently a subsequent original inventor cannot avail himself of the invention ; and this is evidently in accordance with the rule, *qui prior est tempore, potior est jure* (*x*). If, therefore, several persons simultaneously discover the same thing, the party first communicating it to the public under the protection of the patent is the legal inventor, and is entitled to the benefit of it (*y*).

A person, however, to be entitled to a patent for an invention must be *the first and true inventor* (*z*) ; so that, if there be any public user thereof by himself or others before the grant of the patent (*a*), or if the invention has been previously made public in this country by a description contained in a work, whether written or printed, which has been publicly circulated, one who afterwards takes out a patent for it is not the true and first inventor within the

(*u*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 26. See *Hobson v. Thelluson*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 642.

(*x*) See 3 Wheaton (U.S.), R. App. 24.

(*y*) *Per* Abbott, C.J., *Forsyth v. Riviere*, Webs. Pat. Cas. 97, n. ; *per* Tindal, C.J., *Cornish v. Keene*, Id. 508.

(*z*) See Norman Pat. Chap. 8.

(*a*) *Househill Coal and Iron Co. v. Neilson*, 9 Cl. & F. 788. See *Brown v. Ammandale*, Webs. Pats. Cas. 433. And generally, in regard to the question, what is such prior user as will avoid a patent, see Norman Pat. Chap. 5.

21 Jac. 1, c. 3, even though, in the latter case, he has not borrowed his invention from such publication (b). But a communication from abroad of a manufacture openly published there may be the subject of a patent in this country, and an importer of an invention from abroad is an inventor (c). A communication made in England by one British subject to another of an invention never published in this country does not make the person to whom the invention is communicated the first and true inventor (d).

Although it is generally true that a new principle, or *modus operandi*, carried into practical and useful effect by the use of new instruments, or by a new combination of old ones, is an original invention, for which a patent may be supported (e); yet, if a person merely substitute, for part of a patented invention, some well-known equivalent, whether chemical or mechanical, this, being in truth but a colourable variation, amounts to an infringement of the patent (f); and where letters patent were granted for improvements in apparatus for manufacturing certain chemical substances, and the jury found that the apparatus was not new, but that the patentee's mode of connecting the parts of that apparatus was new, the Court, in an action for an alleged infringement of the patent, directed the verdict to be entered for the defendant, upon an issue taken as to the novelty of the invention (g); and "no sounder or more wholesome doctrine" in reference to

(b) *Stead v. Williams*, 7 M. & Gr. 818; *Stead v. Anderson*, 4 C. B. 806. See *Booth v. Kennard*, 2 H. & N. 84. See Patent Act, 1883, 46 & 47 Vict. c. 57, s. 33 *et seq.*

(c) *Re Claridge's Patent*, 7 Moo. P. C. 394.

(d) *Marsden v. Saville Street Foundry Co.*, 3 Ex. D. 203.

(e) *Boulton v. Bull*, 2 H. Bla. 463; 3 R. R. 439; S. C., 8 T. R. 95; *Hall's case*, Webs. Pat. Cas. 98; cited, *per* Ld. Abinger, *Losh v. Hague*, Id.

207, 208; *Holmes v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 12 C. B. 831, 851. See *Tetley v. Easton*, 2 C. B. N. S. 106; *Patent Bottle Envelope Co. v. Seymer*, 5 Id. 164.

(f) See *Heath v. Unwin*, 13 M. & W. 583; S. C., 12 C. B. 522; 5 H. L. Cas. 505. And see further on this subject, *Newton v. Gr. Junction R. Co.*, 5 Exch. 331; *Newton v. Vaucher*, 6 Exch. 859.

(g) *Gamble v. Kurtz*, 3 C. B. 425.

this subject was ever established than that a patent cannot be had "for a well-known mechanical contrivance merely when it is applied in a manner or to a purpose which is not quite the same, but is analogous to the manner or the purpose in or to which it has been hitherto notoriously used" (*h*).

Copyright.

Copyright in a published book means the sole and exclusive liberty of printing or otherwise multiplying copies of the book (*i*). Such right is now regulated entirely by statute law (*k*), and is the property, for a term of years, of the author and his assigns (*i*). The great object of such law is to stimulate, by the protection given, the composition and publication of learned and useful works (*l*) ; and the author's right rests upon the like principle as that of a patentee, viz., priority of invention, coupled with publication. Copyright in his book can be acquired by a British subject wherever resident, or by an alien friend while resident in British dominions, and is acquired throughout such dominions by publishing the book first in the United Kingdom (*m*), or, as a rule, by producing it first in a British possession (*n*). With regard to books first published in a foreign country, copyright in this country can only exist by virtue of Orders in Council under the International Copyright Acts (*o*).

§ II.—PROPERTY—ITS RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES.

This section contains remarks upon the legitimate mode of enjoying property, the limits and extent of that enjoyment, and the rights and liabilities attaching to it. The maxims

(*h*) *Per* Ld. Westbury, *Harwood v. G. N. R. Co.*, 11 H. L. Cas. 632.

(*i*) 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, ss. 2, 3.

(*k*) *Jefferys v. Boosey*, 4 H. L. Cas. 815: 24 L. J. Ex. 81.

(*l*) *Per* Ld. Cairns, L. R. 3 H. L. 108.

(*m*) See 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45; *Routledge v. Low*, L. R. 3 H. L. 100: 37 L. J. Ch. 454.

(*n*) See 49 & 50 Vict. c. 33, s. 8.

(*o*) See 49 & 50 Vict. c. 33; *Pitts v. George*, [1896] 2 Ch. 866: 66 L. J. Ch. 1.

commented upon, in connection with this subject, are four : that a man shall so use his own property as not to injure his neighbour ; that the owner of the soil is entitled to that which is above and underneath it ; that what is annexed to the freehold usually becomes subject to the same rights of ownership ; that “ every man’s house is his castle.”

SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LĒDAS. (9 Rep. 59).—

Enjoy your own property in such a manner as not to injure that of another person (p).

A man must enjoy his own property in such a manner as not to invade the legal rights of his neighbour: *expedit reipublicæ ne suâ re quis male utatur* (g). “Every man,” observed Lord Truro (r), “is restricted against using his property to the prejudice of others;” and “the principle embodied in the maxim, *sic utere tuo ut alienum non lēdas*, applies to the public in at least as full force as to individuals. There are other maxims equally expressive of the principle: *nihil quod est inconveniens est licitum* (s), and *salus reipublicæ suprema lex*” (t). To so large a class of cases, indeed, and under circumstances so dissimilar, is the rule before us capable of being applied, that we can here merely suggest some few leading illustrations, omitting references to many reported decisions which might equally well exemplify its meaning.

Injuries caused by a wrongful use of property.

In the first place, then, we must observe that, as a rule,

(p) Such is the literal translation of the above maxim ; its true legal meaning would rather be, “So use your own property as not to injure the rights of another.” See Arg., *Jeffries v. Williams*, 5 Exch. 797.

The maxim is cited, commented on, or applied, in *Bonomi v. Backhouse*, E. B. & E. 637, 639, 643 : 9 H. L. Cas. 511 ; *Chasemore v.*

Richards, 7 H. L. Cas. 388 ; per Pollock, C.B., *Bagnall v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 7 H. & N. 440 ; *Williams v. Groucott*, 4 B. & S. 149, 155—156.

(g) I. 1, 8, 2.

(r) *Egerton v. Earl Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Cas. 195.

(s) *Ante*, p. 150.

(t) *Ante*, p. 1.

the invasion of an established right, of itself, constitutes an injury, for which damages are recoverable; for "in all civil acts our law does not so much regard the intent of the actor as the loss and damage of the party suffering." In *trespass qu. cl. fr.*, the defendant pleaded that he had land adjoining plaintiff's close, and upon it a hedge of thorns; that he cut the thorns, and that they, *ipso invito*, fell upon the plaintiff's land, and the defendant took them off as soon as he could. On demurrer, judgment was given for the plaintiff, on the ground that, "though a man do a lawful thing, yet if damage thereby befalls another, he shall answer it, if he could have avoided it" (u). So, where the defendants planted on their own land, about four feet from their boundary fence, a yew tree, which grew so as to project beyond the fence and over an adjoining field hired by the plaintiff for pasture, and his horse, feeding in the field, ate of that part of the yew tree which so projected, and thereby died of poison: it was held that the defendants were liable for the value of the horse (x).

Accordingly, "in considering whether a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for damage which the latter has sustained, the question often is, not whether the defendant has acted with due care and caution, but whether his acts have occasioned the damage:" and this doctrine "is founded on good sense. For when one person in managing his own affairs causes, however innocently, damage to another, it is obviously only just that he should be the party to suffer. He is bound *sic uti suo ut non ledat alienum*" (y).

(u) See *Lambert v. Bessey*, T. Raym. 422; *Weaver v. Ward*, Hob. 134; per Blackstone, J., *Scott v. Shepherd*, 3 Wils. 403; per Ld. Kenyon, *Haycraft v. Creasy*, 2 East, 104; 6 R. R. 380; *Turberville v. Stampe*, 1 Ld. Raym. 264; *Jones v. Festiniog R. Co.*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 735; *Vaughan v. Menlove*, 3 Bing. N. C. 468; *Piggott v. E. Counties R. Co.*,

3 C. B. 229; *Grocers' Co. v. Donne*, 3 Bing. N. C. 34; *Aldridge v. G. W. R. Co.*, 4 Scott, N. R. 156.

(x) *Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board*, 4 Ex. Div. 5: 48 L. J. Ex. 109; *Hurdman v. N. E. R. Co.*, 3 C. P. D. 168: 47 L. J. C. P. 368.

(y) Per Ld. Cranworth, *Rylands v. Fletcher*, L. R. 3 H. L. 341, citing *Lambert v. Bessey*, *supra*.

In the next place, it may be laid down, as a true proposition, that, although bare negligence unproductive of damage to another will not give a right of action, negligence causing damage will do so (z); negligence being defined to be "the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided upon those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing something which a prudent and reasonable man would not do" (a); negligence, moreover, not being "absolute or intrinsic," but "always relative to some circumstances of time, place, or person," imposing a duty to take care (b).

Having thus premised, the following instances will serve to show in what manner the maxim placed at the head of these remarks is applied, to impose restrictions, first, upon the enjoyment of property (c), and secondly, upon the conduct of each individual member of the community. In illustration of the first branch of the subject, we may observe, that, if a man build a house so close to mine that his roof overhangs mine, and throws the water off upon it, this is a

Injury to
neighbour's
house.

(z) See *Broom's Com.*, 4th ed. 656; *Whitehouse v. Birmingham Co.*, 27 L. J. Ex. 25; *Bayley v. Wolverhampton Co.*, 6 H. & N. 241; *Duckworth v. Johnson*, 4 Id. 653.

(a) *Per Alderson, B., Blyth v. Birmingham Co.*, 11 Exch. 784. See also *Heaven v. Pender*, 11 Q. B. D. 503; *Le Lievre v. Gould*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 491.

Laches has been defined to be "a neglect to do something which by law a man is obliged to do;" *per* *Ld. Ellenborough, Sebag v. Abitbol*, 4 M. & S. 462; adopted by *Abbott, C.J., Turner v. Hayden*, 4 B. & C. 2.

(b) *Judgm., Degg v. Midland R. Co.*, 1 H. & N. 781; approved in *Potter v. Faulkner*, 1 B. & S. 800. As to proof of negligence, see *ante*, p. 253; *Assop v. Yates*, 2 H. & N. 768; *Perren v. Monmouthshire R.*

Co., 11 C. B. 855; *Vose v. Lanc. & Y. R. Co.*, 2 H. & N. 728; *Harris v. Anderson*, 14 C. B. N. S. 499; *Reeve v. Palmer*, 5 Id. 84; *Manchester R. Co. v. Fullarton*, 14 Id. 54; *Roberts v. G. W. R. Co.*, 4 Id. 506; *North v. Smith*, 10 Id. 572; *Manley v. St. Helen's Canal Co.*, 2 H. & N. 840; *Willoughby v. Horridge*, 12 C. B. 742; *Templeman v. Haydon*, Id. 507; *Melville v. Doidge*, 6 C. B. 450; *Grote v. Chester & Holyhead R. Co.*, 2 Exch. 251; *Dansey v. Richardson*, 3 E. & B. 144; *Roberts v. Smith*, 2 H. & N. 213; *Cashill v. Wright*, 6 E. & B. 891; *Houlder v. Soulbey*, 8 C. B. N. S. 254.

(c) See *per Holt, C.J., Tenant v. Goldwin*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1092—1093, followed in *Hodgkinson v. Enmor*, 4 B. & S. 241.

nuisance, for which an action lies (*d*). So, an action lies, if, by an erection on his own land, he causes a nuisance by obstructing my ancient lights and windows (*c*); for a man has no right to erect a new edifice on his ground so as to prejudice what has long been enjoyed by another (*f*): *edificare in tuo proprio solo non licet quod alteri noceat* (*g*). In like manner, if a man, in pulling down his house, occasion damage to, or accelerate the fall of, his neighbour's, he will be liable, provided there was negligence on the part of those engaged in pulling down the house; and he will not be exonerated from liability by employing a competent contractor to do the work. Therefore, where the defendant and the plaintiff occupied adjoining houses, and the defendant rebuilt his house, employing a competent builder and architect for that purpose, and in the course of the work the workmen employed by the builder began to fix a staircase, and, in so doing, negligently and without the knowledge of the defendant or his architect cut into a party wall dividing the defendant's house from the plaintiff's, and thereby injured the plaintiff's house; it was held that the defendant was liable (*h*). The operation being a hazardous one, the defendant was bound to see that it was carried out with reasonable care and skill, and he could not avoid responsibility by delegating the control of that operation to a third person, however competent that person might be. It would seem that the defendant's duty in such a case

(*d*) *Penruddocke's case*, 5 Rep. 100; *Fay v. Prentice*, 1 C. B. 328.

(*e*) *Colls v. Home and Colonial Stores*, [1904] A. C. 179; 73 L. J. Ch. 484.

(*f*) See *per* Pollock, C.B., *Bagnall v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 7 H. & N. 440; S. C., 1 H. & C. 544, which well illustrates the maxim commented on. See *Dodd v. Holme*, 1 A. & E. 493; recognised *Bradbee v. Mayor of London*, 5 Scott, N. R. 120;

Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220; recognising *Wyatt v. Harrison*, 3 B. & Ad. 871; 37 R. R. 566; *Brown v. Windsor*, 1 Cr. & J. 20.

(*g*) 3 Inst. 201.

(*h*) *Percival v. Hughes*, 9 Q. B. D. 441; 51 L. J. Q. B. 388; 8 App. Cas. 443. See also *Bradbee v. Mayor of London*, 5 Scott, N. R. 120; *per* Ld. Denman, *Dodd v. Holme*, 1 A. & E. 505. See *Peyton v. Mayor of London*, 9 B. & C. 725; 33 R. R. 311.

does not go beyond the exercise of reasonable care and skill, and that although the law has been varying somewhat in the direction of treating parties engaged in such a work, as insurers of their neighbours, or warranting them against injury, it has not quite reached that point (i).

The mere circumstance of juxtaposition does not, in the absence of any right of easement, render it necessary for a person who pulls down his wall to give notice of his intention to the owner of an adjoining wall, nor is such person, if he be ignorant of the existence of the adjoining wall, bound to use extraordinary caution in pulling down his own (j).

Neither is any "obligation towards a neighbour cast by law on the owner of a house, merely as such, to keep it repaired in a lasting and substantial manner: the only duty is to keep it in such a state that his neighbour may not be injured by its fall; the house may, therefore, be in a ruinous state, provided it be shored sufficiently, or the house may be demolished altogether" (k). Where, however, several houses belonging to the same owner are built together, so that each requires the support of the adjoining house, and the owner parts with one of these houses, the right to such support is not thereby lost (l).

As between the owner of the surface of land and the owner of subjacent mineral strata, and as between owners of adjoining mines, questions frequently arise involving a consideration of the maxim, *sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas* (m), and needing an interpretation of it not too much

(i) *Per* Ld. Fitzgerald, *Hughes v. Percival*, 8 App. Cas., p. 455.

(j) *Chadwick v. Trower*, 6 Bing. N. C. 1; reversing S. C., 3 Id. 334; cited 5 Scott, N. R. 119; *Grocers' Co. v. Donne*, 3 Bing. N. C. 34; *Davis v. L. & Blackwall R. Co.*, 2 Scott, N. R. 74; see *per* Collins, L.J., *Southwark, &c., Co. v. Wandsworth B. of W.*, [1898] 2 Ch. 613.

See further, as to the right to

support by an adjacent house, *Solomon v. Vintners' Co.*, 4 H. & N. 585; *Angus v. Dalton*, 6 App. Cas. 740.

(k) Judgm., *Chauntler v. Robinson*, 4 Excu. 170. As to the right of support for a sewer, see *Met. Board of Works v. Metr. R. Co.*, L. R. 4 C. P. 192; 38 L. J. C. P. 172.

(l) *Richards v. Rose*, 9 Exch. 218.

(m) See *Williams v. Groucott*, 4 B. & S. 149.

curtailing the rights of ownership. In *Humphries v. Brogden* (n), the plaintiff, being the occupier of the surface of land, sued the defendant for working the subjacent minerals negligently and improperly, and without leaving any sufficient pillars and supports, and contrary to the custom of mining in that district; *per quod* the surface gave way. Issue being joined on a plea of not guilty, it was proved at the trial that plaintiff occupied the surface, which was not built upon, and defendant the subjacent minerals, but there was no evidence showing how the occupation of the superior and inferior strata came into different hands. The jury found that the defendant had worked the mines carefully and according to the custom, but without leaving sufficient support for the surface. And the Court held, that upon this finding the verdict should be for the plaintiff, because of common right the owner of the surface is entitled to support from the subjacent strata.

The *primâ facie* rights and obligations of parties so situated relatively to each other may, however, be varied by the production of title deeds or other evidence (o).

In *Smith v. Kenrick* (p), the mutual obligations of the owners of adjoining mines were much considered, and it was there laid down that "it would seem to be the natural right

(n) 12 Q. B. 739 (with which cf. *Hilton v. Whitehead*, Id. 734); *Haines v. Roberts*, 7 E. & B. 625; S. C., 6 Id. 643; *Rowbotham v. Wilson*, 8 H. L. Cas. 348; S. C., 8 E. & B. 123, 6 Id. 593; *Smart v. Morton*, 5 E. & B. 30; *Backhouse v. Bonomi*, 9 H. L. Cas. 503; S. C., E. B. & E. 503; *Davis v. Treharne*, 6 App. Cas. 460; *A.-G. v. Conduit Co.*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 301.

(o) *Per* Ld. Campbell, in *Humphries v. Brogden*, and *Smart v. Morton*, *supra*; *Rowbotham v. Wilson*, *supra*.

There is no general right to the

support of land by subjacent water; *Popplewell v. Hodgkinson*, L. R. 4 Ex. 248; 38 L. J. Ex. 126. See *Jordeson v. Sutton Gas Co.*, [1899] 2 Ch. 217; *Trinidad Asphalt Co. v. Ambard*, [1899] A. C. 594; but see also *Salt Union v. Brunner, Mond & Co.*, [1906] 2 K. B. 822; 76 L. J. K. B. 55.

(p) 7 C. B. 15, 564; with which cf. *Baird v. Williamson*, 15 C. B. N. S. 376, which is distinguished from *Smith v. Kenrick*, *supra*, by Ld. Cranworth, *Rylands v. Fletcher*, L. R. 3 H. L. 341—342; 37 L. J. Ex. 161.

of each of the owners of two adjoining coal mines—neither being subject to any servitude to the other—to work his own in the manner most convenient and beneficial to himself, although the natural consequence may be that some prejudice will accrue to the owner of the adjoining mine, so long as that does not arise from the negligent or malicious conduct of the party.” It has accordingly been held that if in consequence of a mine owner on the rise working out his minerals, water comes by natural gravitation into the mines of the owner on the dip, the latter cannot maintain an action if the working is carried on with skill, and in the usual manner (q). But if one mine owner in working his own mine diverts a natural watercourse, or causes by artificial means more water to come into his mine than otherwise would come, whereby an adjoining mine is flooded, the mine owner is liable for the damage so caused (r).

From the above and similar cases we may infer that much caution is needed in applying the maxim under our notice—in determining how far it may, on a given state of facts, restrict the mode in which property may be enjoyed or used: a principle here applicable under very dissimilar circumstances being, that “if a man brings or uses a thing of a dangerous nature on his own land, he must keep it in at his own peril, and is liable for the consequences if it escapes and does injury to his neighbour” (s). “The person,” therefore, “whose grass or corn is eaten down by the escaping cattle of his neighbour, or whose mine is flooded by the water from his neighbour’s reservoir (t), or

(q) *Wilson v. Waddell*, 2 App. Cas. 95; see *Hurdman v. N. E. R. Co.*, 3 C. P. D. 168; 47 L. J. C. P. 368.

(r) *Baird v. Williamson*, 15 C. B. N. S. 376; 33 L. J. C. P. 101; *Fletcher v. Smith*, 2 App. Cas. 781; 47 L. J. Ex. 4; *Crompton v. Lea*, L. R. 19 Eq. 115; 44 L. J. Ch. 69.

(s) *Jones v. Festiniog R. Co.*, L. R.

3 Q. B. 736; 37 L. J. Q. B. 214; *Rylands v. Fletcher*, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, 339, 340; 37 L. J. Ex. 161, where many cases illustrating the text are collected.

(t) “Suppose A. has a drain through the lands of B. and C., and C. stops up the inlet into his land from B.’s, and A. nevertheless, knowing this, pours water in the

whose cellar is invaded by the filth of his neighbour's privy (*u*), or whose habitation is made unhealthy by the fumes and noisome vapours of his neighbour's alkali works (*v*), is damnified without any fault of his own; and it seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour who has brought something on his own property, which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is confined to his own property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on his neighbour's, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does not succeed in confining it to his own property" (*w*).

Use of flowing water.

Again, the rule of law which governs the enjoyment of a stream flowing in its natural course over the surface of lands belonging to different owners is well established, and illustrates the maxim under notice. Each owner has a right to the advantage of the stream flowing in its natural course over his land, and to use the same as he pleases for any purposes of his own connected with his tenement (*x*), provided that they be not inconsistent with a similar right in the owner of the lands above or below: so that neither can any owner above diminish the quantity or injure the quality of the water, which would otherwise naturally descend; nor can any owner below throw back the water without the licence or the grant of the owner above (*y*).

drain and damages *B.*, *A.* is liable to *B.*" Judgm., *Harrison v. G. N. R. Co.*, 3 H. & C. 238; *Collins v. Middle Level Commrs.*, L. R. 4 C. P. 279; 38 L. J. C. P. 236.

(*u*) Cf. *Foster v. Warblington Urban Council*, [1906] 1 K. B. 648; 75 L. J. K. B. 514.

(*v*) *St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping*, 11 H. L. Cas. 642.

(*w*) Judgm., *Fletcher v. Rylands*, L. R. 1 Ex. 280, adopted by Ld. Cairns in *S. C.*, L. R. 3 H. L. 340; 37 L. J. Ex. 161. See *Eastern Telegraph Co. v. Cape Town Tramways*

Co., [1902] A. C. 381; 71 L. J. P. C. 122 (escape of electricity); *Whitmores (Edenbridge), Ltd. v. Stanford*, [1909] 1 Ch. 427; 78 L. J. Ch. 144.

(*x*) *Macartney v. Lough Swilly Railway*, [1904] A. C. 301; 73 L. J. P. C. 73.

(*y*) *Mason v. Hill*, 5 B. & Ad. 1; 39 R. R. 354; *Ormerod v. Todmorden J. S. Mill Co.*, 11 Q. B. D. 155; 52 L. J. Q. B. 445; *Wright v. Howard*, 1 Sim. & Stu. 190; cited Judgm., 12 M. & W. 349; Judgm., *Embrey v. Owen*, 6 Exch. 368—373; *Chase-more v. Richards*, 7 H. L. Cas. 349;

Where, therefore, the owner of land applies the stream running through it to the use of a newly erected mill, he may, if the stream be diverted or obstructed by the owner of land above, recover for the consequential injury to the mill; and the same principle seems to apply where the obstruction or diversion has taken place before the erection of the mill, unless, indeed, the owner of land higher up the stream has acquired a right to any particular mode of using the water by prescription, that is, by user continued until the presumption of a grant has arisen (z).

What has been just said applies generally to surface water flowing naturally over land—between which and water artificially flowing the distinction is important as regards the mode of applying our principal maxim, and has been thus explained. “The flow of a natural stream creates natural rights and liabilities between all the riparian proprietors along the whole of its course. Subject to reasonable use by himself, each proprietor is bound to allow the water to flow on without altering the quantity or quality. These natural rights and liabilities may be altered by grant or by user of an easement to alter the stream, as by diverting, or fouling, or penning back, or the like. If the stream flows at its source by the operation of nature, that is, if it is a natural stream, the rights and liabilities of the party owning the land at its source are the same as those of the proprietors in the course below. If the stream flows at its source by the operation of man, that is, if it is an artificial stream, the owner of the land at its source or the commencement of the flow is not subject to any rights or liabilities towards any other person, in respect of the water of that stream. The owner of such

Artificial
stream.

Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. 369;
Broadbent v. Ramsbotham, Id. 602.
See also *Whalley v. Laing*, 3 H. &
N. 675, 901; *Hipkins v. Birmingham & S. Gas Light Co.*, 6 H. & N.

250: 5 Id. 74.

(z) Judgm., *Mason v. Hill*, 5 B. & Ad. 25; 39 R. R. 372, where the Roman law upon the subject is briefly considered.

land may make himself liable to duties in respect of such water by grant or contract; but the party claiming a right to compel performance of those duties must give evidence of such right, beyond the mere suffering by him of the servitude of receiving such water" (a).

"Rights and liabilities in respect of artificial streams when first flowing on the surface are entirely distinct from rights and liabilities in respect of natural streams so flowing. The water in an artificial stream flowing in the land of the party by whom it is caused to flow is the property of that party, and is not subject to any rights or liabilities in respect of other persons. If the stream so brought to the surface is made to flow upon the land of a neighbour without his consent, it is a wrong for which the party causing it so to flow is liable. If there is a grant by the neighbour, the terms of the grant regulate the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto. If there is uninterrupted user of the land of the neighbour for receiving the flow as of right for twenty years, such user is evidence that the land from which the water is sent into the neighbour's land has become the dominant tenement, having a right to the easement of so sending the water, and that the neighbour's land has become subject to the easement of receiving that water. But such user of the easement of sending on the water of an artificial stream is of itself alone no evidence that the land from which the water is sent has become subject to the servitude of being bound to send on the water to the land of the neighbour below. The enjoyment of the easement is of itself no evidence that the party enjoying it has become subject to the servitude of being bound to exercise the easement for the benefit of the neighbour." "A party by the mere exercise of a right to make an artificial drain into his neighbour's land, either from mine or surface, does not raise any presumption

(a) Judgm., *Gaved v. Martyn*, 19 *Bracewell*, L. R. 2 Ex. 1: 36 L. J. C. B. N. S. 759. See *Nuttall v.* Ex. 1.

that he is subject to any duty to continue his artificial drain, by twenty years' user, although there may be additional circumstances by which that presumption could be raised, or the right proved. Also, if it be proved that the stream was originally intended to have a permanent flow, or if the party by whom or on whose behalf the artificial stream was caused to flow is shown to have abandoned permanently, without intention to resume, the works by which the flow was caused, and given up all right to and control over the stream, such stream may become subject to the laws relating to natural streams" (b).

Accordingly, if an artificial water course has existed for a considerable number of years, and is of a permanent nature, the water cannot be diverted or lessened in quantity by the owner of the land at its source, or by owners of land through which it passes, to the injury of owners lower down the stream (c); but it is otherwise, if the stream was temporary in its character, as, for instance, created by a pumping-engine used to drain land, and was allowed to flow on to the adjoining land under circumstances which negative an intention to give the use of the artificial stream as a matter of right (d).

With respect to water percolating underground by undefined channels, the general rule of law is that if a landowner, by any lawful operation upon his own land, as by mining or by sinking a well therein, intercepts such water on its way to his neighbour's land, or drain such water out of his neighbour's land, the neighbour has no cause of action for damage sustained thereby, whether the damage be that

Underground
water.

(b) *Judgm., Gaved v. Martyn*, 19 C. B. N. S. 757—759.

(c) *Sutcliff v. Booth*, 9 Jur. N. S. 1037; *Ivimey v. Stocker*, L. R. 1 Ch. 396; *Rameshur Pershad Narain Singh's case*, 4 App. Cas. 121. See *Kensit v. G. E. R. Co.*, 27 Ch. D. 122; 54 L. J. Ch. 19; *Mostyn v. Atherton*, [1899] 2 Ch. 360. See also

Whitmores (Edenbridge), Ltd. v. Stanford, [1909] 1 Ch. 427; *Baily v. Clark & Morland*, [1902] 1 Ch. 649; 71 L. J. Ch. 396.

(d) *Arkwright v. Gell*, 5 M. & W. 232; *Staffordshire & W. Canal Co. v. Birmingham Canal Navigation*, L. R. 1 H. L. 254; 35 L. J. Ch. 757.

the wells or ponds in the neighbour's land run dry (*e*), or that his land subsides from want of the natural subjacent support it formerly derived from the water (*f*). In the absence of any grant, contract, or statute, rendering the general rule inapplicable, such damage is *damnum absque injuria*. But a landowner, though he may lawfully deprive his neighbour of water percolating towards his well, is not entitled to foul his neighbour's well by polluting such water with sewage: he must keep his own filth in (*g*).

Conflicting
rights.

The principle, which the above instances have been selected to illustrate, likewise applies where various rights, which are at particular times unavoidably inconsistent with each other, are exercised concurrently by different individuals; as, in the case of a highway, where right of common of pasture and right of common of turbary may exist at the same time; or of the ocean, which in time of peace is the common highway of all (*h*); in that of a right of free passage along the street, which right may be sometimes interrupted by the exercise of other rights (*i*), or in that of a port or navigable river (*k*), which may be likewise subject at

(*e*) *Acton v. Blundell*, 12 M. & W. 324; *Chasemore v. Richards*, 7 H. L. Gas. 349; 2 H. & N. 168 (where Coleridge, J., *diss.*, cited the maxim under notice); *Bradford Corpor. v. Pickles*, [1895] A. C. 587; 64 L. J. Ch. 759; *McNab v. Robertson*, [1897] A. C. 129; 66 L. J. P. C. 27; *Bradford Corpor. v. Ferrand*, [1902] 2 Ch. 665.

(*f*) *Popplewell v. Hodkinson*, L.R. 4 Ex. 248; 38 L. J. Ex. 126; see *Gr. Junction Canal Co. v. Shugar*, L. R. 6 Ch. 488; and *ante*, p. 294, n. (o); see also *Salt Union v. Brunner, Mond & Co.*, [1906] 2 K. B. 822; 76 L. J. K. B. 55.

(*g*) *Ballard v. Tomlinson*, 29 Ch. D. 115; 54 L. J. Ch. 454.

(*h*) *Per Story, J., The Marianna Flora*, 11 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 42.

(*i*) See *A.-G. v. Brighton, &c., Co.*, [1900] 1 Ch. 276.

(*k*) See *Mayor of Colchester v. Brooke*, 7 Q. B. 399; *Morant v. Chamberlin*, 6 H. & N. 541; *Dobson v. Blackmore*, 9 Q. B. 991; *Dimes v. Petley*, 15 Q. B. 276; *Reg. v. Betts*, 15 Q. B. 1022. As to the liability of the owner of a vessel, anchor, or other thing, which having been sunk in a river obstructs the navigation, see *Brown v. Mallett*, 5 C. B. 599, recognised 2 H. & N. 854; *Hancock v. York, &c., R. Co.*, 10 C. B. 348; *White v. Crisp*, 10 Exch. 312; *per Bovill, C.J., Vivian v. Mersey Docks Board*, L. R. 5 C. P. 29; 39 L. J. C. P. 3; *Bartlett v. Baker*, 3 H. & C. 153; *The Snark*, [1900] P. 105.

As to the liability of a ship-owner for negligently damaging a

times to temporary obstruction. In these and similar cases, where such different co-existing rights happen to clash, the maxim, *sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas*, will, it has been observed, generally serve as a clue to the labyrinth (*l*). And further, the possible jarring of pre-existing rights can furnish no warrant for an innovation which seeks to create a new right to the prejudice of an old one; for there is no legal principle to justify such a proceeding (*m*).

Not only, moreover, does the law give redress where a substantive injury to property is committed, but, on the same principle, the erection of anything offensive so near the house of another as to render it useless and unfit for habitation is actionable (*n*); the action in such case being founded on the infringement or violation of the rights and duties arising by reason of vicinage (*o*). The doctrine upon this subject, as laid down by the Exchequer Chamber (*p*), and substantially adopted by the House of Lords (*q*), being, "that whenever, taking all the circumstances into consideration, including the nature and the extent of the plaintiff's enjoyment before the acts complained of, the annoyance is sufficiently great to amount to a nuisance according to the ordinary rule of law, an action will lie, whatever the locality my be;" but trifling inconveniences merely are not to be regarded (*r*), for *lex non facit votis delicatorem* (*s*). An

Nuisance.

telegraphic cable, see *Sub-Marine Telegraphic Co. v. Dickson*, 15 C. B. N. S. 757.

See also *Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs*, L. R. 1 H. L. 93; *White v. Phillips*, 15 C. B. N. S. 245.

(*l*) Judgm., *R. v. Ward*, 4 A. & E. 384; Judgm., 15 Johns. (U.S.), R. 218; *Panton v. Holland*, 17 Id. 100.

(*m*) Judgm., *R. v. Ward*, *supra*.

(*n*) *Per Burrough, J., Deane v. Clayton*, 7 Taunt. 497; 18 R. R. 553; *Doe v. Keeling*, 1 M. & S. 95; 14 R. R. 405. See *Simpson v. Savage*, 1 C. B. N. S. 347; *Mumford v.*

Oxford, &c., R. Co., 1 H. & N. 34.

(*o*) *Alston v. Grant*, 3 E. & B. 528; Judgm., 4 Exch. 256, 257.

(*p*) *Bamford v. Turnley*, 3 B. & S. 62, 77.

(*q*) *St. Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping*, 11 H. L. Cas. 642.

(*r*) 11 H. L. Cas. 645, 655; *Gaunt v. Fymney*, L. R. 8 Ch. App. 8: 42 L. J. Ch. 122.

(*s*) 9 Rep. 58 a; 41 Ch. D. 97.

See further as to what may constitute a nuisance; *Reg. v. Bradford Nav. Co.*, 6 B. & S. 631; *Cleveland v. Spier*, 16 C. B. N. S. 399.

action, however, does not lie if a man build a house whereby my prospect is interrupted (*t*), or open a window whereby my privacy is disturbed; in the latter case the only remedy is to build on the adjoining land opposite to the offensive window (*u*). In these instances the general principle applies—*qui jure suo utitur neminem lædit* (*x*).

In connection with the law concerning nuisances, the practitioner may have to decide between asserted rights which are in conflict with each other—the right to erect or maintain, and the right to abate a nuisance—in doing so the following propositions (*y*) may guide him. 1. A person may justify an interference with the property of another for the purpose of abating a nuisance, if that other is the wrong-doer, but only so far as the interference is necessary to abating the nuisance. 2. It is the duty of a person who enters upon the land of another to abate a nuisance, to act in the way least injurious to the owner of the land. 3. Where there are alternative ways of abating a nuisance, if one way would cause injury to the property of an innocent third party or to the public, that cannot be justified; although the nuisance may be abated by interference with the property of the wrong-doer. Therefore, where the alternative ways involve an interference with the property either of an innocent person or of the wrong-doer, the interference must be with the property of the wrong-doer.

Easement of
light.

The right to the reception of light in a lateral direction (without obstruction) is an easement. The strict right of property entitles the owner only to so much light (and air)

(*t*) Com. Dig., "*Action upon the Case for a Nuisance*" (C.); *Aldred's case*, 9 Rep. 58. According to the Roman law it was forbidden to obstruct the prospect from a neighbour's house: see D. 8, 2, 3, and 15; Wood, Civ. Law, 3rd ed. 92, 93.

(*u*) *Per Eyre*, C.J., cited 3 Camp. 82; *Jones v. Tapling*, 11 H. L. Cas.

290; 34 L. J. C. P. 342.

(*x*) *Vide* D. 50, 17, 151, and 155, § 1.

(*y*) *Roberts v. Rose*, L. R. 1 Ex. 82; 4 H. & C. 103, 105—106. See further as to abating a nuisance, *Drake v. Pywell*, 4 H. & C. 78; *Lenmon v. Webb*, [1895] A. C. 1: 64 L. J. Ch. 205.

as fall perpendicularly on his land (z). The law on this subject formerly was, that no action would lie, unless a right had been gained in the lights by prescription (a); but it was subsequently held, that, upon evidence of an adverse enjoyment of lights for twenty years or upwards unexplained, a jury might be directed to presume a right by grant or otherwise, even though no lights had existed there before the commencement of the twenty years (b): and although, formerly, if the period of enjoyment fell short of twenty years, a presumption in favour of the plaintiff's right might have been raised from other circumstances, it is now enacted by 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 6, that no presumption shall be allowed or made in support of any claim upon proof of the exercise of the enjoyment of the right or matter claimed for less than twenty years; and by s. 3 of the same statute, that, "when the access and use of light to and for any dwelling-house, workshop, or other building, shall have been *actually enjoyed* (c) therewith for the full period of twenty years, *without interruption* (d), the right thereto shall be deemed absolute and indefeasible, any local usage or custom to the contrary notwithstanding, unless it shall appear that the same was enjoyed by some consent or agreement expressly made or given for that purpose by deed or writing." And by s. 4, "the period of twenty years shall be taken to be the period next before some suit or action wherein the claim shall have been brought into question; and no act or matter shall be deemed to be an interruption within the meaning of the statute, unless the same shall have been submitted to or acquiesced in, for one year after the party interrupted shall have had notice thereof, and of the

(z) Gale on Easements, 5th ed. 319; and in regard to the enjoyment of light and air, see *White v. Bass*, 7 H. & N. 722; *Frewen v. Philpotts*, 11 C. B. N. S. 449; *Chastey v. Ackland*, [1897] A. C. 155: [1895] 2 Ch. 389.

(a) See D. 8, 2, 9.

(b) 2 Selw., N. P., 12th ed. 1134.

(c) See *Courtauld v. Legh*, L. R. 4 Ex. 126.

(d) See *Bennison v. Cartwright*, 5 B. & S. 1; *Plasterers' Co. v. Parish Clerks' Co.*, 6 Exch. 630.

person making or authorising the same to be made.” The last section of this Act is applicable not only to obstructions preceded and followed by portions of the twenty years, but also to an obstruction ending with that period; and, therefore, a prescriptive title to the access and use of light may be gained by an enjoyment for nineteen years and 330 days, followed by an obstruction for thirty-five days (e).

It may be well to add that “every man may open any number of windows looking over his neighbour’s land; and, on the other hand, the neighbour may, by building on his own land, within twenty years after the opening of the window obstruct the light which would otherwise reach it” (f).

After a good deal of controversy it is now established that, when an easement of light has been acquired by prescription, no action will lie for obstructing the access of light, unless the obstruction is so great as to amount to a nuisance. The owner of the dominant tenement is not *necessarily* entitled to complain because there has been some diminution of the light previously enjoyed (g).

Air.

The right to air as distinguished from light appears in some respects to be governed at common law by the same principles as apply to light; but the right to the uninterrupted passage of air across one’s neighbour’s ground cannot be acquired under the Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 2, and it would further seem that no presumption of a grant of such a right will arise from a long and continuous user of the right claimed (h). A total deprivation of air would, however, under certain circumstances, amount to a nuisance, and as such would be restrained, and in the cases cited below injunctions were granted to prevent and

(e) *Flight v. Thomas*, 11 A. & E. 688, affirmed 8 Cl. & F. 231. See *Eaton v. Swansea Waterworks Co.*, 17 Q. B. 267.

(f) *Per* Ld. Cranworth, *Tapling v. Jones*, 11 H. L. Cas. 311.

(g) *Colls v. Home & Colonial Stores*, [1904] A. C. 179; 73 L. J. Ch. 484.

(h) *Webb v. Bird*, 10 C. B. N. S. 268; 13 Id. 841.

remove obstructions which impeded the ventilation of the plaintiff's premises (i).

To the instances already given, showing that, according to the maxim, *sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas*, a person is held liable at law for the consequences of his negligence, may be added the following:—It has been held, that an action lies against a party for so negligently constructing a hay-rick on the extremity of his land, that, in consequence of its spontaneous ignition, his neighbour's house was burnt down (j). So, the owners of a canal, taking tolls for the navigation, are, by the common law, bound to use reasonable care in making the navigation secure, and are responsible for the breach of such duty, upon a similar principle to that which makes a shopkeeper, who *invites* (k) the public to his shop, liable for neglect in leaving a trap-door open without any protection, by which his customers suffer injury (l). The trustees of docks are likewise answerable for their negligence and breach of duty causing damage (m).

Liability for negligence.

The law also, through regard to the safety of the community, requires that persons having in their custody instruments of danger, should keep them with the utmost care (n). Accordingly, where the defendant sent a young

Dangerous instruments.

(i) *Gale v. Abbot*, 8 Jur. (N. S.) 987; *Dent v. Auction Mart Co.*, L. R. 2 Eq. 238.

(j) *Vaughan v. Menlove*, 3 Bing. N. C. 468; *Turberville v. Stampe*, Ld. Raym. 264; S. C., 1 Salk. 13; *Jones v. Festiniog R. Co.*, 37 L. J. Q. B. 214; L. R. 3 Q. B. 733. As to liability for fire, caused by negligence, see further, *Filliter v. Phippard*, 11 Q. B. 347; per Tindal, C.J., *Ross v. Hill*, 2 C. B. 889, and 3 C. B. 241; *Smith v. Frampton*, 1 Ld. Raym. 62; *Visc. Canterbury v. A.-G.*, 1 Phill. 306; *Smith v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 5 C. P. 98.

(k) See *Nicholson v. Lanc. & Y.*

R. Co., 3 H. & C. 534; *Holmes v. N. E. R. Co.*, L. R. 4 Ex. 254; *Lunt v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 277, 286.

(l) *Parnaby v. Lancaster Canal Co.*, 11 A. & E. 233, 243; *Birkett v. Whitehaven Junction R. Co.*, 4 H. & N. 730; *Chapman v. Rothwell*, E. B. & E. 168; *Bayley v. Wolverhampton Waterworks Co.*, 6 H. & N. 241.

(m) *Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs*, L. R. 1 H. L. 93.

(n) "The law of England, in its care for human life, requires consummate caution in the person who deals with dangerous weapons;" per

girl to fetch his loaded gun, and the girl, having got the gun, pointed it at a child and drew the trigger, in the mistaken belief that the priming had been removed: it was held that the defendant was liable for the injuries the child sustained through the gun going off (o). "If," observed Lord Denman in a subsequent case, "I am guilty of negligence in leaving anything dangerous in a place where I know it to be extremely probable that some other person will unjustifiably set it in motion, to the injury of a third, and if that injury should be brought about, I presume that the sufferer might have redress by action against both or either of the two, but unquestionably against the first" (p). This principle has been applied in later cases to the sale of dangerous articles, and it has been laid down that a person who sells a dangerous article, knowing that it is dangerous and that the purchaser is or may be unaware of its dangerous character, is bound to give warning of the danger to the purchaser, and is liable for the consequences of his failure to give it. (q).

Mischievous
animals.

Although the owner of an animal which is *feræ naturæ* has the right to keep it, yet he keeps it at his peril, and if the animal does an injury to any person, the owner is answerable for the injury, unless the person injured brought it upon himself. In this respect there is no distinction between an animal which is *feræ naturæ*, and an animal which,

Erle, C.J., *Potter v. Faulkner*, 1 B. & S. 805. *Rylands v. Fletcher*, L. R. 3 H. L. 330, also exemplifies the text.

(o) *Dixon v. Bell*, 5 M. & S. 198; 17 R. R. 308; *Sullivan v. Creed*, [1904] 2 Ir. R. 317; see also *Clark v. Chambers*, 3 Q. B. D. 327.

(p) *Lynch v. Nurdin*, 1 Q. B. 29, 35, with which cf. *Mangan v. Atterton*, L. R. 1 Ex. 239; *Lygo v. Newbold*, 9 Exch. 302; *G. N. R. Co. v. Harrison*, 10 Exch. 376; *Austin v. G. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 442;

Caswell v. Worth, 5 E. & B. 849; *Englehart v. Farrant*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 240; *McDowall v. G. W. R.*, [1903] 2 K. B. 331; 72 L. J. K. B. 652; *Dominion Natural Gas Co. v. Collins*, [1909] A. C. 640; 79 L. J. P. C. 13; *Cooke v. Midland G. W. R.*, [1909] A. C. 229; 78 L. J. P. C. 76.

(q) *Clarke v. Army & Navy Stores*, [1908] 1 K. B. 155; 72 L. J. K. B. 153. See also *George v. Skivington*, L. R. 5 Ex. 1.

though it belong to a class of animals considered to be *mansuete nature*, is in fact dangerous, and is known by its owner to be such (*r*). Whoever keeps an animal accustomed to attack or bite mankind, with knowledge that it is so accustomed, is *primâ facie* liable to any person attacked or bitten by it, and the gist of an action for the injury is the keeping the animal with knowledge of its mischievous propensity (*s*). An owner of an animal known to be savage is not, however, liable for injuries inflicted on persons trespassing on enclosed land in which the animal is kept (*t*). To render the owner of a dog liable for its biting the plaintiff, it is sufficient to prove his knowledge that it had previously attempted to bite another person, but his knowledge that it had bitten some other animal is generally not enough (*u*). As a rule, the owner of a dog is only liable for the particular vice which he knew that it had (*r*) ; but, by statute, he is now liable, without proof of *scienter*, for injury done by his dog to cattle, including horses, sheep, and swine (*x*).

The owner of animals *mansuetæ naturæ*, such as oxen, horses, sheep, and pigs, is, as a general rule, bound to prevent their straying upon his neighbour's land, and if they so stray, he is liable for all the ordinary consequences of the trespass; the question whether the trespass was due to his negligence being, generally, immaterial (*y*). To this rule there is an exception, necessary

(*r*) *Filburn v. People's Palace Co.*, 25 Q. B. D. 258; 59 L. J. Q. B. 471; *Jackson v. Smithson*, 15 M. & W. 563, 565; *Brady v. Warren*, [1900] 2 Ir. Rep. 632.

(*s*) *May v. Burdett*, 9 Q. B. 101; *Hudson v. Roberts*, 6 Ex. 679; *Baker v. Snell*, [1908] 2 K. B. 825; 77 L. J. K. B. 1090.

(*t*) *Lowery v. Walker*, [1909] 2 K. B. 433; 78 L. J. K. B. 874.

(*u*) *Worth v. Gilling*, L. R. 2 C. P.

1; *Osborne v. Chocqueel*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 109; 65 L. J. Q. B. 534.

(*v*) See *Read v. Edwards*, 17 C. B. N. S. 245; 34 L. J. C. P. 31; cf. *Cooke v. Waring*, 2 H. & C. 332; 32 L. J. Ex. 262.

(*x*) Dogs Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 32), ss. 1, 7.

(*y*) *Cox v. Burbidge*, 13 C. B. N. S. 430, 433; 32 L. J. C. P. 89; *Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co.*, L. R. 10 C. P. 10; 44 L. J. C. P. 24; *Lee v.*

for the conduct of the common affairs of life, in cases where such an animal, in the course of being lawfully driven along a highway, strays upon adjoining premises, The defendant's ox, while being driven through the street, entered the plaintiff's shop through the open doorway, and damaged his goods. In the absence of proof of negligence on the drover's part, it was held that the defendant was not liable, on the ground that owners of property adjacent to a highway hold it subject to risk of injury from accidents not caused by negligence (z). It seems too that the owner of domestic animals is not liable for the damage they cause, while straying on a highway, to a person using the highway, who is not the owner of the soil (a).

The above instances (which might easily be extended through a much greater space than it has been thought desirable to occupy), will, it is hoped, suffice to give a general view of the manner in which the maxim, *sic utere tuo ut alienum non lædas*, is applied in our law to restrict the enjoyment of property, and to regulate in some measure the conduct of individuals, by enforcing compensation for injuries wrongfully occasioned by a violation of the principle which it involves, a principle which is obviously based in justice, and essential to the peace, order, and well-being of the community. As deducible from the cases cited in the preceding pages, and from others to be found in our Reports, the following propositions may, it is conceived, be stated :—

1. It is, *primâ facie*, competent to any man to enjoy and deal with his own property as he chooses.
2. He must, however, so enjoy and use it as not to affect injuriously the rights of others.

Riley, 18 C. B. N. S. 722: 34 L. J. 17: 52 L. J. Q. B. 61.

C. P. 212; see *Singleton v. Williams*, 7 H. & N. 410: 31 L. J. Ex. 287; *Dixon v. G. W. R. Co.*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 300; 66 L. J. Q. B. 132.

(z) *Tillett v. Ward*, 10 Q. B. D.

(a) *Per* Bray, J., *Hadwell v. Righton*, [1907] 2 K. B. 345, 346: 76 L. J. K. B. 891; *Higgins v. Searle*, 100 L. T. 280.

3. Where rights are such as, if exercised, to conflict with each other, we must consider whether the exercise of the right claimed by either party be not restrained by the existence of some duty imposed on him towards the other. Whether such duty be or be not imposed must be determined by reference to abstract rules and principles of law.

4. A man cannot by his tortious act impose a duty on another.

5. But, lastly, a wrongdoer is not necessarily, by reason of his being such, disentitled to redress by action, as against the party who causes him damage, for sometimes the maxim holds that *injuria non excusat injuriam* (b).

CUJUS EST SOLUM EJUS EST USQUE AD CÆLUM. (*Co. Litt.*

4 a.)—*He who possesses land possesses also that which is above it* (c).

Land, in its legal signification, has an indefinite extent upwards, so that, by a conveyance of land, all buildings, growing timber, and water, erected and being thereupon, likewise pass (d). So, if a man eject another from land, and afterwards build upon it, the building belongs to the owner of the ground on which it is built, according to the principle *ædificatum solo solo cedit* (e), which we shall presently consider.

Signification
of term
"land."

From the maxim *cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cælum*, it follows that a person has no right to erect a building on his own land which interferes with the due enjoyment of adjoining premises, and occasions damage thereto, either by overhanging them, or by the flow of water from the

Injury caused
by adjoining
building.

(b) This maxim is also sometimes applicable where the action is founded upon contract. See (*ex. gr.*) *Alston v. Herring*, 11 Exch. 822, 830; *Hilton v. Eckersley*, 6 E. & B. 76; with which acc. *Hornby v. Close*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 153; *Farrer v. Close*,

L. R. 4 Q. B. 602.

(c) A maxim of general application, *per* Grove, J., *Reg. v. Keyn*, 2 Ex. D. 116.

(d) *Co. Litt.* 4 a: 9 Rep. 54; *Allaway v. Wagstaff*, 4 H. & N. 307.

(e) *Post*, p. 314.

roof and eaves upon them, unless, indeed, a legal right so to build has been conceded by grant, or may be presumed by user and by operation of the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71.

Where the declaration alleged that the defendant had erected a house upon his freehold, so as to project over the plaintiffs' house *ad noeuumentum liberi tenementi ipsorum*, but did not assign any special nuisance, the Court held the declaration good, because the erection must evidently have been a nuisance productive of legal damage (*f*); and it has been held that the erection of a cornice projecting over another's garden is a nuisance, from which the law will infer injury, and for which, therefore, an action will lie (*g*).

Injury to
reversion.

With respect to the nature of the remedy for an injury of this kind, not only will an action lie at suit of the occupier, but the reversioner may also sue where injury is done to the reversion; provided such injury be of a *permanent* character (*h*), or prejudicially affect the reversionary interest (*i*). It is well settled, that a man may be guilty of a nuisance as well in continuing as in erecting a building on the land of another (*k*).

Injury by
overhanging
trees.

If a landowner allows the branches of his trees to overhang his boundary, his neighbour has a right of

(*f*) *Baten's case*, 9 Rep. 53. See also *Penruddock's case*, 5 Rep. 100.

(*g*) *Fay v. Prentice*, 1 C. B. 828; *per Pollock, C.B., Solomon v. Vintners' Co.*, 4 H. & N. 600.

(*h*) *Simpson v. Savage*, 1 C. B. N. S. 347, where the cases are collected. See particularly *Mumford v. Oxford, &c., R. Co.*, 1 H. & N. 34; *Battishill v. Reed*, 18 C. B. 696; *Cox v. Glue*, 5 C. B. 533; *Tucker v. Newman*, 11 A. & E. 40; *Jackson v. Pesked*, 1 M. & S. 234; 14 R. R. 417; *Kidgill v. Moor*, 9 C. B. 364; *Bell v. Midland R. Co.*, 10 C. B. N. S. 287.

As to the distinction between injuries to realty of a permanent and

of a merely temporary kind, see also *Hammersmith & City R. Co. v. Brand*, L. R. 4 H. L. 171; *Ricket v. Metr. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 H. L. 175.

Case will lie by the reversioner for a permanent injury to a chattel let out on hire, *Mears v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, 11 C. B. N. S. 850.

(*i*) *Metr. Association v. Petch*, 5 C. B. N. S. 504; *Nott v. Shoolbred*, L. R. 20 Eq. 22; *Cooper v. Crabtree*, 20 Ch. D. 589; 51 L. J. Ch. 544.

(*k*) *Battishill v. Reed*, 18 C. B. 713; citing *Holmes v. Wilson*, 10 A. & E. 503; *Thompson v. Gibson*, 7 M. & W. 456; *Bowyer v. Cook*, 4 C. B. 236.

action for actual damage caused thereby ; and the neighbour is entitled to cut the branches back, whether or not they cause damage ; but it is doubtful whether, in the absence of actual damage, an action lies (*l*). In an action of trespass for nailing a board on the defendant's own wall, so as to overhang the plaintiff's garden, the maxim *cujus est solum ejus est usque ad cælum* was cited in support of the form of action, but Lord Ellenborough (*m*) observed that he did not think it was a *trespass* to interfere with the column of air superincumbent on the close : that, if it was, then an aéronaut was liable to an action of trespass by the occupier of every field over which his balloon might pass ; since the question, whether the action was maintainable, could not depend upon the length of time for which the superincumbent air was invaded : and that, if any damage arose from the board overhanging the close, the remedy was by action on the case, and not by action of trespass (*n*).

Action for nuisance.

It must be observed, moreover, that the maxim under consideration is not a presumption of law applicable in all cases and under all circumstances ; for example, it does not apply to chambers in the inns of court (*o*) ; for “a man may have an inheritance in an upper chamber, though the lower buildings and soil be in another” (*p*).

Not only has land in its legal signification an indefinite extent upwards, but in law it extends also downwards, so that whatever is in a direct line between the surface and the centre of the earth belongs to the owner of the surface ; and hence the word “land,” which is *nomen generalissimum*, includes, not only the face of the earth, but everything

Land extends downwards as well as upwards.

(*l*) *Smith v. Giddy*, [1904] 2 K. B. 448 ; 73 L. J. K. B. 894 ; *Lemmon v. Webb*, [1895] A. C. 1 : 64 L. J. Ch. 205.

(*m*) *Pickering v. Rudd*, 4 Camp. 219 ; 16 R. R. 777 ; *per Shadwell*, V.-C., *Saunders v. Smith*, ed. by Crawford, 20 ; *Kenyon v Hart*, 6 B.

& S. 249, 252.

(*n*) See *Reynolds v. Clarke*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1399 ; *Fay v. Prentice*, 1 C. B. 828 ; *Corbett v. Hill*, L. R. 9 Eq. 671.

(*o*) *Per Maule, J.*, 1 C. B. 840.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 48 b.

under it or over it; and if a man grants all his lands, he grants thereby all his mines, woods, waters, and houses, as well as his fields and meadows (*q*). Where, however, a demise was made of premises late in the occupation of A. (particularly described), part of which was a yard, it was held, that a cellar, situate under the yard, and late in the occupation of B., did not pass; for though *primâ facie* it would pass, yet that might be regulated and explained by circumstances (*r*).

The maxim, then, above cited, gives to the owner of the soil all that lies beneath its surface. Whether, therefore, it be solid rock, or porous ground, or venous earth, or part soil and part water, the owner of the surface may dig therein, and apply all that is there found to his own purposes, at his free will and pleasure (*s*); although, as already stated, he may incur liability by so digging at the extremity and under the surface of own land as to occasion damage to his neighbour's ancient house (*t*).

Separate
property in
surface and
minerals.

But, although the general rule, which obtains in the absence of any express agreement between the parties interested in land, is as above stated, and although it is a presumption of law that the owner of the freehold has a right to the minerals underneath, yet this presumption may be rebutted by showing a distinct title to the surface, and to that which is beneath; for mines may form a distinct possession and different inheritance: and it frequently happens that a person, being entitled both to the mines and to the land above, grants away the land, excepting out of the grant the mines, which would otherwise have passed thereby, and also reserving to himself power to enter upon the surface of the land granted away, in

(*q*) 2 Blac. Com. 18.

(*r*) *Doe v. Burt*, 1 T. R. 701; 1 R. R. 367. See *Denison v. Holliday*, 1 H. & N. 681; and the maxim, *cuicunque aliquis quid concedit, con-*

cedere videtur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potuit; *infra*, p. 367.

(*s*) Judgm., 12 M. & W. 324, 354.

(*t*) 1 Crabb, Real Prop., p. 93.

order to do all acts necessary for the purpose of getting the minerals excepted out of the grant, compensation being made to the grantee for the exercise of the power. In this case one person has the land above, the other has the mines below, with the power of getting the minerals; and the rule is, according to the maxim *sic utere tuo ut alienum non ledas*, already considered, that each shall so use his own right of property as not to injure his neighbour; and, therefore, the grantor will be entitled to such mines only as he can work, leaving a proper support to the surface. And here we may observe, that if a man *excepts* out of a grant all mines and minerals, he excepts also the right of doing all things necessary for the purpose of obtaining the mines and minerals so excepted (*u*), as, for example, the right of going upon the land and making shafts and erecting engines.

If there be a grant of an upper room in a house with a reservation of a lower room to the grantor, he undertaking not to do anything which will derogate from the right to occupy the upper room; in this case, if the grantor were to remove the supports of the upper room, he would be liable in an action of covenant (*x*).

It may be noticed, in conclusion, that the maxim under consideration does not apply in favour of local authorities, in whom streets are vested by virtue of the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 149, or any similar enactment. Such enactments vest in the authority such property only as is necessary for the control, protection and maintenance of the streets as highways for public use, and confer no general proprietary rights in the air above or the ground below the streets (*y*).

(*u*) *Earl of Cardigan v. Armitage*, 2 B. & C. 197; *Clark v. Cogge*, Cro. Jac. 170; *Hayles v. Pease*, [1899] 1 Ch. 567: 68 L. J. Ch. 222.

(*x*) 5 M. & W. 71, 76.

(*y*) *Tunbridge Wells v. Baird*, [1896] A. C. 434: 65 L. J. Q. B. 451; *Wandsworth v. United Telephone Co.*, 13 Q. B. D. 904.

QUICQUID PLANTATUR SOLO SOLO CEDIT. (*Wentw. Off. Ex.*, 14th ed. 145.)—*Whatever is affixed to the soil belongs thereto.*

It may be stated, as a general rule of great antiquity, that, whatever is affixed (*z*) to the soil becomes, in contemplation of law, a part of it, and is subjected to the same rights of property as the soil itself. In the Institutes of the Civil Law it is laid down, that if a man build on his own land with the materials of another, the owner of the soil becomes, in law, the owner also of the building: *quia omne quod solo inædificatur solo credit* (*b*). In this case, indeed, the property in the materials used still continued in the original owner; and although, by a law of the XII. Tables, the object of which was to prevent the destruction of buildings, he was unable, unless the building were taken down, to reclaim the materials *in specie*, he was, nevertheless, entitled to recover double their value as compensation by the action *de tigno juncto* (*b*). On the other hand, if a person built, with his own materials, on the land of another, the house likewise belonged to the owner of the soil; for in this case, the builder was presumed intentionally to have transferred his property in the materials to such owner (*c*). In like manner, if trees were planted or seed sown in the land of another, the owner of the soil became owner also of the tree, the plant, or the seed, as soon as it had taken root (*d*). And this latter proposition is fully adopted, almost in the words of the civil law, by our own law writers—Britton, Bracton, and the author of Fleta (*e*). By Roman law, indeed, where buildings were erected upon, or improvements made to property, by the party in possession, *bonâ fide* and without

(*z*) "In several of the old books the word *fixatur* is used as synonymous with *plantatur*" in this maxim; Judgm., L. R. 3 Ex. 260. As to buried chattels, see 33 Ch. D. 566, 567.

(*b*) I. 2, 1, 29: D. 47, 3, 1.

(*c*) I. 2, 1, 30.

(*d*) I. 2, 1, 31 & 32: D. 41, 1, 7, 13.

(*e*) Britton (by Wingate), c. 33, 180; Bracton, c. 3, ss. 4, 6; Fleta, lib. 3, c. 2, s. 12.

notice of any adverse title, compensation was, it seems, allowed for such buildings and improvements to the party making them, as against the rightful owner (*f*); and although this principle is not recognised by our own common law, nor to its full extent by Courts of equity, yet, where a man, supposing that he has an absolute title to an estate, builds upon the land with the knowledge of the rightful owner, who stands by, and suffers the erection to proceed, without giving any notice of his own claim, he will be compelled, by a Court of equity, in a suit brought for recovery of the land, to make due compensation for such improvements (*g*). “As to the equity arising from valuable and lasting improvements, I do not consider,” remarked Lord Chancellor Clare (*h*), “that a man who is conscious of a defect in his title, and with that conviction on his mind expends a sum of money in improvements, is entitled to avail himself of it. If the person really entitled to the estate will encourage the possessor of it to expend his money in improvements, or if he will look on and suffer such expenditure without apprising the party of his intention to dispute his title, and will afterwards endeavour to avail himself of such fraud—upon the ground of fraud the jurisdiction of a Court of equity will clearly attach upon the case.”

Having thus touched upon the general doctrine, that what has been affixed to the freehold becomes a portion of it, we shall consider how the maxim, *quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit*, applies to: 1st, trees; 2ndly, emblements; 3rdly, away-going crops; and, 4thly, fixtures;—treating these

(*f*) *Sed quamvis ædificium fundo cedat, fundi tamen dominus condemnari solet ut eum duntaxat recipiat, reddito sumptu quo pretiosior factus est, aut super fundo atque ædificio pensio imponatur ex meliorationis æstimatione si maluerit*: Gothofred. ad I. 2, l. 30.

(*g*) 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 12th ed., s. 388; 2 Id., s. 1237; *Ramsden v. Dyson*, L. R. 1 H. L. 129.

(*h*) *Kenney v. Browne*, 3 Ridgw., Par. Cas. 462, 519; cited, Arg., *Austin v. Chambers*, 6 Cl. & F. 31. See, per *Ld. Brougham*, *Perrott v. Palmer*, 3 My. & K. 640.

important subjects with brevity, and merely endeavouring to give a concise outline of the law respecting each.

Who may cut timber.

1. A tree, whether alive or dead, so long as it is attached to the soil, is realty : by severance from the soil it becomes personalty (*i*). Trees are divisible into two classes, timber trees and trees which do not bear timber. By the general law oak, ash and elm are timber, if they be of the age of twenty years or more and contain a reasonable quantity of useable wood ; whereas other trees are not timber except by special local custom (*k*). As a rule, timber is part of the inheritance, and may not be felled by a tenant for life or years, impeachable for waste ; but an exception to this rule has been established in the case of “ timber estates,” cultivated merely for the produce of saleable timber and where the timber is cut periodically in due course (*l*). Moreover, a tenant, who is answerable for waste only, may fell timber of suitable wood, as well as other trees, for the purpose of making therewith necessary repairs to the premises, the decay not being due to his own default (*m*).

Who may cut other trees.

Trees which are not timber may, as a rule, be cut by a tenant for life or years impeachable for waste ; but he may not cut down trees planted for ornament, or protection of a house or bank, nor may he change the nature of the premises, as by stubbing up a wood or a hedge, or stools of underwood, for such acts, being prejudicial to the inheritance, are acts of waste ; and he may not cut trees destined to become timber, except for the purpose of allowing the growth of other timber in a proper manner (*n*).

(*i*) *Re Ainslie*, 30 Ch. D. 485 ; *Re Llewellyn*, 37 Ch. D. 324.

(*k*) *Honywood v. Honywood*, L. R. 18 Eq. 309 ; see Cru. Dig., 4th ed. 116 (7).

(*l*) *Dashwood v. Magniac*, [1891] 3 Ch. 306 : 60 L. J. Ch. 809, where much of the law relating to timber is collected.

(*m*) Co. Litt. 41 b, 53 a, b, 54 b ; *Simmons v. Norton*, 7 Bing. 640 ; 33 R. R. 588 ; *Sowerby v. Fryer*, L. R. 7 Eq. 417.

(*n*) *Ld. D'Arcy v. Askwith*, Hob. 234 ; *Phillipps v. Smith*, 14 M. & W. 589 ; *Honywood v. Honywood*, L. R. 18 Eq. 310. See *Bagot v. Bagot*, 32 Beav. 509 : 33 L. J. Ch. 116.

A tenant for life or years, "without impeachment of waste," is entitled to cut down all the ordinary timber, as well as other trees, upon the estate; but it has long been established that equity will restrain him from committing who is called "equitable waste," as by felling timber planted or left standing for the shelter or ornament of the mansion house or grounds (o).

Tenant without impeachment of waste.

An ordinary tenant in tail may fell timber at his pleasure; but if standing woods be sold by him and these be not felled during his life, the property therein descends with the estate and the buyer cannot cut them (p). A tenant in tail, after possibility of issue extinct, may cut timber; but his position differs from that of an ordinary tenant in tail, for he may be restrained from equitable waste (q).

Tenant in tail.

The Settled Land Act, 1882 (r), provides that where a tenant for life is impeachable for waste in respect of timber, and there is timber ripe and fit for cutting, he may, on obtaining the consent of the trustees of the settlement, or an order of the Court, cut and sell that timber. Three-fourths of the net proceeds become capital money, and the residue goes as rents and profits.

Settled Land Act.

Apart from "timber estates," and from cases where timber is cut pursuant to statute, the general rule is that timber, severed during the possession of a tenant for life or years who is impeachable for waste, belongs to the person entitled to the first vested estate of inheritance in fee or in tail (s); and this rule holds, although there be intermediate interests (t). Equity, however, will interfere to protect such

Property in severed trees.

(o) *Packington's case*, 3 Atk. 215; *Marlborough*, 3 Madd. 538; 18 R. R. 273.
Marquis of Downshire v. Lady Sandys, 6 Ves. 107; *Baker v. Sebright*, 13 Ch. D. 179.

(p) 11 Rep. 50 a; *Cholmeley v. Paxton*, 3 Bing. 211; 28 R. R. 619; S. C., *Cockerell v. Cholmeley*, 10 B. & C. 564.

(q) *Williams v. Williams*, 15 Ves. 427; 12 East, 209; *A.-G. v. Duke of*

(r) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38, s. 35.

(s) 11 Rep. 81 b; *Bewick v. Whitfield*, 3 P. Wms. 268; *Honywood v. Honwood*, L. R. 18 Eq. 311.

(t) *Pigot v. Bullock*, 1 Ves. 479, 484; 2 R. R. 148; *Re Barrington*, 33 Ch. D. 527.

interests, and will prevent the tenant from deriving benefit from his wrongful act, if the owner of the first vested estate of inheritance collude with the tenant to induce him to cut down timber (*u*). If the tenant in possession be without impeachment of waste, the property in the timber, when severed, generally vests in him (*x*). The property in trees not being timber generally vests, upon their severance, in the tenant in possession (*y*).

Emblements.

2. Emblements comprise not only corn sown, but roots planted, and other annual artificial profits of the land (*z*); and these, in certain cases, are distinct from the realty, and subject to many of the incidents attending personal property. The rule at common law, and irrespective of the statute noticed below (*a*) is, that those only are entitled to emblements who have an uncertain estate or interest in land, which is determined by the act of God, or of the law, between the sowing and the severance of the crop (*b*). Where, however, the tenancy is determined by the tenant's own act, as by forfeiture for waste, or by the marriage of a tenant *durante viduitate*, the tenant is not entitled to emblements; for the principle on which the law gives emblements is, that the tenant may be encouraged to cultivate by being sure of receiving the fruit of his labour, notwithstanding the determination of his estate by some unforeseen and unavoidable event (*c*). By this rule, however, the tenant is not entitled to *all* the fruits of his labour, or such right might be extended to things of a more permanent nature, such as trees, or to more crops than one, since the cultivator often looks for a compensation for his capital and labour in the produce of successive years; but the principle is limited to this extent,

(*u*) L. R. 18 Eq. 311; 28 Ch. D. 228; see *Seagram v. Knight*, L. R. 2 Ch. 628; *Lowndes v. Norton*, 6 Ch. D. 139.

(*x*) *Pyne v. Dor*, 1 T. R. 55; see 33 Ch. D. 527.

(*y*) L. R. 18 Eq. 311; *Channon v.*

Patch, 5 B. & C. 897; *Berriman v. Peacock*, 9 Bing. 384; 35 R. R. 568.

(*z*) Com. Dig., "*Biens*" (G. 1).

(*a*) *Post*, p. 321.

(*b*) Co. Litt. 55 a.

(*c*) Com. Dig., "*Biens*" (G. 2).

that he is entitled to one crop of that species only which ordinarily repays the labour by which it is produced within the year in which that labour is bestowed, though the crop may, in extraordinary seasons, be delayed beyond that period (*d*).

If, then, a tenant for life, or *pur autre vie*, sow the land, and die before harvest, his executors shall have the emblements or profits of the crop; and if a tenant for life sow the land, and afterwards grant over his estate, and the grantee die before the corn is severed, it shall go to the tenant for life, and not to the grantee's executor; whereas, if a man sow land, and let it for life, and the lessee for life die before the corn is severed, the reversioner, and not the lessee's executor, shall have the emblements, although, if the lessee himself had sown, it would have been otherwise (*e*).

Tenant for life.

Further, the tenants or under-tenants of tenant for life will be entitled to emblements, in cases where tenant for life shall not have them, viz., where the life estate determines by the act of the tenant for life. Thus, where a woman holds *durante viduitate*, her marriage is her own act, and therefore deprives her of the emblements: but if she lease her estate to a tenant, who sows the land, and she then marries, this act shall not deprive her tenant of his emblements; for he is a stranger and could not prevent her (*f*). All these cases evidently involve the application of the general principle above stated.

So, the parochial clergy are tenants for their own lives, and emblements are expressly given to them by 28 Hen. 8, c. 11, s. 6, with a power enabling the parson to dispose of the corn by will; but, if the estate is determined by the act of the parson himself, as by his resigning his living, then

Parson.

(*d*) *Graves v. Weld*, 5 B. & Ad. 117, 118; 39 R. R. 419; citing *Kingsbury v. Collins*, 4 Bing. 202; 29 R. R. 534. In *Latham v. Atwood*, Cro. Car. 515, hops growing from ancient roots were held to be like

emblements, being "such things as grow by the manurance and industry of the owner."

(*e*) Arg., *Kneveatt v. Pool*, Cro. Eliz. 464.

(*f*) Co. Litt. 55 b.

according to the principle above stated, he will not be entitled to emblements. The position, however, of the lessee of the glebe, if the parson resign, is different; for, his tenancy being determined by another's act, he shall have the emblements (*g*).

Tenant for
years and
tenant from
year to year.

A tenant for years, where the end of the term is certain, is not entitled to emblements (*h*), but a tenant from year to year, if the lessor determine the tenancy, seems to be entitled to emblements because he does not know in what year his lessor may determine the tenancy by notice to quit, and in that respect he has an uncertain estate (*i*). If the tenancy depend upon an uncertainty, as upon the death of the lessor, who is tenant for life or a husband seised in right of his wife, or if the term be determinable upon a life or lives, in these and similar cases, the estate not being certainly to expire for a time foreknown, but merely by the act of God, the tenant, or his representatives, shall have the emblements in the same manner as a tenant for life would be entitled to them (*j*), and if the lessee of tenant for life be disseised, and the lessee of the disseisor sow, and then the tenant for life dies, and the remainderman enters, the latter shall not have the corn, but the lessee of the tenant for life (*k*).

Where, however, a tenant for years, or from year to year, himself determines the tenancy, as if he commit forfeiture, the landlord shall have the emblements (*l*); and it is a general rule that he shall take them when he enters for a condition broken, because he enters by title paramount, and is in as of his first estate (*m*). Where a lease was granted on condition, that, if the lessee should be sued for any debt to judgment, followed by execution, the lessor should

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| (<i>g</i>) <i>Bulwer v. Bulwer</i> , 2 B. & Ald. | 790—791. |
| 470, 472; 21 R. R. 358. | (<i>k</i>) <i>Knevelt v. Pool</i> , Cro. Eliz. 463. |
| (<i>h</i>) Co. Litt. 56 a. | (<i>l</i>) Co. Litt. 55 b. |
| (<i>i</i>) <i>Kingsbury v. Collins</i> , 4 Bing. | (<i>m</i>) <i>Per Bosanquet, J.</i> , 7 Bing. |
| 207; 29 R. R. 534. | 160; Com. Dig., "Biens" (G. 2); |
| (<i>j</i>) Woodf., L. & T., 16th ed. | Co. Litt. 55 b. |

re-enter as of his former estate, it was held that the lessor, having re-entered after a judgment and execution, was entitled to the emblements (*n*).

Where a tenant of any farm or lands holds the same at a rack-rent, it is now provided by the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1851 (*o*), that, instead of claiming emblements, he "shall continue to hold and occupy such farm or lands until the expiration of the then current year of his tenancy, and shall then quit, upon the terms of his lease or holding, in the same manner as if such lease or tenancy were then determined by effluxion of time or other lawful means during the continuance of his landlord's estate;" and the section further provides for an apportionment of the rent as between the tenant and the succeeding owner. The Act applies to any tenancy in respect of which there is a substantial claim to emblements (*p*).

Tenant at
rack-rent.

It has been mentioned that emblements are subject to many of the incidents attending personal property. Thus, by the Distress for Rent Act (*q*), they may be distrained for rent (*r*), they were forfeitable by outlawry in a personal action, they were devisable before the Statute of Wills, and at the death of the owner they vest in his executors and not in his heir (*s*). So, where tenant in fee or in tail dies after the corn has been sown, but before severance, it shall go to his personal representatives and not to the heir (*t*). If, however, tenant in fee sows land, and then devises the land by will and dies before severance, the devisee shall have the corn, and not the devisor's executors (*u*); and although it is not easy to account for this distinction, which gives growing corn

Heir, devisee,
&c.

(*n*) *Davis v. Eytton*, 7 Bing. 154; 33 R. R. 408.

(*o*) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 1.

(*p*) *Haines v. Welch*, L. R. 4 C. P. 91. See, also, as to the operation of the Act, *Ld. Stradbroke v. Mulcahy*, 2 Ir. C. L. Rep. 406.

(*q*) 11 Geo. 2, c. 19.

(*r*) See also 56 Geo. 3, c. 50; *Hutt v. Morrell*, 11 Q. B. 425.

(*s*) 2 Blac. Com. 404.

(*t*) Com. Dig., "Biens" (G. 2); Co. Litt. 55 b, n. (2), by Hargrave.

(*u*) *Anon.*, Cro. Eliz. 61; Co. Litt. 55 b, n. (2); *Spencer's case*, Winch. 51.

to the devisee, but denies it to the heir (*v*), it is clear law that the growing crops pass to the devisee of the land, unless expressly bequeathed to some one else (*x*). The remainderman for life shall also have the emblements sown by the devisor in fee, in preference to the executor of the tenant for life (*y*); and the legatee of goods, stock, and movables, is entitled to growing corn in preference both to the devisee of the land and the executor (*z*).

Tenant at will.

In the case of strict tenancy at will, if the tenant sow his land, and the landlord, before the corn is ripe, or reaped, put him out, the tenant shall have the emblements, since he could not know when his landlord would determine his will, and therefore could not provide against it; but it is otherwise if the tenant himself determine the will, for then the landlord shall have the profits of the land (*a*).

Tenant under execution.

Tenants under execution are entitled to emblements, when, by some sudden and casual profit, arising between seed-time and harvest, the tenancy is determined by the judgment being satisfied (*b*). Again, if A. acknowledge a statute or recognizance, and afterwards sow the land, and the conusee extend the land, the conusee shall have the emblements (*c*). Where judgment was given against a person, and he then sowed the land and brought a writ of error to reverse the judgment, but it was affirmed, it was held that the recoveror should have the corn (*d*).

Away-going crop.

3. An away-going crop may be defined to be the crop sown during the last year of tenancy, but not ripe until after its expiration. The right to this is usually vested in the out-going tenant, either by the express terms of the lease or contract, or by the usage or custom of the country ;

(*v*) See Co. Litt. 55 b, n. (2); 8 R. R. 570; *West v. Moore*, 8 East, 339; 9 R. R. 460.

(*x*) *Cooper v. Woolfitt*, 2 H. & N. 122, 127; citing *Shepp. Touch.* (ed. by Preston), 472.

(*y*) *Toll. Exors.* 157.

(*z*) *Cox v. Godsalve*, 6 East, 604, n.;

(*a*) Litt. s. 68; Co. Litt. 55.

(*b*) *Woodf. L. & T.*, 16th ed. 791.

(*c*) 2 Leon. 54.

(*d*) *Wicks v. Jordan*, 2 Bulstr. 213.

but in the absence of any contract or custom, and provided the law of emblements does not apply, the landlord is entitled to crops unsevered at the determination of the tenancy, as being a portion of the realty, and by virtue of the general maxim, *quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit*; and this rule of the common law still obtains, except in so far as it has been modified by statute (*e*).

The common law, it has been observed, does so little to prescribe the relative duties of landlord and tenant, that it is not surprising that the Courts have been favourably inclined to the introduction of those regulations in the mode of cultivation which custom and usage have established in each district to be the most beneficial to all parties (*f*). The rule, therefore, is, that evidence of custom is receivable, although there be a written instrument of demise, provided the incident which it is sought to import into the contract be consistent with the terms of such contract; but evidence of custom is inadmissible, if inconsistent with the express or implied terms of the instrument; and this rule applies to tenancies as well by oral agreement as by deed or written contract (*g*).

In *Wigglesworth v. Dallison* (*h*), a leading case on this subject, the tenant was allowed an away-going crop, although there was a formal lease under seal. The lease was entirely silent concerning such a right; and Lord Mansfield said that “the custom did not alter or contradict the lease, but only added something to it.” *Wigglesworth v. Dallison.*

In *Hutton v. Warren* (*i*), it was held that a custom, by *Hutton v. Warren.*

(*e*) As to the tenant's right, under modern statutes, to compensation for improvements, see the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908, 8 Edw. 7, c. 28.

(*f*) Judgm., *Hutton v. Warren*, 1 M. & W. 466.

(*g*) *Wigglesworth v. Dallison*, 1 Dougl. 201; *Faviell v. Gaskoin*, 7 Exch. 273; *Muncey v. Dennis*, 1

H. & N. 216; *Clarke v. Roystone*, 13 M. & W. 752.

(*h*) 1 Dougl. 201; affirmed in error, Id. 207, n. (8). See *Beavan v. Delahay*, 1 H. Bla. 5; 2 R. R. 696; recognised *Griffiths v. Puleston*, 13 M. & W. 358, 360; *Knight v. Bennett*, 3 Bing. 361; 28 R. R. 640; *White v. Sayer*, Palm. R. 211.

(*i*) 1 M. & W. 466. Proof of the

which the tenant, cultivating according to the course of good husbandry, was entitled on quitting to receive from the landlord or incoming tenant a reasonable allowance for seeds and labour bestowed on the arable land in the last year of the tenancy, and was bound to leave the manure for the landlord, if he would buy it, was not excluded by a stipulation in the lease to consume three-fourths of the hay and straw on the farm, and spread the manure arising therefrom, and leave such of it as should not be so spread on the land for the use of the landlord on receiving a reasonable price for it.

Tenant
holding
over.

Where a tenant continues to hold over after the expiration of his lease, without coming to any fresh agreement with his landlord, he must be taken to hold generally under the terms of the lease (*k*), on which, therefore, the admissibility of evidence of custom will depend (*l*).

Principle on
which right
depends.

The principle with respect to the right to an away-going crop applies equally to a tenancy from year to year as to a lease for a longer term (*m*); such custom, it has been observed, is just, for he who sows ought to reap, and it is for the encouragement of agriculture. It is, indeed, against the general rule concerning emblements, which are not allowed to tenants who know when their term is to cease, because it is their fault or folly to sow when they know their interest will expire before they can reap. But the custom of a particular place may rectify what otherwise would be imprudence (*n*). It may be observed, too, that the question as to away-going crops under custom is quite

custom lies on the out-going tenant : *Caldecott v. Smythies*, 7 C. & P. 808.

(*k*) See further as to this, *Hyatt v. Griffiths*, 17 Q. B. 505; *Thomas v. Packer*, 1 H. & N. 669.

(*l*) *Boraston v. Green*, 16 East, 71; 14 R. R. 297; *Roberts v. Barker*, 1 Cr. & M. 808; 38 R. R. 733; *Griffiths v. Puleston*, 13 M. & W. 358. See *Kimpton v. Eve*, 3 Ves. &

B. 349; 13 R. R. 116.

(*m*) *Onslow v. —*, 16 Ves. jun. 173. See *Thorpe v. Eyre*, 1 A. & E. 926, where the custom was held not to be available upon a tenancy being determined by an award; *Ex p. Mandrell*, 2 Mad. 315.

(*n*) Judgm., *Wigglesworth v. Dalison*, 1 Dougl. 201; *Dalby v. Hirst*, 1 B. & B. 224; 21 R. R. 577.

a different matter from emblements, which are by the common law (o).

4. The doctrine as to fixtures peculiarly illustrates the maxim under consideration; for the general rule, laid down in the old books, is, that “whenever a tenant has affixed anything to the demised premises during his term, he can never again sever it without the consent of his landlord” (p). The old rule, observed Martin, B. (q), is, “that if the tenant or the occupier of a house or land annex anything to the freehold, neither he nor his representatives can afterwards take it away, the maxim being, *quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit*. But as society progressed, and tenants for lives or for terms of years of houses, for the more convenient or luxurious occupation of them, or for the purposes of trade, affixed valuable articles to the freehold, the injustice of denying the tenant the right to remove them at his pleasure, and of deeming such things practically forfeited to the owner of the fee simply by the mere act of annexation, became apparent to all; and there long ago sprung up a right, supported by the Courts of law and equity, in the temporary owner or occupier of real property, or his representative, to disannex and remove certain articles, though annexed by him to the freehold, and these articles have been denominated *fixtures*.”

Fixtures:—
Preliminary
remarks.

Questions respecting the right to what are ordinarily called fixtures principally arise between three classes of persons; 1st, between the heir and the personal representatives of tenant in fee; 2ndly, between the personal representatives of tenant for life or in tail and the remainderman or reversioner; 3rdly, between landlord and tenant. In the first of these cases, the general rule obtains with the most rigour in favour of the inheritance, and against the right

(o) *Per* Taunton, J., 1 A. & E. 133; citing Com. Dig., “*Biens*” (G. 2).
(p) *Amos & Fer. on Fixtures*, 2nd ed. 19.
(q) 10 Exch. 507, 508.

to disannex therefrom, and to treat as a personal chattel anything which has been affixed thereto; in the second case, the claims of the personal representatives to fixtures are considered more favourably; and, in the last case, the greatest indulgence has been allowed in favour of the tenant (*r*);—so that decisions, establishing the right of the personal representatives to fixtures in the first or second case, apply, *à fortiori*, to the third.

Meaning of
term.

It is here necessary to remark, that the term “fixtures” is often used indiscriminately of articles which are not by law removable when once attached to the freehold, and of articles which are severable therefrom (*s*). But, in its correct sense, to constitute an article a fixture, *i.e.*, part of the realty, it must be actually annexed thereto; and, *e converso*; whatever is so annexed becomes part of the realty, and the person, who was the owner of it when a chattel, loses his property in it, which immediately vests in the owner of the soil. It must be observed, however, that the mere fact of physical attachment is not conclusive as to whether an article is a fixture. Thus, even if a chattel is actually affixed to the freehold it does not become part thereof if the annexation is incomplete so that it can be easily removed without damage to itself or the premises to

(*r*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 East, 51; 6 R. R. 523; *per* Abbott, C.J.; *Colegrave v. Dias Santos*, 2 B. & C. 78.

(*s*) *Per* Parke, B., *Minshall v. Lloyd*, 2 M. & W. 459; Judgm., L. R. 3 Ex. 260. “There is no doubt that sometimes things annexed to land remain chattels as much after they have been annexed as they were before. The case of pictures hung on a wall for the purpose of being more conveniently seen, may be mentioned by way of illustration. On the other hand things may be made so completely a part of the land as being essential

to its convenient use, that even a tenant could not remove them. An example of this class of chattel may be found in doors or windows. Lastly, things may be annexed to land for the purposes of trade, or of domestic convenience or ornament, in so permanent a manner as really to form a part of the land, and yet the tenant who has erected them is entitled to remove them during his term, or it may be within a reasonable time after its expiration.” Judgm., L. R. 4 Ex. 329; *Longbottom v. Berry*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 123, 139; *per* Blackburn, J., *Reg. v. Lee*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 253.

which it is attached, and the annexation is merely for a temporary purpose and its more complete enjoyment and use as a chattel (*t*). On the other hand articles placed in a house with the object of improving the inheritance are fixtures and become part of the freehold even though they are not physically attached to the structure of the house (*u*). Moreover, there are cases in which things which are fixtures may be disannexed and carried away by some person claiming property in them, as against the owner of the freehold (*x*).

The strictness of the rule under consideration was very early relaxed, as between landlord and tenant, in favour of such fixtures as are partly or wholly essential to trade or manufacture (*y*); and the same relaxation has, in several cases, been extended to disputes between heir and executor. In *Elwes v. Maw*, which is a leading authority on fixtures, Lord Ellenborough observed (*z*) that, in determining whether a particular fixed instrument, machine, or even building, should be considered as removable by the executor as against the heir, the Court in three earlier cases (*a*) may be considered as having decided mainly on this ground, that where the fixed instrument, engine, or utensil, (and the building covering it falls within the same principle), was an accessory to a matter of a personal nature, it should be itself considered as personalty. In two of these cases (*b*), a fire-engine was considered as an accessory to the trade of getting and vending coals—a matter of a personal nature. In *Lord Dudley v. Lord Ward*, Lord Hardwicke

Trade
fixtures.

(*t*) *Lyon v. London City & Midland Bank*, [1903] 2 K. B. 135: 72 L. J. K. B. 465; *Leigh v. Taylor*, [1902] A. C. 157: 71 L. J. Ch. 272; *Hill v. Bullock*, [1897] 2 Ch. 482; 66 L. J. Ch. 705.

(*u*) *Monti v. Barnes*, [1901] 1 Q. B. 205: 70 L. J. K. B. 225.

(*x*) 2 Smith's L. C., 11th ed. 209.

(*y*) Judgm., 3 East, 51, 52; *per*

Story, J., *Van Ness v. Pacard*, 2 Peters (U.S.), R. 143, 145.

(*z*) 3 East, 38; 6 R. R. 523.

(*a*) *Lawton v. Lawton*, 3 Atk. 13; *Ld. Dudley v. Ld. Ward*, Amb. 113; and *Lawton v. Salmon*, 1 H. Bla. 259, n.; 2 R. R. 764.

(*b*) *Lawton v. Lawton*, 3 Atk. 13; *Ld. Dudley v. Ld. Ward*, Amb. 113.

said, "A colliery is not only an enjoyment of the estate, but in part carrying on a trade;" and in *Lawton v. Lawton* he said, "One reason that weighs with me is its being a mixed case, between enjoying the profits of the lands and carrying on a species of trade; and, considering it in this light, it comes very near the instances in brewhouses, &c., of furnaces and coppers." Upon the same principle *Comyns, C.B.*, may be considered as having decided the case of the cyder-mill (*c*), *i.e.*, as a mixed case, between enjoying the profits of the land and carrying on a trade, and as considering the cyder-mill as properly an accessory to the trade of making cyder. In the case of the salt-pans (*d*), Lord Mansfield does not seem to have considered them as accessory to the carrying on a trade, but as merely the means of enjoying the benefit of the inheritance. Upon this principle he considered them as belonging to the heir as parcel of the inheritance, for the enjoyment of which they were made, and not to the executor as the instrument of carrying on a trade (*c*).

In a case before the House of Lords, it appeared that the absolute owner of land, for the purpose of better using and enjoying that land, had affixed to the freehold certain machinery. It was held that, in the absence of any disposition by him of this machinery it went to the heir as part of the real estate; and, further, that if the *corpus* of the machinery passed to the heir, all that belonged to such machinery, although more or less capable of being

(*c*) Cited in *Lawton v. Lawton*, 3 Atk. 13; but see *Ld. Hardwicke's* observations on this case in *Lawton v. Salmon*, 1 H. Bla. 259, n.; 2 R. R. 764; *Ld. Dudley v. Ld. Ward*, Amb. 113; and in *Ex p. Quincey*, 3 Atk. 477, and Bull., N. P. 34. It seems that no rule of law can be extracted from a case of the particulars of which so little is known; *per Ld. Cottenham, Fisher v. Dixon*, 12 Cl.

& F. 329; and see as to the cyder-mill case, *per Wood, V.-C., Mather v. Fraser*, 2 K. & J. 536, reviewing the prior authorities.

(*d*) *Lawton v. Salmon*, 1 H. Bla. 259, n.; 2 R. R. 764.

(*e*) *Per Ld. Ellenborough*, 3 East, 54. See *Winn v. Ingilby*, 5 B. & Ald. 625; 24 R. R. 503; *R. v. St. Dunstan*, 4 B. & C. 686, 691; *Harvey v. Harvey*, Stra. 1141.

detached from it, and of being used in such detached state, also passed to him (*f*). On the other hand, an engine or other article, though used for the purpose of trade, may be so affixed to the premises as to become a fixture and, as such, part of the freehold (*g*).

As between devisee and executor the rule is the same as that already considered, the devisee standing in place of the heir as regards his right to fixtures; for, if a freehold house be devised, fixtures pass (*h*); but if tenant for life or in tail devise fixtures, his devise is void, he having no power to devise the realty to which they are incident. He may, however, devise such fixtures as would pass to his executor (*i*).

Devisee and executor.

As between the heir and devisee, it may be considered as a rule, that the devisee is entitled to all articles which are affixed to the land, whether the annexation took place before or after the date of the devise, according to the maxim, *quod ædificatur in areâ legatâ cedit legato*; and, therefore, by a devise of a house, all personal chattels annexed to the house and essential to its enjoyment pass to the devise (*k*).

Devisee and heir.

As between vendor and vendee, everything which forms part of the freehold passes by a sale and conveyance of the freehold itself, if there be nothing to indicate a contrary

Vendor and vendee.

(*f*) *Fisher v. Dixon*, 12 Cl. & F. 312. In this case the exception in favour of trade was held not applicable; the judgments delivered contain, however, some remarks as to the limits of this exception, which are worthy of consideration. See also *Mather v. Fraser*, 2 K. & J. 536, 545; Judgm., *Climie v. Wood*, L. R. 4 Ex. 330; Judgm., *Longbottom v. Berry*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 136.

(*g*) *Hobson v. Gorringe*, [1897] 1 Ch. 182; 66 L. J. Ch. 182; *Reynolds v. Ashby*, [1903] 1 K. B. 87; 73 L. J. K. B. 946; *Crossley Bros. v.*

Lee, [1908] 1 K. B. 86; 77 L. J. K. B. 199; *Provincial Bill Posting Co. v. Low Moor Iron Co.*, [1909] 2 K. B. 344; 78 L. J. K. B. 702 (advertisement hoarding).

(*h*) *Per Best, J., Colegrave v. Dias Santos*, 2 B. & C. 80; *Norton v. Dashwood*, [1896] 2 Ch. 500; 65 L. J. Ch. 737; *Whaley v. Roehrich*, [1908] 1 Ch. 615; 77 L. J. Ch. 367.

(*i*) *Shep. Touch.* 469, 470; 4 Rep. 62. See *D'Eyncourt v. Gregory*, L. R. 3 Eq. 382.

(*k*) *Amos & Fer., Fixtures*, 2nd ed. 246.

intention (*l*). Thus, in *Colegrave v. Dias Santos* (*m*), the owner of a freehold house, containing fixtures, sold it by auction. Nothing was said about the fixtures. A conveyance of the house was executed, and possession given to the purchaser, the fixtures still remaining in the house. It was held that they passed by the conveyance; and that, even if they did not, the vendor, after giving up possession, could not maintain trover for them.

Mortgagor
and
mortgagee.

The maxim *quicquid plantatur solo solo cedit* applies in favour of a legal mortgagee (*n*) of freeholds (*o*) or leaseholds (*p*); and in the absence of a stipulation to the contrary (*q*) all fixtures, whether annexed before (*r*) or after (*s*) the date of the mortgage, including trade fixtures (*t*), form part of the mortgagee's security and may not be removed without his consent, expressed or implied (*u*).

(*l*) *Colegrave v. Dias Santos*, 2 B. & C. 76; cited, Arg., Id. 610; *per* Parke, B., *Hitchman v. Walton*, 4 M. & W. 416; *per* Patteson, J., *Hare v. Horton*, 5 B. & Ad. 730; 39 R. R. 633. See *Steward v. Lombe*, 1 B. & B. 506, 513; 21 R. R. 700; *Ryall v. Rolfe*, 1 Atk. 175; *Thompson v. Pettitt*, 10 Q. B. 101; *Wiltshire v. Cottrell*, 1 E. & B. 674.

(*m*) 2 B. & C. 76. See *Manning v. Bailey*, 2 Exch. 45.

(*n*) As to an equitable mortgagee, see *Tebb v. Hodge*, L. R. 5 C. P. 73; 39 L. J. C. P. 56; *re Lusty*, 60 L. T. 160; *re Samuel Allen & Son, Ltd.*, [1907] 1 Ch. 575; 76 L. J. Ch. 362.

(*o*) *Climie v. Wood*, L. R. 3 Ex. 257; 4 Id. 328; 37 L. J. Ex. 158; 38 Id. 223; *Longbottom v. Berry*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 123; 39 L. J. Q. B. 37; *Holland v. Hodgson*, L. R. 7 C. P. 328; 41 L. J. C. P. 146; *Hobson v. Gorringe*, [1897] 1 Ch. 182; 66 L. J. Ch. 114; *Ellis v. Glover & Hobson, Ltd.*, [1908] 1 K. B. 388; 77 L. J. K. B. 251.

(*p*) *Ex p. Astbury*, L. R. 4 Ch. 630; 38 L. J. Bkcy. 9; *Meux v. Jacobs*, L. R. 7 H. L. 481; 44 L. J. Ch. 481; *Southport Banking Co. v. Thompson*, 37 Ch. D. 64; 57 L. J. Ch. 114; *Reynolds v. Ashby & Son*, [1904] A. C. 466; 73 L. J. K. B. 946.

(*q*) It is a question of construction whether a mortgage which specifies some fixtures passes all; *Southport Banking Co. v. Thompson*, *supra*.

(*r*) *Climie v. Wood*, *Holland v. Hodgson*, *Hobson v. Gorringe*, *supra*.

(*s*) *Walmsley v. Milne*, 7 C. B. N. S. 115; 29 L. J. C. P. 97; *Longbottom v. Berry*; *Reynolds v. Ashby & Son*; *Ellis v. Glover & Hobson, Ltd.*, *supra*.

(*t*) *Climie v. Wood*; *Longbottom v. Berry*; *Hobson v. Gorringe*; *Reynolds v. Ashby & Son*, *supra*.

(*u*) *Gough v. Wood*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 713; 63 L. J. Q. B. 564, was a case of implied consent; see *Hobson v. Gorringe*, and *Ellis v. Glover & Hobson, Ltd.*, *supra*.

This rule applies, where the mortgagor attorns tenant to the mortgagee, to fixtures annexed by the mortgagor during the tenancy (*x*); but if a mortgagor in possession lets the premises with the mortgagee's consent, his tenant has the same right to remove fixtures as other tenants (*y*). A mortgage of lands, which discloses no intention to confer such a power, does not empower the mortgagee to sever the fixtures thereon and sell them as chattels (*z*). The effect of the Bills of Sale Acts, 1878 and 1882 (*a*), is that a separate bill of sale is necessary in order that the mortgagee may have this power over any fixtures which are trade machinery, as defined by s. 5 of the earlier of these Acts (*b*). The Acts, however, do not affect mortgages of lands which give such a power over fixtures thereon other than trade machinery, or which pass trade machinery thereon without giving any power to sever and sell it (*c*).

In case of an absolute sale of premises, where the conveyance is not general, but contains a stipulation that "the fixtures are to be taken at a valuation," those things only should in strictness be valued which would be deemed personal assets as between heir and executor, and would not pass with the inheritance (*d*).

Valuation of
fixtures.

It has been thought that ornamental fixtures form an exception to the general rule, and that fixtures which otherwise would pass to the heir or remainderman, do not pass, if they can be shown to be used for purposes of ornament merely. The true test nevertheless seems to be, in

Ornamental
fixtures.

(*x*) *Ex p. Punnett*, 16 Ch. D. 226: 50 L. J. Ch. 212.

(*y*) *Sanders v. Davis*, 15 Q. B. D. 218: 54 L. J. Q. B. 576; recognised in *Gough v. Wood*, *supra*; see *Thomas v. Jennings*, 66 L. J. Q. B. 5.

(*z*) *Southport Banking Co. v. Thompson*, *supra*; *Re Yates*, 38 Ch. D. 112; 57 L. J. Ch. 697; *Small v. National Provincial Bank*, [1894]

1 Ch. 686: 63 L. J. Ch. 270; *Re Brooke*, [1894] 2 Ch. 600: 64 L. J. Ch. 21.

(*a*) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 31; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43.

(*b*) *Re Yates*, *supra*; *Small v. National Provincial Bank*, *supra*.

(*c*) *Re Yates*, *supra*.

(*d*) *Amos & Fer.*, *Fixtures*, 2nd ed. 221.

questions between a tenant for life or other limited owner and the remainderman, the intention with which they are fixed. If they are fixed with the intention of enjoying them whilst they are there and not with the intention of improving the freehold, they do not become part of the freehold, but remain personalty (*e*). An element in determining the intention is the method of fixing to the permanent structure and the extent to which it would be damaged by their removal (*f*). As between heir or devisee and legatee of personalty, the question is rather as to the intention of the testator,—whether or not he intends them to pass by his will as chattels or to go with the freehold: and here also it is material to consider whether the things in question were fixed as part of a general scheme of decoration, or merely for their better enjoyment as chattels (*g*). In the former case they pass under a devise of the house and not under a general gift of chattels.

Trade fixtures as between tenant for life and remainderman.

In the case of trade fixtures as between tenant for life and remainderman, the same question arises as in the case of ornamental fixtures, viz. the intention with which they are fixed, having regard to all the facts of the case, not the mode of attachment. And as it is advantageous that the tenant for life should be able to improve the estate for his own enjoyment without being compelled to make a present to the remainderman, the strict rule has been largely relaxed in his case and the law will regard trade fixtures as personalty unless there is evidence of an intention to make a present of them to the remainderman (*h*).

Landlord and tenant.

In cases between landlord and tenant, the general rule, that whatever has once been annexed to the freehold becomes a part of it, and cannot afterwards be removed,

(*e*) *Leigh v. Taylor*, [1902] A. C. 1 Ch. 615.
157: 71 L. J. Ch. 272.

(*f*) *Viscount Hill v. Bullock*, [1905] 1 Ch. 406: 74 L. J. Ch. 246;
[1897] 2 Ch. 482: 66 L. J. Ch. 705.

(*g*) *Whalley v. Roehrich*, [1908] *Dudley v. Ld. Ward*, Amb. 113.

except by or with the consent of him who is entitled to the inheritance (i), must be qualified more largely than in the preceding classes. Thus, the tenant may take away during his term, or at the end of it, although not after he has quitted possession, such fixtures as he has himself put upon the demised premises, either for the purposes of trade, or for the ornament or furniture of his house (j); but here a distinction must be observed between erections for the purposes of trade annexed to the freehold, and erections for purposes merely agricultural (k). With respect to the former, the exception engrafted upon the general rule is of almost as high antiquity as the rule itself, being founded upon principles of public policy, and originating in a desire

(i) Co. Litt. 53 a; *per* Kindersley, V.-C., *Gibson v. Hammersmith R. Co.*, 32 L. J. Ch. 340 *et seq.* Trover does not lie for fixtures until after severance; *Dumergue v. Rumsey*, 2 H. & C. 777, 790; *Minshall v. Lloyd*, 2 M. & W. 450; recognised, *Mackintosh v. Trotter*, 3 Id. 124—126; *Roffey v. Henderson*, 17 Q. B. 574, 586; *London Loan Co. v. Drake*, 6 C. B. N. S. 798, 811. In *Wilde v. Waters*, 16 C. B. 651, Maule, J., observes, "Generally speaking, no doubt, fixtures are part of the freehold, and are not such goods and chattels as can be made the subject of an action of trover. But there are various exceptions to this rule, in respect of things which are set up for ornament or for the purpose of trade, or for other particular purposes. As to these, there are many distinctions, some of which are nice and intricate." See, also, *Clarke v. Holford*, 2 C. & K. 540.

(j) Such as stoves, grates, ornamental chimney-pieces, wainscots fastened with screws, coppers, a pump very slightly affixed to the freehold, and various other articles;

per Erle, J., and Crowder, J., *Bishop v. Elliott*, 11 Exch. 115; *Grymes v. Boweren*, 6 Bing. 437; and *per* Tindal, C.J., Id. 439, 440; *Horn v. Baker*, 9 East, 215, 328; 9 R. R. 541. In *Buckland v. Butterfield*, 2 B. & B. 54; 22 R. R. 649, which is an important decision on this subject, it was held that a conservatory erected on a brick foundation, attached to a dwelling-house, and communicating with it by windows, and by a flue passing into the parlour-chimney, becomes part of the freehold, and cannot be removed by the tenant or his assignees. See *West v. Blakeway*, 2 M. & Gr. 729; *Burt v. Haslett*, 18 C. B. 162, 893.

See also *Powell v. Farmer*, 18 C. B. N. S. 168, 178; *Powell v. Boraston*, Id. 175.

(k) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, *Penton v. Robart*, 2 East, 20; 6 R. R. 376; Judgm., *Earl of Mansfield v. Blackburne*, 3 Bing. N. C. 438. A nurseryman may remove trees planted for sale; *Amos & Fer.*, *Fixtures*, 2nd ed. 68; but not orchard trees (*Mears v. Cullender*, [1901] 2 Ch. 388).

to encourage trade and manufactures. With respect to the latter, however, it has been expressly decided that to such cases the general rule must be applied, unless the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act, 1851, or some other statute apply, or the purpose of the erections related partly to trade of any description, such as cyder-mills, machinery for working mines or collieries (*l*).

*Elwes v.
Maw.*

In the leading case on this subject (*m*), it was held that a tenant in agriculture, who erected at his own expense, and for the necessary and convenient occupation of his farm, a beast-house and carpenter's shop, built of brick and mortar, and tiled, and let into the ground, could not legally remove them even during his term, although by so doing he would leave the premises in the same state as when he entered; and a distinction was taken between annexations to the freehold for purposes of trade, and those made for purposes of agriculture and for better enjoying the immediate profits of the land.

Later cases.

In a later case it has been held that glass houses erected by a tenant for the purposes of his trade as a market gardener (and not for mere pleasure and ornament) are removable as trade fixtures (*n*). And where a superincumbent shed is erected as a mere accessory to a personal chattel, as an engine, it may, as coming within the definition of a trade fixture, be removed; but where it is accessory to the realty it cannot be removed (*o*).

The right of removal, where it exists, should be exercised during the continuance of the term, or during a certain time after its expiration during which the tenant has a right to consider himself as still in possession of the premises as tenant under the landlord (*p*). In one case, the lessee of

(*l*) Woodfall, L. & T., 16th ed. 675. See 14 & 15 Vict. c. 25, s. 3; and the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1908.

(*m*) *Elwes v. Maw*, 3 East, 38; 6 R. R. 523. See *Smith v. Render*,

27 L. J. Ex. 83.

(*n*) *Mears v. Cullender*, [1901] 2 Ch. 388; 70 L. J. Ch. 621.

(*o*) *Whitehead v. Bennett*, 27 L. J. Ch. 474.

(*p*) *Ex p. Stephens*, 7 Ch. D. 127;

business premises having become bankrupt, the trustee sold the fixtures upon the terms that they were to be removed within two days after the sale, which was not done, as the buyer was negotiating with the landlord of the premises for their purchase. The negotiations having fallen through, the trustee surrendered the lease to the landlord, who relet the premises with the fixtures on them. About a fortnight afterwards the buyer, hearing of the surrender, applied for the fixtures, and it was held he was entitled to them, as he had not lost his right by delay or *laches* (*q*). This case seems to engraft an equitable exception upon the common law rule that the fixtures must be removed during such time as the tenant has a right to consider himself in possession. It is also important to remark that the legal right of a tenant to remove fixtures may be either extended or controlled by the express agreement of the parties; and the ordinary right of the tenant to disannex tenants' fixtures during the term may thus be renounced (*r*). Leases often contain a covenant for this purpose, either specifying what fixtures shall be removable by the tenant, or stipulating that he shall, at the end of the term, deliver up all fixtures annexed during its continuance (*s*). Where a lessee mortgaged tenant's fixtures, and afterwards surrendered his lease to the lessor, who granted a fresh lease to a third party, the mortgagees were held entitled to enter and sever the fixtures (*t*).

It is also worthy of notice, that a special usage prevailing in the particular neighbourhood may modify the right

47 L. J. Bk. 22; see *Thomas v. Jennings*, 66 L. J. Q. B. 5. See also *In re Glasdir Copper Mines*, [1904] 1 Ch. 819; 73 L. J. Ch. 461, as to the right of mortgagee or purchaser from tenant to remove tenant's fixtures within a reasonable time after surrender of lease.

(*q*) *Saint v. Pilley*, L. R. 10 Ex. 137; 44 L. J. Ex. 137.

(*r*) *Dumergue v. Rumsey*, 2 H. &

C. 777.

(*s*) See *Bishop v. Elliott*, 11 Exch. 113; *Stansfeld v. Mayor of Portsmouth*, 4 C. B. N. S. 120; *Earl of Mansfield v. Blackburne*, 3 Bing. N. C. 438; *Foley v. Addenbrooke*, 13 M. & W. 174; *Sleddon v. Cruikshank*, 16 M. & W. 71; *Heap v. Barton*, 12 C. B. 274.

(*t*) *London Loan Co. v. Drake*, 6 C. B. N. S. 798.

of property in fixtures as between parties bound by that usage (*u*); and that an agreement may, as between the parties thereto, confer upon the one party a right to remove chattels which he has affixed to the soil of the other; but that such right, not being an easement created by deed, nor conferred by a covenant running with the land, does not affect a purchaser of the land for value without notice (*v*).

Wake v. Hall.
Mining
fixtures.

In *Wake v. Hall* (*x*) the question of the right of a mine owner against the surface owner to remove buildings erected by the mine owner on the surface for the purpose of winning the minerals was discussed. From this case it appears that the mine owner has the right to remove all buildings and other erections lawfully erected by him on the surface for the purpose of his mining operations, and that this right of removal continues for a reasonable time after he has ceased to work the minerals.

DOMUS SUA CUIQUE EST TUTISSIMUM REFUGIUM. (5 Rep. 92.)

—Every man's house is his castle (*y*).

Seymayne's
case.

In a leading case which well exemplifies the application of this maxim, the defendant and one B. were joint tenants of a house in London. B. acknowledged a recognizance in the nature of a statute staple to the plaintiff, and, being possessed of certain goods in the house, died, whereupon the house in which the goods remained became vested in the defendant by survivorship. Subsequently the plaintiff sued out process of extent on the statute, and had a writ to extend all the goods which B. had at the day of his death. This writ he delivered to the sheriffs, telling them that divers

(*u*) Vin. Abr., "*Executors*," U. 74. See *Davis v. Jones*, 2 B. & Ald. 165, 168; 20 R. R. 396.

(*v*) See *Hobson v. Gorringe*, [1897] 1 Ch. 182, where *Wood v. Hewett*, 8 Q. B. 913, and *Lancaster v. Eve*, 5

C. B. N. S. 717, were explained.

(*x*) 8 App. Cas. 195; 7 Q. B. D. 295; 52 L. J. Q. B. 494; 50 Id. 545.

(*y*) *Nemo de domo sua extrahi debet*, D. 50, 17, 103.

goods belonging to B. at the time of his death were in the defendant's house ; whereupon the sheriffs charged the jury to make inquiry according to the writ, and the sheriffs and jury came to the house, and offered to enter in order to extend the goods, the outer door of the house being then open ; but the defendant, *præmissorum non ignarus*, and intending to disturb the execution, shut the door against them, whereby the plaintiff lost the benefit of his writ(z).

The five points bearing upon the present subject, which were resolved in this case, will now be stated shortly, with some references to other authorities affecting them.

1. The house of every one is to him as his castle, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose ; wherefore, although the life of man is a thing precious in law, yet if thieves come to a man's house to rob or murder him, and he or his servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and his house, this is not felony.

First resolution.

Accordingly, if a person attempt to burn or burglariously to break and enter a dwelling-house in the night-time, or attempt to break open a house in the day-time with intent to rob, and be killed in the attempt, the slayer shall be acquitted and discharged, for the homicide is justifiable (a). And in such cases, not only the owner whose person or property is thus attacked, but his servant and the members of his family, or even strangers who are present at the time, are equally justified in killing the assailant (b). In order, however, that a case may fall within this rule, the intent to commit the crime above mentioned must be clearly manifested by the felon ; otherwise, the homicide will amount to manslaughter, at least, if not to murder (c).

2. When any house is recovered by action, the sheriff may break the house, and deliver the possession to the

Second resolution.

(z) *Seymayne's case*, 5 Rep. 91.

(a) 1 Hale, P. C. 481, 488. By 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 7, no punishment is incurred by a person who

kills another in his own defence.

(b) 1 Hale, P. C. 481, 484 *et seq.*

(c) 1 Hale, P. C. 484 ; *R. v. Scully*, 1 C. & P. 319.

plaintiff; for after judgment it is not the house of the defendant.

It is the duty of the sheriff, before he delivers possession, to remove from the house all persons and goods within it (*d*); unless the plaintiff has recovered only an undivided portion of the house, in which case he should merely put the plaintiff in possession of his portion (*e*). After verdict and judgment in ejectment, it was in practice usual for the lessor of the plaintiff to point out to the sheriff the premises recovered, and then the sheriff gave the lessor, at his own peril, execution of what he demanded (*f*).

Third
resolution.

3. In all cases where the king is party, (as where a felony or misdemeanor (*g*) has been committed), the sheriff, if the doors be not open, may break the party's house, to execute the king's process, if otherwise he cannot enter; but before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and make request to open doors.

Bare suspicion, however, touching the guilt of the party will not warrant proceeding to this extremity, though a felony has been actually committed, unless the officer comes armed with a warrant from a magistrate grounded on such suspicion (*h*). And the mere entry, by an open door, into a man's house, on suspicion of felony, but without a warrant, is not justified by a plea which does not show that the defendant had reason to believe that the suspected person was there, and entered for the purpose of apprehending him (*i*).

(*d*) *Upton v. Wells*, 1 Leon. 145.

(*e*) *Per Parke, B., Doe v. King*, 6 Exch. 791.

(*f*) Ad. Eject., 4th ed. 300, 301. See, *per Patteson, J., Doe d. Stevens v. Lord*, 6 Dowl. 256, 266.

(*g*) *Launock v. Brown*, 2 B. & Ald. 592; 21 R. R. 410. The rule extends to process for contempt of Court; *Burdett v. Abbot*, 14 East, 157; 12 R. R. 450, where the break-

ing was justified under the Speaker's warrant; see *Harvey v. Harvey*, 26 Ch. D. 644. As to the power of arrest under the warrant of a Secretary of State, see *R. v. Wilkes*, 2 Wils. 151; *Entick v. Carrington*, Id. 275; S. C., 19 Howell, St. Tr. 1030.

(*h*) Foster on Homioide, 320.

(*i*) *Smith v. Shirley*, 3 C. B. 142.

4. In all cases when the door is open, the sheriff may enter the house and do execution, at the suit of any subject; and so may the lord in such case enter the house and distrain for his rent. But it is not lawful for the sheriff, on request made and denial, to break the defendant's house, to execute any process at the suit of any subject.

Fourth
resolution.

This rule is well established. "Nothing is more certain than that in the ordinary cases of the execution of civil process between subject and subject, no person is warranted in breaking open the outer door in order to execute such process; the law values the private repose and security of every man in his own house, which it considers as his castle, beyond the civil satisfaction of a creditor" (*k*). This rule, however, is strictly confined, as regards the sheriff's officer, to a man's house; and barns and other buildings, not parcel of or connected with his dwelling-house, may be broken open to levy an execution (*l*). On the other hand, the landlord's bailiff, though he may lift the latch of a door (*m*), or enter through an open window (*n*), or over a wall (*o*), to distrain for rent, may not break open the outer door of any building whatever (*p*), except in the case of goods fraudulently removed (*q*). The rule also admits of this exception, that if a defendant escape from arrest, the sheriff may, after demand of admission and refusal, break open either his own house or that

(*k*) *Per* Lord Ellenborough, *Burdett v. Abbot*, 14 East, 154; 12 R. R. 450.

(*l*) *Penton v. Browne*, 1 Sid. 186; *Hodder v. Williams*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 663; 65 L. J. Q. B. 70.

(*m*) *Ryan v. Shilcock*, 7 Exch. 72; 21 L. J. Ex. 75.

(*n*) *Nixon v. Freeman*, 5 H. & N. 652; 29 L. J. Ex. 273; *Crabtree v. Robinson*, 15 Q. B. D. 312; 54 L. J. Q. B. 544; *secus.*, of a window closed; *Nash v. Lucas*, L. R. 2

Q. B. 590; or fastened by a hasp; *Hancock v. Austin*, 14 C. B. N. S. 634; 32 L. J. C. P. 252; *Attack v. Bramwell*, 3 B. & S. 520; 32 L. J. Q. B. 146.

(*o*) *Long v. Clarke*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 119; 63 L. J. Q. B. 108.

(*p*) *Brown v. Glenn*, 16 Q. B. 254; 20 L. J. Q. B. 205; *American Must Co. v. Hendry*, 62 L. J. Q. B. 388.

(*q*) *Williams v. Roberts*, 7 Exch. 618; 22 L. J. Ex. 61.

of a stranger for the purpose of retaking him (*r*); and if an officer or bailiff, who has lawfully entered a house to execute process (*s*), or to distrain for rent (*t*), be forcibly ejected, or locked in, he may break open the outer door to re-enter the house, or to quit it. In these cases a request to re-open the door is usually unnecessary, "for the law in its wisdom only requires this ceremony to be observed when it possibly may be attended with some advantage, and may render the breaking open of the outer door unnecessary" (*u*).

The rule applies only to outer doors. When the sheriff has lawfully obtained admission within a house, he may break open inner doors and cupboards, if necessary, in order to execute his process (*v*), and a landlord has the same right, when distraining (*y*). Therefore, where A. let a house, except one room, which he reserved and occupied separately, and, the outer door of the house being open, a constable, in order to arrest him, broke open the door of this room, it was held that trespass would not lie against the constable (*z*). So, where the front door of a house was generally kept fastened, the usual entrance being through the back door, and the sheriff, having entered by the back door while open in the night, broke open the door of an inner room in which B. was with his

(*r*) *Anon.*, 6 Mod. 105; Lofft. 390; *Lloyd v. Sandilands*, 8 Taunt. 250; 19 R. R. 507; *Sandon v. Jervis*, E. B. & E. 942; 28 L. J. Ex. 156; see *Genner v. Sparkes*, 1 Salk. 79.

(*s*) *White v. Wiltshire*, Palm. 52; Cro. Jac. 555; *Pugh v. Griffith*, 7 A. & E. 827; 7 L. J. Q. B. 169; *Aga Kurboolie Mahomed v. The Queen*, 4 Moo. P. C. 237.

(*t*) *Eagleton v. Gutteridge*, 11 M. & W. 465; 12 L. J. Ex. 359; *Eldridge v. Stacey*, 15 C. B. N. S. 458; see *Bannister v. Hyde*, 2 E. & E. 627; 29 L. J. Q. B. 141.

(*u*) *Aga Kurboolie Mahomed's case*, *supra*.

(*x*) *R. v. Bird*, 2 Show. 87; *Lee v. Gansell*, Cowp. 1; *Ratcliffe v. Burton*, 3 B. & P. 223; 6 R. R. 771; *Hutchinson v. Birch*, 4 Taunt. 619; 13 R. R. 703, which shows that, in the case of a *fi. fa.* no request is necessary.

(*y*) *Browning v. Dann*, Cas. temp. Hardw. 167; but see *Dod v. Monger*, 6 Mod. 215.

(*z*) *Williams v. Spence*, 5 Johns. (U.S.) R. 352.

family, and there arrested him, the arrest was held to be lawful (*a*).

It was laid down in a very early case that if the sheriff, in order to execute a *fi. fa.*, break open an outer door when not justified in doing so, this does not vitiate the execution, but merely renders the sheriff liable to an action of trespass (*b*). This doctrine, so far as it relates to an execution against goods, seems to be countenanced by later cases (*c*) ; but it apparently does not apply to an arrest of the person (*d*).

5. The house of any one is not a castle but for himself, and shall not extend to protect any person who flies to his house, or the goods of any other which are brought into his house, to prevent a lawful execution, and to escape the ordinary process of the law ; and therefore in such cases, after denial on request made, the sheriff may break the house. Fifth resolution.

It must be observed, however, that the sheriff, whether he breaks the stranger's house, or merely enters it by an open door, does so at his peril ; and if the defendant or his goods be not in the house, the sheriff is a trespasser (*e*). He may enter the defendant's own house to ascertain whether the defendant or his goods be there (*f*), at any rate if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such is the case (*g*) ; but if he enter the house of a stranger with the like object, he can be justified only by the event (*h*). The

(*a*) *Hubbard v. Mace*, 17 Johns. (U.S.) R. 127.

(*b*) Y. B. 18 Edw. 4, 4 a, cited in *Seymayne's case* ; see 4th resolution, *ad fin.*

(*c*) See *Percival v. Stamp*, 9 Exch. 167 ; 23 L. J. Ex. 25 ; *Brunswick v. Slowman*, 8 C. B. 317 ; 18 L. J. C. P. 299 ; *De Gondouin v. Lewis*, 10 A. & E. 117 ; 9 L. J. Q. B. 148 ; but see also *Yates v. Delamayne*, Bac. Abr., "Execution" (N.).

(*d*) *Kerbey v. Denby*, 1 M. & W. 336 ; 5 L. J. Ex. 162 ; *Hodgson v. Towning*, 5 Dowl. 410.

(*e*) *Cooke v. Birt*, 5 Taunt. 765 ; 15 R. R. 652 ; *Johnson v. Leigh*, 6 Taunt. 246 ; 16 R. R. 614 ; *Morrish v. Murrey*, 13 M. & W. 52.

(*f*) *Ratcliffe v. Burton*, 3 B. & P. 223 ; 6 R. R. 771.

(*g*) *Morrish v. Murrey*, *supra*, per Alderson, B.

(*h*) See note (*e*), *supra*.

reason for this distinction is that the most probable place to find the defendant or his goods is the house in which he dwells (*i*); and therefore the husband's house must be treated as being also that of the wife, if they are cohabiting (*i*). It has been suggested that, for this reason, if the defendant be on a visit with a stranger, the latter's dwelling-house must be considered to be *pro tempore* also that of the defendant, so as to justify the sheriff's entry to search for him, though he be not actually there (*j*). It is clear that the sheriff may not enter the stranger's house after the defendant has ended his visit and gone away (*k*).

Forcible
entry.

It may not be inappropriate to add, in connection with the maxim under consideration, that, although, as a general rule, where a house has been unlawfully erected on a common, a commoner, whose enjoyment of the common has been thus interrupted, may pull it down (*l*), he is, nevertheless, not justified in doing so, without previous notice or request, while there are persons actually in it (*m*). But, as remarked by Lord Campbell (*n*), it would be a most dangerous extension of this doctrine "to hold that the owner of a house could not exercise the right of pulling it down because a trespasser was in it." The right of the owner of a house who is entitled to possession of it to take possession of it peaceably (*o*), and, when he has done that, to expel all trespassers therefrom without

(*i*) *Cooke v. Birt*, *supra*.

(*j*) *Smith's L. C.*, 11th ed., vol. i. 112, citing *Sheers v. Brooks*, 2 H. Bl. 120; 3 R. R. 357.

(*k*) *Morrish v. Murrey*, *supra*.

(*l*) *Arlett v. Ellis*, 7 B. & C. 346; 9 Id. 671; 31 R. R. 214, 231; see *Smith v. Earl Brownlow*, L. R. 9 Eq. 241.

(*m*) *Perry v. Fitzhowe*, 8 Q. B. 757; *Davies v. Williams*, 16 Id. 546; 20 L. J. Q. B. 330; *Jones v. Jones*, 1 H. & C. 1; 31 L. J. Ex. 506; see *Lane v. Capsey*, [1891]

3 Ch. 411; 61 L. J. Ch. 55.

(*n*) *Burling v. Read*, 11 Q. B. 904; 19 L. J. Q. B. 291. See *Jones v. Foley*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 730; 60 L. J. Q. B. 464.

(*o*) *Taunton v. Costar*, 7 T. R. 431; 4 R. R. 481; *Butcher v. Butcher*, 7 B. & C. 399; 31 R. R. 237; *Wildbor v. Rainforth*, 8 B. & C. 4; 32 R. R. 323; *Browne v. Dawson*, 12 A. & E. 624; 10 L. J. Q. B. 7; *Delaney v. Fox*, 1 C. B. N. S. 166; 26 L. J. C. P. 5; *Pollen v. Brewer*, 7 C. B. N. S. 371.

unnecessary force (*p*) is clearly established; and even if he enter forcibly, thereby rendering himself liable to an indictment (*q*), he is not liable to an action for trespass to the land (*r*). It has been held, however, that he is liable to an action for assaults to the person or damage to goods committed or done in the course of the forcible entry (*s*).

§ III.—THE TRANSFER OF PROPERTY.

Two leading maxims relative to the transfer of property are, first, that alienation is favoured by the law; and, secondly, that an assignee holds property subject to the same rights and liabilities as attached to it whilst in the possession of the grantor. Besides these very general principles, we have included in this section several minor maxims of practical importance, connected with the same subject; and, according to the plan pursued throughout this Work, each maxim has been briefly illustrated.

(*p*) *Hey v. Moorehouse*, 6 Bing. N. C. 52: 9 L. J. C. P. 113; *Butcher v. Butcher*, *supra*; *Browne v. Dawson*, *supra*; see *Lows v. Telford*, 1 App. Cas. 414: 45 L. J. Ex. 613.

(*q*) See 5 Ric. 2, st. 1, c. 7 (c. 8, Ruff.); *Milner v. Maclean*, 2 C. & P. 17.

(*r*) *Turner v. Meymott*, 1 Bing. 158; 25 R. R. 612; *Harvey v. Bridges*, 14 M. & W. 437: 1 Exch. 261; *Davison v. Wilson*, 11 Q. B. 890: 17 L. J. Q. B. 196; *Burling v. Read*, *supra*; *Wright v. Borrowghes*, 3 C. B. 685: 16 L. J. C. P. 6; *Beddall v. Maitland*, 17 Ch. D. 174: 50 L. J. Ch. 401.

(*s*) *Newton v. Harland*, 1 M. & Gr. 644, Coltman, J., dissenting;

Beddall v. Maitland, *supra*; *Edwick v. Hawkes*, 18 Ch. D. 199: 50 L. J. Ch. 577. For *dicta* to the contrary, see *Harvey v. Bridges*, 14 M. & W. 437, *per* Parke and Alderson, BB. In *Blades v. Higgs*, 10 C. B. N. S. 713: 30 L. J. C. P. 374, Erle, C.J., treated *Newton v. Harland* as overruled by *Harvey v. Bridges*. But the point decided in *Newton v. Harland* did not actually arise for decision either in *Harvey v. Bridges*, or in *Blades v. Higgs*. The latter case decides that the owner of a chattel can justify an assault to recapture it after demand and refusal; see S. C., 11 H. L. Cas. 621.

ALIENATIO REI PRÆFERTUR JURI ACCRESCENDI. (*Co. Litt.* 185 a.)—*Alienation is favoured by the law rather than accumulation.*

Alienatio is defined to be, *omnis actus per quem dominium transfertur* (*t*), and it is the well-known policy of our law to favour alienation, and to discountenance every attempt to tie up property unreasonably, or in other words, to create a perpetuity.

Feudal
system was
opposed to
alienation.

The reader will at once remark, that the feudal policy was directly opposed to those wiser views which have now long prevailed. It is, indeed, generally admitted (*u*), that, under the Saxon sway, the power of alienating real property was unrestricted, and that land first ceased to be alienable when the feudal system was introduced after the Norman conquest; for, although the Conqueror's right to the Crown of England seems to have been founded on title, and not on conquest, yet, according to the fundamental principle of that system, all land within the king's territories was held to be derived, either mediately or immediately, from him as the supreme lord, and was subjected to the burthens and restrictions incident to the feudal tenure. Now this tenure originated in the mutual contract between lord and vassal, whereby the vassal, in consideration of the feud with which he was invested, bound himself to render services to his lord, and as the vassal could not, without the lord's consent, substitute the services of another for his own (*x*), so neither could the lord transfer the vassal's fealty and allegiance, without his consent, to another (*y*). It is, however, necessary to bear in mind the distinction, recognised by the feudal laws, between alienation and subinfeudation: for, although alienation, meaning thereby the transfer of the original feud or substitution of a new for the old

(*t*) Brisson. ad verb. "*Alienatio*." T. R. 443; 2 R. R. 429.

(*u*) Wright, Tenures, 154 *et seq.*

(*y*) Wright, Tenures, 171; Mr.

(*x*) See *Bradshaw v. Lawson*, 4 Butler's note, Co. Litt. 309 a (1).

feudatory, was prohibited, yet subinfeudation, whereby a new and inferior feud was carved out of that originally created, was permitted. Moreover, as feudatories did, in fact, under cover of subinfeudation, frequently dispose of their lands, this practice, being opposed in its tendency to the spirit of the feudal institutions, was expressly restrained by Magna Charta, c. 32, which was merely in affirmance of the common law of this subject, and which allowed tenants of mesne lords—though not, it seems, tenants holding directly of the Crown—to dispose of a *reasonable part* of their lands to subfeudatories.

The right of subinfeudation to the extent thus expressly allowed by statute prepared the way for the more extensive power of alienation conferred on mesne feudatories by the statute *Quia Emptores*, 18 Edw. 1, st. 1, c. 1. This statute, which effected a material change in the nature of the feudal tenure, by permitting the transfer or alienation of lands in lieu of subinfeudation, after stating, by way of preamble, that in consequence of this latter practice, the chief lords had many times lost their escheats, marriages, and wardships of land and tenements belonging to their fees, enacted “that from henceforth it shall be lawful to every freeman to sell at his own pleasure his lands and tenements, or part of them, so that the feoffee shall hold the same lands and tenements of the chief lord of the same fee, by such service and customs as his feoffee held before.”

Stat. *Quia Emptores*.

This statute did not extend to tenants *in capite*; and although by the 17 Edw. 2, c. 6, *De Prærogativâ Regis*, it was subsequently declared that no one holding of the Crown by military service could, without the king's licence, alien the *greater part* of his lands, so that enough should not remain for the due performance of such service: (from which it has been inferred that, before this enactment, tenants *in capite* had the same right of subinfeudation as ordinary feudatories had before the stat. *Quia Emptores*):

17 Edw. 2,
c. 6.

yet it does not appear that even after the stat. *De Prærogativâ*, alienation of any part of lands held *in capite* ever occurred without the king's licence; and, at all events, this question was set at rest by the subsequent stat. 34 Edw. 3, c. 15, which rendered valid such alienations as had been made by tenants holding under Hen. 3, and preceding sovereigns, although there was a reservation of the royal prerogative as regarded alienations made during the reigns of the first two Edwards.

Having thus remarked, that, by a fiction of the feudal law, all land was held, either directly or (owing to the practice of subinfeudation) mediately of the Crown, we may next observe that gifts of land were in their origin simple, without any condition or modification annexed to them; and although limited or conditional donations were gradually introduced for the purpose of restraining the right of alienation, yet, since the Courts construed such limitations liberally, in order to favour that right which they were intended to restrain, the stat. of Westm. 2, 13 Edw. 1, usually called the statute *De Donis*, was passed, which enacted, "that the will of the giver according to the form in the deed of gift, manifestly expressed, shall be from henceforth observed, so that they to whom the land was given under such condition shall have no power to alien the land so given, but that it shall remain unto the issue of them to whom it was given, after their death, or shall revert unto the giver, or his heir, if issue fail." The effect, therefore, of this statute was to prevent a tenant in tail from alienating his estate for a greater term than that of his own life; or rather, its effect was to render the grantee's estate certain and indefeasible only during the life of the tenant in tail, upon whose death it became defeasible by his issue or the remainderman or reversioner (z).

Before this Act, indeed, where land was granted to a

(z) 1 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 77, 78.

Stat. *De Donis*.

man and the heirs of his body, the donee was held to take a conditional fee-simple, which became absolute the instant issue was born; but after the passing of the stat. *De Donis*, the estate was, in contemplation of law, divided into two parts, the donee taking a new kind of particular estate, which our judges denominated a fee-tail, the ultimate fee-simple of the land expectant on the failure of issue remaining vested in the donor.

“At last,” says Lord Mansfield (*a*), “the people having groaned for two hundred years under the inconveniences of so much property being unalienable; and the great men, to raise the pride of their families, and (in those turbulent times) to preserve their estates from forfeitures, preventing any alteration by the legislature,” the judges adopted various modes of evading the statute *De Donis*, and of enabling tenants in tail to charge or alien their estates (*b*). The first of these was founded on the idea of a recompense in value; in consequence of which it was held that the issue in tail was bound by the warranty of his ancestor, where assets of equal value descended to him from such ancestor. In the next place, they held, in the reign of Edw. 4, that a feigned recovery should bar the issue in tail and the remainders and reversion (*c*). And, by the 32 Hen. 8, c. 36, the legislature expressly declared that a fine should be a bar to the issue in tail (*d*). Finally, under the Act for abolishing fines and recoveries, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74, a tenant in tail became empowered by

Evasion of
stat. *De*
Donis.

3 & 4 Will. 4,
c. 74.

(*a*) *Taylor v. Horde*, 1 Burr. 115.

(*b*) In *Mary Portington's case*, 10 Rep. 35 b, it was held, in accordance with prior authorities, that tenant in tail could not be restrained by any condition or limitation from suffering a common recovery.

(*c*) *Taltarum's case*, Yr. Bk. 12 Edw. 4, 14, 19, where the Court assumed that a recovery properly

suffered would destroy an entail, although they decided that, in the particular case, the entail had not been destroyed.

(*d*) Except where the reversion was in the Crown, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 20. As to the respective effects of the 4 Hen. 7, c. 24, and 32 Hen. 8, c. 36, see Mr. Hargrave's note (1), Co. Litt. 121 a.

any species of deed, made and enrolled in conformity with the Act, absolutely to dispose of the estate of which he is seised in tail in the same manner as if he were absolutely seised thereof in fee (*e*).

Having thus seen how the restrictions which were, in accordance with the spirit of the feudal laws, imposed upon the alienation of land by *deed*, were gradually relaxed, we may further observe that the power of disposing of land by *will* was equally opposed to the policy of those laws. Consequently, although land was devisable until the Conquest, yet shortly afterwards it became inalienable by will (*f*), and so remained until the 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, and 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5. The latter of these statutes was explanatory of the former, and declared that every person (except as therein mentioned) having a sole estate or interest or being seised in fee-simple of and in any manors, lands, tenements, rents, or other hereditaments in possession, reversion, remainder, or of rents or services incident to any reversion or remainder, shall have full and free liberty, power, and authority to give, dispose, will, or devise to any person or persons (except bodies politic and corporate) by his last will in writing, all his said manors, lands, tenements, rents, and hereditaments, or any of them, at his own free will and pleasure. It is, indeed, true, that, by these statutes, some restriction was imposed upon the right of alienating by will lands held by military tenure; yet since such tenures were, by the 12 Car. 2, c. 24, converted into free and common socage tenures, we do, in fact, derive from the Acts of Hen. 8, the important right of disposing by will of all lands and tenements other than copyholds (*g*): a privilege which received important extensions by the 1 Vict. c. 26 (amended by 15 & 16 Vict. c. 24), and which now attaches to all real and

1 Vict. c. 26.

(*e*) See 1 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 88. Tenures, 207.

(*f*) A tenant in gavelkind, however, could devise by will; Wright,

(*g*) As to copyholds see 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 3; Shelf. Copyholds, 52.

personal estate to which a person may be entitled, either at law or in equity, at the time of his death (*h*).

It remains to consider how far the right of alienation exists at common law, when viewed without reference to the arbitrary restrictions imposed under the feudal system, and to show how this right has been favoured by our Courts of law, and encouraged by the legislature. In the first place, we may observe that the *potestas alienandi*, or right of alienation, is a right necessarily incident, in contemplation of law, to an estate in fee-simple; it is inseparably annexed to it, and cannot, in general, be indefinitely restrained by any proviso or condition whatsoever (*i*); for, although a "fee-simple" is explained by Littleton (*k*) as being *hereditas pura*, yet it is not so described as importing an estate purely allodial (for we have already seen that such an estate did not, in fact, exist in this country), but because it implies a simple inheritance, clear of any condition, limitation, or restriction to any particular heirs, and descendible to heirs general, whether male or female, lineal or collateral (*l*). In illustration of this incident of an estate in fee-simple, we find it laid down (*m*) that "if a man makes a feoffment on condition that the feoffee shall not alien to any, the condition is void; because where a man is enfeoffed of land or tenements, he has power to alien them to any person by the law; for, if such condition should be good, then the condition would oust him of the whole power which the law gives him, which would be against reason, and therefore such condition is void." A testator devised land to A. and his heirs for ever; but, in case A. died without heirs, then to C. (a stranger in blood to A.) and his heirs; and, in case A. offered to mortgage or suffer a fine or

Right of
alienation
at common
law.

(*h*) S. 3.

(*i*) 4 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 330.

(*k*) S. 1.

(*l*) Wright, Tenures, 147.

(*m*) *Mildmay's case*, 6 Rep. 42; Co. Litt. 206 b; see *Re Rosher*, 26 Ch. D. 801; *Re Elliot*, [1896] 2 Ch. 353; 65 L. J. Ch. 753.

recovery upon the whole or any part thereof, then to the said C. and his heirs. It was held that A. took an estate in fee, with an executory devise over, to take effect upon the happening of conditions which were void in law, and that a purchaser in fee from A. had a good title against all persons claiming under the will (*n*). So, if a man, before the statute *De Donis*, had made a gift to one and the heirs of his body, after issue born the donee had, by the common law, *potestatem alienandi*; and, therefore, if the donor had added a condition, that, after issue the donee should not alien, the condition would have been repugnant and void. And, by like reasoning, if, after the statute, a man had made a gift in tail, on condition that the tenant in tail should not suffer a common recovery, such condition would have been void; for, by the gift in tail, the tenant had an absolute power given to suffer a recovery, and so to bar the entail (*o*). And here we may remark, that the distinction which exists between real and personal property is further illustrative of the present subject; for, with respect to personalty, it is laid down, that, where an estate tail in things personal is given to the first or any subsequent possessor, it vests in him the total property, and no remainder over shall be permitted on such a limitation; for this, if allowed, would tend to a perpetuity, as the devise, or grantee in tail of a chattel has no method of barring the entail; wherefore the law vests in him at once the entire dominion of goods, being analogous to the fee-simple which a tenant in tail may acquire in real estate (*p*).

We may, in connection with this subject, likewise refer to Sir W. Blackstone's celebrated judgment in *Perrin v. Blake* (*q*), where a distinction is drawn between those rules

(*n*) *Ware v. Cann*, 10 B. & C. Rep. 35.
433; 34 R. R. 469.

(*p*) 2 Blac. Com. 398.

(*o*) 6 Rep. 41; arg., *Taylor v. Horde*, 1 Burr. 84; *Corbet's case*, 1 Rep. 83; *Portington's case*, 10

(*q*) Hargrave's Tracts, fol. 500. As to this judgment, see *per* Ld. Macnaghten, [1897] A. C. 674—676.

of law which are to be considered as the fundamental rules of the property of this kingdom (*r*), and which cannot be transgressed by any intention of a testator, however clearly expressed, and those rules of a more arbitrary, technical, and artificial kind, which the intention of a testator may control. Amongst rules appertaining to the former class, Sir W. Blackstone mentioned these:—(1) every tenant in fee-simple or fee-tail shall have the power of alienating his estates by the several modes adapted to their respective interests; and (2) no disposition shall be allowed which, in its consequence, tends to a perpetuity (*s*).

Not only will our Courts oppose the creation of a perpetuity by deed, but they will likewise frustrate the attempt to create it by will; and, therefore, “upon the introduction of executory devises, and the indulgence thereby allowed to testators, care was taken that the property which was the subject of them should not be tied up beyond a reasonable time, and that too great a restraint upon alienation should not be permitted” (*t*). The rule is accordingly well established, that, although an estate may be rendered inalienable during the existence of a life or of any number of lives in being, and twenty-one years after, or, possibly, even for nine months beyond the twenty-one years, in case the person ultimately entitled to the estate should, at the time of its accruing to him, be an infant *in ventre sa mère* (*u*), yet that all attempts to postpone the enjoyment of the fee for a longer period are void (*v*). Moreover, an estate cannot

Restraint
upon per-
petuities by
devise.

(*r*) See, also, *Egerton v. Earl Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Cas. 1, *passim*.

(*s*) Mr. Butler's note, Co. Litt. 376 b (1).

(*t*) Judgm., *Cadell v. Palmer*, 10 Bing. 142. See *Ware v. Cann*, 10 B. & C. 433; 34 R. R. 469.

(*u*) In an executory devise, the period of gestation may be reckoned both at the beginning and the end of the 21 years; thus, if land is

devised with remainder over in case A.'s son die under 21, and A. dies leaving a son *in ventre sa mère*, then if the son marries in his 21st year, and dies leaving his widow *enceinte*, the estate vests, nevertheless, in the infant *in ventre sa mère*, and does not go over. See, *per* Ld. Eldon, *Thellusson v. Woodford*, 11 Ves. 149; 8 R. R. 119.

(*v*) *Cadell v. Palmer*, 10 Bing.

be limited to an unborn person for life followed by an estate to any child of such unborn person (*w*).

Trusts for
accumulation.

With respect to trusts for accumulation, we may observe, that restrictions, beyond those of the common law, mentioned above, are imposed upon them by an Act, commonly called "Thellusson Act" (*x*), which was passed in 1880 in consequence of the will of Mr. Thellusson and the establishment of its validity in *Thellusson v. Woodford* (*y*).

By this Act, no settlement of realty or personalty may, as a rule, be made in such a manner that its profits be accumulated for any longer term than one only of these periods, viz., (1) the settlor's life; (2) twenty-one years from his death; (3) the minority of any person living, or *in ventre sa mère*, at the time of the settlor's death; (4) the minority of any person who, by the settlement, would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to the profits directed to be accumulated. And the Act provides that every direction to accumulate for a longer term shall be void, and that the profits shall, so long as they shall be directed to be accumulated contrary to its provisions, go to such person or persons as would have been entitled thereto if such excessive accumulation had not been directed. But the Act does not extend to provisions for the payment of debts, or for raising portions for children, or touching the produce of timber or wood upon lands. The Accumulations Act, 1892 (*z*), further, as a rule, prohibits the settlement of property in such a manner that its profits shall be accumulated, for the purchase of land only, for a longer period than during the minority or respective minorities of

140. See *Ld. Dungannon v. Smith*, 12 Cl. & F. 546, distinguished in *Christie v. Gosling*, L. R. 1 H. L. 279, 292; *Spencer v. Duke of Marlborough*, 3 Bro. P. C. 232. As to covenants to reconvey, see *L. & S. W. R. Co. v. Gomm*, 20 Ch. D. 562: 51 L. J. Ch. 530.

(*w*) See *Whitby v. Mitchell*, 42 Ch. D. 494: 44 Id. 85.

(*x*) 39 & 40 Geo. III. c. 98.

(*y*) 4 Ves. 227; S. C., 11 Id. 112, in which case Mr. Hargrave's argument respecting perpetuities is worthy of perusal.

(*z*) 55 & 56 Vict. c. 58.

any person or persons who, under the uses or trusts of the settlement, would for the time being, if of full age, be entitled to receive the profits directed to be accumulated.

It will be evident, from the preceding remarks, that the rule against perpetuities is observed by Courts both of law and of equity (a). In consequence, however, of the peculiar jurisdiction which Courts of equity exercise, to protect the interests of married women, the right of alienation has, in one case, with a view to their benefit, been restricted, and that restriction thus imposed may be regarded as an exception to the operation of the maxim in favour of alienation. It is now fully established, that where property is conveyed to the separate use of a married woman in fee, with a clause in restraint of anticipation during coverture, such clause is valid; for equity, having in this instance created a particular kind of estate, will reserve to itself the power of modifying that estate in such manner as the Court may think fit, and will so regulate its enjoyment as to effect the purpose for which the estate was originally created (b). The law upon this subject was settled in *Tullett v. Armstrong* (c), and *Scarborough v. Borman* (d), where Lord Cottenham, after an elaborate review of the authorities, held that a gift to the sole and separate use of a woman, whether married or unmarried, with a clause against anticipation, was good against an after-acquired husband; and in subsequent cases this decision has been fully recognised and followed (e).

Exception
to rule.

Feme covert.

*Tullett v.
Armstrong.*

The reason of the rule thus established was afterwards stated by his Lordship in these words:—"When first, by the law of this country, property was settled to the separate use of the wife, equity considered the wife as a *feme sole*, to the extent of having a dominion over the property. But

(a) See, also, *per* Wilmot, C.J., *Bridgman v. Green*, Wilmot, Opin. 61.

(b) See *per* Ld. Lyndhurst, *Baggett v. Meux*, 1 Phill. 627 : 1 Coll. 138.

(c) 4 My. & Cr. 377, 390. See *Wright v. Wright*, 2 J. & H. 647, 652.

(d) 4 My. & Cr. 378.

(e) *Baggett v. Meux*, *supra*; and see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 19.

then it was found that that, though useful and operative, so far as securing to her a dominion over the property so devoted to her support, was open to this difficulty—that she, being considered as a *feme sole*, was of course at liberty to dispose of it as a *feme sole* might have disposed of it, and that, of course, exposing her to the influence of her husband, was found to destroy the object of giving her a separate property; therefore, to meet that, a provision was adopted of prohibiting the anticipation of the income of the property, so that she had no dominion over the property till the payments actually became due” (*f*).

Alienation of
personalty
favoured.

Having thus observed that our law favours the alienation of real property, or to use the words of Lord Mansfield, that “the sense of wise men, and the general bent of the people in this country, have ever been against making land perpetually unalienable:” and having seen that “the utility of the end was thought to justify any means to attain it” (*g*), it remains to add, that the same policy obtains with reference to personalty; and, in support of this remark, may be adduced the well-known rule of the law merchant, that for the encouragement of commerce, the right of survivorship, which is ordinarily incident to a joint tenancy, does not exist amongst trading partners: *jus accrescendi inter mercatores pro beneficio commercii locum non habet* (*h*): a rule which evidently favours alienation, by rendering the capital invested by the partners in their trade applicable to the purposes of their partnership, and available to the creditors of the firm (*i*).

Jus accrescendi inter mercatores non habet.

We have already observed that there cannot be an estate tail in personalty (*j*); nor can a perpetuity be created

(*f*) *Per* Id. Cottenham, *Rennie v. Ritchie*, 12 Cl. & F. 234. See also *Hood-Barrs v. Heriot*, [1896] A. C. 174: 65 L. J. Q. B. 352.

(*g*) *Per* Id. Mansfield, 1 Burr. 115.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 182 a; Brownl. 99; Noy, Max., 9th ed. 79; 1 Beawes,

Lex Merc. 6th ed. 42.

(*i*) The reader must now consult on this subject the Partnership Act, 1890.

(*j*) As to heir-looms, see the maxim *accessorium sequitur principale*, *post*. As to annexing personal

therein. Indeed, where the subject-matter of a grant is a personal chattel, it is impossible so to tie up the use and enjoyment of it as to create in the donee a life estate which he may not alien (*k*). It is true, however, that this object may be attained indirectly, in a manner consistent with the rules of law, by annexing to the gift a forfeiture or defeasance on the happening of a particular event, or on a particular act being done; for in that case the donee takes by the limitation a certain estate, of which the event or act is the measure, and upon the happening of the event or the doing of the act, a new and distinct estate accrues to another person. If, for instance, a testator desire to give an annuity without the power of anticipation, he can only do so by declaring that the act of alienation shall determine the interest of the legatee, and create a new interest in another (*l*).

Property may also be given to a party to be enjoyed by him until he become bankrupt, with a proviso that upon the happening of that event the property shall go over to another party. A person cannot, however, create an absolute interest in property and, at the same time, deprive the party to whom that interest is given of those incidents and of that right of alienation which belong, according to the elementary principles of the common law, to the ownership of the estate. Where, therefore, a testator directed his trustees to pay an annuity to his brother, until he should attempt to charge it, or some other person should claim it, and then to apply it for his maintenance, it was held that, on the insolvency of the annuitant, his assignees became entitled to the annuity (*m*).

Limitation of interest.

to real estate, the latter being devised in strict settlement, see 2 Jarm., Wills, 2nd ed. 492.

(*k*) So too a condition cannot be attached by the vendor to goods so as to affect subsequent purchasers with notice (*Taddy & Co. v. Sterious*

& Co., [1904] 1 Ch. 354: 73 L. J. Ch. 191; *McGruther v. Pitcher*, [1904] 2 Ch. 306: 73 L. J. Ch. 653).

(*l*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, 2 My. & K. 204.

(*m*) *Youngehusband v. Gisborne*, 1 Colly. 400.

The distinction between a proviso or condition subsequent, and a limitation above exemplified, may be further explained in the words of Lord Eldon, who says: "there is no doubt that property may be given to a man until he shall become bankrupt. It is equally clear, generally speaking, that, if property is given to a man for his life, the donor cannot take away the incidents to a life estate; and . . . a disposition to a man until he shall become bankrupt, and after his bankruptcy over, is quite different from an attempt to give to him for his life, with a *proviso* that he shall not sell or alien it. If that condition is so expressed as to amount to a limitation, reducing the interest short of a life estate, neither the man nor his assignees can have it beyond the period limited" (*n*).

Settled Land
Act, 1882.

An important extension of the maxim that the law favours alienation is to be found in the Settled Land Act, 1882 (*o*), which confers upon the tenant for life of settled land power to sell the fee-simple without the consent of the other parties interested under the settlement. The Act expressly provides that this power shall not be capable of assignment or release, and it renders void any contract by the tenant for life not to exercise the power, or any provision in the settlement prohibiting its exercise (*p*). In exercising the power the tenant for life acts as trustee for all parties interested under the settlement (*q*).

CUJUS EST DARE EJUS EST DISPONERE. (*Wing. Max.* 53.)—

The bestower of a gift has a right to regulate its disposal (*r*).

Derivation
of rule.

It will be evident, from a perusal of the preceding pages, that this general rule must now be received with

(*n*) *Brandon v. Robinson*, 18 Ves.

433, 434; 11 R. R. 226. See *Re*

Dugdale, 38 Ch. D. 176, 181.

(*o*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 38.

(*p*) See ss. 50, 51.

(*q*) S. 53.

(*r*) Bell, Dict. & Dig. of Scotch

Law, 242.

considerable qualification. It does, in fact, set forth the principle on which the old feudal system of feoffment depended; *tenor est qui legem dat feudo* (s)—it is the tenor of the feudal grant which regulates its effect and extent: and the maxim itself is, in another form, still applicable to modern grants—*modus legem dat donationi* (t)—the bargainor of an estate may, since the land moves from him, annex such conditions as he pleases to the estate bargained, provided that they are not illegal, repugnant, or impossible (u). Moreover, it is always necessary that the grantor should expressly limit and declare the continuance and quantity of the estate which he means to confer; for, by a bare grant of lands, the grantee takes only an estate for life, a feoffment being still considered as a gift, which is not to be extended beyond the express limitation or manifest intention of the feoffor (x). As, moreover, the owner may, subject to certain beneficial restrictions, impose conditions at his pleasure upon the feoffee, so he may likewise, by insertion of special covenants in a conveyance or demise reserve to himself rights of easement and other privileges in the land so conveyed or demised, and thus surrender the enjoyment of it only partially, and not absolutely, to the feoffee or tenant. “It is not,” as remarked by Lord Brougham (y), “at all inconsistent with the nature of property, that certain things should be reserved to the reversioners all the while the term continues. It is only something taken out of the demise—some exception to the temporary surrender of the enjoyment: it is only that they retain more or less partially the use of what was wholly used by them before the demise, and what will again be wholly used by them when that demise is at an end.”

Reservation
in demise
of land.

It must not, however, therefore be inferred that “incidents of a novel kind can be devised and attached to

(s) Craig, *Jus Feud.*, 3rd ed. 66.

(x) Wright, *Tenures*, 151, 152.

(t) Co. Litt. 19 a.

(y) 2 My. & K. 536, 537.

(u) 2 Rep. 71.

property at the fancy or caprice of any owner (z). "No man," remarks Lord St. Leonards, in *Egerton v. Earl Brownlow* (a), "can attach any condition to his property which is against the public good," nor can he "alter the usual line of descent by a creation of his own. A man cannot give an estate in fee-simple to a person and his heirs on the part of his mother. Why? Because the law has already said how a fee-simple estate should descend" (b).

It is further to be observed that it is not in the power of an owner of land to create rights not connected with its use or enjoyment, and to annex them to it, nor can he subject the land to a new species of burden, so as to bind it in the hands of an assignee; thus, in the well-known case of *Ackroyd v. Smith* (c) the plaintiff and his mortgagee had granted to the defendants' predecessors in title, their heirs and assigns, certain premises, together with the right of passing and repassing for all purposes along a certain road. It was held that as the right was to use the road for all purposes, it was not a right incidental to the enjoyment of the premises granted, and, therefore, was not appurtenant to them, and was not assignable, and that the defendants who justified their user of the road under the grant as assignees must be treated as trespassers.

Landlord
and tenant.

"The general principle," says Ashhurst, J., "is clear, that the landlord having the *jus disponendi* may annex whatever conditions he pleases to his grant, provided they be not illegal or unreasonable." It is, for instance, "reasonable that a landlord should exercise his judgment with respect to the person to whom he trusts the management of his estate; and, therefore, a covenant not to assign

(z) *Per* Ld. Brougham, 2 My. & K. 535; *Ackroyd v. Smith*, 10 C. B. 164; *Bailey v. Stephens*, 12 C. B. N. S. 91; *Ellis v. Mayor of Bridgnorth*, 15 C. B. N. S. 52, 78; *Tulk v. Moxhay*, 2 Phill. 774; *Hill v. Tupper*, 2 H. & C. 121, 128; *per*

Cresswell, J., and Watson, B., *Rowbotham v. Wilson*, 8 E. & B. 123; S. C., 8 H. L. Cas. 348.

(a) 4 H. L. Cas. 241, 242.

(b) See also *Marquis of Salisbury v. Gladstone*, 9 H. L. Cas. 241.

(c) 10 C. B. 164.

is legal" (d); and ejectment will lie on breach of such a covenant.

On this principle, likewise, an agreement by defendant to allow plaintiff, with whom he cohabited, an annuity for life, provided she should continue single, was held to be valid, for this was only an original gift, with a condition annexed; and *cujus est dare ejus est disponere*. Moreover, the grant of the annuity was not an inducement to the plaintiff to continue the cohabitation, it was rather an inducement to separate (c).

Another remarkable illustration of the *jus disponendi* presents itself in that strict compliance with the wishes of the grantor, which was formerly (f) regarded as essential to the due execution of a power (g).

ASSIGNATUS UTITUR JURE AUCTORIS. (*Halk. Max.*, p.

14.)—*An assignee is clothed with the rights of his principal* (h).

It is laid down as a leading rule concerning alienations and forfeitures, that *quod meum est sine facto meo vel defectu meo amitti, vel in alium transferri, non potest* (i), where *factum* may be translated "alienation," and *defectus* "forfeiture" (k); and it seems desirable to preface our

(d) *Roe v. Galliers*, 2 T. R. 137, 138; 1 R. R. 445.

(e) *Gibson v. Dickie*, 3 M. & S. 463; 16 R. R. 333; cited arg., *Parker v. Rolls*, 14 C. B. 697.

(f) By 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 10, every will executed as prescribed by that Act is now a valid execution of a power of appointment by will, although other required solemnities may not have been observed.

(g) *Rutland v. Doe*, 12 M. & W. 357, 373, 378; S. C., 10 Cl. & F. 419; *Doe v. Burrough*, 6 Q. B. 229; *Doe v. Eyre*, 3 C. B. 557.

(h) "*Auctores*" dicuntur a quibus *jus in nos transiit*. Brisson. ad verb. "*Auctor*."

(i) This maxim is well illustrated by *Vynor v. Mersey Docks Board*, 14 C. B. N. S. 753.

(k) 1 Prest., Abs. Tit. 147, 318. The kindred maxims are, *Quod semel meum est amplius meum esse non potest*, Co. Litt. 49 b; *Duo non possunt in solido unam rem possidere*, Co. Litt. 368 a. See 1 Prest., Abs. Tit. 318; 2 Id. 86, 286; 2 Dods., Adm. R. 157; 2 Curt. 76.

remarks as to the rights and liabilities which pass by the transfer of property, by stating this elementary principle, that where property in land or chattels has once been effectively and indefeasibly acquired, the right of property can only be lost by some act amounting to alienation or forfeiture by the owner or his representatives.

Who is an assignee.

An "assignee" is one who, by such act as aforesaid, or by the operation of law, as in the event of death, possesses a thing or enjoys a benefit; the main distinction between an *assignee* (*l*) and a *deputy* being, that the former occupies in his own right, whereas the latter occupies in the right of another (*m*). A familiar instance of a transfer by the owner's act occurs in the assignment of a lease by deed; and of a transfer by operation of law, in the case of the heir of an intestate, who is an assignee in law of his ancestor (*n*). Further, the term "assigns" (*o*) includes the assignee of an assignee *in perpetuum* (*p*), provided the interest of the person originally entitled is transmitted on each successive devolution of the estate or thing assigned; for instance, the executor of A.'s executor is the assignee of A., but not so the executor of A.'s administrator, or the administrator of A.'s executor, who is in no sense the representative of A., and to whom, therefore, the unadministered residue of A.'s estate will not pass.

In order to place in a clear light the general bearing of the maxim *assignatus utitur jure auctoris*, we will briefly notice, first, the quantity, and, secondly, the quality or nature, of the interest in property which can be assigned

(*l*) See *Bromage v. Lloyd*, 1 Exch. 32; *Bishop v. Curtis*, 18 Q. B. 878; *Lysaght v. Bryant*, 9 C. B. 46.

(*m*) Perkin's Prof. Bk., s. 100; Dyer, 6.

(*n*) *Spencer's case*, 5 Rep. 16.

(*o*) As to the meaning of the word "assigns" in a covenant, see *Baily*

v. *De Crespigny*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 186. See also *Mitcalfe v. Westaway*, 17 C. B. N. S. 658. An underlease of the whole term amounts to an assignment; *Beardman v. Wilson*, L. R. 4 C. P. 57.

(*p*) Co. Litt. 384 b.

by the owner to another party. And, 1st, it is a well-known general rule, imported into our own from the civil law, that no man can transfer a greater right or interest than he himself possesses: *nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet* (q). The owner, for example, of a base or determinable fee can do no more than transfer to another his own estate, or some interest of inferior degree created out of it; and if there be two joint tenants of land, a grant or a lease by one operates only on his own moiety (r). In like manner, where the grantor originally possessed only a temporary or revocable right in the thing granted, and this right becomes extinguished by efflux of time or by revocation, the assignee's title ceases to be valid, according to the rule *resoluto jure concedentis resolvitur jus concessum* (s).

What amount of interest can be assigned.

We find it laid down, however, that the maxim above mentioned, which is one of the leading rules as to titles, or the equivalent maxim, *non dat qui non habet*, did not, before the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, apply to wrongful conveyances or tortious acts (t). For instance, before that Act, if a tenant for years made a feoffment, this feoffment vested in the feoffee a defeasible estate of freehold; for, according to the ancient doctrine, every person having possession of land, however slender or tortious his possession might be, was, nevertheless (unless, indeed, he were the mere bailiff of the party having title), considered to be in of the seisin in fee, so as to be able by livery to transfer it to another; and, consequently, if, in the case above supposed, the feoffee had, after the conveyance, levied a fine, such fine would, at the end of five years from the expiration of the term, have barred the lessor (u). But

(q) D. 50, 17, 54; Wing. Max., p. 56.

(r) 3 Prest., Abs. Tit. 25, 222.

(s) Mackeld., Civ. Law, 179.

(t) 3 Prest., Abs. Tit. 25; Id. 244.

(u) See Mr. Butler's note (1), Co. Litt. 330 b; *Machell v. Clarke*, 2 Ld. Raym. 778; 1 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 80.

now, by s. 4 of the above Act (*x*), a feoffment “shall not have any tortious operation.”

In connection with copyhold law also, there is an exception to the elementary rule above noticed; for the lord of a manor, having only a particular interest therein as tenant for life, may grant by copy for an estate which may continue longer than his own estate in the manor, or for an estate in reversion, which may not come into possession during the existence of his own estate: the special principle, on which the grants of a lord *pro tempore* stand good after his estate has ceased, being that the grantee's estate is not derived out of the lord's only, but stands on the custom (*y*).

Rule holds generally in mercantile transactions.

In mercantile transactions, as well as in those connected with real property, the general rule undoubtedly is, that a person cannot transfer to another a right which he does not himself possess. The law does not “enable any man by a written engagement to give a floating right of action at the suit of any one into whose hands the writing may come, and who may thus acquire a right of action better than the right of him under whom he derives title” (*z*).

Of the rule above stated, a familiar instance, noticed by M. Pothier, is that, where prescription has begun to run against a creditor, it will continue to run as against his heir, executors, or assigns, for the latter succeed only to the rights of their principal, and cannot stand in a better position than he did: *nemo plus juris in alium transferre potest quam ipse habet* (*a*). However, in considering hereafter the maxim *caveat emptor* (*b*), we shall have occasion to notice several cases which are directly opposed in

(*x*) See Shelford, Real Prop. Stats., 6th ed. 595.

(*y*) Shelford, Copyholds, 20.

(*z*) *Per* Ld. Cranworth, *Dixon v. Bovill*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 16; see *Crouch v. Credit Foncier*, L. R.

8 Q. B. 374, 381; as to which case, see 1 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 480 *et. seq.*

(*a*) 2 Pothier, Oblig. 263. This maxim was applied by Parke, B., in *Awde v. Dixon*, 6 Exch. 872.

(*b*) *Post*, Chapter IX.

principle to the rule; for two very important exceptions to the rule *nemo dat quod non habet* (c) relate, the one to sales in market overt, and the other to the transfer of negotiable instruments. Here we shall content ourselves with briefly pointing out how at the present day a seller of goods may lose his right of stoppage *in transitu* through the bill of lading coming to the hands of a sub-buyer (d).

As a general rule, when the buyer of goods becomes insolvent, the unpaid seller who has parted with the possession of the goods may stop them *in transitu*: he may resume possession of them so long as they are in course of transit, and retain them until payment of the price (e); and this right is usually not affected by any sub-sale of the goods which the buyer may have made without the seller's assent, but the sub-sale, even if for cash paid down, takes effect subject to the original seller's right of stoppage (f). If, however, the seller has indorsed and delivered to the buyer the bill of lading, or any other document of title to the goods, and the buyer has indorsed and delivered it to his sub-buyer, then the sub-buyer, provided he has taken the document in good faith, as well as for valuable consideration (g), is entitled to the goods, free from any right in the original seller to stop them, and thus his position is better than that of the original buyer (h). Moreover, although the property in the goods does not pass to a buyer who, having received the bill of lading together with the seller's draft upon him for the price of the goods, wrongfully retains the bill of lading without honouring the draft (i):

Transfer of
bill of lading.

(c) Per Willes, J., 14 C. B. N. S. 257.

(d) As to the law relating to the passing of the property in the goods by the indorsement and delivery of the bill of lading, see *Sewell v. Burdick*, 10 App. Cas. 74; *Bristol Bank v. Midl. R. Co.*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 653; 61 L. J. Q. B. 115.

(e) S. 44 of the Sale of Goods Act,

1893 (declaring the common law).

(f) Id. s. 47; see *Kemp v. Falk*, 7 App. Cas. 573, 582.

(g) See *Leask v. Scott*, 2 Q. B. D. 376.

(h) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 47 (declaring the common law): *Lickbarrow v. Mason*, 1 Sm. L. C.

(i) Id. s. 19 (3); *Shepherd v. Harrison*, L. R. 5 H. L. 116, 133.

yet, the seller's right of stoppage may now be defeated by such buyer wrongfully transferring the bill of lading to his sub-buyer; for the sub-buyer acquires a good title to the goods by taking the bill of lading in good faith and without notice of the rights of the original seller in respect of the goods (*j*). The legislature has thus altered the common law which made a transfer of a bill of lading ineffectual if the transferor was not himself the owner of the goods (*k*).

Amount of
interest taken
by assignee.

Having thus adverted to the quantity of interest assignable, with reference more especially to the grantor, we must next observe that, as a general rule, the assignee of property takes it subject to all the obligations or liabilities (*l*), and clothed with all the rights, which attached to it in the hands of the assignor (*m*); and this is in accordance with the maxim of the civil law, *qui in jus dominiumve alterius succedit jure ejus uti debet* (*n*). We have already given one instance illustrative of this rule, viz., where an heir or executor becomes vested with the right to property against which the Statute of Limitations has begun to run.

Assignee of
a chose in
action may
sue for it
in his own
name.

We may here remark that, although formerly at law there was a distinction between the transfer of a chose in action and the transfer of the right to sue for the same, the importance of that distinction has largely ceased since the Judicature Act, 1873, whereby an absolute assignment, by writing, under the hand of the assignor, of any debt, or other legal chose in action, of which express notice in writing has

(*j*) Sale of Goods Act, 1893, s. 25 (2); *Cahn v. Pockett's Co.*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 643: 68 L. J. Q. B. 515.

(*k*) *Per* Collins, L.J., [1897] 1 Q. B. 660. See *Gurney v. Behrend*, 3 E. & B. 633, 634; *Glyn v. E. & W. India Docks Co.*, 7 App. Cas. 591.

(*l*) See *White v. Crisp*, 10 Exch. 312; *Newfoundland Government v. Newf. R. Co.*, 13 App. Cas. 199.

(*m*) As to this rule, see *Mangles v. Dixon*, 3 H. L. Cas. 702, cited *Higgs v. Assam Tea Co.*, L. R. 4 Ex. 396;

Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte, L. R. 2 P. C. 393, 405; *Dickson v. Swansea Vale R. Co.*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 44, 48. If a man gives a licence and then parts with the property over which the privilege is to be exercised, the licence is gone; *Colman v. Foster*, 1 H. & N. 37, 40.

(*n*) D. 50, 17, 177, pr. For instance, fee-simple estates are subject, in the hands of the heir or devisee, to debts of all kinds contracted by the deceased.

been given to the debtor, trustee, or other person from whom the assignor would have been entitled to receive or claim such debt or chose in action, is effectual in law (subject to all equities entitled to priority over the right of the assignee) to pass and transfer the legal right to such debt or chose in action, and all legal and other remedies for the same (o).

Without attempting to enumerate the various rights which are assignable, either by the express act of the party, or by the operation of law, we may observe, generally, that the maxim, *assignatus utitur jure auctoris*, is subject to many restrictions (p) besides those to which we have alluded. For instance, at common law, the assignee of the reversion upon a lease of lands could not, according to the better opinion, sue upon the covenants contained in the lease (q); and, though the law has been altered in his favour by the 32 Hen. 8, c. 34, s. 1, and the 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 10, yet those statutes enable him to sue only upon such covenants as touch and concern the thing demised, or have reference to the subject-matter of the lease, and not upon merely collateral covenants (r). Again, notwithstanding that the property of a bankrupt which vests in his trustee includes "things in action" and "every description of property" (s), yet rights of action in respect of torts, or even breaches of contract, resulting immediately in injuries wholly to the person or feelings of the bankrupt, do not pass to the trustee, although the bankrupt's estate may have been consequentially damaged thereby (t). And, as we shall hereafter see (u), the rule that a vested right of action is by death

(o) S. 25, sub-s. 6.

(p) See *Sandrey v. Michell*, 3 B. & S. 405; *Young v. Hughes*, 4 H. & N. 76; *McKune v. Joynson*, 5 C. B. N. S. 218.

(q) 1 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1871), p. 299, n. (b): p. 300, n. (10).

(r) See *Spencer's case*, and the notes, 1 Smith, L. C., 11th ed., pp. 55 *et seq.*

(s) 46 & 47 Vict. c. 42, ss. 54, 168.

(t) *Beckham v. Drake*, 2 H. L. Cas. 579; *Rogers v. Spence*, 12 Cl. & F. 700; *Rose v. Buckett*, [1901] 2 K. B. 449; 70 L. J. K. B. 736. See Williams, *Bankcy.*, 9th ed. 226.

(u) See the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum persona*, post, Chap. IX.

transferred to the personal representatives of the deceased is subject to important exceptions.

The case of a pawn or pledge of a chattel should perhaps also be referred to in connection with the principle, *assignatus utitur jure auctoris*, for here the pawnor retains a property in the chattel, qualified by the right vested in the pawnee; and a sale of the chattel by the pawnor would, therefore, transfer to the buyer that qualified right only which the seller himself possessed (*x*). To constitute a valid pledge, there must, however, be a delivery of the chattel, either actual or constructive, to the pawnee (*y*), and if the pawnee parts with the possession of the chattel he may lose the benefit of his security, and will do so if such parting is absolute (*z*).

Absolute
and special
property.

Again, the well-known distinction between *absolute* and *special* property may be adverted to generally, as showing how and under what circumstances the maxim, that an assignee succeeds to the rights of his grantor, must, in a large class of cases, be understood. *Absolute* property, according to Lawrence, J., is, where one, having the possession of chattels, has also the exclusive right to enjoy them, which right can only be defeated by some act of his own. *Special* property, on the other hand, is, where he who has the possession holds them subject to the claims of other persons (*a*). According, therefore, as the property in the grantor was absolute or subject to a special lien, so will be that transferred to his assignee: *qui in jure dominium re alterius succedit jure ejus uti debet*; and the same principle

(*x*) *Franklin v. Neate*, 13 M. & W. 481, cited *Re Attenborough*, 11 Exch. 463. As to the true nature of a pledge, see *per* Parke, B., *Cheesman v. Exall*, 6 Exch. 344. As to the right of the pledgee to sell the pledge, see *Halliday v. Holgate*, L. R. 3 Ex. 299.

(*y*) *Per* Erle, C.J., *Martin v. Reid*, 11 C. B. N. S. 734.

(*z*) *Meyerstein v. Barber*, L. R. 2 C. P. 51; 36 L. J. C. P. 57; *Young v. Lambert*, L. R. 3 C. P. 142; *Ryal v. Rolle*, 1 Atk. 164; *N. W. Bank v. Poynter*, [1895] A. C. 56; 64 L. J. P. C. 27.

(*a*) *Webb v. Fox*, 7 T. R. 398; 4 R. R. 472. See *per* Pollock, C.B., *Lancashire Waggon Co. v. Fitzhugh*, 6 H. & N. 506.

applies where a subsequent transfer of the property is made by such assignee (*b*).

We shall now proceed to consider a few other kindred maxims, which, though, perhaps, of minor importance, yet could not properly be omitted in even the most cursory notice of the law relating to the transfer of property.

CUICUNQUE ALIQUIS QUID CONCEDIT CONCEDERE VIDETUR ET
ID SINE QUO RES IPSA ESSE NON POTUIT. (11 Rep. 52.)

—Whoever grants a thing is deemed also to grant that without which the grant itself would be of no effect.

“When anything is granted, all the means to attain it, and all the fruits and effects of it, are granted also, and shall pass inclusive, together with the thing, by the grant of the thing itself, without the words *cum pertinentiis*, or any such like words” (*c*). Therefore, where a man, having a close surrounded with his land, grants the close, the grantee shall have a way over the land as incident to the grant (*d*); and, if the land be granted with a reservation of the close, the grantor shall have a way of necessity to the close (*d*), notwithstanding the general rule that a grantor shall not derogate from his grant and that if he intend to reserve any right over the land granted he must reserve it expressly (*e*). So, if a man lease his land and all mines therein, when there are no open mines, the lessee may dig for the minerals (*f*); by the grant of the fish in a man’s pond is granted power to come upon the banks and fish for them (*g*); and where minerals are granted, the presumption is that they are to be enjoyed, and that a power to get them is also

General rule.

Examples.

(*b*) As to a sale or wrongful conversion by bailee for hire, see *Cooper v. Willomatt*, 1 C. B. 672; *Bryant v. Wardell*, 2 Exch. 479; *Fenn v. Bittleston*, 7 Exch. 152; *Spackman v. Miller*, 12 C. B. N. S. 659, 676.

(*c*) Shep. Touch. 89.

(*d*) 1 Wms. Saund. 323; *Pinnington v. Galland*, 9 Exch. 1.

(*e*) See *Wheeldon v. Burrows*, 12 Ch. D. 31, 49, cited *post*, p. 360.

(*f*) *Saunders’s case*, 5 Rep. 12 a.

(*g*) Shep. Touch. 89.

granted as a necessary incident (*h*). On the same principle, if trees be excepted in a lease, the lessor has power, as incident to the exception, to enter the land demised at any reasonable times to fell and remove the trees; and the like law holds of a demise by parol (*i*). So a rector may, as incident to his right to tithes, enter a close to carry the tithes away by the usual road (*k*); and a tenant at will, after notice from his landlord to quit, or other person entitled to emblements, shall have free entry, egress and regress, to cut and carry away the corn (*l*).

Repair of
pipes.

So, it has been observed that, when the use of a thing is granted, everything is granted whereby the grantee may have and enjoy such use; as, if a man give me a licence to lay pipes in his land to convey water to mine, I may enter and dig his land, in order to mend the pipes (*m*). And where it was found by special verdict that a coal-shoot and certain pipes were necessary for the convenience and beneficial use and occupation of a messuage, and it was held that under the circumstances they passed to the lessee as part of the messuage: it was further held, in accordance with the rule under consideration, that the right to go over the soil of a certain passage, in order to use the coal-shoot, and to use and repair the pipes, also passed to the lessee as a necessary incident to the demise, although not mentioned in the lease (*n*).

Erections
necessary
for mining.

Again, where a deed of conveyance of land excepted and reserved out of the grant all coal-mines, together with sufficient way-leave and stay-leave to and from the mines, and

(*h*) See *per* Ld. Wensleydale. *Rowbotham v. Wilson*, 8 H. L. Cas. 360.

(*i*) *Liford's case*, 11 Rep. 52 a; *Hewitt v. Isham*, 7 Exch. 77.

(*k*) See *Cobb v. Selby*, 2 N. R. 466; *James v. Dodds*, 2 Cr. & M. 266.

(*l*) Litt. s. 68; Co. Litt. 56 a.

(*m*) *Per* Twysden, J., *Pomfret v. Ricroft*, 1 Saund. 323; *Hodgson v. Field*, 7 East, 622; 8 R. R. 701; *Blakesley v. Whieldon*, 1 Hare, 180; *Goodhart v. Hyett*, 25 Ch. D. 182, 187; 53 L. J. Ch. 219.

(*n*) *Hinchcliffe v. Earl of Kinnoul*, 5 Bing. N. C. 1.

the liberty of sinking pits : it was held that, as a right to sink pits to get the coals was reserved, all things depending on that right and necessary for its enjoyment were also reserved, and that the grantor had, as incident to the liberty to sink pits, the right to affix to the land all machinery necessary to drain the mines, and draw the coals from the pits : and also that a pond to supply the engine, and an engine-house, were necessary accessories to the engine, and were lawfully made (o).

The maxim under consideration is applicable in construing Acts of Parliament. Thus, where a statute empowered one railway company to carry their line across that of another by a bridge, it was held that the former might place temporary scaffolding on the land of the latter, if that were necessary for constructing the bridge (p). And, generally where an express statutory right is given to make and maintain a thing necessarily requiring support, the statute, in the absence of a context implying the contrary, means that the right to necessary support of the thing constructed shall accompany the right to make and maintain it (q).

Statutory
rights.

On the same principle, the power of making bye-laws is incident to a corporation ; for when the Crown creates a corporation, it grants to it, by implication, all powers necessary for carrying out the objects for which it is created, and securing a perpetuity of succession ; and a discretionary power to make minor regulations, usually called bye-laws, in order to effect the objects of the charter, is necessary ; and the reasonable exercise of this power is, therefore, impliedly conferred by the very act of incorporation (r). On the same principle also seems to rest the doctrine that a grant from the Crown to the men of a particular parish for a specific purpose has the effect of incorporating them so as

Power of
corporation
to make
bye-laws.

(o) *Dand v. Kingscote*, 6 M. & W. 174.

(p) *Clarence R. Co. v. G. N. R. Co.*, 13 M. & W. 706, 721.

L.M.

(q) *L. & N. W. R. Co. v. Evans* [1893] 1 Ch. 16, 28 ; 62 L. J. Ch. 1.

(r) *Per Parke, J., R. v. Westwood*, 7 Bing. 20 ; 33 R. R. 24.

to carry that purpose into effect (*s*); and the rule that a corporation formed for trading purposes has an implied power to contract by parol for purposes necessary for carrying on its trade (*t*).

Rule limited
to necessary
incidents.

Our maxim, however, must be understood as applying only to such things as are incident to the grant and directly necessary to the enjoyment of the thing granted. Thus, if a man grant the fish in his pond, the grantee may not cut the banks to lay the ponds dry, for he can take the fish by nets or other engines (*u*). If a man let a house, reserving a way through it to a back-house, he may not use the way but upon request and at seasonable times (*x*). A way of necessity is also limited by the necessity which created it, and, when such necessity ceases, the right of way likewise ceases; therefore, if, at any later time, the party formerly entitled to such a way can, by passing over his own land, reach the place to which it led by as direct a course as that of the old way, the way ceases to exist as of necessity (*y*). Moreover, it seems that a way of necessity is not a way for all purposes, but only for that of enjoying the place in its original condition (*z*).

Whiteldon v.
Burrows.

We may conclude this part of our subject by citing the following observations from the judgment of Thesiger, L.J., in an important case upon the relative rights of the parties to the grant of part of a tenement:—"I think that two propositions may be stated as what I may call the general rules governing cases of this kind. The first is that on the grant by the owner of a tenement of part of that tenement as it is then used and enjoyed, there will pass to the grantee all those continuous and apparent easements (by which, of

(*s*) See *Ld. Rivers v. Adams*, 3 Ex. D. 366.

(*t*) *S. of Ireland Colliery Co. v. Waddle*, L. R. 4 C. P. 617.

(*u*) *Perk.*, Grants, s. 110; *Hob.* 234; *Plowd.* 16 a; *per Parke*, B., 6 M. & W. 189.

(*x*) *Tomlin v. Fuller*, 1 Vent. 48.

(*y*) *Holmes v. Goring*, 2 Bing. 76; 27 R. R. 549; see *Pearson v. Spencer*, 1 B. & S. 571, 584; 3 Id. 762.

(*z*) *London Corporation v. Riggs*, 13 Ch. D. 798.

course, I mean quasi easements), or, in other words, all those easements which are necessary to the reasonable enjoyment of the property granted, and which have been and are at the time of the grant used by the owner of the entirety for the benefit of the part granted. The second proposition is that, if the grantor intend to reserve any right over the tenement granted, it is his duty to reserve it expressly in the grant. Those are the general rules governing cases of this kind, but the second rule is subject to certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is the well-known exception which attaches to cases of what are called ways of necessity. . . . Both of the general rules I have mentioned are founded upon a maxim which is as well established by authority as it is consonant to reason and common sense, viz., that a grantor shall not derogate from his grant" (a).

Upon a principle similar to that which has been thus briefly considered, it is a rule that, when the law commands a thing to be done, it authorises the performance of whatever may be necessary for executing its command: *quando aliquid mandatur, mandatur et omne per quod pervenitur ad illud* (b). Thus when a statute gives a justice of the peace jurisdiction over an offence, it impliedly gives him power

Authority
implied by
law.

(a) *Wheeldon v. Burrows*, 12 Ch. D. 31, 49: 48 L. J. Ch. 853. See *Russell v. Watts*, 10 App. Cas. 590; *Brown v. Alabaster*, 37 Ch. D. 490, 504; *Birmingham Banking Co. v. Ross*, 38 Id. 295; *Grosvenor Hotel Co. v. Hamilton*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 836: 63 L. J. Q. B. 661. As to what easements pass by a conveyance of land made since 1881, see 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 6.

(b) 5 Rep. 116. Upon this maxim rests the authority of the master of a ship to bind the owner for all that is necessary for the purpose of conducting the navigation of the ship

to a favourable termination; *per Parke, B.*, 6 Exch. 889; *per* *Ld. Blackburn*, 10 App. Cas. 116; and the maxim applies to the authority of agents generally; see *per* *Ld. Blackburn*, 9 App. Cas. 546: it being a general rule that "there is an implied authority to do all those things that are necessary for the protection of the property entrusted to a person, or for fulfilling the duty which a person has to perform;" *per* *Blackburn, J.*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 69; *per* *Lopes, L.J.*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 522.

to apprehend any person charged with such offence (*c*). So, constables, whose duty it is to see the peace kept, may, when necessary, command the assistance of others (*d*). In like manner, the sheriff is authorised to take the *posse comitatus*, or power of the county, to help him in executing a writ of execution, and every one is bound to assist him when required so to do (*e*); and, by analogy, the persons named in a writ of rebellion, and charged with the execution of it, have a right, at their discretion, to require the assistance of any of the liege subjects of the Crown to aid in the execution of the writ (*f*).

The foregoing are simple illustrations of the last-mentioned maxim, or of the synonymous expression, *quando lex aliquid alicui concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest* (*g*), the full import of which has been thus elaborately set forth (*h*):—"Whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as matter of duty, required to be done by law, and it is found impossible to do that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be also done, then that something else will be supplied by necessary intendment. But if, when the maxim comes to be applied adversely to the liberties or interests of others, it be found that no such impossibility exists,—that the power may be legally exercised without the doing that something else, or, even going a step farther, that it is only in some particular instances, as opposed to its general operation, that the law fails in its intention unless the enforcing power be supplied,—then in any such case the soundest rules of construction point to the exclusion of the maxim, and regard the absence of

(*c*) *Bane v. Methuen*, 2 Bing. 63;
27 R. R. 546. See *R. v. Benn*, 6
T. R. 198.

(*d*) *Noy, Max.*, 9th ed., p. 55.

(*e*) *Foljamb's case*, 5 Rep. 116;
cited 4 Bing. N. C. 583; *Noy, Max.*,
9th ed., p. 55; *Judgm., Howden v.*

Standish, 6 C. B. 521.

(*f*) *Miller v. Knox*, 4 Bing. N. C.
574.

(*g*) 12 Rep. 131.

(*h*) *Fenton v. Hampton*, 11 Moo.
P. C. 360.

the power which it would supply by implication as a *casus omissus*."

The mode of applying the maxim just cited may be thus exemplified. The Lower House of Assembly of Dominica being a legislative assembly constituted under royal proclamation, with a view to the making of laws for the peace, welfare, and good government of the inhabitants of the colony (*i*): the question arose (*k*), whether the Assembly had the right to punish its members by committal to gaol, when guilty of contempt of the House, or of obstructing its business, in its presence and during its sittings. In deciding this question adversely to the asserted right, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council observed in substance as follows:—It must be conceded that as the common law sanctions the exercise of the prerogative by which the Assembly was created, the principle of the common law, embodied in the maxim, *quando lex aliquid concedit concedere videtur et illud sine quo res ipsa esse non potest*, applies to the body so created. The question, therefore, is, whether the power to punish for contempts committed in its presence is necessary to the existence of such a body and the proper exercise of the functions which it is intended to execute. It is necessary to distinguish between a power to commit for a contempt, which is a judicial power, and a power to remove an obstruction offered to the deliberations of a legislative body during its sitting, which last power is necessary for self-preservation. If a member of a Colonial Assembly is guilty of disorderly conduct of the House whilst sitting, he may be removed, or excluded for a time, or even expelled; but there is a great difference between such powers and the judicial power of inflicting a penal sentence for the offence. The right to remove for self-security is one thing, the right to inflict punishment

(*i*) Clark, Col. L. 134.

P. C. 328.

(*k*) *Doyle v. Falconer*, L. R. 1

is another. The former is all that is warranted by the maxim above cited, but the latter is not its legitimate consequence. To establish the privilege claimed, it must be shown to be essential to the existence of the Assembly—an incident *sine quo res ipsa esse non potest* (l).

Prohibition
implied
by law.

On the other hand, *quando aliquid prohibetur, prohibetur et omne per quod devenitur ad illud* (m): "Whatever is prohibited by law to be done directly cannot legally be effected by an indirect and circuitous contrivance" (n): and a transaction will not be upheld which is "a mere device for carrying into effect that which the legislature has said shall not be done" (o). Wherever Courts of law see attempts made to conceal illegal or void transactions by fictitious documents, they "brush away the cobweb varnish, and show the transactions in their true light" (p). For instance, when the question is whether the Bills of Sale Acts apply, the Courts disregard the form of the documents, and look to the true nature of the transaction and the real intention of the parties (q); and the same rule obtains, where the question is whether the Gaming Act applies (r). Again, as an example of the maxim, that what "cannot be done *per directum* shall not be done *per obliquum*" (s), it may be mentioned that a tenant who has covenanted not to transfer his lease, commits a fraud upon his landlord, and breaks his covenant, if an alienation be effected by his collusion under colour of a seizure of the term in execution (t). Of fraud itself it has been said that

(l) L. R. 1 P. C. 338. See *Barton v. Taylor*, 11 App. Cas. 197.

(m) 2 Inst. 48.

(n) *Per Tindal, C.J., Booth v. Bank of England*, 7 Cl. & F. 509, 538.

(o) *Per Martin, B., Morris v. Blackman*, 2 H. & C. 912, 918.

(p) *Per Wilmot, C.J., Collins v. Blantern*, 2 Wils. 341, 349; cf. *Jones v. Merionethshire Building Society*,

[1892] 1 Ch. 173: 61 L. J. Ch. 138.

(q) *Re Watson*, 25 Q. B. D. 27; *Madell v. Thomas*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 230: 60 L. J. Q. B. 227.

(r) *Universal Stock Exchange v. Strachan*, [1896] A. C. 166, 173: 65 L. J. Q. B. 428.

(s) Co. Litt. 223 b.

(t) *Doe v. Carter*, 8 T. R. 300; 4 R. R. 586.

it is "infinite in variety; sometimes it is audacious and unblushing; sometimes it pays a sort of homage to virtue, and then it is modest and retiring; it would be honesty itself if it could only afford it. But fraud is fraud all the same; and it is the fraud, not the manner of it, which calls for the interposition of the Courts" (u).

With regard to the argument that a transaction is an "evasion" of a prohibitory Act, it must be observed that the real question always is whether the transaction is or is not within the Act, although it does not follow that it is not within it, because the very words of the Act have not been violated (r). For clauses in statutes avoiding transactions, when the meaning is open to question, are to receive a wide or a limited construction according as the one or the other will best effectuate the purpose of the statute (w); and statutes made against fraud may be liberally expounded to suppress the fraud (x). Nevertheless, what the legislature intended not to be done can be legitimately ascertained only from what it has enacted, either in express words or by reasonable and necessary implication (y). And in considering an Act imposing a tax, Chitty, L.J., said, "the whole argument on evasion of the Act is fallacious. The case either falls within the Act or it does not. If it does not, there is no such thing as an evasion" (z). Evasion is intentionally doing something whereby a person escapes the consequences of an Act although he is brought within it (a).

"Evasion"
of Act.

(u) *Per* Ld. Macnaghten, *Reddaway v. Banham*, [1896] A. C. 199, 221: 65 L. J. Q. B. 381.

(v) See *Per* Ld. Cranworth, *Edwards v. Hall*, 6 D. M. & G. 74, 89.

(w) *Re Burdett*, 20 Q. B. D. 310, 314.

(x) *Twyne's case*, 3 Rep. 82 a.

(y) *Per* Ld. Watson, [1897] A. C. 38.

(z) *A.-G. v. Beech*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 147, 157: 67 L. J. Q. B. 585. See also *per* Ld. Macnaghten, *A.-G. v. Richmond & Gordon (Duke)*, [1909] A. C. 466, 473: 78 L. J. K. B. 998.

(a) See *per* Ld. Lindley in *Bullivant v. A.-G. for Victoria*, [1901] A. C. 196, 207; and *per* Ld. House in *Simms v. Registrar of Probates*, [1900] A. C. 323, 334.

ACCESSORIUM NON DUCIT SED SEQUITUR SUUM PRINCIPALE.

(Co. Litt. 152 a.)—*The incident shall pass by the grant of the principal, but not the principal by the grant of the incident (b).*

Rule derived
from Roman
law.

Upon the maxim, *res accessoria sequitur rem principalem* (c), depended the doctrine of *accessio* (d) in the Roman law, *accessio* being that mode of acquiring property whereby the owner of the principal thing became, *ipso jure*, owner also of all that belonged to the principal as accessory to it. Two extensive classes of cases accordingly fell within the operation of the doctrine: 1, that in which the owner of a thing acquired a right of property in its organic products, as in the young of animals, the fruit of trees, the alluvion or deposit on land, and in some other kinds of property originating under analogous circumstances: 2, that in which one thing became so closely connected with and attached to another that their separation could not be effected at all, or at least not without injury to one or other of them; for in such cases the owner of the principal thing was held to acquire also the accessory connected therewith (e).

(b) Co. Litt. 152 a, 151 b; *per* Vaughan, B., *Harding v. Pollock*, 6 Bing. 63; 32 R. R. 47.

(c) "A principal thing (*res principalis*) is a thing which can subsist by itself, and does not exist for the sake of any other thing. All that belongs to a principal thing, or is in connection with it, is called an accessory thing (*res accessoria*)."
Mackeld. Civ. Law, 155. See *Ashworth v. Heyworth*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 316, 319.

(d) "*Accessio* is the general name given" in the Roman Law "to every accessory thing, whether corporeal or incorporeal, that has been

added to a principal thing from without, and has been connected with it, whether by the powers of nature or by the will of man, so that in virtue of this connection it is regarded as part and parcel of the thing. The *appurtenances* to a thing are to be noticed as a peculiar kind of accession; they are things connected with another thing, with the view of serving for its perpetual use." Mackeld. Rom. Law, 155, 156.

(e) See Mackeld. Civ. Law, 279, 281; I. 2, 1, *De Rerum Divisione*; Brisson, ad verb. "*Accessorium*."

The maxim, *accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principale*, is, then, derived from the Roman law, and signifies that the accessory right follows the principal (*f*); it may be illustrated by the remarks appended to the rule immediately preceding (*g*), as also by the following examples.

Examples of
rule in our
law.

An easement to take water from a river to fill a canal ceases when the canal no longer exists (*h*). The owner of land has, *primâ facie*, a right to the title-deeds, as something annexed to his estate therein, and it is accordingly laid down that, if a man seised in fee conveys land to another and his heirs, without warranty, all the title-deeds belong to the purchaser, as incident to the land (*i*), though not granted by express words (*k*). In like manner, heir-looms are such goods and chattels as go by special custom to the heir along with the inheritance, and not to the executor of the last owner of the estate; they are due to the heir by custom, and not by the common law, and he shall accordingly have an action for them. There are also some other things in the nature of heirlooms which likewise descend with the particular title or dignity to which they are appurtenant (*l*).

Again, rent is incident to the reversion, and, therefore, by a general grant of the reversion, the rent will pass; though, by the grant of the rent generally, the reversion will not pass, for *accessorium non ducit sed sequitur suum principale*: however, by the introduction of special words, the reversion may be granted away, and the rent reserved (*m*). So, an advowson appendant to a manor is so intimately connected

Advowson
appendant.

(*f*) Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, p. 7. See also Co. Litt. 389 a.

(*g*) See also *Chanel v. Robotham*, Yelv. 68; *Wood v. Bell*, 5 E. & B. 772.

(*h*) *National Guaranteed Manure Co. v. Donald*, 4 H. & N. 8.

(*i*) See *per Tindal, C.J., Tinnis-*

wood v. Pattison, 3 C. B. 248; and Id., n. (*b*).

(*k*) *Ld. Buckhurst's case*, 1 Rep. 1; *Goode v. Burton*, 1 Exch. 189, 193 *et seq.*; *Allwood v. Heywood*, 32 L. J. Ex. 153.

(*l*) See 1 Crabb, Real Prop. 11, 12.

(*m*) 2 Blac. Comm. 176; Litt. s. 229; Co. Litt. 143 a.

with it, as to pass by the grant of the manor *cum pertinentiis*, without being expressly referred to; and, therefore, if a tenant in tail of a manor with an advowson appendant suffered a recovery, it was not necessary for him to express his intention to include the advowson in the recovery; for any dealing with the manor, which is the principal, operates on the advowson, which is the accessory, whether expressly named or not. It is, however, to be observed that, although the conveyance of the manor *primâ facie* draws after it the advowson also, yet it is always competent for the owner to sever the advowson from the manor, by conveying the advowson away from the manor, or by conveying the manor without the advowson (*n*); and hence there is a marked distinction between the preceding cases and those in which the incident is held to be inseparably connected with the principal, so that it cannot be severed therefrom. Thus, it is laid down that estovers, or wood granted to be used as fuel in a particular house, shall go to him that hath the house; and that, inasmuch as a Court baron is incident to a manor, the manor cannot be granted and the Court reserved (*o*). In some cases, also, that which is parcel or of the essence of a thing passes by the grant of the thing itself, although at the time of the grant it were actually severed from it; by the grant, therefore, of a mill, the mill-stone may pass, although temporarily severed from the mill (*p*).

Severance
from grant.

Common
appendant,
&c.

Again, common of pasture *appendant* is the privilege belonging to the owners or occupiers of arable land holden of a manor, to put upon the wastes of the manor their cattle or sheep; it is appendant to the particular farm, and

(*n*) Judgm., *Moseley v. Motteux*, 10 M. & W. 544; Bac. Abr., "*Grants*" (I. 4).

(*o*) Finch, Law, 15.

(*p*) Shep. Touch. 90. See *Wylde v. Pickford*, 8 M. & W. 443. As to

what shall be deemed to pass as appendant, appurtenant, or incident, see Bac. Abr., "*Grants*" (I. 4); *Smith v. Ridgeway*, 4 H. & C. 37, 577; *Langley v. Hammond*, L. R. 3 Ex. 161: 37 L. J. Ex. 118.

passes with it, as incident to the grant (*q*). But divers things which, though continually enjoyed with other things, are only appendant thereto, do not pass by a grant of those things: as, if a man has a warren in his land, and grants or demises the land, by this the warren does not pass, unless, indeed, he grant or demise the land *cum pertinentiis*, or with all the profits, privileges, &c., thereunto belonging, in which case the warren might, perhaps, pass (*r*).

In *Ewart v. Cochrane* (*s*), it was stated to be the law of England that when two properties are possessed by the same owner, and there has been a severance made of one part from the other, anything which was used and was necessary for the comfortable enjoyment of that part of the property which is granted, shall be considered to follow from the grant if there are the usual words in the conveyance.

Another well-known application of the maxim under consideration is to covenants running with the land, which pass therewith, and on which the assignee of the lessee, or the heir or devisee of the covenantor, is in many cases liable, according to the kindred maxim of law, *transit terra cum onere* (*t*); a maxim, the principle of which holds not merely with reference to covenants, but likewise with reference to customs annexed to land: for instance, it is laid down that the custom of gavelkind, being a custom by reason of the land, runs therewith, and is not affected by a fine or recovery had of the land; but "otherwise it is of lands in ancient demesne partible among the males, for there the custom runneth not with the land simply, but by reason of the ancient demesne: and, therefore, because the

(*q*) Shep. Touch. 89, 240; Bac. Abr., "*Grants*" (I. 4); Co. Litt., by Thomas, vol. i. p. 227.

(*r*) Shep. Touch. 89; 1 Crabb, Real Prop. 488. See *Pannell v. Mill*, 3 C. B. 625; *Graham v. Ewart*, 1 H. & N. 550; 11 Exch.

320; cited in *Jeffryes v. Evans*, 19 C. B. N. S. 266; *Earl of Lonsdale v. Rigg*, 11 Exch. 654: 1 H. & N. 923.

(*s*) 4 Macq. 122; *Francis v. Hayward*, 20 Ch. D. 773: 22 Id. 177.

(*t*) Co. Litt. 231 a.

nature of the land is changed, by the fine or recovery, from ancient demesne to land at the common law, the custom of parting it among the males is also gone" (*u*).

Application
of rule to
titles.

With reference to titles, moreover, one of the leading rules is, *cessante statu primitivo cessat derivativus* (*x*)—the derived estate ceases on the determination of the original estate; and the exceptions to this rule have been said to create some of the many difficulties which present themselves in the investigation of titles (*y*). The rule itself may be illustrated by the case of a demise for years by a tenant for life, or by any person having a particular or defeasible estate, which, unless confirmed by the remainderman or reversioner, or authorised by statute, will determine on the death of the lessor; and the same principle usually applies whenever the original estate determines according to the express terms or nature of its limitation, or is defeated by a condition in consequence of the act of the party, as by the marriage of a tenant *durante viduitate*, or by the resignation of the parson who has leased the glebe lands or tithes belonging to the living (*z*).

An exception to the foregoing rule arises in cases of copyholds, where the tenant has granted a lease to another with the license of the lord, and then commits a forfeiture: here the license operates as a confirmation by the lord of the term thus created, and, therefore, pending the term, the lord cannot maintain ejectment for the land (*a*).

Mercantile
transactions.

The law relative to contracts and mercantile transactions likewise presents many examples of the rule that the accessory follows and cannot exist without its principal; thus,

(*u*) Finch, Law, 1, 16.

(*x*) 8 Rep. 34.

(*y*) 1 Prest., Abs. Tit. 245.

The maxim "applies only when the original estate determines by limitation or is defeated by a condition. It does not apply when the owner of the estate does any act which amounts to an alienation or

transfer, though such alienation or transfer produces an extinguishment of the original estate." Shep. Touch. by Preston, 286. See *London Loan Co. v. Drake*, 6 C. B. N. S. 798, 810.

(*z*) 1 Prest. Abs. Tit. 197, 317, 358, 359.

(*a*) *Clarke v. Arden*, 16 C. B. 227.

where framed pictures are sent by a carrier, the frames, as well as the pictures, are within the Carriers Act, 1830, s. 1 (b). Again, the obligation of the surety is accessory to that of the principal, and is extinguished by the release or discharge of the latter, for *quum principalis causa non consistit ne ea quidem quæ sequuntur locum habent* (c), and *quæ accessionum locum obtinent extinguuntur cum principales res peremptæ fuerint* (d). The converse, however, of the case just instanced does not hold, and the reason is that *accessorium non trahit principale* (e).

So, likewise, interest of money is accessory to the principal, and must, in legal language, "follow its nature" (f); and, therefore, if the plaintiff in any action is barred from recovering the principal, he must, as a rule (g), be equally barred from recovering the interest (h). And, "If by a will the whole of the personal estate, or the residue of the personal estate, be the subject of an executory bequest, the income of such personal estate follows the principal as an accessory, and must, during the period which the law allows for accumulation, be accumulated and added to the principal" (i); and where stock, to which the assignor was entitled in reversion upon his mother's death, was assigned with all his right, title, and interest therein, it was held that

Principal and interest.

(b) *Henderson v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 5 Ex. 90; 39 L. J. Ex. 55; distinguishing *Treadwin v. G. E. R. Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 308.

(c) D. 50, 17, 129, § 1; 1 Pothier, Oblig., 413.

(d) 2 Pothier, Oblig., 202.

(e) 1 Pothier, Oblig., 477; 2 Id. 147, 202.

(f) 3 Inst. 139; Finch, Law, 23.

(g) See *Parr's Bank v. Yates*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 460; 67 L. J. Q. B. 851.

(h) Judgm., *Clarke v. Alexander*, 8 Scott, N. R. 165. See per *Ld. Ellenborough*, 3 M. & S. 10: 2

Pothier, Oblig., 479. "The giving of interest is not by way of a penalty, but is merely doing the plaintiff full justice, by having his debt with all the advantages properly belonging to it. It is in truth a compensation for delay." Judgm., 16 M. & W. 144.

See *Hollis v. Palmer*, 2 Bing. N. C. 713; *Florence v. Drayson*, 1 C. B. N. S. 584; *Florence v. Jennings*, 2 Id. 454; *Forbes v. Forbes*, 18 Beav. 552.

(i) Per *Ld. Westbury*, *Bective v. Hodgson*, 10 H. L. Cas. 665.

the assignment passed the bonuses which afterwards accrued during the mother's life (*k*).

Freight follows ownership of vessel.

The title to freight is *primâ facie* an incident of ownership, and, if a sale or transfer of shares be effected, while the ship is under a contract of affreightment, without the mention of the word freight, that will pass to the purchaser the corresponding share in the freight, notwithstanding a subsequent contract of the vendor to transfer this particular freight to another (*l*).

LICET DISPOSITIO DE INTERESSE FUTURO SIT INUTILIS TAMEN FIERI POTEST DECLARATIO PRÆCEDENS QUÆ SORTIATUR EFFECTUM INTERVENIENTE NOVO ACTU. (*Bac. Max., reg. 14.*)—*Although the grant of a future interest is inoperative, yet it may become a declaration precedent, taking effect upon the intervention of some new act.*

Rule laid down by Lord Bacon.

"The law," said Lord Bacon, "doth not allow of grants except there be a foundation of an interest in the grantor; for the law will not accept of grants of titles, or of things in action which are imperfect interests, much less will it allow a man to grant or incumber that which is no interest at all, but merely future. But of declarations precedent, before any interest vested, the law doth allow, but with this difference, so that there be some new act or conveyance to give life and vigour to the declaration precedent" (*m*).

Grant of after-acquired property.

It has been observed (*n*) that Lord Bacon treats the first branch of the maxim, namely, that a disposition of after-acquired property passes nothing in law, as a legal proposition beyond dispute, and only labours to establish the second

(*k*) *Re Armstrong's Trusts*, 3 K. 522; see also *Rusden v. Pope*, L. R. & J. 486; *Cooper v. Woolfitt*, 2 H. 3 Ex. 270: 37 L. J. Ex. 137. & N. 122.

(*m*) *Bac. Max., reg. 14.*

(*l*) *Lindsay v. Gibbs*, 22 Beav.

(*n*) *Judgm., 1 C. B. 386.*

branch, namely, that such disposition may be considered as a declaration precedent which derives effect from some new act of the party after the property is acquired. The same general rule is laid down by all the other writers of authority. "It is," says Perkins (o), "a common learning in the law that a man cannot grant or charge that which he hath not." Again, it has been said that, if a man grant me all the wool of his sheep, meaning thereby the wool of the sheep which he then has, the grant is good (p); but that he cannot grant me all the wool which shall grow upon the sheep that he shall buy hereafter (q).

Lord Bacon's maxim relates, however, only to the acquisition of a legal title. "At law, property, non-existing, but to be acquired at a future time, is not assignable; but in equity it is. At law, although a power is given in the deed of assignment to take possession of after-acquired property, no interest is transferred, even as between the parties themselves, unless possession is actually taken; but, in equity, the moment the property comes into existence the agreement operates upon it" (r). Accordingly, if a man purports to assign property of which he is not the owner, the assignment, although it does not operate to pass the legal interest in the property, may yet operate as a contract by him to convey it upon his becoming the owner, and if the contract be for value, equity, treating as done that which ought to be done, fastens upon the property as soon as he has acquired it, and the contract to assign becomes in equity an assignment (s). Such assignment, however, is an assignment only of the equitable interest, and consequently, until the assignee has

Rule in equity.

(o) Tit. "*Grants*," s. 65; see also Vin. Abr., "*Grants*" (H. 6); Noy, Max., 9th ed. 162; Com. Dig., "*Grant*" (D.).

(p) Perk., tit. "*Grants*," s. 90; see *per* Pollock, C.B., 15 M. & W. 116.

(q) Hob. 132; see Shep. Touch.

by Preston, 241.

(r) *Per* Ld. Chelmsford, *Holroyd v. Marshall*, 10 H. L. Cas. 191, 219.

(s) *Collyer v. Isaacs*, 19 Ch. D. 342; *Re Clarke*, 36 Id. 348; *Tailby v. Official Receiver*, 13 App. Cas. 523; *Re Turcan*, 40 Ch. D. 5.

also acquired the legal interest, his position is precarious, for the equitable interest will be defeated if the legal interest be acquired by a third person for value and without notice of the equitable interest (*t*). The difference between legal and equitable interests has not been swept away by the Judicature Acts: the Courts administer both law and equity, but a conveyance void at common law has not become valid as a conveyance at common law (*u*).

Possession.

As a rule, therefore, "an assignment or contract for value of future property without possession creates an equitable title only; but if possession is actually taken of the property when it comes into existence, then a legal interest is acquired" (*x*). It seems, however, that the possession, to confer the legal title, must be given by the assignor, or be taken under his authority, for the purpose of carrying the former assignment into effect (*y*).

Bill of sale of future property.

Under the Bills of Sale Act, 1882 (*z*), the rule is that a bill of sale made by way of security for the payment of money is void, if it purport to assign after-acquired property (*a*). To this rule, however, there are certain exceptions relating to substituted fixtures, plant and trade machinery (*b*).

Contract to sell future goods.

By the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, the goods forming the subject of a contract of sale may be future goods, *i.e.*, goods to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of the contract; and the Act provides that where by a contract of sale the seller purports to effect a present sale of future goods, the contract operates as an agreement to sell

(*t*) *Joseph v. Lyons*, 15 Q. B. D. 280; *Hallas v. Robinson*, 15 Q. B. D. 288.

(*u*) *Per Cotton*, L.J., 15 Q. B. D. 285, 286.

(*x*) *Morris v. Delobel-Flipo*, [1892] 2 Ch. 360.

(*y*) *Lunn v. Thornton*, 1 C. B.

379, 387; *Congreve v. Evetts*, 10 Exch. 298, 308; *Carr v. Allatt*, 27 L. J. Ex. 385.

(*z*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 43.

(*a*) *Thomas v. Kelly*, 13 App. Cas. 506.

(*b*) S. 6 (2); *London, &c., Co. v. Creasey*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 768.

the goods (c). An agreement to sell future goods has always been allowed by our law (d).

Property to which a testator becomes entitled after the execution of his will may pass under it; for a will is an instrument of a peculiar nature, speaking and taking effect as if it had been executed immediately before the testator's death, unless a contrary intention appears by the will (e); and two maxims relating to wills are *ambulatoria est voluntas defuncti usque ad ritæ supremum exitum* (f), and *omne testamentum morte consummatum est* (g).

(c) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 5.

(e) 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 24.

(d) *Hibblewhite v. M'Morine*, 5 M. & W. 462.

(f) D. 34, 4, 4; 4 Rep. 61.

(g) Co. Litt. 322 b.

CHAPTER VII.

RULES RELATING TO MARRIAGE AND DESCENT.

It has been thought convenient to insert a selection of rules relating to Marriage and Descent immediately after those which concern the legal rights and liabilities attaching to property in general.

CONSENSUS, NON CONCUBITUS, FACIT MATRIMONIUM. (*Co. Litt.* 33 a.)—*It is the consent of the parties, not their concubinage, which constitutes a valid marriage.*

Marriage how constituted.

Marriage, as understood in Christendom, is the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others (*a*). It is constituted by the *conjunctio animorum* or *present* consent of the parties expressed under such circumstances as the law requires, so that, as soon as such consent has been given, each of the parties, although they do not consummate the marriage *conjunctio corpore*, nevertheless possesses all the legal rights of husband or wife.

The above maxim has been adopted from the civil law (*b*) by the common lawyers, who, indeed, borrowed (especially in ancient times) almost all their notions of the legitimacy of marriage from the canon and civil laws (*c*). By the

(*a*) *Per* Ld. Penzance, *Hyde* v. *Hyde*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 130; see *Re Bethell*, 38 Ch. D. 220: 57 L. J. Ch. 487; *Brinkley* v. *A.-G.*, 15 P. D. 76: 59 L. J. P. 51.

(*b*) *Nuptias non concubitus sed consensus facit*; D. 50, 17, 30.

(*c*) 1 Blac. Comm. 434. See 2 Voet. Com. Pandect., lib. 23, tit. 2.

latter, as well as by the earlier ecclesiastical law (*d*), marriage was a mere *consensual* contract, only differing from other contracts of this class in being indissoluble even by the consent of the contracting parties: it was always deemed to be "a contract executed without any part performance;" so that the maxim was undisputed, *consensus, non concubitus, facit nuptias vel matrimonium* (*e*).

By the law of England (*f*), also, marriage is considered in the light of a contract, to which, with some exceptions, the ordinary principles which govern contracts in general must be applied; and the leading principle is that embodied in the above maxim, that marriage can only be constituted by the consent of the parties: *concubitus* may take place for the mere gratification of present appetite, but marriage requires an agreement of the parties looking to the *consortium ritæ* (*g*).

English law
of marriage.

It must be treated, however, as an established proposition that, by our common law, marriage could not be constituted by a mere civil contract, though followed by *concubitus*. Long after the abolition by statute (*h*) of all proceedings in ecclesiastical courts to compel the celebration of a marriage *in facie ecclesiæ* by reason of a civil contract of matrimony

(*d*) The contract, though made without the intervention of a priest, amounted to a perfect marriage by the canon law, until modified by the decree of the Council of Trent; See *per* Ld. Campbell, *Beamish v. Beamish*, 9 H. L. Cas. 335.

(*e*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, *Reg. v. Millis*, 10 Cl. & F. 719. See also Ld. Stowell's celebrated judgment in *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple* (by Dodson), p. 10 (*a*), where many authorities respecting this maxim are collected. See also the remarks upon this case, 10 Cl. & F. 679; and, *per* Cresswell, J., *Brook v. Brook*, 27 L. J. Ch. 401; S. C., 9 H. L. Cas. 193. *Field's Marriage Annuling*

Bill, 2 H. L. Cas. 48, well illustrates the maxim.

(*f*) The following cases may be referred to upon the law of Scotland respecting marriages *per verba de præsentì*: *Yelverton v. Longworth*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 743; *Dalrymple v. Dalrymple*, 2 Hagg. Cons. 54; *Hamilton v. Hamilton*, 9 Cl. & F. 327; *Stewart v. Menzies*, 8 Id. 309; *Bell v. Graham*, 13 Moo. P. C. 242; *Dysart Peerage Case*, 6 App. Cas. 489.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Stowell, 2 Hagg. Cons. 62, 63.

(*h*) By 26 Geo. 2, c. 33, s. 13; repealed, but re-enacted by 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 27.

per verba de presenti or *per verba de futuro*, the effect at common law of the civil contract was very fully considered (i), and it was then decided in the House of Lords (j), in accordance with the unanimous opinion of the judges that, although a present and perfect consent, expressed *per verba de presenti*, “was sufficient to render a contract of marriage indissoluble between the parties themselves, and to afford to either of them, by application to the spiritual court, the power of compelling the solemnisation of an actual marriage”: yet, such contract “never constituted a full and complete marriage in itself, unless made in the presence and with the intervention of a minister in holy orders” (k).

Remarks of
Tindal, C.J.,
in *Reg. v.*
Millis, on
the requisites
of a valid
marriage
at common
law.

In *Reg. v. Millis* (i), where this was decided, the following remarks, apposite to the maxim under our notice, were made by Tindal, C.J., in delivering the opinion of the judges. “It will appear, no doubt,” said his lordship, “upon referring to the different authorities, that at various periods of our history there have been decisions as to the nature and description of the religious forms and ceremonies necessary for the completion of a perfect marriage, which cannot be reconciled together; but there will be found no authority to contravene the general position, that, at all times, by the common law of England, it was essential to the constitution of a full and complete marriage, that there must be some religious solemnity; that both modes of obligation should exist together, the civil and religious; that, besides the civil contract, that is, the contract *per verba de presenti*, which has always remained the same,

(i) In *Reg. v. Millis*, 10 Cl. & Fin. 534.

(j) The lords being equally divided in opinion, the rule, *semper præsuntur pro neganti*, was applied.

(k) *Per* Tindal, C.J., 10 Cl. & F. 655; see also *Catherwood v. Caslon*, 13 M. & W. 261; *Beamish v. Beamish*, 9 H. L. Cas. 274. There is a strong legal presumption in favour

of marriage; *Piers v. Piers*, 2 H. L. Cas. 331; *Reg. v. Manwaring*, Dears. & B. 132; *Lauderdale Peerage case*, 10 App. Cas. 692. But in *Shedden v. Patrick*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. Cas. 470, the presumption of a marriage, arising from cohabitation and acknowledgment, was held to be rebutted.

there has at all times been also a *religious ceremony*, which has not always remained the same, but has varied from time to time, according to the variation of the laws of the Church; with respect to which ceremony, it is to be observed, that, whatever at any time has been held by the law of the Church to be a sufficient religious ceremony of marriage, the same has at all times satisfied the common law of England in that respect." For instance, before the Marriage Act, 1753, the Church held that a marriage celebrated by a minister in holy orders, but not in a church, or by such minister in a church, but without publication of banns or licence, was irregular, but was sufficient, nevertheless, to constitute the religious part of the obligation, and that the marriage was valid notwithstanding such irregularity; and the law of the land followed the spiritual court in that respect, and held such marriage to be valid. "But it will not be found in any period of our history, either that the Church of England has held the religious celebration sufficient to constitute a valid marriage, unless it was performed in the presence of an ordained minister, or that the common law has held a marriage complete without such celebration" (l).

In support of these opinions, the Chief Justice referred to the state of the law upon the marriages of Quakers and Jews, both before and after the Marriage Act, 1753. After that Act, he observed, it was generally supposed that the exception therein, as to the marriages of Quakers and Jews, amounted to a tacit acknowledgment by the legislature, that a marriage solemnised with the religious ceremonies which they were known to adopt ought to be deemed sufficient; but before that Act, when the question was open, we find no case in which it was held that a marriage between Quakers was legal, on the ground that it was a marriage by a contract *per verba de presenti*; on the contrary, the

(l) 10 Cl. & F. 655, 656.

inference is strong that it was never considered legal. As to marriages between Jews, he pointed out that, in early times, Jews stood in a very peculiar condition: for many centuries they were treated not as natural-born subjects, but as foreigners, and were scarcely recognised as participating in the civil rights of other subjects of the Crown: the ceremony of marriage by their own peculiar forms might, therefore, be regarded as constituting a legal marriage, without affording any argument as to the nature of a contract of marriage, *per verba de presenti*, between other subjects (*m*).

Statutory
changes in
the law.

The preceding remarks must be understood, of course, as relating to the requisites of the marriage contract at common law. By various enactments, commencing with the Marriage Act, 1836 (*n*), the legislature has recognised marriage as essentially a civil contract, and has enabled persons to contract marriage *per verba de presenti* without any religious ceremony, provided that the provisions of those enactments are complied with.

Promises of
marriage.

Having thus observed that marriage is a contract entered into by consent of the parties with the forms, whether of a religious or civil nature, prescribed by law, the difference must be noticed between a contract of marriage *per verba de presenti* and a contract to marry *per verba de futuro*. The latter never constitutes a marriage by our law (*o*); only gives a right of action for damages if violated; and may be determined by mutual consent (*p*). A person can avoid this contract on the ground that he was an infant when he made it (*q*).

(*m*) 10 Cl. & F. 671, 673.

(*n*) 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85. Most of the later Acts, of which the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, and the 61 & 62 Vict. c. 58, are the most important, are collected in Chitty's Statutes. The marriage of British subjects abroad is now regulated by 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23.

(*o*) See *Beechey v. Brown*, E. B. &

E. 769; 29 L. J. Q. B. 105.

(*p*) See *per* Ld. Lyndhurst, 10 Cl. & F. 837; *Davis v. Bomford*, 6 H. & N. 245; 30 L. J. Ex. 139; *Hall v. Wright*, E. B. & E. 746, 765; 27 L. J. Q. B. 345; 29 Id. 43.

(*q*) See *Coxhead v. Mullis*, 3 C. P. D. 439; *Northcote v. Doughty*, 4 Id. 385; *Ditcham v. Worrall*, 5 Id. 410.

If the contract be between an adult and an infant, the former is bound, so as to be liable to an action for breaking it; but the latter may avoid it; and this distinction rests on the principle that the law does not hold an infant to a contract which may be to his prejudice (*r*).

Not only may infants avoid their contracts to marry *in futuro*, but further, if infants actually intermarry, while under the age of discretion, which is fourteen years for a boy and twelve for a girl, by our law the marriage is voidable. Upon both parties attaining the age of discretion, either may elect that the marriage shall be void, whereupon it becomes a nullity without recourse to the courts; but if both then agree to the marriage, it becomes binding upon them without any new ceremony. If a person above and a person under the age of discretion intermarry, the former, as well as the latter, may elect to avoid the marriage when the latter reaches that age, for in contracts of matrimony both parties must be bound or neither (*s*). Our law is based herein upon the civil law; whereas the canon law, paying more regard to physical constitution than age, holds a marriage good, if the parties be *habiles ad matrimonium*, whatever be their respective ages.

At the common law, if the parties be of the age of discretion, no consent but their own is necessary to make their marriage valid; and this is agreeable to the canon law. Under the Marriage Acts the consent of a parent or guardian is usually required for the marriage of an infant who is not a widower or widow (*t*); but though a person whose consent is required can take steps to prevent the marriage (*u*), and though, where the marriage is not by banns, it can seldom

Infancy.

Consent of third persons.

(*r*) See *Holt v. Ward*, 2 Stra. 937; *Warwick v. Bruce*, 2 M. & S. 209; 6 Taunt. 118; 14 R. R. 634. See also 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62.

(*s*) Co. Litt. 79 a. The maxim, *quod semel placuit in electionibus amplius displicere non potest* (Co.

Litt. 146 a), here applies.

(*t*) See 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, ss. 16, 17; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, s. 10; 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23, s. 4 (1).

(*u*) See 4 Geo. 4, c. 78, ss. 8, 11, 22; 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 85, ss. 13, 42; 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23, ss. 4 (2), 5.

be procured without such person's consent, except by perjury (*x*), yet, if the marriage takes place, the absence of the consent does not invalidate it (*y*).

Royal
Marriage Act,
1772.

To this rule, however, the absence of the sovereign's consent when required by the 12 Geo. 3, c. 11, forms an exception. No descendant of George II., except the issue of princesses married into foreign families, can contract matrimony without the previous consent of the sovereign under the great seal, and the marriage if contracted without that consent is void. A descendant, however, if above the age of twenty-five, can, after a year's notice to the Privy Council, marry without the sovereign's consent, unless both Houses of Parliament within the year expressly declare their disapproval of the intended marriage. This Act extends to marriages contracted outside the realm (*z*).

Insanity.

The maxim, *consensus facit matrimonium*, prevents the marriage of a person while labouring under mental incapacity; for consent is absolutely requisite to matrimony, and persons *non compotes mentis* are incapable of consenting thereto (*a*). And, similarly, a marriage obtained by the duress of one of the parties, so that there is no real consent of that party, is void (*b*). But, though fraud which procures the appearance without the reality of consent invalidates a marriage, fraud which induces consent does not invalidate it (*c*).

Duress.

It is an important question how far the validity of a

(*x*) See 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, s. 14; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, ss. 2, 18; 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23, ss. 7, 15.

(*y*) See *Prowse v. Spurway*, 46 L. J. P. 50; *Holmes v. Simmons*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 523; *R. v. Birmingham*, 8 B. & C. 29; and 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, s. 17; 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23, s. 13 (1). As to the forfeiture of property accruing by the marriage, see 4 Geo. 4, c. 76, ss. 23—25; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 119, s. 19; 55 & 56 Vict. c. 23, s. 14.

(*z*) *Sussex Peerage case*, 11 Cl. & F. 85.

(*a*) *Turner v. Meyers*, 1 Hagg. Cons. 414; *Hancock v. Peaty*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 335; see *Durham v. Durham*, 10 P. D. 80.

(*b*) *Ford v. Stier*, [1896] P. 1: 65 L. J. P. 13; *Cooper v. Cranc*, [1891] P. 369: 61 L. J. P. 35; *Scott v. Sebright*, 12 P. D. 21.

(*c*) *Moss v. Moss*, [1897] P. 263: 66 L. J. P. 154.

marriage depends, in our law, upon the law of the domicil of the parties (*lex loci domicilii*) and how far on the law of the place where the marriage is contracted (*lex loci contractus*). As regards the degrees of consanguinity or affinity within which persons may lawfully marry, it seems to be well established that, at any rate where both parties have the same domicil, the validity of the marriage is governed by the law of the domicil, wherever the marriage takes place. Thus a marriage of first cousins in this country is invalid if the parties are domiciled in a country where such marriages are not recognised (*d*); and conversely a marriage of persons who are within the prohibited degrees is invalid if the parties are domiciled in this country, although the marriage is celebrated in a country according to the laws of which the marriage would be lawful (*e*).

Materiality
of *lex loci
domicilii*.

It is also established that when the marriage takes place in this country, and one of the parties (whether male or female) is domiciled in this country, the marriage if valid according to our laws is not invalidated by reason of any personal incapacity of the other party which would invalidate the marriage according to the laws of his place of domicil, but which is not recognised by our law, such as absence of consent of parents (*f*) or his belonging to a caste or religious order which would prohibit the marriage in question (*g*).

On the other hand the question what ceremony is necessary for duly effecting a marriage depends entirely on the law of the country where the marriage takes place, regardless of the domicil of the parties (*h*).

It may be added that whatever be the domicil of the

(*d*) *Sottomayor v. De Barros*, 3 94 : 49 L. J. P. 1.
P. D. 1; 47 L. J. P. 23.

(*e*) *De Wilton v. Montefiore*, [1902]
2 Ch. 481 : 69 L. J. Ch. 717; *Brook*
v. Brook, 9 H. L. Cas. 193 : 27 L. J.
Ch. 401.

(*f*) *Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P. 46.

(*g*) *Chetti v. Chetti*, [1909] P. 67;
Sottomayor v. De Barros, 5 P. D.

(*h*) See *Sottomayor v. De Barros*,
3 P. D., at p. 5; per Barnes, P., in
Ogden v. Ogden, [1908] P. 46, 58;
and the Foreign Marriages Act,
1892 (55 & 56 Vict. c. 23), and the
Marriage with Foreigners Act, 1906
(6 Edw. VII. c. 40).

parties, our laws will not recognise a marriage, though valid in the place where it is celebrated, if the *lex loci celebrationis* violates the precepts of religion or of public morals or where the marriages are such as are generally recognised as incestuous (*i*). So a polygamous marriage, valid where celebrated, is not recognised at all in this country (*j*).

Upon the general question upon what law does the capacity to contract depend, reference may be made to Lord Macnaghten's speech in *Cooper v. Cooper* (*k*), where an ante-nuptial settlement made in Ireland by an infant having an Irish domicil, with a view to marrying a domiciled Scotchman, was avoided on the ground of her infancy. "It has been doubted," said his lordship, "whether the personal competency or incompetency of an individual to contract depends on the law of the place where the contract is made, or on the law of the place where the contracting party is domiciled. Perhaps in this country the question is not finally settled, though the preponderance of opinion, here as well as abroad, seems to be in favour of the law of the domicil. It may be that all cases are not to be governed by one and the same rule. But when the contract is made in the place where the person whose capacity is in question is domiciled there can be no room for dispute.

HÆRES LEGITIMUS EST QUEM NUPTIÆ DEMONSTRANT. (*Co. Litt.* 7 *b.*)—*The common law takes him only to be a son whom the marriage proves to be so* (*l*).

The word "heir" (*m*), in legal understanding, signifies

(*i*) *Per Barnes, P., in Ogden v. Ogden*, [1908] P., at p. 59: 77 L. J. P. 34.

(*j*) *Hyde v. Hyde*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 130.

(*k*) 13 App. Cas. 88.

(*l*) *Mirror of Justices*, p. 70;

Fleta, lib. 6, c. 1.

(*m*) As to the popular and technical meaning of the word "ancestor," see *per Kindersley, V.-C., Re Don's Estate*, 27 L. J. Ch. 104, 105: 4 Drew, 194.

him to whom lands, tenements, or hereditaments, by the act of God and right of blood, descend, of some estate of inheritance, for *Deus solus heredem facere potest non homo*, and he only is heir who is *ex justis nuptiis procreatus* (n) It is, then, a rule or maxim of our law, with respect to the descent of land in England from father to son, that the son must be "*heres legitimus*."

Legal meaning of word "heir."

An English marriage having taken place between two English persons, the husband committed adultery, and afterwards went to Scotland to found jurisdiction against himself, because by the law of Scotland adultery without cruelty is a ground of divorce. The Scotch court pronounced a decree of divorce *à vinculo matrimonii*. It was held that a Scotch marriage duly celebrated between the divorced wife and an Englishman (who was thenceforth domiciled in Scotland), did not give to their children the character of "lawfully begotten," so as to enable them to succeed to real property in England—the Scotch divorce not having dissolved the English marriage (o).

Shaw v. Gould.

Again, in order that land in England may descend from father to son, the son must have been born after actual marriage between his father and mother; and this is a rule *juris positivi*, as indeed are all the laws which regulate succession to real property, this particular rule having been framed for the direct purpose of excluding, in the descent of land in England, the application of the rule of the civil and canon law, *pater est quem nuptie demonstrant* (p), by which the subsequent marriage between the father and mother was held to make the son born before marriage legitimate; and this rule of descent, being a rule

(n) Co. Litt. 7 b.; cited 5 B. & C. 440, 454. The rule respecting property in the young of animals is in accordance with the Roman Law, *partus sequitur ventrem*: I. 2, 1, 19; D. 6, 1, 5, § 2; per Byles, J., 6 C.B. N. S. 852.

(o) *Shaw v. Gould*, L. R. 3. H. L. 55. See *Birt v. Boutinez*, L. R. 1 P. & D. 487; *Harvey v. Farnie*, 8 App. Cas. 43: 52 L. J. P. & D. 33; *Le Mesurier v. Le Mesurier*, [1895] A. C. 517: 64 L. J. P. C. 97.

(p) D. 2, 4, 5.

Doe v.
Vardill.

of positive law, annexed to the land itself, cannot be broken in or disturbed by the law of the country where the claimant was born. Therefore, in *Doe v. Vardill* (q), it was held that a person born in Scotland of parents domiciled there, but not married till after his birth, though legitimate by the law of Scotland (r), could not take real estate in England as heir to his father, who died intestate. And in *Re Don's Estate*, Kindersley, V.-C., held that the father of an *ante natus* born in Scotland, and legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents, could not, under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, succeed to real estate in England whereof the son died seised (s).

Heir to the
father is heir
to the son.

If, moreover, the parent be incapable of inheriting land himself, he has no heritable blood in him which he can transmit to his child, according to the maxim and old acknowledged rule of descent, *qui doit inheriter al père doit inheriter al fitz*,—he who would have been heir to the father shall be heir to the son; and, therefore, if in *Doe v. Vardill* the son had died, leaving a child, before the intestate, such child could not, according to English law, have inherited under the circumstances (t), and if in *Re Don's Estate* there had been a son *post natus*, such son could not have inherited to his *ante natus* brother.

Formerly also the rule was that attainder so entirely corrupted the blood of a person attainted that not only could no person inherit from him, but no person could inherit through him: so that if there were grandfather, father, and son—three generations, and the father was attainted, and the grandfather died seised of lands in fee, the attainted father being dead in the meantime, the

(q) 2 Cl. & Fin. 571; S. C. 1 Scott, N. E. 828; 6 Bing. N. C. 385; 5 B. & C. 438; 37 R. R. 253; explained by Ld. Brougham, *Fenton v. Livingstone*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 532; by Ld. Cranworth, Id. 544. See also *Shedden v. Patrick*, L. R. 1 Sc.

App. Cas. 470.

(r) See *Countess of Dalhousie v. M'Dowall*, 7 Cl. & F. 817; *Munro v. Munroe*, Id. 842; *Birtwhistle v. Vardill*, Id. 895.

(s) 4 Drew. 194.

(t) 1 Scott, N. R. 842.

grandson could not have inherited to the grandfather (*u*). By 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 10, however, when the person from whom the descent of any land is to be traced shall have any relation who, having been attainted, shall have died before such descent shall have taken place, then such attainder shall not prevent from inheriting such land any person who would have been capable of inheriting the same by tracing his descent through such relation if he had not been attainted, unless such land shall have escheated in consequence of such attainder before 1834. This Act, however, by s. 11, does not extend to any descent taking place on the death of any person dying before that date.

There is likewise another rule of law immediately connected with, and similar in principle to, the preceding, which may be here properly mentioned: *qui ex damnato coitu nascuntur inter liberos non computentur* (*v*)—neither a bastard (*x*) nor any person not born in lawful wedlock can be, in the legal sense of the term, an heir (*y*); for a bastard is reckoned by the law to be *nullius filius*, and, being thus the son of nobody, he has no inheritable blood in him (*z*), and cannot take land by succession; and if there be no other claimant than such illegitimate child, the land shall escheat to the lord. Moreover, as a bastard cannot be heir himself, so neither can he have any heirs but those of his own body; for as all collateral kindred consists in being derived from the same common ancestor, and, as a bastard has no legal ancestors, he can have no collateral kindred, and consequently, can have no legal

Nullius filius.

(*u*) *Per* Kindersley, V.-C., 27 L. J. Ch. 102, 103; 4 Drew. 194. See further as to attainder, *Kynnauld v. Leslie*, L. R. 1 C. P. 389. Attainder was abolished by the Forfeiture Act, 1870.

(*v*) Co. Litt. 8 a.

(*x*) "The strictly technical sense

of the term 'bastard' is one who is not born in lawful wedlock;" *per* Kindersley, V.-C., 27 L. J. Ch. 102.

(*y*) Glanville, lib. 7, c. 13; *Shaw v. Gould*, ante, p. 395, n. (o).

(*z*) See the argument, *Stevenson's Heirs v. Sullivan*, 5 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 226, 227: Id. 262, note.

heirs but such as claim by a lineal descent from himself; and, therefore, if a bastard purchases land, and dies seised thereof without issue and intestate, the land shall escheat to the lord of the fee (*a*).

Under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106, s. 2, descent is now to be traced from the purchaser, and under this section a son claiming by descent from an illegitimate father who was the purchaser, could not have transmitted the estate by descent, upon failure of his own issue, to his heir *ex parte maternâ*. But this was remedied by a later statute (*b*), and in such a case, instead of escheating, the land will descend, the descent being traced from the person last entitled to it as if he had purchased it.

Right of inheritance follows the *lex loci*.

The right of inheritance does not follow the law of the domicile of the parties, but that of the country where the land lies, yet, with respect to personal property, which has no locality, and is of an ambulatory nature, it is part of the law of England that this description of property should be distributed according to the *jus domicilii* (*c*). "It is a clear proposition," observed Lord Loughborough, "not only of the law of England, but of every country in the world where law has the semblance of science, that personal property has no locality. The meaning of that is, not that personal property has no visible locality, but that it is subject to that law which governs the person of the owner, both with respect to the disposition of it, and with respect to the transmission of it, either by succession, or by the act of the party; it follows the law of the person. The owner in any country may dispose of his personal property. If he dies, it is not the law of the country in which the property is, but the law of the country of which he was a subject, that will regulate

(*a*) Co. Litt. 3 b; Finch, Law, 117, 118. For a summary method of proving the legitimacy of a person, see 22 & 23 Vict. c. 93.

(*b*) 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, ss. 19, 20.

(*c*) *Per* Abbott, C.J., 5 B. & C. 451, 452; *per* Holroyd and Bayley JJ., Id. 454. See 17 Ch. D. 266, 40 Id. 216.

the succession" (d). *Mobilia sequuntur personam* (e), is the maxim of our own as of the Roman Law. The personal estate of a testator accompanies him wherever he may reside and become domiciled, so that he acquires the right of disposing of and dealing with it, according to the law of his domicile (f). It is to be observed, however, that the maxim *Mobilia sequuntur personam* applies only to the succession and distribution of property, not to the right of the crown to the property of an intestate dying without next of kin. The right to such property depends on the place where the property is (g).

NEMO EST HÆRES VIVENTIS. (*Co. Litt.* 22 b.)—No one can be heir during the life of his ancestor.

By law, no inheritance can vest, nor can any person be the actual complete heir of another, till the ancestor is dead; before the happening of this event he is called heir-apparent, or heir-presumptive (h), and his claim, which can only be to an estate remaining in the ancestor at the time of his death, and of which he has made no testamentary disposition, may be defeated by the superior title of an alienee in the ancestor's lifetime, or of a devisee under his will. Therefore, if an estate be made to A. for life, remainder to the heirs of B.;

Meaning of rule.

(d) *Sill v. Worswick*, 1 H. Bl. 690; 2 R. R. 816; cited in *Freke v. Carbery*, L. R. 16 Eq. 466; per Ld. Wensleydale, *Fenton v. Livingstone*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 547; per Ld. Brougham, *Bain v. Whitehaven & Furness Junction R. Co.*, 3 H. L. Cas. 19; *Dogliani v. Crispin*, L. R. 1 H. L. 301.

(e) Story, Conf. of Laws, 8th ed. 534 et seq.

(f) *Dogliani v. Crispin*, *supra*; *Bremer v. Freeman*, 10 Moo. P. C. C. 306; *Hodgson v. Beauchesne*, 12 Id. 285; *Crookenden v. Fuller*, 29 L. J.

P. M. & A. 1: 1 Swab. & Tr. 441; *Anderson v. Lanerville*, 9 Id. 325. See, however, *De Nicols v. Curlier*, [1900] A. C. 21, where the widow of a Frenchman who had acquired an English domicile since his marriage in France was held to be entitled on his death to the share of his property which the French law conferred on her upon her marriage.

(g) *In re Barnett's Trusts*, [1902] 1 Ch. 847: 71 L. J. Ch. 408.

(h) 2 Bla. Com. by Stewart, 231; *Co. Litt.* 8 a.

now, if A. dies before B., the remainder is at an end; for, during B.'s life, he has no heir; but, if B. dies first, the remainder then immediately vests in his heir, who will be entitled to the land on the death of A. (i).

So it has been said that "a will takes effect only on the testator's death; during his life it is subject to his control; and, until it was consummated by his death, no one had, in a legal view, any interest in it: *Nemo est hæres viventis*" (j).

Relaxation
of the rule.

The general rule being, that the law recognises no one as heir until the death of his ancestor, it follows, that though a party may be heir-apparent, or heir-presumptive, yet he is not very heir, living the ancestor: and therefore, where an estate is limited to one as a purchaser under the denomination of heir, heir of the body, heir male, or the like, the party cannot take, as a purchaser, unless by the death of the ancestor, he has, at the time when the estate is to vest, become very heir. But this rule has been relaxed in many instances, and an exception engrafted on it, that, if there be sufficient on the will to show that by the word "heir" the testator meant heir-apparent, it shall be so construed; and in such a case the popular sense shall prevail against the technical (k). In other words, the authorities appear to establish this proposition, that, *primâ facie*, the word "heir" is to be taken in its strict legal sense; but that, if there be a plain demonstration in the will, that the testator used it in a different sense, such different sense may be assigned to it. What will amount to such plain demonstration must in each case depend on the language used, and the circumstances under which it was used and is not a question to be determined by reference to reported cases,

(i) *Per* Patteson, J., *Doe v. Perratt*, 7 Scott, N. R. 23, 24; S. C., 9 Cl. & Fin. 606; *per* Littledale, J., 5 B. & C. 59.

(j) *Per* Spencer, J., *Mann v. Pearson*, 2 Johnson (U.S.), R. 36.

(k) *Doe v. Perratt*, 10 Bing. 207,

208, 229. See S. C., 7 Scott, N. R. 45 *et seq.*; *Egerton v. Earl Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Cas. 103, 137; 1 Fearne, Cont. Rem., 10th ed. 210, and see further, as to the rule, *Id.*, Index, tit. Maxims.

but by a careful consideration of that language and those circumstances in the particular case under discussion (*l*).

Hence, if a devise be made to A. for life, remainder to the heirs of the body of B. so long as B. shall live, an estate *pur autre vie* being given, and the ancestor being *cestui que vie*, the rule of law would plainly be excluded. So, a devise to A. for life, remainder to the right heirs of B. now living, vests the remainder in B.'s heir-apparent or presumptive; and a devise to A. for life, remainder to the right heir of B., he paying to B. an annuity upon coming into possession, would clearly vest the remainder in B.'s heir-apparent (*m*). In like manner, the familiar expressions, "heir to the throne," "heir to a title or estate," "heir-apparent," "heir-presumptive," prove that the existence of a parent is quite consistent with the *popular* idea of heirship in the child. In all such cases the legal maxim has no place, nor can it have in any in which the person speaking knows of the existence of the parent, and intends that the devise to the child shall take effect during the life of the parent. It would appear that the question proper to be asked in each such case would be, "Did the testator use the word 'heir' in the strict legal sense, or in any other sense?" and if the answer should be that he used the term, not in the legal and technical, but in some popular sense, the sense thus ascertained should be carried out (*n*).

Instances where rule is excluded.

Respecting the subject here touched upon, detailed information must be sought for in treatises more technical than this.

HÆREDITAS NUNQUAM ASCENDIT. (*Glanville, lib. 7, c. 1.*)—*The right of inheritance never lineally ascends.*

The above was an express rule of the feudal law, and

- (*l*) *Per* Patteson, J., 7 Scott, N. R. N. R. 46, 50.
 26. (*n*) *Per* Ld. Cottenham, 7 Scott,
 (*m*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, 7 Scott, N. R. 60, 61; S. C., 5 B. & C. 48.
 L.M. 26

Rule, how
applied.

remained an invariable maxim (*o*) until the Inheritance Act, 1833 (*oo*), which effected so great a change in the law of inheritance. The rule was thus stated and illustrated by Littleton (*p*): If there be father and son, and the father has a brother, who is, therefore, uncle to the son, and the son purchase land in fee-simple, and die without issue, living his father, the uncle shall have the land as heir to the son, and not the father, although the latter is nearer in blood, because it is a maxim in law that the inheritance may lineally descend, but not ascend. Yet if the son in this case die without issue, and his uncle enter into the land as heir to the son, and afterwards the uncle die without issue, living the father, the father shall have the land as heir to the uncle, and not as heir to the son, for he should rather come to the land by collateral descent than by lineal ascent.

It was, moreover, a necessary consequence of this rule coupled with the maxim, *seisina facit stipitem*, that, if, in the instance above put, the uncle did not enter into the land, the father could not inherit it, because a man claiming as heir in fee-simple by descent must make himself heir to him who was last seised of the actual freehold and inheritance; and if the uncle, therefore, did not enter, he would have had but a freehold in law, and no actual freehold, and the last person seised of the actual freehold was the son, to whom the father could not make himself heir (*q*).

The maxim, *hæreditas nunquam ascendit*, therefore, applied only to exclude the ancestors in a direct line, for the inheritance might ascend *indirectly*, as in the preceding example, from the son to the uncle (*r*).

The Inheritance Act,
1833.

The above rule, however, was altered with respect to descents on deaths occurring since 1833, it being enacted by s. 6 of The Inheritance Act, 1833 (*oo*), that every lineal ancestor shall be capable of being heir to any of his issue;

(*o*) 2 Com. by Broom & Hadley,
378; 3 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 331.
(*oo*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 106.

(*p*) S. 3.
(*q*) Co. Litt. 11 b.
(*r*) Bracton, lib. 2, c. 29.

and in every case where there shall be no issue of the purchaser, his nearest lineal ancestor shall be his heir in preference to any person who would have been entitled to inherit either by tracing his descent through such lineal ancestor, or in consequence of there being no descendant of such lineal ancestor, so that the father shall be preferred to a brother or sister, and a more remote lineal ancestor to any of his issue other than a nearer lineal ancestor or his issue.

But by s. 7 it is provided, that none of the maternal ancestors of the person from whom the descent is to be traced, nor any of their descendants, shall be capable of inheriting until all his paternal ancestors and their descendants shall have failed; and also that no female paternal ancestor of such person, nor any of her descendants, shall be capable of inheriting until all his male paternal ancestors and their descendants shall have failed and that no female maternal ancestor of such person, nor any of her descendants, shall be capable of inheriting until all his male maternal ancestors and their descendants shall have failed.

And here we may conveniently advert to a well-known maxim of our law, which is thus expressed: *linea recta semper præfertur transversali* (s)—the right line shall always be preferred to the collateral. It is a rule of descent that the lineal descendants *in infinitum* of any person deceased shall represent their ancestor, that is, shall stand in the same place as the person himself would have done had he been living (t).

Lineal
descent
preferred.

Hence it is, that the son or grandchild, whether son or daughter, of the eldest son succeeds before the younger son, and the son or grandchild of the eldest brother before the younger brother; and so, through all the degrees of succession by the right of representation the right of proximity is transferred from the root to the branches, and gives

(s) Co. Litt. 10 b; Fleta, lib. 6, c. 1.

(t) 3 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 333.

them the same preference as the next and worthiest of blood (*u*).

Exclusion of
the half
blood.

Another rule immediately connected with the preceding, was that which related to the exclusion of the half blood, but which, originally, it would seem, extended only to exclude a *frater uterinus* from inheriting land descended *a patre*: *frater fratri uterino non succedet in hæreditate paternâ* (*x*). This rule, however, although expressed with considerable limitation in the maxim just cited, had this more extended signification—that the heir, in order to take by descent, need not be the nearest kinsman absolutely; but, although a distant kinsman of the whole blood, he should nevertheless be admitted to the total exclusion of a much nearer kinsman of the half blood: and, further, that the estate should escheat to the lord, rather than the half blood should inherit (*y*).

It has, however, been observed by Mr. Preston, that the mere circumstance that a person was of the half blood to the person last seised, would not have excluded him from taking as heir, if he were of the whole blood to those ancestors through whom the descent was to be derived by *representation*: thus, if two first cousins, D. and E., had intermarried, and had issue a son, F., and D. had married again, and had issue, G., and F. died seised, G. could not have taken as half brother of F., but he might as maternal cousin to him (*z*); for *quando duo jura in unâ personâ concurrunt æquum est ac si essent in diversis* (*a*).

The Inheritance Act,
1833.

The law on this subject, however, was entirely altered and materially improved by s. 9 of the Inheritance Act, 1833, which enables the half blood to inherit next after any relation in the same degree of the whole blood and his issue, where the

(*u*) Hale, Hist., 6th ed. 322, 323;
3 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 333.

(*x*) Fort. de Laud. Leg. Ang., by
Amos, p. 15.

(*y*) *Per* Kindersley, V.-C. 27 L. J.

Ch. 102.

(*z*) 2 Prest. Abs. Tit. 447.

(*a*) Id. 449. The maxim *supra* is
exemplified by *Jones v. Davies*, 7
H. & N. 507; S. C., 5 Id. 766.

common ancestor is a male, and next after the common ancestor where a female, so that the brother of the half blood on the part of the father shall inherit next after the sisters of the whole blood on the part of the father and their issue, and the brother of the half blood on the part of the mother shall inherit next after the mother.

We may add that the rule excluding the half blood did not hold on the descent of the Crown. Therefore, if a king had issue a son and a daughter by one wife, and a son by another wife, and died; on the death of the eldest son without issue, the younger son was entitled to the Crown, to the exclusion of the daughter. For instance, the Crown actually did descend from King Edward VI. to Queen Mary, and from her to Queen Elizabeth, who were respectively of the half blood to each other. Nor did the rule apply to estates tail (b).

Descent of
the Crown.

PERSONA CONJUNCTA ÆQUIPARATUR INTERESSE PROPRIO. (*Bac. Max., reg. 18.*)—*The interest of a personal connection is sometimes regarded in law as that of the individual himself.*

In the words of the civil law, *jura sanguinis nullo jure civili dirimi possunt* (c); the law, according to Lord Bacon, hath so much respect for nature and conjunction of blood, that in divers cases it compares and matches nearness of blood with consideration of profit and interest, and, in some cases, allows of it more strongly. Therefore, if a man covenant in consideration of blood, to stand seised to the use of his brother or son, or near kinsman, a use is well raised by his covenant without transmutation of possession (d).

Rule laid
down by
Lord Bacon.

(b) 1 Com. by Broom & Hadley, 228; Chit. Pre. Crown, 10; Litt. ss. 14, 15; 3 Cruise, Dig., 4th ed. 386. See also Hume's Hist. of England, vol. 4, pp. 242, 265. (c) D. 50, 17, 8; Bac. Max., reg. 11. (d) Bac. Max., reg. 18.

The above maxim, as to *persona conjuncta*, is likewise, in some cases, applicable in determining the liability of an infant on contracts, for what cannot strictly be considered as "necessaries" within the ordinary meaning of that term (*e*). Thus, as observed by Lord Bacon, "if a man under the years of twenty-one, contract for the nursing of his lawful child, this contract is good, and shall not be avoided by infancy, no more than if he had contracted for his own aliments or erudition." The like legal principle has been extended so as to render an infant widow liable upon her contract for the funeral of her husband, who had left no property to be administered (*f*).

Qualification
of rule.

The maxim under consideration does not, however, apply so as to render a parent liable on the contract of the infant child, even where such contract is for "necessaries," unless there be some evidence that the parent has either sanctioned or ratified the contract. If, said Lord Abinger, C.B. (*g*), a father does any specific act from which it may reasonably be inferred that he has authorised his son to contract a debt, he may be liable in respect of the debt so contracted; but the mere moral obligation on the father to maintain his child affords no inference of a legal promise to pay his debts. "In order to bind a father in point of law for a debt incurred by his son, you must prove that he has contracted to be bound, just in the same manner as you would prove such a contract against any other person; and it would bring the law into great uncertainty if it were permitted to juries to impose a liability in each particular case, according to their own feelings or

(*e*) As to which see *Ryder v. Wombwell*, L. R. 4 Ex. 32.

(*f*) *Chapple v. Cooper*, 13 M. & W. 259, 260.

(*g*) *Mortimore v. Wright*, 6 M. & W. 487; *Shelton v. Springett*, 11 C. B. 452. See *Ambrose v. Kerrison*, 10 C. B. 776 (followed in *Bradshaw*

v. Beard, 12 C. B. N. S. 344); *Read v. Legard*, 6 Exch. 636, and *Rice v. Shepherd*, 12 C. B. N. S. 332; *Richardson v. Dubois*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 51. See *Bazeley v. Forder*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 559, as showing under peculiar circumstances the liability of the husband in respect of his wife.

prejudices." "It is," observed Parke, B., in the same case, "a clear principle of law, that a father is not under any legal obligation to pay his son's debts, except, indeed, by proceedings under the 43 Eliz. (h), by which he may, under certain circumstances, be compelled to support his children according to his ability; but the mere moral obligation to do so cannot impose upon him any legal liability" (i).

Again, we read, "It hath been resolved by the justices that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband, *quia sunt due animæ in carne unâ*, and it might be a cause of implacable discord and dissension between the husband and the wife, and a means of great inconvenience" (k). At common law, however, the above rule did not apply where a personal injury had been committed by the husband against the wife, or *vice versâ* (l). And the rule in question has been in great part abrogated by the legislature.

Evidence of wife against husband, &c.

By the Evidence Amendment Act, 1853 (m), the husband or wife became a competent and compellable witness for or against the wife or husband, except in a criminal proceeding or proceeding instituted in consequence of adultery. By the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869 (n), the husband or wife of a party to a proceeding instituted in consequence of adultery became a competent witness therein. And by the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (o), the husband or wife of a person charged with an offence became a competent witness for the defence (p), and also in certain

(h) See *Grinnell v. Wells*, 7 M. & Gr. 1033; *Ruttinger v. Temple*, 4 B. & S. 491.

criminal proceedings against her husband for the security of her separate property as though she were a *feme sole*.

(i) For Courts of Law "are to decide according to the legal obligations of parties;" *per* Alderson, B., *Turner v. Mason*, 14 M. & W. 117.

(l) *Lord Audley's case*, 3 How. St. Tr. 402, 413.

(k) Co. Litt. 6 b. Under 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 12, a married woman has the same remedies by way of

(m) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83.

(n) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68.

(o) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36.

(p) S. 1.

specific cases (*q*), may be called as witness for the prosecution without the consent of the person charged. But such witness, if called under the above Act of 1853 or 1898, cannot be compelled to disclose communications made to him or her by the wife or husband during the marriage (*r*).

In the sense then above explained, and with the restrictions above suggested, must be understood the maxim illustrated by Lord Bacon, and with which we conclude our list of rules relative to marriage and descent: *Persona conjuncta æquiparatur interesse proprio*.

(*q*) S. 4, and schedule. See also
40 Vict. c. 14.

(*r*) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, s. 3; 61 &
62 Vict. c. 36, s. 1 (d).

CHAPTER VIII.

 THE INTERPRETATION OF DEEDS AND WRITTEN
INSTRUMENTS.

IN this chapter an attempt is made to give a general view of such maxims as are of most practical utility in construing deeds and written instruments; and some remarks are occasionally added, showing how these rules apply to wills and statutes. As the decided cases on the subject are very numerous, and as in a work like the present it would be undesirable, and indeed impossible, to refer to any considerable portion of them, only those cases are cited which elucidate most clearly the meaning, extent, and qualifications of the various maxims. The importance of fixed rules of interpretation is manifest, and not less manifest is the importance of a knowledge of those rules. In construing deeds and wills, the language of which, owing to the use of inaccurate terms, frequently falls short of, or altogether misrepresents, the intentions of the parties, such rules are necessary in order to insure just and uniform decisions; and they are equally so where it becomes the duty of a Court of law to unravel those intricacies and ambiguities which occur in statutes, and which result from ideas not sufficiently precise, from views too little comprehensive, or from the unavoidable imperfections of language (*a*). In each case, where difficulty arises, peculiar principles and methods of interpretation are applied, reference being always had to the general scope and intention of the

(*a*) ‡ See *Ld. Teignmouth's Life of Sir W. Jones*, 261.

instrument, the nature of the transaction, and the legal rights and situation of the parties interested. The rules of interpretation separately considered in this chapter are:—1, that an instrument shall be construed liberally and according to the intention of the parties; 2, that the whole context shall be considered; 3, that the meaning of a word may often be known from the context; 4, that no man shall derogate from his own grant; 5, that a latent ambiguity may, but a patent ambiguity cannot, be explained by extrinsic evidence; 6, that where there is no ambiguity, the natural construction shall prevail; 7, that an instrument or expression is sufficiently certain which can be made so; 8, that surplusage may be rejected; 9, that a false description is often immaterial; 10, that general words may be restrained by reference to the subject-matter; 11, that the special mention of one thing may be understood as excluding another; 12, that the expression of what is implied is inoperative; 13, that a clause referred to must be understood as incorporated with that referring to it; 14, that relative words refer to the next antecedent; 15, that that mode of exposition is best which is founded on a reference to contemporaneous facts and circumstances; 16, that he who too minutely regards the form of expression takes but a superficial and, therefore, probably an erroneous view of the meaning of an instrument.

BENIGNÆ FACIENDÆ SUNT INTERPRETATIONES PROPTER SIMPLICITATEM LAICORUM UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT; ET VERBA INTENTIONI, NON E CONTRA, DEBENT INSERVIRE. (*Co. Litt.* 36 a.) *A liberal construction should be put upon written instruments, so as to uphold them, if possible, and carry into effect the intention of the parties.*

The two rules of most general application in construing a written instrument are—1st, that it shall, if possible, be

so interpreted *ut res magis valeat quam pereat* (b), and 2ndly, that such a meaning shall be given to it as may carry out and effectuate to the fullest extent the intention of the parties. These maxims are, indeed, in some cases restricted by the operation of technical rules, which, for the sake of uniformity, ascribe definite meanings to particular expressions; and, in other cases, they receive, when applied to particular instruments, certain qualifications, which are imposed for wise and beneficial purposes; but, notwithstanding these restrictions and qualifications, the above maxims are undoubtedly the most important and comprehensive which can be used for determining the true construction of written instruments.

It is then laid down repeatedly by the old reporters and legal writers, that in construing a deed, every part of it must be made, if possible, to take effect, and every word must be made to operate in some shape or other (c). The construction, likewise, must be such as will preserve rather than destroy (d); it must be reasonable, and agreeable to common understanding (e); it must also be favourable, and as near the minds and apparent intents of the parties as the rules of law will admit (f), and, as observed by Lord Hale, the judges ought to be curious and subtle to invent

General principles of construction of deeds.

(b) See *per* Erle, C.J., *Cheney v. Courtois*, 13 C. B. N. S. 640; *Broom v. Batchelor*, 1 H. & N. 255; cited in *Heffield v. Meadows*, L. R. 4 C. P. 600; *Steele v. Hoe*, 14 Q. B. 431, 445; *Ford v. Beech*, 11 Q. B. 852, 866, 868, 870; *Oldershaw v. King*, 2 H. & N. 517; *Mare v. Charles*, 5 E. & B. 978; approved in *Penrose v. Martyr*, E. B. & E. 503.

"All contracts should, if possible, be construed *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*;" *per* Byles, J., *Shoreditch Vestry v. Hughes*, 17 C. B. N. S. 162. The maxim was applied in *Reg. v. Broadhempston*, 1 E. & E. 154, 163; *Pugh v. Stringfield*, 4 C.

B. N. S. 364, 370. See *Blackwell v. England*, 8 E. & B. 541, 549.

"If a plea admits of two constructions, one of which gives a sensible effect to the whole, and the other makes a portion of it idle and insensible, the Court is bound to adopt the former construction;" *per* Williams, J., *Peter v. Daniel*, 5 C. B. 579.

(c) *Shep. Touch.* 84; *Plowd.* 156.

(d) *Per* Ld. Brougham, *Langston v. Langston*, 2 Cl. & F. 243; cited arg., *Baker v. Tucker*, 3 H. L. Cas. 116.

(e) 1 Bulst. 175; *Hob.* 304.

(f) 1 And. 60; *Jenk. Cent.* 260.

reasons and means to make acts effectual according to the just intent of the parties (*g*); they will not, therefore, cavil about the propriety of words when the intent of the parties appears, but will rather apply the words to fulfil the intent, than destroy the intent by reason of the insufficiency of the words (*h*).

It may, indeed, chance that, on executing an agreement under seal, the parties failed to contemplate the happening of some particular event or the existence of some particular state of facts at a future period (*i*); and all the Court can do in such a case is to ascertain the meaning of the words actually used; and, in construing the deed, they will adopt the established rule of construction, "to read the words in their ordinary and grammatical sense, and to give them effect, unless such a construction would lead to some absurdity or inconvenience (*k*), or would be plainly repugnant to the intention of the parties to be collected from other parts of the deed" (*l*). For "the golden rule of construction," to which we shall presently revert, "is that words are to be construed according to their natural meaning, unless such a construction would either render them senseless or would be opposed to the general scope and intent of the instrument, or unless there be some very cogent reason of convenience in favour of a different interpretation" (*m*).

Deeds shall
he made
operative, if
possible.

Deeds, then, shall be so construed as to operate according to the intention of the parties, if by law they may; and if they cannot in one form, they shall operate in that which by law will effectuate the intention: *quando res non*

(*g*) *Crossing v. Scudamore*, 2 Lev. 9; *per* Ld. Hobart, Hob. 277, cited Willes, R. 682; *Moseley v. Motteux*, 10 M. & W. 533.

(*h*) 1 Plowd. 159, 160, 162.

(*i*) See Judgm., *Lloyd v. Guibert*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 120.

(*k*) The element of inconvenience

is not to be considered if the construction of the document is clear. *Bottomley's case*, 16 Ch. D. 681, 686; 50 L. J. Ch. 167.

(*l*) *Per* Parke, B., *Bland v. Crowley*, 6 Exch. 529.

(*m*) *Per* Bramwell, B., *Fowell v. Tranter*, 3 H. & C. 461.

valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest (n). For in these later times, the judges have gone further than formerly, and have had more consideration for the substance, to wit, the passing of the estate according to the intent of the parties, than the shadow, to wit, the manner of passing it (o).

Thus, where A., in consideration of natural love and of 100l., by deeds of lease and release, granted, released, and confirmed his lands after his own death, to his brother B. in tail, with remainder to C., the son of another brother of A., in fee; and he covenanted and granted that the lands should, after his death, be held by B. and the heirs of his body, or by C. and his heirs, according to the true intent of the deed; it was held, that, although the deed could not operate as a release, because it attempted to convey a freehold *in futuro*, yet it was good as a covenant to stand seised (p). So, if the King's charter will bear a double construction, one which will carry the grant into effect, the other which will make it inoperative, the former is to be adopted (q). And generally, "if words have a double intendment, and the one standeth with law, and the other is against law, they are to be taken in the sense which is agreeable to law" (r).

Roe v. Tran-
marr.

(n) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Goodtitle v. Bailey*, Cowp. 600; cited *Roe v. Archbp. of York*, 6 East, 105: 8 R. R. 413; 1 Ventr. 216. See also the instances mentioned in *Gibson v. Minet*, 1 H. Bl. 614, 620; 1 R. R. 754.

(o) *Osmen v. Sheaf*, 3 Lev. 370; cited *Doe v. Davies*, 2 M. & W. 516; *per* Willes, C.J., *Smith v. Packhurst*, 3 Atk. 136; cited, *Marq. of Cholmondely v. Ld. Clinton*, 2 B. & Ald. 637; 21 R. R. 419; *Tarleton v. Staniforth*, 5 T. R. 695; 4 R. R. 845; *per* Maule, J., *Borradaile v. Hunter*, 5 Scott, N. R. 431, 432; 2 Wms. Saund. 96 a, n. (1); 3 Prest. Abstr. Tit. 21, 22; 1 Id. 313.

(p) *Roe v. Tranmarr*, Willes, 682. See the cases collected 2 Wms.

Saund. 96 a, n. (1); 1 Prest. Abstr. Tit. 313; 1 Rep. 76; *Perry v. Watts*, 4 Scott, N. R. 366; *Doe v. Woodroffe*, 10 M. & W. 608; 15 Id. 769; 2 H. L. Cas. 811.

"The general rule," also, "is that a covenant not to sue when it does not affect other parties, and is so intended, may be pleaded as a release." *Per* Byles, J., *Ray v. Jones*, 19 C. B. N. S. 423. A deed of bargain and sale void for want of inrolment will operate as a grant of the reversion; *Haggerston v. Hanbury*, 5 B. & C. 101; 29 R. R. 176; *Adams v. Steer*, Cro. Jac. 210. (q) *Per* Tindal, C.J., *Rutter v. Chapman*, 8 M. & W. 102.

(r) *Shep. Touch*, 80, adopted by

In accordance with the same principle of construction, where divers persons join in a deed, and some are able to make such deed, and some are not able, this shall be said to be his deed alone that is able (*s*); and if a deed be made to one that is incapable and another that is capable, it shall enure only to the latter (*t*). So, if mortgagor and mortgagee join in a lease, this enures as the lease of the mortgagee, and the confirmation of the mortgagor (*x*); and a joint lease by tenant for life and remainderman operates during the former's life as his demise, confirmed by the remainderman, and afterwards as the demise of the remainderman (*y*).

Rule as to
deeds further
considered.

The preceding examples suffice to show that where a deed cannot operate in the precise manner or to the full extent intended by the parties, it shall, nevertheless, be made as far as possible to effectuate their intention. Acting, moreover, on a kindred principle, the Court will endeavour to affix such a meaning to words of obscure or doubtful import occurring in a deed, as may best carry out the plain and manifest intention of the parties, as collected from the four corners of the instrument,—with these qualifications, however, that the intent of the parties shall never be carried into effect contrary to the rules of law, and that, as a general rule, the Court will not introduce into a deed words which are not to be found there (*z*), nor strike out of a deed words which are there, in order to make the sense different (*a*). The following illustrations of the above propositions may advantageously be noticed, and many others of equal importance will, doubtless, occur to the reader.

Martin, B., *Fussell v. Daniel*, 10 Exch. 597; Co. Litt. 42 a, 183; Noy, Max., 9th ed. 211.

(*s*) Shep. Touch. 81: Finch, L. 60.

(*t*) Shep. Touch. 82.

(*x*) *Doe v Adams*, 2 Cr. & J. 232; per *Ld. Lyndhurst*, C.B., *Smith v. Pocklington*, 1 Cr. & J. 446; 35 R. R. 756. But a mortgagor may now have leasing powers under the

Conveyancing Act, 1881, s. 18.

(*y*) *Treport's case*, 6 Rep. 15.

(*z*) See per *Willes*, C.J., *Parkhurst v. Smith*, *Willes*, 332; cited by *Alexander*, C.B., *Colmore v. Tyndall*, 2 Y. & J. 618; 31 R. R. 637; per *Ld. Brougham*, *Langston v. Langston*, 2 Cl. & F. 243; 37 R. R. 57; *Pannell v. Mill*, 3 C. B. 625, 637.

(*a*) *White v. Burnby*, 16 L. J.

In cases excluded from the operation of s. 3 of the Real Property Act, 1845 (*b*), the question whether a particular instrument should be construed as a lease or as an agreement for a lease must be answered by considering the intention of the parties, as collected from the instrument itself; and any words which suffice to explain the intent of the parties, that the one should divest himself of the possession, and the other come into it for such a determinate time, whether they run in the form of a licence, covenant, or agreement, will of themselves be held, in construction of law, to amount to a lease for years as effectually as if the most proper and pertinent words had been used for that purpose (*c*).

Instrument
of demise.

The rules applicable and cases decided with reference to the construction of covenants will also be found to furnish strong instances of the anxiety which our Courts evince to effectuate the *real intention* (*d*) of the parties to a deed or agreement (*e*); for it is not necessary, in order to charge a party with a covenant, that there should be express words of covenant or agreement, but it is enough if the intention of the parties to create a covenant be apparent (*f*). Where,

Construction
of covenants.

Q. B. 156; *secus* as to mere surplusage, see *post*.

(*b*) 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106. See *Rollason v. Leon*, 7 H. & N. 73; *Tidey v. Mollett*, 16 C. B. N. S. 298. See also *Burton v. Reevel*, 16 M. & W. 307; *Bond v. Rosling*, 1 B. & S. 371.

(*c*) Bac. Abr. "Leases" (K.); and 2 Shep. Touch., by Preston, 272; cited Judgm., *Doe v. Day*, 2 Q. B. 152 *et seq.*; *Alderman v. Neate*, 4 M. & W. 704.

(*d*) Such intention may however be frustrated by the operation of a positive and technical rule of law. "A technical rule is one which is established by authority and precedent, which does not depend upon

reasoning or argument, but is a fixed established rule to be acted upon, and only discussed as regards its application—in truth is the law." Such a rule is that where a deed is made *inter partes*—no one who is not expressed to be a party can sue upon a covenant contained in it; *Chesterfield Co. v. Hawkins*, 3 H. & C. 677, 691, cited in *Gurrien v. Kopera*, Id. 699.

(*e*) See *Doe v. Price*, 8 C. B. 894.

(*f*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., *Courtney v. Taylor*, 7 Scott, N. R. 765; *Wood v. Copper-miners' Co.*, 7 C. B. 906; *per* Parke, B., *Rigby v. G. W. R. Co.*, 14 M. & W. 815; and *James v. Cochrane*, 7 Exch. 177; S. C., 8 Id. 556; *Farrall v. Hilditch*, 5 C. B.

therefore, words of recital (*g*) or reference manifest a clear intention that the parties shall do certain acts, the Courts will, from these words, infer a covenant to do such acts, and will sustain actions of covenant for their non-performance as effectually as if the instruments had contained expressed covenants to perform them (*h*). In brief, "no particular form of words is necessary to form a covenant; but whenever the Court can collect from the instrument an engagement on the one side to do or not to do something, it amounts to a covenant, whether it is in the recital or in any other part of the instrument" (*i*).

Joint or
several
covenant
or bond.

In like manner, where the language of a covenant is such that the covenant may be construed either as joint or as several, it shall be taken, at common law, to be joint or several, according to the interest of the covenantees. Where, however, the covenant is in its terms expressly and positively joint, it must be construed as a joint covenant in compliance with the declared intention of the parties (*k*).

Dependent or
independent
covenants.

In like manner, the rule has been established by a long series of decisions, that the question, whether covenants are

N. S. 840. See *Bealey v. Stuart*, 7 H. & N. 753, 759; *Re Haden*, [1898] 2 Ch. 220: 67 L. J. Ch. 423.

(*g*) See *Lay v. Mottram*, 19 C. B. N. S. 479.

(*h*) Judgm., *Aspdin v. Austin*, 5 Q. B. 683; cited *Dunn v. Sayles*, Id. 692; and *Churchward v. Reg.*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 191, 208, and *Rust v. Nottidge*, 1 E. & B. 104; *Williams v. Burrell*, 1 C. B. 429, where the distinction between express covenants and covenants in law is pointed out; *Per Crompton, J.*, 2 B. & S. 516.

(*i*) *Per Parke, B.*, *G. N. R. Co. v. Harrison*, 12 C. B. 609; Judgm., *Rashleigh v. S. E. R. Co.*, 10 C. B. 632, as to which case see *Knight v. Gravesend Waterworks Co.*, 2 H. &

N. 10, 11.

(*k*) *Bradburne v. Botfield*, 14 M. & W. 564, 572, *Sorsbie v. Park*, 12 M. & W. 146; *White v. Tyndall*, 13 A. C. 263; *Palmer v. Mallett*, 36 Ch. D. 411. See also *Haddon v. Ayres*, 1 E. & E. 118; *Pugh v. Stringfield*, 3 C. B. N. S. 2; *per Maule, J.*, *Beer v. Beer*, 12 C. B. 78; citing *Wetherell v. Langston*, 1 Exch. 634; *Hopkinson v. Lee*, 6 Q. B. 964; *Foley v. Addenbrooke*, 4 Q. B. 207; followed in *Thompson v. Hakewill*, 19 C. B. N. S. 713, 723; *Mills v. Ladbroke*, 7 Scott, N. R. 1005, 1023; *per Parke, B.*, *Wootton v. Steffenoni*, 12 M. & W. 134; *Harrold v. Whitaker*, 11 Q. B. 147, 163; *Wakefield v. Brown*, 9 Q. B. 209, followed in *Magnay v. Edwards*, 13 C. B. 479.

dependent or independent of each other, is to be determined by the intention of the parties as it appears on the face of the instrument, and by the application of common sense to each particular case: to the intention, when once discovered, all technical forms of expression must give away (*l*). Where, therefore, a question arose whether certain covenants in marriage articles were dependent or not, Lord Cottenham observed: "If the provisions are clearly expressed, and there is nothing to enable the Court to put upon them a construction different from that which the words import, no doubt the words must prevail: but if the provisions and expressions be contradictory, and if there be grounds appearing upon the face of the instrument, affording proof of the real intention of the parties, then that intention will prevail against the obvious and ordinary meaning of the words. If the parties have themselves furnished a key to the meaning of the words used, it is not material by what expression they convey their intention" (*m*).

The notes to *Pordage v. Cole* (*n*) may usefully be referred to when construing a particular clause in a contract for the purpose of ascertaining whether the breach of that part of the contract entitles the other contracting party to put an end to it, or whether it only entitles him to damages. If the clause or stipulation goes to the root of the contract

(*l*) Judgm., *Stavers v. Curling*, 3 Bing. N. C. 368; *Baylis v. Le Gros*, 4 C. B. N. S. 537; *London Gas Light Co. v. Chelsea Vestry*, 8 Id. 215; *Sibthorp v. Brunel*, 3 Exch. 826, 828; *Hemans v. Picciotto*, 1 C. B. N. S. 646. See *Mackintosh v. Midl. Counties R. Co.*, 14 M. & W. 548.

The answer to the question, what is or what is not a condition precedent, depends not on merely technical words but on the plain intention of the parties to be deduced from the whole instrument; *Roberts v.*

Brett, 11 H. L. Cas. 337, 354.

(*m*) *Lloyd v. Lloyd*, 2 My. & Cr. 202.

(*n*) 1 Wms. Saund. 548; *Jonasohn v. Young*, 4 B. & S. 296. In the notes to *Pordage v. Cole* are specified various cases in which Courts have done great violence to the strict letter of covenants for the purpose of carrying into effect what was considered to be the real intention of the parties. See *Marsden v. Moore*, 4 H. & N. 504, where *Pordage v. Cole* is cited and distinguished.

between the parties, the contract may be determined; if it goes only to part of the consideration on both sides, the sole remedy is by way of damages.

General rule
as to con-
struing an
agreement.

The same sense, we may in the next place observe, is to be put upon the words of a contract in an instrument under seal as would be put upon the same words in an instrument not under seal: that is to say, the same intention must be collected from the same words, whether the particular contract in which they occur be special or not (o).

In the case, then, of a contract or agreement, whether by deed or parol, the Courts are bound so to construe it, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*—that it may be made to operate rather than be inefficient; and, in order to effect this, the words used shall have a reasonable intendment and construction (p). Thus, where A. guaranteed to B. the payment of all bills of exchange drawn by B. on C. and accepted by C., and the payment of any balance that might be due from C. to B., the Court decided that the guarantee extended to future as well as past transactions, for if the words “might be due” were to be limited to past transactions the guarantee would be void for want of consideration, but every document ought to be construed, if possible, so as to make it operative. It should be noticed with reference to this case that Bramwell, B., differed from the majority of the Court upon the ground that the words *primâ facie* referred to past transactions, and that the maxim is inapplicable where there are extrinsic circumstances in relation to which the words used are in their primary sense intelligible (q). Words of art, which, in the understanding of conveyancers, have a peculiar technical meaning, shall not be scanned and construed with a conveyancer’s acuteness, if, by so doing, one part of the instrument is made inconsistent with

(o) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, 13 Max., 9th ed., p. 50.
East, 74.

(q) *Broom v. Batchelor*, 1 H. & N.

(p) Com. Dig. “*Pleader*” (C. 25); 255.
Bac., Works, vol. 4, p. 25; Noy,

another, and the whole is incongruous and unintelligible; but the Court will understand the words used in their popular sense, and will interpret the language of the parties *secundum subjectam materiem*, referring particular expressions to the particular subject-matter of the agreement, so that full and complete force may be given to the whole (r).

Whether, for example, a particular clause in a charter-party shall be held to be a condition, upon the non-performance of which by the one party the other is at liberty to abandon the contract, and consider it at an end,—or whether it amounts to an agreement only, the breach whereof is to be recompensed by an action for damages,—must depend, in each particular case, upon the intention of the parties to be collected from the terms of the agreement itself, and from the subject-matter to which it relates; it cannot depend on any formal arrangement of the words, but on the reason and sense of the thing, as it is to be collected from the whole contract (s). In such a case, therefore, the rule applies, *in conventionibus contrahentium voluntas potius quam verba spectari placuit* (t): in contracts and agreements the intention of the parties, rather than the words actually used, should be considered (u).

(r) *Hallewall v. Morrell*, 1 Scott, N. R. 309; *per Cur.*, *Hill v. Grange*, Plowd. 164, 170; cited Arg., 2 Q. B. 509; *per Willes, C.J.*, Willes, 332; *Heseltine v. Siggers*, 1 Exch. 856. If an instrument is capable of two constructions, that one shall be preferred which will make the instrument operate rightfully; *Faussett v. Carpenter*, 2 Dow. & Cl. 232; 35 R. R. 17.

As to construing an award, see *Law v. Blackburn*, 14 C. B. 77; *Mays v. Cannell*, 15 C. B. 107, and cases there cited.

(s) *Bentsen v. Taylor*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 274; 63 L. J. Q. B. 15; *Behn*

v. Burness, 32 L. J. Q. B. 204, 3 B. & S. 751; and see *Glaholm v. Hays*, 2 Scott, N. R. 482; *Ollive v. Booker*, 1 Exch. 416, 423; *Seeger v. Duthie*, 8 C. B. N. S. 45; *Oliver v. Fielden*, 4 Exch. 135, 138; and *Crookewit v. Fletcher*, 1 H. & N. 911; *Gattorno v. Adams*, 12 C. B. N. S. 560; *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Ritchie v. Atkinson*, 10 East, 306; Judgm., *Furze v. Sharwood*, 2 Q. B. 415. See *White v. Beeton*, 7 H. & N. 42.

(t) 17 Johns. (U.S.) R. 150, and cases there cited.

(u) *Dimech v. Corlett*, 12 Moo. P. C. 199, 228.

Meaning of words.

Subject, however, to the preceding remarks, Courts will apply the ordinary rules of construction in interpreting instruments, and will construe words according to their strict and primary acceptation, unless, from the immediate context or from the intention of the parties apparent on the face of the instrument, the words appear to have been used in a different sense, or unless, in their strict sense, they are incapable of being carried into effect. It must, moreover, be observed that the meaning of a particular word may be shown by parol evidence to be different in some specified place, trade, or business, from its proper and ordinary acceptation (*x*).

Patents, construction of.

With respect to patents, it was long ago observed by Lord Eldon, that they are to be considered as bargains between the inventor and the public, to be judged of on the principles of good faith, by making a fair disclosure of the invention, and to be construed as other bargains (*y*). Moreover, although formerly there seems to have been a practice, with both judges and juries, to destroy the patent right even of beneficial patents, by exercising great astuteness in taking objections as to the title of the patent, and particularly as to the specification, whereby many valuable patent rights were destroyed; yet, more recently, the Courts have not been so strict in taking objections to the specification, but have rather endeavoured to deal fairly both with the patentee and the public, willing to give to the patentee, on his part, the reward of a valuable patent, but taking care to secure to the public, on the other hand, the benefit of the proviso, requiring a specification, which is introduced into the patent for their advantage, so that the right to the patent may be fairly and properly expressed in the

(*x*) See *per* Pollock, C.B., *Mallan v. May*, 13 M. & W. 511; *Lewis v. Marshall*, 8 Scott, N. R. 477, 494; *per* Parke, B., *Clift v. Schwabe*, 3 C. B. 469, 470; *per* Ld. Cranworth, C., 6 H. L. Cas. 78; *post*, Chap. X.

(*y*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Neilson v. Harford*, Webs. Pat. Cas. 341; Norman on Patents, 78, 79. The mode of construing a patent as between the patentee and the Crown will be stated hereafter.

specification (z). Accordingly, in construing a specification, the whole instrument must be taken together, and a fair and reasonable interpretation be given to the words used (a) ; the words being construed according to their ordinary and proper meaning, unless there be something in the context to give them a different meaning, or unless the facts properly in evidence, and with reference to which the patent must be construed, show that a different interpretation ought to be made (b). It has been laid down that the test of the sufficiency of a specification is whether it would enable an ordinary workman, exercising the actual knowledge common to the trade, to make the machine (c). Where evidence was tendered of the various patents in existence at the time when the patent in question was granted, for the purpose of so construing the specification as to exclude from its operation prior patents, and thereby to make it valid : it was held that such evidence could not be used for that purpose, although it was admissible to explain words of art to be found in the specification, and that words used in a patent must be construed, like the words of any other instrument, in their natural sense, regard being had to the fact that the document is not addressed to the world at large, but to a particular class possessing a certain amount of knowledge on the subject (d).

Extrinsic evidence to explain specification.

The following remarks of Lord Ellenborough, with Policy of insurance.

(z) *Per Parke, B., Neilson's Patent*, Webs. Pat. Cas. 310 ; *per Alderson, B., Morgan v. Seaward*, Id. 173, who observed : " It is the duty of a party who takes out a patent to specify what his invention really is ; and although it is the bounden duty of a jury to protect him in the fair exercise of his patent right, it is of great importance to the public, and by law it is absolutely necessary, that the patentee should state in his specification, not only the nature of his invention, but how that in-

vention may be carried into effect."

(a) *Beard v. Egerton*, 8 C. B. 165.

(b) *Judgm., Elliott v. Turner*, 2 C. B. 446, 461. As to construing a specification which contains terms of art, see *Betts v. Menzies*, 10 H. L. Cas. 117.

(c) *Plimpton v. Malcolmson*, 3 Ch. D. 531 ; 45 L. J. Ch. 505 ; *Morgan v. Seaward*, 1 Webs. P. R. 174 ; see also *Wegmann v. Corcoran*, 13 Ch. D. 65.

(d) *Clark v. Adie*, 2 App. Cas. 423 ; 46 L. J. Ch. 585, 598.

reference to a policy of insurance, here also occur to mind as generally applicable. "The same rule of construction," said that learned Judge, "which applies to all other instruments, applies equally to this instrument of a policy of insurance, viz., that it is to be construed according to its sense and meaning, as collected, in the first place, from the terms used in it, which terms are themselves to be understood in their plain, ordinary, and popular sense, unless they have generally in respect to the subject-matter, —as by the known usage of trade, or the like,—acquired a peculiar sense distinct from the popular sense of the same words, or unless the context evidently points out that they must, in the particular instance, and in order to effectuate the immediate intention of the parties to that contract, be understood in some other special and peculiar sense" (e). And again, "the contract of insurance," it has been said, "though a mercantile instrument, is to be construed according to the same rules as all other written contracts, namely, the intention of the parties, which is to be gathered from the words of the instrument, interpreted together with the surrounding circumstances. If the words of the instrument are clear in themselves, the instrument must be construed accordingly, but if they are susceptible of more meanings than one, then the judge must inform himself by the aid of the jury and the surrounding circumstances which bear on the contract" (f).

Rules to
observed in
construing a
will.

In construing a will, it has been said, that the intention of the testator is the polar star by which the Court should be guided, provided no rule of law is thereby infringed (g).

(e) *Robertson v. French*, 4 East, 135, 136; 7 R. R. 535; cited by Ld. Tenterden, *Hunter v. Leathley*, 10 B. & C. 871; by Bowen, L.J., *Hart v. Standard Mar. Ins. Co.*, 22 Q. B. D. 501.

(f) *Per Erle, C.J., Carr v. Montefiore*, 5 B. & S. 428.

(g) *Per Ld. Kenyon, Watson v. Foxon*, 2 East, 42; *per Willes, C.J., Doe v. Underdown*, Willes, 296; *per Buller, J., Smith v. Coffin*, 2 H. Bl. 450; 3 R. R. 435; cases cited, *Arg., Ley v. Ley*, 3 Scott, N. R. 168; *Doe v. Davies*, 4 M. & W. 599, 607; *Doe v. Permeuwen*, 11 A. & E. 131; *per*

"It is the duty of those who have to expound a will, if they can, *ex fumo dare lucem*" (h). In other words, the first thing for consideration always is, what was the testator's intention at the time he made the will; and then the law carries that intention into effect as nearly as it can, according to certain settled technical rules (i).

"Touching the general rules to be observed for the true construction of wills," said Dodderidge, J.,—"in testamentis plenius testatoris intentionem scrutamur. But yet this is to be observed with these two limitations: 1st, his intent ought to be agreeable to the rules of law: 2ndly, his intent ought to be collected out of the words of the will. As to this it may be demanded, how shall this be known? To this it may be thus answered: first, to search out what was the scope of his will; secondly, to make such a construction, so that all the words of the will may stand; for to add anything to the words of the will, or, in the construction made, to relinquish and leave out any of the words, is *maledicta glossa*. But every string ought to give its sound" (k).

In a case involving important interests (l), the following were laid down as the leading and fundamental rules for construing a will. In the first place, "while the intention of the testator ought to be our only guide to the interpretation of his will; yet it must be his intention as collected from the words employed by himself in his will (m); no

Parke, B., *Grover v. Burningham*, 5 Exch. 191; *Martin v. Lee*, 14 Moo. P. C. 142.

(h) *De Beauvoir v. De Beauvoir*, 15 L. J. Ch. 308; S. C., 15 Sim. 163; 3 H. L. Cas. 524.

(i) Judgm., *Doe v. Roach*, 5 M. & S. 490; *Hodgson v. Ambrose*, Dougl. 341; *Festing v. Allen*, 12 M. & W. 279; *Alexander v. Alexander*, 16 C. B. 59; *Doe v. Hopkinson*, 5 Q. B. 223; *Doe v. Glover*, 1 C. B. 459.

"The general rule in interpreting

a will and codicil is that the whole of the will takes effect, except in so far as it is inconsistent with the codicil;" *Robertson v. Powell*, 2 H. & C. 766—767; citing *Doe v. Hicks*, 1 Cl. & F. 20; 36 R. R. 1; *Richardson v. Power*, 19 C. B. N. S. 799.

(k) *Blamford v. Blamford*, 3 Bulst. 103. See *Parker v. Tootal*, 11 H. L. Cas. 143.

(l) *Earl of Scarborough v. Doe*, 3 A. & E. 962; cited 8 M. & W. 200.

(m) In *Doe v. Garlick*, 14 M. & W.

surmise or conjecture of any object which the testator may be supposed to have had in view can be allowed to have any weight in the construction of his will, unless such object can be collected from the plain language of the will itself."

With the rule thus stated, we may compare the language of Lord Cottenham, in *Earl of Hardwicke v. Douglas* (n). "It is not, according to my impression of the rule upon which the Courts have acted, consistent with the principles of construction to set aside the effect of clear and unambiguous words because there is reason to suppose that they do not produce the effect which the testator intended they should produce. If there be any ambiguity, then of course it is the duty of all Courts to put that construction upon the words which seems best to carry the intention into effect; but if there be no ambiguity, however unfortunate it may be that the intention of the testator shall fail, there is no right in any Court of justice to say those words shall not have their plain and unambiguous meaning."

In the second place, it is a necessary rule, in investigating the intention of a testator, not only that the words of the will alone should be regarded in order to determine the effect of the devise, but that the legal consequences which may follow from the nature and qualities of the estate, when once collected from the words of the will itself, should be altogether disregarded (o). Thus, in determining whether

701, Parke, B., observed that difficulties have arisen from confounding the testator's *intention* with his *meaning*. "*Intention* may mean what the testator intended to have done, whereas the only question in the construction of wills is on the *meaning of the words*." In *Grover v. Burningham*, 5 Exch. 194, Rolfe, B., also observed, "We are to ascertain by construing the will *non quod*

voluit sed quod dixit, or rather we are to ascertain *quod voluit* by interpreting *quod dixit*." And see, *per* Ld. Wensleydale, *Grey v. Pearson*, 6 H. L. Cas. 106; *Slingsby v. Grainger*, 7 Id. 284.

(n) 7 Clark & F. 795, 815. See also *Quicke v. Leach*, 13 M. & W. 218.

(o) 3 A. & E. 963. At the same time the circumstance, that the

the testator's intention was to devise an estate tail or only an estate for life, it is not a sound mode of reasoning to import into the consideration of the question, that, if the estate is held to be an estate tail, the devisee will have power to defeat the testator's intention by barring the entail; for the Court will not assume that the testator was ignorant of the legal consequence of the disposition which he has made (*p*). A person ought to direct his meaning according to the law, and not seek to mould the law according to his meaning; for, if a man were assured, that, whatever words he used, his meaning only would be considered, he would be very careless about his choice of words, and the attempt to explain his meaning in each case would give rise to infinite confusion (*q*).

Hence, although it is the duty of the Court to ascertain and carry into effect the intention of the party, yet there are, in many cases, fixed and settled rules by which that intention is determined; and to such rules wise judges have thought proper to adhere, in opposition to their own private opinions as to the party's probable intention (*r*). The object, indeed, of all such technical rules is to create certainty, and to prevent litigation, by enabling persons who are conversant with these subjects to give correct advice, which would be impossible if the law were uncertain and liable to fluctuation in each particular case (*s*).

In accordance with the above remarks, Parke, B., in an important case respecting the rule against perpetuities, said:—"We must first ascertain the intention of the testator,

Rule against perpetuities.

language if strictly construed will lead to a consequence inconsistent with the presumable intention, is not to be left out of view, especially if other considerations lead to the same result; *Quicke v. Leach*, 13 M. & W. 228.

(*p*) 3 A. & E. 963, 964; *per*

Parke, B., *Morrice v. Langham*, 8 M. & W. 207.

(*q*) Plowd. 162.

(*r*) See *per* Alexander, C.B., 6 Bing. 478; *Judgm.*, 2 Phill. 68.

(*s*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *Doe v. Garlick*, 14 M. & W. 707.

or more properly the meaning of his words, in the clause under consideration, and then endeavour to give effect to them so far as the rules of law will permit. Our first duty is to construe the will, and this we must do exactly in the same way as if the rule against perpetuity had never been established, or were repealed when the will was made, not varying the construction in order to avoid the effect of that rule, but interpreting the words of the testator wholly without reference to it" (t). The rule in *Shelley's case* (u)—by which, where an estate of freehold is limited to a person, and the same instrument contains a limitation, either mediate or immediate, to his heirs in fee or in tail, the word "heirs" is construed as a word of limitation—is a familiar instance of an arbitrary and technical rule of construction, the authority of which is acknowledged by the Courts, although its application may tend to defeat the intention of the testator.

Rule in
Shelley's case.

Construction
of power.

So, in construing a power to lease contained in a will, it "becomes necessary to look to the language of the testator in the creation of the power itself, and to ascertain his intention by considering the true meaning of the language which he has used, giving to it its natural signification according to the ordinary rules of interpretation; giving effect, if possible, to every part of the clause; and if any part of it be ambiguous, interpreting it by reference to the context, to the general intent of the will, and, if necessary, to the surrounding circumstances" (x).

Not only are there fixed and established rules by which

(t) *Per Parke, B., Ld. Dungannon v. Smith*, 12 Cl. & F. 599 (distinguished in *Christie v. Gosling*, L. R. 1 H. L. 279); *per Ld. Macnaghten, Edwards v. Edwards*, [1909] A. C. 275; 78 L. J. Ch. 504.

(u) 1 Rep. 104 a; see *Van Grutten v. Foxwell*, [1897] A. C. 658; 66 L. J. Q. B. 745.

(x) *Jegon v. Vivian*, L. R. 2 C. P.

427; L. R. 3 H. L. 285.

"Facts extrinsic to the will must be ascertained for the Court in the usual manner, either by admission of the parties or by a jury. When they have been ascertained, the operation of construction is to be performed by the Court." *Webber v. Stanley*, 16 C. B. N. S. 752.

the Courts will, in certain cases, be guided in determining the legal effect of a will, but there are likewise certain technical expressions, the established legal interpretation of which differs from the meaning attributed to them in popular language; and, consequently, a will in which such expressions occur may, in some cases, be made to operate in a manner different from that contemplated by the testator (*y*): the duty of the Court being to give effect to *all* the words of the will, if that can be done without violating any part of it, and also to construe technical words in their proper sense, where they can be so understood consistently with the context (*z*).

Technical expressions.

The following observations of V.-C. Knight Bruce, although they refer to the particular circumstances of the case immediately under his consideration, show clearly the general principles which guide the Court in assigning a meaning to technical expressions. "Both reason and authority, I apprehend," said the learned Judge, "support the proposition that the defendants are entitled to ask the Court to read and consider the whole of the instrument in which the clause stands; and, in reading and considering it, to bear in mind the state of the testator's family, as at the time when he made the codicil he knew it to be; and if

(*y*) See 2 Powell on Devises, by Jarman, 3rd. ed. 564 *et seq.*; *Doe v. Simpson*, 3 Scott, N. R. 774; cited by Byles, J., *Richards v. Davies*, 13 C. B. N. S. 87, and distinguished in *Harcastle v. Dennison*, 10 Id. 606.

(*z*) *Doe v. Walker*, 2 Scott, N. R. 334; *Towns v. Wentworth*, 11 Moo. P. C. 526, 543; *per* Martin, B., *Biddulph v. Lees*, E. B. & E. 317; *per* Alderson, B., *Lees v. Mosley*, 1 Y. & Coll. 589; cited Arg., *Greenwood v. Rothwell*, 6 Scott, N. R. 672. See, also, Arg., *Festing v. Allen*, 12 M. & W. 286; *Jack v. M'Intyre*, 12 Cl. & F. 158; *Jenkins v. Hughes*, 8 H. L. Cas. 571.

Where the testator appears to have been very illiterate, "the rules of grammar and the usual meaning of technical language may be disregarded in construing his will;" *per* Ld. Campbell, *Hall v. Warren*, 9 H. L. Cas. 427.

Generally, as to the duty of the Court in construing a will containing technical words, see, further, *per* Ld. Westbury, *Young v. Robertson*, 4 Macq. Sc. A. C. 325; distinguished in *Richardson v. Power*, 19 C. B. N. S. 798; *Ralston v. Hamilton*, 4 Macq. Sc. A. C. 397; *Jenkins v. Hughes*, 8 H. L. Cas. 571.

the result of so reading and considering the whole document with that recollection is to convince the Court, from its contents, that the testator intended to use the words in their ordinary and popular sense, and not in their legal and technical sense, as distinguishable from their ordinary and popular sense, to give effect to that conviction by deciding accordingly" (a).

"Children." The following instance may serve to illustrate the above remarks (b):—The term "children" in a will *primâ facie* means, in accordance with its strict technical sense in law, legitimate children, and, if there is nothing more in the will, the fact that the person whose children are referred to has illegitimate children does not entitle the illegitimate children to take. But there are two classes of cases in which the above interpretation is departed from. One is where it is impossible, from the circumstances of the parties, that any legitimate children could take under the bequest; for instance, if the bequest be to the children of a deceased person who has left none but illegitimate children, the maxim *ut res magis valeat* is applied. The other is where upon the face of the will itself, and upon a just construction of the words used in it, there is an expression of the testator's intention to use the term "children" according to a meaning which will apply to and include illegitimate children (c).

In like manner, where a bequest is made to the "children" or "issue" of A., the whole context of the will must be considered, in order to ascertain the proper effect to be attributed to the word "children" or "issue." It may be, that the word "children" must be enlarged and construed to mean "issue" generally, or the word "issue" restricted so as to mean "children," and each case must depend on the peculiar expressions used, and the structure of the

(a) *Early v. Benbow*, 2 Coll. 353.

Ld. Rendlesham, 7 Id. 429.

(b) As to the meaning of "unmarried," see *Clarke v. Colls*, 9 H. L. Cas. 601,—of "eldest male lineal descendant," *Thellusson v.*

(c) *Per* Ld. Cairns, *Hill v. Crook*, L. R. 6 H. L. 265, 282; see cases collected in *Re Deakin*, [1894] 3 Ch. 565: 63 L. J. Ch. 779.

sentences (*d*). When, however, the context is doubtful, the Court, so far as it can, will prefer that construction which will most benefit the testator's family generally, on the supposition that such a construction must most nearly correspond with his intention (*e*).

Lastly, in determining whether an estate-tail or only a life estate passes under the words of a will, the same general rule of interpretation above considered is applicable, and has thus been forcibly stated by Lord Brougham: "I take the principle of construction, as consonant to reason and established by authority, to be this—that, where by plain words, in themselves liable to no doubt, an estate-tail is given, you are not to allow such estate to be altered and cut down to a life estate, unless there are other words which plainly show the testator to have used the former as words of purchase contrary to their natural and ordinary sense, or unless in the rest of the provisions there be some plain indication of a general intent inconsistent with an estate-tail being given by the words in question, and which general intent can only be fulfilled by sacrificing the particular provisions, and regarding the expressions as words of purchase. Thus, if there is a gift first to A. and the heirs of his body, and then, in continuation, the testator, referring to what he had said, plainly tells us, that he used the words, 'heirs of the body' to denote A.'s first and other sons, then, clearly, the first taker would only take a life estate. . . . So, again, if a limitation is made afterwards, and is clearly the main object of the will, which never can take effect unless an estate for life be given

(*d*) Where in a devise there is a gift over on general failure of "issue," the word "issue" means "heirs of the body," unless from the context it clearly appear that the testator intended to give it a different meaning; *Roddy v. Fitzgerald*, 6 H. L. Cas. 823; *Bowen v. Lewis*, 9 App. Cas. 890. See *Bradley*

v. Cartwright, L. R. 2 C. P. 511; *Eastwood v. Avison*, L. R. 4 Ex. 141; *per* Ld. Chelmsford, *Williams v. Lewis*, 6 H. L. Cas. 1021.

(*e*) *Per* Ld. Langdale, *Farrant v. Nichols*, 9 Beav. 329, 330; *Slater v. Dangerfield*, 15 M. & W. 263; *Richards v. Davies*, 13 C. B. N. S. 69.

instead of an estate-tail: here, again, the first words become qualified, and bend to the general intent of the testator, and are no longer regarded as words of limitation, which, if standing by themselves, they would have been" (f).

To the general maxims of construction applicable to wills, viz., *Benigne faciendæ sunt interpretationes et verba intentioni debent inservire*, the doctrine of cy-près is referable (g). According to this doctrine (which proceeds upon the principle of carrying into effect as far and as nearly as possible the intention of the testator), if there be a general and also a particular intention apparent on the will, and the particular intention cannot take effect, the words shall be so construed as to give effect to the general intention (h). Thus, where lands were devised to the second son of W. (who at the testator's death had no son), for such son's life, and after his death, or in case he should inherit his paternal estate by the death of his elder brother, then to his second son and his heirs male; with remainder to the third and other sons of W. successively in tail male: it was held, that the lands vested in the second son of W. (when born) by executory devise for an estate in tail male, determinable on the accession of the paternal estate (i). So, in the case of a condition precedent annexed to a legacy, with which a literal compliance becomes impossible from unavoidable circumstances, and without any default of the legatee; or where a bequest is made for charitable purposes, with which a literal compliance becomes inexpedient or impracticable; in such cases a court of equity will apply the doctrine of cy-près, and will endeavour substantially,

(f) *Fetherston v. Fetherston*, 3 Cl. & F. 75, 76; per Ld. Brougham, *Thornhill v. Hall*, 2 Id. 36; 37 R. R. 1.

(g) See per Ld. St. Leonards, *East v. Twyford*, 4 H. L. Cas. 556.

(h) Per Buller, J., *Robinson v. Hardcastle*, 2 T. R. 254; 1 R. R. 467; Shep. Touch. 87. The rule

as to cy-près is stated by Ld. St. Leonards, *Monypenny v. Dering*, 2 De G. M. & G. 173. See, per Ld. Kenyon, *Brudenell v. Elwes*, 1 East, 451; 6 R. R. 310.

(i) *Nicholl v. Nicholl*, 2 W. Bl. 1159. See, however, *Monypenny v. Dering*, 16 M. & W. 418; 2 M. & Gr. 145.

and as nearly as possible, to carry into effect the intention of the testator (*k*).

It is to be observed that the doctrine of *cy-près* does not apply to limitations of personal estate, nor of a mixed fund (*l*). It is also inapplicable where an attempt is made to limit a succession of life estates to the issue of an unborn person either for a definite or indefinite series of generations; and also where the limitation to the children of the unborn person gives them an estate in fee simple (*m*).

Cy-près when inapplicable.

The remarks above made, and authorities referred to, serve to give a general view of the mode of applying to the interpretation of wills those comprehensive maxims which we have been endeavouring to illustrate and explain, and which are, indeed, comprised in the well-known saying: *ultima voluntas testatoris est perimplenda secundum veram intentionem suam* (*n*).

Summary of preceding remarks.

We shall, therefore, sum up this part of our subject with observing that the only safe course to pursue in construing a will is to look carefully for the testator's intention as it is to be derived from the words used by him within the whole of the will, regardless alike of any general surmise or conjecture from without the will, as of any legal consequences annexed to the estate itself, when such estate is discovered within the will (*o*); bearing in mind, however, that where technical rules have become established, such rules must be followed, although opposed to the testator's presumable and probable intention—that where technical expressions occur they must receive their legal meaning, unless, from a perusal of the entire instrument, it be evident that the

(*k*) 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 12th ed. 1169—1180, where this doctrine is considered; 1 Jarm. Wills, 5th ed. 204; *Ironmongers Co. v. A.-G.*, 10 Cl. & F. 908; *Mills v. Farmer*, 19 Ves. 483; 13 R. R. 247; *Re White*, [1893] 2 Ch. 41. The entire doctrine of equity with regard to trusts, and especially trusts raised by precatory

words, will occur to the reader as fraught with illustrations of the maxims commented on in the text.

(*l*) *Boughton v. James*, 1 Coll. 44; 1 H. L. Cas. 406.

(*m*) 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 271.

(*n*) Co. Litt. 322 b.

(*o*) Judgm., 3 A. & E. 964.

testator employed them in their popular signification—that words which have no technical meaning shall be understood in their usual and ordinary sense, if the context do not manifestly point to any other (*p*)—that where the particular intention of the testator cannot literally be performed, effect may, in some cases, be given to the general intention, in order that his wishes may be carried out as nearly as possible, and *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*; and lastly, that where, by acting on one interpretation of the words used, it would make the testator act capriciously without any intelligible motive, contrary to the ordinary mode in which men generally act in similar cases, then, if the language admits of two constructions, that construction may properly be adopted which avoids those anomalies, even though that construction be not the most obvious or the most grammatically accurate. But if the words used are unambiguous, they cannot be departed from merely because they lead to consequences which may be considered capricious or even harsh and unreasonable (*q*).

Analogous principles of the Roman law.

It may not be uninteresting further to remark, that the rules laid down in the Roman law upon the subject under consideration, are almost identical with those above stated, as recognised by our own jurists at the present day. Where, for instance, ambiguous expressions occurred, the rule was, that the intention of him who used them should especially be regarded: *in ambiguis orationibus maxime sententia spectanda est ejus qui eas protulisset* (*r*), a rule which we learn was confined to the interpretation of wills wherein one person only speaks, and was not applicable to agreements generally, in which the intention of both the

(*p*) The question as to what will pass under the word "portrait" in a will is elaborately discussed, *Duke of Leeds v. Earl Amherst*, 9 Jur. 359; S. C., 13 Sim. 459.

(*q*) *Abbott v. Middleton*, 7 H. L. Cas. 89; *Bathurst v. Errington*, 4 Ch. D. 251; 2 App. Cas. 698; 46 L. J. Ch. 748.

(*r*) D. 50, 17, 96.

contracting parties was necessarily to be considered (s), and accordingly in another passage in the Digest, we find the same rule so expressly qualified : *cum in testamento ambigue aut etiam perperam scriptum est benigne interpretari et secundum id quod credibile est cogitatum credendum est* (t) : where an ambiguous, or even an erroneous expression occurs in a will, it should be construed liberally, and in accordance with the testator's probable meaning. In like manner we find it stated that a departure from the literal meaning of the words used is not justifiable, unless it be clear that the testator himself intended something different therefrom : *non alitur a significatione verborum recedi oportet quam cum manifestum est aliud sensisse testatorem* (u) ; and, lastly, we find the general principle of interpretation to which we have already adverted thus concisely worded : *in testamentis plenius voluntates testantium interpretantur* (x), that is to say, a will shall receive a more liberal construction than its strict meaning, if alone considered, would permit (y).

The construction of a statute, like the operation of a devise, depends upon the apparent intention of the maker, to be collected either from the particular provision or the general context, though not from any general inferences drawn merely from the nature of the objects dealt with by the statute (z). Acts of Parliament and wills alike ought to be construed according to the intention of the parties who made them (a) ; and the preceding remarks as to the

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of statutes.

(s) Wood, Inst. 107.

(t) D. 34, 5, 24 ; see Brisson. ad. verb. "*Perperam*"; Pothier ad Pand. (ed. 1819), vol. 3, p. 46, where examples of this rule are collected.

(u) D. 32, 69 pr. ; applied by Knight Bruce, L.J., 2 De G. M. & G. 313.

(x) D. 50, 17, 12.

(y) Cujac. *ad loc.*, cited 3 Pothier ad Pand. 46.

(z) *Fordyce v. Bridges*, 1 H. L.

L.M.

Cas. 1. Where a *casus omissus* occurred in a statute, the doctrine of *cy-près* was applied, *Smith v. Wedderburne*, 16 M. & W. 104. See *Salkeld v. Johnson*, 2 C. B. 757.

(a) It is said, that a will is to be favourably construed, because the testator is *inops consilii* : "This," observed Ld. Tenterden, "we cannot say of the legislature, but we may say that it is *magnas inter opes inops*," 9 B. & C. 752, 753.

See the remarks of Wood, V.-C.,

construction of deeds and wills will, therefore, generally hold good with reference to the construction of statutes, the great object being to discover the true intention of the legislature; and where that intention can be indubitably ascertained, the Courts are bound to give it effect, whatever may be their opinion of its wisdom or folly (*b*); "acting upon the rule as to giving effect to all the words of the statute, a rule universally applicable to all writings, and which ought not to be departed from, except upon very clear and strong grounds" (*c*).

"The general rule," as observed by Byles, J. (*d*), "for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that the words are to be read in their popular, natural, and ordinary sense, giving them a meaning to their full extent and capacity, unless there is reason upon their face to believe that they were not intended to bear that construction because of some inconvenience which could not have been absent from the mind of the framers of the Act, which must arise from the giving them such large sense."

And again—"In construing an Act of Parliament, when the intention of the legislature is not clear, we must adhere to the natural import of the words; but when it is clear what the legislature intended, we are bound to give effect to it notwithstanding some apparent deficiency in the language used" (*e*).

Hence, although the general proposition be undisputed

as to determining whether a mandatory enactment is to be considered directory only, or obligatory with an implied nullification for disobedience, *Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner*, 29 L. J. Ch. 827; S. C., 30 Id. 379, approved in *Ward v. Beck*, 13 C. B. N. S. 675-676.

(*b*) See the analogous remarks of Ld. Brougham, with reference more particularly to the common law, in *Reg. v. Millis*, 10 Cl. & F. 749; also,

per Vaughan, J., 9 A. & E. 980; Judgm., *Fellowes v. Clay*, 4 Q. B. 349; *per* Alexander, C.B., 2 Yo. & J. 215.

(*c*) Judgm., 8 Exch. 860.

(*d*) *Birks v. Allison*, 13 C. B. N. S. 23.

(*e*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *Huxham v. Wheeler*, 3 H. & C. 80. See also *Roths v. Kirkcaldy Commrs.*, 7 App. Cas. 702.

that "an affirmative statute giving a new right, does not of itself and of necessity destroy a previously existing right," it will nevertheless have such effect, "if the apparent intention of the legislature is that the two rights should not exist together" (f).

A remedial statute, therefore, shall be liberally construed, so as to include cases which are within the mischief which the statute was intended to remedy (g); whilst, on the other hand, where the intention of the legislature is doubtful, the inclination of the Court will always be against that construction which imposes a burthen (h), tax (i), or duty (k), on the subject. It has been designated as a "great rule" in the construction of fiscal law, "that they are not to be extended by any laboured construction, but that you must adhere to the strict rule of interpretation; and if a person who is subjected to a duty in a particular character or by virtue of a particular description no longer fills that character, or answers that description, the duty no longer

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of penal
statutes.

(f) *Per* Ld. Cranworth, *O'Flaherty v. M'Dowell*, 6 H. L. Cas. 157. See *Ex p. Warrington*, 3 De G. M. & G. 159; *New Windsor Corp. v. Taylor*, [1899] A. C. 41; 68 L. J. Q. B. 87.

(g) See *Twyne's case*, 3 Rep. 80.

(h) *Per* Ld. Brougham, *Stockton & Darlington R. Co. v. Barrett*, 11 Cl. & F. 607; *per* Parke, B., *Ryder v. Mills*, 3 Exch. 869, and *Wroughton v. Turtle*, 11 M. & W. 567. "All acts which restrain the common law ought themselves to be restrained by exposition:" *Ash v. Abdy*, 3 Swanst. 664. Mere permissive words shall not abridge a common law right; *Ex p. Clayton*, 1 Russ. & My. 372; *per* Erle, C.J., *Caswell v. Cook*, 11 C. B. N. S. 652. (i) *Per* Parke, B., *Re Micklethwait*, 11 Exch. 456, and *A.-G. v. Bradbury*, 7 Id. 116, citing *Denn v. Diamond*, 4 B. & C. 243; 28 R. R.

237; *Mayor of London v. Parkinson*, 10 C. B. 228; *Judgm., Vauxhall Bridge Co. v. Sawyer*, 6 Exch. 509.

(k) *Judgm., Marg. of Chandos v. Int. Rev. Commrs.*, 6 Exch. 479; *per* Wilde, C.J., 5 C. B. 135. See *per* Bramwell, B., *Foley v. Fletcher*, 3 H. & N. 781-782.

"Acts of Parliament, however, imposing stamp duties ought to be construed according to the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used:" *Judgm., Ld. Foley v. Int. Rev. Commrs.*, L. R. 3 Ex. 268.

If a statute imposing a toll contain also exemptions from it in favour of the crown and of the public, any clause so exempting from toll is "to have a fair, reasonable, and not strict construction;" *per* Byles, J., *Toomer v. Reeves*, L. R. 3 C. P. 66.

attaches upon him, and cannot be levied" (l). A penalty, moreover, must be imposed by clear words (m). The words of a penal statute (n) shall be restrained for the benefit of him against whom the penalty is inflicted, and the language of the statute must be strictly looked at in order to see whether the person against whom the penalty is sought to be enforced has committed an offence within it" (o).

"The principle," remarked Lord Abinger, "adopted by Lord Tenterden (p), that a penal law ought to be construed strictly, is not only a sound one, but the only one consistent with our free institutions. The interpretation of statutes has always in modern times been highly favourable to the personal liberty of the subject, and I hope will always remain so" (q).

This rule, however, which is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals, and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in the legislative and not in the judicial department, must not be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words in their ordinary

(l) *Per* Ld. Westbury, *Dickson v. Reg.*, 11 H. L. Cas. 184.

(m) *Per* Alderson, B., *Woolley v. Kay*, 1 H. & N. 309; *Judgm., Ryder v. Mills*, 3 Exch. 869 *et seq.*; *Coe v. Lawrance*, 1 E. & B. 516, 520; *Archer v. James*, 2 B. & S. 61, 103.

(n) In *A.-G. v. Sillem*, 2 H. & C. 431, the method of construing a penal statute was much considered, and there (Id. 530) Bramwell, B., said, "The law that governs this case is a written law, an Act of Parliament, which we must apply according to the true meaning of the words used in it. We must not extend it to anything not within the natural meaning of those words but within the mischief or sup-

posed mischief intended to be prevented, nor must we refuse to apply it to what is within that natural meaning, because not, or supposed not to be, within the mischief;" see also *per* Pollock, C.B., Id. 509. "I suppose 'within the equity' means the same thing as 'within the mischief' of the statute:" *per* Byles, J., *Shuttleworth v. Le Fleming*, 19 C. B. N. S. 703.

(o) *Per* Field, J., *Graff v. Evans*, 8 Q. B. D. 373; 51 L. J. M. C. 25.

(p) See *Proctor v. Mainwaring*, 3 B. & Ald. 145.

(q) *Henderson v. Sherborn*, 2 M. & W. 236; *Judgm., Fletcher v. Calthrop*, 6 Q. B. 887; cited and adopted, *Murray v. Reg.*, 7 Q. B. 707.

acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend (*r*).

We may add, in connection with this part of the subject, Preamble. that although the enacting words of a statute are not necessarily to be limited or controlled by the words of the preamble, but in many instances go beyond it, yet, on a sound construction of every Act of Parliament, the words in the enacting part must be confined to that which is the plain object and general intention of the legislature in passing the Act; and the preamble affords a good clue to discover what that object was (*s*). "The only rule," it has been said, "for the construction of Acts of Parliament is, that they should be construed according to the intent of the Parliament which passed the Act. If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound the words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention of the lawgiver. But if any doubt arises from the terms employed by the legislature, it has always been held a safe means of collecting the intention, to call in aid the ground and cause for making the statute, and to have recourse to the preamble, which, according to Chief Justice Dyer (*t*), is a 'key to open the minds of the makers of the Act, and the mischiefs which they intended to redress'" (*u*).

(*r*) See Judgm., *United States v. Wiltberger*, 5 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 95; *per* Pollock, C.B., 3 H. & N. 812.

(*s*) *Per* Ld. Tenterden, *Halton v. Cave*, 1 B. & Ad. 538; 25 R. R. 373; Judgm. *Salkeld v. Johnson*, 2 Exch. 283, and cases there cited; *per* Kelly, C.B., *Winn v. Mossman*, L. R. 4 Ex. 300; *Carr v. Royal Exchange Ass. Co.*, 1 B. & S. 956; *per* Maule, J., *Edwards v. Hodges*, 15 C. B. 484,

citing *Copeman v. Gallant*, 1 P. Wms. 314; *per* Coleridge, J., *Pocock v. Pickering*, 18 Q. B. 797, 798; Co. Litt. 79 a.; *per* Buller, J., *Crespigny v. Wittenoom*, 4 T. R. 793; and cases cited in *Whitmore v. Robertson*, 8 M. & W. 472; *Stockton & D. R. Co. v. Barrett*, 11 Cl. & F. 590.

(*t*) Plowd. 369.

(*u*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., delivering the opinion of the Judges in *The Sussex Peerage*, 11 Cl. & F. 143. See

Headings and
Recitals.

The heading of a portion of a statute may, it seems, be referred to to determine the sense of any doubtful expression in a section ranged under it (*x*); and a recital of an Act of Parliament, stating its object, has been held to limit general words in the enacting part to the object as declared in the recital (*y*).

The "golden
rule."

The golden rule for construing wills, statutes, and, in fact, all written instruments has been thus stated: "The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further" (*z*). The later part of "golden rule" must, however, be applied with much caution. "If," remarked Jervis, C.J., "the precise words used are plain and unambiguous in our judgment, we are bound to construe them in their ordinary sense, even though it lead, in our view of the case, to an absurdity or manifest injustice. Words may be modified or varied, where their import is doubtful or obscure. But we assume the functions of legislators when we depart from the ordinary meaning of the precise words used, merely because

also as to the office of the preamble, *per* Buller, J., *R. v. Robinson*, 2 East, P. C. 1113, cited *R. v. Johnson*, 29 St. Tr. 303.

Formerly the *title* of a statute was "no part of the law, and in strictness ought not to be taken into consideration at all;" *Salkeld v. Johnson*, 2 Exch. 283. See *per* Willes, J., *Claydon v. Green*, L. R. 3 C. P. 522. But it seems that it is now part of the Act; *Fielding v. Morley*, [1899] 1 Ch. 1: 67 L. J. Ch. 611.

The marginal note to a section in the copy printed by the King's

printer forms no part of the statute itself, and does not hind as explaining or construing the section; *Claydon v. Green*, L. R. 3 C. P. 511, 522; followed in *Sutton v. Sutton*, 22 Ch. D. 521: 52 L. J. Ch. 334.

(*x*) *Hammersmith R. Co. v. Brand*, L. R. 4 H. L. Cas. 171. See *E. Counties R. Co. v. Marriage*, 9 H. L. Cas. 32.

(*y*) *Howard v. Earl of Shrewsbury*, L. R. 17 Eq. 378: 34 L. J. Ch. 495.

(*z*) *Grey v. Pearson*, 6 H. L. Cas. 61, 106; *Caledonian R. Co. v. N. British R. Co.*, 6 App. Cas. 114, 131.

we see, or fancy we see, an absurdity or manifest injustice from an adherence to their literal meaning" (a).

It may then safely be stated as an established rule of construction, that an Act of Parliament should be read according to the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words (b), unless, being so read, it would be absurd or inconsistent with the declared intention of the legislature, to be collected from the rest of the Act (c), or unless a uniform series of decisions has already established a particular construction (d), or unless terms of art are used which have a fixed technical signification: as, for instance, the expression "heirs of the body," which conveys to lawyers a precise idea, as comprising in a legal sense only certain lineal descendants; and this expression shall, therefore, be construed according to its known meaning (e).

Meaning of words.

It is also a rule of the civil law adopted by Lord Bacon, which was evidently dictated by common sense, and is in accordance with the spirit of the maxim which we have been considering, that, where obscurities, ambiguities, or faults of expression render the meaning of an enactment doubtful, that interpretation shall be preferred which is most consonant to equity, especially where it is in conformity with the general design of the legislature. In

(a) 11 C. B. 391; *per* Pollock, C.B., 9 Exch. 475. See *Woodward v. Watts*, 2 E. & B. 457.

(b) "It is a good rule, in the construction of Acts of Parliament, that the Judges are not to make the law what they may think reasonable, but to expound it according to the common sense of its words:" *per* Cresswell, J., *Biffin v. Yorke*, 6 Scott, N. R. 235; *Richards v. M'Bride*, 8 Q. B. D. 119; 51 L. J. M. C. 15. See also, *Judgm., R. v. Hall*, 1 B. & C. 123; 25 R. R. 321; cited 2 C. B. 66; and *The Lion*, L. R. 2 P. C. 530; *Stracey v. Nelson*,

12 M. & W. 541; *United States v. Fisher*, 2 Cranch. (U.S.), R. 286; cited 7 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 169.

(c) *Judgm., Smith v. Bell*, 10 M. & W. 389; *Turner v. Sheffield R. Co.*, Id. 434; *Steward v. Greaves*, Id. 719; *per* Alderson, B., *A.-G. v. Lockwood*, 9 M. & W. 398; *Judgm., Hyde v. Johnson*, 2 Bing. N. C. 780.

(d) *Per* Parke, B., *Doe v. Owens*, 10 M. & W. 521; *per* Ld. Brougham, C., *Earl of Waterford's Peerage*, 6 Cl. & F. 172.

(e) 2 Darr. Stats. 702; *Poole v. Poole*, 3 B. & P. 620.

ambigua roce legis ea potius accipienda est significatio quæ ritio caret, præsertim cum etiam voluntas legis ex hoc colligi possit (f). And if the Act is ambiguous, and upon one construction the balance of hardship or inconvenience seems to be strongly against the public, the balance of inconvenience may be considered in determining the question of construction (*g*).

EX ANTECEDENTIBUS ET CONSEQUENTIBUS FIT OPTIMA INTERPRETATIO. (2 *Inst.* 173.)—*A passage is best interpreted by reference to what precedes and follows it.*

Rule.

It is an important rule of construction, that the meaning of the parties to any particular instrument should be collected *ex antecedentibus et consequentibus*; that is to say, every part of it should be brought into action, in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that may be done (*h*); or, in other words, the construction must be made upon the entire instrument, and not merely upon disjointed parts of it (*i*); the whole context must be considered, in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties, although the immediate object of inquiry be the meaning of an isolated clause (*k*). In short, the law will judge of a deed, or other instrument, consisting of divers parts or clauses, by looking at the whole; and will give to each part its proper office, so as to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties (*l*).

(*f*) D. 1, 3, 19; Bac. Max., reg. 3.

(*g*) *Dixon v. Caledonian Co.*, 5 App. Cas. 827.

(*h*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Barton v. Fitzgerald*, 15 East, 541; 13 R. R. 519; *Shep. Touch.* 87; *per* Hobart, C.J., *Winch.* 93. See *Micklethwait v. Micklethwait*, 4 C. B. N. S. 790, 862.

(*i*) *Ld. North v. Bp. of Ely*, cited

1 Bulst. 101; and *Judgm.*, *Doe v. Meyrick*, 2 Cr. & J. 230; 37 R. R. 687; *Maitland v. Mackinnon*, 1 H. & C. 607.

(*k*) *Coles v. Hulme*, 8 B. & C. 568; 32 R. R. 486; Hobart, 275; cited *Gale v. Reed*, 8 East, 79; 9 R. R. 376.

(*l*) See Hobart, 275; *Doe v. Guest*, 15 M. & W. 160.

Thus, in the case of a bond with a condition, the latter may be read and taken into consideration, in order to explain the obligatory part of the instrument (*n*). So, in construing an agreement in the form of a bond in which a surety becomes liable for the fulfilment of an agent's duties therein particularly enumerated, a general clause in the obligatory part of the bond must be interpreted strictly, and controlled by reference to the prior clauses specifying the extent of the agency (*n*). On the same principle, the recital in a deed or agreement may be looked at in order to ascertain the meaning of the parties, and is often highly important for that purpose (*o*): and the general words of a subsequent distinct clause or stipulation may often be explained or qualified by the matter recited (*p*). Where, indeed, "the words in the operative part of a deed of conveyance are clear and unambiguous, they cannot be controlled by the recitals or other parts of the deed." But where, on the other hand, "those words are of doubtful meaning, the recitals and other parts of the deed may be used as a test to discover the intention of the parties, and to fix the true meaning of those words" (*q*). So, covenants are to be construed according to the obvious intention of the parties, as collected from the whole context of the instrument containing them, and according to the reasonable sense of the words; and, in conformity with the rule above laid down, a covenant in large and general terms

Examples.

(*m*) *Coles v. Hulme*, 8 B. & C. 568; 32 R. R. 486; and cases cited, 8 B. & C. 574, *ii.* (*a*).

(*n*) *Napier v. Bruce*, 8 Cl. & F. 470.

(*o*) *Shep. Touch.* 75; *Marg. of Cholmondeley v. Ld. Clinton*, 2 B. & Ald. 625; 4 Bligh, 1: 21 R. R. 419.

(*p*) *Payler v. Homersham*, 4 M. & S. 423; 16 R. R. 416; cited in *Harrison v. Blackburn*, 17 C. B. N. S. 691; *Simons v. Johnson*, 3

B. & Ad. 180; 37 R. R. 377; *Boyes v. Bluck*, 13 C. B. 652; *Solly v. Forbes*, 2 B. & B. 38; 22 R. R. 641; *Charleton v. Spencer*, 3 Q. B. 693; *Sampson v. Easterby*, 9 B. & C. 505; affirmed in 1 Cr. & J. 105; *Price v. Barker*, 4 E. & B. 760, 777; *Henderson v. Stobart*, 5 Exch. 99.

(*q*) *Judgm., Walsh v. Trevanion*, 15 Q. B. 751. See *Ex p. Dawes*, 17 Q. B. D. 286.

has frequently been narrowed and restrained (*r*), where there has appeared something to connect it with a restrictive covenant, or where there have been words in the covenant itself amounting to a qualification (*s*): and it has, indeed, been said, in accordance with the above rule, that, "however general the words of a covenant may be, if standing alone, yet, if from other covenants in the same deed, it is plainly and irresistibly to be inferred that the party could not have intended to use the words in the general sense which they import, the Court will admit the operation of the general words" (*t*).

It is, moreover, as a general proposition, immaterial in what part of a deed any particular covenant is inserted (*u*); for the construction of a deed does not depend on the order of the covenants, or upon the precise terms of them; but regard must be had to the object, and the whole scope of the instrument (*v*). For instance, in the lease of a colliery, two lessees covenanted "jointly and severally in manner following;" and then followed various covenants as to working the colliery; after which was a covenant, that the moneys appearing to be due should be accounted for and paid by the lessees, not saying, "and each of them:" it was held, that the general words at the beginning of the covenants by the lessees extended to all the subsequent covenants throughout the deed on the part of the lessees, there not being anything in the nature of the subject to restrain the operation of those words to the former part only of the lease (*x*).

(*r*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Iggulden v. May*, 7 East, 241; 8 R. R. 623; Plowd. 329; *Cage v. Paxton*, 1 Leon. 116; *Broughton v. Conway*, Moor, 58; *Gale v. Reed*, 8 East, 89; 9 R. R. 376; *Sicklemore v. Thistleton*, 6 M. & S. 9; 18 R. R. 280; cited *Jowett v. Spencer*, 15 M. & W. 662; *Hesse v. Stevenson*, 3 B. & P. 365. See *Doe v. Godwin*, 4 M. & S. 265; 16 R. R. 463.

(*s*) Judgm., *Smith v. Compton*, 3 B. & Ad. 200; 37 R. R. 387.

(*t*) Judgm., *Hesse v. Stevenson*, 3 B. & P. 574. See the maxim as to *verba generalia*, below.

(*u*) *Per* Buller, J., 5 T. R. 526; 1 Wms. Saund. 60, n. (l).

(*v*) *Per* Wilde, C.J., *Richards v. Bluck*, 6 C. B. 441.

(*x*) *Duke of Northumberland v. Errington*, 5 T. R. 522; 2 R. R.

Upon the same principle it is a sound rule of construction that where a word has a clear and definite meaning when used in one part of a deed, will or other document, but has not when used in another, the presumption is that the word is intended to have the same meaning in the latter as in the former part (*y*).

Again, words may be transposed, if it be necessary to do so in order to give effect to the evident intent of the parties (*z*); as, if a lease for years be made in February, rendering a yearly rent payable at Michaelmas and Lady-day during the term, the law will make a transposition of the feasts, and read it thus, "at Lady-day and Michaelmas," in order that the rent may be paid yearly during the term. And so it is in the case of an annuity (*a*). And, although courts of law have no power to alter the words, or to insert words which are not in the deed, yet they ought to construe the words in a manner most agreeable to the meaning of the grantor, and may reject any words that are merely insensible (*b*). Likewise, if there be two clauses or parts of a deed (*c*) repugnant the one to the other, the former shall be received, and the latter rejected, unless there be some special reason to the contrary (*d*); for instance, in a grant, if words of restriction are added which are repugnant to the grant, the restrictive words must be rejected (*e*).

It seems, however, to be a true rule, that this rejection of repugnant matter can be made only in those cases where there is a full and intelligible contract left to operate after the repugnant matter is excluded; otherwise, the whole contract, or such parts of it as are defective, will be pronounced

266; *Copland v. Laporte*, 3 A. & E. 517.

(*y*) *In re Birks, Kenyon v. Birks*, [1900] 1 Ch. 417; 69 L. J. Ch. 124.

(*z*) *Parkhurst v. Smith*, Willes, 332; S. C., 3 Atk. 135.

(*a*) Co. Litt. 217 b.

(*b*) *Per* Willes, C.J., 3 Atk. 136;

S. C., Willes, 332; Savile, 71.

(*c*) *Secus* of a will, see p. 445.

(*d*) Shep. Touch. 88; Hardr. 94

Walker v. Giles, 6 C. B. 662, cited

Re Royal Liver Soc., L. R. 5 Ex. 80

(*e*) Hobart, 172; *Mills v. Wright*

1 Freem. 247.

void for uncertainty (*f*). And as already observed, "if a deed can operate two ways, one consistent with the intent, and the other repugnant to it, the Courts will be ever astute so to construe it, as to give effect to the intent," and the construction must be made on the entire deed (*g*).

A marriage settlement recited that it was the intention of the parties to settle an annuity of £1,000 per annum on the intended wife, in case she should survive her husband. In the body of the deed the words used were "£1,000 sterling lawful money of Ireland." It was held that the words "of Ireland" must be excluded, for the expression could have no meaning, unless some of the words were rejected, and it is a rule of law, that, if the first words used would give a meaning, the latter words must be excluded (*h*). So, we read that, if one makes a lease for ten years "at the will of the lessor," this is a good lease for ten years certain, and the last words are void for the repugnancy (*i*). And without multiplying examples to a like effect, the result of the authorities seems to be that "when a court of law can clearly collect from the language within the four corners of a deed or instrument in writing the real intention of the parties, they are bound to give effect to it by supplying anything necessarily to be inferred from the terms used, and by rejecting as superfluous whatever is repugnant to the intention so discerned" (*k*).

Interpreta-
tion of wills.

Where, however, two clauses or gifts in a will are irreconcilable, so that they cannot possibly stand together, that

(*f*) 2 Anderson, 108. In *Doe v. Carew*, 2 Q. B. 317, a proviso in a lease was held to be insensible. In *Youde v. Jones*, 13 M. & W. 534, an exception introduced into a deed of appointment under a power was held to be repugnant and void. See, also, *Furnivall v. Coombes*, 6 Scott, N. R. 522; cited in *Kelner v. Baxter*, L. R. 2 C. P. 186; *White v. Hancock*, 2 C. B. 830. In *Scott v. Avery*, 8 Exch. 487, 5 H. L. Cas.

811, various authorities having reference to repugnant stipulations in contracts are cited.

(*g*) *Per Turner, V.-C., Squire v. Ford*, 8 Hare, 57.

(*h*) *Cope v. Cope*, 15 Sim. 118.

(*i*) Bac. Abr., Leases and Terms for Years, L. 3, cited and distinguished in *Morton v. Woods*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 305.

(*k*) *Per Kelly, C.B., Gwyn v. Neath Canal Co.*, L. R. 3 Ex. 215.

which is posterior in position prevails, the subsequent words being considered to denote a subsequent intention : *cum duo inter se pugnancia reperiuntur in testamento ultimum ratum est (l)*. It is well settled that where there are two repugnant clauses in a will, the last prevails, as being most indicative of the intent (*m*), and this results from the general rule of construction ; for, unless the principle were recognised of adopting one clause and rejecting the other, both would be necessarily void, each having the effect of neutralising and frustrating the other (*n*). Therefore, if a testator, in one part of his will, gives to a person an estate of inheritance in land, or an absolute interest in personalty, and in subsequent passages unequivocally shows that he means that person to take a life-interest only, the prior gift is restricted accordingly (*o*). The maxim last mentioned must, however, in its application, be restricted by, and made subservient to, that general principle, which requires that the testator's intention shall, if possible, be ascertained and carried into effect (*p*).

Lastly, it is an established rule, in construing a statute that the intention of the law-giver and the meaning of the law are to be ascertained by viewing the whole and every part of the Act (*q*). One part of a statute must be so construed by another, that the whole may, if possible, stand (*r*) ; and that, if it can be prevented, no clause,

Interpreta-
tion of
statutes.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 112 b.

(*m*) 16 Johns. (U.S.), R. 546.

(*n*) 1 Jarm., Wills, 5th ed. 436.
Words and passages in a will, which cannot be reconciled with the general context, may be rejected ; Id. 444.

(*o*) Id. 437. See, also, *Doe v. Marchant*, 7 Scott, N. R. 644.

(*p*) *Morrall v. Sutton*, 1 Phill. 545, 546. See *Greenwood v. Sutcliffe*, 14 C. B. 226, 235 (*a*) ; *Plenty v. West*, 6 C. B. 201, 219.

(*q*) See *per* Ld. Herschell, 14 App. Cas. 506.

(*r*) Thus in *Fitzgerald's case*, L. R.

5 Ex. 33, Pigott, B., referring to 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57, said, " We must deal with the Act in the ordinary way, that is, put on it a reasonable construction ; and if the words are ambiguous we must interpret it *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*."

Where the proviso of an Act of Parliament is directly repugnant to the purview, the proviso shall stand and be a repeal of the purview, as it speaks the last intention of the makers : *A.-G. v. Chelsea Waterworks Co.*, Fitzgib. 195.

Every word
should take
effect.

sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant; and it is a sound general principle, in the exposition of statutes, that less regard is to be paid to the words used than to the policy which dictated the Act; as, if land be vested in the King and his heirs by Act of Parliament, saving the right of A., and A. has at that time a lease of it for three years, in this case A. shall hold it for his term of three years, and afterwards it shall go to the King: for this interpretation furnishes matter for every clause to work and operate upon (*s*).

Also, if any section be intricate, obscure, or doubtful the proper mode of discovering its true meaning is by comparing it with the other sections, and finding out the sense of one clause by the words or obvious intent of another (*t*). This, as Sir E. Coke observed, is the most natural and genuine method of expounding a statute (*u*); and it is, therefore, a true principle, that *verba posteriora propter certitudinem addita ad priora quæ certitudine indigent sunt referenda* (*x*)—reference should be made to a subsequent section in order to explain a previous clause of which the meaning is doubtful.

We may add, too, that, “where an Act has received a judicial construction putting a certain meaning on its words, and the legislature in a subsequent Act *in pari materia* uses the same words, there is a presumption that the legislature used those words intending to express the meaning which it knew had been put upon the same words before; and unless there is something to rebut that presumption, the Act should be so construed, even if the words were such that they might originally have been construed otherwise” (*y*). For instance, in *Greaves v.*

(*s*) 1 Bl. Com. 89; Bac. Abr.,
“Statute” (I. 2); Arg. *Hine v.*
Reynolds, 2 Scott, N. R. 419.

(*t*) *Stowell v. Ld. Zouch*, Plowd.
365; *Doe v. Brandling*, 7 B. & C.
643.

(*u*) Co. Litt. 381 a.

(*x*) Wing. Max., p. 167; 8 Rep.
236. See 4 Leon. 248.

(*y*) 11 H. L. Cas. 480—481. *R. v.*
Poor Law Commrs. (St. Pancras), 6
A. & E. 7. See, also, *per Parke, B.*

Tofield (z), a landowner by deed charged his land with a life annuity which was never registered under the 18 & 19 Vict. c. 15, s. 12; he subsequently mortgaged the property to a third person, who took with notice of the annuity: it was held that, as that section was in terms similar to the clauses in the Registry Acts which had been decided not to make an unregistered conveyance void as against a subsequent purchaser who had notice, the legislature must be taken to have used the words in the later Act in the sense given to them by those decisions, and that the annuities, therefore, were valid as against the mortgagee.

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS. (3 T. R. 87.)—*The meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it (a).*

It is a rule laid down by Lord Bacon, that *copulatio verborum indicat acceptationem in eodem sensu* (b)—the coupling of words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense. And, where the meaning of a particular word is doubtful or obscure, or where a particular expression when taken singly is inoperative, the intention of the party who used it may frequently be ascertained by looking at adjoining words, or at expressions occurring in other parts of the same instrument, for *quæ non valent singula juncta juvant* (c)—words which are ineffective when taken singly operate when taken conjointly: one provision

Grammatical rules.

2 M. & W. 476; *per* Ld. Selborne, 9 App. Cas. 269.

(z) 14 Ch. D. 563; 50 L. J. Ch. 119.

(a) This, it was observed, in reference to *King v. Melling*, 1 Vent. 225, was a rule adopted by Ld. Hale, and was no pedantic or inconsiderate expression when falling from him, but was intended to convey, in short terms, the grounds upon which he

formed his judgments. See 3 T. R. 87; 1 B. & C. 644; Arg. 13 East, 531. See, also, *Bishop v. Elliott*, 11 Exch. 113; 10 Id. 496, 519; which offers an apt illustration of the above maxim; *Burt v. Haslett*, 18 C. B. 162, 893.

(b) Bac. Works, vol. 4, p. 26; cited 9 App. Cas. 569.

(c) 2 Bulstr. 132.

of a deed, or other instrument, must be construed by the bearing it will have upon another (*d*).

It is not proposed to give many examples of the application of the maxim *noscitur a sociis*, nor to enter at length into a consideration of the numerous cases which might be cited to illustrate it: it may, in truth, be said to be comprised in those principles which universally obtain, that courts of law and equity will, in construing a written instrument, endeavour to discover and give effect to the intention of the party, and, with a view to so doing, will examine carefully every portion of the instrument. The maxim is, moreover, applicable, like other rules of grammar, whenever a construction has to be put upon a will, statute, or agreement: and although difficulty frequently arises in applying it, yet this results from the particular words used, and from the particular facts existing in each individual case; so that one decision, as to the inference of a person's meaning and intention, can be considered as an express authority to guide a subsequent decision only where the circumstances are similar and the words are wholly or nearly identical.

Policy of
insurance.

The following instance of the application of the maxim, *noscitur a sociis*, to a mercantile instrument may be mentioned on account of its importance, and will suffice to show how the principle which it expresses has been employed for the benefit of commerce. The general words inserted in a maritime policy of insurance after the enumeration of particular perils are as follow:—"and of all perils, losses, and misfortunes, that have or shall come to the hurt, detriment, or damage of the said goods and merchandises, and ship, &c., or any part thereof." These words, it has been observed, must be considered as introduced into the policy in furtherance of the objects of marine insurance, and may have the effect of extending a reasonable indemnity to many cases not distinctly covered by the special words:

(*d*) Arg. *Galley v. Barrington*, 2 Kenyon, 4 T. R. 227.
Bing. 391: 27 R. R. 663; *per* Ld.

they are entitled to be considered as material and operative words, and to have the due effect assigned to them in the construction of the instrument; and this will be done by allowing them to comprehend and cover other cases of marine damage of the like kind with those which are specially enumerated, and occasioned by similar causes; that is to say, the meaning of the general words may be ascertained by referring to the preceding special words (e).

In applying this rule, however, it must be remembered that general words following particular expressions may be so used as to exclude the strict application of the maxim. Where by a charterparty the parties exempted each other from all liability arising from "frosts, floods, strikes . . . and any other unavoidable accidents or hindrances of *what kind soever* beyond their control, delaying the lading of the cargo," it was held that the use of the words "of what kind soever" excluded the rule of *ejusdem generis*, and that the charterers were not liable for delay in loading caused by a block of other ships at the loading port (f).

That the exposition of every will must be founded on the whole instrument, and be made *ex antecedentibus et consequentibus*, is, observed Lord Ellenborough, one of the most prominent canons of testamentary construction; and therefore, in this department of legal investigation, the maxim *noscitur a sociis* is necessarily of frequent practical application: yet where between the parts there is no connection by grammatical construction, or by some reference, express or implied, and where there is nothing in the will declarative of some common purpose, from which it may be

Maxim applies in the exposition of wills.

(e) See Judgm., *Cullen v. Butler*, 5 M. & S. 495: 17 R. R. 400; *Thames & Mersey M. I. Co. v. Hamilton*, 12 App. Cas. 484, 495: 55 L. J. Q. B. 626. *The Knight St. Michael*, [1898] P. at p. 35: 67 L. J. P. 19. In *Borradaile v. Hunter*, 5 M. & Gr. 639, 667, this maxim was applied by Tindal, C.J. (*diss.* from

the rest of the Court), to explain a proviso in a policy of life insurance. In *Cleft v. Schwabe*, 3 C. B. 437, the same maxim was likewise applied in similar circumstances; see *Dormay v. Borradaile*, 5 C. B. 380.

(f) *Larsen v. Sylvester & Co.*, [1908] A. C. 295: 77 L. J. K. B. 993.

inferred that the testator meant a similar disposition by such different parts, though he may have varied his phrase or expressed himself imperfectly, the Court cannot go into one part of a will to determine the meaning of another, perfect in itself, and without ambiguity, and not militating with any other provision respecting the same subject-matter, notwithstanding that a more probable disposition for the testator to have made may be collected from such assisted construction. For instance, if a man devise his lands generally, after payment of his debts and legacies, his trust (*g*) estates will not pass; for, in such case *noscitur a sociis* what the lands are which he intended to pass by such devise: it is clear he could only mean lands which he could pass subject to the payment of his debts and legacies. But, from a testator having given to persons standing in a certain degree of kinship to him a fee-simple in certain lands, no conclusion which can be relied on can be drawn, that his intention was to give to other persons standing in the same rank of proximity the same interest in other lands; and where, moreover, the words of the two devises are different, the more natural conclusion is, that, as the testator's expressions varied, they were altered because his intention in both cases was not the same (*h*).

Distinction
between the
conjunctive
and disjunc-
tive illus-
trated.

In addition to the preceding remarks, a few instances may here be referred to, illustrating the distinction between the *conjunctive* and the *disjunctive* which it is so essential to observe in construing a will.

A leasehold estate was devised after the death of A., to B. for life, remainder to his child or children by any woman whom he should marry, upon condition that, in case B.

(*g*) *Roe v. Reade*, 8 T. R. 188.
(*h*) *Judgm., Right v. Compton*, 9 East, 272, 273: 11 East, 223; *Hay v. Earl of Coventry*, 3 T. R. 83: 1 R. R. 652; *per* Coltman, J., *Knight v. Selby*, 3 Scott, N. R. 409, 417; Arg. 1 M. & S. 333. See *Sanderson*

v. Dobson, 1 Exch. 141; and *per* Byles, J., *Jegon v. Vivian*, L. R. 1 C. P. 24; S. C., 2 Id. 422, L. R. 3 H. L. 289; *Doe v. Earles*, 15 M. & W. 450. See also, *Vandeleur v. Vandeleur*, 3 Cl. & F. 98, where the maxim is differently applied.

should die, "an infant, unmarried, and without issue," the premises should go over to other persons. It was held that the devise over depended upon one contingency, viz., B.'s dying an infant, attended with two qualifications, viz., his dying without leaving a wife surviving him, and his dying childless; and that the devise over could take effect only in case B. died in his minority, leaving neither wife nor child; and it was observed by Lord Ellenborough that, if the condition had been, "if he dies an infant, *or* unmarried, *or* without issue," that is to say, in the disjunctive throughout, the rule would have applied, *in disjunctivis sufficit alteram partem esse veram* (i); and, consequently, that if B. had died in his infancy, leaving children, the estate would have gone over to B.'s father and his children, to the prejudice of B.'s own issue (j). According to the same rule of grammar, also, where a condition inserted in a deed consists of two parts in the conjunctive, both must be performed, but otherwise where the condition is in the disjunctive; and where a condition or limitation is both in the conjunctive and disjunctive, the latter shall be taken to refer to the whole; as, if a lease be made to husband and wife for the term of twenty-one years, "if the husband *and* wife *or* any child between them shall so long live," and the wife dies without issue, the lease shall, nevertheless, continue during the life of the husband, because the above condition shall be construed throughout in the disjunctive (k).

The disjunctive is also read as conjunctive, except in devises which create an estate tail, where an estate is limited to A. and his heirs, but if A. should die under the age of twenty-one or without issue then over. The principle

(i) Co. Litt. 225 a : 10 Rep. 58 : 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 470 *et* Wing. Max., p. 13 : D. 50, 17, 110, *seq.* ; *Mortimer v. Hartley*, 6 Exch. 47; 6 C. B. 819 : 3 De G. & S. 316.

(j) *Doe v. Cooke*, 7 East, 272; *Johnson v. Simcock*, 7 H. & N. 344; S. C., 6 Id. 6. As to changing the copulative into the disjunctive, see

(k) Co. Litt. 225 a; *Shep. Touch.* 138, 139. See, also, *Burgess v. Bracher*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1366.

is stated to be that where the dying under twenty-one is associated with the event of the devisee leaving an object who would take an interest derivatively through him, the copulative (or conjunctive) construction is to prevail (*l*). Therefore if A. dies under twenty-one leaving issue the gift over fails; and also if A. attains the age of twenty-one, but dies without issue, the gift over fails since both events must happen, *i.e.*, A. dying under twenty-one *and* leaving no issue, before the gift over can take effect.

Statutes.

In the construction of statutes, likewise, the rule *noscitur a sociis* is frequently applied, the meaning of a word, and, consequently, the intention of the legislature, being ascertained by reference to the context, and by considering whether the word in question and the surrounding words are, in fact, *ejusdem generis*, and referable to the same subject-matter (*m*). Especially must it be remembered that “the sages of the law have been used to collect the sense and meaning of the law by comparing one part with another and by viewing all the parts together as one whole, and not of one part only by itself—*nemo enim aliquam partem recte intelligere possit antequam totum iterum atque iterum perlegerit*” (*n*).

General words in a statute, how controlled.

The following illustrations will show how general words in a statute may be more or less limited by the particular words which precede them. By the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 75, s. 37, a penalty was imposed upon any person not being a freeman of the Watermen's Company, who should navigate any wherry, lighter, or other craft upon the Thames within certain limits. It was held upon the principle of the maxim

(*l*) 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 474.

(*m*) *Per* Coleridge, J., *Cooper v. Harding*, 7 Q. B. 941; *Judgm.*, *Stephens v. Taprell*, 2 Curt. 465; *per* Channell, B., *Pearson v. Hull L. B. of Health*, 3 H. & C. 944. The maxim was applied to construe a

statute in *Hardy v. Tingey*, 5 Exch. 294, 298—to ascertain the meaning of libellous words in *Wakley v. Cooke*, 4 Exch. 511, 519.

(*n*) Arg. 7 Howard (U.S.), R. 637, citing *Lincoln College case*, 3 Rep. 596.

noscitur a sociis, that a steam tug of eighty-seven tons burden engaged in moving another vessel was not a craft within the meaning of the statute (o).

Again, by 5 Geo. 4, c. 83, s. 4, it is an offence to use any subtle craft, means, or device by palmistry, or otherwise, to deceive and impose on any of His Majesty's subjects. The defendant having attempted to impose upon persons by falsely pretending to have the supernatural faculty of obtaining answers and raps from the spirits of the dead, was held properly convicted of the offence specified in the statute, the words "or otherwise" not being limited to any precise class or genus of deception, but simply limited to such deceptions as were similar in character to palmistry (p). Here the general words were not limited to things *eiusdem generis* with the specified offence, but to things like in their nature to that offence (q).

We shall conclude these remarks with observing, that the three rules or canons of construction with which we have commenced this chapter are intimately connected together,—that they must always be kept in view collectively when the practitioner applies himself to the interpretation of a doubtful instrument.

VERBA CHARTARUM FORTIUS ACCIPIUNTUR CONTRA PROFERENTEM.

(Co. Litt. 36 a.)—*The words of an instrument shall be taken most strongly against the party employing them.*

This maxim ought to be applied only where other rules of construction fail (r); and, indeed, in *Taylor v. St. Helen's*

(o) *Reed v. Ingham*, 3 E. & B. 457. See also *Powell v. Kempton Park Co.*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 242, 257, 889.

(p) *Monck v. Hilton*, 2 Ex. D. 261, 266; S. C., [1899] A. C. 143: 268; 46 L. J. M. C. 163. 68 L. J. Q. B. 392; *Re Stockport Schools*, [1898] 2 Ch. 687.

(q) For some important observations on the doctrine of *eiusdem generis*, see *Anderson v. Anderson*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 749; 64 L. J. Q. B. (r) Judgm., *Lindus v. Melrose*, 3 H. & N. 182.

Corporation (s), Jessel, M.R., is reported to have said: "I do not see how, according to the now established rules of construction as settled by the House of Lords in the well-known case of *Grey v. Pearson* (t), followed by *Roddy v. Fitzgerald* (u) and *Abbott v. Middleton* (x), the maxim can be considered as having any force at the present day. The rule is to find out the meaning of the instrument according to the ordinary and proper rules of construction. If we can thus find out its meaning, we do not want the maxim. If, on the other hand, we cannot find out its meaning, then the instrument is void for uncertainty, and in that case it may be said that the instrument is construed in favour of the grantor, for the grant is annulled." The maxim, however, has been judicially recognised (y) since the above observations were made upon it; and perhaps it may be paraphrased thus—that, as between the grantor and grantee, or between the maker of an instrument and the holder, if the words of the grant or instrument are of doubtful import, that construction shall be placed upon them which is most favourable to the grantee or holder.

Deed-poll.

The rule has been held to apply more strongly to a deed-poll (z) than to an indenture, because in the former case the words are those of the grantor only (a). But though a deed-poll is to be construed against the grantor, the Court will not add words to it, nor give it a meaning contradictory to its language (b).

Grant, &c.

If, then, a tenant in fee simple grants to anyone an estate for life generally, this shall be construed to mean an estate for the life of the grantee, because an estate for a man's own life

(s) 6 Ch. D. 264, 280: 46 L. J. Ch. 857.

(t) 6 H. L. Cas. 61.

(u) 6 H. L. Cas. 823.

(x) 7 H. L. Cas. 68.

(y) *E.g.*, in *Burton v. English*, 12 Q. B. D. 218, 220, *per* Brett, M.R.;

see also 9 App. Cas. 350.

(z) See 8 & 9 Vict. o. 106, s. 5; 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, s. 11.

(a) *Plowd.* 134; *Shep. Touch.*, b; *Preston*, 88, n. (81).

(b) *Per* Williams, J., *Doe v. St. Helens R. Co.*, 2 Q. B. 373.

is higher than for the life of another (*c*). But if tenant for life leases to another for life, without specifying for whose life, this shall be taken to be a lease for the lessor's own life; for this is the greatest estate which it is in his power to grant (*d*). And, as a general rule, it appears clear, that, if a doubt arise as to the construction of a lease between the lessor and lessee, the lease must be construed most beneficially for the lessee (*e*).

In like manner, if two tenants in common grant a rent of 10s., this is several, and the grantee shall have 10s., from each; but if they make a lease, and reserve 10s., they shall have only 10s. between them (*f*). So it is a true canon of construction, that where there is any reasonable degree of doubt as to the meaning of an exception in a lease, the words of the exception, being the words of the lessor, are to be taken most favourably for the lessee, and against the lessor (*g*); and where a deed may enure to divers purposes, he to whom the deed is made shall have election which way to take it, and he shall take it in that way which shall be most to his advantage (*h*). But it seems that in such a case the instrument, if pleaded, should be stated according to its legal effect, in that way in which it is intended to have it operate (*i*).

According to the principle above laid down, it was held that leasehold lands passed by the conveyance of the freehold, "and all lands or meadows to the said messuage or mill belonging, or used, occupied, and enjoyed, or deemed, taken, or accepted as part thereof." This, said Lord Loughborough, being a case arising on a deed, is to be

(*c*) Co. Litt. 42 a; Plowd. 156; Finch, Law, 63; Shep. Touch. 88.

(*d*) Finch, Law, 55, 56. See also, Id. 60.

(*e*) *Dunn v. Spurrier*, 3 B. & P. 399, 403, where various authorities are cited. See also Judgm., 1 Cr. & M. 657.

(*f*) 5 Rep. 7; Plowd. 140; Co. Litt. 197 a, 267 b.

(*g*) *Per Bayley, J., Bullen v. Denning*, 5 B. & C. 847; 29 R. R. 431.

(*h*) Shep. Touch. 83; cited 8 Bing. 106.

(*i*) 2 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 519.

distinguished from cases of a like nature which have arisen on wills. In general, where there is a question on the construction of a will, neither party has done anything to preclude himself from the favour of the Court. But, in the present instance, the legal maxim applies, that a deed shall be construed most strongly against the grantor (*k*).

The rule of law, moreover, that a man's own acts shall be taken most strongly against himself, not only obtains in grants, but extends, in principle, to other engagements and undertakings (*l*). Thus, the return of a writ of *fi. fa.* shall, if the meaning be doubtful, be construed against the sheriff; and, if sued for a false return, he shall not be allowed to defend himself by putting a construction on his own return which would make it bad in law, when it admits of another construction which will make it good (*m*).

Simple contracts.

In like manner, with respect to contracts not under seal, the generally received doctrine of law undoubtedly is that the party who makes any instrument should take care so to express the amount of his own liability, as that he may not be bound further than it was his intention that he should be bound; and, on the other hand, that the party who receives the instrument, and parts with his goods on the faith of it, should rather have a construction put upon it in his favour, because the words of the instrument are not his, but those of the other party (*n*). This principle applies to a condition in a policy of insurance which "being

(*k*) *Doe v. Williams*, 1 H. Bl. 25, 27; 2 R. R. 703.

(*l*) 1 H. Bl. 586. A release in deed, being the act of the party, shall be taken most strongly against himself; Co. Litt. 264 b; cited *Ford v. Beech*, 11 Q. B. D. 869.

"Although the words of a covenant are to be construed according to the intent of the parties, yet they are to be taken most strongly against the party who stipulates:" *per* Holroyd,

J., Webb v. Plummer, 2 B. & Ald. 752; 21 R. R. 479. See *W. London R. Co. v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 11 C. B. 254, 309, 339.

(*m*) See *Reynolds v. Barford*, 7 M. & Gr. 449, 456; cf. *ante*, p. 238.

(*n*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Mayer v. Isaac*, 6 M. & W. 612; commenting on observations of Bayley, B., in *Nicholson v. Paget*, 1 Cr. & M. 48. See *Alder v. Boyle*, 4 C. B. 635.

the language of the company must, if there be any ambiguity in it, be taken most strongly against them" (o), and to an exception to the shipowner's liability in a bill of lading, which is the language of the shipowner (p).

A remarkable illustration of the maxim is to be found in a case arising out of the failure of the Glasgow Bank. By the Articles of that Bank any person who became the holder of a share became subject to all the liabilities of an original partner. Certain shares were transferred into the names of persons who were entered in the stock ledger as "trustees." The bank failed, with large liabilities, and the trustees were placed on the list of contributories liable to calls in their own right. On a petition to rectify the list it was decided that they were personally liable as partners to the creditors of the Bank, the House of Lords being of opinion that the expression, "as trustees," was ambiguous and must be construed *fortius contra proferentes*, so as to carry out the main object of the contract (q).

If the party giving a guarantee leaves anything ambiguous in his expressions, it has been said that such ambiguity must be taken most strongly against him (r); though it would rather seem that the document in question is to be construed according to the intention of the parties to it as expressed by the language which they have employed, understood fairly in the sense in which it is used, the intention being, if needful, ascertained by looking to the relative position

(o) *Per* Cockburn, C.J., *Notman v. Anchor Ass. Co.*, 4 C. B. N. S. 481; *Fitton v. Accidental Death Ins. Co.*, 17 Id. 134, 135; *Fowkes v. Manch. & L. Life Ass. Co.*, 32 L. J. Q. B. 153, 157, 159; 3 B. & S. 917; *per* Ld. St. Leonards, *Anderson v. Fitzgerald*, 4 H. L. Cas. 484; *per* Blackburn, J., *Braunstein v. Accidental Death Ins. Co.*, 1 B. & S. 799; *per* Fletcher Moulton, L.J., *Joel v. Law Union & Crown Insurance Co.*,

[1908] 2 K. B. 863, 890; 77 L. J. K. B. 1108.

(p) *Per* Lord Loreburn, *Nelson Line v. Nelson*, [1908] A. C. 16, 19; 77 L. J. K. B. 82.

(q) *Muir v. City of Glasgow Bank*, 4 App. Cas. 337; 40 L. J. 339.

(r) *Hargreave v. Smee*, 6 Bing. 244, 248; 31 R. R. 407; *Stephens v. Pell*, 2 Cr. & M. 710. See *Cumpston v. Haigh*, 2 Bing. N. C. 449, 454.

of the parties at the time when the instrument was written (s).

If a carrier give two different notices, limiting his responsibility in case of loss, he will be bound by that which is least beneficial to himself (t). In like manner, where a party made a contract of sale as agent for A., and, on the face of such agreement, stated that he made the purchase, paid the deposit, and agreed to comply with the conditions of sale, for A., and in the mere character of agent, it was held, that this act of the contracting party must be taken *fortissime contra proferentem*; and that he could not, therefore, sue as principal on the agreement, without notice to the defendant before action brought, that he was the party really interested (u). So, if an instrument be couched in terms so ambiguous as to make it doubtful whether it be a bill of exchange or a promissory note, the holder may, as against the party who made the instrument, treat it as either (v). If documents are drawn and accepted by the same parties (which in strictness would make them promissory notes and not bills of exchange), yet if the intention to give and receive such documents as bills of exchange be clear, both the parties to the documents and the holders may treat them as such (x).

In the Roman law, the rule under consideration for the construction of contracts may be said, in substance, to have existed, although its meaning differed considerably from that which attaches to it in our own: the rule there was, *ferre*

(s) *Per* Bovill, C.J., *Coles v. Pack*, L. R. 5 C. P. 70; *Wood v. Priestner*, L. R. 2 Ex. 66, 282.

(t) *Munn v. Baker*, 2 Stark. 255; 17 R. R. 686, n. See *Phillips v. Edwards*, 3 H. & N. 813, 820.

(u) *Bickerton v. Burrell*, 5 M. & S. 383, 386, as to which case, see *Rayner v. Grote*, 15 M. & W. 359. See also, *Boulton v. Jones*, 2 H. & N. 564, and cases there cited; *Carr*

v. Jackson, 7 Exch. 382.

(v) *Edis v. Bury*, 6 B. & C. 433; 30 R. R. 389; *Block v. Bell*, 1 M. & Rob. 149; *Lloyd v. Oliver*, 18 Q. B. 471; *Forbes v. Marshall*, 11 Exch. 166. In *McCall v. Taylor*, 19 C. B. N. S. 301, the instrument in question was held to be neither a bill of exchange nor a promissory note.

(x) *Williams v. Ayers*, 3 App. Cas. 133. See 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 5 (2).

secundum promissorem interpretamur (y), where *promissor*, in fact, signified the person who contracted the obligation (z), that is, who replied to the *stipulatio* proposed by the other contracting party. In case of doubt, then, the clause in the contract thus offered and accepted, was interpreted against the *stipulator*, and in favour of the *promissor*; in *stipulationibus cum quæritur quid actum sit verba contra stipulatorem interpretanda sunt* (a); and the reason given for this mode of construction is, *quia stipulatori liberum fuit verba late concipere* (b): the person stipulating should take care fully to express that which he proposes shall be done for his own benefit. But, as remarked by Mr. Chancellor Kent, the true principle appears to be "to give the contract the sense in which the person making the promise believed the other party to have accepted it, if he in fact did so understand and accept it" (c); though this remark must necessarily be understood as applicable only where an ambiguity exists after applying those various and stringent rules of interpretation by which the meaning of a passage must, in very many cases, be determined. When dealing with a *mercantile* instrument, moreover, "the Courts are not restrained to such nicety of construction as is the case with regard to conveyances, pleadings, and the like," and in reference to a charter-party, it has been observed (d), that "generally speaking where there are several ways in which the contract might be performed, that mode is adopted which is the least profitable to the plaintiff and the least burthensome to the defendant." Further, in reference to the same instrument, it has been remarked that the merchant "is in most cases the party best acquainted with the trade for which the

(y) D. 45, 1, 99, pr.

(z) Brisson, *ad verb.* "*Promissor*," "*Stipulatio*;" 1 Pothier, by Evans, 58.

(a) D. 45, 1, 38, § 18.

(b) D. 45, 1, 19, pr.; D. 2, 14, 39.

(c) 2 Kent, Com., 12th ed. vol. 2,

557: 20 Day (U.S.), R. 281; Paley, Moral Phil., 4th ed., 125, 127; 1 Duer, Insur. 159, 160.

(d) *Per* Maule, J., *Cockburn v. Alexander*, 6 C. B. 814, and *Gether v. Capper*, 15 Id. 707; S. C., 18 Id. 866.

ship is taken up, and with the difficulties which may impede the performance by him of his contract; words, therefore, in a charter-party, relaxing in his favour a clause by which an allowance to him of time for a specified object is in the interest of the ship precisely limited, must be read as inserted on his requirement, and construed at the least with this degree of strictness against him that they shall not have put upon them an addition to their obvious meaning;” though that meaning, where it is ambiguous, must be gathered from the surrounding circumstances to which the charter-party was intended to apply (*e*).

When the general rule should be applied.

It must further be observed, that the general rule in question, being one of some strictness and rigour, is the last to be resorted to, and is never to be relied upon but when all other rules of exposition fail (*f*). In some cases, indeed, it is possible that any construction which the Court may adopt will be contrary to the real meaning of the parties; and, if parties make use of such uncertain terms in their contracts, the safest way is to go by the grammatical construction, and if the sense of the words be *in equilibrio*, then the rule of law will apply, *verba chartarum fortius accipiuntur contra proferentem* (*g*).

Exception to rule—When it would work a wrong to a third person.

Moreover, the principle under consideration does not seem to hold when a harsh construction would work a wrong to a third person, it being a maxim that *constructio legis non facit injuriam* (*h*). Therefore if tenant in tail make a lease for life generally, this shall be taken to mean a lease for the life of the lessor (*i*), for this stands well with the law; and not for the life of the lessee, which it is beyond the power of a tenant in tail to grant (*k*).

(*e*) *Hudson v. Ede*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 578; S. C., 3 Id. 412.

(*f*) Bac. Max., reg. 3; 1 Duer. Insur. 210.

(*g*) *Per Bayley, J., Love v. Pares*, 13 East, 86.

(*h*) Co. Litt. 183 a; Shepp. Touch.

88; Judgm., *Rodger v. Comptoir d'Escompte de Paris*, L. R. 2 P. C. 406.

(*i*) *Per Bayley, J., Smith v. Doe*, 2 B. & B. 551; 22 R. R. 19; Fiuch, Law, 60.

(*k*) 2 Bl. Com. 380.

Acts of Parliament are not, in general, within the reason of the rule under consideration, because they are not the words of *parties*, but of the legislature; neither does this rule apply to wills (*l*). Where, however, an Act is passed for the benefit of a canal, railway, or other company, it has been observed, that this is a bargain between a company of adventurers and the public, the terms of which are expressed and set forth in the Act, and the rule of construction (*m*) in such cases is now fully established to be, that any ambiguity in the terms of the contract must operate against the adventurers, and in favour of the public, the former being entitled to claim nothing which is not *clearly* given to them by the Act (*n*). Where, therefore, by such an Act, rates are imposed upon the public and for the benefit of the company, such rates must be considered as a tax upon the subject; and it is a sound general rule, that a tax shall not be considered to be imposed (or at least not for the benefit of a subject) without a plain declaration of the intent of the legislature to impose it (*o*).

Wills and statutes.

Public companies.

In a well-known case, which is usually cited as an authority upon the construction of Acts for the formation of companies to carry out works of a public nature, the law

(*l*) 2 Darr. Stats. 688; Bac. Max., reg. 3.

(*m*) The rule that a private Act "is to be construed as a contract or a conveyance, is a mere rule of construction;" *per* Byles, J., 6 C. B. N. S. 218—219. Cf. *per* Ld. Macnaghten, [1895] A. C. 559. As to the recitals in a private Act, see *Shrewsbury Peerage*, 7 H. L. Cas. 1.

(*n*) *Per* Ld. Tenterden, *Stourbridge Canal Co. v. Wheeley*, 2 B. & Ad. 793: 36 R. R. 746; recognised *Priestley v. Foulds*, 2 Scott, N. R. 228; *per* Coltman, J., Id. 226; *Judgm., Gildart v. Gladstone*, 11 East, 685; recognised *Barrett v. Stockton & D. R. Co.*, 2 Scott, N. R.

370; S. C. affirmed, 3 Id. 803, and 8 Id. 641; cited *Ribble Nav. Co. v. Hargreaves*, 17 C. B. 385, 402; *per* Maule, J., *Portsmouth Floating Bridge Co. v. Nance*, 6 Scott, N. R. 831; *Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Nav.*, 1 My. & K. 165 (as to the remarks of Ld. Eldon in which case, see *per* Alderson, B., *Lee v. Milner*, 2 Yo. & C. 618; *per* Ld. Chelmsford, *Ware v. Regent's Canal Co.*, 28 L. J. Ch. 157; *per* Erle, C.J., *Baxendale v. G. W. R. Co.*, 16 C. B. N. S. 137).

(*o*) *Judgm., Kingston-upon-Hull Dock Co. v. Browne*, 2 B. & Ad. 58, 59; 36 R. R. 459; *Grantham Canal Nav. Co. v. Hall*, 14 M. & W. 880.

Remarks of
Lord Eldon.

was thus laid down by Lord Eldon:—"When I look upon these Acts of Parliament, I regard them all in the light of contracts made by the legislature on behalf of every person interested in anything to be done under them; and I have no hesitation in asserting, that, unless that principle is applied in construing statutes of this description, they become instruments of greater oppression than anything in the whole system of administration under our constitution. Such Acts have now become extremely numerous, and from their number and operation, they so much affect individuals, that I apprehend those who come for them to Parliament do in effect undertake that they shall do and submit to whatever the legislature empowers and compels them to do, and that they shall do nothing else; that they shall do and shall forbear all that they are thereby required to do and to forbear as well with reference to the interests of the public as with reference to the interests of individuals" (*p*). Acts, such as here referred to (*q*), have been called Parliamentary bargains made with each of the landowners. Perhaps more correctly they ought to be treated as conditional powers given by Parliament to take the lands of the different proprietors, through whose estates the works are to proceed. Each landowner, therefore, has a right to have the powers strictly and literally carried into effect as regards his own land, and has a right also to require that no variation shall be made to his prejudice in the carrying into effect the bargain between the undertakers and any one else (*r*).

Railway Acts.

So, with respect to Railway Acts, it has been repeatedly laid down, that the language of these Acts is to be treated as the language of their promoters; they ask the legislature to confer privileges upon them, and profess to give

(*p*) *Blakemore v. Glamorganshire Canal Nav.*, 1 My. & K. 162; 36 R. R. 289; cited *Judgm.*, 1 E. & B. 868, 869.

(*q*) See also *supra*, n. (*m*) and (*o*).

(*r*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Lee v. Milner*, 2 Yo. & C. 611, 618; adopted *Judgm.*, *York & N. Midland R. Co. v. Reg.*, 1 E. & B. 869.

the public certain advantages in return. Acts passed under such circumstances should be construed strictly against the parties obtaining them, but liberally in favour of the public (s). "The statute," said Alderson, B. (t), speaking of such an Act, "gives this company power to take a man's land without any conveyance at all; for if they cannot find out who can make a conveyance to them, or if he refuses to convey, or if he fail to make out a title, they may pay their money into Chancery, and the land is at once vested in them by a parliamentary title. But in order to enable them to exercise this power, they must follow the words of the Act strictly." And it is clear that the words of a statute will not be strained beyond their reasonable import to impose a burthen upon, or to restrict the operation of, a public company (u). It will, of course, be borne in mind that the principle of construing *contra proferentem* an Act of the kind above alluded to can only be applied where a doubt presents itself as to the meaning; for such an Act, and every part of it, must be read according to the ordinary and grammatical sense of the words used, and with reference to those established rules of construction which we have already stated.

Lastly, with reference to the maxim *fortius contra proferentem*,—where a question arises on the construction of a grant of the Crown, the rule under consideration is reversed; for such grant is construed most strictly against the grantee,

Grant from
the Crown.

(s) Judgm., *Parker v. G. W. R. Co.*, 7 Scott, N. R. 870. As to the construction of a contract scheduled to a private Act of Parliament, see *Corbett v. S. E. R.*, [1906] 2 Ch. 12; 75 L. J. Ch. 489; *Joseph Crosfield & Sons v. Manchester Ship Canal Co.*, [1904] 2 Ch. 123, [1905] A. C. 421; 73 L. J. Ch. 637.

(t) *Doe v. Manchester, Bury, & R. R. Co.*, 14 M. & W. 694; *Webb v.*

Manchester & Leeds R. Co., 1 Railw. Cas. 576, 599; per *Ld. Langdale*, *Gray v. Liverpool & Bury R. Co.*, 4 Id. 240; per *Ld. Macnaghten*, *Herron v. Rathmines Commrs.*, [1892] A. C. 523.

(u) *Smith v. Bell*, 2 Railw. Cas. 877; *Parrett Nav. Co. v. Robins*, 3 Id. 383; with which acc. *Cracknell v. Mayor of Thetford*, L. R. 4 C. P. 634, 637.

and most beneficially for the Crown, so that nothing will pass to the grantee but by clear and express words (*x*); the method of construction just stated seeming, as judicially remarked (*y*), "to exclude the application of either of these two phrases (*z*), *expressum facit cessare tacitum*, or *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*. That which the Crown has not granted by express, clear and unambiguous terms, the subject has no right to claim under a grant or charter" (*a*).

AMBIGUITAS VERBORUM LATENS VERIFICATIONE SUPPLETUR;
NAM QUOD EX FACTO ORITUR AMBIGUUM VERIFICATIONE
FACTI TOLLITUR. (*Bac. Max., reg. 23.*) — *Latent ambiguity may be supplied by evidence; for an ambiguity which arises by proof of an extrinsic fact may, in the same manner, be removed.*

Definition of
latent and
patent
ambiguity.

Two kinds of ambiguity occur in written instruments: the one is called *ambiguitas latens* (*b*), i.e., where the writing appears on the face of it certain and free from ambiguity; but the ambiguity is introduced by evidence of something

(*x*) Arg., *R. v. Mayor of London*, 1 Cr. M. & R., 12, 15, and cases there cited; Chit. Pre. of the Crown, 391; Finch, Law, 101.

(*y*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *E. Archipelago Co. v. Reg.*, 2 E. & B. 906, 907; S. C., Id. 310.

(*z*) *Post*, p. 504.

(*a*) It is established on the best authority, that in construing grants from the Crown, a different rule of construction prevails from that by which grants from one subject to another are to be construed. In a grant from one subject to another, every intendment is to be made against the grantor, and in favour of the grantee, in order to give full effect to the grant; but in grants from the Crown an opposite rule

of construction prevails. Nothing passes except that which is expressed, or which is matter of necessary and unavoidable intendment, in order to give effect to the plain and undoubted intention of the grant. And in no species of grant does this rule of construction more especially obtain than in grants which emanate from, and operate in derogation of, the prerogative of the Crown: *ex. gr.* where a monopoly is granted. Judgm., *Feather v. Reg.*, 5 B. & S. 283—284; citing, *per* Id. Stowell, *The Rebeckah*, 1 Rob. 227, 230.

(*b*) Of which see an example, *Raffles v. Wichelhaus*, 2 H. & C. 906.

extrinsic, or by some collateral matter outside the instrument: the other species is called *ambiguitas patens*, i.e., an ambiguity apparent on the face of the instrument itself (*c*).

Ambiguitas patens, said Lord Bacon, cannot be holpen by averment, and the reason is, because the law will not couple and mingle matter of specialty, which is of the higher account, with matter of averment, which is of the lower account in law, for that were to make all deeds hollow, and subject to averment; and so, in effect, to make that pass without deed which the law appoints shall not pass but by deed (*d*); and this rule, as above stated and explained, applies not only to deeds, but to written contracts in general (*e*); and especially, as will be seen by the examples to be given, to wills.

Rule as to
patent
ambiguity.

On this principle, a devise to "one of the sons of J. S." (who has several sons), cannot be explained by parol proof (*f*); and if there be a blank in the will for the

(*c*) Bac. Max., reg. 23. The remarks respecting ambiguity here offered should be taken in connection with those appended to the five maxims which follow next. The subject of latent and patent ambiguities and likewise of misdescription, is very briefly treated in the text, since ample information thereupon may be found in the masterly treatise of Sir James Wigram, upon the "Admission of the Extrinsic Evidence in Aid of the Interpretation of Wills."

(*d*) Bac. Max., reg. 23; *Doe v. Lyfford*, 4 M. & S. 550; 16 R. R. 537; *Ld. Cholmondeley v. Ld. Clinton*, 2 Mer. 343; 16 R. R. 167; Judgm., *Doe v. Needs*, 2 M. & W. 139; *Stead v. Berrier*, Sir T. Raym. 411.

(*e*) See *Hollier v. Eyre*, 9 Cl. & F. 1.

A contract, said Pollock, C.B., in *Nichol v. Godts*, 10 Exch. 194,

"must be read according to what is written by the parties, for it is a well-known principle of law, that a written contract cannot be altered by parol. If A. and B. make a contract in writing, evidence is not admissible to show that A. meant something different from what is stated in the contract itself, and that B. at the time assented to it. If that sort of evidence were admitted, every written document would be at the mercy of witnesses who might be called to swear anything." See *Besant v. Cross*, 10 C. B. 895; *Martin v. Pycroft*, 2 De G. M. & G. 785; *post*, Chap. X.

(*f*) *Strode v. Russel*, 2 Vern. 624; *Cheyney's case*, 5 Rep. 68. See *Castledon v. Turner*, 3 Atk. 257; *Harris v. Bp. of Lincoln*, 2 P. Wms. 136, 137; *per Tindal, C.J.*, *Doe v. Perratt*, 7 Scott, N. R. 36. See, also, *per Littledale, J.*, and Parke, J., *Shortrede v. Cheek*, 1 A. & E. 57.

devisee's name, parol evidence cannot be admitted to show what person's name the testator intended to insert (*g*); it being an important rule, that, in expounding a will, the Court is to ascertain, not what the testator actually intended as distinguished from what his words express, but what is the meaning of the words he has used (*h*).

If, as Sir James Wigram observed, the statutes relating to wills had merely required that a nuncupative will should not be set up in opposition to a written will, parol evidence might, in many cases, be admissible to explain the intention of the testator, where the person or thing intended by him is not adequately described in the will; but if the true meaning of those statutes be, that the writing which they require shall itself express the intention of the testator, it is difficult to understand how the statutes can be satisfied merely by a writing, if the description it contains has nothing *in common with* that of the person intended to take under it, or not enough to determine his identity. To define that which is indefinite is to make a material addition to the will (*i*). In accordance with these observations, where a testator devised property "first to K., then to —, then to L.," and the will referred to a card as showing the parties designated by these letters, but it did not appear that this card existed at the time of the execution of the will, it was held that the card was clearly inadmissible in evidence; the Court observing, that this was a case of a patent ambiguity; and that according to all the authorities, parol evidence to explain the meaning of the will could not legally be admitted (*k*).

If, then, as further observed in the treatise already cited, a testator's words, aided by the light derived from the

(*g*) *Baylis v. A.-G.*, 2 Atk. 239; (*i*) See Wigram, *Extrin. Evid.*,
Hunt v. Hort, 3 Bro. C. C. 311; 4th ed. 127, 128.
 cited 8 Bing. 254.

(*k*) *Clayton v. Ld. Nugent*, 13
 5 B. & Ad. 129.
 (*h*) *Per Parke, J., Doe v. Gwillim*, M. & W. 200.

circumstances with reference to which they were used, do not express the intention ascribed to him, evidence to prove the sense in which he intended to use the words is, as a general proposition, inadmissible; in other words, the judgment of a Court in expounding a will must be simply declaratory of what is in the will (*l*); and to construe a will, where the intent of the testator cannot be known, has been designated as *intentio cæca et sicca* (*m*). The devise, therefore, in cases falling within the scope of this observation, will, since the will is *insensible*, and not really *expressive of any intention*, be void for uncertainty (*n*).

The rule as to patent ambiguities which we have been considering is not confined in its operation to the interpretation of wills. Where a bill of exchange was expressed in figures to be drawn for £245, and in words for two hundred pounds, value received, with a stamp applicable to the higher amount, evidence to show that the words "and forty-five" had been omitted by mistake, was held inadmissible (*o*); for, the doubt being on the face of the instrument, extrinsic evidence could not be received to explain it. The instrument, however, was held to be a good bill for the smaller amount, it being a rule that, where there is a discrepancy between the figures and the words of a bill, the words prevail (*p*). But, although a patent ambiguity cannot be explained by extrinsic evidence, it may, in some cases, be helped by construction, or a comparison of other parts of the instrument with that particular part in which the ambiguity arises; and in others, it may be helped by a right of election vested in the grantee or devisee (*q*), the

(*l*) Wigram, Extrin. Evid., 4th ed. pp. 98 *et seq.*, where many instances of this rule are given. See also *Goblet v. Beechey*, Id. p. 185; 3 Sim. 24.

(*m*) *Per Rolfe, C.J., Taylor v. Web, Styles*, 319.

(*n*) In *Mayor of Gloucester v.*

Osborn, 1 H. L. Cas. 272, legacies failed for uncertainty of purpose.

(*o*) *Saunderson v. Piper*, 5 Bing. N. C. 425.

(*p*) Id. 431, 434; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 9 (2).

(*q*) See *Duckmanton v. Duckmanton*, 5 H. & N. 219.

power being given to him of rendering certain that which was before altogether uncertain and undetermined. For instance, where a general grant is made of ten acres of ground adjoining or surrounding a particular house, part of a larger quantity of ground, the choice of such ten acres is in the grantee, and a devise to the like effect is to be considered as a grant (*r*); and if I grant ten acres of wood where I have one hundred, the grantee may elect which ten he will take; for, in such a case, the law presumes that the grantor was indifferent on the subject (*s*). So, if a testator leaves a number of articles of one kind to a legatee, and dies possessed of a greater number, the legatee and not the executor has the right of selection (*t*).

On the whole, then, we may observe, in the language of Lord Bacon, that all ambiguity of words within the deed, and not out of the deed, may be helped by construction, or, in some cases, by election, but never by averment, but rather shall make the deed void for uncertainty (*u*).

Rule, how
qualified.

The general rule, however, as to patent ambiguity must be received with this qualification, viz., that extrinsic evidence is unquestionably admissible for the purpose of showing that the uncertainty which appears on the face of the instrument does not, in point of fact, exist; and that the intent of the party, though uncertainly and ambiguously expressed, may yet be ascertained, by proof of facts, to such a degree of certainty as to allow of the intent being carried into effect (*x*). In cases falling within the scope of this remark, the evidence is received, not for the purpose of proving the testator's intention, but of explaining the words which he has used. Suppose, for instance, a legacy, "to one of the children of A. by her late husband

(*r*) *Hobson v. Blackburn*, 1 My. & K. 571, 575; 36 R. R. 381.

(*s*) Bac. Max., reg. 23. See also, *per Cur.*, *Richardson v. Watson*, 4 B. & Ad. 787: Vin. Abr. "*Grants*," (H. 5).

(*t*) *Jacques v. Chambers*, 2 Colly. 435.

(*u*) Bac. Max., reg. 23; *per Tindal*, C.J., 7 Scott, N. R. 36; Wigram, Extrin. Evid., 3rd ed. 83, 101.

(*x*) 2 Phill. Evid., 10th ed. 389.

B.; "suppose, further, that A. had only one son by B., and that this fact was known to the testator; the necessary consequence, in such a case, of bringing the words of the will into contact with the circumstances to which they refer must be to determine the identity of the person intended, it being the form of expression only, and not the intention, which is ambiguous; and evidence of facts requisite to reduce the testator's meaning to certainty would not, it seems, in the instance above put, be excluded; though it would be quite another question if A. had more sons than one, or if her husband were living (*y*).

With respect to *ambiguitas latens*, the rule is, that, inasmuch as the ambiguity is raised by extrinsic evidence, so it may be removed in the same manner (*z*). Therefore, if a person grant his manor of S. to A. and his heirs, and the truth is, he hath the manors both of North S. and South S., this ambiguity shall be helped by averment as to the grantor's intention (*a*). So, if one devise to his son John, when he has two sons of that name (*b*), or to the eldest son of J. S., and two persons, as in the case of a second marriage, meet that designation (*c*), evidence is admissible to explain which of the two was intended. Wherever, in short, the words of the will in themselves

Latent
ambiguity.

(*y*) Wigram, Ex. Evid., 4th ed. 80.

(*z*) 2 Phill. Evid., 10th ed. 392; Wigram, Extrin. Evid., 4th ed. 109; *per* Williams, J., *Way v. Hearn*, 13 C. B. N. S. 305; *Judgm., Bradley v. Washington St. Packet Co.*, 13 Peters (U.S.) R. 97. "A latent ambiguity is raised by evidence;" *per* Coleridge, J., 11 Q. B. 25. Where parol evidence has been improperly received to explain a supposed latent ambiguity, the Court *in tanto* will decide upon the construction of the instrument without regard to the finding of the jury upon such evidence; *Bruff v. Conybeare*, 13 C. B.

N. S. 263.

(*a*) Bac. Max., reg. 23; Plowd. 85 b; *Miller v. Travers*, 8 Bing. 248; 34 R. R. 703.

(*b*) *Counden v. Clarke*, Hob. 32; *Fleming v. Fleming*, 1 H. & C. 242; *Jones v. Newman*, 1 W. Bl. 60; *Cheyney's case*, 5 Rep. 68; *per* Tindal, C.J., *Doe v. Perratt*, 7 Scott, N. R. 36.

(*c*) *Per Erskine, J.*, 5 Bing. N. C. 433; *Doe v. Needs*, 2 M. & W. 129; *Richardson v. Watson*, 4 B. & Ad. 792; 38 R. R. 366. And see the cases cited 2 Phill. Evid., 10th ed. 393 *et seq.*

are plain and unambiguous, but they become ambiguous by the circumstance that there are two persons, to each of whom the description applies, then parol evidence may be admitted to remove the ambiguity so created (*d*).

A like rule applies also where the subject-matter of a devise or bequest is called by divers names, "as if I give lands to Christchurch in Oxford, and the name of the corporation is *Ecclesia Christi in Universitate*, Oxford, this shall be holpen by averment, because there appears no ambiguity in the words" (*e*).

In all cases, indeed, in which a difficulty arises in applying the words of a will to the thing which is the subject-matter of the devise, or to the person of the devisee, the difficulty or ambiguity which is introduced by the admission of extrinsic evidence may be rebutted and removed by the production of further evidence upon the same subject, calculated to explain what was the estate or subject-matter really intended to be devised, or who was the person really intended to take under the will; and this appears to be the extent of the maxim as to *ambiguitas latens* (*f*). The characteristic of these cases is, that the words of the will *do* describe the object or subject intended, and the evidence of the declarations of the testator has not the effect of varying the instrument in any way whatever; it only enables the Court to reject one of the subjects or objects to which the description in the will applies, and to determine which of the two the devisor understood to be signified by the description which he used in the will (*g*).

A devise was made of land to M. B., for life, remainder

(*d*) *Per* Alderson, B., 13 M. & W. 206, and 15 Id. 561; *Duke of Dorset v. Ld. Hawarden*, 3 Curt. 80.

(*e*) Bac. Max., reg. 23.

(*f*) Judgm., *Miller v. Travers*, 8 Bing. 247, 248; 34 R. R. 708; *per* Abbott, C.J., *Doe v. Westlake*, 4 B. & Ald. 58; 22 R. R. 621; distin-

guished in *Fleming v. Fleming*, 1 H. & C. 242, 247. See also *Re Stephenson*, [1897] 1 Ch. 75; 66 L. J. Ch. 93.

(*g*) Judgm., *Doe v. Needs*, 2 M. & W. 140; *Ld. Walpole v. Earl of Cholmondeley*, 7 T. R. 138.

to "her three daughters, Mary, Elizabeth, and Ann," in fee, as tenants in common. At the date of the will, M. B. had two legitimate daughters, Mary and Ann, living, and one illegitimate, Elizabeth. Extrinsic evidence was held admissible to rebut the claim of the last-mentioned, by showing that M. B. formerly had a legitimate daughter named Elizabeth, who died before the date of the will, and that the testator did not know of her death, or of the birth of the illegitimate daughter (*h*).

Similarly, where a testator appointed his "nephew Joseph Grant" to be the executor of his will, evidence was admitted to show that the testator meant by that description, not his own brother's son who bore that name, but his wife's brother's son, who also bore that name and whom the testator had constantly spoken of as his nephew (*i*).

"The rule as to the reception of parol evidence to explain a will," remarked Romilly, M.R., in *Stringer v. Gardiner* (*k*), "is perfectly clear. In every case of ambiguity, whether latent or patent, parol evidence is admissible to show the state of the testator's family or property; but the cases in which parol evidence is admissible to show the person intended to be designated by the testator, are those cases of latent ambiguity, mentioned by Sir J. Wigram, where there are two or more persons who answer the descriptions in the will, each of whom standing alone, would be entitled to take."

It is true, moreover, that parol evidence must be admissible to some extent to determine the application of every written instrument. It must, for instance, be received to show what it is that corresponds with the description (*l*); and the admissibility of such evidence for this purpose being conceded, it is only going one step further to give

Extrinsic evidence necessarily admissible for some purposes.

(*h*) *Doe v. Benyon*, 12 A. & E. 431; *Doe v. Allen*, Id. 451.

(*k*) 28 L. J. Ch. 758. See also, *Re Taylor*, 34 Ch. D. 258.

(*i*) *Grant v. Grant*, L. R. 2 P. & D. 8: 5 C. P. 727; see 17 Ch. D.

(*l*) *Macdonald v. Longbottom*, 1 E. & E. 977.

parol evidence, as in the above instances, of other extrinsic facts, which determine the application of the instrument to one subject, rather than to others, to which, on the face of it, it might appear equally applicable (*m*).

"Speaking philosophically," said Rolfe, B., "you must always look beyond the instrument itself to some extent, in order to ascertain who is meant; for instance, you must look to names and places" (*n*); and "in every specific devise or bequest it is clearly competent and necessary to inquire as to the thing specifically devised or bequeathed" (*o*). Thus, "parol evidence is always necessary to show that the party sued is the person making the contract, and bound by it" (*p*). So, if the word Blackacre be used in a will, there must be evidence to show that the field in question is Blackacre (*q*). Where there is a devise of an estate purchased of A., or of a farm in the occupation of B., it must be shown by extrinsic evidence, what estate was purchased of A., or what farm was occupied by B., before it can be known what is devised (*r*). So, whether parcel or not of the thing demised is always matter of evidence (*s*). In these and similar cases, the instrument appears on the face of it to be perfectly intelligible, and free from ambiguity, yet extrinsic evidence must, nevertheless, be received, for the purpose of showing to what the instrument refers (*t*).

(*m*) 2 Phill. Ev., 10th ed. 333.

(*n*) 13 M. & W. 207.

(*o*) *Per* Ld. Cottenham, *Shuttleworth v. Greaves*, 4 My. & Gr. 38.

(*p*) *Judgm.*, *Trueman v. Loder*, 11 A. & E. 594. See *Stebbing v. Spicer*, 8 C. B. 827.

(*q*) *Doe v. Holton*, 4 A. & E. 82; recognised, *Doe v. Webster*, 12 A. & E. 450; cited, *per* Williams, J., *Doe v. Willetts*, 7 C. B. 715; *per* Bovill, C.J., *Horsely v. Graham*, L. R. 5 C. P. 14.

(*r*) *Per* Grant, M.R., 1 Mer. 653.

(*s*) *Per* Buller, J., *Doe v. Burt*, 1 T. R. 701, 704; 1 R. R. 367; *Paddock*

v. Fradley, 1 Cr. & J. 90; *Doe v. Earl of Jersey*, 3 B. & C. 870: 19 R. R. 380; *Lyle v. Richards*, L. R. 1 H. L. 222.

(*t*) *Per* Patteson, J., and Coleridge, J., 4 A. & E. 81, 82. See *Doe v. Webster*, 12 A. & E. 442. Evidence of co-existing circumstances admitted to explain the condition of a bond, *Montefiore v. Lloyd*, 15 C. B. N. S. 203. Evidence admitted to identify pauper with person described in indenture of apprenticeship, *Reg. v. Wooldale*, 6 Q. B. 549.

The rule as to *ambiguitas latens*, above briefly stated, may likewise be applied to mercantile instruments with a view to ascertain the *intention*, though not to vary the *contract* of the parties (*u*). Therefore, where the plaintiffs, the patentees of an invention for the manufacture of rifles, had granted a licence to the defendants to use the patent, the latter covenanting to pay a royalty for every rifle manufactured "under the powers hereby granted," it being thought at that time (but erroneously) that all persons manufacturing for the government were entitled to the free use of a patent, the Court admitted extrinsic evidence to show that the licence was not intended to apply to rifles manufactured by the defendants for the government, on the ground that the words "under the powers hereby granted" contained a latent ambiguity, and might be explained by extraneous evidence (*x*). And although, generally speaking, the construction of a written contract is for the Court, when it is shown by extrinsic evidence that the terms of the contract are ambiguous, evidence is admissible to explain the ambiguity, and to show what the parties really meant. "Where there is an election between two meanings, it is, properly, a question for the jury" (*y*). And in a case (*z*), where the defendants under an agreement signed by them as three of the directors of a company had agreed to repay to the plaintiff £500 advanced by him to the company, the learned judges, referring to *Macdonald v. Longbottom* (*a*), and *Acebal v. Levy* (*b*), admitted parol evidence to show that the defendants were liable as principals on the agreement, and ultimately gave judgment accordingly.

(*u*) *Smith v. Jeffries*, 15 M. & W. 561. [1900] A. C. 182. As to ambiguous contracts, see also, *Boden v. French*, 10 C. B. 886, 889.

(*x*) *Roden v. London Small Arms Co.*, 46 L. J. Q. B. 213. (*z*) *McCollin v. Gilpin*, 6 Q. B. D. 516; 49 L. J. 558.

(*y*) *Per Maule, J., Smith v. Thompson*, 8 C. B. 59; see, however, (*a*) 1 E. & B. 977; 28 L. J. Q. B. 293; 29 Id. 256.

Bowes v. Shand, 2 App. Cas. 462; (*b*) 10 Bing. 376.
Bank of N. Zealand v. Simpson,

Where, as we shall hereafter see, a contract is entered into with reference to a known and recognised use of particular terms employed by the contracting parties, or with reference to a known and established usage, evidence may be given to show the meaning of those terms, or the nature of that usage, amongst persons conversant with the particular branch of commerce or business to which they relate. But cases of this latter class more properly fall within a branch of the law of evidence which we shall separately consider, viz., the applicability of usage and custom to the explanation of written instruments (c).

QUOTIES IN VERBIS NULLA EST AMBIGUITAS, IBI NULLA EXPOSITIO CONTRA VERBA FIENDA EST. (*Wing. Max. p. 24.*)—*In the absence of ambiguity, no exposition shall be made which is opposed to the express words of the instrument.*

Rule where there is not ambiguity.

It seems desirable, before proceeding to consider some additional maxims relative to the subject of ambiguity in written instruments, to observe that, according to the above maxim, it is not allowable to interpret what has no need of interpretation, and that the law will not make an exposition against the express words and intent of the parties (d). Hence, if I grant to you that you and your heirs, or the heirs of your body, shall distrain for a rent of forty shillings within my manor of S., this, by construction of law, *ut res magis valeat*, amounts to a grant of rent out of my manor of S., in fee-simple, or fee-tail; for the grant would be of little effect if the grantee had but a bare distress and no rent. But if a rent of forty shillings be granted out of the manor of D., with a right to distrain if

(c) See the maxim, *optimus interpret rerum usus*, Chap. X.

(d) Co. Litt. 147 a; 7 Rep. 103;

per Kelynge, C.J., Lanyon v. Carne, 2 Saunds. 167. See *Jesse v. Roy*, 1 Cr., M. & R. 316; 40 R. R. 580.

such rent be in arrear in the manor of S., this does not amount to a grant of rent out of the manor of S., for the rent is granted to be issuing out of the manor of D., and the parties have expressly limited out of what land the rent shall issue, and upon what land the distress shall be taken (e).

It may, however, be laid down as a general rule, applicable as well to cases in which a written instrument is required by law, as to cases in which it is not, that where such instrument appears on the face of it to be complete, parol evidence is inadmissible to vary or contradict the agreement: *e.g.*, to show that the word "and" was inserted by mistake (f); in such cases the Court will look to the written contract, in order to ascertain the meaning of the parties, and will not admit parol evidence, to show that the agreement was in reality different from that which it purports to be (g). And, therefore, where a charter-party provided that the vessel was to proceed to a named port or so near thereto as she could safely get always afloat, evidence of a custom of the port for vessels to be lightened in the roads before proceeding into the harbour was held inadmissible in an action by the charterer against the shipowner for not lightening the vessel, but proceeding instead to the nearest safe port to that named in the charter-party, on the ground that such a custom would vary the express terms of the charter (h).

Although, moreover, it has been said that a somewhat strained interpretation of an instrument may be admissible where an absurdity would otherwise ensue, yet, if the intention of the parties is not clear and plain, but

(e) Co. Litt. 147 a.

10 C. B. 212.

(f) *Hitchin v. Groom*, 5 C. B. 515.

(h) *The Alhambra*, 6 P. D. 68;

(g) *Per Bayley and Holroyd, JJ.*,
Williams v. Jones, 5 B. & C. 108;
29 R. R. 181; *Spartali v. Benecke*,

50 L. J. P. D. 36; see *The Nifa*,
[1892] P. 411: 62 L. J. Adm. 12.

in equilibrio, the words shall receive their more natural and proper construction (i).

Remarks in
Shore v.
Wilson.

The general rule, observes a learned judge, I take to be, that where the words of any written instrument are free from ambiguity in themselves, and where external circumstances do not create any doubt or difficulty as to the proper application of those words to claimants under the instrument, or the subject-matter to which the instrument relates, such instrument is always to be construed according to the strict plain common meaning of the words themselves; and that, in such case, evidence *dehors* the instrument, for the purpose of explaining it according to the surmised or alleged intention of the parties to the instrument, is utterly inadmissible (k); therefore words deleted from a document and initialed cannot be looked at for the purpose of arriving at the intention of the parties (l). The true interpretation, however, of every instrument being manifestly that which will make the instrument speak the intention of the party at the time it was made, it has always been considered as an exception from—or, perhaps, to speak more precisely, not so much an exception from, as a corollary to—the general rule above stated, that, where any doubt arises upon the true sense and meaning of the words themselves, or any difficulty as to their application under the surrounding circumstances, the sense and meaning of the language may be investigated and ascertained by evidence *dehors* the instrument itself; for both reason and common sense agree that by no other means can the language of the instrument be made to speak the real mind of the party (m); and

(i) *Earl of Bath's case*, Cart. 108, 109, adopted 1 Fonbl. Eq., 5th ed. 445, n.

(k) *Per Tindal, C.J., Shore v. Wilson*, 5 Scott, N. R. 1037. For an instance of the application of this rule to a will, see *Doe v.*

Chichester, 3 Taunt. 147; S. C., 4 Dow. 65; 16 R. R. 32; explained, Wigram, Extrin. Evid., 4th ed. 89.

(l) *Inglis v. Buttery*, 3 App. Cas. 552; see *Campbell v. Campbell*, 5 Id. 814.

(m) *Per Tindal, C.J., 5 Scott*,

although parol evidence cannot be used to add to or detract from the description in a deed, or to alter it in any respect, such evidence is always admissible to show the condition of every part of the property and all other circumstances necessary to place the Court, when it construes an instrument, in the position of the parties to it, so as to enable the Court to judge of the meaning of the instrument (*n*). “You may,” observed Coleridge, J. (*o*), with reference to a guarantee under the old law (*p*), “explain the meaning of the words used by any legal means. Of such legal means, one is to look at the situation of the parties. Till you have done that, it is a fallacy to say that the language is ambiguous: that which ends in certainty is not ambiguous.”

The following cases may be mentioned as falling within the scope of the preceding remarks: 1st, where the instrument is in a foreign language, in which case the jury must ascertain the meaning of the terms upon the evidence of persons skilled in the particular language (*q*); 2ndly, ancient words may be explained by contemporaneous usage; 3rdly, if the instrument be a mercantile contract, the meaning of the terms must be ascertained by the jury according to the acceptance amongst merchants; 4thly, if the terms are technical terms of art, their meaning must, in like manner, be ascertained by the evidence of persons skilled in the art to which they refer. In such cases, the Court may at once determine, upon the inspection

Cases in
illustration

N. R. 1037, 1038; *Montefiore v. Lloyd*, 15 C. B. N. S. 203; *Leathley v. Spyer*, L. R. 5 C. P. 595; and see *Re Grainger, Dawson v. Higgins*, [1900] 2 Ch. 756: 69 L. J. Ch. 789; *Re Eve, Edwards v. Burns*, [1909] 1 Ch. 796: 78 L. J. Ch. 388; *In re Jameson, King v. Winn*, [1908] 2 Ch. 111: 77 L. J. Ch. 729 (cases on admissibility of evidence for purpose of construing wills).

(*n*) *Baird v. Fortune*, 4 Macq. H. L. 127 at p. 149; *Magee v. Lovell*, L. R. 9 C. P. 107, 112.

(*o*) *Bainbridge v. Wade*, 16 Q. B. 100; see *Morrell v. Cowan*, 7 Ch. D. 151.

(*p*) See, now, 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 3.

(*q*) As to this proposition, see 2 Phill. Ev., 10th ed. 366.

of the instrument, that it belongs to the province of the jury to ascertain the meaning of the words, and, therefore, that, in the inquiry, extrinsic evidence to some extent must be admissible (*r*).

It may be scarcely necessary to observe, that the maxim under consideration applies equally to the interpretation of an Act of Parliament; the general rule being that *a verbis legis non est recedendum* (*s*). A court of law will not make any interpretation contrary to the express letter of a statute; for nothing can so well explain the meaning of the makers of the Act as their own direct words, since *index animi sermo*, and *maledicta expositio quæ corrumpit textum* (*t*); it would be dangerous to give scope for making a construction in any case against the express words, where the meaning of the makers is not opposed to them, and when no inconvenience will follow from a literal interpretation (*u*). "Nothing," observed Lord Denman, "is more unfortunate than a disturbance of the plain language of the legislature, by the attempt to use equivalent terms" (*x*).

CERTUM EST QUOD CERTUM REDDI POTEST.—*Noy, Max.*, 9th ed. 265.)—*That is sufficiently certain which can be made certain.*

General
application
of rule.

This maxim, which sets forth a rule of logic as well as of law, is peculiarly applicable in construing a written instrument. For instance, although every estate for years must have a certain beginning and a certain end, "albeit there appear no certainty of years in the lease, yet, if by reference

(*r*) *Per* Erskine, J., 5 Scott, N. R. 988; *per* Parke, B., *Clift v. Schwabe*, 3 C. B. 469, 470. As to the construction of a settlement in equity, see, *per* Ld. Campbell, *Evans v. Scott*, 1 H. L. Cas. 66.

(*s*) 5 Rep. 119; cited, Wing.

Max., p. 25.

(*t*) 4 Rep. 35; 2 Rep. 24; 11 Rep. 34; Wing. *Max.*, p. 26.

(*u*) *Eldrich's case*, 5 Rep. 119.

(*x*) *Everard v. Poppleton*, 5 Q. B. 184; *per* Coltman, J., *Gadsby v. Barrow*, 8 Scott, N. R. 804.

to a certainty it may be made certain, it sufficeth" (y). Lease. Therefore, if a man make a lease for so many years as J. shall name, this is a good lease for years; for though it is at present uncertain, yet when J. hath named the years, it is reduced to a certainty. So, if a parson make a lease for twenty years, if he shall so long live and continue parson, it is good, for there is a certain period fixed, beyond which it cannot last, though it may determine sooner on the lessor's death or his ceasing to be parson (z).

"It is true," said Lord Kenyon, "that there must be a certainty in the lease as to the commencement and duration of the term; but that certainty need not be ascertained at the time; for if, in the fluxion of time, a day will arrive which will make it certain, that is sufficient. As, if a lease be granted for twenty-one years, after three lives in being: though it is uncertain at first when that term will commence, because those lives are in being, yet when they die it is reduced to a certainty, and *id certum est quod certum reddi potest*" (a). But where an executory agreement for a lease did not mention the date from which the lease was to commence, it was held that it was not to be inferred that it was to commence from the date of the agreement, in the absence of language pointing to that conclusion (b).

Again, it is a rule of law, that, "no distress can be taken for any services that are not put into certainty nor can be reduced to any certainty, for *id certum est quod certum reddi potest*" (c); and, accordingly, where land is demised at a rent which is capable of being reduced to a certainty, the lessor will be entitled to distrain for the same (d).

The office of the *habendum* in a deed is to limit, explain,

(y) Co. Litt. 45 b.

(z) 2 Bla. Com. 143: 6 Rep. 35: Co. Litt. 45 b.

(a) *Goodright v. Richardson*, 3 T. R. 463.

(b) *Marshall v. Berridge*, 19 Ch. D. 233.

(c) Co. Litt. 96 a, 142 a; *Parke v. Harris*, 1 Salk. 262.

(d) *Daniel v. Gracie*, 6 Q. B. 145; *Pollitt v. Forrest*, 11 Q. B. 949. As to a feoffment of lands, see Co. Litt. 6 a; and *Maughan v. Sharpe*, 17 C. B. N. S. 443.

Habendum. or qualify the words in the premises; but if the words of the *habendum* are manifestly contradictory and repugnant to those in the premises, they must be disregarded (*e*). A deed shall be void if it be totally uncertain; but if the King's grant refers to another thing which is certain, it is sufficient; as, if he grant to a city all liberties which London has, without saying what liberties London has (*f*).

Uncertainty. An agreement in writing for the sale of a house did not describe the particular house, but it stated that the deeds were in the possession of A. The Court held the agreement sufficiently certain, since it appeared upon the face of the agreement that the house referred to was the house of which the deeds were in the possession of A., and, consequently, the house might easily be ascertained, and *id certum est quod certum reddi potest* (*g*).

Additional Instances.

Again, the word "certain" must, in a variety of cases, where a contract is entered into for the sale of goods, refer to an indefinite quantity at the time of the contract made, and must mean a quantity which is to be ascertained according to the above maxim (*h*).

And where the law requires a particular thing to be done, but does not limit any period within which it must be done, the act required must be done within a reasonable time; and a reasonable time is capable of being ascertained by evidence, and, when ascertained, is as fixed and certain as if specified by Act of Parliament (*i*).

Where it was awarded that the costs of certain actions should be paid by the plaintiff and defendant in specified proportions, the award was held to be sufficiently certain, since it would become so upon taxation of costs by the proper officer (*k*). By the 3 & 4 Wm. IV., c. 42, s. 28,

(*e*) *Doe v. Steele*, 4 Q. B. 663.

(*f*) Com. Dig., "Grant" (E. 14) (G. 5); *Finch*, L., 49.

(*g*) *Owen v. Thomas*, 3 My. & K. 353; *Plant v. Bourne*, [1897] 2 Ch. 281, 288; 64 L. J. Ch. 643.

(*h*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Wildman v. Glossop*, 1 B. & Ald. 12.

(*i*) See *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Palmer v. Moxon*, 2 M. & S. 50.

(*k*) *Cargcy v. Aitcheson*, 2 B. & C. 170; 26 R. R. 298. See *Pedley v.*

interest may be given by the jury upon all debts payable at a certain time. The plaintiff agreed to supply the defendant with furniture upon the terms that payment was to be made, one-third in cash, as soon as the goods and invoices were delivered, and the balance in bills at six and twelve months. An action being brought for the one-third cash which the defendant had failed to pay, interest was claimed from the date when the goods were delivered. The Court allowed interest, considering the statute satisfied, if an event be named on which payment is to be made, and that the time of payment was fixed as being the time when the goods and invoices were delivered (l).

UTILE PER INUTILE NON VITIATUR. (3 Rep. 10.)—*Surplusage does not vitiate that which in other respects is good and valid.*

It is a rule of extensive application with reference to the construction of written instruments, and in the science of pleading, that matter which is mere surplusage may be rejected, and does not vitiate the instrument or pleading in which it is found—*Surplusagium non nocet* (m) is the maxim of our law.

Goddard, 7 T. R. 73; *Wood v. Wilson*, 2 Cr. M. & R. 241; *Waddle v. Downman*, 12 M. & W. 562; *Smith v. Hartley*, 10 C. B. 800, 805; *Graham v. Darcey*, 6 C. B. 539; *Holdsworth v. Barsham*, 2 B. & S. 480.

The maxim was applied to a valuation in *Gordon v. Whitehouse*, 18 C. B. 747, 753—to an indenture of apprenticeship in *Reg. v. Wooldale*, 6 Q. B. 549, 566. It may also be applicable in determining whether an action of debt will lie under given circumstances; see *Barber v. Butcher*, 8 Q. B. 863, 870.

(l) *Duncombe v. Brighton Club*

L.M.

Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 371; 44 L. J. Q. B. 216; *Grath v. Ross*, 44 L. J. C. P. 315. See, however, *Merchant Shipping Co. v. Armitage*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 99, 114; *L. C. & D. R. Co. v. S. E. R. Co.*, [1893] A. C. 429; 63 L. J. Ch. 93.

(m) Branch, Max., 5th ed. 216. *Non solent quæ abundant vitariæ scripturas*, D. 50, 17, 94.

"Surplusage (in pleading) is something that is altogether foreign and inapplicable:" *per* Maule, J., *Aldis v. Mason*, 11 C. B. 139. See also, as to surplusage, *Shep. Touch.* 236; cited, *per* Williams, J., *Janes*

Examples.
Deed.

Accordingly, where words of known signification are so placed in the context of a deed that they make it repugnant and senseless, they are to be rejected equally with words of no known signification (*n*). It is also a rule in conveyancing, that, if an estate be granted in any premises, and that grant is express and certain, the *habendum*, although repugnant to the deed, shall not vitiate it. If, however, the estate granted in the premises be not express, but arise by implication of law, then a void *habendum*, or one differing materially from the grant, may defeat it (*o*).

Award.

A cause and all matters of difference were referred to the arbitration of three persons, the award of the three, or of any two of them, to be final. The award purported on the face of it to be made by all three, but was executed by two only of the arbitrators, the third having refused to sign it. This award was held to be good as the award of the two, for the statement that the third party had concurred, might, it was observed, be treated as mere surplusage, the substance of the averment being that two of the arbitrators had made the award (*p*).

So where the directors of an unincorporated and unregistered joint-stock company issued promissory notes which purported to bind the shareholders severally, as well as jointly, it was held that it was beyond the power of the directors to make the shareholders severally liable

v. Whitbread, 11 C. B. 412. *MacLae v. Sutherland*, 3 E. & B. 1, 83, illustrates the maxim.

(*n*) *Vaugh. R.* 176. See *Whittome v. Lamb*, 12 M. & W. 813.

(*o*) *Arg.*, *Goodtitle v. Gibbs*, 5 B. & C. 712, 713; 29 R. R. 366; and cases there cited; *Shep. Touch.* 112, 113; *Hobart*, 171. See also, instances of the application of this rule to an order of removal, *Reg. v. Rotherham*, 3 Q. B. 776, 782; *Reg. v. Silkstone*, 2 Q. B. 422; to an order under 2 & 3 Vict. c. 85, s. 1,

Reg. v. Goodall, 2 Dowl. P. C., N. S., 382; *Reg. v. Oxley*, 6 Q. B. 256; to a conviction, *Chaney v. Payne*, 1 Q. B. 722; to a notice of objection under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 18, *Allen v. House*, 8 Scott, N. R. 987; cited, *Arg.*, 2 C. B. 9; to an information, *A.-G. v. Clerc*, 12 M. & W. 640.

(*p*) *White v. Sharp*, 12 M. & W. 712. See also, *per Alderson, B.*, *Wynne v. Edwards*, 12 M. & W. 712; *Harlow v. Read*, 1 C. B. 733.

upon the notes, but that the expression in the notes, by which a separate liability was sought to be created, might easily be detached in construing it and be taken *pro non scripta* (q).

The above maxim, however, applies peculiarly to pleading; in which it is a rule, that matter immaterial cannot operate to make a pleading double, and that mere surplusage does not vitiate a plea, and may be rejected (r). Application of rule in pleading.

Lastly, with respect to an indictment, it is laid down, that an averment, which is altogether superfluous, may here be rejected as surplusage (s). Accordingly, where a criminal information was laid against a member of the legislative Assembly of New South Wales, for an assault on a member, committed within the precincts of the House, while the Assembly was sitting, which information averred that such assault was in contempt of the Assembly (that being in itself no offence), it was held that the information was good, as the alleged contempt could be treated as surplusage, and the information sustainable for an assault (t). If, however, an averment be part of the description of the offence, or be embodied by reference in such description, it cannot be so rejected, and its introduction may, unless an amendment be permitted, be fatal (u). Indictment.

FALSA DEMONSTRATIO NON NOCET CUM DE CORPORE CONSTAT.

(6 T. R. 676.)—*Mere false description does not vitiate, if there be sufficient certainty as to the object.*

Falsa demonstratio means an erroneous description of a person or a thing in a written instrument; and the above Meaning of rule.

(q) *MacLae v. Sutherland*, 3 E. & B. 1. rejection of surplusage in a declaration.

(r) Co. Litt. 303 b.; Steph. Pl., 6th ed. 310, 341. (s) *Reg. v. Parker*, L. R. 1 C. C. 225.

Ring v. Roxburgh, 2 Cr. & J. 418 (t) *A.-G. of N. S. Wales v. Macpherson*, L. R. 3 P. C. 268.

(cited by Rolfe, B., *Duke v. Forbes*, 1 Exch. 356], is an instance of the (u) Dickins. Quart. Sess., 5th ed., by Mr. Serjt. Talfourd, 175.

rule respecting it signifies that where the description is made up of more than one part, and one part is true, but the other false, there, if the part which is true describes the subject with sufficient legal certainty, the untrue part will be rejected and will not vitiate the devise (*x*): the characteristic of cases within the rule being, that the description, so far as it is false, applies to no subject at all, and, so far as it is true, applies to one only (*y*). Thus, where a testator devised "all his freehold houses in Aldersgate Street, London," having in fact only leasehold houses there, it was held that the word "freehold" should rather be rejected than the will be wholly void, and that the leasehold houses should pass (*z*); and again, where a testator devised "his freehold farm situate at E. and now in the occupation of J. B.," it was held that the whole farm passed under the devise, although a part of it was copyhold (*a*). In the latter case weight was given to the fact that there was no residuary devise, for a will should be read, if possible, so as to lead to a testacy, not an intestacy (*b*); and the devise in question was construed according to the principle, that "if the words of description when examined do not fit with accuracy, and if there must be some modification of some part of them in order to place a sensible construction on the will, then the whole thing must be looked at fairly in order to see what are the leading words of description and what is the subordinate matter, and for this purpose evidence of extrinsic facts may be regarded" (*c*).

Erroneous
addition.

The rule as to *falsa demonstratio* has sometimes been stated to be that "if there be an adequate and sufficient description, with convenient certainty of what was meant

(*x*) *Per* Lindley, M.R., *Cowen v. Truefitt*, [1899] 2 Ch. 309, 311: 68 L. J. Ch. 568, citing Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 742.

(*y*) *Id.*; and *per* Alderson, B., *Morrell v. Fisher*, 4 Exch. 591, 604.

(*z*) *Day v. Trig*, 1 P. Wms. 286;

cited [1899] 2 Ch. 312.

(*a*) *Re Bright-Smith*, 31 Ch. D. 314: 55 L. J. Ch. 365.

(*b*) *Re Harrison*, 30 Ch. D. 390, 394: 55 L. J. Ch. 799.

(*c*) *Per* Ld. Selborne, *Hardwick v. Hardwick*, L. R. 16 Eq. 168, 175.

to pass, a subsequent erroneous addition will not vitiate it" (d): *quicquid demonstratæ rei additur satis demonstratæ frustra est* (e). But in applying the doctrine of *falsa demonstratio* it is not material in what part of the description the *falsa demonstratio* is found: to limit the doctrine to cases in which the misdescription occurs at the end of the sentence would be to reduce a very useful rule, which is founded on good sense, to a mere technicality (f). *In civile est nisi tota sententia perspecta de aliquâ parte judicare* (g). The rule, however, is well illustrated by the case of a gift of an entire thing which is sufficiently described, followed by an insufficient enumeration of the particulars of which that entirety consists: for the latter may be treated as a *falsa descriptio quæ non nocet*, unless, indeed, the context and surrounding circumstances show that what happens to be a blundering enumeration of particulars was a designed limitation of the gift itself (h). "Where some subject-matter is devised as a whole under a denomination, which is applicable to the entire land, and then the words of description that include and denote the entire subject-matter are followed by words which are added on the principle of enumeration, but do not completely enumerate and exhaust all the particulars which are comprehended and included within the antecedent universal or generic denomination: then the ordinary principle and rule of law which is perfectly consistent with common sense and reason is this: that the entirety which has been expressly and definitely given, shall not be prejudiced by an imperfect and inaccurate enumeration of the particulars of the specific gift" (i).

(d) *Per* Alderson, B., 4 Exch. 604; see also, *per* Parke, B., *Llewellyn v. Earl of Jersey*, 11 M. & W. 189.

(e) D. 33, 4, 1, § 8.

(f) See *Cowen v. Truefitt*, *supra*.

(g) Hob. 171.

(h) *Travers v. Blundell*, 6 Ch. D. 436, 445. See *Harrison v. Hyde*, 4 H. & N. 805; *Josh v. Josh*, 5 C. B.

N. S. 454; Com. Dig., "*Fait*" (E. 4); *Cambridge v. Rous*, 8 Ves. 12; 6 R. R. 199; *Enohin v. Wylie*, 10 H. L. Cas. 1.

(i) *Per* Ld. Westbury, *West v. Lawday*, 11 H. L. Cas. 384. See also, *per* Lefroy, C.J., *Roe v. Lidwell*, 11 Ir. C. L. R. 326, cited *arg. Skull v. Glenister*, 16 C. B. N. S.

Cum de corpore constat.

The maxim is often cited without the addition of the words, *cum de corpore constat* (*k*), but these words seem to be of some importance; for it has been said that the maxim applies only—as expressed by Lord Kenyon in *Thomas v. Thomas* (*l*)—to cases “in which the false demonstration is superadded to that which was sufficiently certain before” (*m*). The doctrine, *falsa demonstratio non nocet*, applies “only where the words of the devise, exclusive of the *falsa demonstratio*, are sufficient of themselves to describe the property intended to be devised, reference being had, if necessary, to the situation of the premises, to the names by which they have been known, or to other circumstances properly pointing to the meaning of the description” (*n*).

The foregoing observations are, in the main, applicable not only to wills, but to other instruments (*o*); so that the characteristic of cases strictly within the above rule is this, that the description, so far as it is false, applies to no subject, and, so far as it is true, applies only to one subject; and the Court, in these cases, rejects no words save words shown to have no application to any subject (*p*). The following case shows the anxiety of the Court to give effect to a testator’s intention, where the subject-matter of the bequest is inaccurately described, but is capable of explanation by extrinsic evidence. A testator by his will

89; *In re Brockett, Dawes v. Miller*, [1908] 1 Ch. 185; 77 L. J. Ch. 245.

(*k*) Or “*cum de personâ constat*,” see 6 T. R. 676. The maxim is cited in full in the judgment, 6 Ch. D. 444.

(*l*) 6 T. R. 671, 676. See *Mosley v. Massey*, 8 East, 149; *per Parke, J.*, *Doe v. Galloway*, 5 B. & Ad. 51; 39 R. R. 381; *Dyne v. Nutley*, 14 C. B. 122; *per Littledale, J.*, *Doe v. Bower*, 3 B. & Ad. 549; 37 R. R. 466; *Gynes v. Kemsley*, 1 Freem. 293; Hoh. 32, 65, 171; Vin. Abr., “Devise” (T. b.), pl. 4.

(*m*) *Per Wightman, J.*, *Doe v. Hubbard*, 15 Q. B. 240.

(*n*) *Per Patteson, J.*, 15 Q. B. 241.

(*o*) *Lond. Gr. Junction R. Co. v. Freeman*, 2 Scott, N. R. 705, 748. See *Reg. v. Wilcock*, 7 Q. B. 317; *Jack v. McIntyre*, 12 Cl. & F. 151; *Ormerod v. Chadwick*, 16 M. & W. 367; followed by *Wightman, J.*, *Reg. v. Stretfield*, 32 L. J. M. C. 236.

(*p*) See *Wigram, Ex. Ev.*, 4th ed., 145, 165; *Judgm., Morrell v. Fisher*, 4 Exch. 604; *Mann v. Mann*, 14 Johns. (U.S.), R. 1.

gave an annuity of £21 per annum, which "I purchased of" G. He had no annuity of that amount, but he had an annuity of £46 which he had purchased from G., and he had insured G.'s life for the amount of the purchase-money, at the yearly premium of £25, leaving £21 as his beneficial interest in the annuity. It was held that the entire annuity of £46 per annum passed by the bequest (q).

Where accordingly a question involving the legal doctrine now before us arises upon a will, we must inquire whether there is a devise of a thing certain; if there be, the addition of an untrue circumstance will not vitiate the devise (r).

In *Selwood v. Mildmay* (s), the testator devised to his wife part of his stock in the £4 per cent. Annuities of the Bank of England, and it was shown, by parol evidence, that at the time he made his will he had no stock in the £4 per cent. Annuities, but that he had had some, which he had sold out, and the proceeds of which he had invested in Long Annuities. It was held that the bequest was, in substance, a bequest of stock, using the words as a denomination, not as the identical *corpus* of the stock; and as none could be found to answer the description but the Long Annuities, it was decided that such stock should pass, rather than the will be altogether inoperative. Again, a testatrix, by her will, bequeathed several legacies of £3 per cent. Consols standing in her name in the books of the Bank of England; but, at the date of her will, as well as of her death, she possessed no such stock, nor stock of any kind whatever. It was held that, the ambiguity in this case being latent, evidence was admissible

*Selwood v.
Mildmay.*

(q) *Purchase v. Shallis*, 14 Jur. 403; cf. *Re Rowe*, [1898] 1 Ch. 153; 67 L. J. Ch. 87.

(r) Plowd. 191; cited and adopted in *Nightingall v. Smith*, 1 Exch. 886; and, *per Parke, B., Morrell v.*

Fisher, 4 Exch. 599. And, as illustrating the passage above cited, cf. *Doe v. Hubbard*, 15 Q. B. 227, with *Doe v. Carpenter*, 16 Id. 181.

(s) 3 Ves. 306; cf. *Re Weeding*, [1896] 2 Ch. 364.

to show how the mistake of the testatrix arose, and to discover her intention (*t*).

But where a testatrix died possessed of property in Consols, Reduced Annuities, and Bank Stock, and by her will bequeathed "the whole of my fortune now standing in the Funds to E. S." it was held that the Bank Stock did not pass (*u*).

On the same principle, in the case of a lease of part of a park, described as being in the occupation of S., and as lying within specified abuttals, with all houses belonging thereto, and "which are now in the occupation of S.": it was held that a house, situate within the abuttals, but not in the occupation of S., would pass (*x*). So, where an estate is devised, called A., and described as in the occupation of B., and it is found that, though there is an estate called A., yet the whole is not in B.'s occupation (*y*); or, where an estate is devised to a person whose surname or Christian name is mistaken, or whose description is imperfect or inaccurate: in these cases parol evidence is admissible to show what estate was intended to pass, or who was the devisee intended to take, provided there is sufficient indication of intention appearing on the face of the will to justify the application of the evidence (*z*). Thus, a devise of all the testator's freehold houses in Aldersgate Street, where, in fact, he had no freehold, but had leasehold houses, was held to pass the latter, the word "freehold" being rejected (*a*); the rule being, that, where any

Rule applicable to will.

(*t*) *Lindgren v. Lindgren*, 9 Beav. 358; citing *Selwood v. Mildway*, 3 Ves. 306; 4 R. R. 1; *Miller v. Travers*, 8 Bing. 244; 34 R. R. 703; and *Doe v. Hiscocks*, 5 M. & W. 363.

(*u*) *Slingsby v. Grainger*, 7 H. L. Cas. 273.

(*x*) *Doe v. Galloway*, 5 B. & Ad. 43; 39 R. R. 381; *Beaumont v. Field*, 1 B. & Ald. 247; 19 R. R. 308; 3 Preston Abstr. Tit. 206; *Doe*

v. Parry, 13 M. & W. 356.

(*y*) *Goodtitle v. Southern*, 1 M. & S. 299; 14 R. R. 435.

(*z*) Judgm., *Miller v. Travers*, 8 Bing. 248; 34 R. R. 703; *Doe v. Hiscocks*, 5 M. & W. 363; *Rishton v. Cobb*, 5 My. & Cr. 145; see *Re Boddington*, 25 Ch. D. 685; *Re Waller*, 68 L. J. Ch. 526.

(*a*) *Day v. Trig*, 1 P. Wms. 286; *Doe v. Cranstoun*, 7 M. & W. See

property described in a will is sufficiently ascertained by the description, it passes under the devise, although *all* the particulars stated in the will with reference to it may not be true (b). In other words, *nil facit error nominis cum de corpore vel personâ constat* (c). "It is fit, and therefore required," observed Mr. Preston (d), "that things should be described by their proper names; but, though this be the general rule, it admits of many exceptions, for things may pass under any denomination by which they have been usually distinguished."

In a case (e), where property was devised to the second son of *Edward W.*, of L., this devise was held, upon the context of the will, and upon extrinsic evidence as to the state of the W. family, and the degree of the testator's acquaintance with the different members of it, to mean a devise to the second son of *Joseph W.*, of L., although it appeared that there was in fact a person named *Edward Joseph W.*, the eldest son of *Joseph W.*, who resided at L., and who usually went by the name of *Edward* only; and it was remarked that, according to the general rule of law and of construction, if there had been two persons, each fully and accurately answering the whole description, evidence might be received, or arguments from the language of the will, and from circumstances, be adduced, to show to which of those persons the will applied; but that where one person, and only one, fully and accurately answers the whole description, the Court is bound to apply the will to that person. It was, however, further observed that an exception would occur in applying the above rule, where

Blundell v. Gladstone.

Parker v. Marchant, 6 Scott, N. R. 485; *Goodman v. Edwards*, 2 My. & K. 759; 39 R. R. 348; *Hobson v. Blackburn*, 1 My. & K. 571: 36 R. R. 381.

(b) *Per Parke, B., Doe v. Cranstoun*, 7 M. & W. 10; *Newton v. Lucas*, 1 My. & Cr. 391.

(c) See *Janes v. Whitbread*, 11 C. B. 406; and *Stanley v. Stanley*, 2 J. & H. 491.

(d) 3 Prest. Abst. Tit. 206; 6 Rep. 66.

(e) *Blundell v. Gladstone*, 1 Phil. 279; S. C. *nom. Ld. Camoys v. Blundell*, 1 H. L. Cas. 778.

it would lead to a construction of a devise manifestly contrary to what was the intention of the testator, as expressed by his will, and that the rule must be rejected as inapplicable to a case in which it would defeat instead of promoting the object for which all rules of construction have been framed (*f*).

Restriction
of rule.

Miller v.
Travers.

Although an averment to take away surplusage is good, yet it is not so to increase that which is defective in the will of the testator (*h*); and, it has been observed (*i*), that there "is a diversity where a certainty is added to a thing which is uncertain, and where to a thing certain." In a leading case on this subject (*h*), testator devised all his freehold and real estates in the county of L. and city of L. It appeared that he had no estates in the county of L., a small estate in the city of L., inadequate to meet the charges in the will, and estates in the county of C., not mentioned in the will. It was held that parol evidence was inadmissible to show the testator's intention that his real estates in the county of C. should pass by his will. For it was observed that this would be not merely calling in the aid of extrinsic evidence to apply the intention of the testator, as it was to be collected from the will itself, to the existing state of his property: it would be calling in aid extrinsic evidence to introduce into the will an intention not apparent upon the face of it. It would be not simply removing a difficulty arising from a defective or mistaken description, it would be making the will speak upon a subject on which it was altogether silent, and would be the

(*f*) For later cases on false description of beneficiaries in a will, see *Anderson v. Berkley*, [1902] 1 Ch. 936; 71 L. J. Ch. 444; *Blake's Trusts, In re*, [1904] 1 Ir. R. 98; *Sharp, In re: Maddison v. Gill*, [1908] 2 Ch. 190; 77 L. J. Ch. 724.

(*h*) *Per Anderson, C.J.*, Godb. 131, recognised 8 Bing. 253; *per* Ld. Eldon, 6 Ves. jun. 397.

(*i*) See, *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Doe v. Greathed*, 8 East, 103; Hob. R., 172; *Doe v. Ashley*, 10 Q. B. 663.

(*h*) *Miller v. Travers*, 8 Bing. 244; 34 R. R. 703. See the observations on this decision by Sir J. Wigram, in the treatise already referred to, and, *per* Ld. Brougham, *Mostyn v. Mostyn*, 5 H. L. Cas. 168.

same thing in effect as the filling up a blank which the testator might have left in his will: it would amount, in short, by the admission of parol evidence, to the making of a new devise for the testator, which he was supposed to have omitted (*l*).

If, then, with all the light which can be thrown upon the instrument by evidence as to the meaning of the description, there appears to be no person or thing answering in any respect thereto, it seems, that, to admit evidence of a different description being intended to be used by the writer, would be to admit evidence for the substitution of one person or thing for another, in violation of the rule, that an averment is not good to increase that which is defective in a written instrument (*m*). Accordingly where a testator by his will appointed Francis Courtenay Thorpe, gentleman, as one of his executors, and there was living a youth of twelve years of age who alone answered the description, evidence to show that the testator referred to the father of the youth was not admitted (*n*).

Included in the maxim as to *falsa demonstratio*, is the rule laid down by Lord Bacon in these words: *præsentia corporis tollit errorem nominis, et veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis* (*o*); which he thus illustrated: "If I give a horse to J. D., when present, and to say to him, 'J. S. take

*Præsentia
corporis tollit
errorem
nominis.*

(*l*) 8 Bing. 249, 250.

(*m*) 2 Phil. Evid., 10th ed. 345.

(*n*) *R. v. Peel*, L. R. 2 P. & D. 46.

(*o*) Bac. Max., reg. 24; 6 Rep. 66; 1 Ld. Raym. 303; 6 T. R. 675; *Doe v. Hulhwaite*, 3 B. & Ald. 640; 22 R. R. 508; *per* Gibbs, C.J., S. C., 8 Taunt. 313; *Nicoll v. Chambers*, 11 C. B. 996, and *Hopkins v. Hitchcock*, 14 C. B. N. S. 65, 73, where there was a misdescription of property in a contract of sale. As to the maxim *supra*, see the remarks of Ld. Brougham in *Ld. Camoys v. Blundell*, 1 H. L. Cas. 792, 793; *Mostyn v. Mostyn*, 5 H. L. Cas.

155; S. C., 3 De G. M. & G. 140.

In *Drake v. Drake*, 8 H. L. Cas. 179, Ld. Campbell observed, "There is a maxim that the name shall prevail against an error of demonstration; but then you must first show that there is an error of demonstration, and until you have shown that, the rule *veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis* does not apply. I think that there is no presumption in favour of the name more than of the demonstration."

The maxim was applied by Byles, J., *Way v. Hearn*, 13 C. B. N. S. 307.

this,' it is a good gift, notwithstanding I call him by a wrong name. So, if I say to a man, 'Here, I give you my ring with the ruby,' and deliver it, and the ring is set with a diamond, and not a ruby, yet this is a good gift. In like manner, if I grant my close, called 'Dale,' in the parish of Hurst, in the county of Southampton, and the parish extends also into the county of Berks, and the whole close of Dale lies, in fact, in the last-mentioned county, yet this false addition will not invalidate the grant (p). Moreover, where things are particularly described, as, 'My box of ivory lying in my study, sealed up with my seal of arms,' 'My suit of arras, with the story of the Nativity and Passion;' inasmuch as of such things there can only be a detailed and circumstantial description, so the precise truth of *all* the recited circumstances is not required; but, in these cases, the rule is, *ex multitudine signorum colligitur identitas vera*; therefore, though my box were not sealed, and though the arras had the story of the Nativity, and not of the Passion embroidered upon it, yet, if I had no other box and no other suit, the gifts would be valid, for there is certainty sufficient, and the law does not expect a precise description of such things as have no certain denomination. Where, however, the description applies accurately to some portion only of the subject-matter of the grant, but is false as to the residue, the former part only will pass; as, if I grant all my land in D., held by J. S., which I purchased of J. N., specified in a demise to J. D., and I have land in D., to a part of which the above description applies, and have also other lands in D., to which it is in some respects inapplicable, this grant will not pass all my land in D., but the former portion only" (q). So, if a man grant all his estate in his own occupation in the town of W., no estate

(p) See *Anstee v. Nelms*, 1 H. & N. 225; *per Byles, J., Rand v. Green*, 9 C. B. N. S. 477. 77, 78; Bac. Abr., "Grants" (H. 1); Toml. Law Dict. "Gift;" Noy, Max, 9th ed., p. 50.

(q) Bac. Works, vol. 4, pp. 73, 75,

can pass except what is in his own occupation and is also situate in that town (r).

In an important case (s) connected with criminal procedure, the maxim *præsentia corporis tollit errorem nominis* was judicially applied, the facts being these: Preparatory to a trial for murder, the name of A., a juror on the panel, was called, and B., another juror, on the same panel, appeared, and by mistake answered to the name of A., and was sworn as a juror. A conviction ensued, which a majority of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved held ought not to be set aside, one of the learned Judges thus founding his opinion upon the maxim cited:— “This mistake is not a mistake of the man, but only of his name. The very man who, having been duly summoned, and being duly qualified, looked upon the prisoner, and was corporeally presented and shown to the prisoner for challenge, was sworn and acted as a juror. At bottom the objection is but this, that the officer of the Court, the juror being present, called and addressed him by a wrong name. Now, it is an old and rational maxim of law, that where the party to a transaction, or the subject of a transaction, are either of them actually and corporeally present, the calling of either by a wrong name is immaterial. *Præsentia corporis tollit errorem nominis*. Lord Bacon, in his maxims (t), fully explains and copiously illustrates this rule of law and good sense, and shows how it applies, not only to persons, but to things. In this case, as soon as the prisoner omitted the challenge, and thereby in effect said, ‘I do not object to the juror there standing,’ there arose a compact between the Crown and the prisoner that the individual juror there standing corporeally present should try the case. It matters not, therefore, that some of the accidents of that individual, such as his name, his address, his occupation, should have been mistaken. *Constat de corpore*.”

(r) 7 Johns. (U.S.), R. 224.

M. C. 121.

(s) *Reg. v. Mellor*, 27 L. J.,

(t) *Ubi supra*.

Rules as to
construction
of grants.

The rules, it has been remarked (*u*), which govern the construction of grants have been settled with the greatest wisdom and accuracy. Such effect is to be given to the instrument as will effectuate the intention of the parties, if the words which they employ will admit of it, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*. Again, if there are certain particulars once sufficiently ascertained which designate the thing intended to be granted, the addition of a circumstance, false or mistaken, will not frustrate the grant (*x*). But when the description of the estate intended to be conveyed includes several particulars, all of which are necessary to ascertain the estate to be conveyed, no estate will pass except such as will agree with the description in every particular (*y*).

In *Doe v. Rouse* (*z*), Lord Bacon's maxim above cited was felicitously applied. There the testator—having a wife *Mary*, who survived him—went through the ceremony of marriage with a woman named *Caroline*, who continued to reside with him as his wife to the time of his death. Shortly before his death he devised property to “*my dear wife Caroline*.” It was held that *Caroline* took under this devise. “The testator,” observed Maule, J., “devises the premises in question to his dear wife Caroline. That is a devise to a person by name, and one which appears to be that of the lessor of the plaintiff. There is no competition with any one else of the same name, to whom it can be suggested that the will intended to refer. The only question is, whether the lessor of the plaintiff, not being the lawful wife of the testator, properly fills the description of his ‘*dear wife Caroline*.’ Formerly the name was held to be the important thing. This is shown by the 25th maxim

(*u*) *Jackson v. Clark*, 7 Johns. (U.S.) R. 223, 224; recognised 18 Id. 84.

(*x*) *Blayne v. Gold*, Cro. Car. 447, 473, where the rule was applied to a devise.

(*y*) 3 Atk. 9; Dyer, 50.

(*z*) 5 C. B. 422. The distinction must be noticed between a mere false description and a description amounting to a condition which must be fulfilled; see *Re Boddington*, 25 Ch. D. 685.

of Lord Bacon, to which I have before adverted :—‘ *Veritas nominis tollit errorem demonstrationis*. So, if I grant land *episcopo nunc Londinensi qui me erudit in pueritiâ* : this is a good grant, although he never instructed me.’ That rule has no doubt been relaxed in modern times, and has given place to another, that the construction of the devise is to be governed by the evident intention of the testator. There are cases in which the Courts have gone some length in opposition to the actual words of the will ; but always with a view to favouring the apparent or presumed intention of the testator. Here, however, the struggle against the old rule is not that the intention of the testator may be best effectuated by a departure from it, but to get rid of a devise to the person who was really intended to take. Here is a person fitly named, and there can be no reasonable doubt that she was the person intended. It being conceded that it was the testator’s intention that *Caroline* should have the property, and he having mentioned her by an apt description, I see no ground for holding that because the words ‘ my dear wife ’ are not strictly applicable to her, the intention of the testator should fail and the property go to some one to whom he did not mean to give it. *Caroline* was *de facto* the testator’s wife ; and she lived with him as such down to the time of his death. It is possible that the first marriage may not have been a valid one. At all events, if *Mary* was his lawful wife, all that can be said is that the testator had been guilty of bigamy. It is not the case of a description that is altogether inapplicable to the party, but of a description that is in a popular sense applicable. The competition is between one whom the testator clearly did mean, and another whom it is equally clear that he did not mean. Interpreting the language he has used in its proper and legitimate manner, and regard being had to the circumstances existing at the time of the execution of the will, there can be no doubt that the intention of the testator is best effectuated by holding that the lessor of the plaintiff is

the person designated, and that apt words have been used to convey the property in question to her."

Legal
intendment.

Lastly, the maxim, *non accipi debent verba in demonstrationem falsam quæ competent in limitationem veram* (a), embodies a rule which sets an important limit to the application of the maxim, *falsa demonstratio non nocet*; and this rule means that if it stand doubtful upon the words, whether they import a false reference or demonstration, or whether they be words of restraint that limit the generality of the former words, the law will never intend error or falsehood. If therefore there is some land wherein all the demonstrations are true, and some wherein part are true and part false, they shall be intended words of true limitation, to pass only those lands wherein all those circumstances are true (b). The doctrine relating to the rejection of *falsa demonstratio* never can be properly applied where there is a property which every part of the description fits and on which every word thereof has full effect (c). Where terms can be applied so as to operate on a subject-matter and limit the other terms employed in its description—or, in other words, where there is a subject-matter to which they all apply—it is not possible to reject any of those terms as a *falsa demonstratio* (d). If all the terms of the description fit some particular property, you cannot enlarge them by extrinsic evidence so as to include anything which any part of those terms does not accurately fit (e). If a man pass lands, describing them by particular references, all of which references are true, the Court cannot reject any one of them (f).

(a) Bac. Max., reg. 13.

(b) Bac. Max., reg. 13, *ad finem*; per Parke, J., *Doe v. Bower*, 3 B. & Ad. 459, 460: 37 R. R. 466; *Doe v. Oxenden*, 3 Taunt. 147: 12 R. R. 619; Judgm., *Morrell v. Fisher*, 4 Exch. 604; per Willes, J., *Josh v. Josh*, 5 C. B. N. S. 463.

(c) Judgm., *Webber v. Stanley*, 16

C. B. N. S. 698, 752; see also *Re Seal*, [1894] 1 Ch. 316: 63 L. J. Ch. 275.

(d) Judgm., *Smith v. Ridgway*, L. R. 1 Ex. 332, 333.

(e) Per Ld. Selborne, *Hardwick v. Hardwick*, L. R. 16 Eq. 175.

(f) Per Le Blanc, J., *Doe v. Lyford*, 4 M. & S. 557: 16 R. R. 537.

Before concluding these remarks, it may be well to state shortly the rules respecting ambiguity and *falsa demonstratio*, in connection with the exposition of wills, which seem to be applicable to four classes of cases :—

Rules as to
wills restated.

1. Where the description of the thing devised, or of the devisee, is clear upon the face of the will, but, upon the death of the testator, it is found that there is more than one estate or subject-matter of devise, or more than one person whose description follows out and fills the words used in the will : in this case parol evidence is admissible to show what thing was intended to pass, or who was intended to take (*g*).

2. Where the description contained in the will of the thing intended to be devised, or of the person who is intended to take, is true in part, but not true in every particular : in this class of cases parol evidence is admissible to show what estate was intended to pass, and who was the devisee intended to take, provided there is a sufficient indication of intention appearing on the face of the will to justify the application of the evidence (*g*).

3. A third class of cases may arise, in which a judge, if he knew *aliunde* for whom or for what an imperfect description was intended, would discover a sufficient certainty to act upon ; although, if ignorant of the intention, he would be far from finding judicial certainty in the words of the devise ; and here it would seem that evidence of intention would not be admissible, the description being, *as it stands*, so imperfect as to be useless, unless aided thereby (*h*).

4. It may be laid down as a true proposition, which is indeed included within that secondly above given, that, if the description of the person or thing be wholly inapplicable to the subject intended or said to be intended by it, evidence is inadmissible to prove whom or what the testator really intended to describe (*i*).

(*g*) 8 Bing. 248.

ed. 167.

(*h*) See Wigram, Extrin. Ev., 4th

(*i*) Id. 168.

Lastly, we may observe that the maxim, *falsa demonstratio non nocet*, which we have been considering, obtained in the Roman law (*k*); for we find it laid down in the Institutes, that an error in the proper name or in the surname of the legatee should not make the legacy void, provided it could be understood from the will what person was intended to be benefited thereby. *Si quidem in nomine, cognomine, prænominē legatarii testator erraverit, cum de personâ constat, nihilominus valet legatum* (*l*). So, it was a rule akin to the preceding, that *falsâ demonstratione legatum non perimi* (*m*), as if the testator bequeathed his bondman, Stichus, whom he bought of Titius, whereas Stichus had been given to him or purchased by him of some other person; in such a case the misdescription would not avoid the bequest (*n*).

It is evident that the maxims above cited, and others to a similar purport which occur both in the civil law and in our own reports, are, in fact, deducible from those very general principles with the consideration of which we commenced this chapter—*Benigne faciendæ sunt interpretationes, et verba intentioni non e contra debent inservire* (*o*).

(*k*) See Phillim., Roman L., 35.

(*l*) I. 2, 20, 29; compare D. 30, 1, 4; also, 2 Domat. Bk. 2, tit. 1, s. 6, § 10, 19; s. 8, § 11.

(*m*) I. 2, 20, 30. See *Whitfield v. Clement*, 1 Mer. 402; 15 R. R. 143.

(*n*) I. 2, 20, 30; Wood, Inst., 3rd ed. 165.

(*o*) It may probably be unnecessary to remind the reader that the

cases decided with reference to the rule of construction considered in the preceding pages are exceedingly numerous, and that such only have been noticed as seemed peculiarly adapted to the purposes of illustration. A similar remark is equally applicable to the other maxims commented on in this chapter.

VERBA GENERALIA RESTRINGUNTUR AD HABILITATEM REI VEL PERSONÆ. (*Bac. Max. reg. 10.*)—*General words may be aptly restrained according to the matter or person to which they relate (p).*

"It is a rule," observed Lord Bacon (*q*), "that the king's grant shall not be taken or construed to a special intent. It is not so with the grants of a common person, for they shall be extended as well to a foreign intent as to a common intent, but yet with this exception, that they shall never be taken to an impertinent or repugnant intent; for all words, whether they be in deeds or statutes, or otherwise, if they be general, and not express and precise, shall be restrained unto the fitness of the matter and the person" (*r*).

Rule as laid down and illustrated by Lord Bacon.

Thus, if I grant common "in all my lands" in D., if I have in D. both open grounds and several, it shall not be stretched to common in my several grounds, much less in my garden or orchard. So, if I grant to J. S. an annuity of £10 a year, "*pro concilio impenso et impendendo*" (for past and future council), if J. S. be a physician, this shall be understood of his advice in physic, and, if he be a lawyer, of his council in legal matters (*s*). And in accordance with the same principle a right of common of turbary claimed by

(*p*) *Per Willes, J., Moore v. Rawlins*, 6 C. B. N. S. 320; citing *Payler v. Homersham*, 4 M. & S. 423: 16 R. R. 516; and in *Chorlton v. Lings*, L. R. 4 C. P. 387.

General words may be controlled by the recital in an instrument. See *Bank of British N. America v. Cavillier*, 14 Moo. P. C. C. 187, and cases there cited.

(*q*) *Bac. Max., reg. 10*; 6 Rep. 62.

(*r*) The maxim was accordingly applied to restrain the words of a general covenant by a railway company to "work efficiently" a line

demised to them—the covenant being construed "with a reference to the subject-matter and the character of the defendants." *West L. R. Co. v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 11 C. B. 254, 356.

Though a release be general in its terms, its operation will, at law, in conformity with the doctrine recognised in courts of equity, be limited to matters contemplated by the parties at the time of its execution; *Lyall v. Edwards*, 6 H. & N. 337.

(*s*) *Bac. Works*, vol. 4, p. 46. See *Com. Dig., "Condition"* (K. 4).

prescription and user has been held to be restrained to those parts of the *locus in quo* in which it could be used (*t*).

Additional
illustrations.

In accordance, likewise, with the above maxim, the subject-matter of an agreement is to be considered in construing its terms, and they are to be understood in the sense most agreeable to the nature of the agreement (*u*). If a deed relates only to a particular subject, general words in it shall be confined to that subject, otherwise they must be taken in their general sense (*x*). The words of the condition of a bond "cannot be taken at large, but must be tied up to the particular matters of the recital" (*y*), unless, indeed, the condition itself is manifestly designed to be extended beyond the recital (*z*); and, further, it is a rule, that what is generally spoken shall be generally understood, *generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda* (*a*), unless it be qualified by some special subsequent words, as it may be (*b*); *ex. gr.*, the operative words of a bill of sale may be restricted by what follows (*c*).

Principles of
construction.

Rules upon
this subject.

In construing the words of any instrument, then, it is proper to consider, 1st, what is their meaning in the largest

(*t*) *Peardon v. Underhill*, 16 Q. B. 120.

(*u*) 1 T. R. 703.

(*x*) *Thorpe v. Thorpe*, 1 Ld. Raym. 235; S. C., Id. 662.

(*y*) *Per Eyre, J.*, Gilb., Cas. 240. See *Seller v. Jones*, 16 M. & W. 112, 118; *Stoughton v. Day*, Aleyn, 10; *Ld. Arlington v. Merrick*, 2 Saund. 414; as to which, see *Mayor of Berwick v. Oswald*, 3 E. & B. 653; S. C., 5 H. L. Cas. 856; *Kitson v. Julian*, 4 E. & B. 854, 858; *Napier v. Bruce*, 8 Cl. & F. 470; *N. W. R. Co. v. Whinray*, 10 Exch. 77.

(*z*) *Sansom v. Bell*, 2 Camp. 39; Com. Dig., "Parols" (A. 19); *Evans v. Earle*, 10 Exch. 1.

(*a*) 3 Inst. 76.

(*b*) *Shep. Touch.* 88; Co. Litt. 42 a; Com. Dig. "Parols" (A. 7).

(*c*) *Wood v. Rowcliffe*, 6 Exch. 407. See, also, with reference to a release, the authority cited, *ante*, p. 499, n. (*r*).

Where the words in the operative part of a deed of conveyance are of doubtful meaning, the recitals and other parts of the deed may be used as a test to discover the intention of the parties, and to fix the true meaning of those words: *Judgm., Welsh v. Trevanion*, 15 Q. B. 751. See, also, *Young v. Raincock*, 7 C. B. 310.

As to the mode of construing a deed containing restrictive covenants, see, *per Dallas, C.J.*, *Nind v. Marshall*, 1 B. & B. 348, 349: 21 R. R. 610; cited *arg.*, *Crossfield v. Morrison*, 7 C. B. 302.

sense which, according to the common use of language, belongs to them (*d*) ; and, if it should appear that that sense is larger than the sense in which they must be understood in the instrument in question, then, 2ndly, what is the object for which they are used. They ought not to be extended beyond their ordinary sense in order to comprehend a case within their object, for that would be to give effect to an intention not expressed ; nor can they be so restricted as to exclude a case both within their object and within their ordinary sense, without violating the fundamental rule, which requires that effect should be given to such intention of the parties as they have used fit words to express (*e*). Thus, in a settlement, the preamble usually recites what it is which the grantor intends to do, and this, like the preamble to an Act of Parliament, is the key to what comes afterwards. It is very common, moreover, to put in a sweeping clause, the object of which is to guard against any accidental omission ; but in such cases it is meant to refer to estates or things of the same nature and description as those which have been already mentioned, and such general words are not allowed to extend further than was clearly intended by the parties (*f*).

In construing a deed of grant clear words of conveyance cannot be controlled by words of recital (*g*). But if the words of conveyance are general and not specific, they may be controlled by a specific recital. The lord of the manor of E., which was situate in the parish of K. in the county of M., being also entitled to other real estate in K., not parcel of the manor, mortgaged to A. this real estate, not including the manor. Afterwards, by a deed reciting that he was seised of or entitled to the messuages, lands, hereditaments,

Deed recital
controlling
words of
conveyance.

(*d*) 3 Inst. 76.

(*e*) *Per* Maule, J., *Borradaile v. Hunter*, 5 Scott, N. R., 431, 432. See *Moseley v. Motteux*, 10 M. & W. 533.

(*f*) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Moore v. Magrath*, 1 Cowp. 12 ; *Shep. Touch.*, by Atherly, 79, u.

(*g*) *Mackenzie v. Duke of Devonshire*, [1896] A. C. 400.

and premises thereafter intended to be conveyed, subject to the mortgage to A., he conveyed to B., by way of mortgage, all the property comprised in the mortgage to A., and "all other the lands, tenements, and hereditaments in the county of M., whereof or whereto the mortgagor is seised or entitled for any estate of inheritance." It was held that the manor of K. was not included in the mortgage to B. (*h*).

Rule appli-
cable to wills.

So, in construing a will, a court of justice is not by conjecture to take out of the effect of general words property which those words are always considered as comprehending the best rule of construction being that which takes the words to comprehend a subject which falls within their usual sense, unless there is something like declaration plain to the contrary (*i*). Thus, it is a certain rule, that reversions are held to be included in the general words of a devise, unless a manifest intention to the contrary appears on the face of the will (*k*).

Again, it is a well-known rule that a devise of an indefinite estate by will before 1838, without words of limitation, is *primâ facie* a devise for life only; but this rule will give way to a different intention, if such can be collected from the instrument, and the estate may be accordingly enlarged (*l*). So, words which would *primâ facie* give an estate tail may be cut down to a life estate, if it plainly appear that they were used as words of purchase only, or if the other provisions of the will show a general intent inconsistent with the particular gift (*m*).

(*h*) *Rooke v. Ld. Kensington*, 2 K. & J. 753; see further *Jenner v. Jenner*, L. R. 1 Eq. 361; *Crompton v. Jarratt*, 30 Ch. D. 298.

(*i*) *Per Ld. Eldon, Church v. Mundy*, 15 Ves. 396; adopted by Tindal, C.J., *Doe v. Thomas*, 1 Scott, N. R. 371; and by Ld. Esher, *Anderson v. Anderson*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 749, 753: 64 L. J. Q. B. 457.

(*k*) 1 Scott, N. R. 371.

(*l*) *Doe v. Garlick*, 14 M. & W. 698; *Doe v. Fawcett*, 3 C. B. 274; *Lewis v. Puxley*, 16 M. & W. 733. See 1 Vict. c. 26, s. 28.

In *Hogan v. Jackson*, 1 Cowp. 299 (affirmed 3 Bro. P. C., 2nd ed. 388), the effect of general words in a will was much considered.

(*m*) *Fetherston v. Fetherston*, 3 Cl. & F. 75, 76.

The doctrine, however, that the general intent must overrule the particular intent, observed Lord Denman, has, when applied to the construction of wills, been much and justly objected to of late, as being, as a general proposition, incorrect and vague, and likely to lead in its application to erroneous results. In its origin it was merely descriptive of the operation of the rule in *Shelley's case* (n); and it has since been laid down in other cases where technical words of limitation have been used, and other words, showing the intention of the testator that the objects of his bounty should take in a different way from that which the law allows, have been rejected; but in the latter cases the more correct mode of stating the rule of construction is, that technical words, or words of known legal import, must have their legal effect, even though the testator uses inconsistent words, unless those inconsistent words are of such a nature as to make it perfectly clear that the testator did not mean to use the technical words in their proper sense (o). The doctrine of general and particular intent, thus explained, should be applied to all wills (p), in conjunction with the rule already considered, viz., that every part of that which the testator meant by the words he has used should be carried into effect as far as the law will permit, but no further; and that no part should be rejected, except what the law makes it necessary to reject (q).

With what qualification.

Lastly, it is said to be a good rule of construction, that, "where an Act of Parliament begins with words which describe things or persons of an inferior degree and concludes with general words, the general words shall not be

Statute—a rule to be observed in construing.

(n) See *Van Grutten v. Foxwell*, [1897] A. C. 658, 663; 66 L. J. Q. B. 745.

(o) See *Judgm., Toller v. Wright*, 15 Q. B. 954, and cases there cited.

(p) *Judgm., Doe v. Gallini*, 5 B. & Ad. 621, 640; 39 R. R. 580;

Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh, 57; 21 R. R. 1; *Roddy v. Fitzgerald*, 6 H. L. Cas. 823; *Jordan v. Adams*, 9 C. B. N. S. 483; *Jenkins v. Hughes*, 8 H. L. Cas. 571.

(q) *Judgm.*, 5 B. & Ad. 641; 39 R. R. 580.

extended to any thing or person of a higher degree" (r); that is to say, "where a particular class (of persons or things) is spoken of, and general words follow, the class first mentioned is to be taken as the most comprehensive, and the general words treated as referring to matters *ejusdem generis* with such class" (s), the effect of general words when they follow particular words being thus restricted (t).

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS. (*Co. Litt.* 210 a.)

—The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another.

Rule stated
and illus-
trated.

This rule, or, as it is otherwise worded, *expressum facit cessare tacitum* (u), enunciates one of the first principles applicable to the construction of written instruments (x); for instance, it seems plainly to exclude any increase of an estate by implication, where there is an estate expressly limited by will (y); and an implied covenant is to be controlled within the limits of an express covenant (z). Where a lease contains an express covenant by the tenant to repair,

(r) *Archb. of Canterbury's case*, 2 Rep. 46 a; see 1 Bing. 373 : 2 B. & Ad. 594 : 7 Exch. 772 : L. R. 7 C. P. 403.

(s) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *Lynden v. Stanbridge*, 2 H. & N. 51; *per* Ld. Campbell, *Reg. v. Edmundson*, 2 E. & E. 83; *Gibbs v. Lawrence*, 30 L. J. Ch. 170.

"Where a general enactment is followed by a special enactment on the same subject, the later enactment overrides and controls the earlier one;" *per* Erle, C.J., 14 C. B. N. S. 433.

The rule stated in the text applies also to deeds and agreements; see, for instance, *Agar v. Athenæum Life*

Ass. Soc., 3 C. B. N. S. 725.

(t) See *Reg. v. Cleworth*, 4 B. & S. 927, 934.

(u) *Co. Litt.* 210 a, 183 b.

(x) See *per* Ld. Denman, 5 Bing. N. C. 185.

(y) *Per* Crompton, J., *Roddy v. Fitzgerald*, 6 H. L. Cas. 856.

(z) *Nokes' case*, 4 Rep. 80; S. C., Cro. Eliz. 674; *Merrill v. Frame*, 4 Taunt. 329; 13 R. R. 612; *Gainsford v. Griffith*, 1 Saund. R. 58; Vaugh. R. 126; *Deering v. Farrington*, 1 Ld. Raym. 14, 19; *Mathew v. Blackmore*, 1 H. & N. 762. See *Bower v. Hodges*, 13 C. B. 765; *Rashleigh v. S. E. R. Co.*, 10 C. B. 612; and *post*, p. 610.

there can be no implied contract to repair arising from the relation of landlord and tenant (a). So, although the word "demise" in a lease implies a covenant for title and a covenant for quiet enjoyment, yet both branches of such implied covenant are restrained by an express covenant for quiet enjoyment (b). And, where parties have entered into written engagements with express stipulations, it is manifestly not desirable to extend them by implications; the presumption is, that having expressed *some*, they have expressed *all* the conditions by which they intend to be bound under that instrument (c).

It is an ordinary rule that "if authority is given expressly, though by affirmative words, upon a defined condition, the expression of that condition excludes the doing of the act authorised, under other circumstances than those so defined: *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*" (d). In the *Queen v. Eastern Archipelago Co.* (e), a company had been incorporated under Royal charter, which contained a proviso

(a) *Standen v. Christmas*, 10 Q. B. 135, 141; as to which see *per* Bramwell, B., *Churchward v. Ford*, 2 H. & N. 446; and see *Gott v. Gandy*, 2 E. & B. 847.

"The authorities cited in the text-books establish these rules, that where there is a *general* covenant to repair and keep and leave in repair, the inference is that the lessee undertakes to repair newly erected buildings. On the other hand, where the covenant is to repair, and keep and leave in repair the *demised buildings*, no such liability arises:" *per* Channell, B., *Cornish v. Cleiff*, 3 H. & C. 451.

(b) *Line v. Stephenson*, 5 Bing. N. C. 183; *Merrill v. Frame*, 4 Taunt. 329; 13 R. R. 612; *per* Ld. St. Leonards, *Monypenny v. Monypenny*, 9 H. L. Cas. 139. See *Messent v. Reynolds*, 3 C. B. 194; *Baynes v. Lloyd*, [1895] 2 Q. B.

610. By 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, the word "give" or "grant" in a deed executed after 1st Oct. 1845, does not imply any covenant in law in respect of any hereditament, except by force of some Act of Parliament. A covenant for quiet enjoyment, however, is implied by the word "demise" in a lease for years; and this implication was not taken away by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 76, or 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106.

(c) *Judgm., Aspdin v. Austin*, 5 Q. B. 683, 684; *Dunn v. Sayles*, Id. 685; *Emmens v. Elderton*, 4 H. L. Cas. 624; *McGuire v. Scully*, Beatt. 370. As to *Aspdin v. Austin*, see *per* Crompton, J., *Worthington v. Ludlow*, 2 B. & S. 516.

(d) *Per* Willes, J., *N. Stafford Steel Co. v. Ward*, L. R. 3 Ex. 177.

(e) 1 E. & B. 310; S. C., 2 Id. 856.

that it should be lawful for the Queen, by any writing under the Great Seal or sign manual, to revoke the charter, under circumstances which subsequently happened. The charter was not revoked in the manner mentioned in the proviso, but proceedings were taken under a *scire facias* to repeal it. It was objected that the only mode of getting rid of the charter was the one given by the proviso. The Judges were equally divided in opinion, and consequently a rule to arrest judgment, on the ground that the declaration did not show that the Queen had, by writing under the Great Seal or sign manual, revoked the charter, was lost. The following observations of Coleridge, J., in delivering judgment, seem pertinent to the subject under consideration: "Whatever might be the condition of grantees under other charters, in this charter the law and mode of revocation was specially laid down in this sentence (*i.e.*, the proviso). These grantees were to understand they held this charter subject to this power of revocation and this only. Commonly speaking, *expressum facit cessare tacitum*, and this would seem a case in which the wholesome maxim eminently applies" (*f*).

Caution
requisite in
applying rule.

Great caution is necessary in dealing with the maxim *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* (*g*), for, as Lord Campbell observed in *Saunders v. Evans* (*h*), it is not of universal application, but depends upon the intention of the party as discoverable upon the face of the instrument or of the transaction; thus, where *general words* are used in a written instrument, it is necessary, in the first instance, to determine whether those general words are intended to include other matters besides such as are specifically mentioned, or to be

(*f*) 1 E. & B. 342.

(*g*) To show the caution necessary in applying the maxim may be cited *Price v. G. W. R. Co.*, 16 M. & W. 244; *Attwood v. Small*, 6 Cl. & F. 482; *London J. S. Bank v. Mayor of London*, 1 C. P. D. 17; *Colquhoun*

v. Brooks, 21 Q. B. D. 65, where the maxim was described as "a valuable servant, but a dangerous master."

(*h*) 8 H. L. Cas. 729; and see, *per* Dr. Lushington, *The Amalia*, 32 L. J., P. M. & A. 194.

referable exclusively to them, in which latter case only can the above maxim be properly applied (*i*). Where, moreover, an expression, which is *primâ facie* a word of qualification, is introduced, the true meaning of the word can only be ascertained by an examination of the entire instrument, reference being had to those ordinary rules of construction to which we have already adverted (*j*).

In illustration of the maxim under consideration, the following cases (*k*) may be mentioned. An action of covenant was brought upon a charter-party whereby the defendant covenanted to pay freight for "goods delivered at A.;" the ship had been wrecked at B. while on her voyage to A.; it was held that freight could not be recovered *pro rata itineris*, although the defendant accepted the goods at B.; for, the action being on the original agreement, the defendant had a right to say in answer to it, *non hæc in fœdera veni* (*l*). In order to recover freight *pro rata itineris*, the owner must, in such a case, proceed on the new agreement implied by law from the merchant's behaviour (*m*). Again, where a mortgage deed contained a covenant by the mortgagor that he would out of the monies to come to him from certain lands pay to the mortgagee the principal and interest secured by the mortgage deed, it was held that an action by the mortgagee against the mortgagor for money lent would not lie, on the ground that the parties had expressly stated the

Examples.

(*i*) See *Petch v. Tutin*, 15 M. & W. 110. Cf. *per* Bowen, L.J., *Skinner v. Shew*, [1893] 1 Ch. 424: 62 L. J. Ch. 196.

(*j*) In *Doe v. Ingleby*, 15 M. & W. 465, 472, the maxim was applied, by Parke, B., *diss.*, to a proviso for re-entry in a lease, and this case will serve to illustrate the above remark.

(*k*) See also *Reid v. Bickerstaff*, [1909] 2 Ch. 305, 321: 78 L. J. Ch. 753 (where the express mention, in a conveyance, of restrictive covenants contained in certain deeds

was held to exclude a reference by implication to covenants contained in other deeds not mentioned).

(*l*) *Cook v. Jennings*, 7 T. R. 381; 4 R. R. 468. See *Vlierboom v. Chapman*, 13 M. & W. 230.

In *Fowkes v. Manch. & L. Life Ass. Co.*, 3 B. & S. 917, 930, the principal maxim was applied to a policy of insurance. See 8 E. & B. 301.

(*m*) *Per* Lawrence, J., 7 T. R. 385; 4 R. R. 468; *Mitchell v. Darthez*, 2 Bing. N. C. 555, 571.

mode of payment, and therefore the implied promise to pay on demand as for money lent was excluded (n).

Again, on a mortgage of dwelling-houses, foundries, and other premises, "together with all grates, boilers, bells, and other fixtures in and about the said two dwelling-houses and the brewhouses thereunto belonging:" it was held that, although, without these words, the fixtures in the foundries would have passed, yet, by them, the fixtures intended to pass were confined to those in the dwelling-houses and brew-houses (o). So, where in an instrument there are general words first, and an express exception afterwards, the ordinary principle of law has been said to apply—*expressio unius exclusio alterius* (p).

*Doe v.
Burdett.*

The case of *Doe v. Burdett* (q), furnishes a good illustration of the maxim. In that case, lands were limited to such uses as S. should appoint by her last will in writing, to be by her signed, sealed, and published, in the presence of and attested by three credible witnesses. S. (before the 1 Vict. c. 26 (r)) signed and sealed an instrument, containing an appointment, commencing thus: "I, S., do publish and declare this to be my last will;" and concluding, "I declare this only to be my

(n) *Mathew v. Blackmore*, 1 H. & N. 762.

(o) *Hare v. Horton*, 5 B. & Ad. 715; 39 R. R. 633; cited *Mather v. Frazer*, 2 K. & J. 536. See *Ringer v. Cann*, 3 M. & W. 343; *Cooper v. Walker*, 4 B. & C. 36, 49.

(p) *Spry v. Flood*, 2 Curt. 365.

(q) 7 Scott, N. R. 66, 79, 101, 104; S. C., 9 A. & E. 936; 4 Id. 1. The decision of the H. L. in this case went upon the principle, *expressio unius exclusio alterius* (per Sir H. Jenner Fust, *Barnes v. Vincent*, 9 Jur. 261; S. C. (reversed in error), 5 Moore, P. C. 201), and the opinions delivered in it by the judges will also be found to illustrate the importance of adhering to precedents, and

the general principle of construing an instrument *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*. *Doe v. Burdett* is commented on by Wigram, V.-C., *Vincent v. Bp. of Sodor and Man*, 8 C. B. 929; and was followed in *Newton v. Ricketts*, 9 H. L. Cas. 262, 269. See, also, *Johns v. Dickinson*, 8 C. B. 934; *Roberts v. Phillips*, 4 E. & B. 450, 453.

(r) Sect. 9 enacts that every will shall be in writing, and signed by the testator in the presence of two witnesses at one time; and sect. 10, that appointments by will shall be executed like other wills, and shall be valid, although other required solemnities are not observed.

last will ; in witness whereof I have to this my last will set my hand and seal, this 12th Dec. 1789.” And then followed the attestation, thus : “ Witness, C. B., E. B., A. B.” It was decided by the House of Lords that the power was well executed ; and this case was distinguished from several (s), in which the attestation clause, in terms, stated the performance of one or more of the required formalities, but was silent as to the others, and in which, consequently, the power was held to have been badly exercised, on the ground, that legal reasoning would necessarily infer the non-performance of such others in the presence of the witnesses, but that a general attestation clause imported an attesting of *all* the requisites.

It has been decided that a will expressly subjecting the personal estate to certain charges to which it was before liable does not by force of the maxim raise a necessary implication that it is not to bear other charges, not so expressly directed to be paid out of it, to which it is primarily liable (t). Wills.

The operation of the principle under consideration is the same, whether the contract be under seal or by parol. For instance, in order to prevent a debt being barred by the Statute of Limitations, a conditional promise to pay “ as soon as I can,” is not sufficient, unless proof be given of the defendant’s ability to perform the condition ; and the reason is, that upon a general acknowledgment, where nothing is said to prevent it, a general promise to pay ought to be implied ; but where the party guards his acknowledgment, and accompanies it with an express declaration to prevent any such implication, then the rule, *expressum facit cessare tacitum*, applies (u). Simple contracts. In like manner, when the drawer of a

(s) See, particularly, *Wright v. Wakeford*, 17 Ves. 454 ; S. C., 4 Taunt. 213 ; commented on by Wigram, V.-C., 8 C. B. 928 *et seq.* ; *Doe v. Peach*, 2 M. & S. 576 ; 15 R. R. 361 ; *Doe v. Pearse*, 2 Marsh. 102 ; S. C., 6 Taunt. 402 ; 16 R. R. 634. See, *per* Patteson, J., 7 Scott, N. R. 120, 121 ; *per* Tindal, C.J., Id. 126.

(t) *Brydges v. Phillips*, 6 Ves. 567 ; 2 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed., 1467.

(u) Judgm., *Tanner v. Smart*, 6 B. & C. 609 ; 30 R. R. 461 ; *Edmunds v. Downes*, 2 Cr. & M. 459 ; 39 R. R. 813. See *Irving v. Veitch*, 3 M. & W. 90.

bill, when applied to for payment, does not state that he has received no notice of dishonour, but merely sets up some other matter in excuse of non-payment, from this conduct the jury may infer an admission that the valid ground of defence does not in fact exist (*x*).

The above cases sufficiently show the practical application and utility of the maxim of construction, *expressum facit cessare tacitum*; and several of them likewise serve to illustrate the general rule, which will be considered more in detail hereafter (*z*), that parol evidence is, except in certain cases, wholly inadmissible to show terms upon which a written instrument is silent; or, in other words, that, where there is an express contract between parties, none can be implied (*a*). The Court will not, by inference, insert in a contract implied provisions with respect to a subject for which the contract has expressly provided. If the seller of a horse warrant it to be sound, and the horse though sound be unfit for the purpose of carrying a lady, this is no breach of that warranty: the maxim *expressum facit cessare tacitum* applies. "If this were not so, it would be necessary for the parties to every agreement to provide in terms that they are to be understood not to be bound by anything which is not expressly set down,—which would be manifestly inconvenient" (*b*).

(*x*) *Campbell v. Webster*, 2 C. B. 258, 266.

(*z*) See the maxim, *nihil tam conveniens est naturali æquitati quam unumquodque dissolvi eodem ligamine quo ligatum est*, *post*, Chap. IX., and the maxim, *optimus interpres rerum usus*, *post*, Chap. X.

(*a*) *Per Bayley, J., Grimman v. Legge*, 8 B. & C. 326; 32 R. R. 398; *Moorsom v. Kymer*, 2 M. & S. 316, 320; 15 R. R. 261; *Cook v. Jennings*, 7 T. R. 383, 385; 4 R. R. 468; *per* *Ld. Kenyon*, 7 T. R. 137; *Cowley v. Dunlop*, *Id.* 568; *Cutter v.*

Powell, 6 T. R. 320; 3 R. R. 185; S. C., 2 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 1 (with which cf. *Taylor v. Laird*, 1 H. & N. 266; *Button v. Thompson*, L. R. 4 C. P. 330); *per* *Buller, J., Toussaint v. Martinnant*, 2 T. R. 105; *per* *Parke, B., Bradbury v. Anderton*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 190; *Mitchell v. Darthez*, 2 Bing. N. C. 555; *Lawrence v. Sydebotham*, 6 East, 45, 52; 8 R. R. 385; *per* *Blackburn, J., Fowkes v. Manch. & London Life Ass. Co.*, 3 B. & S. 930.

(*b*) *Per Maule, J., Dickson v. Zizinia*, 10 C. B. 911.

The following cases may here properly be noticed in further illustration of the maxim before us:—where the rent of a house was specified in a written agreement, to be £26 a year, and the landlord, in an action for use and occupation, proposed to show, by parol evidence, that the tenant had also agreed to pay the ground-rent, the Court refused to admit the evidence (*c*).

By an agreement for the purchase of the manor of S., it was agreed that, on the completion of the purchase, the purchaser should be entitled to the “rents and profits of such parts of the estate as were let” from the 24th day of June, 1843: it was held, that the purchaser was not, by virtue of this agreement, entitled to the fine received by the vendor on the admittance of a tenant of certain copyhold premises, part of the manor, this admittance, after being postponed from time to time, having taken place on the 1st July, 1843, and the fine having been paid in the December following; for the condition above mentioned was held applicable only to such parts of the estate as might be “let” in the ordinary sense of that word, and *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*; the lands in question not having been let, it could not be said that the purchaser was entitled to the money sought to be recovered, the agreement binding the vendor to pay over the *rents* only, and not extending to the casual profits (*d*).

On the same principle, where the conditions of sale of growing timber did not state anything as to *quantity*, parol evidence, that the auctioneer at the time of sale warranted a certain quantity, was held inadmissible (*e*).

Sale of goods.
Warranty, &c.

This distinction must, however, be taken, that, where the

(*c*) *Preston v. Merceau*, 2 W. Bla. 1249; *Rich v. Jackson*, 4 Bro. C. C. 515. See *Sweetland v. Smith*, 1 Cr. & M. 585, 596; *Doe v. Pullen*, 2 Bing. N. C. 749, 753, where the maxim is applied by Tindal, C.J.,

to the case of a tenancy between mortgagor and mortgagee.

(*d*) *Earl of Hardwicke v. Ld. Sandys*, 12 M. & W. 761.

(*e*) *Powell v. Edmunds*, 12 East, 6; 11 R. R. 316.

warranty is one which the law implies (*f*), it is clearly available, notwithstanding there is a written contract, if such contract be entirely silent on the subject (*g*). Moreover, by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, which codifies the law relating to sales of goods, an express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied from that Act, unless inconsistent therewith (*h*). The reason of this rule, which is borrowed from the common law, is that "the doctrine that an express provision excludes implication—*expressum facit cessare tacitum*—does not affect cases in which the express provision appears, upon the true construction of the contract, to have been superadded for the benefit of the buyer" (*i*), and to have been inserted for the purpose of adding to, and not of qualifying, the provision which the law implies for his benefit (*k*).

Evidence of
custom and
usage.

Although the maxim, *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, ordinarily operates to exclude evidence offered with the view of annexing incidents to written contracts (*l*) in matters with respect to which they are silent, yet it has long been settled, that, in commercial transactions, extrinsic evidence of custom or usage is admissible for this purpose (*m*). The same rule has, moreover, been applied to contracts in other transactions of life, especially to those between landlord and

(*f*) As to implied warranties and undertakings, see under the maxim *Caveat emptor, post*.

(*g*) *Shepherd v. Pybus*, 4 Scott, N. R. 434.

(*h*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 14 (4).

(*i*) *Per Willes, J., Mody v. Gregson*, L. R. 4 Ex. 53; approved *Drummond v. Van Ingen*, 12 App. Cas. 284, 294.

(*k*) *Bigge v. Parkinson*, 7 H. & N. 961.

(*l*) See *Cutter v. Powell*, 6 T. R. 320; 3 R. R. 185; *Pettitt v. Mitchell*, 5 Scott, N. R. 721; *Moon v. Witney Union*, 3 Bing. N. C. 814, 818; cited and distinguished in

Moffatt v. Laurie, 15 C. B. 583, 592; and in *Scrivener v. Pask*, 18 C. B. N. S. 785, 797; *Reg. v. Stoke-upon-Trent*, 5 Q. B. 303. It is a general rule, that, upon a mercantile instrument, evidence of usage may be given in explanation of an ambiguous expression: *Bowman v. Horsey*, 2 M. & Rob. 85. Generally as to the admissibility of evidence of usage to explain mercantile instruments, see Broom's Com. Law, 5th ed. 498.

(*m*) *Syers v. Jonas*, 2 Exch. 111, 117; cited *per Willes, J., Azemar v. Casella*, L. R. 2 C. P. 439; and cases collected under the maxim *optimus interpres rerum usus, post*, Chap. X.

tenant (*n*), in which known usages have been established ; and this has been done upon the principle of presuming that in such transactions the parties did not mean to express in writing the whole of the contract by which they intended to be bound, but a contract with reference to those known usages (*o*). Whether such a relaxation of the strictness of the common law was wisely applied where formal instruments have been entered into, and particularly leases under seal, may perhaps be doubted ; but this relaxation has been established by such authority, and the relations of landlord and tenant have been so long regulated upon the supposition that all customary obligations, not altered by the contract, are to remain in force, that it is too late to pursue a contrary course, since it would be productive of much inconvenience if the practice were now to be disturbed (*p*). As an instance of the admissibility of evidence respecting a special custom, may be mentioned the ordinary case in which an agreement to farm according to the custom of the country is held to apply to a tenancy where the contract to hold as tenant is in writing, but is altogether silent as to the terms or mode of farming (*q*).

Every demise, indeed, between landlord and tenant in respect of matters as to which the parties are silent, may be fairly open to explanation by the general usage and custom of the country, or of the district where the land lies ; for all persons, under such circumstances, are supposed to be cognisant of the custom, and to contract with a tacit reference to it (*r*).

It is, however, a settled rule, that, although in certain cases evidence of custom or usage is admissible to annex incidents to a written contract, it can in no case be given in

Evidence inadmissible to vary contract.

(*n*) *Wigglesworth v. Dalison*, 1 Dougl. 201.

(*o*) *Per Parke, B., Smith v. Wilson*, 3 B. & Ad. 728 ; 37 R. R. 536.

(*p*) *Judgm., Hutton v. Warren*, 1 M. & W. 475, 478. *Wigglesworth v.*

Dallison, 1 Smith's L. C., 11th ed. 545, is the leading case upon this subject.

(*q*) *Judgm.*, 4 Scott, N. R. 446.

(*r*) *Per Story, J.*, 2 Peters (U.S.), R. 148.

contravention thereof (s); and the principle of varying written contracts by the custom of trade has been in many cases, of which some few are cited below, distinctly repudiated (t).

Application
of maxim to
construction
of statute.

A statute, it has been said (u), is to be so construed, if possible, as to give sense and meaning to every part; and the maxim was never more applicable than when applied to the interpretation of a statute, than *expressio unius est exclusio alterius* (x). The sages of the law, according to Plowden, have ever been guided in the construction of statutes by the intention of the legislature, which they have always taken according to the necessity of the matter, and according to that which is consonant to reason and sound discretion (y).

(s) *Yeats v. Pym*, 6 Taunt. 446; 16 R. R. 653; *Clarke v. Roystone*, 13 M. & W. 752; *Suse v. Pompe*, 8 C. B. N. S. 538. See *Palmer v. Blackburn*, 1 Bing. 61; 25 R. R. 599; *Aklieselkab Helios v. Ekman*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 83; 66 L. J. Q. B. 538.

(t) *Spartali v. Benecke*, 10 C. B. 212, 223; *Dickenson v. Jardine*, L. R. 3 C. P. 639; *Johnstone v. Usborne*, 11 A. & E. 549, 557; *Trueman v. Loder*, Id. 589 (as to which case see *Dale v. Humfrey*, E. B. & E. 1004; S. C., 7 E. & B. 266, 277; *Brown v. Byrne*, 3 E. & B. 703); *Jones v. Littledale*, 6 A. & E. 486; *Magee v. Atkinson*, 2 M. & W. 440. See *Graves v. Legg*, 2 H. & N. 210; S. C., 11 Exch. 642; 9 Id. 709; *Pym v. Campbell*, 6 E. & B. 370; cited in *Rogers v. Hadley*, 2 H. & C. 249; *Stewart v. Aberdeen*, 4 M. & W. 211. The law applicable to this subject will be stated more at length when we consider the mode of dissolving contracts, and the application of evidence to their interpretation.

(u) *Per Cur.*, 9 Johns. (U.S.) R. 349.

(x) See *Gregory v. Des Anges*, 3

Bing. N. C. 85, 87; *Atkinson v. Fell*, 5 M. & S. 240; *Cates v. Knight*, 3 T. R. 442, 444; cited, Arg., *Albon v. Pyke*, 5 Scott, N. R. 245; *R. v. North Nibley*, 5 T. R. 21; *per Tindal, C.J., Newton v. Holford* (in error), 6 Q. B. 926; *A.-G. v. Sillem*, 10 H. L. Cas. 704. The maxim was applied to a statute in *Reg. v. Caledonian R. Co.*, 16 C. B. 31, and *Edinburgh & Glasgow R. Co. v. Linlithgow Mags.*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 717, 730. *Watkins v. G. N. R. Co.*, 16 Q. B. 961, also proceeded on the above maxim; *per* Ld. Campbell, *Caledonian R. Co. v. Colt*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 839. See *Lawrence v. G. N. R. Co.*, 16 Q. B. 643.

In *Bostock v. N. Staffordshire R. Co.*, 4 E. & B. 832, Ld. Campbell said, with reference to statutes relating to a canal company, "In construing instruments so loosely drawn as these local Acts, we can hardly apply such maxims as that, 'the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another,' or that, 'the exception proves the rule.'" See also [1897] 2 Q. B. 351.

(y) Plowd. 205 b,

Thus it sometimes happens that in a statute, the language of which may fairly comprehend many different cases, some only are expressly mentioned by way of example merely, and not as excluding others of a similar nature. So, where the words used by the legislature are *general*, and the statute is only declaratory of the common law, it shall extend to other persons and things besides those actually named, and, consequently, in such cases, the ordinary rule of construction cannot properly apply. Sometimes, on the contrary, the expressions used are restrictive, and intended to exclude all things which are not enumerated. Where, for example, certain specific things are taxed, or subjected to a charge, it seems probable that it was intended to exclude everything else even of a similar nature, and *à fortiori*, all things different in *genus* and description from those which are enumerated. Accordingly, where the 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1, enacted that every occupier of lands, houses, coal mines, or saleable underwood, should be rated for the relief of the poor, it was decided by the House of Lords, that as coal mines alone were mentioned in the Act as rateable, iron mines were not (z).

There is a class of cases where evidence of custom is admitted, which apparently contradicts the language of the contract, namely, where an agent, who enters into a written contract, expressing himself on the face of it to do so as agent, may be held liable as a principal in the transaction, upon proof of a custom to that effect. In *Hutchinson v. Tatham* (a), perhaps the strongest instance of this rule to be found in the books, the defendant, acting as an agent, with due authority to do so, effected a charter-party which was expressed in the body of it to be made between the plaintiff, who was a shipowner, and the defendant, as "agent to

(z) *Morgan v. Crawshay*, L. R. 5 H. L. 334; *Denison v. Holliday*, 1 H. & N. 631. Iron mines became rateable by 37 & 38 Vict. c. 54.

(a) L. R. 8 C. P. 482; 42 L. J.

C. P. 260; *Humphrey v. Dale*, 7 E. & B. 266; E. B. & E. 1004; and see *Imperial Bank v. L. & St. Katharine Docks Co.*, 5 Ch. D. 195; *Pike v. Ongley*, 18 Q. B. D. 708.

merchants;" and the charter-party was signed by the defendant, as "agent to merchants." The Court, admitting that, but for the custom, the defendant would not have been personally liable on the charter-party, held that evidence was admissible of a usage to make him so, if he did not disclose his principal's name within a reasonable time. One of the learned judges thought that evidence of the custom would not have been admissible if it had made the agent liable as a principal in the first instance, but that, as it only made him liable as a principal if he failed to disclose his principal's name within a reasonable time, that was not inconsistent with the contract. This would seem, with respect, too subtle a refinement of the maxim, *expressio unius exclusio alterius*, and the writer ventures to suggest that the true ground of the liability of an agent so signing rests in a breach of an implied undertaking; because where an agent contracts for an undisclosed principal he impliedly undertakes to disclose the principal's name within a reasonable time, and, if he fail to do so, an action, it is submitted, lies against him for the breach of this undertaking, to recover damages for the loss of the contract. The agent in this manner would be liable in respect of the contract he had made, as an agent, without the need of introducing a custom which, but for the decided cases, appears to contradict the written document.

Lastly, where a general Act of Parliament confers immunities which expressly exempt certain persons from the operation of its provisions, it excludes all exemptions to which the subject might have been before entitled at common law; for the introduction of the exemption is necessarily exclusive of all other independent extrinsic exceptions (b).

The following remarks of an eminent legal authority, showing the importance of the maxim considered in the

Further
remarks as
to maxim.

(b) Dwarr. Stats., 2nd ed. 605; T. R. 442.
R. v. *Cunningham*, 5 East, 478: 3

preceding pages, when regarded as a rule of evidence rather than of construction, are submitted as well deserving attention. "It is a sound rule of evidence, that you cannot alter or substantially vary the effect of a written contract by parol proof. This excellent rule is intended to guard against fraud and perjuries; and it cannot be too steadily supported by Courts of justice. *Expressum facit cessare tacitum: vox emissa volat, litera scripta manet*: are law axioms in support of the rule; and law axioms are nothing more than the conclusions of common sense, which have been formed and approved by the wisdom of ages. This rule prevails equally in a Court of equity and a Court of law; for, generally speaking, the rules of evidence are the same in both Courts. If the words of a contract be intelligible, says Lord Chancellor Thurlow (c), there is no instance where parol proof has been admitted to give them a different sense. 'Where there is a deed in writing,' he observes in another place (d), 'it will admit of no contract which is not part of the deed.' You can introduce nothing on parol proof that adds to, or deducts from, the writing. If, however, an agreement is by *fraud* or *mistake* made to speak a different language from what was intended, then, in those cases, parol proof is admissible to show the fraud or mistake. These are cases excepted from the general rule" (e).

We do not propose to dwell longer upon the maxim, *expressum facit cessare tacitum*; a cursory glance at the contents of the preceding pages will show it to be of extensive practical application, both in the construction of written instruments and verbal contracts, as also in determining the inferences which may fairly be drawn from expressions used or declarations made with regard to particular circumstances. It is, indeed, a principle of logic and of common sense, and not merely a technical rule of construction, and might,

(c) *Shelburne v. Inchiquin*, 1 Bro. C. C. 341.

(d) *Ld. Irnham v. Child*, Id. 93.

(e) *Per* Kent, C.J., 1 Johns. (U.S.), R. 571, 572. See *Pattle v. Hornibrook*, [1897] 1 Ch. 25, 30.

therefore, be illustrated by decided cases, having reference to every branch of the legal science. It, moreover, has an important bearing upon the doctrine of our law as to implied obligations. An obligation should not be implied in a written contract, unless, on considering the express terms reasonably, an implication necessarily arises that both parties must have intended that the obligation should exist (*f*). A Court when called upon to imply an obligation which is not expressed must take care that it does not make the contract speak where it was intentionally silent, and above all that it does not make it speak entirely contrary to what, as may be gathered from the whole terms and tenor of the contract, was the intention of the parties (*g*).

Maxim is
sometimes
inapplicable.

The maxim above commented on, is, it has been said (*h*), “by no means of universal conclusive application. For example: it is a familiar doctrine that, although where a statute makes unlawful that which was lawful before, and appoints a specific remedy, that remedy must be pursued, and no other; yet where an offence was antecedently punishable by a common law proceeding, as by indictment, and a statute prescribes a particular remedy in case of disobedience, such particular remedy is *cumulative*, and proceedings may be had either at common law or under the statute” (*i*).

(*f*) *The Moorcock*, 14 P. D. 68; *Hamlyn v. Wood*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 491; 60 L. J. Q. B. 734; see also *per* Bowen, L.J., in *Lamb v. Evans*, [1893] 1 Ch. 218, 229; 62 L. J. Ch. 404; *Oriental SS. Co. v. Tylor*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 518; 63 L. J. Q. B. 128.

(*g*) *Per* Cockburn, C.J., *Churchward v. Reg.*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 195; cf. *Reg. v. Demers*, [1900] A. C. 103.

(*h*) *Per* Williams, J., 2 E. & B. 879.

(*i*) *Reg. v. Gregory*, 5 B. & Ad. 555. See 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 33.

EXPRESSIO EORUM QUÆ TACITE INSUNT NIHIL OPERATUR. (2 *Inst.* 365.)—*The expression of what is tacitly implied is inoperative.*

“The expression of a clause which the law implies works nothing” (*k*). For instance, if land be let to two persons for the term of their lives, this creates a joint tenancy; and the words “and the survivor of them,” if added, are mere surplusage, because, by law, the term would go to the survivor (*l*). So, upon a lease reserving rent payable quarterly, with a proviso that, if the rent were in arrear twenty-one days next after the day of payment being lawfully demanded, the lessor might re-enter, it was held that, five years’ rent being in arrear, and no sufficient distress on the premises, the lessor might re-enter without a demand, and that the above maxim applied; for, before the 4 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 2 (*m*), a demand was necessary as a consequence of law, whether the lease contained the words “lawfully demanded” or not. Then the statute said that “in all cases where half a year’s rent shall be in arrear, and the landlord has a right of entry,” the remedy shall apply, provided there be no sufficient distress; that is, the statute dispensed with the demand which was required at the common law, whether expressly provided for by the stipulation of the parties or not (*n*).

Examples
of rule.

Again, every interest which is limited to commence and

(*k*) 4 Rep. 73; 5 Rep. 11; Wing. Max., p. 235; Finch, Law, 24; D. 50, 17, 81. In Hobart, R. 170, it is said that this rule “is to be understood having respect to itself only, and not having relation to other clauses.” The rule was applied in *Wroughton v. Turtle*, 11 M. & W. 570; and in *Lawrance v. Boston*, 7 Exch. 28, 35, in reference to the Stamp Acts. See, also, *Ogden v. Graham*, 1 B. & S. 773.

(*l*) Co. Litt. 191 a, cited, Arg., 4 B. & Ald. 306; 2 Prest. Abst. Tit. 63. See, also, *per* Ld. Langdale, *Seifferth v. Badham*, 9 Beav. 374. The maxim is applied, *per* Martin, B., in *Scott v. Avery*, 5 H. L. Cas. 829.

(*m*) See, now, 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, s. 210.

(*n*) *Doe v. Alexander*, 2 M. & S. 525; 15 R. R. 338; *Doe v. Wilson*, 5 B. & Ald. 364, 384; 24 R. R. 423.

is capable of commencing on the regular determination of the prior particular estate, at whatever time the particular estate may determine, is, in point of law, a vested estate; and the universal criterion for distinguishing a contingent interest from a vested estate is, that a contingent interest cannot take effect immediately, even though the former estate were determined, while a vested estate may take effect immediately, whenever the particular estate shall determine. Hence it often happens, that a limitation expressed in words of contingency is treated in law as a vested estate, according to the rule, *expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt nihil operatur*. If, for instance, a limitation be made to the use of A. for life, and if A. shall die in the lifetime of B., to the use of B. for life, this limitation gives to B. a *vested* estate, because the words expressive of a contingency are necessarily implied by the law as being in a limitation to A. for life and then to B.; and without those words a vested interest would clearly be given (*o*).

In accordance with the same principle, where a person makes a tender, he always means that the amount tendered, though less than the plaintiff's demand, is all that he is entitled to in respect of it. Where, therefore, the person making the tender said to plaintiff, "I am come with the amount of your bill," upon which plaintiff refused the money, saying, "I shall not take that, it is not my bill," and nothing more passed, the tender was held sufficient; and in answer to the argument, that a tender made in such terms would give to its acceptance the effect of an admission, and was consequently bad, it was observed that the plaintiff could not preclude himself from recovering more by accepting an offer of part, accompanied by expressions which are implied in every tender (*p*).

(*o*) See, *per* Willes, C.J., 3 Atk. 409, 411; recognised in *Bowen v. 138*; 1 Prest. Abst. Tit. 108, 109. *Owen*, 11 Q. B. 130, 135.

(*p*) *Henwood v. Oliver*, 1 Q. B.

The above instances, taken in connection with the remarks appended to the *maxim*, *expressio unius est exclusio alterius*, will serve to show that an expression, which merely embodies that which would in its absence have been by law implied, is altogether inoperative. Such an expression, when occurring in a written instrument, is denominated by Lord Bacon, *clausula inutilis*; and, according to him, *clausula vel dispositio inutilis per præsumptionem vel causam remotam ex post facto non fulcitur*; a rule which he thus explains,—*clausula vel dispositio inutilis* is “when the act or the words do work or express no more than the law by intendment would have supplied;” and such a clause or disposition is not supported by any subsequent matter “which may induce an operation of those idle words or acts” (*q*).

*Clausula
inutilis.*

It may be observed, however, that it is often desirable to express what the law would imply, in order to remove all doubt as to intention. *Abundans cautela non nocet* (*r*).

VERBA RELATA HOC MAXIME OPERANTUR PER REFERENTIAM
UT IN EIS INESSE VIDENTUR. (*Co. Litt.* 159 *a.*)—*Words to
which reference is made in an instrument have the same
operation as if they were inserted in the clause referring
to them* (*s*).

It is important to bear in mind, when reading any particular clause of a deed or written instrument, that regard must be paid not only to the language of that clause, but also to that of any other clause which may by reference be

(*q*) Bac. Max., reg. 21.

(*r*) 11 Rep. 6.

(*s*) The rule is that, “by referring in a document signed by the party to another document, the person so signing in effect signs a document containing the terms of the one referred to:” *per* Crompton, J.,

Fitzmaurice v. Bayley, 9 H. L. Cas. 99, where the question arose on s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds. As to the general rule against multiplication of charges under a trust created by reference to other trusts, see *Trew v. Perp. Trustee Co.*, [1895] A. C. 264.

incorporated with it; and, since the application of this rule, so simple in its terms, is occasionally attended with difficulty (*t*), it has been thought desirable in this place briefly to examine it (*u*).

Examples.
Reference to
schedule, in-
ventory, or
plan.

Where, by articles under seal, a man bound himself to deliver "the whole of his mechanical pieces as per schedule annexed," the schedule was held to form part of the deed, for the deed without it would be insensible and inoperative (*v*). And if a contract of sale refer to an inventory, the entire contents thereof become incorporated with the contract (*x*).

In like manner, if a contract, or an Act of Parliament, refer to a plan, the plan forms a part of the contract or Act, for the purpose for which the reference is made (*y*). And a deed of conveyance, made under the authority of an Act, and in the form prescribed thereby, must be read as if the sections of the Act applicable to the subject-matter of the grant and its incidents were inserted in it (*z*).

A deed recited a contract for the sale of a certain lands by a description corresponding with that subsequently contained in the deed, and then proceeded to convey them, with a reference for that description to three schedules. The portion of the schedule relating to the piece of land in question stated, in one column, the number which this

(*t*) See *Reg. v. Registrar of Middlesex*, 15 Q. B. 976; *Fishmongers' Co. v. Dimsdale*, 12 C. B. 557; *Betts v. Walker*, 14 Q. B. 363; *Stewart v. Anglo-Californian Gold-Mining Co.*, 18 Q. B. 736.

(*u*) *Boydell v. Drummond*, 11 East, 141, 153, 156, 157; 10 R. R. 450 (distinguished in *Crane v. Powell*, L. R. 4 C. P. 123, 129), and *Wilkinson v. Evans*, L. R. 1 C. P. 407, may be consulted in connection with the maxim. See, also, *Ridgway v. Wharton*, 6 H. L. Cas. 238; cited *Barker v. Allan*, 5 H. & N. 72; *Sillem v. Thornton*, 3 E. & B. 868, 880.

(*v*) *Weeks v. Maillardet*, 14 East, 568, 574; cited and distinguished, *Dyer v. Green*, 1 Exch. 71; and in *Daines v. Heath*, 3 C. B. 938, 945.

(*x*) *Taylor v. Bullen*, 5 Exch. 779. See *Wood v. Rowcliffe*, 6 Id. 407.

(*y*) *N. British R. Co. v. Tod*, 12 Cl. & F. 722, 731; *Reg. v. Regent's Canal Co.*, 28 L. J. Ch. 153. See *Gatway v. Baker*, 5 Cl. & F. 157; *Brain v. Harris*, 10 Exch. 908; *Reg. v. Caledonian R. Co.*, 16 Q. B. 197.

(*z*) *Eliot v. N. E. R. Co.*, 10 H. L. Cas. 333, 353. See also 52 & 53 Vict. c. 63, s. 31.

piece bore on a certain plan, and, in another column, under the heading "description of premises," it was stated to be "a small piece, marked on the plan;" and by applying the maxim, *verba illata inesse videntur*, the Court considered that it was the same thing as if the plan referred to in the schedule had been actually inserted in the deed, since it was, by operation of the above principle, incorporated with it (a).

If A. writes to B. that he will give £1,000 for B.'s estate, and at the same time states the terms in detail, and B. simply writes back, "I accept your offer," it may be shown, by parol evidence of the circumstances under which B.'s letter was written, that the word "offer" refers to A.'s letter, and thereupon the two letters may be read as though incorporated the one with the other, so as to constitute a sufficient memorandum of the contract signed by B. to satisfy the Statute of Frauds (b).

Memorandum.
Statute of
Frauds.

Where a question arose respecting the sufficiency of an affidavit, Heath, J., observed, "the Court generally requires, and it is a proper rule, that the affidavit shall be intituled in the cause, that it may be sufficiently certain in what cause it is to admit of an indictment for perjury; but this affidavit refers to the annexed plea, and the annexed plea is in the cause, and *verba relata inesse videntur*; therefore it amounts to the same thing as if the affidavit were intituled; and the plaintiff could prosecute for perjury on this affidavit" (c).

Affidavit.

So, with reference to an indictment, it has been observed,

Indictment.

(a) *Llewellyn v. Earl of Jersey*, 11 M. & W. 183, 188; *Lyle v. Richards*, L.R. 1 H.L. 222; *Barton v. Daves*, 10 C. B. 261, 263, 266. See, also, as to the admissibility of parol evidence to identify a plan referred to in an agreement for a lease, *Hodges v. Horsfall*, 1 Russ. & My. 116; 32 R. R. 157.

450: 48 L. J. Q. B. 596; *Cave v. Hastings*, 7 Q. B. D. 125; 50 L. J. Q. B. 575; see *Taylor v. Smith*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 65; 61 L. J. Q. B. 331.

(c) *Per* Heath, J., *Prince v. Nicholson*, 5 Taunt. 337; 15 R. R. 612. See, in connection with the maxim, *Duke of Brunswick v. Slowman*, 8 C. B. 617.

(b) *Long v. Millar*, 4 C. P. D.

that "there are many authorities to show that one count thereof may refer to another, and that under such circumstances the maxim applies, *verba relata inesse videntur*" (*d*).

Will.

The rule is also applied to the interpretation of wills (*e*), although the Courts will not construe a will with the same critical precision which would be prescribed to a grammarian. For instance, the words, "the said estates," occurring in a will, seemed in strictness to refer to certain freehold lands, on which construction the devisee would have taken only an estate for life, according to the rule which existed before the 1 Vict. c. 26 (*f*); but Lord Ellenborough observed that, in cases of this sort, unless the testator uses expressions of absolute restriction, it may generally be taken for granted that he intends to dispose of the whole interest; and, in furtherance of this intention, Courts of justice have laid hold of the word "estate" as passing a fee, wherever it is not so connected with mere local description as to be cut down to a more restrained signification (*g*).

Another important application of the maxim before us occurs where reference is made in a will to an extrinsic document, in order to explain the testator's intention, in which case such document will be received as part of the will, from the fact of its adoption thereby, provided it be clearly identified as the instrument to which the will points (*h*). But parol evidence is inadmissible to show an

(*d*) *Judgm., Reg. v. Waverton*, 17 Q. B. 570.

(*e*) See *Doe v. Maxey*, 12 East, 589; *Wheatley v. Thomas*, Sir T. Raym. 54.

The maxim may apply where a power of appointment by will is exercised. See, for instance, *Re Barker*, 7 H. & N. 109.

(*f*) See *Hill v. Brown*, [1894] A. C. 124; 63 L. J. P. C. 46.

(*g*) *Roe v. Bacon*, 4 M. & S. 366, 368. See 1 Vict. c. 26, ss. 26, 28.

In *Doe v. Woodall*, 3 C. B. 349, the question was as to the meaning of the words "in manner aforesaid" occurring in a will. And see the cases on this subject, cited 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 701 (*q*).

(*h*) *Molineux v. Molineux*, Cro. Jac. 144; *Dickinson v. Stidolph*, 11 C. B. N. S. 341; 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 98. As to incorporating in the probate of wills papers referred to thereby, but not *per se* testamentary, see *Sheldon v. Sheldon*, 1

intention to connect two instruments together, where there is no reference to a foreign instrument, or where the description of it is insufficient (*i*). A further illustration, moreover, of the general principle presents itself, where the question arises whether the execution of a will applies to the several papers in which the will is contained, or is confined to that with which it is more immediately associated, or whether an attested codicil communicates the efficacy of its attestation to an unattested will, so as to render effectual a devise or bequest contained in such prior unattested instrument (*k*).

Without adducing further instances of the application of the maxim, *verba illata inesse videntur*—it will be proper to notice a difficulty which sometimes arises where an *exception* (*l*), or *proviso* (*m*) either occurs in, or by reference is imported into, a general clause in a written instrument; the difficulty (*n*) being to determine whether the party who relies upon the general clause should aver that the particular case does not fall within the exceptive provision, or whether he should leave it to the party who relies upon that provision to avail himself of it.

Exceptions
and pro-
visoes.

Now the rule usually laid down upon this subject is, that where matter is introduced by way of *exception* into a general

Robert. 81; *Allen v. Maddock*, 11 Moo. P. C. 427; *Re Balme*, [1897] P. 261: 66 L. J. P. 161.

(*i*) See *Clayton v. Ld. Nugent*, 13 M. & W. 200.

(*k*) 1 Jarman on Wills, 5th ed. 103; *Allen v. Maddock*, 11 Moo. P. C. 427; *Re Gill*, L. R. 2 P. & D. 6; *Singleton v. Tomlinson*, 3 App. Cas. 404.

(*l*) Logically speaking, an *exception* ought to be of that which would otherwise be included in the category from which it is excepted, but there are a great many examples to the contrary: *per* Ld. Campbell, *Gurly v. Gurly*, 6 Cl. & F. 764.

(*m*) The office of a *proviso* in an Act is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to qualify its generality, or to exclude the possibility of a misinterpretation extending it to cases not intended to be within its purview: *per* Story, J., 15 Peters (U.S.), R. 445. Cf. *per* Ld. Herschell, [1897] A. C. 656.

(*n*) An analogous difficulty may also arise with reference to the repeal or modification of a prior by a subsequent statute (see *Bowyer v. Cook*, 4 C. B. 236); and with reference to the restriction of general by special words (see *Howell v. Richards*, 11 East, 633; 11 R. R. 287).

clause, the plaintiff must show that the particular case does not fall within such exception, whereas a *proviso* need not be noticed by the plaintiff, but must be pleaded by the opposite party (*o*). "The difference is, that where an exception is incorporated in the body of the clause, he who pleads the clause ought also to plead the exception; but where there is a clause for the benefit of the pleader, and afterwards follows a proviso which is against him, he shall plead the clause, and leave it to the adversary to show the proviso" (*p*).

Hence, if an Act of Parliament or a private instrument contain, first, a general clause, and afterwards a separate and distinct clause, which has the effect of taking out of the general clause something which would otherwise be included in it, a party relying upon the general clause may, in pleading, set out that clause alone, without noticing the separate and distinct clause which operates as an exception. But if the exception itself be incorporated in the general clause, then the party relying upon the general clause must, in pleading, state it with the exception, and if he state it as containing an absolute unconditional stipulation, without noticing the exception, it will be a variance (*q*).

In accordance with the first of these rules, where one section of a penal statute creates an offence, and a subsequent section specifies certain exceptions thereto, the exceptions need not be negatived by the party prosecuting (*r*). So, where the exception is created by a distinct subsequent Act

(*o*) *Spieries v. Parker*, 1 T. R. 141: 1 R. R. 165; *R. v. Jukes*, 8 T. R. 542: 5 R. R. 445; *per* Ld. Mansfield, *R. v. Jarvis*, cited 1 East, 646, n.; *Stevens v. Stevens*, 5 Exch. 306.

(*p*) *Per* Treby, C.J., 1 Ld. Raym. 120; cited 7 T. R. 31; *Russell v. Ledsam*, 14 M. & W. 574. See *Crow v. Falk*, 8 Q. B. 467.

(*q*) *Vavasour v. Ormrod*, 6 B. & C. 430; cited, *Arg.*, *Tucker v. Web-*

ster, 10 M. & W. 373; *per* Ld. Abinger, *Gr. Junction R. Co. v. White*, 8 Id. 221; *Thibault v. Gibson*, 12 Id. 94; cited *per* Ld. Denman, *Falk v. Force*, 12 Q. B. 672. See *Roe v. Bacon*, 4 M. & S. 366, 368; *Paddock v. Forrester*, 3 Scott, N. R. 715; 1 Wms. Saunds. 262 b (1); *R. v. Jukes*, 8 T. R. 542; 5 R. R. 445.

(*r*) *Van Boven's case*, 9 Q. B. 669. See 15 M. & W. 318.

of Parliament, as well as where it occurs in a subsequent section of the same Act, the above remark applies (*s*); and this rule has likewise been held applicable where an exception was introduced by way of proviso in a subsequent part of a section of a statute which imposed a penalty, and on a former part of which section the plaintiff suing for the penalty relied (*t*). "There is," remarked Alderson, B., "a manifest distinction between a proviso and an exception. Therefore, if an exception occurs in the description of the offence in the statute, the burden of proof rests with the complainant to show that the accused does not come within it (*u*); but, if the exception comes by way of proviso, and does not alter the offence, but merely states what persons are to take advantage of it, then the defence must be specially pleaded, or may be given in evidence under the general issue, according to circumstances" (*x*).

The latter of the two rules above mentioned may be thus illustrated. An exception was introduced into the reservation of rent in a demise, not in express terms, but only by reference to subsequent matter in the instrument, viz., by the words, "except as hereinafter mentioned;" the plaintiff in his declaration stated the reservation without the exception; this was held, according to the above rule, to be a variance (*y*).

(*s*) See *per* Ld. Abinger, *Thibault v. Gibson*, 12 M. & W. 94.

(*t*) *Simpson v. Ready*, 12 M. & W. 736 (as to which case, see, *per* Alderson, B., *Mayor of Salford v. Ackers*, 16 Id. 92); *per* Parke, B., *Thibault v. Gibson*, 12 Id. 96.

(*u*) *Davis v. Scrace*, L. R. 4 C. P. 172; 38 L. J. M. C. 79; *Taylor v. Humphries*, 17 C. B. N. S. 539; 34 L. J. M. C. 1.

(*x*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Simpson v. Ready*, 12 M. & W. 740: 11 Id. 344; *per* Ld. Mansfield, *Spieres v. Parker*, 1 T. R. 144; 1 R. R. 165, and *R. v. Jarvis*, 1 East, 644 (*d*); *Bousfield v. Wilson*, 16 M. & W. 185. See *Tennant v. Cumberland*, 1 E. & E. 401.

(*y*) *Vavasour v. Ormrod*, 6 B. & C. 430.

AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAT RELATIO, NISI IMPEDIATUR SENTENTIA. (*Noy, Max., 9th ed. p. 4.*)—*Relative words refer to the next antecedent, unless by such construction the meaning of the sentence would be impaired.*

Rule admits
of relaxation.

Relative words must ordinarily be referred to the last antecedent, where the intent upon the whole deed or instrument does not appear to the contrary (*z*), and where the matter itself does not hinder it (*a*): the "last antecedent" being the last word which can be made an antecedent so as to have a meaning (*b*).

But, although this general proposition is true in strict grammatical construction, yet there are numerous examples in the best writers to show that the context often requires a deviation from the rule, and that the relative may refer to nouns which go before the last antecedent, and either take from it or give to it some qualification (*c*).

For instance, an order of magistrates was directed to the parish of W., in the county of R., and also to the parish of M., in the county of L., and the words "county of R." were then written in the margin, and the magistrates were, in a subsequent part of the order, described as justices of the peace for the county aforesaid: it was held, that it

(*z*) *Com. Dig., "Parols"* (A. 14, 15); *Jenk. Cent.* 180; *Dyer*, 46 b; *Wing. Max.*, p. 19. See *Bryant v. Wardell*, 2 Exch. 479; *Piatt v. Ashley*, 1 Exch. 257; *Electric Telegraph Co. v. Brett*, 10 C. B. 838; *Reg. v. Brown*, 17 Q. B. 833, with which compare *Re Jones*, 7 Exch. 586; *E. Counties R. Co. v. Marriage*, 9 H. L. Cas. 32; S. C., 2 H. & N. 625; cited by Channell, B., *Tetley v. Wanless*, L. R. 2 Ex. 29; S. C., Id. 275; and in *Latham v. Lafone*, Id. 123; *Bristol & E. R. Co. v. Garton*, 8 H. L. Cas. 477.

(*a*) *Finch, Law*, 8.

(*b*) *Per Tindal, C.J.*, 1 A. & E. 445. See *Esdaile v. Maclean*, 15 M. & W. 277; *Williams v. Newton*, 14 M. & W. 747; *Peake v. Screech*, 7 Q. B. 603; *Reg. v. Inhab. of St. Margaret, Westminster*, Id. 569; *Ledsam v. Russell* (in error), 16 M. & W. 663; S. C., 1 H. L. Cas. 687.

(*c*) *Staniland v. Hopkins*, 9 M. & W. 192, where a difficulty arose upon the construction of a statute. See, also, *A.-G. v. Shillibeer*, 3 Exch. 71; *Beer v. Santer*, 10 C. B. N. S. 435; *Beckh v. Page*, 7 Id. 861; *Earl of Kintore v. Ld. Inverury*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 520.

thereby sufficiently appeared that they were justices for the county of R. (*d*).

The above rule of grammar is, of course, applicable Wills. to wills as well as to other written instruments; for instance:—A testator devised all his *property* situate in P., and also his farm called S., to his adopted child M. He then left to his nephew, W., all his other lands; and the will contained this subsequent clause: “And should M. have lawful issue, *the said property* to be equally divided between her lawful issue.” It was held that these words, “The said property” did not comprise the lands devised to the nephew, although it was argued that they must, according to the true grammatical construction of the will, either comprise *all* the property before spoken of, or must refer to the next antecedent (*e*).

CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITIO EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMA IN
LEGE. (2 *Inst.* 11.)—*The best and surest mode of
expounding an instrument is by referring to the time
when, and circumstances under which, it was made* (*f*).

There is no better way of interpreting ancient words, or Ancient
grants, &c. of construing ancient grants, deeds, and charters, than by usage (*g*); and the uniform course of modern authorities fully establishes the rule, that, however general the words

(*d*) *R. v. St. Mary's, Leicester*, 1 B. & Ald. 327; *Reg. v. Casterton*, 6 Q. B. 507; *Baring v. Christie*, 5 East, 398; 7 R. R. 719; *R. v. Chilverscoton*, 8 T. R. 178.

(*e*) *Peppercorn v. Peacock*, 3 Scott, N. R. 651; *Hall v. Warren*, 9 H. L. Cas. 420. See, also, *Doe v. Langton*, 2 B. & Ad. 680, 691; *Cheyney's case*, 5 Rep. 68; and cases collected in *R. v. Richards*, 1 M. & Rob. 177; *Owen v. Smith*, 2 H. Bla. 594; 3 R. R. 513; *Galley v. Barrington*, 2

Bing. 387; 27 R. R. 663; *Doe v. Nall*, 6 Exch. 102; *Peacock v. Stockford*, 3 De G. M. & G. 73, 79.

(*f*) The Courts, however, have frequently repudiated the idea of being influenced in their interpretation of a statute by knowledge of what occurred in Parliament during the passing of the bill; see, for instance, *per* Pollock, C.B., 7 Exch. 617; *per* Alderson, B., 5 Exch. 667.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Hardwicke, *A.-G. v. Parker*, 3 Atk. 576; and 2 *Inst.*

of an ancient grant may be, it is to be construed by evidence of the manner in which the thing granted has always been possessed and used; for so the parties thereto must be supposed to have intended (*h*). Thus, if it be doubtful on the face of an instrument whether a present demise or future letting was meant, the intention of the parties may be elucidated by the conduct they have pursued (*i*); and where the words of an instrument are ambiguous, the Court may call in aid acts done under it as a clue to the intention (*k*).

Statutes.

Upon the same principle, also, depends the great authority which, in construing an old statute, is attributed to the construction put upon it by judges who lived at or soon after the time when the statute was made, as being best able to determine the intention of the legislature from their knowing the circumstances to which the statute related (*l*); and where the words of an Act are obscure, and where the sense of the legislature cannot, with certainty, be collected by interpreting the language according to grammatical correctness, considerable stress is laid upon the light in which it was received and held by the contemporary lawyers of repute. "Great regard," said Sir E. Coke, "ought, in construing a statute, to be paid to the construction which the sages of the law, who lived about the time or soon after it was made, put upon it; because they were best able to

282; cited 4 T. R. 819; *per* Parke, B., *Clift v. Schwabe*, 3 C. B. 469; and *Jewison v. Dyson*, 9 M. & W. 556; *R. v. Mashiter* 6 A. & E. 153; *R. v. Davie*, Id. 374; *Senhouse v. Earle*, Amb. 288; Co. Litt. 8 b; *Lockwood v. Wood*, 6 Q. B. 31; *per* Ld. Eldon, *A.-G. v. Forster*, 10 Ves. 338; *Reg. v. Dulwich College*, 17 Q. B. 600.

(*h*) *Weid v. Hornby*, 7 East, 199; 8 R. R. 608; *R. v. Osbourne*, 4 East, 327.

(*i*) *Chapman v. Bluck*, 4 Bing. N. C. 187, 195.

(*k*) *Per Tindal, C.J., Doc v. Ries*, 8 Bing. 181.

(*l*) 2 Phill. Evid., 10th ed. 420; *Bank of England v. Anderson*, 3 Bing. N. C. 666. See the resolutions in *Heydon's case*, 3 Rep. 7; as to which see *per* Pollock, C.B., *A.-G. v. Sillem*, 2 H. & C. 431; Ld. Camden's Judgment in *Entick v. Carrington*, 19 How. St. Trials, 1043 *et seq.*; *per* Coleridge, J., *Reg. v. Archb. of Canterbury*, 11 Q. B. 595, 596; *per* Crompton, J., *Sharpley v. Mablethorpe*, 3 E. & B. 917; *per* Byles, J., 6 C. B. N. S. 213.

judge of the intention of the makers at the time when the law was made" (*m*). And, "it is by no means an inconvenient mode of construing statutes to presume that the legislature was aware of the state of the law at the time they were passed" (*n*). Yet, an Act which purports to amend the law is not conclusive evidence of what the earlier law was (*o*); and even the use of the words "it is declared" does not necessarily render an Act retrospective in operation (*p*).

Conformably to what has been said, stress was laid by several of the judges in the *Fermoy Peerage* case (*q*), upon the usage observed in the creation of Irish Peerages since the passing of the Act of Union. And in *Salkeld v. Johnson* (*r*), the Court of Exchequer, referring to the 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 100, observed, "We propose to construe the Act according to the legal rules for the interpretation of statutes, principally by the words of the statute itself: which we are to read in their ordinary sense, and only modify or alter so far as it may be necessary to avoid some manifest absurdity or incongruity, but no further" (*s*). It is proper also to consider the state of the law which it proposes or purports to alter, the mischiefs which existed and which it was intended to remedy (*t*), and the nature of the remedy provided, and to look at the statutes *in pari materiâ* (*u*), as a means of explaining this statute. These are the proper modes of ascertaining the intention of the legislature."

Generally, however, usage does not aid interpretation unless there be ambiguity (*v*). If there has been a long usage

Limits of
the maxim,

(*m*) 2 Inst. 11, 136, 181; *per* Holt, C.J., Comb. R. 210; *Newcastle Corp. v. A.-G.*, 12 Cl. & F. 419; *Morgan v. Crawshay*, L. R. 5 H. L. 315.

(*n*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *Jones v. Brown*, 2 Exch. 332.

(*o*) *Mollwo v. Court of Wards*, L. R. 4 P. C. 437.

(*p*) *Harding v. Queensland Commrs.*, [1898] A. C. 769: 67 L. J. P. C. 144.

(*q*) 5 H. L. Cas. 747, 785.

(*r*) 2 Exch. 273.

(*s*) *Ante*, pp. 434, *et seq.*

(*t*) Cf. *per* Ld. Esher, *Powell v. Kempton Co.*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 242; S. C. [1899] A. C. 143: 68 L. J. Q. B. 392.

(*u*) See *Ex p. Copeland*, 2 De G. M. & G. 914.

(*v*) *N. E. R. Co. v. Hastings*, [1900] A. C. 260.

to apply trust funds to purposes warranted by one possible construction of a will, but not by another, the Courts lean to that construction which upholds the usage; but usage does not justify deviation from terms which are plain (*x*): it is a strong ground for the interpretation of doubtful expressions, but affords no sanction to manifest breaches of trust (*y*). Similarly, against the clear words of a statute no usage is of avail (*z*); and hence it has been said that the maxim amounts to no more than this, that if an Act be susceptible of the construction put upon it by long usage, the Courts will not disturb that construction (*a*).

But where a statute is silent upon some points, usage, especially if it be not inconsistent with the directions actually given, may well supply the defect; and where a statute uses language of doubtful import, what has been done under it for a long course of years may well give an interpretation, reducing uncertainty to a fixed rule. In such cases the maxim, hereafter illustrated (*b*), is applicable: *optimus legis interpretæ consuetudo* (*c*).

In construing an ancient statute, such as the Act of Uniformity, contemporaneous usage is of great value, and to ascertain what that usage was the Courts may refer to all such ancient works as a careful historian would rely upon; for the law permits a reference to historical works in order to ascertain ancient facts of a public nature (*d*).

But in construing a modern statute *contemporanea expositio*

(*x*) *A.-G. v. Rochester*, 5 De G. M. & G. 822; *A.-G. v. Sidney Sussex College*, L. R. 4 H. L. 732.

(*y*) See 2 H. L. Cas. 861, 863.

(*z*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, *Dunbar Mags. v. Duchess of Roxburghe*, 3 Cl. & F. 354.

(*a*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., *Pochin v. Duncombe*, 1 H. & N. 856; cf. *Id.* 58; *per* Ld. Campbell, *Gorham v.*

Bp. of Exeter, 15 Q. B. 73, 74.

(*b*) See Chap. X., where the admissibility of usage to explain instruments is considered, and further authorities are cited.

(*c*) See *per* Ld. Brougham, 3 Cl. & F. 354; *Re Mackenzie*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 566.

(*d*) *Read v. Bp. of Lincoln*, [1892] A. C. 644; 62 L. J. P. C. 1.

is of no value; and the Courts have refused to apply it to statutes passed within the last hundred years (*e*).

Similar in effect to an unbroken usage is a long current of judicial decisions (*f*); and where the authorities are consistent a Court may feel bound by them even if it does not wholly approve of the principles which have been acted upon (*g*).

Judicial
decisions.

QUI HÆRET IN LITERA HÆRET IN CORTICE. (*Co. Litt.* 283 *b*.)

—*He who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin-deep into its meaning.*

The law of England respects the effect and substance of the matter, and not every nicety of form or circumstance (*h*). The reason and spirit of cases make law, and not the letter of particular precedents (*i*). Hence it is, as we have already seen, a general rule connected with the interpretation of deeds and written instruments, that, where the intention is clear, too minute a stress should not be laid on the strict and precise signification of words (*j*). For instance, by the grant of a remainder, a reversion may pass, and *e converso* (*k*); and if a lessee covenant to leave all the timber which was growing on the land when he took it, the covenant will be broken, if, at the end of the term, he cuts it down, but leaves it there; for this, though a literal performance of the covenant, would defeat its intent (*l*).

(*e*) *Trustees of Clyde Navigation v. Laird*, 8 A. C. 658, 673; *Assheton Smith v. Owen*, [1906] 1 Ch. 179, 213: 75 L. J. Ch. 181; but see *Reg. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 485, 489: 60 L. J. Q. B. 376.

(*f*) *Windham v. Chetwynd*, 1 Burr. 419.

(*g*) *Newton v. Cowie*, 4 Bing. 284,

241; 29 R. R. 541.

(*h*) *Co. Litt.* 283; *Wing. Max.*, p. 19. See *per* Coltman, J., 2 Scott, N. R. 300.

(*i*) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, 3 Burr. 1364.

(*j*) *Ante*, p. 421.

(*k*) Hobart, 27.

(*l*) Woodf., L. & T., 16th ed. 660. Cf. L. R. 13 Eq. 523.

False
grammar.

In accordance with this principle, it is a further rule, that *mala grammatica non vitiat chartam* (m)—the grammatical construction is not always, in judgment of law, to be followed; and neither false English nor bad Latin makes a deed void when its meaning is apparent (n). Thus, the word "and" has as already intimated, in certain cases, been read "or," and *vice versa*, when this change was rendered necessary by the context (o). Where, however, a proviso in a lease was altogether ungrammatical and insensible, the Court declared that they did not consider themselves bound to find out a meaning for it (p).

In interpreting an Act of Parliament, likewise, it is not always a true line of construction to decide according to the strict letter of the Act; but, subject to the remarks already made (q), the Courts may consider what is its fair meaning (r), and expound it differently from the letter, in order to preserve the intent (s). The meaning of particular words, indeed, in statutes, as well as in other instruments, is to be found not so much in a strict etymological propriety of language, nor even in popular use, as in the subject or occasion on which they are used, and the object that is intended to be attained (t).

(m) 9 Rep. 48; 6 Rep. 40; Wing. Max., p. 18; Vin. Abr., "*Grammar*" (A.); Lofft, 441. "It may as properly be said in Scotch as in English law that *falsa grammatica non vitiat chartam*:" per Ld. Chelmsford, *Gollan v. Gollan*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 591.

(n) Co. Litt. 223 b; *Osborn's case*, 10 Rep. 133; 2 Show. 334. See *Reg. v. Wooldale*, 6 Q. B. 565.

(o) *Chapman v. Dalton*, Plowd. 289; *Harris v. Davis*, 1 Coll. 416. See per Ld. Halsbury, 13 App. Cas. 603.

(p) *Doe v. Carew*, 2 Q. B. 317; *Berdoe v. Spittle*, 1 Exch. 175. See *Moverly v. Lee*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1223, 1224.

(q) *Ante*, pp. 421 *et seq.*

(r) Per Ld. Kenyon, 7 T. R. 196; *Fowler v. Padget*, Id. 509; 4 R. R. 511; 11 Rep. 73; Litt., s. 67, with the commentary, cited 3 Bing. N. C. 525; Co. Litt. 381 b. See *Vincent v. Slaymaker*, 12 East, 372; 11 R. R. 413; Arg., *Bignold v. Springfield*, 7 Cl. & F. 109, and cases there cited.

(s) 3 Rep. 27. *Semper in obscuris quod minimum est sequimur*, D. 50, 17, 9; which is a safe maxim for guidance in our own law; see per Maule, J., *Williams v. Crosling*, 3 C. B. 962.

(t) *Judgm., R. v. Hall*, 1 B. & C. 123; cited 2 C. B. 66.

Still more so is this the case in applying the words used by a judge in giving his reasons for a judgment. The effect of a judgment declaring the law cannot be avoided by considering the exact words used by a judge and then seeking "to evade the pressure of his words" by a colourable alteration of the subject-matter with reference to which they are used—" *qui hæret in litera, hæret in cortice* " (u).

The maxim applies also to the interpretation of contracts Contracts. so as to place the construer in the same position as the party who made the contract, to view the circumstances as he viewed them, and so judge of the meaning of the words, and of the correct application of the language to the things described (x), and extrinsic evidence for these purposes is admissible (y).

(u) *Per* Ld. Halsbury in *Wedderburn v. Duke of Atholl*, [1900] A. C. 403, 417.

(x) Addison on Contracts, 9th

ed., p. 44, and cases there cited.

(y) *Hudson v. Stewart*, L. R. 9 C. P. 311; 43 L. J. C. P. 204; *Brown v. Fletcher*, 35 L. T. 165.

CHAPTER IX.

THE LAW OF CONTRACTS.

A CURSORY glance at the contents of the preceding pages will show that we have frequently had occasion to refer to the law of contracts, in illustration of maxims submitted to the reader. Many, indeed, of our leading principles of law have necessarily a direct bearing upon the law merchant, and must, therefore, be constantly borne in mind when attention is directed to that subject. The following pages are devoted to a review of such maxims as are peculiarly, though by no means exclusively, applicable to contracts; and an attempt has been made, by the arrangement adopted, to show, as far as practicable, the connection between these maxims, and the relation in which they stand to each other. The first of these maxims sets forth the general principle, that parties may, by express agreement *inter se*, and subject to certain restrictions, acquire rights or incur liabilities which the law of itself would not have conferred or imposed. The maxims subsequently considered show that a man may renounce a right which the law has given to him; that one who enjoys the benefit, must likewise bear the inconvenience or loss resulting from his contract; that, where the right or where the delinquency on each side is equal in degree, the title of the party in actual possession prevails. Having thus stated preliminary rules applicable to the conduct and position of contracting parties, we proceed to examine the nature of the consideration essential to a valid contract: the liabilities attaching respectively to vendor and

purchaser: the various modes of payment and receipt of money: the effect of contracting, or, in general, of doing any act, through the intervention of an agent: and the legal consequences which flow from the subsequent ratification of a prior act. Lastly, we state how a contract may be revoked or dissolved, and how a vested right of action may be affected by the Statute of Limitations, or by the negligence or death of the party possessing it. It will be evident, from this brief outline of the principles set forth in this chapter, that some of them apply to actions of tort, as well as to actions founded on contract; and when such is the case, the remarks appended are not confined to actions of the latter description. The general object, however, has been to exhibit the most important elementary rules relative to *contracts*, and to show how the law may, through their medium be applied to regulate the infinitely varied transactions of a mercantile community.

MODUS ET CONVENTIO VINCUNT LEGEM. (2 Rep. 73.)—*The form of agreement and the convention of parties overrule the law.*

This may be regarded as the most elementary principle of law relative to contracts (a), and may be thus stated in a somewhat more comprehensive form: The conditions annexed to a grant or devise, the covenants inserted in a conveyance or lease, and the agreements whether written or verbal, entered into between parties, have, when duly executed and perfected, and subject to certain restrictions, the force of law over those who are parties to such instruments or agreements (b). “Parties to contracts,” remarked

General principles.

(a) In illustration of it, see *Walsh v. Sec. of State for India*, 10 H. L. Cas. 367; *Savin v. Hoylake R. Co.*, L. R. 1 Ex. 9; *Barlow v. Teal*, 15 Q. B. D. 501.

(b) A “contract” is defined to be “Une convention par laquelle les deux parties, ou seulement l’une des deux, promettent et s’engagent envers l’autre à lui donner quelque chose ou

Erle, J., "are to be allowed to regulate their rights and liabilities themselves" (c), and "the Court will only give effect to the intention of the parties as it is expressed by the contract" (d).

Where the tenant of a house covenanted in his lease to pay a reasonable share of the expenses of supporting and repairing all party-walls, and to pay all taxes, duties, assessments, and impositions, parliamentary and parochial—"it being the intention of the parties that the landlord should receive the clear yearly rent of £60 in net money, without any deduction whatever,"—and during the lease the owner of the next house built a party-wall between his own house and the house demised, under the provisions of the 14 Geo. 3, c. 78: it was held that the tenant, and not the landlord, was bound to pay the moiety of the expense of the party-wall; "for," observed Lord Kenyon, "the covenants in the lease render it unnecessary to consider which of the parties would have been liable under the Act; *modus et conventio vincunt legem*" (e).

So, in *Rowbotham v. Wilson* (f), Martin, B., observed, "I think the owner of land may grant the surface, subject to the quality or incident that he shall be at liberty to work the mines underneath, and not be responsible for any subsidence of the surface. If the law of itself, under certain circumstances, protects from the consequences of an act, I think a man may contract for such protection in a case

à faire ou à ne pas faire quelque chose :" Pothier, *Oblig.*, pt. 1, chap. 1, art. 1, s. 1. *Omne jus aut consensus fecit, aut necessitas constituit, aut firmavit consuetudo :* D. 1, 3, 40. "It is the essence of a contract that there should be a concurrence of intention between the parties as to the terms. It is an agreement because they agree upon the terms, upon the subject-matter, the consideration, and the promise:" L. R. 4 Ex. 381.

(c) *Gott v. Gandy*, 23 L. J. Q. B. 1, 3; S. C., 2 E. & B. 847; *per* Erle, J., 4 H. & N. 843.

(d) *Judgm., Stadhard v. Lee*, 3 B. & S. 372; *per* Bramwell, B., *Rogers v. Hadley*, 2 H. & C. 249; and see *Manchester, S. & L. R. Co. v. Brown*, 8 App. Cases, 703: 52 L. J. 132.

(e) *Barrett v. Duke of Bedford*, 8 T. R. 602, 605.

(f) 8 E. & B. 150: 8 H. L. Cas. 348.

where the law of itself would not apply ; *modus et conventio vincunt legem.*"

In an action for not carrying away tithe corn, the plaintiff alleged that it was "lawfully and in due manner" set out: it was held that this allegation was satisfied by proof that the tithe was set out according to an agreement between the parties, although the agreed mode varied from that prescribed by the common law, the tithe being set out in shocks, and not in sheaves, as the law directed (*g*).

The same comprehensive principle applies, also, to agreements having immediate reference to mercantile transactions: thus, the stipulations contained in articles of partnership may be enforced, and must be acted on as far as they go, their terms being explained, and their deficiencies supplied, by reference to the general principles of law. Although, therefore, a new partner cannot at law be introduced without the consent of every individual member of the firm, yet the executor of a deceased partner is entitled to occupy his place, if there be an express stipulation to that effect in the agreement of partnership. Again, the lien which a factor has upon the goods of his principal (*h*) arises from a tacit agreement between the parties, which the law implies; but, where there is an express stipulation to the contrary, it puts an end to the general rule of law (*i*). The general lien of a banker, also, is part of the law merchant, and will be upheld by the Courts, unless there be some agreement between the banker and the depositor, either express or implied, inconsistent with such right (*k*).

Mercantile transactions.

(*g*) *Facey v. Hurdorn*, 3 B. & C. 213. See *Halliwell v. Trappes*, 1 Taunt. 55.

(*h*) See *Dixon v. Stansfeld*, 10 C. B. 398.

(*i*) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, *Walker v. Birch*, 6 T. R. 262. As to the general lien of a wharfinger at common law, see *Dresser v. Bosanquet*, 4

B. & S. 460, 486.

(*k*) *Brandão v. Barnett*, 12 Cl. & F. 787; 3 C. B. 519; *Misa v. Currie*, 1 App. Cas. 554, 569.

As to the lien of a shipowner on the cargo for freight, see *How v. Kirchner*, 11 Moo. P. C. C. 21; *Kirchner v. Venus*, 12 Id. 361.

So, it has been remarked that, in the ordinary case of a sale of chattels, time is not of the *essence* of the contract, *unless* it be made so by express agreement, and this may be effected with facility by introducing conditional words into the bargain; the sale of a specific chattel on credit, therefore, although that credit be limited to a definite term, transfers the property in the goods to the buyer, giving the seller, when that term has expired, a right of action for the price, and a lien upon the goods, if they be still in his possession, till that price be paid (*l*).

Doctrine of
equity.
Specific
performance.

The doctrine relative to specific performance may here be mentioned, as showing that Courts of equity fully acknowledge the efficacy of contracts, where *bonâ fide* entered into in accordance with the formalities, if any, required by law. Equity, indeed, from its peculiar jurisdiction, has power for enforcing the fulfilment of contracts which the common law does not possess (*m*); and in exercising this power, it acts upon the principle that express stipulations, if valid, prescribe the law *quoad* the contracting parties. For instance, money was devised to be laid out in land to the use of B. in tail, remainder to the use of C. in fee. B., having no issue, agreed with C. to divide the money; but before the agreement was carried out B. died, whereupon C. becoming, as he supposed, entitled to the whole fund, refused to complete the agreement. The Court, however, upon a bill filed by B.'s personal representatives, decreed a specific performance (*n*); acting thereby in strict accordance with the maxim, *modus et conventio vincunt legem* (*o*).

Without venturing further into the wide field which is

(*l*) *Martindale v. Smith*, 1 Q. B. 395, cited in *Page v. Eduljee*, L. R. 1 P. C. 145. In *Spartali v. Benecke*, 10 C. B. 216, Wilde, C.J., observes, "If a vendor agrees to sell for a deferred payment, the property passes, and the vendee is entitled to call for a present delivery without payment."

See 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, ss. 10 (1), 18, 41 (1) (b).

(*m*) See *Benson v. Paull*, 6 E. & B. 273.

(*n*) *Carter v. Carter*, Cas. temp. Talb. 271.

(*o*) See, also, *Frank v. Frank*, 1 Chanc. Cas. 84.

here opening upon us, we may add that it does sometimes happen, notwithstanding an express agreement between parties, that peculiar circumstances present themselves which afford grounds for the interference of a Court of equity, in order that the contract entered into may be so modified as to meet the justice of the case. For instance, where an attorney, who died three weeks later, received, whilst he lay ill, 120 guineas by way of apprentice fee with a clerk who was placed with him, the Court decreed a return of 100 guineas, although the articles provided that if the attorney should die within the year £60 only should be returned (p). With respect to this case, Lord Kenyon, indeed, observed (q), that in it the jurisdiction of a Court of equity had been carried "as far as could be;" but the decision seems, from the facts stated in the pleadings (r), to be supportable upon a plain ground of equity, viz., that of mutual mistake, misrepresentation, or unconscientious advantage (s), and, consequently, not really opposed to the spirit of the maxim, *modus et conventio vincunt legem*.

The rule under consideration, however, is subject to limitation, and does not apply where the express provisions of any law are violated by the contract, nor, in general, where the interests of the public, or of third parties, would be injuriously affected by its fulfilment. *Pacta, quæ contra leges constitutionesque vel contra bonos mores fiunt, nullam vim habere, indubitati juris est* (t); and *privatorum conventio juri publico non derogat* (u). "If the thing stipulated for is in itself contrary to law, the paction by which the execution of the illegal act is stipulated must be held as intrinsically null: *pactis privatorum juri publico non derogatur*' (v). Accordingly illegality may be pleaded as a defence to an

Limitation
of rule.

(p) *Newton v. Rowse*, 1 Vern., 3rd ed. 460. See *Re Thompson*, 1 Exch. 864; *Whincup v. Hughes*, L. R. 6 C. P. 83.

(q) *Hale v. Webb*, 2 Bro. Ch. 80.

(r) See 1 Vern., 3rd ed. 460 (2).

(s) 1 Story, Eq. Jurisp., 12th ed. p. 460.

(t) C. 2, 3, 6.

(u) D. 50, 17, 45, § 1; D. 2, 14, 38; 9 Rep. 141.

(v) Arg., 4 Cl. & F. 241.

action on a deed. Thus, where the defendant and other obligors on a bond had agreed to execute the bond in favour of the plaintiff as security for money paid by him to another person as a bribe not to prosecute the other obligors for perjury, the defendant was permitted to set up the agreement and thereby avoid the payment of the bond on the ground of illegality (*x*).

Again, the jurisdiction of the Courts cannot be ousted by mere agreement of the parties (*y*). Contracts in writing often contain an "arbitration clause." Such clause, in so far as it provides for the reference of disputes, is valid (*z*); but, being construed as collateral to the rest of the contract, it is no defence in law to an action thereon (*a*), though it may entitle the defendant to have the action stayed (*b*). A clause which provides absolutely that a right under the contract shall not be enforceable by action is void, as an attempt to oust jurisdiction (*y*); but if it merely provides that an award, fixing the debt or the damages, shall be a condition precedent to the recovery thereof by action, it is not only valid, but is a defence to the action if brought before the award (*c*).

Not only is the consent or private agreement of individuals ineffectual in rendering valid any direct contravention of the law (*d*), but it will altogether fail to make just, sufficient, or effectual that which is unjust or deficient in respect to any matter which the law declares to be indispensable and not circumstantial merely (*e*). Therefore an

(*x*) *Collins v. Blantern*, 1 Smith's L. C., 11th ed. 369, and authorities cited in the note thereto.

(*y*) *Horton v. Sayer*, 4 H. & N. 643; 29 L. J. Ex. 28.

(*z*) *Livingston v. Ralli*, 5 E. & B. 132.

(*a*) *Collins v. Lockc*, 4 App. Cas. 674; *Dawson v. Fitzgerald*, 1 Ex. D. 257.

(*b*) See 52 & 53 Vict. c. 49, ss. 4, 27.

(*c*) *Scott v. Avery*, 5 H. L. Cas. 811; 25 L. J. Ex. 308; *Viney v. Bignold*, 20 Q. B. D. 172; *Caledonian Ins. Co. v. Gilmour*, [1893] A. C. 85.

(*d*) See *British Wagon Co. v. Gray*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 35; 65 L. J. Q. B. 75; and cf. *Montgomery v. Liebethal*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 487; 67 L. J. Q. B. 313.

(*e*) Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 694.

agreement by a married woman, that she will not avail herself of her coverture as a ground of defence to an action on a personal obligation which she has incurred, would not be valid or effective in support of the plaintiff's claim and by way of answer to a plea of coverture (*f*); for a married woman is under a total disability, and her contract is absolutely void, except where it can be viewed as a contract by her husband through her agency, or is within the Married Woman's Property Acts.

So, with reference to a provision in a foreign policy of insurance against all perils of the sea, "*nullis exceptis*," it was observed, that, although there was an express exclusion of any exception by the terms of the policy, yet the reason of the thing engrafts an implied exception even upon words so general as these; as, for example, in the case of damage occasioned by the wilful fault of the assured; it being a general rule that insurers are not liable when loss or damage happens by the fraud of the assured, from which rule it is not permissible to derogate by any pact to the contrary; for *nulla pactione effici potest ut dolus præstetur* (*g*)—a man cannot validly contract that he shall be irresponsible for his own fraud. Neither will the law permit a person who enters into a binding contract, to say, by a subsequent clause, that he will not be liable to be sued for a breach of it (*h*).

It is equally clear that an agreement entered into between two persons cannot, in general, affect the rights of a third party, who is a stranger to it; thus, an agreement between A. and B., that B. shall discharge a debt due from A. to C., does not prejudice C.'s right to sue A. for the debt;

Agreement
cannot affect
the rights
of third
parties.

(*f*) See *Liverpool Adelphi Loan Ass. v. Fairhurst*, 9 Exch. 422; *Wright v. Leonard*, 11 C. B. N. S. 258; *Cannam v. Farmer*, 3 Exch. 698; *Bartlett v. Wells*, 1 B. & S. 836; *Bateman v. Faber*, [1898] 1 Ch. 145; 67 L. J. Ch. 130.

(*g*) Judgm., 5 M. & S. 466: D. 2, 14, 27, 3. See *Trinder v. Thames, &c. Ins. Co.*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 114; 67 L. J. Q. B. 666; *Shaw v. G. W. R. Co.*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 373, 382.

(*h*) Per Martin, B., *Kelsall v. Tyler*, 11 Exch. 534.

debitorum pactionibus creditorum petitio nec tolli nec minui potest (i); and, according to the rule of the Roman law, *privatis pactionibus non dubium est non lædi jus cæterorum* (k).

In the above and similar cases, then, as well as in some others relative to the disposition of property, which have been noticed in the preceding chapter (l), another maxim emphatically applies: *fortior et potentior est dispositio legis quam hominis* (m)—the law in some cases overrides the will of the individual, and renders ineffective and futile his expressed intention or contract (n).

Surrender
by operation
of law.

For instance, "surrender" is the term applied in law to "an act done by or to the owner of a particular estate, the validity of which he is estopped from disputing, and which could not have been done if the particular estate continued to exist;" as in the case of a lessee taking a second lease from the lessor, or a tenant for life accepting a feoffment from the party in remainder, or a lessee accepting a rent-charge from his lessor. In such case the surrender is not the result of *intention*; for, if there was no intention to surrender the particular estate, or even if there was an express intention to keep it unsurrendered, the surrender would be the act of the law, and would prevail in spite of the intention of the

(i) 1 Pothier, Oblig., 108, 109. See, however, *Rouse v. Bradford Bank*, [1894] A. C. 586.

(k) D. 2, 15, 3, pr.

(l) See, also, *per* Ld. Kenyon, *Doe v. Carter*, 8 T. R. 61; S. C., Id. 300; 4 R. R. 586; Arg., 15 East, 178.

(m) Co. Litt. 234 a, cited, 15 East, 178. The maxim is illustrated by Williams, J., *Hybart v. Parker*, 4 C. B. N. S. 213—214.

(n) For instance, a man cannot, by his own acts or words, render that irrevocable, which, in its own

nature and according to established rules of law, is revocable, as in the case of a will. Similarly, it was said that "the rule which prohibits the assignment of a right to sue on a covenant, is not one which can be dispensed with by the agreement of the parties, and it applies to covenants expressed to be with assignees, as well as to others;" Judgm., 1 Exch. 645. And see Judgm., *Hibblewhite v. M' Morine*, 6 M. & W. 216.

parties (o): *fortior et potentior est dispositio legis quam hominis* (v).

Subject to such and similar exceptions, however, the general rule of the civil law holds equally in our own: *pacta conventa quæ neque contra leges neque dolo malo inita sunt omnimodo observanda sunt* (g)—compacts which are not illegal, and do not originate in fraud, must in all respects be observed.

QUILIBET POTEST RENUNCIARE JURI PRO SE INTRODUCTO.

(*Wing. Max.*, p. 483.)—*Any one may, at his pleasure, renounce the benefit of a stipulation or other right introduced entirely in his own favour* (r).

According to the well-known principle expressed in this maxim, a defendant may, as a rule, decline to avail himself of a defence which would be at law a valid and sufficient answer to the plaintiff's demand, and waive his right to insist upon that defence (s).

Waiver of
defence.

(o) *Lyon v. Reed*, 13 M. & W. 285, 306; commented on, *Nickells v. Atherstone*, 10 Q. B. 944. As to a surrender by operation of law, see also the cases collected, 2 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 837 *et seq.*; *Doe v. Wood*, 14 M. & W. 682; *Morrison v. Chadwick*, 7 C. B. 266; *Tanner v. Hartley*, 9 C. B. 634; *Judgm., Doe v. Poole*, 11 Q. B. 716.

(p) Similarly applied in 8 Johns. (U.S.), R. 401; Co. Litt. 338 a. It may possibly happen, too, that the direction of a particular legal tribunal will have to be disregarded by a judge, as opposed to the common law; see *per Coleridge, J.*, 15 Q. B. 192. And see other instances, in connection with illegal contracts, *post*. *Et vide per* Ld. Truro, *Ellcock v. Mapp*, 3 H. L. Cas. 507; *per*

Parke, B., *Hallett v. Dowdall*, 18 Q. B. 87.

(q) C. 2, 3, 29.

(r) Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 545; 1 Inst. 99 a; 2 Inst. 183; 10 Rep. 101; *Wilson v. McIntosh*, [1894] A. C. 133; 63 L. J. P. C. 49.

The words *pro se* were introduced to show that no man can renounce a right, of which the claims of society forbid the renunciation: *per* Ld. Westbury, *Hunt v. Hunt*, 31 L. J. Ch. 175. For instance, if an action be brought upon a contract which is shown at the trial to be illegal, the Courts may apply the maxim, *ex turpi causa non oritur actio*, although the defendant has not pleaded the illegality; *Scott v. Brown*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 724; see *post*, p. 554.

(s) See *per* Bayley, J., 2 M. & S.

Statute of
Limitations.

For instance, a defendant, who is sued for a debt barred by the statute of limitations (*t*), may waive his right to rely upon the defence which that statute confers (*u*); and the benefit of the statute may also be waived by a debtor before action brought to recover the debt (*x*), by his signing a written (*y*) promise to pay the debt, either unconditionally or subject to conditions afterwards fulfilled, or a written acknowledgment of the debt from which a promise to pay it may be inferred (*z*); or, again, by his making a part payment on account of the whole debt under circumstances which do not rebut the implication of a promise by him to pay the balance (*a*).

Infancy.

Similarly, where a person is sued after his coming of age for a debt which he contracted during his infancy, and which, owing to his infancy, was either voidable by him, or even absolutely void (*b*), it is, no doubt, generally open to him to waive such ground of defence. The statute law (*c*) has, indeed, affected the general rule of the common law (*d*), that a person binds himself by his ratification after full age to transactions which he entered into while an infant; yet there are still transactions to which that rule applies. For instance, if an infant makes a settlement of property upon his marriage, the settlement is generally voidable by him upon his coming of age, but he may waive his right to

25; *per* Abbott, C.J., 5 B. & Ald. 686. *Graham v. Ingleby*, 1 Exch. 651, 656, shows that a plaintiff might waive the benefit of the 4 Ann. c. 16, s. 11, which required that a plea in abatement should be verified by affidavit.

(*t*) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16.

(*u*) See R. S. C. 1883, O. 19, r. 15.

(*x*) See *Bateman v. Pindar*, 3 Q. B. 574.

(*y*) See 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1; 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 13.

(*z*) See *Re River Steamer Co.*, L. R. 6 Ch. 822, 828; *Green v.*

Humphreys, 26 Ch. D. 474: 53 L. J. Ch. 625; *Stamford Bank v. Smith*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 765: 61 L. J. Q. B. 405.

(*a*) *Morgan v. Rowlands*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 493; *Tanner v. Smart*, 6 B. & C. 603.

(*b*) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, s. 1; see also 55 Vict. c. 4, s. 5.

(*c*) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62, s. 2; see *Smith v. King*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 543.

(*d*) See *Harris v. Wall*, 1 Exch. 122.

avoid it by his then ratifying it, or, indeed, by his not repudiating it within a reasonable time after his majority (*e*).

A man may also not merely relinquish a particular line of defence, but he may also renounce a claim which might have been substantiated, or release a debt which might have been recovered by ordinary legal process; or he may, by his express contract or stipulation, exclude some more extensive right, which the law would otherwise have conferred upon him. In all these cases, the rule holds, *omnes licentiam habere his quæ pro se indulta sunt renunciare* (*f*)—every man may renounce a benefit or waive a privilege which the law has conferred upon him (*g*). For instance, whoever contracts to purchase an estate in fee-simple without any stipulation to vary the general right, is entitled to call for a conveyance of the fee, and to have a good title to the legal estate made out. But a man may, by express stipulation, or by contract, or even by consent testified by acquiescence or otherwise, bind himself to accept a title merely equitable, or a title subject to some incumbrance; and whatever defect there may be, which is covered by this stipulation, must be disregarded by the conveyancer to whom the abstract of title is submitted, as not affording a valid ground of objection (*h*). Again, the right to estovers is incident to the estate of a tenant for life or years (though not to the estate of a strict tenant at will), unless he be restrained by special covenant to the contrary, which is usually the case;

Renunciation
of right.

(*e*) *Edwards v. Carter*, [1893] A. C. 360; 63 L. J. Ch. 100; *Re Hodson*, [1894] 2 Ch. 421; 63 L. J. Ch. 609.

(*f*) C. 1, 3, 51; C. 2, 3, 29; *Invito beneficium non datur*, D. 50, 17, 69. See, as an illustration, *Markham v. Stanford*, 14 C. B. N. S. 376, 383; distinguished in *Morten v. Marshall*, 2 H. & C. 305.

(*g*) *Per Erle, C.J., Rumsey v. N. E. R. Co.*, 14 C. B. N. S. 649; *Caledonian R. Co. v. Lockhart*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 808, 822; *per Martin, B.*, 8 E. & B. 151; *per Pollock, C.B., and Bramwell, B.*, 2 H. & C. 308, 309. See *Enohin v. Wylie*, 10 H. L. Cas. 1, 15.

(*h*) 3 Prest. Abs. Tit. 221.

so that here the above maxim, or that relating to *modus et conventio*, may be applied (*i*).

Waiver of
notice of
dishonour.

Another familiar instance of the application of the same principle occurs in connection with the law of bills of exchange (*k*). The general rule is, that, in order to charge the drawer or indorser of a bill, the holder must, on the day the bill falls due, present it to the acceptor for payment (*l*), and, if payment be refused, he must give to the drawer or indorser notice of the dishonour within a reasonable time thereafter (*m*). As regards the drawer, the reason of this rule is that the acceptor is presumed to have in his hands effects of the drawer for the purpose of discharging the bill; and, therefore, notice to the drawer is requisite, in order that he may withdraw his effects as speedily as possible from the acceptor's hands. Unless these previous steps have been taken, generally the drawer cannot be resorted to on non-payment of the bill; and the want of notice of the dishonour to a drawer, who has effects in the hands of the acceptor, is considered as tantamount to payment by him. Again, where a bill has been indorsed, and the holder intends to sue an indorser, it is incumbent on him first to demand payment from the acceptor on the day when the bill falls due, and, in case of refusal, to give notice thereof within a reasonable time to the indorser; the reason being, that the indorser is in the position of a surety only, and his undertaking to pay the bill is not an absolute, but a conditional undertaking, that is, in the event of a demand made on the acceptor (who is primarily liable) at the time when the bill becomes due, and of refusal on his part to pay. As, however, the rule requiring presentment for payment and notice of dishonour was introduced for the benefit of the party to whom such notice must be given, it may, in accordance with the above maxim, be

(*i*) Co. Litt. 41 b.

(*l*) Ss. 45, 46.

(*k*) Now codified by the 45 & 46
Vict. c. 61.

(*m*) 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, ss. 47—50.

waived by that party (*n*). But though a party may thus waive the consequences of *laches* in respect of himself, he cannot do so in respect of antecedent parties; for that would violate another legal principal, which limits the application of the maxim now under consideration to cases in which no injury is inflicted, by the renunciation of a legal right, upon a third party.

It will be seen from some of the preceding instances, that the rule which enables a man to renounce a right which he might otherwise have enforced, must be applied with this qualification, that, in general, a private compact cannot be permitted to derogate from the rights of third parties (*o*). In other words, although a party may renounce a right or benefit *pro se introductum*, he cannot renounce that which has been introduced for the benefit of another party; thus, the rule that a child within the age of nurture cannot be separated from the mother by order of removal, was established for the benefit and protection of the child, and therefore cannot be dispensed with by the mother's consent (*p*).

One case may, however, be mentioned to which the rule applies, without qualification—that of a release by one of several joint creditors, which, in the absence of fraud and collusion, operates as a release of the claim of the other creditors, and may be pleaded accordingly. On the other hand, the creditor's discharge of one joint or joint and several debtor is a discharge of all (*q*); and a release of the principal debtor discharges the sureties; unless, indeed, there be an express reservation of remedies as against them, enabling the release to be construed as a mere covenant not to sue the principal (*r*).

Qualification
of rule.

Principal
and surety.

(*n*) Ss. 46 (2) (e), 50 (1) (b).

Q. B. D. 175.

(*o*) 7 Rep. 23. See *Brinsdon v. Allard*, 2 E. & E. 19; *Slater v. Mayor of Sunderland*, 33 L. J. Q. B. 37.

(*q*) *Nicholson v. Revill*, 4 A. & E. 675, 683; Co. Litt. 232 a; Judgm., *Price v. Barker*, 4 E. & B. 777; *Clayton v. Kynaston*, 2 Salk. 573; 2

(*p*) *Reg. v. Birmingham*, 5 Q. B. 210. See 5 E. & B. 892: 10

Roll. Abr. 410, D. 1; 412 G., pl. 4. (*r*) *Kearsley v. Cole*, 16 M. & W.

It is also a well-known principal of law that, where a creditor gives time to the principal debtor (*s*), there being a surety to secure payment of the debt, and does so without consent of or communication with the surety, he discharges the surety from liability, as he thereby places him in a *new situation* (*t*), and exposes him to a risk to which he would not otherwise be liable (*u*); and this seems to afford a further illustration of the remark already offered, that a renunciation of a right cannot in general (*x*) be made to the injury of a third party.

Where, however, a husband, whose wife was entitled to a fund in court, signed a memorandum after marriage, agreeing to secure half her property on herself, it was held that it was competent for the wife to waive this agreement, while executory, and that any benefit which her children

128; *Thompson v. Lack*, 3 C. B. 540; *Price v. Barker*, 4 E. & B. 779; *Owen v. Homan*, 4 H. L. Cas. 997, 1037. See *Commercial Bank of Tasmania v. Jones*, [1893] A. C. 313: 62 L. J. P. C. 104.

(*s*) "The general rule of law where a person is surety for the debt of another is this—that though the creditor may be entitled, after a certain period, to make a demand and enforce payment of the debt, he is not bound to do so; and provided he does not preclude himself from proceeding against the principal, he may abstain from enforcing any right which he possesses. If the creditor has voluntarily placed himself in such a position that he cannot sue the principal, he thereby discharges the surety. But mere delay on the part of the creditor, unaccompanied by any valid contract with the principal, will not discharge the surety:" *per* Pollock, C.B., *Price v. Kirkham*, 3 H. & C. 441.

(*t*) See *Harrison v. Seymour*,

L. R. 1 C. P. 518; *Union Bank of Manchester v. Beech*, 3 H. & C. 672; *Skillett v. Fletcher*, L. R. 2 C. P. 469, and cases there cited.

(*u*) *Per* Ld. Lyndhurst, *Oakeley v. Pasheller*, 4 Cl. & F. 233. See further as to the rule above stated, *per* Ld. Brougham, *Maclaggart v. Watson*, 3 Cl. & F. 541; *per* Ld. Eldon, *Samuell v. Howorth*, 3 Mer. 278; 17 R. R. 81, adopted by Ld. Cottenham, *Creighton v. Rankin*, 7 Cl. & F. 346; *Manley v. Boycot*, 2 E. & B. 46; *Pooley v. Harradine*, 7 Id. 431; *Lawrence v. Walmsley*, 12 C. B. N. S. 799, 808. See also *Bonar v. Macdonald*, 3 H. L. Cas. 226; *Gen. St. Nav. Co. v. Rolt*, 6 C. B. N. S. 550; *Way v. Hearn*, 11 Id. 774: 13 Id. 292; *Frazer v. Jordan*, 8 E. & B. 303; *Taylor v. Burgess*, 5 H. & N. 1; *Bailey v. Edwards*, 4 B. & S. 761; *Rouse v. Bradford Bank*, [1894] A. C. 586: 63 L. J. Ch. 890.

(*x*) See *Langley v. Headland*, 19 C. B. N. S. 42.

might have taken under it, had it been executed, was defeated by her waiver (*y*).

Lastly, it is clear that the maxim, *quilibet potest renunciare juri pro se introducto*, is inapplicable where an express statutory direction enjoins compliance with the forms which it prescribes; for instance, a testator cannot dispense with the observance of formalities essential to the validity of a will; for the provisions of the Wills Act were introduced for the benefit of the public, not of the individual, and must be regarded as positive ordinances of the legislature, binding upon all (*z*). Nor can an individual waive a matter in which the public have an interest (*a*), or a public body, entrusted with powers to be exercised for the benefit of the public, waive their right to exercise any of those powers (*b*); and the maxim seems also inapplicable where a defendant enters into an agreement by which he is to be deprived of that right to protection to which by law he is absolutely entitled (*c*).

Provision
positivi juris.

QUI SENTIT COMMODUM SENTIRE DEBET ET ONUS.—(2 *Inst.* 489.)—*He who derives the advantage ought to sustain the burthen.*

This rule (*d*) applies as well where an implied covenant runs with the land, as where the present owner or occupier of land is bound by the express covenant of a prior occupant; whenever, indeed, the ancient maxim, *transit terra*

Covenant
running with
the land.

(*y*) *Fenner v. Taylor*, 2 Russ. & My. 190; 37 R. R. 300; Macq., H. & W. 85.

(*z*) See *per* Wilson, J., *Habergham v. Vincent*, 2 Ves. jun. 227; cited *Countess of Zichy Ferraris v. Marq. of Hertford*, 3 Curt. 493, 498; S. C., affirmed 4 Moore, P. C. 339.

(*a*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Graham v. Ingleby*, 1 Exch. 657.

(*b*) *Ayr Harbour Trustees v. Oswald*, 8 App. Cas. 623; *Spurling v. Bantoft*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 384: 60 L. J. Q. B. 745; see also *Yabbicom v. King*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 444: 68 L. J. Q. B. 560.

(*c*) *Lee v. Read*, 5 Beav. 381.

(*d*) In exemplification whereof see *Hayward v. Duff*, 12 C. B. N. S. 364.

cum onere, holds true (*e*). The burthen of repairs has, we may observe, always been thrown as much as possible, by the spirit of the common law, upon the occupier or tenant, not only in accordance with the principle contained in the above maxim, but also because it would be contrary to justice, that the expense of accumulated dilapidation should, at the end of a tenancy, fall upon the landlord, when a small outlay of money by the tenant in the first instance would have prevented any necessity for such expense; to which we may add that, generally, the tenant alone has the opportunity of observing, from time to time, when repairs become necessary. In a leading case on this subject, the facts were that a man demised a house by indenture for years, and the lessee, for himself and his executors, covenanted with the lessor to repair the house at all times necessary; the lessee afterwards assigned it to another party, who suffered it to decay; it was adjudged that covenant lay at suit of the lessor against the assignee, although the lessee had not covenanted for him and his assigns; for the covenant to repair, which extends to the support of the thing demised, is *quodammodo* appurtenant to it, and goes with it; and, inasmuch as the lessee had taken upon himself to bear the charges of the reparations, the yearly rent was the less, which was to the benefit of the assignee, and *qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus* (*f*).

The following case also serves to illustrate the same principle. An action was brought by the devisee in fee of premises against the executor of a devisee for life of the same premises for permissive waste, the devise providing that the tenant for life should keep the premises in repair. The Court pronounced judgment in favour of the plaintiff on the ground that, however doubtful might

(*e*) Co. Litt. 231 a. See *Moule v. Dean and Chapter of Wind-Garrett*, L. R. 5 Ex. 13, and cases there cited. (*f*) *Dean and Chapter of Wind-Garrett's case*, 5 Rep. 25.

be the liability, in respect of permissive waste (*ff*), of a tenant for life, upon whom no express duty to repair was imposed by the instrument creating the estate, yet where such a duty was imposed the liability passed with the enjoyment of the thing thus demised (*g*).

The maxim under consideration affects a person who accepts a bequest of leaseholds. For instance, a person who enjoys leasehold property under a will, as legal or equitable tenant for life, is generally bound, as between himself and the testator's estate, to perform all the tenant's obligations under the lease which arise during the course of his life interest (*h*).

A liability to repair a public highway may attach to corporations and to individuals by reason of the tenure of lands held by them; and in former days it was common for testators to leave portions of their estate charged with this liability (*i*); and owners of premises fronting a new street may now be called upon to contribute towards making it good under the provisions of the Public Health Act (*k*).

It has been designated a principle of "universal application" that "where a contract has been entered into by one man as agent for another, the person on whose behalf it has been made cannot take the benefit of it without bearing its burthen. The contract must be performed in its integrity" (*l*). Accordingly, where a person adopts a contract which was made on his behalf, but without his authority, he must adopt it altogether. He cannot ratify that part which is beneficial to himself, and reject the

Liability
ratione
tenuræ.

Principal
and agent.

(*ff*) See *Re Cartwright*, 41 Ch. D. 532.

(*g*) *Woodhouse v. Walker*, 5 Q. B. D. 404; 49 L. J. Q. B. 609; *Aspden v. Seddon*, 1 Ex. D. 496; 46 L. J. Ex. 353.

(*h*) *Re Betty*, [1899] 1 Ch. 821; 68 L. J. Ch. 435; *Re Gfers*, [1899] 2 Ch. 55; 68 L. J. Ch. 442.

(*i*) *Glen on Highways*, 107 *et seq.*

(*k*) 38 & 39 Vict. c. 55, s. 150.

(*l*) *Per* Ld. Cranworth and Ld. Kingsdown, *Bristow v. Whitmore*, 9 H. L. Cas. 391, 404, 418 (where there was a difference of opinion as to the application of the principal maxim; see *per* Ld. Wensleydale, Id. 406); cited in *The Feronia*, L. R. 2 A. & E. 75, 77, 85.

remainder; he must take the benefit to be derived from the transaction *cum onere* (*m*). Moreover, where the owner of goods entrusts them to an agent, and authorises him to sell them as his own goods in his own name as principal, and the goods are bought by a buyer in the belief that the agent is the principal, the right of the owner of the goods to recover the price from the buyer is subject to any right of set-off as against the agent which accrued to the buyer while he still believed that the agent was principal (*n*); and it is a rule of general application that a person who allows his agent to appear in the character of principal, must take the consequences of the agent being dealt with on the footing that he really is the principal (*o*).

Assignee.

Again, it is a very general and comprehensive rule, which falls within the scope of the maxim under consideration, that the assignee of a chose in action takes it subject to all the equities to which it was liable in the hands of the assignor; and the reason and justice of this rule, it has been observed, are obvious, since the holder of property can only transfer to another that beneficial interest in it which he himself possesses (*p*). If, moreover, a person accepts anything which he knows to be subject to a duty or charge, it may be rational to conclude that he means to take such duty or charge upon himself, and the law may imply a promise to perform what he has so taken upon himself (*q*).

Analogous
rule in equity,

In administering equity the maxim, *qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus*, may properly be said to merge in the yet more comprehensive rule—*equality is equity*—upon the consideration of which it is not within the scope of our plan

(*m*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, 7 East, 166.

(*n*) *Semenza v. Brinsley*, 18 C. B. N. S. 467, 477; *Cooke v. Eshelby*, 12 App. Cas. 271: 56 L. J. Q. B. 505.

(*o*) *Montague v. Forwood*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 350, 356.

(*p*) 1 Johns. (U.S.), R. 552, 553: 11 Id. 80; *Brandon v. Brandon*, 25 L. J. Ch. 896; *Newfoundland Government v. Newfoundland R. Co.*, 13 App. Cas. 199, 212.

(*q*) See *Lucas v. Nockells*, 1 Cl. & F. 457, citing a passage in Abbott, Shipp., 5th ed. 286.

to enter. The following instances of the application in equity of the maxim immediately under our notice must suffice. The legatee of a house, held by the testator on lease at a reserved rent, higher than it could be let for after his death, cannot reject the gift of the lease and claim an annuity under the will, but must take the benefit *cum onere* (r). A testator gives a specific bequest to A., and directs that in consideration of the bequest A. shall pay his debts: the payment of the debts is, in this case, a condition annexed to the specific bequest, and if A. accept the bequest, he is bound to pay the debts, though they exceed the value of the property bequeathed to him (s).

We may observe also, that the Scotch doctrine of "approbate and reprobate" is strictly analogous to that of election in our own law, and may, consequently, be properly referred to the maxim now under consideration. The principle on which this doctrine depends is, that a person shall not be allowed at once to benefit by and to repudiate an instrument, but that, if he choose to take the benefit which it confers, he shall likewise discharge the obligation or bear the *onus* which it imposes. "It is equally settled in the law of Scotland as of England, that no person can accept and reject the same instrument. If a testator give his estate to A., and give A.'s estate to B., Courts of equity hold it to be against conscience that A. should take the estate bequeathed to him, and at the same time refuse to give effect to the implied condition contained in the will of the testator. The Court will not permit him to take that which cannot be his but by virtue of the disposition of the will, and at the same time to keep what, by the same will, is given or intended to be given to another person. It is contrary to the established principles of equity that he should enjoy the benefit, while he rejects the condition of the

and in
Scotch law.

(r) *Talbot v. Earl of Radnor*, 3 478: 28 R. R. 156; and see *Armstrong v. Burnett*, 20 Beav. 424.
My. & K. 252.

(s) *Messenger v. Andrews*, 4 Russ.

gift" (*t*). Where, therefore, an express condition is annexed to a bequest, the legatee cannot accept and reject, approbate and reprobate the will containing it. If the testator, possessing a landed estate of small value, and a large personal estate, bequeath the personal estate to the heir, who was not otherwise entitled to it, upon condition that he shall give the land to another, the heir must either comply with the condition, or forego the benefit intended for him (*u*). We may add that the above rule, as expressed by the maxim *quod approbo non reprobo*, likewise holds where the condition is implied merely, provided there be clear evidence of an intention to make the bequest conditional; and in this case, likewise, the heir will be required to perform the condition, or to renounce the benefit (*x*)—*Qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus*.

The converse
of this
maxim holds.

The converse of the above maxim also holds, and is occasionally cited and applied; for instance, inasmuch as the principal is bound by the acts of his authorised agent, so he may take advantage of them (*y*)—*Qui sentit onus sentire debet et commodum* (*z*).

Grant of
ferry, &c.

In like manner, it has been observed (*a*), that wherever a grant is made for a valuable consideration, which involves public duties and charges, the grant shall be construed so as to make the indemnity co-extensive with the burthen—*Qui sentit onus sentire debet et commodum*. In the case, for instance, of a ferry, there is a public charge and duty. The owner must keep the ferry in good repair, upon the peril of an indictment; he must keep sufficient accommodation for all travellers, at all reasonable times; he must content himself with a reasonable toll—such is the *jus publicum* (*b*). In return, he has an exclusive right of ferrying across the

(*t*) *Kerr v. Wauchope*, 1 Bligh. M. & W. 844.
21; 20 R. R. 1. (*z*) 1 Rep. 99.

(*u*) Shaw on Obligations, s. 184.

(*x*) *Id.*, s. 187.

(*y*) *Seignior v. Wolmer*, Godb.
360; Judgm., *Higgins v. Senior*, 8

(*a*) *Per Story, J.*, 11 Peters (U.S.),
630, 631.

(*b*) *Paine v. Patrick*, 3 Mod. 289,
294.

stream which his ferry crosses within the area to which his exclusive right extends (c).

Although, moreover, the maxim *qui sentit commodum sentire debet et onus*, to which we have above mainly adverted, applies to throw the burthen of partnership debts upon the partnership estate (d), which is alone liable to them in the first instance, yet the converse of this maxim holds with regard to the partnership creditor (e).

IN ÆQUALI JURE MELIOR EST CONDITIO POSSIDENTIS. (*Plowd.* 296.)—Where the right is equal, the claim of the party in actual possession shall prevail.

The general rule is, that possession constitutes a sufficient title against every person not having a better title. "He that hath possession of lands, though it be by *disseisin*, hath a right against all men but against him that hath right (f); for, "till some act be done by the rightful owner to divest this possession and assert his title, such actual possession is *primâ facie* evidence of a legal title in the possessor, so that, speaking generally, the burthen of proof of title is thrown upon any one who claims to oust him :

*Melior est
conditio pos-
sidentis.*

(c) See *Newton v. Cubitt*, 12 C. B. N. S. 32: 31 L. J. C. P. 246; *Hopkins v. G. N. R. Co.*, 2 Q. B. D. 224; *Dibdin v. Skirrow*, [1908] 1 Ch. 41: 77 L. J. Ch. 107.

(d) "Perhaps the maxim that 'he who partakes the advantage ought to bear the loss' . . . is only the consequence not the cause why a man is made liable as a partner:" *per* Blackburn, J., *Bullen v. Sharp*, L. R. 1 C. P. 111.

(e) The maxim *qui sentit onus sentire debet et commodum* is applied also in equity. See, for example, *Pitt v. Pitt*, 1 T. & R. 180: 24 R. R. 15; Francis, Max. 5.

(f) Doct. & Stud. 9. "I take it to be a sound and uncontroverted maxim of law, that every plaintiff or demandant in a court of justice must recover upon the strength of his own title, and not because of the weakness of that of his adversary; that is, he shall not recover without showing a *right*, although the adverse party may be unable to show any. It is enough for the latter that he is in possession of the thing demanded until the right owner calls for it. This is a maxim of common justice as well as of law:" *per* Parker, C.J., *Goodwin v. Hubbard*, 15 Tyng. (U.S.), R. 204.

this possessory title, moreover, may, by length of time and negligence of him who had the right, by degrees ripen into a perfect and indefeasible title " (g).

Ejectment†

Hence, it is a familiar rule, that, in ejectment, the party controverting my title must recover by his own strength, and not by my weakness (h); and "when you will recover anything from me, it is not enough for you to destroy my title, but you must prove your own better than mine; for without a better right, *melior est conditio possidentis*" (i).

Trespass
qu. cl. fr.

Similarly, mere possession will support trespass *qu. cl. fr.* against any one who cannot show a better title (h); therefore he who commits a trespass upon the possession of another, being himself a wrong-doer, has no right to put the other party to proof of his title (l). And to the like effect are the rules of the civil law: *non possessori incumbit necessitas probandi possessiones ad se pertinere* (m), and *in pari causâ possessor potior haberi debet* (n).

Chattels.

The same rule as to the effect of possession holds good with regard to chattels. For instance, if a person finds a jewel and takes possession of it (o), he becomes entitled to keep it as against any person who has no better title, and he can maintain trover for a conversion thereof by a mere wrong-doer (p). It must be noticed, however, that the possessor of land is generally entitled, as against the finder, to chattels found on the land; for, as a rule, the possession of land carries with it possession of everything

(g) 2 Blac. Com. 196.

(h) Hobart, 103, 104; Jenk. Cent. 118; *per* Lee, C.J., *Martin v. Strachan*, 5 T. R. 110, n; 2 R. R. 552. See *Feret v. Hill*, 15 C. B. 207 (explained by Maule, J., *Canham v. Barry*, Id. 611); *Davison v. Gent*, 1 H. & N. 744, 750.

(i) Vaughan, R., 58, 60; Hobart, 103. See *Asher v. Whitlock*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 1.

(k) *Every v. Smith*, 26 L. J. Ex.

344; *Jones v. Chapman*, 2 Exch. 833, and cases there cited.

(l) Addison on Torts, 5th ed. 572, citing *Asher v. Whitlock*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 1; 35 L. J. Q. B. 17.

(m) C. 4, 19, 2.

(n) D. 50, 17, 128, § 1.

(o) As to larceny of lost chattels, see *Reg. v. Glyde*, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 139.

(p) *Armory v. Delamirie*, 1 Stra. 504; 1 Sm. L. C.

which is upon the land, and, therefore, as against a mere finder, also the right to possess it (*q*).

It is a rule laid down in the Digest, that the condition of the defendant shall be favoured rather than that of the plaintiff, *favorabiliores rei potius quam actores habentur* (*r*), a maxim which admits of very simple illustration in the ancient practice of our own Courts; for, if, on moving in arrest of judgment, it appeared from the whole record that the plaintiff had no cause of action, the Court would never give judgment for him, for *melior est conditio defendantis* (*s*).

*Melior est
conditio
defendentis.*

If a loss must fall upon one or other of two innocent parties who are both free from blame, justice being thus in *equilibrio*, the application of the maxim, *melior est conditio possidentis*, frequently turns the scale (*t*). It was, indeed, laid down by Ashhurst, J., "as a broad general principle, that whenever one of two innocent persons must suffer by the acts of a third, he who has enabled such third person to occasion the loss must sustain it" (*u*). But, in the light of later decisions, this proposition requires modification (*x*). As a rule, A. is not liable to make good a loss which has fallen upon B. by the act of C., unless the proximate cause of the loss was the breach of a duty owed by A. to B. (*y*). For example, A. innocently accepts a bill of exchange drawn by C. for £500, but so drawn as to facilitate the forgery which C. subsequently commits by fraudulently altering the bill into a bill for £3,500; after the forgery B. becomes the holder of the bill in due course (*z*); he cannot cast any loss he sustains through the forgery upon A., for A. owed him no duty, either by law or

Which of two
innocent
parties must
suffer.

(*q*) *S. Staffordshire Water Co. v. Sharman*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 44: 65 L. J. Q. B. 460; *Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.*, 33 Ch. D. 562.

(*r*) D. 50, 17, 125. As to which maxim, see Arg., 8 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 195, 196.

(*s*) See Hobart, 199.

(*t*) *Per* Bayley, J., *East India Co.*

v. Tritton, 3 B. & C. 289; 27 R. R. 353.

(*u*) 2 T. R. 70.

(*x*) See *per* Ld. Coleridge, 1 C. P. D. 587, 588; *per* Ld. Field, [1891] A. C. 169.

(*y*) *Le Lievre v. Gould*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 491: 62 L. J. Q. B. 353.

(*z*) See 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 64.

by contract, to take precautions against the alteration (a). "It is not consistent with the general spirit of the law to hold innocent persons responsible for not taking measures to prevent the commission of a crime which they have no reason to anticipate: although there may be an exception in the case where one of the parties to the instrument has, either by express agreement, or by implication established in the law, become bound to use such precautions" (b).

Freedom from blame, however, by no means leads in all cases to the application of the maxim, *melior est conditio possidentis*. For instance, money which has been paid and received without fault on either side is frequently recoverable, either as paid under a mistake of fact (c), or on the ground of failure of consideration (d), or in consequence of the express or implied terms of some contract. Thus in *Cox v. Prentice* (e), the plaintiffs bought from the defendant a bar of silver at an agreed price per ounce, and paid the price of four ounces which an assayer, acting as agent for both parties, calculated that the bar contained; after the delivery of the bar it was discovered that it in fact contained only two ounces, and it was held that the plaintiffs, having first offered to return the bar, were entitled to recover the difference in value between its supposed and its true weight, as money had and received to their use, for this was a case of mutual innocence and equal error.

Rule in equity.

In courts of equity, where two persons, having an equal equity, have been equally innocent and equally diligent, the general rule applicable is, *melior est conditio possidentis* or *defendentis*. Such courts frequently refuse to interfere against a *bonâ fide* purchaser for valuable consideration of the legal estate who purchased without notice of any adverse

(a) *Scholfield v. Londresborough*, [1896] A. C. 514; 65 L. J. Q. B. 593.

(b) *Per* Ld. Halsbury, [1896] A. C. 537.

(c) *Shand v. Grant*, 15 C. B. N. S.

324; see *ante*, p. 214.

(d) See *Jones v. Ryde*, 5 Taunt. 488, 495; 15 R. R. 561; *Devauz v. Conolly*, 8 C. B. 640.

(e) 3 M. & S. 344; see 8 C. B. 658—659.

equitable title (*f*) : provided that the purchaser's legal title is complete (*g*).

Not only in *æquali jure*, but likewise in *pari delicto*, is *Par delictum*. it true that *potior est conditio possidentis* ; where each party is equally in fault, the law favours him who is actually in possession ; a well-known rule, which is, in fact, included in that more comprehensive maxim to which the present remarks are appended. "If," said Buller, J., "a party come into a court of justice to enforce an illegal contract, two answers may be given to his demand : the one, that he must draw justice from a pure fountain, and the other, that *potior est conditio possidentis*" (*h*). Agreeably to this rule, where money is paid by one of two parties to such a contract to the other, in a case where both may be considered as *participes criminis*, an action will not lie after the contract is executed to recover the money. If A. agree to give B. money for doing an illegal act, B. cannot recover the money by action, although he has done the act ; yet, if the money be paid, A. cannot recover it back (*i*). So the premium paid on an illegal insurance, to cover a trading with an enemy, cannot be recovered back, though the underwriter cannot be compelled to make good the loss (*k*). In these and similar cases, the party actually in possession has the advantage : *cum par delictum est duorum semper oneratur petitor et melior habetur possessoris causa* (*l*).

(*f*) *Thorndike v. Hunt*, 3 De G. & J. 563 ; *Taylor v. Blakelock*, 32 Ch. D. 560 : 56 L. J. Ch. 390.

(*g*) *Powell v. L. & Provincial Bank*, [1893] 1 Ch. 610 : 2 Ch. 555 : 62 L. J. Ch. 795. See also the maxim, *qui prior est tempore, &c.*, ante, p. 278.

(*h*) *Munt v. Stokes*, 4 T. R. 561, 564 : 2 R. R. 459 : 2 Inst. 391.

(*i*) *Webb v. Bishop*, cited 1 Selw. N. P., 10th ed. 92, n (42) ; *Browning v. Morris*, Cowp. 792 ; *per Park, J.*, *Richardson v. Mellish*, 2 Bing. 250 ; 27 R. R. 603 ; *Taylor v. Chester*,

L. R. 4 Q. B. 309 : 38 L. J. Q. B. 225 ; *Harse v. Pearl Insurance Co.*, [1904] 1 K. B. 558 : 73 L. J. K. B. 373.

(*k*) *Vanduyck v. Hewitt*, 1 East, 96 : 5 R. R. 516 ; *Lowry v. Bourdieu*, Dougl. 468 ; *Andree v. Fletcher*, 3 T. R. 266 : 1 R. R. 701 ; *Lubbock v. Potts*, 7 East, 449 ; *Palyart v. Leckie*, 6 M. & S. 290 : 18 R. R. 381 ; *Cowie v. Barber*, 4 M. & S. 16 : 16 R. R. 368. See *Edgar v. Fowler*, 3 East, 222 : 7 R. R. 433 ; *Thistlewood v. Cracroft*, 1 M. & S. 500.

(*l*) D. 50, 17, 154.

*In pari
delicto potior
est conditio
possidentis.*

“The maxim, *in pari delicto potior est conditio possidentis*, is as thoroughly settled as any proposition of law can be. It is a maxim of law, established, not for the benefit of plaintiffs or defendants, but is founded on the principles of public policy, which will not assist a plaintiff who has paid over money, or handed over property, in pursuance of an illegal or immoral contract, to recover it back; for the Courts will not assist an illegal transaction in any respect” (*m*). The maxim is, therefore, intimately connected with the more comprehensive rule of our law, *ex turpi causâ non oritur actio* (*n*), on account of which no Court will “allow itself to be made the instrument of enforcing obligations alleged to arise out of a contract or transaction which is illegal” (*o*); and the maxim may be said to be a branch of that comprehensive rule: for the well-established test, for determining whether money or property which has been parted with in connection with an illegal transaction can be recovered in a Court of justice, is to ascertain whether the plaintiff, in support of his case, or as part of his cause of action, necessarily relies upon the illegal transaction: if he “requires aid from the illegal transaction to establish his case,” the Court will not entertain his claim (*p*).

In connection with this test it must be observed that, until the contrary be shown, there is a presumption that when money is paid it is paid in discharge of an antecedent debt or liability: upon the plaintiff who claims the repayment of money lies the onus of proving circumstances rendering the defendant liable to repay it (*q*). The application of the test led to the defeat of an action to recover the

(*m*) Judgm., *Taylor v. Chester*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 309, citing *Edgar v. Fowler*, 3 East, 222; 7 R. R. 433; *Collins v. Blantern*, 2 Wils. 341; and *Holman v. Johnson*, Cowp. 343.

(*n*) *Post*, p. 569.

(*o*) *Per* Lindley, M.R., [1892] 2 Q. B. 728.

(*p*) *Simpson v. Bloss*, 7 Taunt. 246; 17 R. R. 509; *Fivaz v. Nicholls*, 2 C. B. 501; *Scott v. Brown*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 724; 61 L. J. Q. B. 738.

(*q*) *Welch v. Seaborn*, 1 Stark. 474; *Aubert v. Walsh*, 4 Taunt. 293; 12 R. R. 651; *Ex p. Cooper*, W. N., 1882, p. 96.

half of a bank-note, pledged to secure payment of a debt which was contracted for an illegal consideration, and of which debt no payment or tender had been made (*r*).

In *Taylor v. Bowers* (*s*), the rule laid down, and acted upon, was that "where money has been paid, or goods delivered, under an unlawful agreement, but there has been no further performance of it, the party paying the money, or delivering the goods, may repudiate the transaction, and recover back his money or goods" (*t*); and it was said that such action "is not founded upon the illegal agreement, nor brought to enforce it, but, on the contrary, the plaintiff has repudiated the agreement, and his action is founded on that repudiation" (*t*). This doctrine was followed in a later case (*u*), in which a lady gave money to a marriage broker under an illegal contract by which part of the money was to be returned if he did not procure her an engagement of marriage within nine months. She repudiated the agreement within the period and recovered the whole of the money paid. In *Kearley v. Thomson* (*v*), however, some doubt was expressed by the Court as to whether the above rule was sound, and it was held that where money has been paid under an illegal agreement a *partial* carrying into effect of the illegal purpose for which it was paid is sufficient to prevent the recovery of the money. *A fortiori*, the money cannot be recovered if the illegal purpose has been fully completed (*x*). It is to be observed that in *Tappenden v. Randall* (*y*), where the doctrine was applied, that there was a *locus pœnitentiæ*, enabling a person to recover money paid under an illegal

Locus pœnitentiæ while contract executory.

(*r*) *Taylor v. Chester*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 309; 38 L. J. Q. B. 225.

(*s*) 1 Q. B. D. 291; 45 L. J. Q. B. 163; see also *Symes v. Hughes*, L. R. 9 Eq. 475.

(*t*) *Per Cockburn, C.J.*, 1 Q. B. D. 225; see also *per Mellish, L.J.*, Id. 300; and *per Bayley and Littledale, JJ.*, 8 B. & C. 224, 226.

(*u*) *Herman v. Charlesworth*, [1905] 2 K. B. 123; 74 L. J. K. B. 620.

(*v*) 24 Q. B. D. 742; 59 L. J. Q. B. 288.

(*x*) *Herman v. Jeuchner*, 15 Q. B. D. 561; 54 L. J. Q. B. 340.

(*y*) 2 B. & P. 467; 5 R. R. 662.

contract so long as the contract remained executory, it was suggested (z) that such doctrine would not apply to a contract "of a nature too grossly immoral for the Court to enter into any discussion of it: as where one man has paid money by way of hire to another to murder a third person."

Assignees.

The general rule undoubtedly is that "whoever is a party to an unlawful contract, if he hath once paid the money stipulated to be paid in pursuance thereof, he shall not have the help of the Court to fetch it back again" (a); and this rule, so far as it affects a party to an unlawful contract, necessarily affects also all such assignees or representatives of that party as stand in no better position than the party himself (b). A trustee in bankruptcy, however, can sometimes recover money paid by the bankrupt under an illegal contract, and not recoverable by the bankrupt himself, on the ground that he claims the money, not through the bankrupt, but by force of his own title thereto under the bankruptcy law (c).

Impar delictum

In certain circumstances parties to an illegal transaction ought not to be regarded as *in pari delicto*. "Where contracts or transactions are prohibited by positive statutes for the sake of protecting one set of men from another set of men, the one from their situation and condition being liable to be oppressed or imposed upon by the other: there the parties are not *in pari delicto*, and in furtherance of these statutes the person injured, after the transaction is finished and completed, may bring his action and defeat the contract" (d). And it may be said generally that

(z) By Heath, J.

(a) *Per* Wilmut, C.J., *Collins v. Blantern*, 2 Wils. 341.

(b) See *Belcher v. Sambourne*, 6 Q. B. 414; *Re Mapleback*, 4 Ch. D. 150.

(c) *Re Campbell*, 14 Q. B. D. 32, where *Re Mapleback*, *supra*, was distinguished. See also *Doe v. Lloyd*,

5 Bing. N. C. 741; *Clarke v. Shee*, 1 Cowp. 197.

(d) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Browning v. Morris*, 2 Cowp. 790; see also *per* Fry, L.J., 24 Q. B. D. 745, 746. The provisions of a statute sometimes enable the one party to an illegal contract to sue the other, although both contracted with

the doctrine of *par delictum* is inapplicable "in cases of oppressor and oppressed." For this reason a debtor was allowed to recover money which he had secretly paid to one of his creditors in order to induce him to agree to a composition (*e*); both parties were *in delicto*, because the act was a fraud upon the other creditors: but it was held not to be *par delictum*, because the one had power to dictate, the other no alternative but to submit.

It appears that equity will give relief to a person who has been party to an illegal transaction, and paid money or given securities under it, if he has acted under pressure or undue influence (*f*); and it has been laid down generally, that where the parties to an illegal contract are not *in pari delicto*, and where public policy may be considered as advanced by allowing the more excusable of the two to sue for relief against the transaction, relief may be given to him in equity (*g*).

In an action for money had and received to the use of the two plaintiffs (*h*), the defendant relied on a receipt for the money, signed by one of them. It was held that the receipt did not estop the plaintiffs from proving, as they did, that the money had not been paid (*i*); and upon proof that the receipt was a fraudulent transaction, between the defendant and the plaintiff who signed it, to which his co-plaintiff was not privy, it was also held that neither the maxim, *in pari*

One party
innocent.

knowledge that the contract was illegal; see *Lewis v. Knight*, 4 E. & B. 917; *Barclay v. Pearson*, [1898] 2 Ch. 154: 62 L. J. Ch. 636; *Bonnard v. Dolt*, [1906] 1 Ch. 740: 75 L. J. Ch. 446.

(*e*) *Atkinson v. Denby*, 7 H. & N. 934: 6 Id. 778; and cases there cited.

(*f*) *Osbaldiston v. Simpson*, 13 Sim. 513; *Williams v. Bayley*, L. R. 1 H. L. 200; *Jones v. Merionethshire Soc.*, [1892] 1 Ch. 173, 183: 61 L. J. Ch. 133.

(*g*) See *per Knight-Bruce*, L. J., *Reynell v. Sprye*, 1 D. M. & G. 660, 679.

(*h*) *Skaife v. Jackson*, 3 B. & C. 421; *Farrar v. Hutchinson*, 9 A. & E. 641; see *per Parke, B.*, *Wallace v. Jackson*, 7 M. & W. 273.

(*i*) See *Bowes v. Foster*, 2 H. & N. 779; *Lee v. L. & Y. R. Co.*, L. R. 6 Ch. 527. Cf. *Bickerton v. Walker*, 31 Ch. D. 151; *Lloyd's Bank v. Bullock*, [1896] 2 Ch. 192: 65 L. J. Ch. 680.

delicto potior est conditio possidentis, nor the maxim, *nemo allegans turpitudinem suam est audiendus* (k), was applicable to defeat the action. One of the plaintiffs was not *in delicto*, and as against him the defendant could not rely upon his own fraud.

Agents.

Thus far we have considered the effect of *par delictum* as between the immediate parties to the illegal transaction, or persons who claim under them; we must add that, where money, payable under an illegal contract, is paid by one party thereto to a third person, who receives it as agent for the other party, the maxim under consideration does not generally apply to prevent such other party from recovering the money from his agent, as money had and received to the plaintiff's use (l). The obligation of an agent, who has received money to the use of his principal, to pay it over to him, rests upon the agent's own promise which the law implies from his so receiving the money, and, since the principal bases his claim to the money upon that promise, and not upon the original contract in respect of which the money was paid to the agent, it is generally immaterial whether such original contract was legal or illegal (m). A principal, however, cannot recover money received for him by his agent, if such receipt itself was illegal and part of an illegal transaction in which both principal and agent were concerned (n). The law will not lend its assistance to adjust the profits of a partnership formed for the purpose of deriving profit from an illegal adventure, or to settle the mutual claims of the parties engaged in it (o). The maxim, *ex pacto illicito non oritur actio*, clearly applies (p).

(k) 4 Inst. 279.

(l) *Tenant v. Elliott*, 1 B. & P. 3; 4 R. R. 755; *Farmer v. Russell*, Id. 296; *Bousfield v. Wilson*, 16 M. & W. 185.

(m) See 1 B. & P. 298, 299. Cf. *Bridger v. Savage*, 15 Q. B. D. 363; 54 L. J. Q. B. 464.

(n) *Nicholson v. Gooch*, 5 E. & B.

999, 1016.

(o) Judgm., *M'Callam v. Mortimer*, 9 M. & W. 642, 643; see *Everet v. Williams*, cited [1899] 1 Q. B. 826; and cf. *Thwaites v. Coulthwaite*, [1896] 1 Ch. 496; 65 L. J. Ch. 238.

(p) See *Stewart v. Gibson*, 7 Cl. & F. 707, 728.

Again where a principal pays money to his own agent, Stakeholders. authorising him to apply it to a particular purpose, it is generally open to the principal, so long as the money remains in the agent's hands unapplied, to revoke the authority and demand the money back, and the agent cannot resist this demand by saying that the purpose to which he was originally authorised to apply the money was illegal (*q*). And, similarly, if a party to an illegal wager pays money thereunder, not to the other party, but to a stakeholder, the stakeholder, so long as the money remains in his hands, is bound to return the money to that party if he demand it back before it has been paid to the winner or the winner's agent: he is liable to the loser if he pay the loser's money to the winner after notice from the loser not to do so (*r*); though it is otherwise, if he pay it to the winner without any such notice from the loser (*s*). This rule, that the authority of the stakeholder to pay the money may be revoked before it has been acted upon, tends to prevent the illegal contract from being executed.

To the maxim respecting *par delictum* may be referred the rule that one of two joint wrong-doers cannot enforce against the other any claim for contribution or indemnity, although the former has borne, or is about to bear, the entire burden of making compensation for the joint wrong (*t*). This rule, however, is limited to cases in which the wrong-doer who seeks such redress knew, or must be presumed

Contribution
between joint
tort-feasors.

(*q*) *Taylor v. Lendey*, 9 East, 49; *Bone v. Eckless*, 5 H. & N. 925.

(*r*) *Cotton v. Thurland*, 5 T. R. 405; *Smith v. Bickmore*, 4 Taunt. 474; *Hastelow v. Jackson*, 8 B. & C. 221; 32 R. R. 369; *Barclay v. Pearson*, [1893] 2 Ch. 154, 168; 62 L. J. Ch. 636; see also *Strachan v. Universal Stock Exchange*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 329, 334 (affirmed, [1896] A. C. 167; 65 L. J. Q. B. 428), and *Burge v. Ashley*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 744, 747, cases where the contract was void

under 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, but not illegal.

(*s*) *Howson v. Hancock*, 8 T. R. 575; *Gatty v. Field*, 9 Q. B. 431, 440; see also *Strachan v. Universal Stock Exchange* (No. 2), [1895] 2 Q. B. 697, 705.

(*t*) *Merryweather v. Nixan*, 8 T. R. 186; 16 R. R. 810; see *The Englishman*, [1894] P. 239; [1895] P. 212; distinguished in *The Morgengry*, [1900] P. 1; 69 L. J. P. 3.

to have known, that he was doing an unlawful act (*u*). A person, who has been employed or requested to do an act, which in itself was not necessarily or apparently illegal, and which he has done honestly and *bonâ fide* in compliance with his employer's instructions or request, is therefore generally entitled to be indemnified by his employer against the consequences of such act proving to be an injury to third persons (*x*); and the rule does not affect an action of deceit, brought by a person who has been induced by a fraudulent misrepresentation to do acts which were in fact illegal, or even criminal, but which, in consequence of such representation, he did in the belief that they were neither illegal nor immoral acts (*y*). Again, one of two partners who has discharged a liability of the firm, incurred through the wrongful acts of his co-partner to which he himself was not privy (*z*), or through negligent acts done, not by himself, but by a servant of the firm (*a*), can generally claim indemnity or contribution from his co-partner. Moreover, it is well established that where money has been paid by a trustee in breach of trust to persons who took it knowing the payment to be a breach of trust, they and the trustee are not joint tort-feasors within the above rule (*b*).

(*u*) *Adamson v. Jarvis*, 4 Bing. 66, 73; 29 R. R. 503; see *per* *Ld. Herschell*, *Palmer v. Wick, &c. Co.*, [1894] A. C. 318, 324.

(*x*) *Betts v. Gibbins*, 2 A. & E. 57; see *Shackell v. Rosier*, 2 Bing. N. C. 634, 637; *Toplis v. Grane*, 5 Bing. N. C. 636, 650; *Dugdale v. Lovering*, L. R. 10 C. P. 196; 44 L. J. C. P. 197.

(*y*) *Burrows v. Rhodes*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 816; 68 L. J. Q. B. 545; *Dixon v. Faucus*, 30 L. J. Q. B. 137.

(*z*) *Campbell v. Campbell*, 7 Cl. & F. 181.

(*a*) *Pearson v. Skelton*, 1 M. & W. 504.

(*b*) *Moxham v. Grant*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 88, 93; 69 L. J. Q. B. 97.

EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO. (*Cowp.* 343.)—*A right of action cannot arise out of fraud.*

It was thought convenient to place this maxim in immediate proximity to that which precedes it, because these two important rules of law are intimately related to each other, and the cases which have already been cited in illustration of the rule as to *par delictum* may be referred to generally as establishing the position, that an action cannot be maintained which is founded in fraud, or which springs *ex turpi causâ*. The connection which exists between these maxims may, indeed, be satisfactorily shown by reference to a case already cited. In *Firaz v. Nicholls* (c), an action was brought to recover damages for an alleged conspiracy between B., the defendant, and a third party, C., to obtain payment of a bill of exchange accepted by the plaintiff in consideration that B. would abstain from prosecuting C. for embezzlement; and it was held that the action would not lie, inasmuch as it sprung out of an illegal transaction, in which both plaintiff and defendant had been engaged, and of which proof was essential in order to establish the plaintiff's claim as stated upon the record. In this case, therefore, the maxim, *ex dolo malo non oritur actio*, was evidently applicable; and not less so, with regard both to the original corrupt agreement and to the subsequent alleged conspiracy, was the general principal of law, *in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis* (d). To the class of cases also which establish that contribution cannot be enforced amongst wrong-doers (e), and that a person, who has knowingly committed an act declared by the law to be criminal, will not be permitted to recover compensation from others who participated with him in the commission of the crime (f),

Connection
between this
and the
preceding
maxim.

(c) 2 C. B. 501, 512, 515.

(d) See, also, *Stevens v. Gourley*,
7 C. B. N. S. 99, 108.

(e) See *ante*, p. 567.

(f) *Per* Ld. Lyndurst, *Colburn v. Patmore*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 83: 40 R. R. 493; *per* Maule, J., 2 C. B. 509.

a similar remark seems equally to apply. Bearing in mind then, this connection between the two kindred maxims, we shall proceed to consider briefly the very comprehensive principle, *ex dolo malo*, or, more generally, *ex turpi causâ, non oritur actio*.

Dolus in the
Roman law.

In the first place, then, we may observe, that the word *dolus*, when used in its more comprehensive sense, was understood by the Roman jurists to include "every intentional misrepresentation of the truth made to induce another to perform an act which he would not else have undertaken" (*g*), and a marked distinction accordingly existed in the civil law between *dolus bonus* and *dolus malus*: the former signifying that degree of artifice or dexterity which a person might lawfully employ to advance his own interest, in self-defence against an enemy or for some other justifiable purpose (*h*); and the latter including every kind of craft, guile, or machination, intentionally employed for the purpose of deception, cheating, or circumvention (*i*). As to the latter species of *dolus* (with which alone we are now concerned), it was a fundamental rule, that *dolo malo pactum se non servaturum* (*j*); and, in our own law, it is a familiar principle, that an action brought upon a supposed contract, which is shown to have arisen from fraud, may be successfully resisted (*k*).

Rule in
our law.

It is, moreover, a general proposition, that an agreement to do an unlawful act cannot be supported at law,—that no right of action can spring out of an illegal contract (*l*); and

(*g*) Mackeld. Civ. Law, 165.

(*h*) Mackeld. Civ. Law, 165; Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 319; D. 4, 3, 3; Brisson, *ad verb.* "*Dolus*;" Tayl. Civ. Law, 4th ed. 118.

(*i*) D. 4, 3, 1, § 2; Id. 50, 17, 79; Id. 2, 14, 7, § 9.

(*j*) D. 2, 14, 7, § 9.

(*k*) *Per* Patteson, J., 1 A. & E. 42; *per* Holroyd, J., 4 B. & Ald. 34; *per* Ld. Mansfield, 4 Burr. 2300;

Evans v. Edmonds, 13 C. B. 777; *Canham v. Barry*, 15 C. B. 597; with which cf. *Feret v. Hill*, Id. 207; *Reynell v. Sprye*, 1 De G. M. & G. 660; *Curson v. Belworthy*, 3 H. L. C. 742. The effect of fraud upon a contract, and the right to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud, are discussed under the maxim, *caveat emptor, post*.

(*l*) *Per* Ld. Abinger, 4 M. & W.

this rule, which applies not only where the contract is especially illegal, but whenever it is opposed to public policy, or founded on an immoral consideration^(m), is expressed by the well-known maxim, *ex turpi causâ non oritur actio* (n), and is in accordance with the doctrine of the civil law, *pacta quæ turpem causam continent non sunt observanda* (o): "wherever the consideration, which is the ground of the promise, or the promise which is the consequence or effect of the consideration, is unlawful, the whole contract is void" (p). A Court of law will not, then, lend its aid to enforce the performance of a contract which appears to have been entered into by both the contracting parties for the express purpose of carrying into effect that which is prohibited by the law of the land; and this objection to the validity of a contract must, from authority and reason, be allowed in all cases to prevail. No legal distinction can be supported between the application of this objection to parol contracts and to contracts under seal; for "it would be inconsistent with reason and principle to hold, that, by the mere ceremony of putting a seal to an instrument, that is, by the voluntary act of the parties themselves, a contract, which was void in itself, on the ground of its being in violation of the law of the land, should be deemed valid, and an action maintainable thereon, in a Court of justice" (q).

In *Collins v. Blantern* (r), which is a leading case to show that illegality may well be pleaded as a defence to an action on a bond, it was alleged that the bond had been given to the obligee as an indemnity for a note entered into

Collins v. Blantern.

657; *per* Ashurst, J., 8 T. R. 93. See *Jones v. Waite*, 5 Scott, N. R. 951; 5 Bing. N. C. 341; 1 Id. 656; *Ritchie v. Smith*, 6 C. B. 462; *Cundell v. Dawson*, 4 Id. 376; *Sargent v. Wedlake*, 11 Id. 732.

(m) *Allen v. Rescous*, 2 Lev. 174; *Walker v. Perkins*, 3 Burr. 1568; *Wetherell v. Jones*, 3 B. & Ad. 225,

226; *Egerton v. Earl Brownlow*, 4 H. L. Cas. 1.

(n) Judgm., *Bank of United States v. Owens*, 2 Peters (U. S.), R. 539.

(o) D. 2, 14, 27, § 4; I. 3, 20, 24.

(p) 1 Bulstr. 38; Hobart, 72;

Dyer, 356.

(q) Judgm., 5 Bing. N. C. 675.

(r) 2 Wils. 341; 1 Sm. L. C.

by him for the purpose of inducing the prosecutor of an indictment for perjury to withhold his evidence. For the plaintiff, it was contended that the bond was good and lawful, the condition being singly for the payment of a sum of money, and that no averment should be admitted that the bond was given upon an unlawful consideration not appearing upon the face of it; but it was held, that the bond was void *ab initio*, and that the facts might be specially pleaded; and it was observed by Wilmot, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Court, that "the manner of the transaction was to gild over and conceal the truth; and whenever Courts of law see such attempts made to conceal such wicked deeds, they will brush away the cobweb varnish and show the transactions in their true light." And again, "this is a contract to tempt a man to transgress the law, to do that which is injurious to the community: it is void by the common law; and the reason why the common law says such contracts are void is for the public good: *you shall not stipulate for iniquity*. All writers upon our law agree in this—no polluted hand shall touch the pure fountains of justice" (s).

Interference
with course
of justice.

It is obviously detrimental to the interests of the public that the course of justice should be perverted; and upon that ground, and in accordance with the decision in *Collins v. Blantern*, it has been frequently ruled that agreements to compromise pending criminal prosecutions are illegal and void (t); and such an agreement cannot be enforced, even though it was entered into with the sanction of the judge at the trial of the proceedings to which it related (u). There

(s) See, also, *Prole v. Wiggins*, 3 Bing. N. C. 230; *Paxton v. Popham*, 9 East, 408; *Pole v. Harrobin*, Id. 417, n.; *Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Turner*, 5 Bing. N. C. 666; 6 Id. 324; *Cuthbert v. Haley*, 8 T. R. 390.

(t) See *Ex p. Critchley*, 3 D. & L. 527; 15 L. J. Q. B. 124; *Re Camp-*

bell, 14 Q. B. D. 32; *Lound v. Grimwade*, 39 Ch. D. 605; 57 L. J. Ch. 725.

(u) *Keir v. Leeman*, 6 Q. B. 308; 9 Id. 371; *Windhill L. Bd. v. Vint*, 45 Ch. D. 351; 59 L. J. Ch. 608. See *Reg. v. Blakemore*, 14 Q. B. 544; *Reg. v. Hardey*, Id. 529; *Reg. v. Alleyne*, 4 E. & B. 186.

is authority for saying that a compromise is permissible in the case of a misdemeanor, such as a common assault, which might have been made the subject of a civil action, and which is not regarded for this purpose as an offence of a public nature (*x*); but this exception to the general rule clearly does not extend to the offence of obstructing a highway, for that is a matter which concerns the public (*y*). Similarly, agreements, whether express or implied, that no prosecution shall be instituted for a supposed crime are illegal, and no action can be maintained thereon (*z*); though it appears that a mere threat of a prosecution, made by a creditor to his debtor, does not invalidate a security for payment of the debt which the debtor subsequently gives to the creditor, and which the creditor, though induced thereby not to prosecute, yet takes without entering into any agreement whatever that he will not prosecute (*a*). Other agreements which are illegal, because they tend to interfere improperly with the course of justice, are agreements to pay money for the withdrawal of a petition to set aside a public election on the ground of bribery (*b*), or of a motion to strike a solicitor off the rolls for professional misconduct (*c*), or of opposition to a bankrupt's application for his discharge (*d*): and also agreements, made with a surety for the appearance or good conduct of a defendant to criminal proceedings, to indemnify the surety against his liabilities as such (*e*). None of these agreements will be enforced by the Courts (*f*).

(*x*) *Keir v. Leeman*, *supra*;
Fisher & Co. v. Apollinaris Co.,
L. R. 10 Ch. 297; 44 L. J. Ch. 500.

(*y*) *Windhill L. Bd. v. Vint*,
supra.

(*z*) *Ward v. Lloyd*, 6 M. & Gr.
785; *Clubb v. Hutson*, 18 C. B.
N. S. 414; *Williams v. Bayley*,
L. R. 1 H. L. 200; *Re Mapleback*,
4 Ch. D. 150; *Flower v. Sadler*, 10
Q. B. D. 572; *Jones v. Merioneth-*
shire Soc., [1892] 1 Ch. 173; 61
L. J. Ch. 138.

(*a*) *Ward v. Lloyd*, and *Flower v.*
Sadler, *supra*.

(*b*) *Coppock v. Bower*, 4 M. & W.
361.

(*c*) *Kirwan v. Goodman*, 9 Dowl.
330.

(*d*) *Kearley v. Thomson*, 24 Q. B.
D. 742; 59 L. J. Q. B. 288.

(*e*) *Herrman v. Jeuchner*, 15 Q. B.
D. 561; 54 L. J. Q. B. 561; *Conso-*
lidated E. & F. Co. v. Musgrave,
[1900] 1 Ch. 37; 69 L. J. Ch. 11.

(*f*) As to the compromise of

Contract,
when invalid.

As a general rule, then, a contract cannot be made the subject of an action if it be impeachable on the ground of dishonesty, or as being opposed to public policy,—if it be either *contra bonos mores*, or forbidden by the law (*g*). In answer to an action founded on such an agreement, the maxim may be urged, *ex maleficio non oritur contractus* (*h*)—a contract cannot arise out of an act radically vicious and illegal; “those who come into a court of justice to seek redress must come with clean hands, and must disclose a transaction warranted by law” (*i*); and “it is quite clear, that a court of justice can give no assistance to the enforcement of contracts which the law of the land has interdicted” (*k*).

It does not fall within the plan of this work to enumerate, much less to consider at length, all the different grounds on which a contract may be invalidated for illegality (*l*). We

divorce suits, see *Gipps v. Hume*, 31 L. J. Ch. 37; and cf. *Brown v. Brine*, 1 Ex. D. 5.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, 6 T. R. 16; *Stevens v. Gourley*, 7 C. B. N. S. 99; *Cunard v. Hyde*, 2 E. & E. 1. See, *per* Holroyd, J., 2 B. & Ald. 103; *per* Martin, B., *Horton v. Westminster Impr. Commrs.*, 7 Exch. 791.

As to contracts void on the ground of maintenance or champerty, see *Earle v. Hopwood*, 9 C. B. N. S. 567; *Simpson v. Lamb*, 7 Id. 84; *Sprye v. Porter*, 7 Id. 58; *Grell v. Levy*, 16 Id. 73; *Anderson v. Radcliffe*, E. B. & E. 806; *Alabaster v. Harness*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 339; 64 L. J. Q. B. 75; *Rees v. De Bernardy*, [1896] 2 Ch. 437; 65 L. J. Ch. 656.

(*h*) *Judgm.*, 1 T. R. 734; *Parsons v. Thompson*, 1 H. Bla. 322; 2 R. R. 773; 8 Wheaton (U. S.), R. 152. See *Nicholson v. Gooch*, 5 E. & B. 999, 1015, which forcibly illustrates the maxim.

(*i*) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, *Petrie v. Hannay*, 3 T. R. 422.

(*k*) *Per* Ld. Eldon, 2 Rose, 351.

(*l*) The following cases, however, may be referred to upon this subject, in addition to those already cited: *Simpson v. Ld. Howden*, 9 Cl. & F. 61; cited by Ld. Campbell, *Hall v. Dyson*, 17 Q. B. 791 (as to which see *Hills v. Mitson*, 8 Exch. 751); and by Ld. St. Leonards, *Hawkes v. E. Counties R. Co.*, 1 De G. M. & G. 753; S. C., affirmed 5 H. L. Cas. 331; *Preston v. Liverpool, &c., R. Co.*, 5 H. L. Cas. 605; *Jones v. Waite*, 9 Cl. & F. 101; *Mittelholzer v. Fullarton*, 6 Q. B. 982, 1022; *Santos v. Illidge*, 8 C. B. N. S. 861; 6 Id. 841; *Bousfield v. Wilson*, 16 M. & W. 185. In *Attwood v. Small*, 6 Cl. & F. 232, the effect of fraud on a contract of sale was much considered; but this case properly falls under the maxim, *caveat emptor*, to which, therefore, the reader is referred.

shall merely cite some few cases in illustration of the above remarks. In strict accordance with them, it has been held, that no action could be maintained on a bond given to a person in consideration of his doing, and inducing others to do, something contrary to and prohibited by the valid terms of letters patent; and that the obligee was equally incapable of recovering, whether he knew or did not know the terms of the letters patent—the ignorance, if in fact it existed, resulting from his own fault (*m*). “The question,” said Lord Tenterden, “comes to this: can a man have the benefit of a bond by the condition of which he undertakes to violate the law? It seems to me that it would not be according to the principles of the law of England, which is a law of reason and justice, to allow a man to maintain an action under such circumstances; it would be to hold out an encouragement to any man to induce others to become dupes, and to pay their money for that from which they could derive no advantage.”

Examples
of rule.
Bond for
unlawful
purpose.

In *scire facias* against the defendant as member of a steam-packet company, the plea stated that the original action was for a demand in respect of which neither defendant in the *sci. fa.*, nor the packet company, nor the defendant in the original action (the public officer of the company), was by law liable, as the plaintiff at the commencement of the action well knew; and that, such registered officer and the plaintiff well knowing the premises, the said officer fraudulently and deceitfully, and by connivance with plaintiff, suffered the judgment in order to charge the defendant in *sci. fa.* The Court held the plea to be good, and further observed, that fraud *no doubt vitiates everything* (*n*); and that, upon being satisfied of such fraud, they possessed power to vacate, and would vacate, their own judgment (*o*).

Judgment
obtained by
collusion.

(*m*) *Duvergier v. Fellowes*, 1 Cl. & F. 39; 34 R. R. 578. 38 L. J. C. P. 310; *Lewis v. Clay*, 67 L. J. Q. B. 224.

(*n*) See, for instance, *Foster v. Mackinnon*, L. R. 4 C. P. 704, 711: (*o*) *Philipson v. Earl of Egremont*, 6 Q. B. 587, 605; *Dodgson v.*

*Fisher v.
Bridges.*

To take yet one other illustration of the maxim before us. To a declaration in covenant for the payment of a certain sum of money, the defendant pleaded that, before the making of the covenant, it was unlawfully agreed between the plaintiff and defendant that the plaintiff should sell and the defendant purchase of him a conveyance of land for a term of years, in consideration of a sum of money to be paid by the defendant to the plaintiff, "to the intent and in order and for the purpose, as the plaintiff at the time of the making the said agreement well knew," that the land should be sold by lottery, contrary to the statutes in such case made and provided; that afterwards, "in pursuance of the said illegal agreement," the land was assigned for the term and, a part of the purchase-money remaining unpaid, the defendant, to secure the payment thereof to the plaintiff, made the covenant in the declaration mentioned. Upon these pleadings, the Court of Queen's Bench held, that the covenant in question appeared to have been made after the illegal transaction between the parties had terminated; that it formed no part of such transaction, and was consequently unaffected by it. The judgment thus given was, however, reversed in error upon grounds which seem conclusive. The original agreement was clearly tainted with illegality, inasmuch as all lotteries were prohibited by the Lotteries Act, 1698 (*p*); and by the Gaming Act, 1738 (*q*), all sales of lands by lottery were declared to be void to all intents and purposes. The agreement being illegal, then, no action could have been brought to recover the purchase-money of the land which was the subject-matter thereof; and the covenant accordingly, being connected with an illegal agreement, could not be enforced (*r*). And, further, even if the defendant's plea were

Scott, 2 Exch. 457. See also *per*

Pollock, C.B., *Rogers v. Hadley*, 32 L. J. Ex. 248.

(*p*) 10 & 11 Will. 3, c. 23 (c. 17 Ruff.).

(*q*) 12 Geo. 2, c. 28, s. 4.

(*r*) *Paxton v. Popham*, 9 East, 408; *The Gas Light Co. v. Turner*, 6 Bing. N. C. 324; 5 Id. 666.

not to be understood as alleging that the covenant was given in pursuance of an illegal agreement, it would, remarked the Court of Exchequer Chamber, still show a good defence to the action, for "the covenant was given for the payment of the purchase-money. It springs from and is the creature of that illegal agreement; and if the law would not enforce the illegal contract, so neither will it allow parties to enforce a security for purchase-money which by the original bargain, was tainted with illegality" (s).

It is an indisputable proposition, that as against an innocent party, "no man shall set up his own iniquity as a defence, any more than as a cause of action" (t). Where, however, a contract or deed is made for an illegal purpose, a defendant against whom it is sought to be enforced may show the turpitude of both himself and the plaintiff, and a Court of justice will decline its aid to enforce a contract thus wrongfully entered into. For instance, money cannot be recovered which has been paid *ex turpi causâ, quum dantis æque et accipientis turpitudine versatur* (u). An unlawful agreement, it has been said, can convey no rights in any Court to either party; and will not be enforced at law or in equity in favour of one against the other of two persons equally culpable (x). A person who contributes to the performance of an illegal act by supplying a thing with the knowledge that it is to be used for that purpose is precluded from recovering the price of the thing so supplied. "Nor can any distinction be made between an illegal and an immoral purpose; the rule which is applicable to the matter is, *ex turpi causâ non oritur actio*, and whether it is an immoral or an illegal purpose in which the plaintiff has

*Dantis et
accipientis
turpitudine.*

(s) *Fisher v. Bridges*, 3 E. & B. 642 (reversing judgment in S. C., 2 E. & B. 118); followed in *Geere v. Mare*, 2 H. & C. 339. See *A.-G. v. Hollingworth*, 2 H. & N. 416; *O'Connor v. Bradshaw*, 5 Exch. 882.

(t) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Montefiori v. Montefiori*, 1 W. Bla. 364; cited

by Abbott, C.J., 2 B. & Ald. 368. It is a maxim, that *jus ex injuriâ non oritur*; see Arg., 4 Bing. 639.

(u) 1 Pothier, *Traité de Vente*, 186.

(x) *Per* Ld. Brougham, *Armstrong v. Armstrong*, 3 My. & K. 64.

participated it comes equally within the terms of that maxim, and the effect is the same; no cause of action can arise out of either the one or the other" (y).

Principle of rule.

The principle on which the rule above laid down depends is, as stated by Chief Justice Wilmot, the public good. "The objection," said Lord Mansfield (z), "that a contract is immoral or illegal as between plaintiff and defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed, but it is founded in general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice as between him and the plaintiff—by accident, if I may so say. The principle of public policy is this: *ex dolo malo non oritur actio*. No Court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of action upon an immoral or an illegal act. If, from the plaintiff's own stating or otherwise, the cause of action appear to arise *ex turpi causâ* or the transgression of a positive law of this country, there the Court says he has no right to be assisted. It is upon that ground the Court goes, not for the sake of the defendant, but because they will not lend their aid to such a plaintiff. So, if the plaintiff and defendant were to change sides, and the defendant were to bring his action against the plaintiff, the latter would then have the advantage of it, for where both are equally in fault, *potior est conditio defendentis*" (a).

Rule, how qualified.

It may here be proper to notice, that, although a Court will not assist in giving effect to a contract which is "expressly or by implication forbidden by the statute or

(y) *Pearce v. Brooks*, L. R. 1 Ex. 213, 218; *Cowan v. Milbourn*, L. R. 2 Ex. 230.

(z) *Holman v. Johnson*, Cowp. 343; and *Lightfoot v. Tenant*, 1 B. & P. 554; 4 R. R. 735; cited in *Hobbs v. Henning*, 17 C. B. N. S. 819, as showing "the distinction between a mere mental purpose that

an unlawful act should be done, and a participation in the unlawful transaction itself." *Jackson v. Duchaire*, 3 T. R. 551, 553; cited, *Spencer v. Handley*, 5 Scott, N. R. 558.

(a) See, also, Arg., 15 Peters (U.S.), R. 471; *per* Tindal, C.J., 2 C. B. 512; *per* Lindley, L.J., [1892] 2 Q. B. 728.

common law," or which is "contrary to justice, morality, and sound policy;" yet where the consideration and the matter to be performed are both legal, a plaintiff will not be precluded from recovering by an infringement of the law in the performance of something to be done on his part; such infringement not having been contemplated by the contracting parties (*b*).

In determining, moreover, the effect of a penal statute (*c*) Penal statute. upon the validity of a contract entered into by one who has failed in some respects to comply with its provisions, it is necessary to consider whether the object of the statute was merely to inflict a penalty on the offending party for the benefit of the revenue, or whether the legislature intended to prohibit the contract itself for the protection of the public. In the former case, an action may lie upon the contract; but in the latter case the maxim under consideration will apply, and even if the contract be prohibited for revenue purposes only, it will be altogether illegal and void, and no action will be maintainable upon it (*d*).

It must be observed that a contract, although illegal and

(*b*) *Wetherall v. Jones*, 3 B. & Ad. 225, 226. See *Redmond v. Smith*, 8 Scott, N. R. 250.

(*c*) With reference to a breach of the Revenue Laws, *Ld. Stowell* observed, "It is sufficient if there is a contravention of the law—if there is a *fraus in legem*. Whether that may have arisen from mistaken apprehension, from carelessness, or from any other cause, it is not material to inquire. In these cases it is not necessary to prove actual and personal fraud." *The Reward*, 2 Dods. Adm. R. 271.

(*d*) *D'Allex v. Jones* (Exch.), 2 Jur. N. S. 972; *Taylor v. Crowland Gas and Coke Co.*, 10 Exch. 293, 296; *Bailey v. Harris*, 12 Q. B. 905; *Smith v. Mawhood*, 14 M. & W. 452; *Cope v. Rowlands*, 2 M. &

W. 149; *Cundell v. Dawson*, 4 C. B. 376; *Pidgeon v. Burslem*, 3 Exch. 465; *Oulds v. Harrison*, 10 Exch. 572; *Jessopp v. Lutwyche*, Id. 614; *Rosewarne v. Billing*, 33 L. J. C. P. 55, 56; *Johnson v. Hudson*, 11 East, 180; 10 R. R. 465. See, *per Holt, C.J.*, *Bartlett v. Viner*, Carth. 252; cited, *Judgm.*, *De Begnis v. Armistead*, 10 Bing. 110: 38 R. R. 406; and in *Fergusson v. Norman*, 5 Bing. N. C. 85. Upon the latter case see 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, s. 51. For another instance illustrating the text, see *per Parke, B.*, *Bodger v. Arch*, 10 Exch. 337; cited, *Amos v. Smith*, 1 H. & C. 241. And see *Jones v. Giles*, 10 Exch. 119, 144: 11 Exch. 393; *Ritchie v. Smith*, 6 C. B. 462.

Divisible
contract.

void as to part, is not necessarily void *in toto*. Thus, if a bond be given, with condition to do several things, and some are agreeable to law, and some against it, the bond shall be good as to doing the former, and only void as to doing the latter (*e*); and, if a deed, not founded upon an illegal consideration, contain two severable and independent covenants, of which the one is legal and the other not, the illegality of the one does not usually prevent the enforcement of the other (*f*). For "the general rule is that where you cannot sever the illegal from the legal part of a covenant the contract is altogether void, but where you can sever them, whether the illegality be created by statute or by the common law, you may reject the bad part and retain the good" (*g*); and this rule applies not only to covenants, but also to assignments (*h*), and to bye-laws (*i*).

One illegal
consideration
taints whole
contract.

If, however, a contract be made upon a consideration part of which is illegal, or upon several considerations one of which is illegal, the law clearly is that the whole promise, or every one of the promises, dependent upon such consideration or considerations, is also illegal (*k*): for it is induced and affected by the whole consideration, or every one of the considerations, including what is illegal therein: it is impossible to discriminate between the weight to be given to the several parts of the consideration, or to the several considerations, and there can be no severance of

(*e*) *Chesman v. Nainby*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1459.

(*f*) *Gaskell v. King*, 11 East, 164: 10 R. R. 462; *Mallan v. May*, 11 M. & W. 653; see *Baker v. Hedgecock*, 39 Ch. D. 520: 57 L. J. Ch. 889; *per* Lindley, M.R., *Haynes v. Doman*, [1899] 2 Ch. 13, 24: 68 L. J. Ch. 419.

(*g*) *Per Willes, J., Pickering v. Ilfracombe R. Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 235, 250: 37 L. J. C. P. 118; *Robinson v. Ommaney*, 23 Ch. D. 285: 52 L. J. Ch. 440.

(*h*) *Re Isaacson*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 333: 69 L. J. Q. B. 191.

(*i*) See *per* Lindley, L.J., *Strickland v. Hayes*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 292; upon which case see *Burnett v. Berry*, Id. 641: 65 L. J. M. C. 118.

(*k*) *Featherston v. Hutchinson*, Cro. Eliz. 199; *Scott v. Gillmore*, 3 Taunt. 226: 12 R. R. 641; *Harrington v. Victoria Dock Co.*, 3 Q. B. D. 549: 47 L. J. Q. B. 594; with which cf. *Shipway v. Broadwood*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 369: 68 L. J. Q. B. 360.

that which is legal from that which is not: whereas, where there is no illegality in the consideration, and some of the promises are legal and others are illegal, the illegality of those which are bad does not communicate itself to, or contaminate, those which are good, unless, indeed, they are inseparable from and dependent upon one another (*l*).

One of several considerations which is not illegal, but is merely void, does not have this effect: it is wholly nugatory, and the contract is enforceable if the other considerations are good (*m*). The distinction between considerations which are illegal and those which are only void is often of importance. For instance, where a cheque is given for an illegal consideration, an indorsee for value who takes with notice of the illegality cannot maintain an action upon the cheque (*n*); but it is otherwise if the cheque be given for a consideration which is merely void (*o*).

Consideration
merely void.

In connection with the question whether a particular contract is illegal on grounds of public policy, it has been observed that "public policy is an unruly horse and dangerous to ride" (*p*); and that, although certain kinds of contracts have been held void at common law on the ground of public policy, this branch of the law "certainly should not be extended, as judges are more to be trusted as interpreters of the law than as expounders of what is called public policy" (*q*).

Public policy.

(*l*) *Kearney v. Whitehaven Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 700: 62 L. J. M. C. 129.

(*m*) *Jones v. Waite*, 5 Bing. N. C. 341, 351.

(*n*) *Woolf v. Hamilton*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 337: 67 L. J. Q. B. 917.

(*o*) *Lilly v. Rankin*, 56 L. J. Q. B. 248.

(*p*) *Per Burrough, J.*, 2 Bing. 252.

(*q*) *Per Cave, J., Re Mirams*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 594: 60 L. J. Q. B. 397; see *per* *Ld. Bramwell*, [1892]

A. C. 45. For cases in which the rule of public policy has been recently extended to new circumstances, see *Wilson v. Carnley*, [1908] 1 K. B. 729: 77 L. J. K. B. 729 (a promise of marriage by a man who was married at the time); and *In re Beard, Beard v. Hall*, [1908] 1 Ch. 383: 77 L. J. Ch. 265 (a condition in a will divesting the interest of a legatee if he entered the naval or military service of the Crown).

Non-repudiation of fraudulent contract.

The effect of fraud is not absolutely to avoid a contract induced by it, but to render it voidable at the option of the party defrauded; and the contract continues valid until the party defrauded has elected to avoid it (*r*). Thus if a party be induced to buy an article by fraudulent misrepresentations of the seller respecting it, and, after discovering the fraud, continue to deal with the article as his own, he cannot recover back the price from the seller; nor does there seem any authority for saying that a party must, in such a case, know *all* the incidents of a fraud before he deprives himself of the right of rescinding: the proper and safe course is to repudiate the whole transaction at the time of discovering the fraud (*s*). "Where an agreement has been procured by fraud," observed Maule, J. (*t*), "the party defrauded may at his election treat it as void, but he must make his election within a reasonable time. The party guilty of the fraud has no such election." But the election once made by the party defrauded cannot be retracted by him: *electio semel facta non patitur regressum* (*u*).

Presumption against illegality.

Lastly, *ubi quid generaliter conceditur inest haec exceptio si non aliquid sit contra jus fasque* (*x*), is a maxim of our law; and if an act which is the subject of a contract may, according to the circumstances, be lawful or unlawful, it will not be presumed that the contract was to do the unlawful act: the contrary is the proper inference (*y*). If the act is capable of being done legally, either party may enforce the

(*r*) *Reese Silver Mining Co. v. Smith*, L. R. 4 H. L. 64: 39 L. J. Ch. 8, 49.

(*s*) *Campbell v. Fleming*, 1 A. & E. 40; *Clarke v. Dickson*, E. B. & E. 148; *White v. Garden*, 10 C. B. 919; *Harnor v. Groves*, 15 C. B. 667.

(*t*) *E. Anglian R. Co. v. E. Counties R. Co.*, 11 C. B. 803; citing *Campbell v. Fleming*, *supra*; *Bwlch-y-Plwm Lead Mining Co. v. Baynes*, L. R. 2 Ex. 326; *Oakes v. Tur-*

quand, L. R. 2 H. L. 325. In *Pilbrow v. Pilbrow's Atmospheric R. Co.*, 5 C. B. 453, Maule, J., observed, "It is not true that a *deed* that is obtained by fraud is therefore void. The rule is that the party defrauded may, at his election, treat it as void."

(*u*) Co. Litt. 146 a.

(*x*) 11 Rep. 78 b.

(*y*) *Per* Ld. Abinger, *Lewis v. Davison*, 4 M. & W. 654.

contract unless he wickedly intended that the law should be broken (z). It is "a universal principle that every transaction in the first instance is assumed to be valid, and the proof of fraud lies upon the person by whom it is imputed" (a); and where the omission to do an act would be "a criminal neglect of duty," the burden of proving that it was not done, that is, of proving a negative, usually falls upon the party who alleges its omission (b).

Having in the preceding pages directed attention to some leading points connected with the *illegality* of the consideration for a promise or agreement, and having selected from very many cases some only which seemed peculiarly adapted to throw light upon the maxim, *ex dolo malo non oritur actio*, we may further pray in aid of the above very cursory remarks respecting it, the observations already made upon the yet more general principle, that *a man shall not be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong* (c), and shall at once proceed to offer some remarks as to the rule that a consideration is needed to support a promise, and as to the sufficiency and essential requisites thereof.

EX NUDO PACTO NON ORITUR ACTIO. (*Noy, Max. 24.*)—
No cause of action arises from a bare promise.

The maxim, as used by writers on our law of contracts, bears a meaning widely different from that which it bore in Roman jurisprudence. *Nudum pactum* is defined by Ulpian, *ubi nulla subest causa propter conventionem* (d). By *causa*

*Nudum
pactum* in
Roman law.

(z) *Waugh v. Morris*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 202; 42 L. J. Q. B. 57; *Thwaites v. Coulthwaite*, [1896] 1 Ch. 496; 65 L. J. Ch. 238. Upon the latter case, see *Powell v. Kempton Park Co.*, [1899] A. C. 143; 68 L. J. Q. B. 392.

(a) *Per Parke, B.*, 8 Exch. 400; *per* Ld. Kenyon, 2 T. R. 711.

(b) See *per* Ld. Ellenborough, 3

East, 199; cf. the maxim, *omnia presumuntur rite esse acta*; *post*, Chap. X.

(c) *Ante*, p. 233.

(d) D. 2, 14 7, § 4; Plowd. 309, n.; Vin. Abr., "*Nudum Pactum*" (A.). See 1 Powell, Contr. 330 *et seq.* As to the doctrine of *nudum pactum* in the civil law, see Pillans

were meant the formal requisites necessary to obtain for an engagement legal recognition, that is, the ceremonial conditions which constituted *stipulatio*, *nexum*, &c. (*c*). The *cause d'où naît l'obligation* of the French civil code is nearer in meaning to our *consideration*, but is more extensive, and may denote a mere moral duty, or a fancied duty based upon feelings of honour, and even the motive which may actuate a person in making a promise (*f*), to which the English word does not extend.

Nudum pactum in English jurisprudence.

The force of the above maxim, as used in English jurisprudence, is thus explained by Blackstone. "A consideration of some sort or other is so necessary to the forming of a contract, that a *nudum pactum*, or agreement to do or pay something on one side, without any compensation on the other, will not at law support an action; and a man cannot be compelled to perform it" (*g*). The nakedness of a promise, in our system, consists in the absence of consideration, and not in the want of formal conditions, such as writing or registration. Thus, our notion of a bare promise bears no analogy to the *nudum pactum* of the digest. The law, it has been observed (*h*), "supplies no means nor affords any remedy to compel the performance of an agreement made without sufficient consideration. Such agreement is *nudum pactum ex quo non oritur actio*; and whatsoever may be the sense of this maxim in the civil law, it is in the last-mentioned sense only that it is to be understood in our law."

Consideration.

The modern English doctrine of consideration has been one of gradual development. In the time of Henry VI. the word does not seem to have been in vogue; the equivalent found in cases of that period is *quid pro quo* (*i*), and that

v. *Van Mierop*, 3 Burr. 1670 *et seq.*; 1 Fonbl. Eq., 5th ed. 335 (*a*).

(*e*) Pollock on Contr., Chap. III.

(*f*) Ibid., Chap. IV.

(*g*) 2 Bl. Com. 445; Noy, Max., 9th ed. 348.

(*h*) *Per Skynner, C.B., Rann v.*

Hughes, 7 T. R. 350, n. (*a*). See, *per* Ld. Kenyon, 3 T. R. 421; Judgm., *Bank of Ireland v. Archer*, 11 M. & W. 389. See *McManus v. Bark*, L. R. 5 Ex. 65; 39 L. J. Ex. 65.

(*i*) Pollock, Contr., Chap. III.

phrase conveys an accurate idea of the connotation of the modern word, except indeed as used by conveyancers in conjunction with *good* (*k*). Consideration could not be better defined than it is in the Indian Contract Act: "when at the desire of the promisor, the promisee or any other person, has done or abstained from doing, or does or abstains from doing, or promises to do or abstain from doing something, such act or abstinence or promise is called a consideration for the promise" (*l*). Accordingly, if I promise to pay a man £100 for nothing, he neither doing nor promising anything in return or to compensate me for my money, my promise is *nudum pactum*, and has no force in law (*m*). A gratuitous promise or undertaking may indeed form the subject of a moral obligation, and may be binding in honour, but it does not create a legal responsibility (*n*).

Where indeed a promise is made under seal, the solemnity of that mode of delivery is held to import, at law, that there was a sufficient consideration for the promise, so that the plaintiff is not in this case required to prove a consideration; nor can the deed be impeached by merely showing that it was made without consideration, unless proof be given that it originated in fraud (*o*). Neither is a consideration necessary for the validity of a deed operating at common law. Nevertheless if A. made a feoffment in fee to another without consideration, equity would presume that he meant it to the use of himself, and would therefore raise an implied resulting use in his favour (*p*). Even if he should by express limitation of uses prevent the estate from resulting at law, there would still in equity result a *trust* for his benefit. Even in the case of a deed, moreover,

Contract
under seal.

(*k*) As to which see below, p. 570.

(*l*) Indian Contract Act, sect. 2. All the definitions in this section should be carefully studied.

(*m*) 2 Bl. Com. 445; Vin. Abr., "Contract" (K).

(*n*) Judgm., 1 H. Bla. 327. See

Balfe v. West, 13 C. B. 466; *Else v. Gatward*, 5 T. R. 143, 149.

(*o*) 2 Bla. Com., 16th ed. 446, n.

(4). *Per* Parke, B., *Wallis v. Day*, 2 M. & W. 277.

(*p*) 1 Sand. Uses, 68.

“Good” and “valuable” consideration. it is necessary to observe the distinction between a *good* and a *valuable* consideration; the former is such as that of blood, or of natural love and affection, as when a man grants an estate to a near relative, being influenced by motives of generosity, prudence, or natural duty. Deeds made upon this consideration are looked upon by the law as merely *voluntary*, and, although good as between the parties, are liable to be set aside in favour of creditors under the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 47, or, if fraudulent within the meaning of the 13 Eliz. c. 5, under that Act (*q*). On the other hand, a valuable consideration is such as money, marriage, or the like; and this is esteemed by the law as an equivalent given for the grant (*r*).

Owing to the construction put upon the 27 Eliz. c. 4, a purchaser for valuable consideration of lands, could, as a rule, avoid a prior voluntary conveyance of the lands, though in fact made *bonâ fide* and without any fraudulent intent (*s*). But this rule was altered by the Voluntary Conveyances Act, 1893 (*t*).

Consideration in simple contract.

It is of the greatest importance to the student of our law to start with an accurate comprehension of the meaning of consideration in simple contracts. We therefore add to what has already been said the definition of Parke, B.: “any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant derives a benefit or advantage, or any labour, detriment, or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff, however small the benefit or inconvenience may be, is a sufficient consideration, if such act is performed, or such inconvenience suffered, by the plaintiff with the consent, either express or implied, of the defendant” (*u*).

(*q*) See notes to *Twyne's case*, 1 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 1; 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 47.

(*r*) 2 Bl. Com. 297, 444; 10 B. & C. 606.

(*s*) See *Doe v. Manning*, 9 East, 59, 66; 9 R. R. 503; *Ramsay v.*

Gilchrist, [1892] A. C. 412; 61 L. J. P. C. 72.

(*t*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 21.

(*u*) 1 Selw. N. P., 10th ed. 41; Judgm., 2 E. & B. 487—488; *per* Parke, B., *Moss v. Hall*, 5 Exch. 49; *Bracewell v. Williams*, L. R. 2

The consideration for a promise must have *some* tangible value in the eye of the law (*x*). Where in an action of assumpsit the consideration for the defendant's promise was stated to be the release and conveyance by the plaintiff of his interest in certain premises, at the defendant's request, but the declaration did not show that the plaintiff had any interest in the premises except a lien upon them, which was expressly reserved by him, the declaration was held bad, as disclosing no legal consideration for the promise (*y*).

Consideration must have some value.

It is now well settled that, as long as the consideration for a promise has some value its *adequacy* is not material (*z*). The value of all things contracted for "is measured by the appetite of the contractors, and therefore the just value is that which they be content to give" (*a*). Moreover, the consideration may be contingent. It may consist of something which a party does not undertake, and consequently is not bound to perform, but which being done renders the

Adequacy not material.

Value may be contingent,

C. P. 196; *Crowther v. Farrer*, 15 Q. B. 677, 680; *Hulse v. Hulse*, 17 C. B. 711. See, also, *Nash v. Armstrong*, 10 C. B. N. S. 259; *Shadwell v. Shadwell*, 9 Id. 159; *Davis v. Nisbett*, 10 Id. 752; *Surtees v. Lister*, 7 H. & N. 1; *Scotson v. Pegg*, 6 Id. 295; *Westlake v. Adams*, 5 C. B. N. S. 248; *Hartley v. Ponsonby*, 7 E. & B. 872; *Carlile v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co.*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 256, 271; 62 L. J. Q. B. 257.

(*x*) *Per* Patteson, J., *Thomas v. Thomas*, 2 Q. B. 859; *Price v. Easton*, 4 B. & Ad. 433; *Tweddle v. Atkinson*, 1 B. & S. 393; *Edwards v. Baugh*, 11 M. & W. 641; *Bridgman v. Dean*, 7 Exch. 199; *Wade v. Simeon*, 2 C. B. 548; *Llewellyn v. Llewellyn*, 15 L. J. Q. B. 4; *Crow v. Rogers*, 1 Stra. 592; *Lilly v. Hays*, 5 A. & E. 548; approved in *Noble v. National Discount Co.*, 5 H. & N. 225, 228; *Galloway v. Jackson*, 3

Scott, N. R. 753, 763; *Thornton v. Jenyns*, 1 Id. 52; *Jackson v. Cobbin*, 8 M. & W. 790; *Cowper v. Green*, 7 M. & W. 633; 1 Roll. Abr. 23, pl. 29; *Fisher v. Waltham*, 4 Q. B. 889; *Wilson v. Wilson*, 1 H. L. Cas. 538; *Hart v. Miles*, 4 C. B. N. S. 371, and cases *infra*.

(*y*) *Kaye v. Dutton*, 7 M. & Gr. 807; recognizing *Edwards v. Baugh*, 11 M. & W. 641; *Lyth v. Ault*, 7 Exch. 669; *Strickland v. Turner*, Id. 208; *Fremlin v. Hamilton*, 8 Exch. 308; see *Cooper v. Parker*, 14 C. B. 118; *Millward v. Littlewood*, 5 Exch. 775; *Wild v. Harris*, 7 C. B. 999; *Holmes v. Penney*, 9 Exch. 584, 589; *Foakes v. Beer*, 9 App. Cas. 605.

(*z*) *Westlake v. Adams*, 5 C. B. N. S. 248, 265; 24 L. J. C. P. 271; *per* Byles, J.

(*a*) Hobbes, *Leviathan*, pt. 1, Ch. XV.

promise on the other side binding in law. Thus, if a tradesman agree to supply on certain terms such goods as a customer may order during a future period, he cannot sue the customer for not ordering any goods, but if the customer order any goods, the consideration becomes effectual, and a contract binding upon the tradesman immediately arises (*b*). Not only is a promise to forbear an action a good consideration, but so also is actual forbearance at request (*c*).

or problem-
atical.

Moreover, a consideration may be good in law, although there may be merely a chance, and that a remote one, of any benefit arising to one party or detriment to the other. Thus, although a claim be wholly ill-founded, yet if it has been made in good faith, a promise to abandon it, or its abandonment at request, either before or pending an action upon it, constitutes a good consideration for a contract (*d*).

Consideration
must be real,
not illusory;
must not fail
through the
act of the
promisee.

The consideration for a contract, although its adequacy will not be examined by the Courts, must not be colourable merely nor illusory (*e*), and it is open to the promisor to show, if he can, that the chance of his deriving benefit from that which is put forward as the consideration for his promise has been defeated by the act of the promisee. In such a case there is said to be a *failure of consideration*. In debt for money had and received, the defendant pleaded the execution and delivery to the plaintiff of a deed securing to the plaintiff an annuity, and acceptance of the same by the plaintiff in discharge of the debt; replication, that no memorial of the deed had been enrolled pursuant to the statute; that, the annuity being in arrear, the plaintiff

(*b*) *G. N. R. Co. v. Witham*, L. R. 9 C. P. 16: 43 L. J. C. P. 1.

(*c*) *Crears v. Hunter*, 19 Q. B. D. 341: 56 L. J. Q. B. 518.

(*d*) *Callisher v. Bischoffheim*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 449: 39 L. J. Q. B. 181; *Miles v. N. Zealand Co.*, 32

Ch. D. 266: 55 L. J. Ch. 801.

(*e*) *White v. Bluett*, 23 L. J. Exch. 36. See *Gough v. Findon*, 7 Exch. 48; *Frazier v. Hatton*, 2 C. B. N. S. 512; *Gorgier v. Morris*, 7 C. B. N. S. 588.

brought an action for the arrears ; that defendant pleaded in bar the non-enrolment ; and that plaintiff thereupon elected and agreed that the indenture should be void, and discontinued the action. The replication was held to be a good answer to the plea, since it showed that the accord and satisfaction thereby set up had been rendered nugatory by the defendant's own act (*f*).

The definitions of consideration which have already been given are sufficient to preclude the possibility of its being confounded with the *motive* of a promise (*g*). Consideration may furnish the inducement for a promise, and that inducement may be a motive, but the motive is a mental fact subjective to the promisor, the consideration is objective and extraneous to his mind. A common expression, which involves a leading principle of the law of contracts, is that *the consideration must move from the plaintiff*. By this is meant not only that the consideration must be something external to the mind of the promisor, and therefore not a mere motive, but also, that there must have been what is called *privity of contract* between the promisor and the person who seeks to enforce the promise. In common parlance, the principle may be thus stated : he alone can exact performance of a promise, who has furnished or contributed to furnish the consideration (*h*).

Consideration
not to be
confounded
with motive.

Consideration
must move
from the
plaintiff.

Where plaintiff promised to discharge A. from part of a debt due to himself, and to permit B. to stand in his place as to that part, defendant promising, in return, that B. should give plaintiff a promissory note ; the consideration moving from plaintiff, and being an undertaking detrimental to him, was held sufficient to sustain the defendant's

(*f*) *Turner v. Browne*, 3 C. B. 157 ; *Thomas v. Thomas*, 2 Q. B. 851.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Denman, and Paterson, J., Id. 859 ; Id. 861 (*a*).

(*h*) See *Playford v. U. K. Tele-*

graph Co., L. R. 4 Q. B. 706 ; *Becher v. G. E. R. Co.*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 241 ; *Jennings v. G. N. R. Co.*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 7 ; *Alton v. Midland R. Co.*, 19 C. B. N. S. 213 ; *Watson v. Russell*, 5 B. & S. 968.

promise (*i*). Where, however, A. being indebted to plaintiff in one sum, and B. being indebted to A. in another, the defendant, in consideration of being permitted by A. to sue B. in his name, promised to pay A.'s debt to the plaintiff, and A. gave such permission, whereupon defendant recovered from B.; judgment was arrested on the ground that plaintiff was a mere stranger to the consideration for the promise made by defendant, having done nothing of trouble to himself or of benefit to the defendant (*k*).

The question of privity of contract has been much discussed in connection with the relation of a country solicitor towards his client and town agent respectively. It has been more than once subject of inquiry whether such privity exists between the client and town agent as would entitle one to sue the other. Where B., the country attorney of A., sent money to the defendants, who were his London agents, to be paid to C., on account of A., and the defendants promised B. to pay the money according to his directions, but afterwards, being applied to by C., refused to pay it, claiming a balance due to themselves from B. on an account between them, it was held that an action for money had and received would not lie against the defendants at the suit of A. (*l*). "The general rule," observed Lord Denman, "undoubtedly is, that there is no *privity* between the agent in town and the client in the country; and the

(*i*) *Peate v. Dicken*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 422; *Tipper v. Bicknell*, 3 Bing. N. C. 710; *Harper v. Williams*, 4 Q. B. 219; and *Dashwood v. Jermyn*, 12 Ch. D. 776.

(*k*) *Bourne v. Mason*, 1 Ventr. 6; *Liversidge v. Broadbent*, 4 H. & N. 603, 610, and *Tweedle v. Atkinson*, 1 B. & S. 393, also illustrate the maxim.

(*l*) *Cobb v. Becke*, 6 Q. B. 930; *Robbins v. Fennell*, 11 Q. B. 248; *Bluck v. Siddaway*, 15 L. J. Q. B.

359; *Hooper v. Trefry*, 1 Exch. 17. See *Litt v. Martindale*, 18 C. B. 314, where there seems to have been very slight (if any) evidence of privity; *Johnson v. R. Mail St. Packet Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 38; *Moore v. Bushell*, 27 L. J. Ex. 3; *Gerhard v. Bates*, 2 E. & B. 476; *Brewer v. Jones*, 10 Exch. 655; *Barkworth v. Ellerman*, 6 H. & N. 605; *Painter v. Abel*, 2 H. & C. 113; *Collins v. Brook*, 5 H. & N. 700.

former cannot maintain an action against the latter for his fees, nor the latter against the former for negligence" (m).

A. employs B., an attorney, to do an act for the benefit of C., A. having to pay B., and there being no intercourse of any sort between B. and C. If, through the negligence or ignorance of B. in transacting the business, C. loses the benefit intended for him by A., C. cannot maintain an action against B. to recover damages for the loss. If the law were otherwise, a disappointed legatee might sue the solicitor employed by a testator to make a will in favour of a stranger, whom the solicitor never saw or before heard of, if the will were void for not being properly signed and attested (n).

As will shortly be seen, nothing done or suffered by the promisee *antecedently* to the promise constitutes a good consideration for the promise unless it was done or suffered at the request of the promisor. In certain cases it was once thought that where the plaintiff voluntarily did that which the defendant was morally bound to do, and the defendant afterwards expressly promised to reward him, a previous request would be implied, so that the moral duty attaching to the defendant would be a valid consideration for his promise (o). It never was considered that every moral consideration was sufficient for this purpose (p). After considerable controversy it was finally settled in *Eastwood v. Kenyon* (q), that a mere moral obligation arising from a past benefit not conferred at the request of the defendant is not a good consideration, and that the class of considerations

Moral obligation does not constitute consideration.

(m) For later cases on this subject see *Lawrence v. Fletcher*, 12 Ch. D. 858; *Vyse v. Foster*, L. R. 10 Ch. 236; *Ex p. Edwards*, 8 Q. B. D. 262; *Re Nelson*, 30 Ch. D. 1; *Macfarlane v. Lister*, 37 Ch. D. 89; *Hannaford v. Syms*, 79 L. T. 30.

(n) *Per* Ld. Campbell, *Robertson v. Fleming*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 177.

As to privity in connection with

the relation of attorney and client, see *Fish v. Kelly*, 17 C. B. N. S. 194; *Helps v. Clayton*, Id. 553.

(o) *Lee v. Muggeridge*, 5 Taunt. 36; *Watson v. Turner*, B. N. P. 129, 147, 281; *Trueman v. Fenton*, Cowp. 544; *Atkins v. Banwell*, 2 East, 505.

(p) *Per* Ld. Tenterden, *Littlefield v. Shee*, 2 B. & Ad. 811.

(q) 11 A. & E. 438, 446.

derived from moral obligations includes only those cases in which there has been a legal right deprived of legal remedy. In such cases, as will be seen, the defendant may be held liable, without putting moral duty on a par with legal consideration (*r*). It is now past controversy that mere moral feeling is not enough to affect the legal rights of parties (*s*); nor can a subsequent express promise convert into a debt that which of itself was not a legal debt (*t*); and although the mere fact of giving a promise creates a moral obligation to perform it, yet the enforcement of such promises by law, however plausibly justified by the desire to effect all conscientious engagements, might be attended with mischievous consequences; one of which would be the frequent preference of voluntary undertakings to claims for just debts. Suits would thereby be multiplied, and voluntary undertakings would also be multiplied, to the prejudice of real creditors (*u*).

Bills of
exchange.

As regards bills of exchange, cheques, and promissory notes the rule is, that such instruments are presumed to be made upon, and *primâ facie* import, consideration (*v*). And the words "value received" express only what the law implies from the nature of the instrument, and the relation of the parties apparent upon it (*y*), and then the maxim, *expressio eorum quæ tacite insunt nihil operatur*, is applicable (*z*). In an action upon a bill or note between the immediate parties thereto, the consideration may be inquired into; and if it be

(*r*) See *post*, p. 597.

(*s*) *Per* Ld. Denman, *Beaumont v. Reeve*, 8 Q. B. 483; cited and recognised, *Fisher v. Bridges*, 3 E. & B. 642; *Eastwood v. Kenyon*, 11 A. & E. 438; *Wennall v. Adney*, 3 B. & P. 247, 249 (*a*): 6 R. R. 780. In *Jennings v. Brown*, 9 M. & W. 501, Parke, B., observes in reference to *Binnington v. Wallis* (4 B. & Ald. 650), that the giving up the annuity was "a mere moral consideration,

which is nothing."

(*t*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., *Kaye v. Dutton*, 7 M. & Gr. 811—812.

(*n*) Judgm., 11 A. & E. 450, 451. See *Roberts v. Smith*, 4 H. & N. 315.

(*x*) *Per* Martin, B., 1 H. & C. 710; see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 30.

(*y*) *Hatch v. Trayes*, 11 A. & E. 702; see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 3 (*4*).

(*z*) *Ante*, p. 519.

proved that the plaintiff gave, and the defendant received, no value, the action will fail (*a*). And it may fail in part where the consideration is divisible and has failed in part; for where, observed Cresswell, J. (*b*), there is a promise to pay a certain sum, the whole being supposed to be due, "each part of the money expressed to be due is the consideration for each part of the promise; and the consideration as to any part failing, the promise is *pro tanto nudum pactum*."

In actions not between immediate parties to a bill or note, the established rule is, that suspicion must be cast upon the plaintiff's title before he can be required to prove what consideration he gave for it. But, if it be proved that the instrument was obtained by fraud, or is affected by illegality, such proof affords a presumption that the guilty party placed it in the hands of an accomplice to sue upon it, and consequently casts upon the plaintiff the burden of showing that he was a *bonâ fide* indorsee for value (*c*).

Different kinds of consideration.

Having thus briefly shown the nature of the *consideration* and the *privity* necessary to a valid contract, we may proceed to specify the important distinctions which exist between considerations *executed*, *concurrent*, *continuing*, and *executory*. These terms, as used to qualify consideration, are relative in point of time to the promise. The following example will serve as an introductory illustration. A declaration in assumpsit stated that in consideration of the plaintiff's *agreeing* to stay an action against B., the defendant promised to pay the amount upon a certain event; at the trial, the following agreement was proved: "In consideration of the plaintiff's *having agreed* to stay proceedings against B., &c.;" it was held that the contract was an *executory* contract, and a *continuing* agreement to stay proceedings, and that there was therefore no variance (*d*).

(*a*) *Southall v. Rigg, and Forman v. Wright*, 11 C. B. 481, 492; see *Re Whitaker*, 42 Ch. D. 119.

(*b*) 11 C. B. 494; see *Warwick v. Nairn*, 10 Exch. 762.

(*c*) *Per Parke, B., Bailey v. Bidwell*, 13 M. & W. 73, 76; see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 30 (2); *Tatam v. Haslar*, 23 Q. B. D. 345.

(*d*) *Tanner v. Moore*, 9 Q. B. 9.

In this case *having agreed* before the date of the promise would indicate an *executed* consideration, *agreeing* might constitute a *concurrent* consideration (*i.e.*, coincident in point of time with the promise), or *executory* (*i.e.*, to be performed after the promise).

Consideration must be moved by request.

It will appear from the definitions of consideration above cited (*e*), that it is necessary that the service which is advanced as the consideration for a promise should be undertaken at the instance or request of the promisor. This is the meaning of the decision in the leading case of *Lampleigh v. Brathwait* (*f*), that a mere voluntary courtesy will not support an assumpsit, but a courtesy moved by a previous request will. In the case of a service which is not past or executed at the time of the promise, it is obvious that a request on the part of the promisor is a logical necessity. To promise something in consideration that another will in the future do or suffer something (executory consideration), or will continue to do or suffer something (continuing), or will *hic et nunc* do or suffer something (concurrent), is itself a request.

In case of past service, request must be proved.

Where, however, the service is past or executed at the date of the promise, it is, as a rule, necessary to show that the service was undertaken at the request of the promisor. For, to take a simple illustration, if a man disburse money about the affairs of another, without request, and then afterwards the latter promise to repay him (*g*), there is wanting an essential element of valid legal consideration.

Cases of executed service where it is not necessary to prove request.

Although, generally speaking, in the case of *executed* considerations it is necessary that a request should be laid and proved, there are cases of past consideration, where, as in the case of *executory* service, the nature of the consideration

(*e*) *Ante*, pp. 584-587.

(*f*) 1 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 141, *per* Parke, J., *Reason v. Wirdnam*, 1 C. & P. 434; 1 Wms. Saund. 264 (1).

(*g*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., *Thornton v. Jenyns*, 1 Scott, N. R. 74, citing *Hunt v. Bate*, Dyer, 272, and 1 Roll. Abr. 11. See particularly *Roscorla v. Thomas*, 3 Q. B. 234.

itself imports a request (*h*). Thus, in an action of assumpsit for money *lent*, it was held unnecessary to allege that it was lent at the defendant's request; for there cannot be a claim for money lent unless there be a loan, and a loan implies an obligation to pay (*i*). In the case of money *paid*, however, the above doctrine will not apply, because a gratuitous payment would not create a legal obligation; and "no man can be a debtor for money paid unless it was paid at his request" (*k*).

Moreover, there are circumstances under which the law will itself imply that the service has been undertaken by request of the promisor. Such request is implied in the following cases:—

Request implied in certain cases.

1. Where the defendant has adopted and enjoyed the benefit of the service, and the maxim, *omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur* (*l*), is applicable; for instance, where A., purporting to act on behalf of B., but without his authority, orders goods from C., and pays the price, and A. afterwards adopts the contract by accepting the goods. But it must be observed that a person cannot be said in law to adopt or ratify an act, unless it was in fact done on his behalf (*m*), and a request to do an act is not implied from the mere fact that a benefit is enjoyed by reason that the act was done. This is shown by the cases where one of the parties interested in a life policy, who on his own account has kept it up by paying the premiums (*n*), or

(*h*) See 1 M. & Gr. 265, note; cited *per* Parke, B., 12 M. & W. 759.

(*i*) *Victors v. Davies*, 12 M. & W. 758; *per* Pollock, C.B., 1 H. & C. 716; *M'Gregor v. Graves*, 3 Exch. 34.

(*k*) *Per* Parke, B., 12 M. & W. 760; *Brittain v. Lloyd*, 14 M. & W. 762; cited in *Lewis v. Campbell*, 8 C. B. 541, 547; and *per* Parke, B., *Hutchinson v. Sydney*, 10 Exch. 439.

Hayes v. Warren, 2 Stra. 933, cited 1 Wms. Saund. 264 (1). See,

in further illustration of the subject above touched upon, *Dietrichsen v. Giubilei*, 14 M. & W. 845; *per* Parke, B., *King v. Sears*, 2 Cr. M. & R. 53; *Emmens v. Elderton*, 4 H. L. Cas. 624.

(*l*) See *post*, p. 672.

(*m*) See *per* Bowen, L.J., 34 Ch. D. 250; *Durant v. Roberts*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 629; 69 L. J. Q. B. 382.

(*n*) *Leslie v. French*, 23 Ch. D. 552; *Falcke v. Scottish Co.*, 34 Ch. D. 234; *Re Winchelsea*, 39 Ch. D.

one tenant in common of a house, who on his own account has spent money on its repair (o), has failed to recover for his outlay from the others. Again, where a builder contracts to erect buildings on the defendant's land for a lump sum, and, after part of the work has been done, abandons the contract, the defendant is not liable to pay for the work done merely by reason of his deriving benefit from it (p).

2. Where the service consists in the plaintiff having been compelled to do that to which the defendant was legally compellable. Thus, as a rule, a person, whose goods are lawfully seized for another's debt, is entitled to redeem them and to recover the amount paid from the debtor, or, if the goods be sold to satisfy the debt, he may recover their value (q). And upon this principle rests the right to indemnity of a surety who pays the debt of his principal, and the right to contribution of a joint debtor who pays the whole joint debt (q). This rule, however, may be excluded by contract; and where the owner of the goods seized is, as between himself and the defendant, liable to pay the debt, the rule is inapplicable (q).

3. Where the plaintiff *voluntarily* does that which the defendant might have been legally compelled to do, and the defendant afterwards in consideration of the service *expressly* promises (r). It is to be noticed that in the case of such voluntary service, a subsequent express promise is necessary to support an action, whereas in the cases under the two former heads, the promise is implied as well as the request (s).

168. See also *The Gas Float Whitton*, [1896] P. 42, 58; [1897] A. C. 337.

(o) *Leigh v. Dickeson*, 15 Q. B. D. 60. But see *Re Jones*, [1893] 2 Ch. 461; *Re Cook*, [1896] 1 Ch. 923: 65 L. J. Ch. 654.

(p) *Sumpter v. Hedges*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 673: 67 L. J. Q. B. 545.

(q) See *Edmunds v. Wallingford*, 14 Q. B. D. 811, 814, 815, and the authorities there cited; *The Orchis*, 15 P. D. 38. As to what amounts

to compulsion, see *Johnson v. R. Mail St. P. Co.*, L. R. 3 C. P. 38; *Gebhardt v. Saunders*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 452, 458; *Andrews v. St. Olave B. W.*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 775: 67 L. J. Q. B. 592.

(r) *Wennall v. Adney*, 3 B. & P. 250, in notis: 6 R. R. 780; *Wing v. Mill*, 1 B. & Ald. 104; *Paynter v. Williams*, 1 C. & M. 818.

(s) *Atkins v. Banwell*, 2 East, 505.

A distinction will be noted between the above cases and cases in which it has been held that an express promise may effectually revive a precedent good consideration, which might have afforded grounds for an action upon a promise implied from such consideration, were it not for the interference of some positive rule of law, which has suspended the action or remedy without destroying the right. Thus a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations is still a good consideration for a promise in writing to pay (*t*); for the effect of a plea of the statute is to admit that the cause or consideration of the action still exists, but to show that the remedy is lost by lapse of time (*u*).

Where suspended right of action is revived by express promise.

"The cases," said Lord Denman (*x*), "in which it has been held, that, under certain circumstances, a consideration insufficient to raise an implied promise will nevertheless support an express one, will be found collected and reviewed in the note to *Wennall v. Adney* (*y*), and in *Eastwood v. Kenyon* (*z*). They are cases of *voidable* contracts subsequently ratified, of debts barred by operation of law, but subsequently revived, and of equitable and moral obligations, which, but for some rule of law, would of themselves have been sufficient to raise an implied promise."

At one time there was an inclination to explain the rule stated thus by Lord Denman, and previously laid down by Lord Mansfield (*a*), as depending upon the moral obligation arising from the previous agreement (*b*). It is not easy to see how such a theory was reconciled with the fact, that an express promise was ineffectual where the original contract to which it had reference was not merely suspended for a time or voidable at the option of the defendant, but absolutely void at law. While, on the other hand, it was always

(*t*) *La Touche v. La Touche*, 3 H. & C. 576, 588.

(*u*) *Scarpillini v. Atcheson*, 7 Q. B. 878.

(*x*) *Roscorla v. Thomas*, 3 Q. B. 237; Judgm., 1 C. B. 870.

(*y*) 3 B. & P. 249.

(*z*) 11 A. & E. 438.

(*a*) *Hawkes v. Sanders*, Cowp. 290; *Atkins v. Hill*, Id. 288.

(*b*) Leake, Law of Contracts, 615.

understood that where the validity of an agreement is not affected by statute, but the remedy of one party is suspended, an express promise subsequently made will have relation back to the previous consideration, and will not be treated as *nudum pactum* (c).

Illustrations. Promises to pay a debt simply, or by instalments, or when the party is able, are all equally supported by the past consideration, and, when the debts have become payable *instantly*, may be given in evidence in support of the ordinary indebitatus counts. So when the debt is not already barred by the statute, a promise to pay the creditor will revive it and make it a new debt, and a promise to an executor to pay a debt due to a testator creates a new debt to him. But it does not follow that though a promise revives the debt in such cases, the debt will be a sufficient consideration to support a promise to do a collateral thing, as to supply goods or perform work and labour. In such case it is but an accord unexecuted, and no action will lie for not executing it (d).

Infants. Formerly many contracts made by an infant, which are now void, were merely voidable at his option. Accordingly an express promise made by him after full age revived the previous consideration so as to remove the subsequent promise from the category of *nuda pacta* (e); but since the Infant Relief Act, 1874 (f), this is no longer so, for s. 2 of that statute expressly enacts that no action shall be brought to charge any one upon any such promise (g). The contract of a married woman was at one time absolutely void (h); and, therefore, if the record stated that goods were supplied

Married women.

(c) See Pollock, Contr. Chap. XII. Judgm., *Earl v. Oliver*, 2 Exch. 90. See *Reeves v. Hearne*, 1 M. & W. 323.

(d) Judgm., 2 Exch. 90; *per Parke, B.*, *Smith v. Thorne*, 18 Q. B. 139.

(e) *Per Patteson, J.*, 8 A. & E.

470. See note (a) to *Wennall v. Adney*, 3 B. & P. 249.

(f) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 62; *ante*, p. 546.

(g) For the effect of this St., see Pollock, Contr. Ch. II., pt. 1.

(h) See *Neve v. Hollands*, 18 Q. B. 262.

to a married woman, who, after her husband's death, promised to pay, this was not sufficient, because the debt was never owing from her (*i*).

Another illustration, which would suffice, if it were necessary, to refute the theory of moral obligation, is afforded by the case of a person who promises to repay a debt from which he has been discharged by bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Act, 1849, expressly annulled the efficacy of such promise which previously might have been enforced. A similar provision was contained in the Act of 1861, but not in that of 1869, and, consequently, the question was more than once raised under the last-mentioned statute, whether the common law was revived in consequence of the omission. It was, however, decided that the policy of the bankruptcy laws was sufficient without express statutory enactment to render ineffectual any attempt to resuscitate a debt from which a person had been discharged by bankruptcy (*k*).

Debts discharged by bankruptcy.

Again there are cases of agreements coming within the purview of s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds, in which *no action can be brought* on account of the absence of a written memorandum, but in which a subsequent promise may nevertheless furnish a ground of action. A verbal agreement was entered into between the plaintiff and defendants respecting the transfer of an interest in land. The transfer was effected, and nothing remained to be done but to pay the consideration. It was held, that the agreement, not being in writing, as required by the statute, could not be enforced by action, but that, as the transferee had, after the transfer, admitted to the transferor that he owed him

Statute of Frauds.

(*i*) *Meyer v. Haworth*, 8 A. & E. 467, 469. In *Traver v. —*, 1 Sid. 57, a woman, after her husband's death, promised the plaintiff that, if he would prove that her husband had owed him £20, she would pay it. This was held a good considera-

tion, "because it was a trouble and charge to the creditor to prove his debt." See *Cope v. Albinson*, 8 Exch. 185.

(*k*) *Heather v. Webb*, 2 C. P. D. 1; 46 L. J. C. P. 89.

Usury laws.

the stipulated price, the amount might be recovered as money found to be due upon an account stated (*l*). Also bills of exchange given after the repeal of the usury law by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 90, in renewal of bills given while that law was in force to secure payment of money lent at usurious interest, have been held valid, the receipt of the money being a sufficient consideration to support a new promise to pay it. In the case referred to, this qualified proposition was sanctioned by the majority of the court: "A man by express promise may render himself liable to pay back money which he has received as a loan, though some positive rule of law or statute intervened at the time to prevent the transaction from constituting a legal debt" (*m*).

Promise
express or
implied.

We must, in the next place, observe that the subsequent promise, like the antecedent request, may, in many cases, be implied. For instance, the very name of a loan imports that it was the intention of both parties that the money should be repaid (*n*); a promise to pay interest will be implied by law from the forbearance of money at the defendant's request (*o*); and from money being found due on accounts stated, the law implies a promise to pay it (*p*); but where the consideration has been executed, and a promise would, under the circumstances, be implied by law, it is clearly established that no express promise, made in respect of that prior consideration, but differing from that which by law would be implied, can be enforced (*q*). For, were it otherwise, there would be two co-existing promises on one consideration (*r*). It has, however, been said that the cases establishing this proposition may have proceeded

(*l*) *Cocking v. Ward*, 1 C. B. 858, 870. See 1 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 321.

(*m*) *Flight v. Reed*, 1 H. & C. 703, 716.

(*n*) *Per Pollock*, C.B., 1 H. & C. 716.

(*o*) *Nordenstrom v. Pitt*, 13 M. &

W. 723.

(*p*) *Per Crompton, J., Fagg v. Nudd*, 3 E. & B. 652.

(*q*) *Judgm., Kaye v. Dutton*, 7 M. & Gr. 815, and cases there cited.

(*r*) *Per Maule, B., Hopkins v. Logan*, 5 M. & W. 249.

on another principle, viz., that the consideration was exhausted by the promise implied by law from the very execution of it, and that, consequently, any promise made afterwards must be *nudum pactum*, there remaining no consideration to support it (*s*). "But the case may perhaps be different where there is a consideration from which *no* promise would be implied by law, that is, where the party suing has sustained a detriment to himself, or conferred a benefit on the defendant, *at his request*, under circumstances which would not raise any implied promise. In such cases it appears to have been held, in some instances, that the act done at the request of the party charged, is a sufficient consideration to render binding a promise afterwards made by him in respect of the act so done (*t*).

But, however this may be, it is quite clear, that, where the consideration is past, the promise alleged, even if express, must be identical with that which would have been implied by law from the particular transaction; in other words, "a past and executed consideration will support no other promise than such as may be implied by law" (*u*); thus, in *assumpsit*, the declaration stated, that, in consideration that plaintiff, at the request of defendant, *had bought* a horse of defendant at a certain price, defendant promised that the horse was *free from vice*, but deceived the plaintiff in that the horse was vicious. This declaration was held bad; for the executed consideration, though laid with a request, neither raised by implication of law the promise charged in the declaration, nor supported such promise if express; and the Court observed, that the only promise which would result from the consideration, as stated, and be co-extensive with it, would be to deliver the horse upon request (*x*).

Nature of
implied
promise.

(*s*) See *Deacon v. Gridley*, 15 C. B. 295.

(*t*) *Judgm.*, 7 M. & Gr. 816.

(*u*) *Per Parke, B., Atkinson v. Stephens*, 7 Exch. 572; *Judgm.*,

Earle v. Oliver, 2 Exch. 89; *Lattimore v. Garrard*, 1 Exch. 809, 811.

(*x*) *Roscorla v. Thomas*, 3 Q. B. 234, 237.

In an action against the public officer of an insurance company, a count in the declaration stated, that it was agreed between the company and the plaintiff, that, from the 1st of January then next, the plaintiff, as the attorney of the company, should receive a salary of £100 per annum, in lieu of rendering an annual bill of costs for general business; and in consideration that the plaintiff had promised to fulfil the agreement on his part, the company promised to fulfil the same on their part, *and to retain and employ the plaintiff as such attorney (y)*. The verdict being in favour of the plaintiff, the judgment was afterwards arrested by the Court of Common Pleas, upon this ground, that there was no sufficient consideration to sustain that part of the above count, which alleged a promise to retain and employ the plaintiff, the Court holding that the language of the agreement, as stated, imported an obligation to furnish actual employment to the plaintiff in his profession of an attorney, and that, inasmuch as the consideration set forth was in the past, that the plaintiff *had* promised to perform his part of the agreement, such consideration, being a past or executed promise, was exhausted by the like promise of the company to perform the agreement, and did not enure as a consideration for the additional part of the promise alleged, to retain and employ the plaintiff in the sense before mentioned, as also to perform the agreement. The view thus taken, however, was pronounced erroneous by the Court of Exchequer Chamber, and by the House of Lords, who held that the averment as to retaining and employing the plaintiff was not to be understood as importing a contract beyond the strict legal effect of the agreement, whence it followed that the mutual promises to perform such agreement, laid in the count objected to, were a sufficient legal consideration to sustain the defendant's promise.

(y) *Emmens v. Elderton*, 4 H. L. Cas. 624; S. C., 13 C. B. 495; 6 Id. 160
4 Id. 479.

A *concurrent* consideration is where the act of the plaintiff and the promise of the defendant take place at the same time; and here the law does not, as in the case of a bygone transaction, require that, in order to make the promise binding, the plaintiff should have acted at the request of the defendant (*z*). Thus, where it appeared from the whole declaration taken together, that, at the same moment, by a simultaneous act, a promise was made, that, on the plaintiff's accepting bills drawn by one of the parties then present, the defendants should deliver certain deeds to the plaintiff when the bills were paid, it was held, that a good consideration was disclosed for the defendant's promise (*a*). So, where the promise of the plaintiff and that of the defendant are simultaneous, the one may be a good and sufficient consideration for the other (*b*); and where two parties, upon the same occasion, and at the same time, mutually promise to perform a certain agreement not then actually entered into, the consideration moving from the one party is sufficient to support the promise by the other (*c*).

Concurrent
considera-
tion.

Again, where, by one and the same instrument, it is agreed that one of the contracting parties shall pay a sum of money, and that the other shall at the same time execute a conveyance of an estate, the payment of the money and the execution of the conveyance may properly be considered concurrent acts; and, in this case, no action can be maintained by the vendor to recover the money until he executes, or offers to execute a conveyance (*d*). It may, indeed, be stated, generally, that neither party can

(*z*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., 3 Bing. N. C. 715.

(*a*) *Tipper v. Bicknell*, Id. 710; *West v. Jackson*, 16 Q. B. 280.

(*b*) As to *mutuality* in contracts, see Broom's Com., 5th ed. 307 *et seq.*; *Bealey v. Stuart*, 31 L. J. Ex. 281; *Westhead v. Sproson*, 6 H. & N. 726; *Whittle v. Frankland*, 2 B. & S. 49.

(*c*) *Thornton v. Jenyns*, 1 M. & Gr. 166. See *King v. Gillett*, 7 M. & W. 55; *Harrison v. Cage*, 1 Ld. Raym. 386; cited *Smith v. Woodfine*, 1 C. B. N. S. 667.

(*d*) *Per* Ld. Tenterden, *Spiller v. Westlake*, 2 B. & Ad. 157: 36 R. R. 520; *Bankart v. Bowers*, L. R. 1 C. P. 484.

sue on such an entire contract without showing a performance of, or an offer, or, at least, a readiness and willingness to perform his part of the agreement, or a wrongful discharge or prevention of such performance by the other party; in which latter case the party guilty of the wrongful act shall not, in accordance with a maxim already considered, be allowed to take advantage of it, and thereby relieve himself from liability for breach of contract (*e*). Whether or not, in any given case, one *promise* be the consideration for another, or whether the *performance*, and not the mere promise, be the consideration, must be gathered from, and depends entirely upon, the words and nature of the agreement, and the intention of the contracting parties (*f*).

Continuing
considera-
tion.

In addition to cases in which the consideration is concurrent, or is altogether past and executed, others occur wherein the consideration is *continuing* at the time of making the promise; thus, it has been held, that the mere relation of landlord and tenant is a sufficient consideration for the tenant's promise to manage a farm in a husbandlike manner (*g*).

CAVEAT EMPTOR. (*Hob. 99.*)—*Let a purchaser beware.*

Rule of the
Roman law.

It seems clear, that, by the civil law, a warranty of title was, as a general rule, implied on the part of the vendor of land, so that he was answerable in damages to the buyer if

(*e*) *Ante*, p. 233, *et seq.* "If a party does all he can to perform the act which he has stipulated to do, but is prevented by the wrongful act of the other party, he is in the same situation as if the performance had been perfected:" *per* Holroyd, J., *Studdy v. Sanders*, 5 B. & C. 639; see also, *Caines v. Smith*, 15 M. & W. 189. See notes to *Cutter*

v. Powell, 2 Sm. L. C. 1.

(*f*) *Thorpe v. Thorpe*, 1 Ld. Raym., 662; 1 Salk. 171; *per Cur.*, *Stavers v. Curling*, 3 Scott, 750, 754; *per* Williams, J., *Christie v. Boulby*, 7 C. B. N. S. 567.

(*g*) *Powley v. Walker*, 5 T. R. 373; 2 R. R. 619; recognised *Beale v. Sanders*, 3 Bing. N. C. 850; *Massey v. Goodall*, 17 Q. B. 310.

evicted; *sive tota res evincatur, sive pars, habet regressum emptor in venditorem* (h); and again, *non dubitatur, etsi specialiter venditor evictionem non promiserit, re evictâ, ex empto competere actionem* (i). With us, however, the above proposition does not hold, and it is laid down, that, "if a man buy lands whereunto another hath title, which the buyer knoweth not, yet ignorance shall not excuse him" (k). By the civil law, as observed by Sir E. Coke, every man is bound to warrant the thing that he sells or conveys, albeit there be no express warranty; but the common law binds him not, *unless there be a warranty*, either in deed (l), or in law; for *caveat emptor* (m) *qui ignorare non debuit quod jus alienum emit* (n)—let a purchaser, who ought not to be ignorant of the amount and nature of the interest which he is about to buy, exercise proper caution.

Sale of land.—As the maxim *caveat emptor* applies, with certain specific restrictions, not only to the quality of, but also to the title to land which is sold, the purchaser is generally bound to view the land and to inquire after and inspect the title-deeds, at his peril if he does not. He does not use common prudence, if he relies on any other security (o). The ordinary course, indeed, which is adopted on the sale of real estates is this: the seller submits his title to the inspection of the purchaser, who exercises his own judgment, or such other as he confides in, on the goodness of the title (p); and if it should turn out to be defective, the purchaser has no remedy, unless he take special covenant or warranty, provided there be no fraud practised on him to

(h) D. 21, 2, 1.

(i) C. 8, 45, 6.

(k) Doct. and Stud., bk. 2, ch. 47.

(l) See *Worthington v. Warrington*, 5 C. B. 635; *Ellis v. Rogers*, 29 Ch. D. 661.

(m) Co. Litt. 102, a. "I have always understood that in purchases of land the rule is *caveat emptor*;" per Lawrence, J., *Gwillim v. Stone*,

3 Taunt. 439; see L. R., 2 C. P. 379; [1895] 2 Q. B. 616.

(n) Hobart, 99.

(o) 3 T. R. 56, 65; *Roswell v. Vaughan*, Cro. Jac. 196; per Holt, C.J., 1 Salk. 211.

(p) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 78, s. 1, substituted 40 for 60 years as a sufficient root of title, and see 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 3,

induce him to purchase (q). Thus, if a regular conveyance is made, containing the usual covenants for securing the buyer against the acts of the seller and his ancestors only, and his title is actually conveyed to the buyer, the rule of *caveat emptor* applies against the buyer, so that he must, at his peril, perfect all that is requisite to his assurance; and, as he might protect his purchase by proper covenants, none can be added (r). An administrator found, among the papers of his intestate, a mortgage deed, purporting to convey premises to him, and without arrears of interest. Not knowing it to be a forgery, he assigned it, covenanting, not for good title in the mortgagor, but only that nothing had been done by himself or by the intestate to encumber the property; and, as this precluded all presumption of any further security, the assignee was held bound to look to the goodness of the title, and failed to recover the purchase-money (s). The case of an ordinary mortgage, however, differs from that of a conveyance, because the mortgagor covenants that at all events he has a good title (t).

Landlord and
tenant.

That an evicted tenant may be without remedy against his landlord, by reason of the maxim *caveat emptor*, is well shown by the case of *Baynes v. Lloyd* (u). The plaintiffs accepted from the defendants a lease under seal, the operative words whereof were "the landlords agree to let;" the word "demise" was not used, and there were no express covenants for title. The defendants had only a leasehold interest in the premises let; their lease expired during the plaintiff's term, and thereupon the plaintiffs were evicted by the superior landlord. It was held that they had no

(q) *Per* Lawrence, J., 2 East, 323; Judgm., *Stephens v. De Medina*, 4 Q. B. 428; *per* Erle, C.J., *Thackeray v. Wood*, 6 B. & S. 773; *per* Martin, B., *Id.* 775.

(r) See Judgm., *Johnson v. Johnson*, 3 B. & P. 162, 170; 6 R. R. 736; Arg. 3 East, 446; 4 Rep. 26; 5 Rep. 84

(s) *Bree v. Holbech*, Dougl. 655; cited 6 T. R. 606; *per* Gibbs, C.J., 1 Marsh. R. 163; *Thackeray v. Wood*, 6 B. & S. 766.

(t) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, *Cripps v. Reade*, 6 T. R. 607; 3 R. R. 273.

(u) [1895] 1 Q. B. 820; 2 Id. 610; 64 L. J. Q. B. 787.

remedy in covenant against the defendants. From the judgments given it appears that the weight of authority favours the view that a covenant in law is not implied from the mere relation of landlord and tenant, but only from certain words if used in creating the lease (*x*); but if any covenant is implied from that relation (*y*), it is only a covenant for quiet enjoyment (*z*), determining, where the landlord has any estate, with the determination of that estate. "Whoever wants to be secure when he takes a lease should inquire after and examine the title-deeds" (*a*).

As a general rule, there is no warranty, still less a condition, implied by law on the demise of real property, that it is fit for the purpose for which it is let. For instance, on the lease of a house or farm there is usually no implied warranty that it is reasonably fit for habitation or cultivation (*b*). But to this rule there are some exceptions; for on the letting of a ready-furnished house the lessor impliedly undertakes that the house is reasonably fit for habitation at the time when the tenancy commences, and if it be not so fit the tenant may at once quit it without notice (*c*). By statute, there is a similar condition implied on the letting of a house, though not furnished, for habitation by persons of the working classes (*d*).

State of
demised
premises.

The general rule that there is no such implied warranty is well illustrated by the decision in *Sutton v. Temple* (*e*),

(*x*) As to "demise," see the authorities collected in the above case.

(*y*) See *Bandy v. Cartwright*, 8 Exch. 913; *Hall v. City of London Brewery*, 2 B. & S. 737; cited [1895] 1 Q. B. 826.

(*z*) As to this covenant, see *Harrison v. Muncaster*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 680; *M., S. & L. R. Co. v. Anderson*, [1898] 2 Ch. 394; *Tebb v. Cave*, [1900] 1 Ch. 642.

(*a*) *Per* Ld. Mansfield, *Keech v. Hall*, 1 Dougl. 21.

(*b*) *Hart v. Windsor*, 12 M. & W. 68; *Surplice v. Farnsworth*, 7 M. & Gr. 576; see *Keates v. Earl of Cadogan*, 10 C. B. 591.

(*c*) *Smith v. Marrable*, 11 M. & W. 5; *Wilson v. Finch Hatton*, 2 Ex. D. 336; *Sarson v. Roberts*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 395: 65 L. J. Q. B. 37.

(*d*) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 70, s. 75; see *Walker v. Hobbs*, 23 Q. B. D. 458: 59 L. J. Q. B. 93.

(*e*) 12 M. & W. 52.

where the eatage of a field, that is, the use of the herbage to be eaten by cattle, was let for a specific time at a specific rent. Upon the tenant stocking the field with his beasts several of them died from the effects of a poisonous substance which had been spread over the field without the landlord's knowledge. It was held that there was no implied warranty by the landlord that the eatage was wholesome food for cattle, and that the tenant was not entitled to throw up the lease. The word "demise," it was observed did not carry with it any warranty as to fitness of purpose.

Fraud and
misrepresentation.

The question of warranty is distinct from that of fraud and also from that of material misrepresentation on the part of the vendor. The effect of fraud will be considered later (f), when we deal with contracts for the sale of goods; it seems enough to say here that the general principles, there briefly referred to, apply equally to cases where contracts to purchase land are induced by fraud. In the absence of fraud, the common law did not regard any misrepresentation as to the subject-matter of a contract, as a cause of action, unless such misrepresentation amounted to a warranty, or as a defence, unless either the misrepresentation was such as struck at the root of the contract or the contract was conditional upon the truth of the representation (g); but the rule of equity has long been otherwise, and consequently specific performance of contracts to purchase land can be resisted, or rescission of such contracts obtained, not only where they have been effected through fraud (h), but also where they have been brought about by a material misrepresentation, however innocent, of the vendor or his

(f) *Post*, p. 618.

(g) *Chandeler v. Lopus*, Cro. Jac. 4; *Cornfoot v. Fowke*, 6 M. & W. 358; and see the judgment of Bowen, L.J., in *Newbigging v. Adam*, 34 Ch. D. 582, 592; and *per* Blackburn, J., in *Kennedy v.*

Panama, New Zealand & Australian Royal Mail Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 580, 587; 36 L. J. Q. B. 260. See also *Derry v. Peek*, 14 A. C. 337; 58 L. J. Ch. 864.

(h) See *Attwood v. Small*, 6 Cl. & F. 232.

authorised agents (*i*). For instance, where a contract to purchase an hotel was entered into on the faith of a representation that the tenant, who was in fact insolvent, was "very desirable," specific performance was refused and rescission was decreed (*k*). It must be noticed, however, that, although completion by conveyance is not a bar to rescission on the ground of fraud, yet misrepresentation is not a ground for rescinding a contract for the purchase of land after completion, unless it was fraudulent and capable of supporting a common law action of deceit (*l*). After taking the conveyance and paying the purchase-money, the purchaser, who has accepted the title, cannot call upon the vendor to take back the land and give back the money, merely because it turns out that the title, which the vendor innocently represented as good, is in fact bad; otherwise there would be no use in taking covenants for title, or in restricting their scope (*m*).

Cases sometimes arise in which the vendor can perform his contract in its substance, but cannot perform it to the letter, owing to some very slight error of description. In such cases, if the error does not amount to a material misrepresentation on the faith of which the purchaser contracted, the vendor may be able to obtain a decree for specific performance on the terms of making compensation for the error (*n*). The modern tendency, however, is to hold the vendor strictly to the bargain he in fact made, and a purchaser is never compelled to take with compensation something materially different from what he was induced by representations to believe that he was offered (*o*). For

Slight
errors of
description.

(*i*) See *Redgrave v. Hurd*, 20 Ch. D. 1, 12: 51 L. J. Ch. 113.

(*k*) *Smith v. Land Corporation*, 28 Ch. D. 7.

(*l*) *Wilde v. Gibson*, 1 H. L. C. 605; *Brett v. Clowser*, 5 C. P. D. 376; *Brownlie v. Campbell*, 5 App. Cas. 925, 937; *Soper v. Arnold*, 37

Ch. D. 96, 102: 57 L. J. Ch. 145.

(*m*) See *per* Cotton, L.J., 37 Ch. D. 101.

(*n*) See *Mortlock v. Buller*, 10 Ves. 305: 7 R. R. 417; *Rudd v. Lascelles*, [1900] 1 Ch. 815.

(*o*) *Re Arnold*, 14 Ch. D. 270, 279.

instance, a purchaser will not be compelled to accept an underlease, if it was misdescribed in the vendor's particulars of sale as a lease, and was bought as such (*p*).

Stipulations
as to errors.

Contracts for the sale of land often contain a stipulation that if there be any misdescription in the particulars of the sale, the contract shall not be annulled, but compensation shall be given. Such a stipulation, however, is not construed as applicable to every misdescription; it does not apply to a fraudulent one, nor to one the compensation for which could not reasonably be estimated; and where the misdescription, though not fraudulent, is in a material and substantial point, so far affecting the subject-matter of the contract that it may reasonably be supposed that, but for such misdescription, the purchaser might never have entered into the contract at all, then he may annul the contract, and is not bound to resort to compensation, notwithstanding the stipulation (*q*). Moreover, unless the stipulation be so expressed as to limit it to errors discovered before the conveyance, the right to compensation under the stipulation is not extinguished by the completion of the purchase; for the conveyance does not cover the whole ground covered by the contract (*r*).

Effect of
completion.

Where, however, there is no contract for compensation, a lessee or purchaser cannot, after completion, claim compensation for a defect of title which he might have discovered before completion; in the absence of fraud, he is without remedy, unless some express or implied covenant of the lease or conveyance has been broken; and it may be observed that an express qualified covenant excludes the implication by law of any wider covenant (*s*).

Vendor
retaining
possession
until com-
pletion.

A vendor of land who retains possession until completion owes some duty to the purchaser to take reasonable care

(*p*) *Re Beyfus & Masters's Contract*, 39 Ch. D. 110.

351: 53 L. J. Q. B. 348.

(*q*) *Re Fawcett & Holmes*, 42 Ch. D. 150, 156: 58 L. J. Ch. 763.

(*s*) *Clayton v. Leech*, 41 Ch. D. 103; *Kelly v. Rogers*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 910: 61 L. J. Q. B. 604: *ante*, p.

(*r*) *Palmer v. Johnson*, 13 Q. B. D.

504.

to preserve the property of which he thus retains possession, and to see that it does not become deteriorated. Whilst a vendor was still in possession, a trespasser removed large quantities of soil from the land; the conveyance was afterwards executed, neither party being then aware of the trespass. It was held that the conveyance did not extinguish the vendor's liability to the purchaser for his breach of duty (*t*).

An unpaid vendor of a house, or other building, who retains possession until completion, is, however, as a rule, not answerable to the purchaser, if in the interval the building be damaged or destroyed by accidental fire; the loss must fall upon the purchaser, if bound by the contract of sale (*u*); and if the contract is silent as to insurances against fire effected by the vendor, the purchaser cannot, even after completion, maintain any claim against the vendor in respect of moneys received by him from the insurance offices (*x*). Risk of fire.

We may here add that the maxim, *damnum sentit dominus*, or *res perit domino* (*y*), expresses the general rule applicable in our law to the case of the accidental destruction of goods contracted to be sold: in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the loss usually falls on the buyer or on the seller according as the property in the goods has or has not passed (*z*). The above maxim, however, is affected by another, *mora debitoris non debet esse creditori damnosa* (*a*); for where delivery of the goods has been delayed through the fault of either buyer or seller, the goods are at the risk of the party in fault as regards any loss which might not have occurred but for such fault (*b*).

(*t*) *Clarke v. Ramuz*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 456; 60 L. J. Q. B. 679. *Castellain v. Preston*, 11 Q. B. D. 380; 52 L. J. Q. B. 366.

(*u*) *Paine v. Meller*, 6 Ves. 349; 5 R. R. 327. (*y*) Cited by Blackburn, J., L. R. 7 Q. B. 453, 454.

(*x*) *Rayner v. Preston*, 18 Ch. D. 1; 50 L. J. Ch. 472; see *Collingridge v. Royal Exch. Ass. Co.*, 3 Q. B. D. 173; 47 L. J. Q. B. 32; (*z*) See 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 21; cf. s. 7; and see also ss. 32, 33.

(*a*) See Pothier, C. de Vente, § 58. (*b*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 21.

Sale of
personal
chattels.

Sales of personal property.—We shall now consider shortly how far the maxim *caveat emptor* applies to sales of personalty, and what are the risks taken by a buyer in respect, first, of the quality of what he buys, and secondly, of the title thereto. Discussion of the subject, so far as goods are concerned, has been simplified by the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (*c*), whereby the legislature codified the law relating to the sale of all chattels personal, except things in action and money. The term “goods,” as used in the Act, includes “emblements, industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the land, which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale” (*d*).

Distinction
between con-
ditions and
warranties.

To understand the subject, it is necessary at the outset to grasp the distinction drawn, as regards contracts of sale, between a condition and a warranty. A warranty is but a collateral agreement with reference to the goods which are the subject of the contract, and its breach, though it may give rise to a claim for damages, gives no right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudiated (*e*); whereas the breach of a condition to be fulfilled by the seller, so long as it may be treated as a condition, gives this right (*f*). Whether a stipulation in the contract is a condition or a warranty is a question of construction, and it may be a condition, though called a warranty (*g*). The buyer may treat a breach of a condition as a breach of warranty (*h*); and, subject to the express or implied terms of the contract, that is his only remedy after he has accepted any of the goods under a contract which is not severable, or after the property in the goods has passed to him under a contract for specific goods (*i*). Specific goods are goods identified and agreed upon at the time of the contract (*k*).

(*c*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71.

(*d*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 62 (1).

(*e*) Id. s. 62 (1).

(*f*) Id. s. 11.

(*g*) Id. s. 11 (b).

(*h*) Id. s. 11 (a).

(*i*) Id. s. 11 (c). See *Perkins v. Bell*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 193; 62 L. J. Q. B. 91.

(*k*) Id. s. 62 (1).

Upon a sale of goods the general rule with regard to their nature or quality is *caveat emptor*, so that, in the absence of fraud, the buyer has no remedy against the seller for any defect in the goods, not covered by some condition or warranty, either express or implied. It is beyond all doubt that, by the general rules of law, there is no warranty of quality arising from the bare contract of sale of goods, and that, where there has been no fraud, a buyer, who has not obtained an express warranty, takes all risk of defect in the goods, unless there are circumstances beyond the mere fact of sale from which a warranty may be implied (*l*).

It is, therefore, necessary to consider under what circumstances the law implies any warranty of quality upon a sale of goods; and the following appear to be the only cases in which, when goods are sold, there can be any implied condition or warranty as to either their nature or their quality (*m*). Quality of goods here includes their state or condition (*n*).

1. Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description (*o*) there is an implied condition that the goods shall correspond with the description (*p*). If the sale be by sample, as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods corresponds with the sample, if the goods do not also correspond with the description (*q*). With this rule, that where the sale is not merely a sale of a specific article, but is a sale of an article by description, the article

(*l*) *Springwell v. Allen*, Alleyne, 91, and 2 East, 448, n.: 15 R. R. 611; *Williamson v. Allinson*, 2 East, 446; *Early v. Garrett*, 9 B. & C. 902: 33 R. R. 371; *Morley v. Attenborough*, 3 Ex. 500; *Ormrod v. Huth*, 14 M. & W. 664; *Hall v. Conder*, 2 C. B. N. S. 22; *Hopkins v. Tanqueray*, 15 C. B. 130; *Ward v. Hobbs*, 4 App. Cas. 13.

(*m*) The law on this subject now

depends, mainly, upon 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, ss. 13—15. For a classification of the cases on the subject, as decided by the common law, see *Jones v. Just*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 197, 202.

(*n*) See 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 62 (1).

(*o*) See *Varley v. Whipp*, [1900] 1 Q. B. 513: 69 L. J. Q. B. 333.

(*p*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 13.

(*q*) *Id.*

must answer to that description, we may compare the statement of the civil law, *si aes pro auro veneat, non valet: aliter atque si aurum quidem fuerit, deterius autem quam emptor existimarit: tunc enim emptio valet* (r). Generally, if the article tendered agrees, in its nature, with the description, the buyer takes the risk as to its quality; and in this respect there appears to be no difference between a sale of victuals and a sale of any other commodity (s). There can be no implied warranty as to quality, unless the case falls within one of the classes of cases next to be mentioned.

Sale, by description, of goods dealt in by seller.

2. Where goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in goods of that description, whether he be the manufacturer or not, there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of merchantable quality (t). If, however, the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied condition as regards defects which such examination ought to have revealed (t).

Sale by sample.

3. In the case of a contract for sale by sample there are three implied conditions (u): 1, that the bulk shall correspond with the sample in quality (x); 2, that the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample (y); and 3, that the goods shall be free from any defect rendering them unmerchantable, which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of the bulk (z).

Purchase for particular purpose, known to seller.

4. Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods are required, so as to show that he relies on the seller's skill or judgment, and the goods are of a description

(r) Cited L. R. 2 Q. B. 588.

(s) *Burnby v. Bollett*, 16 M. & W. 644; *Emmerton v. Mathews*, 7 H. & N. 586; *Smith v. Baker*, 40 L. T. 261; *Ward v. Hobbs*, 4 App. Cas. 13; 48 L. J. Q. B. 281.

(t) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 14 (2); *Wren v. Holt*, [1903] 1 K. B. 610; 72 L. J. K. B. 340 (beer sold in a

tied house).

(u) Id. s. 15 (2).

(x) See *Wells v. Hopkins*, 5 M. & W. 7.

(y) See *Lorymer v. Smith*, 1 B. & C. 1.

(z) See *Drummond v. Van Ingen*, 12 App. Cas. 284; 56 L. J. Q. B. 563.

which it is in the course of the seller's business to supply, whether he be the manufacturer or not, then there is an implied condition that the goods shall be reasonably fit for that purpose (*a*). Where, however, a contract is made for the sale of a specified article under its patent or other trade name, there is no implied condition as to its fitness for any particular purpose (*b*).

5. An implied warranty or condition as to quality or fitness for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade (*c*).

Usage of
trade.

6. An implied warranty or condition may be annexed by the provisions of a statute (*d*). For instance, on the sale of a chain cable there is, usually, an implied warranty that it has been duly tested and proved (*e*).

Act of
Parliament.

In passing now from implied to express warranties, we may notice that, as a general rule, an express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty or condition implied by law, unless inconsistent therewith (*f*).

With regard to express warranties, the general rule is that every affirmation made at the time of sale is a warranty, provided it appears, on the evidence, to have been so intended, the question whether or not it was so intended being one of fact for the jury; and no special form of words is required to constitute a warranty, for if the seller assumes to assert a *fact* of which the buyer is ignorant, he will generally be taken to have intended a warranty; but it is otherwise, if he merely gives an opinion on a matter of which he has no especial knowledge, and on which the buyer

Express
warranties.

(*a*) Id. s. 14 (1). See, for instance, *Brown v. Edgington*, 2 M. & Gr. 279; *Randall v. Newson*, 2 Q. B. D. 102; *Frost v. Aylesbury Dairy Co.*, [1905] 1 K. B. 608; 76 L. J. K. B. 386.

(*b*) Id. s. 14 (1). See, for instance, *Chanter v. Hopkins*, 4 M. & W. 399.

(*c*) Id. s. 14 (3). See *Jones v.*

Bowden, 4 Taunt. 847; 14 R. R. 683.

(*d*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 14.

(*e*) 62 & 63 Vict. c. 23, s. 2.

(*f*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 14 (4); *Bigge v. Parkinson*, 7 H. & N. 955. Cf. the maxim, *expressis unius, &c.*, ante, p. 504.

may be expected also to have an opinion and to exercise his judgment (*g*).

Visible
defects.

It is, indeed, laid down by the older authorities that “defects, apparent at the time of a bargain, are not included in a warranty, however general, because they can form no subject of deceit or fraud; and, originally, the mode of proceeding for breach of warranty was by an action of deceit, grounded on a supposed fraud; and it may be presumed that there can be no deceit where a defect is so manifest that both parties discuss it at the time of the bargain. A party, therefore, who should buy a horse, *knowing* it to be blind in both eyes, could not sue on a general warranty of soundness” (*h*). The maxim, *caveat emptor*, seems, therefore, to apply, as a rule, in cases where the seller affirms that the subject-matter of the sale has not a defect, which is a visible defect and obvious to the senses; *ea quæ commendandi causâ in venditionibus dicuntur, si palam appareant, renditorem non obligant* (*i*); in the absence of an express agreement to the contrary, a general warranty does not usually extend to defects apparent on simple inspection, requiring no skill to discover them, nor to defects known to the buyer (*k*). However, if without such knowledge on the part of the buyer, a horse is warranted sound, which, in reality, wants the sight of an eye, though this might be thought to be the object of one’s senses, yet, as the discernment of such a defect is frequently matter of skill, it has been held, that an action lies to recover damages for the imposition (*l*). “The defect,” as Lord Campbell said (*m*), “was not one of which the purchaser with express warranty was

(*g*) *Per* Buller, J., *Pasley v. Freeman*, 3 T. R. 51, 57: 1 R. R. 634; *Power v. Barham*, 4 A. & E. 473; *Carter v. Crick*, 4 H. & N. 412; *Stucley v. Baily*, H. & C. 405.

(*h*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., *Margetson v. Wright*, 7 Bing. 605. See *Liddard v. Kain*, 2 Bing. 183: 27 R. R. 582;

Holliday v. Morgan, 1 E. & E. 1.

(*i*) D. 18, 1, 43, pr.

(*k*) See Benj., *Sales*, 4th ed., p. 613.

(*l*) *Butterfields v. Burroughs*, 1 Salk. 211; *Holliday v. Morgan*, 1 E. & E. 1.

(*m*) 1 E. & E. 4.

bound to take notice; he might naturally exercise less vigilance than he would exercise where he had not a warranty to rely on."

It is to be remarked that an express warranty will not necessarily result from a simple commendation of the quality of goods by the seller; for in this case the rule of the civil law, *simplex commendatio non obligat* (n), has been adopted by our own, and such *simplex commendatio* will, in most cases, be regarded merely as an invitation to custom, since every seller will naturally affirm that his own wares are good (o), unless it appear on the evidence, or from the words used, that the affirmation at the time of sale was intended to be a warranty, or that such must be its necessary meaning (p): it is, therefore, laid down, that in a purchase without warranty, a man's eyes, tastes, and senses must be his protection (q); and that where the subject of the affirmation is mere matter of opinion (r), and the buyer may himself institute inquiries into the truth of the assertion, the affirmation must be considered a "nude assertion," and it is the buyer's fault from his own *laches* that he is deceived (s). Either party may, therefore, be innocently

Simple commendation.

(n) D. 4, 3, 37; *per* Byles, J., 17 C. B. N. S. 597.

(o) See, *per* Sir J. Mansfield, *Vernon v. Keyes*, 4 Taunt. 488, 493: 11 R. R. 499; Arg., *West v. Jackson*, 16 Q. B. 282, 288; *Chandelor v. Lopus*, Cro. Jac. 4. Where A. bought a waggon at sight of B., which B. affirmed to be worth much more than its real value: it was held that no action would lie against B. for the false affirmation, there being no express warranty nor any evidence of fraud: *Davis v. Meeker*, 5 Johns. (U.S.), R. 354.

(p) *Per* Buller, J., 3 T. R. 57; *Allan v. Lake*, 18 Q. B. 560; *Jones v. Clark*, 27 L. J. Ex. 165; *Vernede v. Weber*, 1 H. & N. 311; *Simond v. Braddon*, 2 C. B. N. S. 321;

Shepherd v. Kain, 5 B. & Ald. 240; 24 R. R. 344; *Freeman v. Baker*, 5 B. & Ad. 797: 39 R. R. 651; *Budd v. Fairmaner*, 8 Bing. 52: 34 R. R. 619; *Coverley v. Burrell*, 5 B. & Ald. 257: 24 R. R. 350.

(q) *Fitz.*, Nat. Brev. 94; 1 Roll. Abr. 96.

(r) See *Power v. Barham*, 4 A. & E. 473; *Jendwine v. Slade*, 2 Esp. N. P. C. 572.

(s) *Per* Grose, J., 3 T. R. 54, 55; *Bayley v. Merrel*, Cro. Jac. 386: 3 Bulstr. 94; cited and distinguished in *Brass v. Maitland*, 6 E. & B. 470; *Risney v. Selby*, 1 Salk. 211: 2 Ld. Raym. 1118; recognised in *Dobell v. Stevens*, 3 B. & C. 625: 27 R. R. 441; *per* Tindal, C.J., *Shrewsbury v. Blount*, 2 Scott, N. R. 594.

silent as to grounds open to both to exercise their judgment upon; and in this case, *aliud est celare, aliud tacere* (t): silence is not equivalent to concealment (u).

Fraud.

It may be recollected that our proposition was that a buyer of goods has no remedy against the seller for any defects not covered by some condition or warranty, in the absence of fraud. We have already, in noticing the maxim as to *dolus malus* (x), observed generally upon the effect of fraud in vitiating transactions, and the remarks then made apply with peculiar force to the contract of sale.

Remedies for fraud.

There are two courses, either of which is usually open to a buyer who has been induced to buy goods by the seller's fraud (y). He may either abide by the contract, and bring an action, usually called an action of deceit, for the damage sustained by the fraud: or he may rescind the contract, returning the goods, if already accepted, and recovering the price, if already paid, by action after demand and refusal; but he cannot pursue the latter course after his own act has put it out of his power to restore the parties to their original condition (z)—“you cannot both eat your cake, and return your cake” (a). And a contract induced by fraud is not void, but only voidable at the election of the party defrauded (b). When once he has elected to abide by the contract, being aware

As to the rule in equity, where specific performance or rescission is sought, see *Price v. Macaulay*, 2 De G. M. & G. 339, 346; *Redgrave v. Hurd*, 20 Ch. D. 1, 13.

(t) Cicero, de Officiis, l. 3, c. 12, 13.

(u) Per Ld. Mansfield, *Carter v. Boehm*, 3 Burr. 1910; per Best, C.J., 3 Bing. 77. See *Laidlaw v. Organ*, 2 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 178; Arg., 9 Id. 631, 632; per Abbott, C.J., *Bowring v. Stevens*, 2 C. & P. 341.

As to what will constitute fraudulent concealment in the view of a Court of equity, see *Central R. Co. of Venezuela v. Kisch*, L. R. 2 H. L.

99. By such a Court the maxim, *qui vult decipi decipiatur*, is recognised; see *Reynell v. Sprye*, 1 De G. M. & G. 697, 710.

(x) *Ante*, p. 569.

(y) As to remedies for a breach of warranty in the sale of goods, see 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 53.

(z) *Clarke v. Dickson*, E. B. & E. 148: 27 L. J. Q. B. 228; *Urguhart v. Macpherson*, 3 App. Cas. 831, 838.

(a) Per Crompton, J., E. B. & E. 152.

(b) *Clough v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 7 Ex. 26, 34.

of the fraud, he cannot afterwards rescind it—*quod semel placuit in electionibus amplius displicere non potest* (c); and in this, as in all cases of election, the election, if it be to rescind, must be made within a reasonable time, that is to say, within a reasonable time after the discovery of the fraud (d).

To establish his right to rescind a contract on the ground of fraud, or to recover damages on that ground, the buyer must be prepared to prove affirmatively the following matters: 1, that the seller made a false representation of fact; 2, that in making it he was guilty of fraud; 3, that he made the fraudulent misrepresentation with the intention that the buyer should act upon it; 4, that the buyer believed it to be true; and 5, that he was thereby induced to enter into the contract. In an action of deceit, the buyer must also prove that he has suffered damage arising out of the fraud, for fraud without damage or damage without fraud is insufficient—these two must concur, to give this cause of action (e).

Upon the first of these matters which the buyer must prove, it should be noticed that a seller who knows of defects in his goods is under no legal obligation to disclose them to a buyer who is ignorant of them (f), and an action cannot be maintained against a person for an alleged deceit, “charging merely his concealment of a material fact which he was morally, but not legally, bound to disclose” (g). The seller may know that the buyer believes the goods to be different in quality from what they really are, but if that belief has not been induced by the act of the seller, he is not chargeable with misrepresentation

What is a misrepresentation.

(c) Co. Litt. 146 a; *per* Ld. Blackburn, *Scarf v. Jardine*, 7 App. 345, 360: 51 L. J. Q. B. 612.

(d) *Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd*, L. R. 5 P. C. 221.

(e) *Per* Croke, J., 3 Bulst. 95; see *Pasley v. Freeman*, 2 Sm. L.

C., 11th ed. 66, and the notes thereto.

(f) *Keates v. Earl of Cadogan*, 10 C. B. 591.

(g) *Per* Ld. Chelmsford, *Peek v. Gurney*, L. R. 6 H. L. 377, 390.

merely because he is silent (*h*). A seller, however, is, no doubt, guilty of a misrepresentation, if he does not merely keep silent, but in some way actively fosters a mistaken belief which he knows that the buyer entertains. Although simply reticence may not amount to fraud in law, however it might be viewed by moralists, yet a mere nod or shake of the head by the seller, with the intention of inducing the buyer to believe in the existence of a non-existing fact, must be treated as a misrepresentation (*i*); and with regard to misrepresentations it is clear that silence is an equivalent when the withholding of that which is not stated makes that which is stated absolutely false (*k*). Half a truth may amount to a real falsehood (*l*), and fraud may thus consist as well in the suppression of what is true, as in the representation of what is false (*m*). Again, a number of statements which, when taken together, necessarily give a false impression, are none the less false because it may be difficult to point out that any particular statement is untrue (*n*).

What is
fraud.

With regard to the proof of fraud, fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made, (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. The third case is probably but an instance of the second, for one who makes a statement under such circumstances can have no real belief in the truth of what he states; and to prevent a false statement from being fraudulent there must always be an honest belief in its truth. If fraud be proved

(*h*) *Smith v. Hughes*, L. R. 6 Q. B. 597; *Ward v. Hobbs*, 4 App. Cas. 13: 48 L. J. Q. B. 28; *Turner v. Green*, [1895] 2 Ch. 205: 64 L. J. Ch. 539.

(*i*) See *per* Ld. Campbell, *Walters v. Morgan*, 3 D. F. & J. 723; cited, [1895] 2 Ch. 209.

(*k*) See *per* Ld. Cairns, *Peck v.*

Gurney, L. R. 6 H. L. 377, 403.

(*l*) See S. C., p. 392, *per* Ld. Chelmsford; *Gluckstein v. Barnes*, [1900] A. C. 251, *per* Ld. Macnaghten.

(*m*) *Per* Chambre, J., *Tapp v. Lee*, 3 B. & P. 371.

(*n*) See *per* Ld. Halsbury, *Aaron's Reef v. Twiss*, [1896] A. C. 273, 281: 65 L. J. P. C. 54.

the motive of the person guilty of it is immaterial(*o*). The absence of reasonable grounds for making a statement does not make the statement fraudulent, if honestly believed in; and it is only material so far as it throws light on the question whether there was an honest belief in the statement(*p*). False representations, made without knowledge that they are false, are not rendered fraudulent by stupidity or carelessness, however gross; there must be some indifference to the truth amounting to dishonesty(*q*). The expression "legal fraud," which is said to have owed its origin to Lord Kenyon, is misleading. Fraud has the same meaning when used in Courts of law as in ordinary parlance, and always implies moral turpitude.

It is generally said that the misrepresentation to be proved must be one of fact(*r*); and this is so far correct that the expression of mere general hopes or expectations as to the benefits which may follow from making the contract is insufficient(*s*). The maxim *simplex commendatio non nocet*, to which we have already referred(*t*), is then applicable. But expressions of opinion, whether as to the past or the future, may, and often do, involve statements of existing facts, for which a person will be held responsible(*u*); and so may expressions of opinion upon matters which, in one aspect, are matters of law(*x*).

The intention with which a fraudulent misrepresentation is made is generally a matter of inference. The law, however, as a rule, imputes to a man an intention to

Fraudulent
intent.

(*o*) *Per* Ld. Herschell, in *Derry v. Peek*, 14 App. Cas. 337, 374: 58 L. J. Ch. 864, after an exhaustive review of the previous authorities.

(*p*) S. C., 14 App. Cas. 369, *per* Ld. Herschell.

(*q*) *Angus v. Clifford*, [1891] 2 Ch. 449: 60 L. J. Ch. 443.

(*r*) See, for instance, *per* Ld. Cairns, L. R. 6 H. L. 409.

(*s*) *Bellairs v. Tucker*, 13 Q. B. D. 562, 575.

(*t*) *Ante*, p. 617.

(*u*) *Edgington v. Fitzmaurice*, 29 Ch. D. 459: 55 L. J. Ch. 650; see *per* Bowen, L.J., *Smith v. Land Corporation*, 28 Ch. D. 7, 15; *per* Lindley, L.J., *Karberg's case*, [1892] 3 Ch. 1, 11: 61 L. J. Ch. 741.

(*x*) *West London Bank v. Kitson*, 13 Q. B. D. 360: 53 L. J. Q. B. 345.

produce those consequences which are the natural result of his acts, and if a man knowingly uses language which in its natural sense conveys a wrong impression, he can scarcely be heard to say that he did not intend to deceive (*y*). To prove, in an action of deceit, that he intended to deceive the plaintiff, it is not necessary to show that his misrepresentation was made to the plaintiff direct; it is enough that it was made to a third person with the direct intent that it should be communicated to the plaintiff, or to a class of persons of which the plaintiff was one, and should be acted upon by the plaintiff in the manner in which he in fact acted upon it (*z*). Fraud, it has been said, is infinite in variety; but it is the fraud, and not the manner of it, which calls for the intervention of the Courts (*a*).

The deceit.

It is not sufficient for a buyer to prove that the seller intended to defraud him; he must also prove that the fraud "was an inducing cause to the contract; for which purpose it must be material, and it must have produced in his mind an erroneous belief, influencing his conduct" (*b*). Accordingly, where an action of deceit was brought upon a statement in a prospectus, and that statement was ambiguous, being true or false according as one or other of two possible meanings was attached to it, it was held that it was essential to the plaintiff's case that he should prove that he had interpreted the statement in the sense in which it was false, and had in fact been deceived by it (*c*).

It may be observed that, when an action is brought upon a fraudulent prospectus, it is an old expedient, and seldom successful, to cross-examine the plaintiff, and ask him as to each particular statement in the prospectus what influence

(*y*) 9 App. Cas. 190: 41 Ch. D. 372. A document must be read, as against its author, in the sense it was intended to convey; [1900] A. C. 250.

(*z*) See *Swift v. Winterbotham*, L. R. 8 Q. B. 244, 253 (S. C., 9 Id. 301); *Peck v. Gurney*, L. R. 6 H. L.

377; *Andrews v. Mockford*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 372: 65 L. J. Q. B. 302.

(*a*) *Per* Ld. Macnaghten, [1895] A. C. 221.

(*b*) *Per* Ld. Selborne, 9 App. Cas. 190.

(*c*) *Smith v. Chadwick*, 9 App. Cas. 187: 51 L. J. Ch. 597.

it had upon his mind, and how far it determined him to enter into the contract. This is quite fallacious. * A person reading a prospectus generally looks at it as a whole, and on the whole forms his conclusion. You cannot weigh the elements by ounces (*d*).

The second question which we proposed shortly to consider relates to the risks run by a buyer of goods with regard to the title thereto. Before the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (*e*), it was, at any rate at one time, a great question under what circumstances could any undertaking by the seller as to his title to sell be implied. But the discussion of this question has been much limited by the rule laid down in that Act. The rule which now obtains is that, in a contract of sale of goods, unless the circumstances of the contract are such as to show a different intention, there is an implied condition on the seller's part that, in the case of a sale, he has a right to sell, and that, in the case of an agreement to sell, he will have that right at the time when the property is to pass (*f*). Moreover, in the absence of circumstances showing a contrary intention, there is an implied warranty that the buyer shall enjoy quiet possession of the goods (*g*), and that the goods shall be free from any encumbrance in favour of a third party, not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when the contract is made (*h*).

Seller's
undertaking
as to title.

This rule limits discussion mainly to the point whether in a particular case an intention was shown that the buyer should take risks as to title; and its effect is that a person who buys goods in the ordinary way across the counter in a shop usually has a remedy against the seller, if the goods be subsequently claimed of right by some other person.

(*d*) *Per* Ld. Halsbury, *Arnison v. Smith*, 41 Ch. D. 348, 369: 58 L. J. Ch. 335.

(*e*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71.

(*f*) Id. s. 12 (1); which states the law in accordance with the opinion

of Mr. Benjamin, founded on the decision in *Eichholz v. Bannister*, 17 C. B. N. S. 708: 34 L. J. C. P. 105; see Benj. on Sale, 4th ed. 634.

(*g*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 12 (2).

(*h*) Id. s. 12 (3).

It must be remembered, however, that the above implied conditions and warranties may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by usage binding upon both (*i*).

If goods be sold by a person who is not the owner, and the owner be found and be paid for the goods, then, as a general rule, the person who sold them under pretended authority has no right to call upon the buyer to pay him also (*k*). For example, though an auctioneer, inasmuch as he has a lien on the purchase-money, may bring an action in his own name against the buyer for the price of goods sold, and the defendant has no right to plead payment to the auctioneer's employer, yet if the employer was not the true owner of the goods, the defendant may plead payment to or a claim by the true owner (*l*).

General rule
as to transfer
of title.

Although the buyer of goods bought from a seller who had no title to sell them may have remedies against the seller, yet, as a rule, the sale gives him no title to the goods as against the owner, and, as between the buyer and the owner, the maxim *caveat emptor* applies. For the general principle is that where goods are sold by a person who is not the owner, and who does not sell under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had (*m*): *nemo dat quod non habet* (*n*): *nemo plus juris ad alium transferre potest quam ipse habet* (*o*). To this well-established principle, which applies to choses in action as well as to goods there are, nevertheless, certain exceptions which, or some of which, will be briefly mentioned.

(*i*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 55.

(*k*) *Allen v. Hopkins*, 13 M. & W. 102. See *Walker v. Mellor*, 11 Q. B. 478.

(*l*) *Robinson v. Rutter*, 4 E. & B. 954; *Dickenson v. Naul*, 4 B. & Ad. 638; see also *Grice v. Kenrick*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 340; 39 L. J. Q. B. 175.

(*m*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 21 (1).

(*n*) *Per Littledale, J.*, 5 B. & Ad. 339; *per Willes, J.*, 14 C. B. N. S. 257.

(*o*) D. 50, 17, 54; Wing. Max., p. 56; 2 Pothier, Oblig. 263; see *per Parke, B.*, 6 Exch. 872.

1. The first exception occurs in cases where the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded or estopped from denying the seller's authority to sell (*p*). Mere carelessness where there is no duty to be careful creates no estoppel; for instance, a person who does not lock up his goods, which are consequently stolen, may be said to be negligent towards himself, but, since he neglects no duty which the law casts upon him, he is not estopped from denying the title of persons who may have, however innocently, bought the goods from the thief (*q*). But the case is otherwise, where the owner by his words or conduct caused the buyer to believe that the seller was the owner of the goods or had the owner's authority to sell them, and induced him to buy them in that belief, for then he cannot afterwards set up the seller's want of title or authority to sell (*r*).

Exceptions.
1. Title by estoppel.

2. A second exception arises in cases which are governed by the Factors Act, 1889 (*s*), or any enactment enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he were the true owner (*t*). Under the Factors Act, where a mercantile agent is, with the owner's consent, in possession of goods or the documents of title to goods, a sale of the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent, is as valid as if he were expressly authorised by the owner to make it, provided that the buyer acts in good faith and has not at the time of the sale notice that the agent has not authority to make it (*u*). The owner's consent to the possession must be

2. Title under Factors Act.

Sale by mercantile agent.

(*p*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 21 (1).

(*q*) *Per* Blackburn, J., *Swan v. N. Brit. Australian Co.*, 2 H. & C. 175, 181; cf. *per* Ld. Halsbury. *Scholfield v. Londesborough*, [1896] A. C. 514, 522: 65 L. J. Q. B. 593.

(*r*) See the general rule as to estoppels by conduct laid down by Ld. Denman in *Pickard v. Sears*, 6 A. & E. 469, 474, and expounded by

Parke, B., in *Freeman v. Cooke*, 2 Exch. 654.

(*s*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45.

(*t*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 2 (a).

(*u*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45, s. 2 (1).

"Mercantile agent" means a mercantile agent having in the customary course of his business as such agent authority to sell goods, or consign them for sale, or buy them, or

presumed in the absence of evidence to the contrary (*x*); and if it has been given, it cannot be determined as against a buyer buying without notice of the determination (*y*).

Sale by seller
or buyer in
possession
after sale.

Moreover, under the provisions of this Act (*z*), where a person, having sold goods, continues in possession of the goods, or the documents of title thereto, his delivery of the goods, or documents, under a sale or agreement for sale, to a person receiving them in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, has the same effect as if the delivery were expressly authorised by the owner (*a*). And, again, where a person, having bought or agreed to buy goods, obtains with the seller's consent possession of the goods or the documents of title thereto, his delivery of the same under a sale or agreement for sale to a person receiving them in good faith, and without notice of any right of the original seller in respect of the goods, has the same effect as if the delivery were made by a mercantile agent in possession of the goods or documents with the owner's consent (*b*).

3. Sale under
special power.

3. A third exception comprises cases in which a sale is made under a special common law or statutory power of sale, or under the order of a Court of competent jurisdiction (*c*). Sales by pawnees (*d*), sheriffs (*e*), masters of ships in case of

raise money on their security: *Id.* s. 1 (1); see *Hastings v. Pearson*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 62: 62 L. J. Q. B. 75.

(*x*) 52 & 53 Vict. c. 45, s. 2 (4).

(*y*) *Id.* s. 2 (2).

(*z*) Ss. 8 & 9; see also 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 25.

(*a*) See *Nicholson v. Harper*, [1895] 2 Ch. 415: 64 L. J. Ch. 672.

(*b*) See *ante*, p. 363. As to hire-purchase agreements, see *Lee v. Butler*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 318; *Helby v. Matthews*, [1895] A. C. 471; *Payne v. Wilson*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 653: 2 *Id.* 537; as to auctioneers, *Shenstone v. Hilton*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 452.

(*c*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 21 (2) (*b*).

As to sales by order of Court, see *R. S. C.* 1883, O. L., r. 2: *C. C. R.* 1889, O. XII., r. 2. See also 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 70.

(*d*) See *Pothonier v. Dawson, Holt*, 385: 17 R. R. 647; *Tucker v. Wilson*, 1 P. Wms. 261; *Lockwood v. Ewer*, 9 Mod. 278; *Martin v. Read*, 11 C. B. N. S. 730; *Johnston v. Stear*, 15 *Id.* 330; *Pigot v. Cubley*, *Id.* 701; *Halliday v. Holgate*, L. R. 3 Ex. 299. As to pawnbrokers, see 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93.

(*e*) *Dyer*, 363 a; *Doe v. Donston*, 1 B. & Ald. 230: 19 R. R. 300.

necessity (*f*), landlords distraining for rent (*g*), or innkeepers realising their lien (*h*), are examples of this exception.

4. A fourth exception relates to sales in market overt; for where goods are sold in market overt according to the usage of the market, the buyer acquires a good title thereto, if he buy in good faith and without notice of any defect or want of title on the part of the seller (*i*). This exception does not effect an unauthorised sale of goods belonging to the Crown (*k*); and it protects only the buyer, and not the seller, however innocent (*l*). It applies only to sales in an open, public and legally constituted market or fair (*m*); though it seems that a sale in a modern statutory market is as much protected as a sale in an ancient market held by charter or prescription (*n*). The buyer is not protected, unless the sale was according to the usage of the market. Hence, he is not protected, unless the whole transaction took place in the market (*o*); and a sale by sample in the market of goods lying outside the market-place affords him no protection (*p*). It seems that the onus of showing that the usages of the market, as to payment of toll or otherwise, were complied with lies upon the buyer (*q*).

4. Sale in market overt.

By the custom of the city of London, every shop in the city which is open to the public is market overt, between sunrise and sunset on all days, save Sundays and holidays; but only so for such goods as the shopkeeper professes

(*f*) *Kaltenbach v. Mackenzie*, 3 C. P. D. 467, 473.

(*g*) 2 W. & M., sess. 1, c. 5, s. 2; 51 & 52 Vict. c. 21.

(*h*) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 38.

(*i*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 22, which agrees with the common law: see 2 Blac. Com. 449; Pease on Markets, 120. The sale of horses is still regulated by the common law, as amended by 2 & 3 Ph. & M. c. 7, and 31 Eliz. c. 12.

(*k*) 2 Inst. 713.

(*l*) *Peer v. Humphrey*, 2 A. & E. 495.

(*m*) *Lee v. Bayes*, 18 C. B. 599.

(*n*) *Ganly v. Ledwidge*, 10 Ir. Rep. C. L. 33; but see *Moyce v. Newington*, 4 Q. B. D. 32.

(*o*) 2 Inst. 713; Roll. Abr. "Market," E; Dyer, 99 b.

(*p*) *Hill v. Smith*, 4 Taunt. 520, 532; 13 R. R. 670; *Crane v. London Dock Co.*, 5 B. & S. 313.

(*q*) *Moran v. Pitt*, 42 L. J. Q. B. 47; see *Comyns v. Boyer*, Cro. Eliz. 485,

to trade in; and the custom does not apply where the shopkeeper is buyer, and not seller (*v*).

In the case of stolen goods, the title acquired by buying in market overt is liable to be defeated. Where goods have been stolen, and the offender is prosecuted to conviction, the property in the goods reverts in the owner, notwithstanding any intermediate dealing with them, whether by sale in market overt or otherwise (*s*). None but stolen goods, however, now so revert. Goods obtained by fraud or other wrongful means not amounting to larceny, do not revert by reason only of the conviction of the offender (*t*).

Although the conviction of the thief reverts the property in stolen goods, yet until such conviction a title gained by purchase in market overt continues good. Hence the owner cannot maintain trover against the buyer if he disposed of the goods before the conviction, and it is immaterial that the buyer disposed of them with notice of the theft (*u*). The buyer, on the other hand, cannot recover from the owner the cost of keeping the goods before they reverted (*x*).

5. Transfer
of negotiable
instruments.

5. The fifth and last exception which we shall mention to the general rule, that a good title to personal property cannot be acquired from a person who has none, relates to money, bank-notes and negotiable instruments. In a leading case on this subject, it was decided that the property in a bank-note, like that in cash, passes by delivery, and that a party taking it in good faith and for value, as money, is entitled to retain it as against a former owner from whom it was stolen (*y*). And it is well-established law that a

(*r*) *Hargreave v. Spink*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 25 : 61 L. J. Q. B. 318; *Lyons v. De Pass*, 11 A. & E. 326; see 5 Rep. 83 b; Cro. Eliz. 454; Moore, 360; Cro. Jac. 68; 12 Mod. 521; 2 Camp. 335.

(*s*) 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 24 (1). This section applies to horses, as well as other goods.

(*t*) Id. s. 24 (2), amending 24 & 25

Vict. c. 96, s. 100, as construed in *Beniley v. Vilmont*, 12 App. Cas. 471.

(*u*) *Horwood v. Smith*, 2 T. R. 750 : 1 R. R. 613.

(*x*) *Walker v. Matthews*, 8 Q. B. D. 109 : 51 L. J. Q. B. 243.

(*y*) *Miller v. Race*, 1 Burr. 452. The reader is referred, for some further information on the subject

person who takes a negotiable instrument in good faith and for value, obtains a valid title, although he takes from one who had none (z). It must be noticed, however, that if the signature of any person is necessary to render any instrument negotiable, it does not become negotiable by the forgery of his signature; and the general rule is that no title can be obtained through a forgery (a). Moreover, if a person is induced by fraud to sign a negotiable instrument under the belief that he is signing an entirely different instrument, his signature is a nullity, provided that in so signing he acted without negligence (b).

A negotiable instrument is taken in good faith when it is taken honestly, whether it be taken negligently or not (c). A person who takes such an instrument for value, honestly believing that the person from whom he takes it has a right to dispose of it, acquires a good title to it; and his knowledge that the person disposing of it is only an agent does not compel him to inquire into the extent of such agent's authority (d). But, although carelessness or foolishness in not suspecting that there is something wrong in the transaction is not dishonesty, yet it is dishonesty, and not good faith, to take a negotiable instrument, suspecting that there is something wrong, and carefully refraining from further inquiry, lest such suspicion of *mala fides* may be converted into knowledge (e).

Meaning of
good faith.

of negotiable instruments, to the note appended to this case, 1 Sm. L. C., 10th ed. 447.

(z) *Gorgier v. Mieville*, 3 B. & C. 45: 27 R. R. 290; *London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons*, [1892] A. C. 201: 62 L. J. Ch. 427. As to bills of exchange, promissory notes, and cheques, see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, ss. 29, 38.

(a) *Johnson v. Windle*, 3 Bing. N. C. 225, 229; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 24.

(b) *Foster v. Mackinnon*, L. R. 4

C. P. 704; *Lewis v. Clay*, 67 L. J. Q. B. 224.

(c) See 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 90.

(d) *London J. S. Bank v. Simmons*, *supra*. As to acceptances and indorsements *per pro*, see *Bryant v. Banque du Peuple*, [1893] A. C. 170: 62 L. J. P. C. 68; 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 25.

(e) *Id.*; *Raphael v. Bank of England*, 17 C. B. 161; *Jones v. Gordon*, 2 App. Cas. 616; see *Tatam v. Haslar*, 23 Q. B. D. 345: 58 L. J. Q. B. 432.

Holder for
value.

Value is given for a negotiable instrument if it is accepted in accord and satisfaction of a liability. The manager of a bank stole therefrom certain negotiable bonds, and the plaintiffs became the holders for value without notice of any fraud. Afterwards the bank manager, by a fraud upon the plaintiffs, obtained from them some of the bonds, and also others similar to, though not the same as, the remainder of the stolen bonds. All the bonds, so obtained by him, were placed in the possession of the bankers, were shown to the bank's auditors, and treated as the bank's securities, before the theft had been discovered. In an action brought by the plaintiffs against the bankers to recover the bonds, it was held that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption was that the bankers had accepted the bonds in discharge of their manager's civil obligation to make restitution in respect of his theft, and that they were entitled to retain the bonds, as *bonâ fide* holders for value (*f*).

Money.

With regard to money we may here notice the following case (*g*). A thief stole a five-pound gold piece which was current coin of the realm, and in exchange for it a dealer in curiosities gave him five sovereigns; upon the subsequent conviction of the thief, the convicting justices made an order, under the Larceny Act, 1861 (*h*), for the restitution of the coin by the dealer to the original owner; and this order was upheld by a Divisional Court. The Court was of opinion that the coin would not have reverted upon the conviction, if it had passed, as current money, to a person innocently taking it in discharge of a debt, but that the order was good in the particular case on the ground that the coin was passed to the dealer, not in its character as coin of currency, but as the subject of a sale as an article of

(*f*) *London & County Bank v. London & R. P. Bank*, 21 Q. B. D. 535 : 57 L. J. Q. B. 601. See *Nash v. De Freville*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 72.

(*g*) *Moss v. Hancock*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 111 : 68 L. J. Q. B. 657. Cf. *Clarke v. Shee*, 1 Cowp. 197.
(*h*) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100.

virtu. With deference, this ground of decision (*i*) does not seem wholly satisfactory; it is, at any rate, not easy to see how the nature of the transaction can be made to depend upon what the person who takes the coin intends to do with it when the transaction has been completed.

Another rather peculiar case may here be mentioned, which is not only illustrative of the general legal doctrines regulating the rights of buyers, but likewise of another principle (*k*), which we have already considered in connection with criminal law; viz., where a man buys a chattel which, unknown to himself and to the seller, contains valuable property (*l*). A person bought, at a public auction, a bureau, in a secret drawer of which he afterwards discovered money, which he appropriated to his own use. At the time of the sale, no person knew that the bureau contained anything whatever. The Court held (*m*) that, although there was a delivery of the bureau, and a lawful property in it thereby vested in the buyer, yet that there was no delivery so as to give him a lawful possession of the money, for the seller had no intention to deliver it, nor the buyer to receive it; both were ignorant of its existence; and when the buyer discovered that there was a secret drawer containing the money, it was a simple case of finding, to which the law applicable to all cases of finding applied. It was further observed, that the old rule (*n*), that "if one lose his goods and another find them, though he convert them, *animo furandi*, to his own use, it is no

(*i*) Channell, J., drew the inference that the coin was not taken *bonâ fide*. The onus of proving that it was so taken probably lay on the dealer; see the rule as to bills of exchange, *per* Parke, B., *Bailey v. Bidwell*, 13 M. & W. 76; *Tatam v. Haslar*, 23 Q. B. D. 345. It was stated that the coin in question "had never been in circulation;" but the meaning of this phrase does

not seem to have been adequately discussed.

(*k*) *Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea*; see *ante*, p. 256.

(*l*) Cf. *Elwes v. Brigg Gas Co.*, 33 Ch. D. 563, where, after land had been demised, a prehistoric boat was found buried in the land.

(*m*) *Merry v. Green*, 7 M. & W. 623.

(*n*) 3 Inst. 108.

larceny," has undergone, in more recent times, some limitations (o). One is, that, if the finder knows who the owner of the lost chattel is, or if, from any mark upon it, or the circumstances under which it is found, the owner could be reasonably ascertained, then the taking of the chattel, with a guilty intent, and the subsequent fraudulent conversion to the taker's own use, constitutes a larceny. To this class of decisions the case under consideration was held to belong, *unless* the buyer had reason to believe that he bought the contents of the bureau, if any, and consequently had a *colourable* right to the money.

In the preceding remarks upon the maxim *caveat emptor*, we have confined our attention to those classes of cases to which alone it appears to be *strictly* applicable, and in connection with which reference to it is, in practice, most frequently made. To consider all the applications of the maxim which is invoked so frequently in discussions relating to the rights and duties of a purchaser would not have been possible within the limit of this treatise.

QUICQUID SOLVITUR, SOLVITUR SECUNDUM MODUM SOLVENTIS
—QUICQUID RECIPITUR, RECIPITUR SECUNDUM MODUM
RECIPIENTIS. (*Halk. M.*, p. 149.)—*Money paid is to be
applied according to the intention of the party paying it ;
and money received, according to that of the recipient.*

The question upon what terms was money paid and received often resolves itself into one merely of fact, or of inference to be drawn by a jury from the facts. For instance, where the dispute is whether money offered in satisfaction of a claim was so taken, it is a question of fact whether the payee agreed to take it in satisfaction or took it merely on account of his claim, and an inference may be

(o) See Pollock & Wright, *Possession*, p. 180 ; *Reg. v. Flowers*, 16 Q. B. D. 643.

drawn in his favour from what he said when he took the money (*p*), or against him from his taking it in silence and without objection (*q*). Again, where money is both paid and received as rent under a lease, a mere protest that it is accepted conditionally and without prejudice to the right to insist upon a prior forfeiture cannot countervail the fact of such receipt (*r*), but still it is a question of fact whether the money was received as rent (*s*).

With these observations, we pass to consider briefly the maxim before us, which is frequently cited in cases where, a debtor having made a payment on account to a creditor to whom he owes several distinct debts, the question arises, from which one or more of the debts does the payment operate as a total or partial discharge (*t*).

Appropriation of payments.

The general rule of our law upon this subject is that "the debtor may, in the first instance, appropriate the payment: *solvitur in modum solventis*; if he omit to do so, the creditor may make the appropriation: *recipitur in modum recipientis*; but if neither make any appropriation, the law appropriates the payment to the earlier debt" (*u*).

General rule.

The debtor may appropriate the payment, in the first instance, that is, at the time when he makes the payment, but not afterwards (*x*). It was long ago established that a debtor who owes distinct debts to one creditor may, as a rule, discharge first whichever he prefers (*y*). A tender of part of one entire debt is bad (*z*): the creditor may stand on his rights and refuse it; but if he accept the money as offered, the debt is discharged to the extent of the payment.

Appropriation by debtor.

(*p*) *Day v. McLea*, 22 Q. B. D. 610: 58 L. J. Q. B. 293.

(*q*) *Kitchin v. Hawkins*, L. R. 2 C. P. 22; see *Webb v. Weatherby*, 1 Bing. N. C. 505.

(*r*) *Davenport v. The Queen*, 3 App. Cas. 115, 132: 47 L. J. C. P. 8.

(*s*) See *per* *Ld. Wensleydale*, *Croft v. Lumley*, 6 H. L. Cas. 672, 744; S. C., 5 E. & B. 648, 682.

(*t*) For further information upon the maxim, see the learned article by *Ld. Lindley* in the *Law Mag.* for Aug., 1855, p. 21.

(*u*) *Per* *Tindal, C.J.*, *Mills v. Fowkes*, 5 Bing. N. C. 461.

(*x*) *The Mecca*, [1897] A. C. 286, 293: 66 L. J. P. 86.

(*y*) *Anon.*, *Cro. Eliz.*, 68.

(*z*) *Dixon v. Clark*, 5 C. B. 365.

An appropriation by the debtor at the time of payment need not be express: it may be inferred from the circumstances of the transaction (*a*). For instance, where a security for a particular debt is sold and the proceeds paid to the creditor, they are, *prima facie*, applied in discharge of that debt (*b*). There is a presumption, until the contrary appear, that a man pays his own money on account of what he alone, and not another, owes, and that he pays on account of what he owes to the payee alone, and not of what he owes to the payee and others (*c*).

Appropriation
by creditor.

If the debtor does not make any appropriation at the time when he makes the payment, the right of application devolves on the creditor (*d*), and this right then continues "up to the very last moment:" that is, until he communicates an appropriation to the debtor, for his election, whilst not so communicated, remains incomplete (*e*): or until he brings an action (*f*), or the case comes before a jury (*g*). "He is not bound to declare his election in express terms; he may declare it by bringing an action, or in any other way that makes his meaning and intention plain. Where the election is with the creditor, it is always his intention expressed, implied, or presumed, and not any rigid rule of law, that governs the application of the money" (*h*).

A creditor, having the right to appropriate, may elect between an earlier and a later debt (*i*), between a specialty and a simple contract debt (*i*), between a debt which is guaranteed and one which is not (*j*), between a debt which

(*a*) *Peters v. Anderson*, 5 Taunt. 596: 15 R. R. 592; *Newmarch v. Clay*, 14 East, 244; *Thompson v. Hudson*, L. R. 7 Ch. 320.

(*b*) *Brett v. Marsh*, 1 Vern. 468.

(*c*) *Nottidge v. Prichard*, 2 Cl. & F. 393: 32 R. R. 187; *Burland v. Nash*, 2 F. & F. 687.

(*d*) *The Mecca*, [1897] A. C. 286.

(*e*) *Simson v. Ingham*, 2 B. & C. 65, 74: 26 R. R. 273.

(*f*) *Miles v. Fowkes*, 5 Bing. N. C. 462.

(*g*) *Per Taunton, J., Philpott v. Jones*, 2 A. & E. 41, 44: see [1897] 2 Ch. 437.

(*h*) *Per Ld. Macnaghten*, [1897] A. C. 294.

(*i*) *Peters v. Anderson*, 5 Taunt. 596: 15 R. R. 592.

(*j*) *Kirby v. Duke of Marlborough*, 2 M. & S. 18: 14 R. R. 573;

bears interest and one which bears none (*k*), between a purely equitable and a legal debt (*l*), between a debt incurred through marriage and a debt personally contracted (*m*) between a debt which is founded and one which is not founded on an illegal consideration (*n*). He may appropriate the payment to a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations, but his appropriation to part of a debt so barred does not revive the debt so as to entitle him to sue for the balance; the debt, if revived, is revived, not by the creditor's appropriation, but by the payment being made under circumstances evidencing a promise by the debtor to pay the whole of that debt (*o*).

A creditor, however, has no right to appropriate a payment to a debt which arises after, or the amount of which is not ascertained until after, the time of the payment (*p*); and it has been laid down generally that "there must be two debts: the doctrine never has been held to authorise a creditor, receiving money on account, to apply it towards satisfaction of what does not, nor ever did, constitute any legal or equitable demand against the party making the payments" (*q*). The law will not appropriate a payment to a demand which it prohibits as illegal (*r*). Moreover, the creditor's right of appropriation does not extend to all moneys of the debtor which come to the creditor's hands; if he receive money to his debtor's use without the debtor's

Williams v. Rawlinson, 3 Bing. 71: 28 R. R. 584; *Re Sherry*, 25 Ch. D. 704.

(*k*) *Chase v. Cox*, Freem. 261; *Manning v. Westerne*, 2 Vern. 606.

(*l*) *Bosanquet v. Wray*, 6 Taunt. 597: 16 R. R. 677.

(*m*) *Goddard v. Cox*, 2 Str. 1194; see 45 & 46 Vict. c. 75, s. 14.

(*n*) See *Friend v. Young*, [1897] 2 Ch. 421; 66 L. J. Ch. 737, and cases there collected. See also *Smith v. Betty*, [1903] 2 K. B. 317:

72 L. J. K. B. 853 (where the creditor in special circumstances had lost the right to appropriate).

(*o*) *Seymour v. Pickett*, [1905] 1 K. B. 715: 74 L. J. K. B. 413.

(*p*) *Hammersley v. Knowllys*, 2 Esp. 666: 5 R. R. 764; *Goddard v. Hodges*, 1 Cr. & M. 33; see *Re Harrison*, 33 Ch. D. 52, 67.

(*q*) *Lamprell v. Billericay Union*, 3 Exch. 307.

(*r*) *Wright v. Laing*, 3 B. & C. 165, 171: 27 R. R. 313.

knowledge, he cannot at once appropriate it to a statute-barred debt; the debtor must be given an opportunity of electing how the money should be applied (s).

Entire
account.

The rule which we have been considering is "that where there are *distinct* accounts and a general payment, and no appropriation made, at the time of such payment, by the debtor, the creditor may apply such payment to which account he pleases. But where the accounts are treated as *one entire* account by all parties, that rule does not apply" (t).

Clayton's
case.

For instance, in the case of a current account between banker and customer, as a rule, all the sums paid in form one blended fund, the parts of which have no longer any distinct existence; the customer draws upon the entire fund. In this case there is generally "no room for any other appropriation than that which arises from the order in which the receipts and payments take place and are carried to the account. *Presumably*, it is the sum first paid in that is first drawn out; it is the first item on the debit side of the account that is discharged or reduced by the first item of the credit side; the appropriation is made by the very act of setting the two items against each other" (u).

This doctrine, with regard to current accounts, which is known as a rule in *Clayton's case*, has been often applied in cases where a current account to which a partnership firm is party, is continued without break, after a change in the constitution of the firm. If such a change is effected by a partner's death at a time when the firm is indebted on such an account, and the account is continued as an unbroken account between the new firm and the creditor, payments by the new firm, when brought into the account, usually discharge or reduce the liability of the deceased

(s) *Waller v. Lacy*, 1 Man. & R. R. 342.
Gr. 70.

(u) *Per Grant*, M.R., *Clayton's case*, 1 Mer. 572, 608 : 15 R. Purchas, 2 B. & Ald. 45 : 20 R. 161.

partner's estate (x). But an incoming partner is not liable for the debts of the old firm in the absence of an express or implied agreement by him to answer for them (y).

The above doctrine, however, ought not to be applied to defeat a creditor's right of appropriation, as already explained, in cases where there is no current account between the parties (z). Even in cases *primâ facie* falling within that doctrine, an account between the parties, however kept and rendered, is not conclusive on the question of appropriation; accounts rendered are evidence of the appropriation of payments to earlier items, but that evidence may be rebutted by other evidence to the contrary: each case must be decided according to its own circumstances (a).

A person holding money as trustee mixes it with his own money by paying it into his private current account with his bankers; he afterwards from time to time draws upon the account, and makes payments into it, in the ordinary manner. In favour of the *cestui que trust* seeking to follow the trust money, the law presumes that, so far as the trustee had money of his own to draw upon, he drew upon that, and not upon the trust money (b).

Where both principal and interest are due, sums paid on account are, as a rule, applicable first to interest; but this rule does not extend to interest which, by express or implied agreement, has been added to and become part of the principal debt (c).

Where a bill of exchange or promissory note has been

(x) *Clayton's case, supra*; *Hooper v. Keay*, 1 Q. B. D. 178. For further illustrations, see *Lindley on Partnership*.

(y) See 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39, s. 17; *Rolfe v. Flower*, L. R. 1 P. C. 27.

(z) *The Mecca*, [1897] A. C. 286; 66 L. J. P. 86.

(a) *Id.*, per *Ld. Macnaghten*; see

City Discount Co. v. McLean, L. R. 9 C. P. 692; *Henniker v. Wigg*, 4 Q. B. 792.

(b) *Re Hallett*, 13 Ch. D. 696; see *Hancock v. Smith*, 41 Ch. D. 456; *Re Hallett*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 237, 245; 63 L. J. Q. B. 573.

(c) *Parr's Bank v. Yates*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 460; 67 L. J. Q. B. 851.

Following trust money.

Interest.

Payment by bill.

given by a debtor to his creditor, the question sometimes arises, whether the giving of such instrument should be considered as payment, and as operating to extinguish the original debt: or merely as security for its payment, and as postponing the period of payment until the bill or note becomes due. Upon this subject the general rule was thus laid down by Lord Langdale:—"The debt may be considered as actually paid if the creditor, at the time of receiving the note, has agreed to take it in payment of the debt, and to take upon himself the risk of the note being paid; or if, from the conduct of the creditor, or the special circumstances of the case, such a payment is legally to be implied. But in the absence of any special circumstances throwing the risk of the note upon the creditor, his receiving the note in lieu of present payment of the debt is no more than giving extended credit, postponing the demand for immediate payment, or giving time for payment on a future day, in consideration of receiving this species of security. Whilst the time runs, payment cannot legally be enforced, but the debt continues till payment is actually made; and if payment be not made when the time has run out, payment of the debt may be enforced as if the note had not been given. If payment be made at or before the expiration of the extended time allowed, it is then for the first time that the debt is paid" (d).

(d) *Sayer v. Wagstaff*, 5 Beav. 415; *Re Romer*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 286: 62 L. J. Q. B. 610; see *Peacock v. Purssel*, 14 C. B. N. S. 728; *Davis v. Reilly*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 1: 66 L. J. Q. B. 844; *Bence v. Shearman*, [1898] 2 Ch. 582: 67 L. J. Ch. 513. See *Felix, Hadley & Co. v. Hadley*, [1898] 2 Ch. 680: 67 L. J. Ch. 649.

QUI PER ALIUM FACIT PER SEIPSUM FACERE VIDETUR. (*Co. Litt.* 258 a.)—*He who does an act through another is deemed in law to do it himself.*

This maxim enunciates the general doctrine on which the law relative to the rights and liabilities of principal and agent depends. It can, however, in this volume be but briefly considered. General rule.

Where a contract is entered into with A. as agent for B., it is deemed, in contemplation of law, to be entered into with B., and the principal is, in most cases, the proper party to sue (e) or be sued for a breach of such contract—the agent being viewed simply as the medium through which it was effected (f): *Qui facit per alium facit per se.*

The following instances, which are of ordinary occurrence, illustrate the rule, which, for certain purposes, identifies the agent with the principal:—Payment to an authorised agent (g), as an auctioneer, in the regular course of his employment (h), is payment to his principal (i), and generally Examples of rule.

Payment to agent.

(e) To entitle a person to sue upon a contract it must be shown that he himself made it, or that the contract was made on his behalf by an agent authorised to act for him at the time, or whose act has been subsequently ratified and adopted by him: *Watson v. Swann*, 11 C. B. N. S. 756.

(f) Thus, in *Depperman v. Hubbersty*, 17 Q. B. 766, Coleridge, J., observed: "Here an avowed agent of a principal sues another avowed agent of the same principal; and the action must fail for want of privity of contract between the two parties to the suit." See *Lee v. Everest*, 2 H. & N. 285, 291; *Coombs v. Bristol & Exeter R. Co.*, 3 H. & N. 1.

(g) *Postock v. Hume*, 8 Scott, N. R. 590.

(h) See *Mews v. Carr*, 1 H. & N.

484; *Bell v. Balls*, [1897] 1 Ch. 663: 66 L. J. Ch. 397.

(i) *Sykes v. Giles*, 5 M. & W. 645; approved in *Williams v. Evans*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 352 (which shows that an auctioneer has no authority to receive payment by a bill of exchange).

"The general rule of law is, that where a creditor's agent is bound to pay the whole amount over to the principal, he must receive it in cash from the debtor; and that a person who pays such agent, and who wishes to be safe, must see that the mode of payment does enable the agent to perform this his duty;" per Bovill, C.J., *Bridges v. Garrett*, L. R. 4 C. P. 587—588, and cases there cited. See *Catterall v. Hindle*, L. R. 2 C. P. 368; *Stephens v. Badcock*, 3 B. & Ad. 354; 37 R. R. 448;

payment to an agent, if made in the ordinary course of business, operates as payment to the principal (*k*), but such payment, in the absence of a custom of trade to the contrary, must be made in *cash* (*l*); if made by a bill, cheque, or note, it may be a good payment if such bill is subsequently honoured, or the cheque or note paid (*m*).

In connection with the subject of payment it may here be noticed that, where an agent has bought goods on credit for his principal, a subsequent payment by the principal to his own agent does not, as a rule, discharge the principal from his liability to the seller for the price of the goods. It is clear that if the seller knew, when the contract was made, that the agent was acting for a principal, whether disclosed or undisclosed, the subsequent payment by the principal to his agent does not affect the seller, unless, indeed, the payment was made in the belief that the seller's claim had been already satisfied, and it was the seller's own conduct that misled the principal into that belief (*n*). It has been held that, where the seller has given credit to the agent as a principal in ignorance of the fact that there was a principal behind him, a payment by the principal to the agent may discharge the principal as against the seller (*o*); but the correctness of this decision has been doubted (*n*).

Tender.

The receipt of money by an authorised agent will charge the principal (*p*), and in like manner, a tender made to an authorised agent will in law be regarded as made to the principal. Thus, where the plaintiff directed his clerk,

cited, *Arg.*, *Whyte v. Rose*, 3 Q. B. 498; *Parrott v. Anderson*, 7 Exch. 93.

(*k*) *Williams v. Deacon*, 4 Ex. 397; *Underwood v. Nicholls*, 17 C. B. 239.

(*l*) *Barker v. Greenwood*, 2 Y. & C. (Ex. R.) 414, 419; *Sweeting v. Pearce*, 9 C. B. N. S. 534; 30 L. J. C. P. 109. See *Papè v. Westacott*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 272; 63 L. J. Q. B. 222.

(*m*) *Bridges v. Garrett*, L. R. 5 C. P. 456; *per Blackburn, J.*, *Williams v. Evans*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 352, 354.

(*n*) *Irvine v. Watson*, 5 Q. B. D. 414; 49 L. J. Q. B. 531; *Davison v. Donaldson*, 9 Q. B. D. 623.

(*o*) *Armstrong v. Stokes*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 598; 41 L. J. Q. B. 253.

(*p*) See *Thompson v. Bell*, 10 Exch. 10.

who was in the habit of receiving money for him, not to receive certain money from his debtor if it should be offered to him, and the clerk, in pursuance of these directions, refused to receive the money when offered: upon the principle *qui facit per alium facit per se*, the tender to the servant was held to be a good tender to the master (*q*). Payment also by an agent as such is equivalent to payment by the principal. Where, for example, a covenant was "to pay or cause to be paid," it was held that the breach was sufficiently assigned by stating that the defendant had not paid, without saying, "or caused to be paid;" for had the defendant caused to be paid, he had paid, and, in such a case, the payment might be pleaded in discharge (*r*). So payment to an agent, if made in the ordinary course of business, will operate as payment to the principal (*s*).

Payment by agent.

On the same principle, the delivery of goods to a carrier's servant is a delivery of them to the carrier (*t*), and the delivery of a cheque to the agent of A. is a delivery to A. (*u*). Railway companies, moreover, are not to be placed in a different condition from all other carriers. They will be bound in the course of their business as carriers by the contract of the agent whom they put forward as having the management of that branch of their business. So that, where it appeared from the evidence, that certain goods were undoubtedly received by a railway company, for transmission on some contract or other, and that the only

Delivery of goods.

(*q*) *Moffat v. Parsons*, 5 Taunt. 307; 15 R. R. 506.

(*r*) *Gyse v. Ellis*, 1 Stra. 228.

(*s*) See *Williams v. Deacon*, 4 Exch. 397; *Kaye v. Brett*, 5 Exch. 269; *Parrott v. Anderson*, 7 Exch. 93; and cases cited *ante*, p. 639.

(*t*) *Dawes v. Peck*, 8 T. R. 330; 4 R. R. 675; *Brown v. Hodgson*, 2 Camp. 36; *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Griffin v. Langfield*, 3 Camp. 254; *Fragano v. Long*, 4 B. & C. 219;

28 R. R. 226; *G. W. R. Co. v. Goodman*, 12 C. B. 313. Moreover, a delivery to the carrier may be in law a delivery to the consignee; see the above cases, and *Dunlop v. Lambert*, 6 Cl. & F. 600. But an acceptance by the carrier is not an acceptance by the consignee; *per* Parke, B., *Johnson v. Dodgson*, 2 M. & W. 656.

(*u*) *Samuel v. Green*, 10 Q. B. 262.

person spoken to respecting such transmission was the party stationed to receive and weigh the goods; it was held that this party must have an implied authority to contract for sending goods, and that the company were consequently bound by that contract (*x*). It has been held, that the stationmaster of a railway company has not, though the general manager of the company has (*y*), implied authority to bind the company by a contract for surgical attendance on an injured passenger (*z*).

Agent for sale
of goods.

When an agent for the sale of goods contracts in his own name, and as a *principal*, the general rule is, that an action may be maintained, either in the name of the party by whom the contract was made, and privy to it, or of the party on whose behalf and for whose benefit it was made (*a*). Even when the agent is a factor, receiving a *del credere* commission, the principal may, at any period after the contract of sale, demand payment to himself of the sum agreed on, unless such payment has previously been made to the factor, in due course, and according to the terms of the contract (*b*). The following rules, respecting the liability of parties on a contract to buy goods, are likewise illustrative of the doctrine under consideration,

(*x*) *Pickford v. Grand Junction R. Co.*, 12 M. & W. 766; *Heald v. Carey*, 11 C. B. 977.

(*y*) *Walker v. G. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ex. 228.

(*z*) *Cox v. Midland Counties R. Co.*, 3 Exch. 268. See *Walker v. G. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ex. 228; *Poulton v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 534.

(*a*) *Per Bayley, J., Sargent v. Morris*, 3 B. & Ald. 280; 22 R. R. 382; *Sims v. Bond*, 5 B. & Ad. 393; 39 R. R. 511; *Duke of Norfolk v. Worthy*, 1 Camp. 337; 10 R. R. 749; *Cothay v. Fennell*, 10 B. & C. 672; 34 R. R. 541; *Bastable v.*

Poole, 1 Cr. M. & R. 413; *per* Ld. Abinger, 5 M. & W. 650; *Garrett v. Handley*, 4 B. & C. 656; 27 R. R. 405; distinguished in *Agacio v. Forbes*, 14 Moo. P. C. C. 160, 170, 171; see *Ramazotti v. Bowring*, 7 C. B. N. S. 851; *Ferrand v. Bischoffsheim*, 4 Id. 710; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 M. & W. 844.

(*b*) *Hornby v. Lacy*, 6 M. & S. 172; 18 R. R. 345; *Morris v. Cleasby*, 4 M. & S. 566, 574; 16 R. R. 544; *Sadler v. Leigh*, 4 Camp. 195; *Grove v. Dubois*, 1 T. R. 112; 16 R. R. 664, n.; *Scrimshire v. Alderton*, 2 Stra. 1182.

and are here briefly stated on account of their general importance:—1st, an agent, contracting as principal, is liable in that character; and if the real principal was known to the seller at the time when the contract was entered into by the agent, dealing in his own name, and credit is afterwards given to such agent, the latter only can be sued on the contract (c); 2ndly, if the principal be unknown at the time of contracting, whether the agent represent himself as such or not, the seller may, within a reasonable time after discovering the principal, debit either at his election (d). But, 3rdly, if a person act as agent without authority, no one but he himself can be liable; and if he exceed his authority, the principal is not bound by acts done beyond the scope of his legitimate authority (e). If A. employ B. to work for C., without warrant from C., A. alone can be liable to pay for the work done (f), and C. is not liable merely because B. believed A. to be in truth the agent of C.; for, in order to charge C., there must be proof of a contract with him, either express or implied, and with him

(c) *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, 15 East, 62; 13 R. R. 368; *Addison v. Gandasequi*, 4 Taunt. 574; 13 R. R. 689; *Franklyn v. Lamond*, 4 C. B. 637. See *Smith v. Sleaf*, 12 M. & W. 585, 588.

(d) *Thomson v. Davenport*, 9 B. & C. 78; 32 R. R. 578; cited *per* Martin, B., *Barber v. Pott*, 4 H. & N. 767; *Smethurst v. Mitchell*, 1 E. & E. 622, 631; *Heald v. Kenworthy*, 10 Exch. 734; *Risbourg v. Bruckner*, 3 C. B. N. S. 812; *per* Park, J., *Robinson v. Gleadow*, 2 Bing. N. C. 161, 162; *Paterson v. Gandasequi*, *supra*; *Wilson v. Hart*, 7 Taunt. 295; *Higgins v. Senior*, 8 M. & W. 834; *Humfrey v. Dale*, 7 E. & B. 266; S. C., E. B. & E. 1004.

(e) *Woodin v. Burford*, 2 Cr. & M. 391; 39 R. R. 802; *Wilson v. Bar-*

throp, 2 M. & W. 863; *Fenn v. Harrison*, 3 T. R. 757; *Polhill v. Walter*, 3 B. & Ad. 114; 37 R. R. 344; *per* Ld. Abinger, C.B., *Acey v. Fernie*, 7 M. & W. 154; *Davidson v. Stanley*, 3 Scott, N. R. 49; *Harper v. Williams*, 4 Q. B. 219. See *Downman v. Williams*, 7 Q. B. 108 (where the question was as to the construction of a written undertaking); *Cooke v. Wilson*, 1 C. B. N. S. 153; *Gillett v. Offor*, 18 C. B. 905; *Green v. Kopke*, Id. 549; *Parker v. Winlow*, 7 E. & B. 942, 949; *Wake v. Harrop*, 1 H. & C. 202; S. C., 6 H. & N. 768; *Oglesby v. Yglesias*, E. B. & E. 930; *Williamson v. Barton*, 7 H. & N. 899.

(f) *Per* Ld. Holt, C.J., *Ashton v. Sherman*, Holt, 309; cited 2 M. & W. 218.

in the character of a principal, directly, or through the intervention of an agent (*g*).

Liability for
acting as
agent with-
out authority.

The question what is the liability of a person who professes to contract as an agent, when he has in fact no authority to make the contract, has been frequently discussed, and the result of the discussion appears to be as follows :—

1. He is not liable, as a rule, upon the contract itself as a party to it, for he professes to bind not himself, but another (*h*). To this rule, however, there appears to be an exception in certain cases where a person contracts as agent for a non-existent principal. For where goods were ordered on behalf of a company which had not been formed at the date of the order, and were supplied pursuant to the order, and subsequently consumed in the company's business, it was held that the person who gave the order was personally liable upon the contract for the price of the goods (*i*).

2. Although he be not personally liable on the contract, yet a person who professes to contract as agent when he in fact has no authority, usually incurs a liability. If he knows that he has no authority, but induces a person to contract on the faith of his representation that he has authority, he is liable for the damage resulting from his fraud, in an action of deceit (*k*). And even if he represent himself as an agent innocently, in the mistaken belief that he is such, he is generally liable, in damages, for the breach of his warranty of authority. By professing to contract as agent, a person usually warrants his authority, either expressly or impliedly, and it is a good consideration for the warranty that the contract is entered into on the faith of it (*l*). The measure of damages is, as a rule, the actual

(*g*) *Thomas v. Edwards*, 2 M. & W. 215.

(*h*) *Jenkins v. Hutchinson*, 13 Q. B. 744; *Lewis v. Nicholson*, 18 Id. 503.

(*i*) *Kelner v. Baxler*, L. R. 2 C. P.

174, where the maxim, *ut res magis valeat quam pereat*, was applied.

(*k*) *Polhill v. Walter*, 8 B. & Ad. 114; 37 R. R. 344.

(*l*) *Collen v. Wright*, 8 E. & B.

647, 658; *Cherry v. Colonial Bank*

loss sustained by the plaintiff in consequence of his not having the benefit of the contract warranted (*m*); and costs *reasonably* incurred in attempting to enforce the contract against the supposed principal are recoverable (*n*).

3. It is open, however, to a person who professes to contract as agent to stipulate expressly that he does not warrant his authority (*o*), and such a stipulation may be inferred by necessary implication (*p*), or from usage of trade (*q*). It seems that no warranty of authority will be *implied* in cases where a public servant purports to contract on behalf of the Crown (*r*).

4. A person who continues to act as agent, in ignorance that his authority has been determined by his principal's death or lunacy, may be liable as having impliedly warranted the continuance of his authority (*s*).

On the maxim, *qui facit per alium facit per se*, depends also the liability of persons in partnership for the acts of a member of the firm. The law of partnership, as it stood at common law, was frequently stated to be a branch of the law of principal and agent (*t*); and that doctrine is expressly recognised by the Partnership Act, 1890 (*u*), which declared and amended the law of partnership. Every partner is an

Liability of partners.

of *Australasia*, L. R. 3 P. C. 24; *West London Commercial Bank v. Kitson*, 13 Q. B. D. 360. See also *Firbank's Executors v. Humphreys*, 18 Q. B. D. 54, 60; 56 L. J. Q. B. 57; *Starkey v. Bank of England*, [1903] A. C. 114; 72 L. J. Ch. 402; *Yonge v. Toynbee*, [1910] 1 K. B. 215.

(*m*) *Simons v. Patchett*, 7 E. & B. 568; *Meek v. Wendt*, 21 Q. B. D. 126; W. N. 1889, 4.

(*n*) *Collen v. Wright*, *supra*; *Richardson v. Dunn*, 8 C. B. N. S. 655.

(*o*) *Halbot v. Lens*, [1901] 1 Ch. 344; 70 L. J. Ch. 125.

(*p*) *Smout v. Ilbery*, 10 M. & W. 1, 12.

(*q*) *Lilly v. Smales*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 456.

(*r*) *Dunn v. Macdonald*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 401, 555; 66 L. J. Q. B. 420.

(*s*) See *Yonge v. Toynbee*, [1910] 1 K. B. 215; 79 L. J. K. B. 208, which seems in effect to overrule *Smout v. Ilbery*, 10 M. & W. 1, and *Salton v. New Beeston Cycle Co.*, [1900] 1 Ch. 43; 68 L. J. Ch. 370. But see 44 & 45 Vict. c. 41, s. 47, as to agents acting under a power of attorney.

(*t*) See *per* Abbott, C.J., 2 B. & Ald. 678; *per* Ld. Wensleydale, 6 H. L. Cas. 417, 418; 8 Id. 304, 312.

(*u*) 53 & 54 Vict. c. 39.

agent of the firm, and his other partners, for the purpose of the business of the partnership, and the acts of every partner, who does any act for carrying on in the usual way business of the kind carried on by the firm, bind the firm and his partners, unless the partner has in fact no authority to act for the firm in the particular matter, and the person with whom he deals either knows that he has no authority, or does not know or believe him to be a partner (*x*). And where, by any wrongful act or omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of the business of the firm, or with the authority of his co-partners, loss or injury is caused to strangers, the firm is liable therefor to the same extent as the partner (*y*). Again, the firm is liable to make good the loss where one partner, acting within the scope of his apparent authority, receives money or property of a third person and misapplies it; or where the firm in the course of its business receives such money or property and it is misapplied by a partner while it is in the firm's custody (*z*).

These rules are well illustrated by the decision in *Marsh v. Keating* (*a*). There a partner in a firm of bankers caused a customer's stock in the firm's custody to be sold under a forged power of attorney; the proceeds, having been paid into the firm's account with their agent, were drawn out by the partner by means of a cheque signed in the firm's name (*b*), and were then appropriated by him for his own private purposes. The other partners were ignorant of these transactions, but it was held that the customer was entitled to adopt the sale, and sue the firm for the proceeds, as money had and received.

Without entering at length upon the subject of partnership liabilities incurred through the act of a member of the firm, we may observe, that wherever a contract is alleged to have been made through the medium of a third person,

(*x*) S. 5.

(*a*) 2 Cl. & F. 250.

(*y*) S. 10.

(*b*) See s. 6.

(*z*) S. 11.

General
remarks as
to agency.

whether a co-partner or not, the real and substantial question is, with whom was the contract made? and, to answer this question, the jury usually have to consider whether the party through whose instrumentality the contract is alleged to have been made, had in fact authority to make it. "It would," however, "be very dangerous to hold," as matter of law, "that a person who allows an agent to act as a principal in carrying on a business, and invests him with an apparent authority to enter into contracts incidental to it, could limit that authority by a secret reservation" (c).

Where an action is brought by a creditor against a member of the managing or provisional committee of a railway company, the question of liability ordinarily resolves itself into the consideration, whether the defendant did or did not authorise the particular contract upon which he is sued. In *Barnett v. Lambert* (d) the defendant consented, by his letter to the secretary of a railway company, that his name should be placed on the list of its provisional committee. His name was accordingly published as a provisional committee-man, and on one occasion he attended and acted as chairman at a meeting of the committee. It was held that he was liable for the price of stationery supplied on the secretary's order and used by the committee, after the date of his letter—the question for decision being one of fact, and matter of inference for the jury, to be drawn from the defendant's conduct, as showing that he had constituted the secretary his agent to pledge his credit "for all such things as were necessary for the working of the committee, and to enable

Application of maxim to committee-men of railway companies.

Barnett v. Lambert.

(c) *Per Mellor, J., Edmunds v. Bushell*, L. R. 1 C. P. 97, 100. See *Watteau v. Fenwick*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 34; *Howard v. Sheward*, L. R. 2 C. P. 148; *Baines v. Ewing*, L. R. 1 Ex. 320.

(d) 15 M. & W. 489, where *Todd v. Emly*, 8 M. & W. 505; *Fleming v. Hector*, 2 M. & W. 172; and *Tredwen v. Bourne*, 6 M. & W. 461, were cited.

it to go on." "Where," observed Alderson, B., "a subscription has been made, and there is a fund, it is not so; because if you give money to a person to buy certain things with, the natural inference is that you do not mean him to pledge your credit for them" (e).

Reynell v. Lewis.

In *Reynell v. Lewis* and *Wylde v. Hopkins* (f), decided shortly after *Barnett v. Lambert*, the Court of Exchequer laid down the principles applicable to such cases; and it may probably be better to give the substance of this judgment at some length, as it affords important practical illustrations of that maxim, "which," in the words of Tindal, C.J. (g), "is of almost universal application:" *qui facit per alium facit per se*.

With whom
was contract
made.

"The question," observed the Court, "in all cases in which the plaintiff seeks to fix the defendant with liability upon a contract, express or implied, is, whether such contract was made by the defendant, by himself or his agent, with the plaintiff or his agent, and this is a question of fact for the decision of the jury upon the evidence before them. The plaintiff, on whom the burthen of proof lies in all these cases, must, in order to recover against the defendant, show that the defendant contracted *expressly* or *impliedly*; *expressly*, by making a contract with the plaintiff; *impliedly*, by giving an order to him under such circumstances as show that it was not to be gratuitously executed: and, if the contract was not made by the defendant personally, it must be proved that it was made by an agent of the defendant properly authorised (h), and that it was made as his contract. In these cases of actions against provisional committee-men of railways, it often happens that the contract is made by a third person, and

(e) *Higgins v. Hopkins*, 3 Exch. 163; *Burnside v. Dayrell*, Id. 224.

Barker v. Stead, 16 L. J. C. P. 160.

(f) 15 M. & W. 517; *Collingwood v. Berkeley*, 15 C. B. N. S. 145; *Cross v. Williams*, 7 H. & N. 675;

(g) 8 Scott, N. R. 830.

(h) See *Cooke v. Tonkin*, 9 Q. B. 936.

the point to be decided is, whether that third person was an agent for the defendant for the purpose of making it, and made the contract as such (i). The agency may be constituted by an express limited authority to make such a contract, or a larger authority to make all falling within the class or description to which it belongs, or a general authority to make any; or it may be proved by showing that such a relation existed between the parties as by law would create the authority, as, for instance, that of partners, by which relation, when complete, one becomes by law the agent of the other for all purposes necessary for carrying on their particular partnership, whether general or special, or usually belonging to it; or the relation of husband and wife, in which the law, under certain circumstances, considers the husband to make his wife an agent. In all these cases, if the agent in making the contract acts on that authority, the principal is bound by the contract, and the agent's contract is his contract, but not otherwise. This agency may be created by the immediate act of the party, that is, by really giving the authority to the agent, or representing to him that he is to have it, or by constituting that relation to which the law attaches agency; or it may be created by the representation of the defendant to the plaintiff that the party making the contract is the agent of the defendant, or that such relation exists as to constitute him such; and if the plaintiff really makes the contract on the faith of the defendant's representation, the defendant is bound—he is estopped from disputing the truth of it with respect to that contract; and the representation of an authority is *quoad hoc*, precisely the same as a real authority given by the defendant to the supposed agent. This representation may be made directly to the plaintiff, or made publicly, so that it may be inferred to have reached him: and may be made by words and

Agency, how constituted.

(i) See *Riley v. Packington*, L. R. 17 C. B. N. S. 829; *Burbidge v. Morris*, 3 H. & C. 66.
2 C. P. 536; *Maddick v. Marshall*,

conduct. Upon none of these propositions is there, we apprehend, the slightest doubt, and the proper decision of all these questions depends upon the proper application of these principles to the facts of each case, and the jury are to apply the rule with due assistance from the judge." In the course of the judgment from which we have made so long an extract, the Court further observed, that an agreement to be a provisional committee-man is merely an agreement for carrying into effect the preliminary arrangements for petitioning Parliament for a bill, and thus promoting the scheme, but constitutes no agreement to share in profit or loss, which is the characteristic of a partnership, although if the provisional committee-man subsequently acts he will be responsible for his acts. They likewise remarked, that where the list of the provisional committee has appeared in a prospectus, published with the defendant's consent, knowledge, or sanction, the context of such prospectus must be examined, to see whether or not it contains any statement affecting his liability, as, for instance, the names of a managing committee, in which case it will be a question whether the meaning be that the acting committee shall take the whole management of the concern, to the exclusion of the provisional committee, or that the provisional committee-men have appointed the acting committee, or the majority of it, as their agents (*k*). In this latter case, moreover, it must further be considered whether the managing and delegated body is authorised to pledge the credit of the provisional committee, or is merely empowered to apply the funds subscribed to the liquidation of expenses incurred in the formation and carrying out of the concern (*l*).

(*k*) See Judgm., 15 M. & W. 530, 531; *Wilson v. Viscount Curzon*, Id. 532; *Williams v. Pigott*, 2 Exch. 201.

(*l*) *Dawson v. Morrison*, 16 L. J. C. P. 240; *Rennie v. Clarke*, 5

Exch. 292. See, also, as to the liability of a provisional committee-man, *Patrick v. Reynolds*, 1 C. B. N. S. 727; or member of a committee of visitors, *Moffatt v. Dickson*,

The authority of the master of a ship is very large. Master of ship.
 Under the general authority which he has, "he may make contracts and do all things necessary for the due and proper prosecution of the voyage in which the ship is engaged. But this authority does not usually extend to cases where the owner can himself personally interfere, as in the home port, or in a port in which he has beforehand appointed an agent who can personally interfere to do the thing required" (*m*). He may make contracts to carry goods on freight, but cannot bind his owners by a contract to carry freight free. With regard also to goods put on board the ship, the master may sign a bill of lading, and acknowledge thereby the condition of the goods; but his authority to give bills of lading is limited to such goods as have been put on board (*n*).

A wife, from the mere fact of marriage, has no Agency of wife.
 authority to pledge her husband's credit, except in the particular case of necessity; this necessity arises when the wife is living apart from the husband, through his fault, and is not properly provided for, but not, as a rule, when they are living together (*o*).

The question whether a wife has authority to pledge her husband's credit, while they live together, is a question of fact, to be determined upon all the circumstances of the particular case. The ordinary state of cohabitation between

13 C. B. 543; *Kendall v. King*, 17 Id. 483, 508. As to the authority of a resident agent, or the directors of a mining company, to borrow money on the credit of the company, see *Ricketts v. Bennett*, 4 C. B. 686, and cases there cited; *Burmester v. Norris*, 6 Exch. 796.

(*m*) *Arthur v. Barton*, 6 M. & W. 188; *Gunn v. Roberts*, L. R. 9 C. P. 331; 43 L. J. C. P. 233.

(*n*) *Grant v. Norway*, 10 C. B. 665, 687; *Hubbersty v. Ward*, 8 Exch. 330; *Jessel v. Bath*, L. R. 2

Ex. 267; *Valieri v. Boyland*, L. R. 1 C. P. 382; *Barker v. Highley*, 15 C. B. N. S. 27. Cf. *Compania Nav. Vasconzada v. Churchill & Sim*, [1906] 1 K. B. 237; 75 L. J. K. B. 94. See, further, as to the authority of the master, or ship's husband, to pledge the owner's credit, *The Great Eastern*, L. R. 2 A. & E. 88; *The Karnak*, L. R. 2 P. C. 505.

(*o*) *Debenham v. Mellon*, 6 App. Cas. 24; 50 L. J. Q. B. 155; *Manby v. Scott*, 1 Siderf. 109; 2 Smith, L. C.

husband and wife gives rise to a presumption of an authority in the wife to do things which, in the ordinary circumstances of cohabitation, it is usual in a wife to do. This presumption can be rebutted; but, since the management of certain departments of the household expenditure is usually entrusted to the wife, it may be presumed, until the contrary be shown, that she has authority to pledge her husband's credit in respect of necessities, falling within those departments, and suitable to his station in life and style of living (o).

Sheriff.

To the general principle under consideration may also be referred the decisions which establish that the sheriff is liable for an illegal or fraudulent act committed by his bailiff, even if he were not personally cognisant of the transaction (p); and such decisions are peculiarly illustrative of this principle, because there is a distinction to be noticed between the ordinary cases and those in which the illegal act is done under such circumstances as constitute the wrong-doer the special bailiff of the party at whose suit process is executed; for, where the plaintiff's attorney requested of the sheriff a particular officer, delivered the warrant to that officer, took him in his carriage to the scene of action, and there encouraged an illegal arrest, it was held that the sheriff was not liable for a subsequent escape (q). Nor will the sheriff be liable if the wrong complained of be neither expressly sanctioned by him, nor impliedly committed by his authority; as, where the bailiff

(o) See note (o) on p. 651.

(p) *Per* Ashhurst, J., *Woodgate v. Knatchbull*, 2 T. R. 148, 154; 1 R. R. 449; *Gregory v. Cotterell*, 5 E. & B. 571; *Raphael v. Goodman*, 8 A. & E. 565; *Sturmy v. Smith*, 11 East, 25; *Price v. Peek*, 1 Bing. N. C. 380; *Crowder v. Long*, 8 B. & C. 602; *Smart v. Hutton*, 8 A. & E. 568, n. See *Peshall v. Layton*, 2 T. R. 712; *Thomas v. Pearse*, 5

Price, 578; *Jarmain v. Hooper*, 7 Scott, N. R. 663; *Morris v. Salberg*, 22 Q. B. D. 614.

(q) *Doe v. Trye*, 5 Bing. N. C. 573; *Ford v. Leche* 6 A. & E. 699; *Wright v. Child*, L. R. 1 Ex. 358; *Alderson v. Davenport*, 13 M. & W. 42; *per* Buller, J., *De Moranda v. Dunkin*, 4 T. R. 121; *Botten v. Tomlinson*, 16 L. J. C. P. 138

derived his authority, not from the sheriff, but from the plaintiff, at whose instigation he acted (*r*); and it is not competent to one whose act produces the misconduct of the bailiff, to say, that the act of the officer done in breach of his duty to the sheriff, and which he has himself induced, is the act of the sheriff (*s*).

But, notwithstanding the almost universal applicability of the maxim under consideration, cases may occur in which, by reason of express provisions of a statute, it will not apply. Thus it was held that, under the 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 1, an acknowledgment signed by the debtor's agent did not revive a debt barred by the 21 Jac. 1, c. 16 (*t*). But the law upon this point was altered by the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 13.

Exceptions
to rule.

Before terminating our remarks as to the legal consequences which flow from the relation of principal and agent in transactions founded upon contract, we may briefly refer to a kindred principle which limits the operation of the maxim *qui facit per alium facit per se*. This principle is, that a delegated authority cannot be re-delegated: *delegata potestas non potest delegari* (*y*); or, as it is otherwise expressed, *vicarius non habet vicarium* (*z*)—one agent cannot lawfully appoint another to perform the duties of his agency (*a*). This rule applies wherever the authority involves a trust or discretion in the agent for the exercise of

Delegated
authority.

(*r*) *Cook v. Palmer*, 6 B. & C. 39; *Crowder v. Long*, 8 B. & C. 598; *Tompkinson v. Russell*, 9 Price, 287; *Bowden v. Waitkman*, 5 Moore, 183; *Stuart v. Whittaker*, R. & M. 310; *Higgins v. M'Adam*, 3 Y. & J. 1.

(*s*) *Per Bayley, J.*, 8 B. & C. 603, 604.

(*t*) *Hyde v. Johnson*, 2 Bing. N. C. 776. See, also, *Toms v. Cuming*, 8 Scott, N. R. 910; *Cuming v. Toms*, Id. 827; *Davies v. Hopkins*, 3 C. B. N. S. 376.

(*y*) 2 Inst. 597; Arg., *Fector v. Beacon*, 5 Bing. N. C. 310.

(*z*) Branch, Max., 5th ed. 380.

(*a*) See *per* Ld. Denman, *Cobb v. Becke*, 6 Q. B. 936; *Combe's case*, 9 Rep. 75; *Gwilliam v. Twist*, [1895] 2 Q. B. 84. See *Reg. v. Newmarket R. Co.*, 15 Q. B. 702; *Reg. v. Dulwich College*, 17 Q. B. 600, 615, where Ld. Campbell incidentally observes that "the Crown cannot enable a man to appoint magistrates."

which he is selected; but does not apply where it involves no matter of discretion, and it is immaterial whether the act be done by one person or another, and the original agent remains responsible to the principal (*b*). Thus, a principal employs a broker from the opinion which he has of his personal skill and integrity; and the broker has no right, without notice, to turn his principal over to another; and, therefore, a broker cannot, without authority from his principal, transfer consignments made to him, in his character of broker, to another broker for sale (*c*). On the same principle, where an Act for building a bridge required that any notice to be given by the trustees appointed under the Act should be signed by three of the trustees, it was held, that a notice, signed with the names of the clerks to the trustees, but signed, in fact, not by such clerks, but by a clerk employed by them, was insufficient, as being an attempt to substitute for a deputy his deputy (*d*). But where the act is purely ministerial, as for example, the signing of a name, the discretionary part of the agency having been exercised by the proper party to whom it was entrusted, it may in general be delegated to and performed by the hand of another (*e*); and an agent can employ another in respect of such acts as are usually, and in the ordinary course of the business for which the agent is employed, done by others (*f*), or which the agent must necessarily do through the agency of other persons (*g*).

(*b*) See Leake on Contracts, pp. 482—483, and *Hemming v. Hale*, 7 C. B. N. S. 498; see as slightly bearing on the question, *Johnson v. Raylton*, 7 Q. B. D. 438: 50 L. J. Q. B. 753.

(*c*) *Cockran v. Irlam*, 2 M. & S. 301, n. (*a*): 15 R. R. 257; *Solly v. Rathbone*, 2 M. & S. 298; *Catlin v. Bell*, 4 Camp. 183; *Schmaling v. Thomlinson*, 6 Taunt. 147; *Coles v. Trecothick*, 9 Ves. 251: 7 R. R.

167; *Henderson v. Barnwall*, 1 Yo. & J. 387: 30 R. R. 799.

(*d*) *Miles v. Bough*, 3 Q. B. 845; cited, Arg., *Allan v. Waterhouse*, 8 Scott, N. R. 68, 76.

(*e*) Leake on Contracts, p. 483; *Johnson v. Osenton*, L. R. 4 Ex. 107: 38 L. J. Ex. 76.

(*f*) Leake on Contracts, 483; *Ex p. Sutton*, 2 Cox, Eq. Cas. 84.

(*g*) *Rossiter v. Trafalgar Life Ass. Association*, 27 Beav. 377.

It may, likewise, be well to observe, that delegated jurisdiction, as distinguished from proper jurisdiction, is that which is communicated by a judge to some other person, who acts in his name, and is called a deputy; and this jurisdiction is, in law, held to be that of the judge who appoints the deputy, and not of the deputy; and in this case the maxim holds, *delegatus non potest delegare*: the person to whom any office or duty is delegated—for example, an arbitrator—cannot lawfully devolve the duty on another, unless he be expressly authorised so to do (*h*). Nor can an individual, clothed with judicial functions, delegate the discharge of those functions to another, unless as in the case of a County Court judge, he be expressly empowered to do so (*i*). For the ordinary rule is that although a ministerial officer may appoint a deputy, a judicial officer cannot (*k*).

A magistrate, as observed by Lord Camden, can have no assistant nor deputy to execute any part of his employment. "The right is personal to himself, and a trust that he can no more delegate to another, than a justice of the peace can transfer his commission to his clerk" (*l*).

Although, however, a deputy cannot, according to the above rule, transfer his entire powers to another, yet a deputy possessing general powers may, in many cases, constitute another person his servant or bailiff, for the purpose of doing some particular act; provided, of course,

Rule, how
qualified.

(*h*) See Bell, Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 280, 281, 292; *Whitmore v. Smith*, 7 H. & N. 509; cited in *Thorburn v. Barnes*, L. R. 2 C. P. 384, 404; *Little v. Newton*, 2 Scott, N. R. 509; *Reg. v. Jones*, 10 A. & E. 576; *Hughes v. Jones*, 1 B. & Ad. 388; *Wilson v. Thorpe*, 6 M. & W. 721; Arg., 5 Bing. N. C. 310; *White v. Sharpe*, 12 M. & W. 712; *Rutter v. Chapman*, 8 M. & W. 1. See *The case of the Masters' Clerks*, 1 Phill. 650. See also *Reg. v. Perkin*, 7 Q. B.

165; *Smeeton v. Collier*, 1 Exch. 457; *Sharp v. Nowell*, 6 C. B. 253.

(*i*) 51 & 52 Vict. c. 43, ss. 18—21. See *Rex v. Lloyd*, [1906], 1 K. B. 22; 75 L. J. K. B. 126.

(*k*) See *per* Parke, B., *Walsh v. Southworth*, 6 Exch. 150, 156; which illustrates the former part of the rule stated *supra*. See *Baker v. Cave*, 1 H. & N. 674.

(*l*) *Entick v. Carrington*, 19 Howell, St. Trials, 1063.

that such act be within the scope of his own legitimate authority. For instance, the steward of a manor, with power to make a deputy, made B. his deputy, and B., by writing under his hand and seal, made C. his deputy, to the intent that he might take a surrender of G., of copyhold lands. It was held, that the surrender taken by C. was a good surrender (*m*), and Lord Holt, insisting upon the distinction above pointed out, compared the case before him to that of an under-sheriff, who has power to make bailiffs and to send process all over the kingdom, and that only by virtue of his deputation (*n*).

The rule as to delegated functions must, moreover, be understood with this necessary qualification, that, in the particular case, no power to re-delegate such functions has been given (*o*). Such an authority to employ a deputy may be either *express* or *implied* by the recognised usage of trade; as in the case of an architect or builder, who employs a surveyor to make out the quantities of the building proposed to be erected; in which case the maxim of the civil law applies, *in contractis tacitè insunt quæ sunt moris et consuetudinis* (*p*)—terms which are in accordance with and warranted by custom and usage may, in some cases, be tacitly imported into contracts (*q*).

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR. (4 *Inst.* 114.)—*Let the principal be held responsible.*

Respective
liability of
master and
servant.

The doctrine enunciated in this maxim has been carried in English law very far, and in the opinion of a learned judge, quite as far as it should be (*r*). It is more usually

(*m*) *Parker v. Kett*, 1 *Ld. Raym.* 658, cited in *Bridges v. Garrett*, *L. R.* 4 *C. P.* 591.

(*n*) 1 *Ld. Raym.* 659; *Leak v. Howell*, *Cro. Eliz.* 538.

(*o*) See 2 *Prest. Abs. Tit.* 276.

(*p*) 3 *Bing. N. C.* 814, 818.

(*q*) *De Bussche v. Alt*, 8 *Ch. D.* 286, 310.

(*r*) *Per* Jessel, *M.R.*, *Smith v. Keal*, 9 *Q. B. D.* 340, 351; 51 *L. J. Q. B.* 487.

and appropriately applied to actions *ex delicto*, than to such as are founded in contract. Where, for instance, an agent commits a tortious act, under the direction or with the assent of his principal, each is liable at suit of the party injured: the agent is liable, because the authority of the principal cannot justify his wrongful act; and the person who directs the act to be done is likewise liable, according to the maxim, *respondeat superior* (s). "If the servant commit a trespass by the command or encouragement of his master, the master shall be guilty of it, though the servant is not thereby excused, for he is only to obey his master in matters that are honest and lawful" (t); and "all persons directly concerned in the commission of a fraud are to be treated as principals" (u).

It is well established that a person who has employed another to do an act is responsible for the act if it be in itself unlawful, and it is immaterial that he employed, not a servant, but an independent contractor. A company which apparently had no right to break up a street employed a contractor to break it up, lay pipes in it, and re-instate its surface; the contractor's servants did not re-instate the surface properly, but left a heap of stones in the street: it was held that the company were liable for damage caused by the nuisance (x). Again, "if I agree with a builder to build me a house according to a certain plan, he would be

Employment
to do unlaw-
ful act.

(s) 4 Inst. 114; *Sands v. Child*, 3 Lev. 352; *Jones v. Hart*, 1 Ld. Raym. 738; *Britton v. Cole*, 1 Salk. 408; *Gauntlett v. King*, 3 C. B. N. S. 59; *per* Littledale, J., *Laugher v. Pointer*, 5 B. & C. 559; 29 R. R. 319; *Perkins v. Smith*, 1 Wils. 328; cited, 1 Bing. N. C. 418; *Stephens v. Elwall*, 4 M. & S. 259; 16 R. R. 458; Com. Dig., "Trespas" (C. 1). See *Collett v. Foster*, 2 A. & N. 356; *Bennett v. Bayes*, 5 H. & N. 391.

A person who deals with the goods of a testator, as agent of the

executor, cannot be treated as executor *de son tort*, whether the will has been proved or not; *Sykes v. Sykes*, L. R. 5 C. P. 113.

(t) 1 Blac. Com. 429; *per* Platt, B., *Stevens v. Midland Counties R. Co.*, 10 Exch. 356; *Eastern Counties R. Co. v. Broom*, 6 Exch. 314.

(u) *Per* Ld. Westbury, *Cullen v. Thomson's Trustees*, 4 Macq. 432—433.

(x) *Ellis v. Sheffield Gas Co.*, 2 E. & B. 767.

an independent contractor, and I should not be liable to strangers for any wrongful act unnecessarily done by him in the performance of his work (*y*); but clearly I should be jointly liable with him for a trespass on the land, if it turned out that I had no right to build upon it" (*z*). It would be immaterial that I did not enter the land myself; for if I merely give a man leave to go on land over which I have no right, and he goes, that will not make me a trespasser, but if I request him to go, then he goes by my authority, and I am liable (*a*).

Employment
of contractor
to do lawful
work.

On the other hand, the general rule is that a person who employs, not his own servant, but an independent contractor to do a lawful act is not answerable for wrongful or negligent acts unnecessarily committed by the contractor, or his servants, in the performance of the contract. In other words, "ever since *Quarman v. Burnett* (*b*), it has been considered settled law that one employing another is not liable for his *collateral* negligence, unless the relation of master and servant existed between them" (*c*). For instance, a butcher who employs a drover, exercising an independent calling, to drive a bullock through the streets is not liable for the negligent driving of the drover's boy (*d*).

Relation of
master and
servant: how
constituted.

It, therefore, often becomes necessary to determine whether the relation between a defendant and a person actually engaged upon work was that of master and servant, or whether such person was an independent contractor or the servant of such; and the general rule is that the relation of master and servant exists if the defendant has the right at the moment to determine or control the manner in which the work shall be done (*e*); whereas a person who

(*y*) *E.g.*, if his carter, in bringing the materials to the land, drove over a stranger in the street.

(*z*) *Per* Willes, J., *Upton v. Townsend*, 17 C. B. 71.

(*a*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Robinson v. Vaughton*, 8 C. & P. 255.

(*b*) 6 M. & W. 499.

(*c*) *Per* Ld. Blackburn, *Dalton v. Angus*, 6 App. Cas. 740, 829.

(*d*) *Milligan v. Wedge*, 12 A. & E. 737; see *post*, p. 660.

(*e*) *Sadler v. Henlock*, 4 E. & B. 570, 578; *Donovan v. Laing*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 629, 634: 63 L. J. Q. B. 25, and cases there collected.

undertakes to produce a given result in such manner as he may think fit is an independent contractor, and the workmen whom he employs to produce the result are his servants, and not the defendant's. Nor are they the defendant's servants merely because he stipulated for the right to require the removal of incompetent workmen (*f*), or for the employment of particular workmen (*g*), or agreed with the contractor to pay to the workmen their wages (*g*). The fact that he stipulated for the execution of the work under the supervision of his own surveyor does not of itself make him the workmen's master, but he may be responsible for the consequences of the workmen obeying a particular order given by the surveyor (*h*).

In conformity with this rule, where the owner of a carriage jobs a horse to draw it and the job-master provides the driver, the driver is generally the servant of the job-master, and the owner of the carriage is not responsible for the driver's negligent management of the horse, so long as he merely directs where the driver is to take him and does not make himself *dominus pro tempore* by directing how the horse is to be driven (*i*). But where a job-master supplies merely the driver to the owner of a horse and carriage, it may be proper to infer that the driver while in charge of the horse is the servant of its owner, for the owner has a right to direct how the horse shall be driven (*k*).

Job-master
providing
driver.

Although the relation between two persons be such that, at common law, it would be improper to treat them as master and servant, yet to treat them as such may be proper owing to some statute. Thus, under the 6 & 7 Vict.

Special
Statute.

(*f*) *Reedie v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 4 Ex. 244.

(*g*) *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 M. & W. 499; *Rourke v. White Moss Co.*, 2 C. P. D. 205.

(*h*) *Steel v. S. E. R. Co.*, 16 C. B. 550; *Hardaker v. Idle District*

Council, [1896] 1 Q. B. 343, 344; 65 L. J. Q. B. 363.

(*i*) *Quarman v. Burnett*, 6 M. & W. 499; *Jones v. Liverpool Corporation*, 14 Q. B. D. 890.

(*k*) *Jones v. Scullard*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 565; 67 L. J. Q. B. 895.

c. 86, the registered proprietor of a cab in London is answerable for the driver while plying for hire, as if the driver were his servant, whatever may in fact be the relation between them (*l*).

Employment
of contractor
upon work
lawful, but
dangerous.

Notwithstanding the general rule to which we have adverted, that a person is not liable for the collateral negligence of an independent contractor whom he has employed upon lawful work, there is an important class of cases in which a person may incur liability through his contractor's negligence. Where a person, having a right which he is not entitled to exercise except upon the terms of his performing a duty, delegates to a contractor the exercise of the right and performance of the duty, he is answerable if the right be exercised, but through the contractor's negligence the duty is not performed. "A person causing something to be done, the doing of which casts on him a duty, cannot escape from the responsibility attaching on him of seeing that duty performed by delegating it to a contractor" (*m*).

Thus, where a statute authorised a company to make a swing-bridge across a river, but required them to open the bridge for the purpose of letting vessels pass, it was held that the company were liable by reason of the negligence of their contractor who made the bridge so that it would not open properly (*n*). And, similarly, where a statute authorised a company to cut a trench across a road, but required them to re-instate the road when their drain-pipes had been inserted, it was held that the company were liable on account of their contractor's negligence in not re-instating the road properly (*o*).

Nor is the rule confined to cases where both the right

(*l*) *King v. London Cab Co.*, 23 Q. B. D. 281; *Keen v. Henry*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 292: 68 L. J. Q. B. 211.

(*m*) *Per Ltd. Blackburn, Dalton v. Angus*, 6 App. Cas. 740, 829; *Hardaker v. Idle District Council*,

[1896] 1 Q. B. 335, 342: 65 L. J. Q. B. 363, and cases there collected.

(*n*) *Hole v. Sittingbourne R. Co.*, 6 H. & N. 488.

(*o*) *Gray v. Pullen*, 5 B. & S. 970.

and duty are statutory. For instance, the common law requires a district council, when it causes a street to be sewered under statutory powers, to take some care that, in the execution of that work, gas-pipes known to be lying under the street be not broken, and if such pipes get broken through the negligence of the contractor employed upon the work, and an explosion follows, the council are liable for the ensuing damage(*p*). Again, the law allows a man to make an artificial reservoir on his land, but imposes on him the duty, if he make the reservoir, of keeping the water in. He may employ a contractor to make the reservoir, but he remains liable, if, through the contractor's negligence, the walls of the reservoir are made too weak, and the water escapes and damage results(*q*).

The above cases show that where a contractor is employed to do work lawful in itself, but of a dangerous character, the employer's duty is to take proper care that the danger is avoided(*r*). The employer, however, is not liable for casual or collateral acts of negligence on the part of the contractor or his servants, which do not involve a breach of the employer's duty. In truth, in the cases referred to, the basis of the employer's liability is, not the contractor's negligence, but his own, whether brought about by the contractor's negligence or not. A company, having statutory powers to build a bridge across a road, employed a contractor to build it. In the course of the delivery of material for the work, a workman of the contractor negligently let a stone fall upon a person in the road, and it was held that the company were not liable(*s*). This was considered to be a mere collateral act of negligence.

Employer
answerable
for breach of
his own duty.

(*p*) *Hardaker v. Idle District Council*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 335. *don U. C.*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 72: 68 L. J. Q. B. 704; *Holliday v. Nat.*

(*q*) *Fletcher v. Rylands*, L. R. 1 Ex. 265: 3 H. L. 330. *Telephone Co.*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 392: 68 L. J. Q. B. 1016; *The Snark*, [1900] P. 105.

(*r*) See also *Pickard v. Smith*, 10 C. B. N. S. 470; *Bower v. Peate*, 1 Q. B. D. 321; *Percival v. Hughes*, 8 App. Cas. 443; *Penny v. Wimble-*

(*s*) *Reedie v. L. & N. W. R. Co.*, 4 Exch. 244.

Master's
liability for
servant's acts.

Where the relation of master and servant exists, "the principle upon which the master is in general liable to answer for accidents resulting from the negligence or unskilfulness of his servant is that the act of the servant is in truth his own act. If the master is himself driving his carriage, and from want of skill causes injury to a passer-by, he is of course responsible for that want of skill. If, instead of driving the carriage with his own hands, he employs his servant to drive it, the servant is but an instrument set in motion by the master, and whatever the servant does in order to give effect to the master's wish may be treated as the act of the master: *qui facit per alium facit per se*" (t). And the general rules are that "a master is responsible for all acts done by his servant in the course of his employment, though without particular directions" (u): that "where a servant is acting within the scope of his employment and in so acting does something negligent or wrongful, the master is liable, even though the act done may be the very reverse of that which the servant was actually directed to do" (x); for "the law casts upon the master a liability for the act of the servant in the course of his employment; and the law is not so futile as to allow a master, by giving secret instructions to his servant, to discharge himself from liability" (y).

On the other hand, the rule is that "the master is only responsible so long as the servant can be said to be doing the act, in the doing of which he is guilty of negligence, in the course of his employment as servant" (z); for "where the servant, instead of doing that which he is employed to do, does something which he is not employed to do at all, the master cannot be said to do it by his servant, and

(t) *Hutchinson v. York, &c. R.*, C. P. 148, 152.
Co., 5 Exch. 343, 350.

(u) *Per* Ld. Holt, *Tuberville v. Stamp*, 1 Ld. Raym. 266.

(x) *Per* Kelly, C.B., *Bayley v. Manchester, &c., R. Co.*, L. R. 8

(y) *Per* Willes, J., *Limpus v. L. G. Omnibus Co.*, 1 H. & C. 526, 539.

(z) *Per* Cockburn, C.J., *Storey v. Ashton*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476, 479.

therefore is not responsible for the negligence of the servant in doing it" (a). It is often difficult to decide whether or not a servant, in doing a particular act in which he was guilty of a wrong or of negligence, was acting within the scope of his employment. The question must be determined according to the facts of the particular case; it is usually a question of fact, to be left, where the trial is by jury, to the jury's determination (b).

It is not only for the negligence of his servant while acting within the scope of his employment that a master is liable; for the rule is that "the master is answerable for every such wrong of the servant or agent as is committed in the course of the service and for the master's benefit, though no express command or privity of the master be proved," and no distinction can be drawn between fraud and any other intentional wrong (c); nor does the master escape civil liability because the wrong is a criminal act (d). A master, however, is not answerable for his servant's fraud, if committed, not with a view to benefit the master, but for the servant's own private ends (e); and it seems that this limitation upon a master's liability obtains, whatever be the nature of the wrong committed by the servant (f). For instance, "if a servant, driving a

Servant's
torts.

(a) *Per Maule, J., Mitchell v. Crasswheeler*, 13 C. B. 237, 247; see *Rayner v. Mitchell*, 2 C. P. D. 357; *Stevens v. Woodward* 6 Q. B. D. 318; and see *Sanderson v. Collins*, [1904] 1 K. B. 628; 73 L. J. K. B. 358; *Beard v. London General Omnibus Co.*, [1900] 2 Q. B. 530; 69 L. J. Q. B. 895; *Hanson v. Waller*, [1901] 1 K. B. 390; 70 L. J. K. B. 231.

(b) See *Bank of N. S. Wales v. Ouston*, 4 App. Cas. 270; *Abrahams v. Deakin*, [1891] 1 Q. B. 516; 60 L. J. Q. B. 238, where it was held that there was no evidence to go to the jury.

(c) *Barwick v. English J.S. Bank*, L. R. 2 Ex. 259; *Mackay v. Commercial Bank*, L. R. 5 P. C. 394; *Swire v. Francis*, 3 App. Cas. 106; *Houldsworth v. Glasgow Bank*, 5 App. Cas. 317, 326.

(d) *Dyer v. Munday*, [1895] 1 Q. B. 742; 64 L. J. Q. B. 448.

(e) *British Mutual Bank v. Charnwood Forest R. Co.*, 18 Q. B. D. 714; see *Thorne v. Heard*, [1895] A. C. 495, 502; 64 L. J. Ch. 652; and *Cheshire v. Bailey*, [1905] 1 K. B. 237; 74 L. J. K. B. 176 (thefts by servants).

(f) *Richards v. West Middlesex W. Co.*, 15 Q. B. D. 664.

carriage, in order to effect some purpose of his own, wantonly strike the horse of another person, and produce an accident, the master will not be liable" (g). But to render the master liable for the servant's wilful act of wrong, it is sufficient that the servant did it in the prosecution of his master's business, intending to benefit his master, and acting within the scope of his employment (h).

The same limitation of the rule has been applied in Criminal Law. Where a servant had in his own physical possession a fraudulent measure for his own fraudulent purposes as distinguished from the interests of his master, his possession was deemed to be his own possession, and not the possession of his master, within the meaning of an Act which imposes penalties on any person who has in his possession for use for trade any measure which is false or unjust (i).

Corporations.

The general principles which render a private individual liable for his servants' acts apply to render a corporation, which can only act through agents, liable for its agents' acts (k). It is the duty of a railway company, being a trading corporation, to keep on the spot an agent having authority to act on their behalf in all emergencies likely to arise there in the course of their business (l); and the fact that there is a person on the spot who acts as if he had such authority is evidence that he has it (m). If the company have statutory powers to arrest for a particular offence, and such agent makes an arrest in the mistaken belief that

(g) *Croft v. Alison*, 4 B & Ald. 590, 592 : 23 R. R. 407.

(h) *Limpus v. L. G. Omnibus Co.*, 1 H. & C. 526; *Seymour v. Greenwood*, 7 H. & N. 355.

(i) *Anglo-American Oil Co. v. Manning*, [1908] 1 K. B. 536 : 77 L. J. K. B. 205.

(k) See *Cornford v. Carlton Bank*,

[1899] 1 Q. B. 392 : [1900] 1 Q. B. 22; *Citizens' Life Assurance Co. v. Brown*, [1904] A. C. 423 : 73 L. J. P. C. 102.

(l) *Giles v. Taff Vale R. Co.*, 2 E & B. 822; see *The Apollo*, [1891] A. C. 499, 507.

(m) *Goff v. G. N. R. Co.*, 3 E. & E. 672 : 30 L. J. Q. B. 148.

the offence has been committed, the company is liable (*n*). So, too, where a railway company was empowered to employ special constables as its servants, the company was held responsible for an arrest for felony made by a special constable without reasonable grounds for believing that a felony had been committed (*o*). If, however, such agent makes an arrest for an imagined offence for the actual commission of which the company has no statutory power to arrest, an authority from the company to make the arrest cannot be implied (*p*).

An important limitation to the maxim *respondet superior* is imposed, at common law, by the principle generally known as the doctrine of common employment. A series of decisions, following in the train of *Priestly v. Fowler* (*q*), established the principle that, at the common law, a servant, when he engages to serve a master, undertakes, as between himself and the master, to run all the *ordinary* risks of the service, including the risk of injury, not only from his own negligence, but also from the negligence of a fellow-servant, whilst the servant is acting in discharge of his duty as servant to him who is the common master of both (*r*). Apart from statute, therefore, a master is not, as a rule, answerable to his servant for the negligence of a fellow-servant, provided that the master has taken due care to associate the servant only with persons of ordinary competence (*s*); for it is usually the duty of the master to be reasonably careful that the servant is not exposed to *unnecessary* risks, whether from incompetent fellow-servants (*s*), or from defective machinery, or from improper methods of using sound machinery (*t*). And the doctrine of common

Doctrine of
common
employment.

(*n*) *Id.*; *Moore v. Metr. R. Co.*, L. R. 8. Q. B. 36.

(*o*) *Lambert v. Great Eastern Ry.*, [1909] 2 K. B. 776; 79 L. J. K. B. 32.

(*p*) *Poulton v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 534.

(*q*) 3 M. & W. 1.

(*r*) *Johnson v. Lindsay*, [1891] A. C. 371, 377; 61 L. J. Q. B. 90, and cases there cited.

(*s*) *Hutchinson v. York, &c., R. Co.*, 5 Exch. 343, 353; *Wigmore v. Jay*, *Id.* 354.

(*t*) *Smith v. Baker*, [1891] A. C.

employment cannot be applied unless there be both a common master and a common employment (*u*). For instance, if a person carry on the business of a banker in one place and also the business of a brewer in another, a clerk employed at the bank and a drayman employed at the brewery are not in a common employment, and the doctrine would not protect the common master from liability to the clerk when run over by the drayman's negligence, though both were engaged at the time on their master's service (*x*). Servants may, however, be engaged in a common employment, though the duties they have to perform are different. Accordingly, the driver and the guard of a coach, or the steersman and the rowers of a boat, are generally engaged in a common employment (*y*); and servants do not cease to be fellow-servants because they are not all equal in point of authority. Thus, it was held that the manager of a mining pit was a fellow-workman engaged in a common employment with the actual miners (*z*).

The rule at common law may accordingly be summed up in the words of Lord Cairns (*a*), who said that the master is not, and cannot be, liable to his servant unless there be negligence on the part of the master in that which he, the master, has contracted or undertaken with his servant to do. The master has not contracted or undertaken to execute in person the work connected with his business. But the master, in the event of his not personally superintending and directing the work, is to select proper and competent persons to do so, and to furnish them with adequate materials and resources for the work.

Statutory
modifications
of doctrine.

The liability, however, of employers to their workmen in respect of personal injuries received in the course of

325, 353: 60 L. J. Q. B. 683; see also *Groves v. Wimborne*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 402: 67 L. J. Q. B. 862.

(*u*) *Swainson v. N. E. R. Co.*, 3 Ex. D. 348.

(*x*) See *The Petrel*, [1893] P. 320,

326: 62 L. J. P. 92.

(*y*) *Bartonshill Coal Co. v. Reid*, 3 Macq. 266, 295.

(*z*) *Wilson v. Merry*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. Cas. 326.

(*a*) L. R. 1 Sc. App. Cas. 332.

their employment has been considerably extended by the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (*b*), and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 (*c*): but it must not be forgotten that the doctrine of common employment still exists and affords a good defence in a common law action for negligence. The last-mentioned Acts merely provide special remedies in the cases to which they apply.

The maxim *respondet superior* cannot be applied to render a landlord answerable for a nuisance committed during the term upon the demised premises by the occupying tenant, unless it be shown that the landlord authorised the nuisance (*d*). But an occupier of premises who licenses another to commit a nuisance thereon is liable for the act of his licensee (*e*). Where demised premises adjoin a highway, the landlord is not liable to a passer-by for injuries from defects in the premises, such as an insecure chimney-pot or dangerous grating, which arose during the term, and which the landlord was not bound, as between himself and the tenant, to remedy (*f*); nor is he liable, if the defects existed at the time of the demise, but the duty of remedying them was expressly cast, by the terms of the demise, upon the tenant (*g*). He is liable, however, if the defects existed at the time of the demise and the tenant did not agree to remedy them (*h*).

Landlord's
responsibility
for nuisance.

The duty to take care that premises are reasonably safe for persons coming to them by invitation is primarily the duty of the occupying tenant (*i*), and the landlord is, as a

(*b*) 43 & 44 Vict. c. 42.

(*c*) 6 Edw. VII. c. 58.

(*d*) *Rich v. Basterfield*, 4 C. B. 783; see *Harris v. James*, 45 L. J. Q. B. 545.

(*e*) *White v. Jameson*, L. R. 18 Eq. 308; *Jenkins v. Jackson*, 40 Ch. D. 71; 58 L. J. Ch. 124.

(*f*) *Nelson v. Liverpool Brewery Co.*, 2 C. P. D. 311; 46 L. J. Q. B. 675.

(*g*) *Gwinell v. Eamer*, L. R. 10 C. P. 658; *Pretty v. Bickmore*, L. R. 8 C. P. 401.

(*h*) *Payne v. Rogers*, 2 H. Bl. 350; 3 R. R. 415; *Todd v. Flight*, 9 C. B. N. S. 377; 30 L. J. C. P. 21; *Bowen v. Anderson*, [1894] 1 Q. B. 164.

(*i*) *Indermaur v. Dames*, L. R. 1 C. P. 274; 2 C. P. 311; 36 L. J. Ex. 181.

rule, under no duty save such as he may owe to his tenant by the terms of his contract (*k*). But there may be cases where a landlord, by undertaking with his tenant to repair some part of the premises (such as a common staircase to a block of flats), is liable for the consequences of non-repair to persons coming thereon by the implied invitation of the tenant (*l*).

Public functionaries.

With respect to public functionaries, having authority, such as judges civil or ecclesiastical, or magistrates, these parties are, in general, protected from the consequences of an illegal and wrongful act done by an officer or other person employed in an inferior ministerial capacity, provided that the principal himself acted in the discharge of his duty, and within the scope of his jurisdiction, and of the authority delegated to him. The principle, however, on which a private person or a company is liable for damage caused by the neglect of servants has been held applicable to a corporation which has been entrusted by statute to perform certain works, and to receive tolls for the use of such works, although those tolls, unlike the tolls received by the private person or the company, are not applied to the use of the corporation, but are devoted to the maintenance of the works (*m*).

“The law requires that the execution of public works by a public body shall be conducted with a reasonable degree of care and skill; and if they, or those who are employed by them, are guilty of negligence in the performance of the works entrusted to them, they are responsible to the party injured” (*n*).

(*k*) *Lane v. Cox*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 415; 66 L. J. Q. B. 193; *Cavalier v. Pope*, [1906] A. C. 428; 75 L. J. K. B. 609; *Huggett v. Miers*, [1908] 2 K. B. 278; 77 L. J. K. B. 710; but see *Hargroves, Aronson & Co. v. Hartopp*, [1905] 1 K. B. 472; 74 L. J. K. B. 233.

(*l*) See *Miller v. Hancock*, [1893]

2 Q. B. 177, as explained in *Huggett v. Miers*, [1908] 2 K. B. 278; 77 L. J. K. B. 710.

(*m*) *Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs*, L. R. 1 H. L. 93, where the cases are reviewed. See *R. v. Selby Dam Commrs.*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 348.

(*n*) *Clothier v. Webster*, 12 C. B. N. S. 790, 796. See *Brownlow v*

In an ordinary case, however, where public commissioners in execution of their office enter into a contract for the performance of work, it seems clear that the person who contracts to do the work "is not to be considered as a servant, but as a person carrying on an independent business, such as the commissioners were fully justified in employing to perform works which they could not execute for themselves, and who was known to all the world as performing them" (o). And the person thus employed may himself, by virtue of an express statutory clause, be protected from liability whilst acting under the direction of the commissioners (p); provided there be no personal negligence on his part or that of his servants, since a negligent execution of the work will make him liable to those injured thereby (q). And a shipowner is not responsible at common law (r) for injuries occasioned by the unskilful navigation of his vessel whilst under the control of a pilot whom the owner was compelled to take on board, and in whose selection he had no voice (s).

It is clear, also, that a servant of the Crown, contracting in his official capacity, is not personally liable on the contracts so entered into. In such cases, therefore, the rule of *respondeat superior* does not apply, such exceptions to it resulting from motives of public policy; for no prudent person would accept a public situation at the hazard of exposing himself to a multiplicity of suits by parties thinking themselves aggrieved (t).

Rule inapplicable to the Crown.

Metr. Board of Works, 16 C. B. N. S. 546; *Gibson v. Mayor of Preston*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 218; *Parsons v. St. Mathew, Bethnal Green*, L. R. 3 C. P. 56; *Hyams v. Webster*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 138.

(o) *Judgm., Allen v. Hayward*, 7 Q. B. 975. See *ante*.

(p) *Ward v. Lee*, 7 E. & B. 426; *Newton v. Ellis*, 5 E. & B. 115.

(q) *Addison on Torts*, 5th ed. 671.

(r) See, also, 57 & 58 Vict. c. 60, s. 633; *Gen. Steam Nav. Co. v. British & Colonial Steam Nav. Co.*, L. R. 4 Ex. 238; *The Lion*, L. R. 2 P. C. 525.

(s) *The Halley*, L. R. 2 P. C. 193, 201, 202. See also *The Thetis*, L. R. 2 A. & E. 365.

(t) *Per Dallas, C.J., Gidley v. Ld. Palmerston*, 3 B. & B. 286, 287: 24

Again, the maxim, *respondeat superior*, does not apply in the case of the sovereign; for, as we have before seen, the sovereign is not liable for personal negligence; and, therefore, the principle, *qui facit per alium facit per se*—which is applied to render the master answerable for the negligence of his servant, because this has arisen from his own negligence or imprudence in selecting or retaining a careless servant—is not applicable to the sovereign, in whom negligence or misconduct cannot be implied, and for which, if it occurs in fact, the law affords no remedy. Nor can a public servant in his official capacity be held liable for the torts of his subordinates in carrying on the business of the department, unless he has himself personally directed and ordered the commission of the wrongful act complained of (*u*). Accordingly, in a case already alluded to, it was observed by Lord Lyndhurst, that instances have occurred of damage occasioned by the negligent management of ships of war, in which it has been held, that, where an act is done by one of the crew without the participation of the commander, the latter is not responsible; but that if the principle contended for in the case then before the Court were correct, the negligence of a seamen in the service of the Crown would, in such a case, render the Crown liable to make good the damage; a proposition which certainly could not be maintained (*x*).

Rule inapplicable to servants of the Crown.

R. R. 668; *per* Ashhurst, J., *Macbeath v. Haldimand*, 1 T. R. 181, 182: 1 R. R. 177; *Palmer v. Hutchinson*, 6 App. Cas. 619; *Mitchell v. The Queen*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 121, n.; but see *Graham v. Public Works Comrs*, [1901] 2 K. B. 781: 70 L. J. K. B. 860.

(*u*) *Raleigh v. Goschen*, [1898] 1 Ch. 78: 67 L. J. Ch. 59; *Bainbridge v. Postmaster-General*, [1906] 1 K. B. 178: 75 L. J. K. B. 366.

(*x*) *Viscount Canterbury v. A.-G.*, 1 Phill. 306; *Feather v. Reg.*, 6 B.

& S. 294 *et seq.*; *Tobin v. Reg.*, 16 C. B. N. S. 310; *Reg. v. Prince*, L. R. 1 C. C. 150. See *Hodgkinson v. Fernie*, 2 C. B. N. S. 415.

It seems almost superfluous to observe, that the above remarks upon the maxim *respondeat superior*, are to some considerable extent applicable in criminal law. On the one hand, a party employing an innocent agent is liable for an offence committed through this medium; on the other, if the agent had a guilty knowledge he will be

A subject sustaining a legal wrong at the hands of a minister of the Crown is not, however, without a remedy, for "as the sovereign cannot authorise wrong to be done, the authority of the Crown would afford no defence to an action brought for an illegal act committed by an officer of the Crown" (a).

Lastly, assuming that an act which would *primâ facie* be a trespass, is done by lawful order of the government, the party who commits the act is clearly exempted from liability; and where the injury "is an act of state without remedy, except by appeal to the justice of the

responsible as well as his employer. See *Bac. Max.*, reg. 16. Though "it is a rule of criminal law that a person cannot be criminally liable for acting as the agent of another without any knowledge that he was acting wrongly;" *per* Crompton, J., *Hearne v. Garton*, 2 E. & E. 76.

In *Coleman v. Riches*, 16 C. B. 118, Jervis, C.J., specifies various cases in which criminal responsibility will be entailed on a master for the acts of his servants in the ordinary course of their employment.

"There are," moreover, "many acts of a servant for which, though criminal, the master is civilly responsible by action;" *per* Jervis, C.J., *Dunkley v. Farris*, 2 C. B. 458; *Palmer v. Evans*, 2 C. B. N. S. 151; *Roberts v. Preston*, 9 C. B. N. S. 208.

Upon the above subject *Ld. Wensleydale* thus observes:—"I take it to be a clear proposition of law, that if a man employs an agent for a perfectly legal purpose, and that agent does an illegal act, that act does not affect the principal unless a great deal more is shown: unless it is shown that the principal directed the agent so to act, or

really meant he should so act, or afterwards ratified the illegal act, or that he appointed one to be his general agent to do both legal and illegal acts;" *Cooper v. Slade*, 6 H. L. Cas. 793; and see *Parkes v. Prescott*, L. R. 4 Ex. 169.

Also, in *Wilson v. Rankin*, 6 B. & S. 216, the Court thus remark:—"It is a well-established distinction, that while a man is civilly responsible for the acts of his agent when acting within the established limits of his authority, he will not be criminally responsible for such acts, unless express authority be shown, or the authority is necessarily to be implied from the nature of the employment, as in the case of a bookseller held liable for the sale by his shopman of a libellous publication. Under ordinary circumstances the authority of the agent is limited to that which is lawful. If in seeking to carry out the purpose of his employment he oversteps the law, he outruns his authority, and his principal will not be bound by what he does." See, also, *Reg. v. Stephens*, L. R. 1 Q. B. 702.

(a) *Judgm., Feather v. Reg.*, 6 B. & S. 296; see *ante*, p. 46.

state which inflicts it, or by application of the individual sufferer to the government of his country to insist upon compensation from the government of this—in either view, the wrong is no longer actionable”(b).

OMNIS RATIHABITIO RETROTRAHITUR ET MANDATO PRIORI ÆQUIPARATUR. (Co. Litt. 207 a.)—*A subsequent ratification has a retrospective effect, and is equivalent to a prior command.*

General rule. It is a rule of very wide application, and one repeatedly laid down in the Roman law, that *ratihabitio mandato comparatur* (c), where *ratihabitio* means “the act of assenting to what has been done by another in my name” (d). “No maxim,” remarks Mr. Justice Story, “is better settled in reason and law than the maxim, *omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori æquiparatur*, at all events, where it does not prejudice the rights of strangers. And the civil law does not, it is believed, differ from the common law on this subject” (e).

It is, then, true as a general rule, that a subsequent ratification and adoption by a person of what has been already done in his name or as on his behalf, but without his authority, has a retrospective effect, and is equivalent to his previous command. For instance, if a stranger pays a debt without the debtor's authority, but acting as his agent and on his behalf, and the debtor subsequently ratifies the payment, it operates as a good payment made by the debtor on the date when it was actually made (f).

(b) *Vide per* Parke, B., *Buron v. Denman*, 2 Exch. 189; explained in *Feather v. Reg.*, 6 B. & S. 296.

(c) D. 46, 3, 12, § 4; D. 50, 17, 60; D. 3, 5, 6, § 9; D. 43, 16, 1, § 14.

(d) Brisson. ad verb. “*Ratihabitio.*”

(e) *Fleckner v. United States Bank*, 8 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 363. The operation of the maxim with reference to the law of principal and agent, is considered at length in Story on Agency.

(f) *Simpson v. Egginton*, 10 Exch. 845.

And if an action is brought in a person's name and for his benefit, but without his knowledge, his subsequent ratification of the proceedings in the action renders them as much his own as if he had originally authorised them (g).

Without multiplying instances of the doctrine, it seems sufficient to state the general proposition, that the subsequent assent by the principal to his agent's conduct not only exonerates the agent from the consequences of a departure from his orders, but likewise renders the principal liable on contracts made in violation of such orders, or even where there has been no previous retainer or employment; and this assent may be inferred from the conduct of the principal (h). The subsequent sanction is considered the same thing, in effect, as assent at the time; the difference being, that, where the authority is given beforehand, the party giving it must trust to his agent; if it be given subsequently to the contract, the party knows that all has been done according to his wishes (i). "That an act done for another by a person not assuming to act for himself, but for such other person, though without any precedent authority whatever, becomes the act of the principal if subsequently ratified by him, is the known and well-established rule of law. In that case, the principal is bound by the act, whether it be for his detriment or advantage, and whether it be founded on a tort or a contract, to the same extent as by, and with all the consequences which follow from, the same act done by his previous authority" (k).

The principal limitation to the doctrine that a person can, by ratifying another's act, render that act his own in law, lies in the rule that a person cannot be said in law to ratify another's act, unless that other, in doing the act,

Act must be done on ratifier's behalf.

(g) *Ancona v. Marks*, 7 H. & N. 686.

(h) Smith, Merc. Law, 9th ed. 125, and cases there cited.

(i) *Per Best, C.J., Maclean v. Dunn*, 4 Bing. 727; 29 R. R. 714.

(k) *Wilson v. Tummam*, 6 M. & Gr. 242.

purported, or assumed, or intended (*l*) to do it as such person's agent; and this rule applies equally whether the doctrine of ratification is invoked to enable a person to take the benefit of an act, or to render him liable therefor as a principal, or to justify an act as done by lawful authority.

Contracts.

Thus, with regard to contracts, it is a well-established principle that "to entitle a person to sue upon a contract, it must be clearly shown that he himself made it or that it was made *on his behalf* by an agent authorised to act for him at the time, or whose act has been subsequently ratified and adopted by him" (*m*).

Torts.

Again, with regard to torts, it is laid down that, by the common law, "he that receiveth a trespasser, and agreeth to a trespass after it be done is no trespasser, unless the trespass was done *to his use or for his benefit*, and then his agreement subsequent amounteth to a commandment" (*n*). The question of liability for a tort by ratification accordingly depends upon whether the act was originally intended to be done to the use or for the benefit of the party who is afterwards said to have ratified it (*o*). Therefore, if A. wrongfully seize my gun to his own use, B. does not become answerable for that trespass, because he afterwards receives the gun from A. and refuses my demand for its return (*p*). And, similarly, if the sheriff, acting under a valid writ by the command of the Court and as the servant of the Court, seizes the wrong person's goods, a subsequent declaration by the execution creditor of his approval of the seizure does not make the seizure a wrongful seizure by him: to render him answerable for the seizure, it is necessary to show that it was done under his previous direction (*q*).

(*l*) *Keighley, Maxsted & Co. v. Durant*, [1901] A. C. 240: 70 L. J. K. B. 662.

(*m*) *Watson v. Swann*, 11 C. B. N. S. 756, 771.

(*n*) 4 Inst. 317; cited by Parke, J., 4 B. & Ad. 616; and by Willes, J., *Stacey v. Whitehurst*, 18 C. B. N. S. 356.

(*o*) Judgm., *Eastern Counties R. Co. v. Broom*, 6 Exch. 314, 327, citing 4 Inst. 317.

(*p*) *Wilson v. Barker*, 4 B. & Ad. 614.

(*q*) *Wilson v. Tunman*, 6 M. & Gr. 236, 242; *Morris v. Salberg*, 22 Q. B. D. 614: 58 L. J. Q. B. 275.

It has long been settled that a person who does an act on his own behalf cannot afterwards justify it as done on behalf of another or rely on that other's subsequent assent to the act. On this point it is sufficient to cite the words of Anderson, C.J. (*r*): If one have cause to distrain my goods, and a stranger, of his own wrong, without any warrant or authority given him by the other, take my goods, not as bailiff or servant to the other, and I bring an action of trespass against him, can he excuse himself, by saying that he did it as bailiff or servant? Can he so father his misdemeanors upon another? He cannot; for once he was a trespasser, and his intent was manifest. But if one distrain as bailiff, although, in truth, he is not bailiff: if after he in whose right he doth it doth assent, he shall not be punished as a trespasser, for that assent shall have relation unto the time of the distress taken." Justification.

It must be observed, however, that there is one class of cases in which a person may, perhaps, be said to adopt or ratify an act although it was done without any pretence of doing it on his behalf. For it is well established that a person whose goods are wrongfully seized and sold may waive the tort, affirm the sale as a sale by his authority, and recover the proceeds as money had and received to his use (*s*). Wrongful sale.

Whether a criminal act can be so ratified as to make it in law the criminal act of the person ratifying it is a question on which there seems to be no clear decision. In *Reg. v. Woodward* (*t*) it seems that the opinion of some of the Judges was that a person is guilty of knowingly receiving stolen goods, if, with knowledge of the felony, he ratifies their receipt by a person who assumed to receive them on Criminal acts.

(*r*) Godholt, 109.

448; see *ante*, p. 238.

(*s*) *Lamine v. Dorrell*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1216; *Smith v. Hodson*, 4 T. R. 211; 2 Smith L. C., 11th ed. 146; *Rodgers v. Maw*, 15 M. & W.

(*t*) 31 L. J. M. C. 91: L. & C. 122; see 1 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 364.

his behalf, the acts of ratification being an agreement with the thief for the price of the goods and payment thereof. The main ground, however, of the decision in this case appears to have been that the receipt of the goods was not complete until the price was agreed and paid.

Forgery.

It seems safe to say that a person whose signature is forged cannot ratify the act so as to protect the forger from the charge of forgery (*u*) ; and it has been held that where a person's signature is forged to a promissory note, the doctrine of liability by ratification cannot be invoked against him in an action on the note, the forger's pretence having been, not that the signature was authorised, but that it was genuine (*a*). The person whose signature is forged may, indeed, become estopped by his conduct from setting up that it is not genuine (*b*) ; but a contract by him that he will not dispute the signature in consideration of the forger not being prosecuted is illegal, and creates no estoppel as between the parties thereto (*c*).

Incapacity to ratify.

The principle, it will be noticed, is that a ratification is equivalent to a prior command ; and it has no greater force. A person cannot ratify an act, if at the time of the act he had no capacity to command or to do it (*d*) ; and there can be no ratification of an act by a person who when the act was done had no existence actually or in contemplation of law (*e*). Thus a corporation cannot ratify a contract which a person purported to make on its behalf before its incorporation (*f*). On the other hand, as the title of an administrator, when he has been appointed, relates back to the time of the intestate's death, it has been held that an

(*u*) See *per* Ld. Blackburn, 6 App. Cas. 99.

(*a*) *Brook v. Hook*, L. R. 6 Ex. 89.

(*b*) See 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 24.

(*c*) *Brook v. Hook*, *supra*.

(*d*) *Riche v. Ashbury Co.*, L. R. 7 H. L. 653.

(*e*) *Per* Willes, J., L. R. 7 C. P. 184.

(*f*) *Re Empress Engineering Co.*, 16 Ch. D. 125 ; *Re Northumberland Avenue Hotel Co.*, 33 Id. 16 ; see *Howard v. Patent Ivory Co.*, 38 Id. 156.

administrator can ratify a sale of the intestate's property made before his appointment by a person purporting to sell as agent for whatever person might happen to be the intestate's legal representative (*g*).

Although the subsequent ratification of an act done as agent is, as a rule, equivalent to a prior command, there are cases in which a ratification is of no effect, because it comes too late. For, where the time within which a person has power to do an act is limited, he cannot ratify the act, if done without his previous authority, unless he ratify it before his power to do the act has ceased (*h*). Thus, a landlord cannot rely upon an unauthorised notice to his tenant to quit, unless he ratify it before the time for giving the notice has passed (*i*); and a person who stops goods in transitu, as agent for the seller, but without his authority, cannot justify the act, unless it be ratified before the seller's right of stoppage is lost (*j*). And the rule has been stated to be that an estate once vested cannot be divested, nor can an act lawful at the time of its performance be rendered unlawful, by the application of the doctrine of ratification (*k*). Moreover, it must be observed that a ratification is an election to confirm an act, and that, being an election, it must be made within a reasonable time, the standard of reasonableness depending in each case upon its circumstances (*l*).

Ratification,
when too
late.

Again, if a person pay another's debt, acting as his agent, but without his authority, it is open to such person and the creditor, so long as the payment remains unratified, to agree to cancel it, and, after it has been so cancelled, the debtor cannot take the benefit of the payment by ratifying

(*g*) *Foster v. Bates*, 12 M. & W. 226; see *Re Watson*, 19 Q. B. D. 234; *post*, pp. 703, 704.

(*h*) *Ainsworth v. Creeke*, L. R. 4 C. P. 476; *Dibbins v. Dibbins*, [1896] 2 Ch. 348; 65 L. J. Ch. 725; *Grover v. Mathews*, [1910] 2 K. B. 401.

(*i*) *Doe v. Goldwin*, 2 Q. B. 143.

(*j*) *Bird v. Brown*, 4 Exch. 786.

(*k*) *Per Cotton, L.J., Bolton v Lambert*, 41 Ch. D. 295, 307.

(*l*) *Per Bowen, L.J., Re Portuguese Consolidated Mines*, 45 Ch. D. 16, 34.

it (*m*). But upon the acceptance, though not authorised, of an offer of purchase, the person who made the offer cannot, by his mere withdrawal of it, render the acceptance incapable of ratification (*n*).

Conditions
of valid
ratification.

From what has been already said the reader will gather that to constitute a valid ratification three conditions must, as a rule, be satisfied: first, the agent whose act is sought to be ratified must have professed to act for the principal (*o*); secondly, at the time the act was done the agent must have had a competent principal; and thirdly, at the time of the ratification the principal must be legally capable of doing the act himself (*p*). Moreover, in order to render the ratification of an act binding, "the ratification must be either with full knowledge of the character of the act to be adopted, or with the intention to adopt it at all events and under whatever circumstances" (*q*). Where the supposed ratification relates to acts as to which there is no pretence of any previous authority, "full knowledge of the facts and unequivocal adoption after such knowledge must be proved, or, in the alternative, the circumstances of the alleged ratification must be such as to warrant the clear inference that the principal was adopting the supposed agent's acts, whatever they were or however culpable they were" (*r*).

Without discussing at length by what acts a ratification may be shown, we may point out here that where work is done to property, such as repairs to a ship, under an order not authorised by the owner, the mere

(*m*) *Walter v. James*, L. R. 6 Ex. 124.

(*n*) *Bolton Partners v. Lambert*, 41 Ch. D. 295: 58 L. J. Ch. 425.

(*o*) It is enough if he professed to act on behalf of the principal, though his real intention may have been to contract on his own behalf (*In re Tiedmann & Ledermann Frères*, [1899] 2 Q. B. 66: 68 L. J. Q. B. 852).

(*p*) See *per Wright, J.*, *Frith v. Staines*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 70, 75: 66 L. J. Q. B. 510.

(*q*) *Per Willes, J.*, L. R. 7 C. P. 57; see *Freeman v. Rosher*, 13 Q. B. 780; *E. Counties R. Co. v. Broom*, 6 Exch. 314; *La Banque Jacques-Cartier v. La Banque d'Eparque*, 13 App. Cas. 111.

(*r*) *Marsh v. Jones*, [1897] 1 Ch. 213, 247: 66 L. J. Ch. 128.

fact that the owner afterwards takes possession of the property and deals with it as his own is not evidence that he has ratified the order: it is not like the case of an acceptance of goods which were not previously the acceptor's property (s).

The doctrine that ratification is equivalent to prior command is applicable to persons, not only when they act on behalf of private individuals, but also when they act on behalf of the Crown (t). For instance, in 1841, Captain Denman, having been sent to the Gallinas to rescue two British subjects, detained there as slaves, took upon himself, without previous orders, to break up a slave-dealing establishment, and when its owner subsequently brought an action against him it was held that he could justify his acts by showing that the British Government had ratified them, and that they were consequently acts of State, the responsibility for which rested with the Crown alone (u).

Ratification
by Crown.

NIHIL TAM CONVENIENS EST NATURALI ÆQUITATI QUAM
UNUMQUODQUE DISSOLVI EO LIGAMINE QUO LIGATUM EST.
(2 Inst. 360.)—*Nothing is so consonant to natural equity
as that every contract should be dissolved by the means
which rendered it binding.*

It is an old rule of the common law that every contract ought to be dissolved by matter of as high a nature as that which first made it obligatory (x). It was considered to be "inconvenient that matters in writing, made by advice and consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the parties, should be controlled

Rule, and
reason of the
rule.

(s) See *Forman v. The Liddesdale*,
[1900] A. C. 190.

(t) *Phillips v. Eyre*, L. R. 6 Q. B.
23, 24.

(u) *Buron v. Denman*, 2 Exch.
167; see also *Sec. of State for India*
v. Sahaba, 13 Moo. P. C. 86.

(x) Jenk. Cent. 166; Id. 74.

by averment of the parties, to be proved by the uncertain testimony of slippery memory" (y); and it was therefore laid down, that, "an obligation is not made void but by a release; for *naturale est quidlibet dissolvi eo modo quo ligatur*: a record by a record; a deed by a deed; and a parol promise or agreement is dissolved by parol; and an Act of Parliament by an Act of Parliament. This reason and this rule of law are always of force in the common law" (z).

Statute.

In the first place, with respect to statutes of the realm, we may remark that these, being created by an exercise of the highest authority which the constitution of this country acknowledges, cannot be dispensed with, amended, suspended, or repealed, but by the authority by which they were made: *jura eodem modo destituuntur quo constituuntur* (a). It was, indeed, a maxim of the civilians that, as laws might be established by long and continued custom, so they could likewise be abrogated by desuetude, or be annulled by contrary usage: *ea vero quæ ipsa sibi quæque civitas constituit sæpe mutari solent vel tacito consensu populi vel aliâ postea lege latâ* (b). Our law, however, follows the safer rule, that every statute continues in force till repealed by the legislature (c).

(y) *Countess of Rutland's case*, 5 Rep. 26. "That which is gained by marriage may be lost by marriage: *eodem modo quo quid constituitur dissolvitur*." Cruise on Dignities, 2nd ed. 90; cited *Cowley v. Cowley*, [1900] P. 123; see S. C. [1901] A. C. 450: 70 L. J. P. 83.

(z) Jenk. Cent. 70.

(a) Dwarr. Stats., 2nd ed. 529; Bell. Dict. and Dig. of Scotch Law, 636. "*Cujus est instituere ejus est abrogare*. We say, in general, he that institutes may also abrogate, most especially when the institution is not only by, but for himself. If

the multitude, therefore, do institute, the multitude may abrogate; and they themselves, or those who succeed in the same right, can only be fit judges of the performance of the ends of the institution." Sidney, Discourse concerning Government, p. 15.

(b) I. 1, 2, 11; Irving, Civ. Law, 4th ed. 123.

(c) *Ashford v. Thornton*, 1 B. & Ald. 405: 19 R. R. 349, affords a remarkable instance of the rule. See, also, *per* Patteson, J., *Reg. v. Archbishop of Canterbury*, 11 Q. B. 627; and *ante*, p. 19.

We propose, in the next place, to consider the three following species of obligations : viz., by record, by specialty, and by simple contract; as to the first of which it will suffice to say, that an obligation by record may be discharged by a release under seal (*d*).

In the case of a specialty, no rule of our common law was better established than that such a contract could, before breach, only be discharged by an instrument of equal force (*e*); that a subsequent parol, that is to say, written or verbal agreement, not under seal, dispensing with or varying the time or mode of performance of an act covenanted to be done, could not be pleaded in bar to an action, on an instrument under seal, for non-performance of the act in the manner thereby prescribed (*f*),—in short, that the terms of a deed could not be contradicted or varied by parol; that a parol licence could not be set up in opposition to a deed (*g*).

Specialty,
how dis-
charged be-
fore breach.

In equity, however, the rule is different; a parol agreement, founded on valuable consideration, was formerly a good ground for an injunction to restrain an action upon a deed, brought in breach of the agreement; and it is clear that the rule of equity, which now prevails in the High Court (*h*), is that a contract under seal, even though the contract be one which is required by law to be in writing, may be rescinded by a valid parol agreement (*i*).

(*d*) *Per Parke, B., Barker v. St. Quintin*, 12 M. & W. 453 (cited in *Ex p. Games*, 3 H. & C. 299); Litt., s. 507, and the commentary thereon; Shep. Touch., by Preston, 322; *Farmer v. Mottram*, 7 Scott, N. R. 408.

(*e*) *Per Bosanquet, J.*, 3 Scott, N. R. 216.

(*f*) *Heard v. Wadham*, 1 East, 619; *Gwynne v. Davy*, 2 Scott, N. R. 29; cited by Cockburn, C.J., L. R. 3 Q. B. 127; *Roe v. Harrison*, 2 T. R. 425; 1 R. R. 513; *Blake's*

case, 6 Rep. 43; *Peytoe's case*, 9 Rep. 77; *Kaye v. Waghorn*, 1 Taunt. 428; 10 R. R. 558; *Cocks v. Nash*, 9 Bing. 341; 35 R. R. 547; *Harden v. Clifton*, 1 Q. B. 522; *Ripplinghall v. Lloyd*, 5 B. & Ad. 742, is particularly worthy of perusal in connection with the above subject.

(*g*) *Per Lush, J., Albert v. Grosvenor Investment Co.*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 128.

(*h*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25 (11).

(*i*) Fry, Spec. Perf., 3rd ed. pp. 469, 470.

Accord and satisfaction after breach.

It is well established that, at the common law, accord and satisfaction after a breach is a good defence to an action to recover unliquidated damages for the breach of a contract under seal, but not to an action to recover a specialty debt; the distinction being that, in the latter case, the duty to pay the debt is deemed to arise entirely from the deed, and therefore can be avoided only by matter of as high a nature; whereas, in the former case, the action is considered to be founded, not entirely upon the deed, but mainly upon the subsequent wrong or default, which, as it supports only a claim to amends, may be satisfied by amends given (*k*). It is equally well established, however, that, in equity, a specialty debt may be discharged, when overdue, by accord and satisfaction, and the rule of equity now prevails in the High Court (*l*).

It has been thought that, by the rules of equity, a voluntary parol declaration by a creditor that he intends to release his debtor from the debt becomes binding upon the creditor after the debtor has acted upon the faith of it (*m*). But this seems to be incorrect; for even in equity, a representation, to create an estoppel, must be a misrepresentation of an existing fact, and not of a mere intention (*n*).

Simple contracts.

The extent of applicability of the maxim, *unumquodque dissolvitur eodem ligamine quo ligatur*, to simple contracts, may be thus concisely indicated: "It is," said Parke, B., in *Foster v. Dawber* (*o*), "competent for both parties to an *executory* contract, by mutual agreement, without any satisfaction, to discharge the obligation of that contract (*p*). But an *executed* contract cannot be discharged, except by release under seal, or by performance of the obligation,"

(*k*) *Blake's case*, 6 Rep. 43 b.

(*l*) *Steeds v. Steeds*, 22 Q. B. D. 537; 58 L. J. Q. B. 302.

(*m*) *Yeomans v. Williams*, L. R. 1 Eq. 184.

(*n*) *Jorden v. Money*, 5 H. L. C. 185; *Chadwick v. Manning*, [1896]

A. C. 231; 65 L. J. P. C. 42. See also *Maddison v. Alderson*, 8 App. Cas. 473.

(*o*) 6 Exch. 839, 851.

(*p*) See *De Bernardy v. Harding*, 8 Exch. 822.

or by accord and satisfaction (*q*). A bill of exchange or promissory note, however, stands on a different footing, and the obligation thereon may, even after breach, be discharged by the waiver or renunciation of the holder (*r*): a doctrine which the 45 & 46 Vict. c. 61, s. 62, recognises, but limits by the requirement that the renunciation, which must be absolute and unconditional, must also be in writing unless the bill or note be delivered up to the acceptor or maker (*s*).

With respect, then, to simple contracts, which are neither within the operation of the Statute of Frauds nor under the control of any Act of Parliament, the rule is, that such contracts may, before breach, be dissolved by parol; the term *parol* being understood as applicable indifferently to written and verbal contracts. By the general rules of the common law, and independently of any statutory enactment, if there be a contract which has been reduced into writing, and which is meant in itself to constitute an entire agreement, *verbal* evidence is not allowed to be given of what passed between the parties, either before the written instrument was made, or during the time that it was in a state of preparation, so as to add to, or subtract from, or in any manner to vary or qualify, the written contract (*t*);

(*q*) *Goldham v. Edwards*, 17 C. B. 141. "It is a general rule of law, that a simple contract may *before* breach be waived or discharged, without a deed and without consideration; but *after* breach there can be no discharge, except by deed or upon sufficient consideration." Byles on Bills, 7th ed., p. 168, adopted by Bramwell, B., *Dobson v. Espie*, 2 H. & N. 79, 83 (which shows that "leave and licence" is not a proper plea to a declaration for breach of contract). *Clay v. Turley*, 27 L. J. Ex. 2.

(*r*) *Cook v. Lister*, 13 C. B. N. S.

543, 593; *Judgm., Foster v. Dawber*, 6 Exch. 851.

(*s*) See *Edwards v. Walters*, [1896] 2 Ch. 157; 65 L. J. Ch. 557.

(*t*) See *Eden v. Blake*, 13 M. & W. 614 (which presents a good illustration of this rule); *Abrey v. Cruax*, L. R. 5 C. P. 37; *Laurie v. Scholefield*, L. R. 4 C. P. 622; *per* Willes, J., *Heffield v. Meadows*, L. R. 4 C. P. 599; *Lockett v. Nicklin*, 2 Exch. 93; *Martin v. Pycroft*, 2 De G. M. & G. 785; *Adams v. Wordley*, 1 M. & W. 374, 380; recognised in *Flight v. Gray*, 3 C. B. N. S. 320, 322; *Hughes v. Statham*, 4 B. & C.

but, after the instrument has been reduced into writing, it is competent to the parties, at any time before breach of it, by a new contract, not in writing, either altogether to waive, dissolve, or annul the former agreement, or in any manner to add to, or subtract from, or vary, or qualify the terms of it, and thus to make it a new contract, which is to be proved partly by the written agreement, and partly by the subsequent verbal terms engrafted upon what will be thus left of the written agreement (*u*). It should be observed, that the first part of the above rule is confined and must be restricted in its application to a contemporaneous *verbal* agreement. It has been expressly decided, that, in an action on a bill or note, a contemporaneous agreement, *in writing*, may be set up, as between the immediate parties, to vary the contract evidenced by such instrument (*x*); and a *verbal* agreement, set up in suspension—though not in defeasance—of a written contract has been held good (*y*).

King v. Gillett.

In *King v. Gillett* (*z*) (which shows that a contract to

187; *Hoare v. Graham*, 3 Camp. 57: 13 R. R. 752; cited *per* Tindal, C.J., 5 Scott, N. R. 254; *Henson v. Coope*, 3 Scott, N. R. 48; *Reay v. Richardson*, 2 Cr. M. & R. 422; *per* Bayley, J., *Lewis v. Jones*, 4 B. & C. 512: 28 R. R. 360; *per* Ld. Abinger, *Allen v. Pink*, 4 M. & W. 140, 144; *Knapp v. Harden*, 1 Gale, 47; *Soares v. Glyn*, 8 Q. B. 42; *Manley v. Boycot*, 2 E. & B. 46.

See *Malpas v. L. & S. W. R. Co.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 336.

A mistake in the original written contract may sometimes be set up by way of equitable defence: see *Steele v. Haddock*, 10 Exch. 643; *Reis v. Scottish Equitable Life Ass. Soc.*, 2 H. & N. 19; *Wake v. Harrop*, 6 H. & N. 768; *Pattle v. Hornibrook*, [1897] 1 Ch. 25: 66 L. J. Ch. 144.

(*u*) Judgm., *Goss v. Lord Nugent*, 5 B. & Ad. 64, 65: 39 R. R. 392;

Hargreaves v. Parsons, 13 M. & W. 561. *Taylor v. Hilary*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 741, and *Giles v. Spencer*, 3 C. B. N. S. 244, present instances of substituted agreements. See, also, *Patmore v. Colburn*, Id. 65; *Douglas v. Watson*, 17 C. B. 685.

(*x*) *Brown v. Langley*, 5 Scott, N. R. 249; *per* Gibbs, J., *Bowerbank v. Monteiro*, 4 Taunt. 846: 14 R. R. 679; *Young v. Austen*, L. R. 4 C. P. 553, 557. See *Strong v. Foster*, 17 C. B. 201; *Halhead v. Young*, 6 E. & B. 312; *Pooley v. Harradine*, 7 E. & B. 431; cited in *Ewin v. Lancaster*, 6 B. & S. 576.

(*y*) *Wallis v. Littell*, 11 C. B. N. S. 369; but see *Stott v. Fairlamb*, 52 L. J. Q. B. 420; *New London Credit Syndicate v. Neale*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 487: 67 L. J. Q. B. 825.

(*z*) 7 M. & W. 55; *Davis v. Bomford*, 6 H. & N. 245.

marry, founded on mutual promises, is not within s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds), the Court of Exchequer held, that to an action on such a contract, it is a good plea that, after the promise, and before any breach, the plaintiff absolved and discharged the defendant from his promise and the performance of the same; and we have here more particularly mentioned this case, because it affords an exact illustration of the rule now under consideration, and which we find laid down in the Digest in these words: *nihil tam naturale est quam eo genere quidque dissolvere quo colligatum est; ideo verborum obligatio verbis tollitur, nudi consensus obligatio contrario consensu dissolvitur* (a). So, in *Langden v. Stokes* (b), which was followed by the Court in deciding the above case, and which was an action of assumpsit, the defendant pleaded that, before any breach, the plaintiff *exoneravit eum* of the alleged promise, and the plea was held good, on the ground that, as this was a promise by words, it might be discharged by words before breach. In order, however, to sustain such a plea, if issue be taken thereon, the defendant, it has been observed, must prove "a proposition to exonerate on the part of the plaintiff, acceded to by himself, and this in effect will be a *rescinding* of the contract previously made" (c).

By the Statute of Frauds, however, certain contracts are not enforceable by action, unless they be in writing (d).

Where writing required by statute.

(a) D. 50, 17, 35.

(b) Cro. Car. 383.

(c) Judgm., 7 M. & W. 59. In *Wood v. Leadbitter*, 13 M. & W. 838, it was held that a parol licence to enter and remain for some time on the land of another, even though money were paid for it, is revocable at any time, and without paying back the money. In this case the law respecting the revocation of a licence was much considered. See, also, *Roffey v. Henderson*, 17 Q. B. 586; *Adams v. Andrews*, 15 Q. B.

284; *Taplin v. Florence*, 10 C. B. 744.

As to the proper mode of pleading a contemporaneous or subsequent agreement, varying that entered into between the parties, see *per Parke, B., Heath v. Durant*, 12 M. & W. 440, which was an action of assumpsit on a policy of insurance.

(d) 29 Car. 2, c. 3, ss. 4, 17; but s. 17 is now replaced by 56 & 57 Vict. c. 71, s. 4. It is now settled that the statute does not render a

Therefore, if the parties to a contract in writing to which the statute applies afterwards make a mere verbal agreement to *vary* its terms, neither party can maintain an action at law upon the contract as so varied; for that is an action upon a contract some of the terms of which are not in writing (*e*); and the result of the decisions seems to be that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant can avail himself of a verbal agreement to vary a contract previously made in writing and required so to be by the statute (*f*). To meet the objection that he did not perform his part of the contract within the stipulated time, the plaintiff may, indeed, prove, by verbal evidence, that he voluntarily postponed performance at the defendant's request (*g*); but it is not open to him to prove by verbal evidence that at his request the defendant agreed that performance should be postponed, because this would be to prove a new verbal contract (*h*); nor can the defendant rely upon a verbal agreement by the plaintiff to vary some of the terms of the contract as an absolute rescission of the original contract in writing (*i*), for that is an attempt to give to the verbal agreement an effect which the parties clearly did not intend that it should have.

It seems, nevertheless, that, in an action upon a contract made in writing and required by the statute so to be made, it is a good defence at law that, before breach, the parties, by an agreement not in writing, waived and abandoned the whole contract in its entirety; that defence not being substantiated, however, by proof of a verbal agreement

verbal contract "void;" *Maddison v. Alderson*, 8 App. Cas. 488; *Britain v. Rossiter*, 11 Q. B. D. 123; see *Hugill v. Masker*, 22 Id. 364.

(*e*) *Goss v. Lord Nugent*, 5 B. & Ad. 58: 39 R. R. 392.

(*f*) See the cases collected in *Hickman v. Haynes*, L. R. 10 C. P.

598, 605; *Vezey v. Rashleigh*, [1904] 1 Ch. 634: 73 L. J. Ch. 422.

(*g*) *Hickman v. Haynes*, *supra*.

(*h*) *Plevins v. Downing*, 1 C. P. D. 220.

(*i*) *Noble v. Ward*, L. R. 2 Ex. 135; *Moore v. Campbell*, 10 Ex. 325; *Vezey v. Rashleigh*, *supra*.

for a partial variation (*k*) ; and it is clear that a verbal agreement amounting to an entire rescission of the contract is an effectual answer in equity to a claim for specific performance (*l*).

We may further observe, in connection with the maxim Payment of
less sum. under consideration, that payment of part only of a liquidated and ascertained demand, cannot be in law a satisfaction of the whole ; for the transaction between the parties consists in reality of two parts, viz., payment, and an agreement to give up the residue ; which agreement is void, as being made without consideration (*m*). The above rule does not, however, apply if the claim is *bonâ fide* disputable ; nor if there has been an acceptance of a chattel or of a negotiable security in satisfaction of the debt, will the Court examine whether that satisfaction were a reasonable one, but it will merely inquire whether the parties actually came to such an agreement. A man, therefore, may give in satisfaction of a debt of £100 a horse of the value of £5, but not £5 ; and a sum of money payable at a *different time* may be a good satisfaction of a larger sum payable at a future day (*n*). Moreover, although the obligor of a bond cannot, at the day appointed, pay a less sum in satisfaction of the whole, yet if the obligee then receive a part and give his acquittance under seal for the whole, this will be a good discharge, according to the maxim, *eodem ligamine quo ligatum est dissolvitur* (*o*).

(*k*) See *Goss v. Lord Nugent*, 5 B. & Ad. 66 ; 39 R. R. 392 ; *Harvey v. Grabham*, 5 A. & E. 74 ; *Stead v. Dawber*, 10 Id. 64, 65 ; *Moore v. Campbell*, and *Noble v. Ward*, *supra*.
(*l*) Fry, Spec. Perf., 3rd ed. pp. 471, 475.

(*m*) *Foakes v. Beer*, 9 App. Cas. 605.

(*n*) *Sibree v. Tripp*, 15 M. & W. 34, 38.

(*o*) Co. Litt. 212 b ; *per Parke*, B., 15 M. & W. 34.

VIGILANTIBUS, NON DORMIENTIBUS, JURA SUBVENIUNT. (2 Inst. 690.)—*The laws assist those who are vigilant, not those who sleep over their rights (p).*

Instances of
this rule.

We have already, under the maxim *caveat emptor* (q), considered the proposition that courts of justice require that each party to a contract shall exercise a due degree of vigilance and caution; we shall now, therefore, confine our attention to the important subject of the limitation of actions, which will serve to exemplify that general policy of our law, in pursuance of which “the using of legal diligence is always favoured, and shall never turn to the disadvantage of the creditor” (r); merely prefacing that this principle is well known (s) and of very extensive applicability, and might be illustrated by reference to very many reported cases (t). Thus, where the right to claim compensation is given by statute—for instance, by an enclosure Act—which directs that the claim shall be made within a specified time, the right will be forfeited by omission to assert it within that time, and in such a case the maxim under consideration has been held forcibly to apply (u); and the rule before us

(p) See Wing. Max. 672; Hob. 347.

(q) *Ante*, p. 604. See, also, the maxim, *prior tempore, potior jure*, *ante*, p. 278.

(r) *Per* Heath, J., *Cox v. Morgan*, 2 B. & P. 412.

(s) In 2 B. & P. 412, Heath, J., observed that this was one of the maxims earliest learnt by attendance in Westminster Hall. It is applied in courts of equity as well as in courts of law; see *per* Ld. Cranworth, in *Leather Cloth Co. v. American L. Cloth Co.*, 11 H. L. Cas. 535; *Spackman v. Evans*, L. R. 3 H. L. 220; *Downes v. Ship*, Id. 343; *McDonnell v. White*, 11 H. L. Cas. 570.

(t) The principle may be applied in construing statutes. They should not be so interpreted as to deprive a creditor of a right actually existing and vested in him, “unless they be clear and direct upon the point;” *Bottomley v. Hayward*, 7 H. & N. 569, 570.

The maxim applies also where there has been undue delay in instituting a suit for divorce; see 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 31; and cases cited in Inderwick, Div. Acts, 27. See, also, *Castleden v. Castleden*, 4 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 159.

(u) *Doe v. Jefferson*, 2 Bing. 118, 125.

is obviously applicable whenever a party debars himself of a legal right or remedy by his own negligence or *laches* (x).

Relative to the doctrine of limitation of actions (y), Mr. Justice Story observed: "It has often been matter of regret in modern times that, in the construction of the 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, the decisions have not proceeded upon principles better adapted to carry into effect the real objects of the statute; that instead of being viewed in an unfavourable light as an unjust and discreditable defence, it has not received such support as would have made it what it was intended to be, emphatically a statute of repose. It is a wise and beneficial law, not designed merely to raise a presumption of payment of a just debt from lapse of time, but to afford security against stale demands after the true state of the transaction may have been forgotten, or be incapable of explanation by reason of the death or removal of witnesses" (z). So in the ancient possessory actions, "there was a time of limitation settled, beyond which no man should avail himself of the possession of himself or his ancestors, or take advantage of the wrongful possession of his adversary; for if he were negligent for a long and unreasonable time, the law refused afterwards to lend him any assistance to recover the possession; both to punish his neglect, *nam leges vigilantibus, non dormientibus, subveniunt*, and also because it was presumed that the supposed wrongdoer had in such a length of time procured a legal title, otherwise he would sooner have been sued" (a). Further,

Policy of statutes for the limitation of actions.

(x) See, for instance, *Camidge v. Allenby*, 6 B. & C. 373: 30 R. R. 358 (with which cf. *Timmins v. Gibbins*, 18 Q. B. 722); *Lichfield Union v. Greene*, 1 H. & N. 884. The maxim was applied by Coltman, J., in *Onions v. Bowdler*, 5 C. B. 74, where a mistake occurred in the overseers' list of persons qualified to vote for a borough.

(y) Which may also be referred to

the maxim, *interest reipublicæ ut sit finis litium*.

(x) *Bell v. Morrison*, 1 Peters (U. S.), R. 360.

(a) 3 Black. Com. 188. As to the doctrine of Prescription in the Roman Law, see Mackeld. Civ. Law, 290. *Usucapio constituta est ut aliquis litium finis esset*; D. 41, 10, 5; Wood, Civ. Law, 3rd ed. 123.

as Wood, V.C., remarked in *Manby v. Bewicke* (b), "the legislature has in this, as in every civilized country that has ever existed, thought fit to prescribe certain limitations of time, after which persons may suppose themselves to be in peaceable possession of their property and capable of transmitting the estates of which they are in possession, without any apprehension of the title being impugned by litigation in respect of transactions which occurred at a distant period, when evidence in support of their own title may be most difficult to obtain."

We can refer here but very briefly to some of the more important statutes respecting the limitation of actions which are at the present time in force.

Recovery of
land.

The period within which an action for the recovery of land may be brought is now regulated by the Real Property Limitation Act, 1874 (c). This Act amended the Real Property Limitation Act, 1833 (d), by reducing the period from twenty years to twelve years next after the right to bring the action first accrued to the plaintiff or to some person through whom he claims. If, however, at the time when that right first accrued the person to whom it accrued was under the disability of infancy, coverture, or unsoundness of mind, a further period of six years from the cesser of the disability is allowed for bringing the action, provided that it be brought within thirty years next after the accrual of the right (e).

Mortgage
debts and
judgments.

Sect. 8 of the Act of 1874 requires an action for the recovery of money secured by a mortgage of land, or by a judgment (f), to be brought within twelve years next after the present right to receive the same accrued to a person capable of giving a discharge therefor; but where there

(b) 3 K. & J. 352; *Trustees of Dundee Harbour v. Dougall*, 1 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 317.

(c) 37 & 38 Vict. c. 57.

(d) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27.

(e) Ss. 1—6.

(f) Whether or not it operates as a charge on land; *Jay v. Johnstone*, [1893] 1 Q. B. 189; 62 L. J. Q. B. 128.

has been within such twelve years a payment on account of principal or interest, or the requisite acknowledgment in writing of the right thereto, the twelve years begin to run afresh from such payment or acknowledgment. This section applies to an action by mortgagee against mortgagor of land upon the covenant for payment of the debt in the mortgage-deed (*g*); but it has not removed from the operation of the Limitation Act, 1623, an action upon a simple contract debt, secured by a charge upon land (*h*).

Unless the case falls within s. 8 of the Act of 1874, the time for bringing an action of covenant or debt upon a specialty is fixed by the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (*i*); and that statute also fixes the time for an action of debt for rent upon an indenture of demise, or of debt or *sci. fa.* upon a recognizance. These actions may be brought, as a rule, within twenty years after accrual of the cause of action, but not later (*j*). The requisite acknowledgment by writing or part payment, however, extends the right of action for twenty years from the acknowledgment (*k*); and if at the time when the cause of action accrues the person to whom it accrues is under disability, the time does not begin to run until the disability has ceased (*l*).

The Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (*i*), also limits the time for bringing an action of debt upon an award where the submission is not by specialty, or for a fine due in respect of copyhold estates, or for an escape, or for money levied on a *fi. fa.*, to six years after the cause of action; and an action for penalties, damages, or sums of money given to the party grieved by any statute, to two years after the cause of action, but not so as to extend the time where further limited by any statute (*m*). Time, however, does

(*g*) *Sutton v. Sutton*, 22 Ch. D. 511; see *Re Frisby*, 43 Ch. D. 106: 59 L. J. Ch. 94.

(*h*) *Barnes v. Glenton*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 885: 68 L. J. Q. B. 502.

(*i*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.

(*j*) S. 3.

(*k*) S. 5.

(*l*) Ss. 4, 5; see *post*, p. 694.

(*m*) S. 3.

not begin to run against a plaintiff under disability until the disability has ceased (*n*).

Simple contracts.

The doctrine of limitation in the case of simple contracts is founded upon a presumption of payment or release arising from length of time, as it is not common for a creditor to wait so long without enforcing payment of what is due; and, as presumptions are founded upon the ordinary course of things, *ex eo quod plerumque fit*, the laws have formed the presumption, that the debt, if not recovered within the time prescribed, has been acquitted or released. Besides, a debtor ought not to be obliged to take care for ever of the acquittances which prove a demand to be satisfied; and it is proper to limit a time beyond which he shall not be under the necessity of producing them. This doctrine has also been established as a punishment for the negligence of the creditor. The law having allowed him a time within which to institute his action, the claim ought not to be received or enforced when he has suffered that time to elapse (*o*).

For these reasons, the Limitation Act, 1623 (*p*), requires actions of account and of assumpsit, actions of debt grounded upon any lending or contract without specialty, and actions of debt or arrearages of rent (*q*), to be commenced within six years next after the cause of such actions, and not after (*r*). Certain actions of account between merchant and merchant, their factors or servants, were excepted from the provisions of this statute, but now by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856 (*s*), these actions also must be brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued.

(*n*) S. 4; see *post*, p. 694.

(*o*) 1 Pothier, by Evans, 451.

(*p*) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16, s. 3.

(*q*) See, also, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 42.

(*r*) No time less than six years is unreasonable, as between drawer

and holder of a cheque, for its presentment, unless loss is occasioned by the delay; *Laws v. Rand*, 3 C. B. N. S. 442. See also, as to payment by cheque, *Hopkins v. Ware*, L. R. 4 Ex. 268.

(*s*) 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 9.

With respect to actions *ex delicto*, the period of limitation (*t*) in trespass *qu. cl. fr.*, or for taking goods or cattle, as also in trover, detinue, replevin, and case (except for slander), is six years; in trespass for assault, battery, or false imprisonment, it is four years: and for slander, two years.

Actions *ex delicto*.

The Limitation Act, 1623, s. 3, applies in terms only to certain actions *at law*; but when the right of set-off in an action was created (*u*), it was applied to that right, since the right was only given to save the need of a cross-action (*v*). And Courts of equity, which follow the law where there is no equity to be administered, came to apply this statute—and, indeed, all like statutes of limitation—to proceedings before them, though not within the strict letter of the statute: applying it by analogy, and thereby enforcing their own rule against aiding stale demands: yet applying it with an important distinction in cases of concealed fraud, on the ground that it has always been a principle of equity, that no length of time is a bar to relief in cases of fraud where there has been no *laches* on the part of the person defrauded. At law it is not a valid reply to a plea of the statute, that the defendant's fraud had prevented the plaintiff from discovering his cause of action within the prescribed period (*x*); but in equity, the rules of which now generally prevail in the High Court (*y*), the maxim, *nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest* (*z*), is applied, and the cause of action is treated as arising at the time when the fraud is first discovered (*a*). There is, therefore,

Concealed fraud.

(*t*) 21 Jac. 1, c. 16 s. 3.

(*u*) See 2 Geo. 2, c. 22, s. 13; 8 Geo. 2, c. 24, s. 5; R. S. C. 1883, O. 19, r. 3.

(*v*) *Remington v. Stevens*, 2 Stra. 1271; see *Walker v. Clements*, 15 Q. B. 1046.

(*x*) *Hunter v. Gibbons*, 1 H. & N. 459; *Imperial Gas Co. v. London*

Gas Co., 10 Exch. 39.

(*y*) 36 & 37 Vict. c. 66, s. 25 (11).

(*z*) D. 50, 17, 134, § 1; see *per* Ld. Coleridge, 9 Q. B. D. 65.

(*a*) *Gibbs v. Guild*, 9 Q. B. D. 59; *Betjemann v. Betjemann*, [1895] 2 Ch. 474, 482: 64 L. J. Ch. 641; see *Thorne v. Heard*, [1895] A. C. 495, 506: 64 L. J. Ch. 652.

no room in equity for the application of the statute in the case of concealed fraud, so long as the party defrauded remains in ignorance without any fault of his own; and in equity it is regarded as a case of concealed fraud, if a person furtively obtains the minerals out of the land of another by a *wilful* secret trespass underground; and it is so regarded, whether or not the wrong-doer afterwards takes active measures to avoid detection: for otherwise cunning which renders such measures unnecessary would be rewarded (b).

Disabilities. We have mentioned that the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, contains provisions in favour of a person to whom a cause of action accrues whilst such person is under a disability; and the like provisions are to be found in s. 7 of the Limitation Act, 1623. Of the five disabilities mentioned in these statutes infancy and unsoundness of mind are the only two which remain unaffected by subsequent legislation. By the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, s. 10, the plaintiff's absence beyond the seas ceased to be a disability, and so did his imprisonment; and the effect of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, whereby a married woman became capable of suing in contract or in tort, or otherwise, as if she were a feme sole, seems to be that every married woman is now discovert within the meaning of the above-mentioned statutes of limitation (c).

Defendant's
absence
beyond the
seas.

The Limitation Act, 1623, contained no provision to meet cases where the defendant is absent beyond the seas at the time when the cause of action accrues. But provision for these cases was afterwards made by the 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, which provided that in such cases time should not begin to run until the defendant's return. A similar

(b) *Bull's Coal Mining Co. v. Osborne*, [1899] A. C. 351: 68 L. J. P. C. 49. As to the effect of concealed fraud upon the right to recover land, see 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, s. 26; *Willis v. Howe*, [1893] 2 Ch. 545: 62 L. J. Ch. 690.
(c) See *Lowe v. Fox*, 15 Q. B. D. 667.

provision will be found in s. 4 of the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (*d*). The effect of these provisions, however, is cut down by the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, s. 11. This section deals with the case where one of the joint debtors is beyond the seas at the time when the cause of action accrues against them, but the other is not, and it enacts that the absence of the former is not to prevent time from running in favour of the latter, but that a judgment recovered against the latter is not to be a bar to a subsequent action against the former.

With regard to the effect upon the Limitation Act, 1623, and the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, of the part payment of a debt, it is important to notice that the Mercantile Law Amendment Act, 1856, s. 14, provides that one of several co-contractors, executors, or administrators, shall not lose the benefit of those statutes, so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only (*e*) of any payment by another of them. This enactment may be regarded as supplementary to Lord Tenterden's Act (9 Geo. 4, c. 14), which provides that none of such persons shall lose the benefit of the Limitation Act, 1623, so as to be chargeable in respect or by reason only of an acknowledgment or promise by another of them. No similar provision, however, exists with regard to an acknowledgment by writing under the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, s. 5; but it has been held that an acknowledgment by the executor of one of two co-obligors to a bond does not bind the other, because an executor can only be liable in respect of the several liability and not of the joint liability of the bond (*f*). Having touched upon the topic of part payment, we may here notice that the payment by a devisee for life of lands of interest upon his

Payment by
one co-con-
tractor.

(*d*) See, also, s. 5. As to what places are not beyond the seas, within the meaning of these Acts, see 19 & 20 Vict. c. 97, s. 12, and 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 7.

(*e*) See *Tucker v. Tucker*, [1894] 3 Ch. 429; 63 L. J. Ch. 737.

(*f*) *Read v. Price*, [1909] 2 K. B. 724; 78 L. J. K. B. 1137.

testator's simple contract or specialty debt keeps alive, as against the remainderman, the creditor's remedies against the lands (*g*).

Maxim as to prescription.

It is not intended here, nor would it be consistent with the plan of this work to consider in detail the numerous points with which the various statutes of limitations bristle. There is, however, one maxim which naturally suggests itself in this place, and which is illustrated by the provisions with respect to cases of disability, which suspend the ordinary operation of such statutes until the disability is removed. The maxim alluded to is expressed thus: *Contra non valentem agere nulla currit præscriptio*—prescription does not run against a party who is unable to act. For instance, in the case of a debt, it only begins to run from the time when the creditor has a right to institute his suit, because no delay can be imputed to him before that time (*h*). In the case, therefore, of a contract to pay money at a future period, or upon the happening of a certain event, as, “when J. S. is married,” the six years are to be dated, in the first instance, from the arrival of the specified period; in the second, from the time when the event occurred (*i*). Again, if a person incurs a debt while he enjoys the immunity from process which our law allows to an ambassador, the six years do not begin to run until that immunity has ceased (*j*).

Where, however, the statute has once begun to run, the rule is that no subsequent disability interrupts its operation;

(*g*) See *Re Hollingshead*, 37 Ch. D. 551.

(*h*) 1 Pothier, by Evans, 451; *Hemp v. Garland*, 4 Q. B. 519, 524; *Reeves v. Butcher*, [1891] 2 Q. B. 509; *Coburn v. Colledge*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 702; 66 L. J. Q. B. 462; *Huggins v. Coates*, 5 Q. B. 432; *Holmes v. Kerrison*, 2 Taunt. 323; 11 R. R. 594. See, also, *Davies v. Humphreys*, 6 M. & W. 153; Bell,

Dict. & Dig. of Scotch Law, 223.

Where a loan is made by cheque the statute does not begin to run until the cheque is paid; *Garden v. Bruce*, L. R. 3 C. P. 300.

(*i*) 1 Pothier, by Evans, 451; *Shutford v. Borough*, Godb. 437; *Fenton v. Emblers*, 1 W. Bla. 353.

(*j*) *Musurus Bey v. Godban*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 352; 63 L. J. Q. B. 621.

for instance, its operation is not interrupted by the death of the debtor, and the non-appointment of an executor by reason of litigation as to the right to probate (*k*). But even to this rule there is an exception; for where administration of the goods of a creditor is granted to a debtor, this, being by act of law, suspends the statute during the administration (*l*).

ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUR CUM PERSONÂ. (*Noy, Max. 14.*)—

A personal right of action dies with the person.

The legal meaning and application of this maxim will, perhaps, most clearly be shown, by stating concisely the various actions maintainable by and against executors and administrators, as well as those causes of action which die with the person. To the latter alone can the above maxim be considered in strictness to apply (*m*).

1. *Contracts*.—The personal representatives are, as a general rule, entitled to sue on all covenants broken in the lifetime of the covenantee; as for rent then due, or for breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment (*n*), or to discharge the land from incumbrances (*o*). A distinction must, however, be remarked between a covenant running with the land and a purely collateral covenant. In the former case, where the formal breach has been in the ancestor's lifetime, but the substantial damage has taken

Actions *ex contractu* by personal representatives.

(*k*) *Rhodes v. Smethurst*, 4 M. & W. 42: 6 Id. 351; *Homfray v. Scroope*, 13 Q. B. 513; *Freaker v. Craneveldt*, 3 My. & Cr. 499; *Penny v. Brice*, 18 C. B. N. S. 396.

(*l*) *Seagram v. Knight*, L. R. 2 Ch. 628.

(*m*) By R. S. C. 1883, O. XVII., r. 1, whether the cause of action survives or not, there is no abatement of a cause or matter by reason

of the death of either party between the verdict or finding of the issues of fact and the judgment, and judgment may be entered notwithstanding the death.

(*n*) *Lucy v. Levington*, 2 Lev. 26. By 13 Edw. 1, st. 1, c. 23, executors were given a writ of account. In 31 Edw. 3, st. 1, c. 11, originated the office of administrator.

(*o*) *Smith v. Simonds*, Comb. 64.

place since his death, the real and not the personal representative is the proper plaintiff; whereas, in the case of a covenant not running with the land, and intended not to be limited to the life of the covenantee, as a covenant not to fell trees excepted from the demise, the personal representative is alone entitled to sue (*p*). In a case where it was held that the executor of a tenant for life may recover for a breach of covenant to repair committed by a lessee of the testator in his lifetime, without averring a damage to his personal estate, the rule was stated to be, that unless the particular covenant be one for breach whereof, in the lifetime of the lessor, the *heir alone* can sue, the executor may sue: unless, indeed, it be a mere personal contract, to which the rule applies, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ* (*q*).

The personal representative, moreover, may sue, not only for the recovery of all debts due to the deceased by specialty or otherwise, but for all breaches of contract with him, except breaches which import a mere personal injury (*r*); and, with that exception, all rights of action for breaches of contract committed during the lifetime of the deceased pass to the personal representative, as also does the right to sue for breaches, committed after the death of the deceased, of contracts which were neither limited to his lifetime nor determined by his death (*s*). An

(*p*) *Raymond v. Fitch*, 2 C. M. & R. 598, 599; *per Williams, J.*, and Parke, B., *Beckham v. Drake*, 2 H. L. Cas. 596, 624; *per Parke, J.*, *Carr v. Roberts*, 5 B. & Ad. 84: 39 R. R. 405; *Kingdon v. Nottle*, 1 M. & S. 355: 4 M. & S. 53: 14 R. R. 462: 16 R. R. 379; *King v. Jones*, 5 Taunt. 518: 15 R. R. 533; S. C. (in error), 4 M. & S. 188.

(*q*) *Ricketts v. Weaver*, 12 M. & W. 718, recognising *Raymond v. Fitch*, *supra*. As to a covenant respecting a chattel, see *per Parke, J.*, *Doe v. Rogers*, 2 N. & M. 555;—

in an indenture of apprenticeship, *Baxter v. Burfield*, 2 Stra. 1266; *Cooper v. Simmons*, 7 H. & N. 707.

(*r*) Judgm., 2 C. M. & R. 596, 597; *per Tindal, C.J.*, *Orme v. Broughton*, 10 Bing. 537: 38 R. R. 544; *Stubbs v. Holywell R. Co.*, L. R. 2 Ex. 311: 1 Wms. Saund. 112, n. (1); *Edwards v. Grace*, 2 M. & W. 190; *Webb v. Cowdell*, 14 M. & W. 820; *per Vaughan Williams, L.J.*, in *Formby v. Barker*, [1903] 2 Ch. 539, 550: 72 L. J. Ch. 716.

(*s*) *Cooper v. Johnson*, 2 B. & Ald. 394: 20 R. R. 483; *per Bayley, J.*,

administrator, moreover, may sue for the price of goods sold and delivered between the death of the intestate and the taking out letters of administration (*t*), but he cannot sue in his representative character upon contracts made after the death of the intestate in the course of carrying on the intestate's business (*u*).

An action, however, is not maintainable by an executor or administrator for a breach of promise of marriage made to the deceased, where no special damage is alleged (*x*) ; for the general allegation of the breach imports only a personal injury ; and, generally, with respect to injuries affecting the life or health of the deceased,—such personal injuries, for instance, as arise out of the unskilfulness of a medical practitioner, or the negligence of a coach proprietor,—the maxim as to *actio personalis* is applicable, unless some damage done to the personal estate of the deceased be stated on the record (*y*). But where the result of a breach of a contract relating to the person is a damage, not to the person only, but also to the personal estate : for instance, where, in the case of negligent carriage or cure, the consequential damage includes the expenditure of money, or the loss for a time of the profits of a business, or of the wages of labour : or where, in the case of a contract to carry safely both the person and the goods, both be injured : in such cases it appears that the executor may sue for the breach of contract, and recover damages to the extent of the injury to the personal estate (*z*).

Rhodes v. Haigh, 2 B. & C. 346, 347 : 26 R. R. 376 ; *M'Dougal v. Robertson*, 4 Bing. 435 : 29 R. R. 592 ; *Tyler v. Jones*, 3 B. & C. 144 ; *Clarke v. Crofts*, 4 Bing. 143 : 29 R. R. 527 ; *Bowker v. Evans*, 15 Q. B. D. 565 ; *Knights v. Quarles*, 2 B. & B. 102 : 22 R. R. 659, which was an action against an attorney for negligence in investing a title.

(*t*) *Foster v. Bates*, 12 M. & W. 226.

(*u*) *Bolingbroke v. Kerr*, L. R. 1 Ex. 222.

(*x*) *Chamberlain v. Williamson*, 2 M. & S. 408 : 15 R. R. 295 ; see also *Finlay v. Chinery*, 23 Q. B. D. 494 : 57 L. J. Q. B. 247.

(*y*) *Judgm.*, 2 M. & S. 415, 416 ; *Beckham v. Drake*, 2 H. L. Cas. 579, 596, 624. See *Knights v. Quarles*, 2 B. & B. 104 : 22 R. R. 659.

(*z*) *Judgm.*, 8 M. & W. 854, 855 ;

Against
representa-
tives.

The personal representatives, on the other hand, are liable, so far as they have assets, on all the covenants and contracts of the deceased broken in his lifetime (*a*), and likewise on such as are broken after his death, for the due performance of which his skill or taste was not required (*b*), and which were not to be performed by the deceased in person (*c*). "The executors," observed Parke, B. (*d*), "are in truth contained in the person of the testator, with respect to all his contracts, except indeed in the case of a *personal* contract, that is, a contract depending on personal skill, in which is always implied the condition that the person is not prevented by the act of God from completing the work. That condition is peculiar to personal contracts." The distinction must, moreover, be noticed between a mere authority and a contract, the former being revoked by death, whereas the latter is not determined thereby, except as above mentioned (*e*).

Further, the personal representatives are liable on a covenant by deceased for their performance of a particular act, as for payment of a sum of money (*f*); for building a

Bradshaw v. Lanc. & Y. R. Co., 10 C. P. 189; 44 L. J. C. P. 148; *Daly v. Dublin R. Co.*, 30 L. R. Ir. 514; *per* Ld. Halsbury, [1897] A. C. 601.

(*a*) "Where a relation exists between two parties which involves the performance of certain duties by one of them, and the payment of reward to him by the other, the law will imply, or the jury may infer a promise by each party to do what is to be done by him;" and for breach of such a promise, executors may sue or be sued; *Morgan v. Ravey*, 6 H. & N. 265, 276; *Batthyany v. Walford*, 36 Ch. D. 269, 279; 56 L. J. Ch. 881. See also *Blyth v. Fladgate*, [1891] 1 Ch. 337, 366; 60 L. J. Ch. 66.

(*b*) *Per* Parke, B., *Siboni v. Kirkman*, 1 M. & W. 423; *per* Patteson, J., *Wentworth v. Cock*, 10 A. & E. 445, 446; *Hopwood v. Whaley*, 6 C. B. 744; *Bac. Abr.*, "Executors and Administrators," (P. 1); *Com. Dig.* "Administration" (B. 14).

(*c*) *Hyde v. Dean of Windsor*, Cro. Eliz. 552, 553; *per* Cur., *Marshall v. Broadhurst*, 1 Cr. & J. 406.

(*d*) *Wills v. Murray*, 4 Exch. 866. See *Tasker v. Shepherd*, 6 H. & N. 575.

(*e*) *Bradbury v. Morgan*, 1 H. & C. 249.

(*f*) *Ex parte Tindal*, 8 Bing. 404, 405, and cases there cited; *Powell v. Graham*, 7 Taunt. 580; 18 R. R. 593.

house left unfinished by the deceased (*g*) ; or on his contract for the performance of work by the plaintiff, before the completion of which he died, but which was subsequently completed (*h*). And the same principle was held to apply where an intestate had agreed to receive from the plaintiffs monthly during a certain period a certain quantity of slate, a portion of which, when tendered after his death, but before the expiration of the stipulated period, his administrator refused to accept (*i*).

The action of *debt* on simple contract, except for rent (*j*), did not, however, formerly lie against the personal representative for a debt contracted by the deceased (*k*), unless the undertaking to pay originated with the representative (*l*) ; and the reason was, that executors or administrators, when charged for the debt, were not admitted to wage their law, and, consequently, were deprived of a legal defence of which the deceased himself might have made use ; but this reason did not apply to *assumpsit*, which, therefore, could always be brought (*m*). However, by the Civil Procedure Act, 1833, wager of law was abolished, and an action of debt on simple contract became maintainable in any Court of common law against an executor or administrator (*n*).

2. *Torts*.—It is to actions in form *ex delicto* that the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ* is peculiarly applicable ; for, as Lord Abinger observed (*o*), this maxim

Actions ex delicto.

(*g*) *Quick v. Ludborrow*, 3 Bulstr. 30 ; recognised, 1 M. & W. 423. See *per Cur.*, 1 Cr. & J. 405, 406 ; *per* Ld. Abinger, 3 M. & W. 353, 354.

(*h*) *Corner v. Shew*, 3 M. & W. 350, 352. See *per* Alderson, B., *Prior v. Hembrow*, 8 M. & W. 889, 890.

(*i*) *Wentworth v. Cock*, 10 A. & E. 42.

(*j*) *Norwood v. Read*, Plowd. 180.

(*k*) *Barry v. Robinson*, 1 N. R. 293.

(*l*) *Riddell v. Sutton*, 5 Bing. 206 :

30 R. R. 569.

(*m*) 3 Bla. Com., 16th ed. 347, and n. (12). In *Perkinson v. Gilford*, Cro. Car. 539, debt was held to lie against the executors of a sheriff, who had levied under a *fi. fa.*, and died without paying over the money. As to a set-off by an executor sued as such, see *Mardall v. Thellusson*, 6 E. & B. 976 ; S. C., 18 Q. B. 857.

(*n*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, ss. 13, 14.

(*o*) *Raymond v. Fitch*, 2 Cr. M. & R. 588, 597.

"is not applied in the old authorities to causes of actions on contracts, but to those in tort, which are founded on malfeasance or misfeasance to the person or property of another: which latter are annexed to the person, and die with the person, except where the remedy is given to (or by) the personal representatives by the statute law." And the general rule of the common law is, that if an injury were done either to the person or to the property of another for which unliquidated damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person to whom, or by whom, the wrong was done (*p*).

Injuries to
testator's
personalty.

Dealing, first, with actions brought *by* personal representatives, we find that this general rule of the common law received considerable alteration by statute, as early as 1330, when the 4 Edw. 3, c. 7, was passed. This Act, after reciting that in times past executors had not "actions for a trespass done to their testators as of the goods and chattels of the same testators carried away in their life," enacted that executors (*q*) in such cases should have an action against the trespassers, and recover their damages, in like manner as their testators if they were in life; and the effect of this Act, which, being remedial in character, has always been construed liberally (*r*), seems to be, that, whatever the form of the action may be, a personal representative now always has the same action as the deceased person whom he represents would have had, for any injury done in such person's lifetime to his personal estate, whereby that estate is rendered less beneficial (*s*). In other words, the Act has been construed as extending "to all torts, except those relating to freeholds, and those where the

(*p*) *Wheatley v. Lane*, 1 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1845) 216 a, n. (1).

(*q*) Administrators are within the equity of the Act; *Smith v. Colgay*, Cro. Eliz. 384; and the remedy was extended by 25 Edw. 3, st. 5, c. 5, to executors of executors.

(*r*) See *per* Ld. Ellenborough, *Wilson v. Knubley*, 7 East, 134; *Emerson v. Emerson*, 1 Ventr. 187.

(*s*) See 1 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1845) 217 b, n.

injury done is of a personal nature" (t). For instance, the Act gives an executor a remedy for the infringement in his testator's lifetime of his registered trade-mark, for that is an injury to personal property (u).

And here we may remind the reader that "the right of an executor to the personal estate of the testator is derived from the will, and the property in the personal goods and chattels of the testator is vested in him immediately upon the testator's death; and he is deemed to be in legal possession of them from that time, though before probate granted" (x). The title of an administrator, on the other hand, is derived from the letters of administration, though it has relation back, for many purposes, to the date of the death; for instance, it has been held that trespass to goods is maintainable by an administrator for an act done between the death of the intestate and the grant of the letters (y). Detinue, however, does not lie at the suit of an administrator for goods of the intestate which the defendant restored before the grant (z).

Representative's title to personal estate.

In regard to this doctrine of relation, we may add in the words of Parke, B., that "an act done by one who afterwards becomes administrator, to the *prejudice* of the estate, is not made good by the subsequent administration. It is only in cases where the act is for the *benefit* of the estate, that the relation back exists, by virtue of which relation the administrator is enabled to recover against such persons as have interfered with the estate, and thereby to prevent it from being prejudiced and despoiled" (a).

(t) *Per* Bramwell, L.J., *Twycross v. Grant*, 4 C. P. D. 40, 45.

(u) *Oakey v. Dalton*, 35 Ch. D. 700; see *Hatchard v. Mege*, 18 Q. B. D. 771: 56 L. J. Q. B. 397.

(x) *Per* Ld. Campbell, *Pemberton v. Chapman*, 7 E. & B. 210, 217.

(y) *Tharpe v. Stallwood*, 5 M. & Gr. 760; recognised in *Foster v. Bates*, 12 M. & W. 227; see *Welch-*

man v. Sturgis, 13 Q. B. 552. In *Bodger v. Arch*, 10 Exch. 333, the doctrine of relation was applied, under peculiar circumstances, to prevent the operation of the statute of limitations; see *Stamford Bank v. Smith*, [1892] 1 Q. B. 765: 61 L. J. Q. B. 405.

(z) *Crossfield v. Such*, 8 Exch. 825.

(a) *Morgan v. Thomas*, 8 Exch.

Injuries to
testator's
realty.

The common law provides no remedy after a person's death for an injury done in his lifetime to his real estate (*b*); and accordingly, if his personal representatives sue in respect of such an injury, the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, still, as a rule, defeats the action, unless it be maintainable under the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (*c*). Under this Act, an action may be maintained by executors or administrators of a deceased person for any injury to his real estate committed in his lifetime, for which he might have maintained an action if alive, provided, first, that the injury was committed within six months before his death, and, secondly, that their action be brought within one year after his death; and damages recovered in the action form part of his personal estate. Since this Act does not enable an executor to commence an action for an injury which was done to his testator's real estate more than six months before the testator's death, an executor cannot carry on a pending action, commenced by his testator, while alive, for an injury to his real estate, if at the time when the testator dies six months have elapsed since the injury was committed (*d*). In the case, however, of a continuing injury which gives rise to a new cause of action every day, the executor can bring an action, or carry on his testator's action, in respect of the injury, if and so far as the injury continued within the period of six months before the testator died (*e*).

Injuries to
testator's
person.

Notwithstanding the statutory exceptions which we have noticed to the general rule of the common law, that rule still applies where a tort is committed to a man's person, feelings or reputation, as by battery, libel, slander, or his daughter's seduction; and in such cases no action is maintainable by his executors or administrators, for they

302, 307; see *Re Watson*, 18 Q. B. D. 116; 19 Id. 234; *ante*, p. 676.

(*b*) See 1 Wms. Saund. (ed, 1845) 217 b.

(*c*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2.

(*d*) *Kirk v. Todd*, 21 Ch. D. 484; 52 L. J. Ch. 224.

(*e*) *Jones v. Simes*, 43 Ch. D. 607; 59 L. J. Ch. 351; *Jenks v. Clifden*, [1897] 1 Ch. 694; 66 L. J. Ch. 338.

represent not so much the person as the personal estate of the testator or intestate, of which they are in law the assignees (*f*). Accordingly, where a man sustained personal injuries through the defendants' negligence, whilst he was using a level crossing at their railway, and eventually died from such injuries, it was held that his administratrix could recover damages neither for the injuries themselves nor for the loss such injuries occasioned to him, while yet alive, through his inability to work and his need of doctors and nurses (*g*).

The victim of bodily harm, if occasioned by another's wrongful act, has a cause of action against the wrong-doer, to recover damages for his physical sufferings; but if the bodily harm results in the victim's death, our common law does not transfer the cause of action to his legal personal representatives; nor does it give to the members of the victim's family who were dependent upon him for their support any cause of action against the wrong-doer for the pecuniary loss which they sustain through their breadwinner's death. For such pecuniary loss, however, some remedy is provided by the Fatal Accidents Act, 1846 (*h*), commonly known as Lord Campbell's Act. Under this Act, in every case where the death of a person is caused by wrongful act, neglect or default, and the act, neglect or default is such as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the injured person to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, the person who would have been liable if death had not ensued is liable to an

Lord Campbell's Act.

(*f*) 3 Blac. Com., 16th ed. 302, n. (9); Com. Dig., "*Administration*" (B. 13); *Bowker v. Evans*, 15 Q. B. D. 565: 54 L. J. Q. B. 421.

(*g*) *Pulling v. G. E. R. Co.*, 9 Q. B. D. 110: 51 L. J. Q. B. 453, where *Bradshaw v. Lanc. & Y. R. Co.*, L. R. 10 C. P. 189, was distinguished, as being an action for breach of contract. See *ante*, p. 699.

(*h*) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93; amended by 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95, and 8 Edw. 7, c. 7. The Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906 (6 Edw. 7, c. 58), also give remedies to personal representatives or dependants of a deceased workman.

action for damages notwithstanding the death, and even though the death was caused under such circumstances as amounted in law to a felony (*i*). Such action, though it must be brought, as a rule (*k*), in the name of the executor or administrator, is an action for the benefit of the wife, husband, parents (*l*) and children (*l*) of the deceased person: the jury being required to give such damages as they think proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to the parties respectively for whose benefit the action is brought; and the amount recovered, after deducting costs not recovered, is divisible amongst these parties in such shares as the jury by their verdict direct (*m*). The action must be brought within twelve months after the death (*n*).

This Act, it is to be observed, creates a new cause of action, arising upon and out of a person's death (*o*); and, therefore, it really leaves the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, untouched; for the cause of action which the injured person might have maintained for his personal sufferings dies with him, and in an action, brought under the Act for the benefit of his relatives, compensation is recoverable only for the pecuniary loss which they themselves sustain by reason of his death (*p*). The Act, however, gives no cause of action, unless the injured person was entitled, at the time of his death, to bring an action for his personal injuries. For instance, the relatives remain

(*i*) 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, s. 1.

(*k*) *Id.* s. 2; see 27 & 28 Vict. c. 95, s. 1.

(*l*) As defined by the Act; see s. 5.

(*m*) S. 2.

(*n*) S. 3.

(*o*) See *per* Ld. Selborne, *Seward v. Vera Cruz*, 10 App. Cas. 59, 67; cited in *Adam v. British & F. S.S. Co.*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 430: 67 L. J. Q. B. 844.

(*p*) *Blake v. Midl. R. Co.*, 18 Q. B. 93; *Chapman v. Rothwell*,

E. B. & E. 168; *Pym v. G. N. R. Co.*, 4 B. & S. 396; see also *Duckworth v. Johnson*, 4 H. & N. 653; *Franklin v. S. E. R. Co.*, 3 *Id.* 211; *Dalton v. S. E. R. Co.*, 4 C. B. N. S. 296. Funeral expenses of the deceased cannot be recovered: *Clark v. London General Omnibus Co.*, [1906] 2 K. B. 648: 75 L. J. K. B. 907. As to taking into account insurances on the life of the deceased, see 8 Edw. 7, c. 7.

without remedy if the injuries from which the deceased died were the result of his own contributory negligence (*q*), or if satisfaction for his injuries was accepted by him before he died (*r*). Moreover, it seems that, by virtue of the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, the relations lose their remedy under the Act if the wrong-doer dies, whether he die before or after the death of the person whom he injured; for the Act supplies no remedy either to the injured person while he lives, or to his relatives after his death, against the executors or administrators of the wrong-doer (*s*).

Death of
wrong-doer.

Turning now to actions *ex delicto* brought against the personal representatives of a wrong-doer, we must refer again to the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (*t*). By this Act, an action of trespass, or trespass on the case, may be maintained against the executors or administrators of any deceased person for any wrong committed by him in his lifetime to another, in respect of his property, real or personal, provided, first, that the injury was committed within six months before such deceased person's death (*u*), and, secondly, that the action be brought within six months after such executors or administrators have taken upon themselves the administration of his estate; and the damages recovered in the action are payable in like order of administration as simple contract debts.

Actions *ex delicto* against personal representatives.

Before the passing of this Act, the remedy for a tort to the property of another, real or personal, by an action in form *ex delicto*—such as trespass, trover, or case for waste, or for diverting a watercourse or obstructing ancient lights

Rule at
common law.

(*q*) *Witherley v. Regent's Canal Co.*, 12 C. B. N. S. 2; *Pym v. G. N. R. Co.*, *supra*.

(*r*) *Read v. G. E. R. Co.*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 555.

(*s*) But compensation in accordance with the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906, is payable by the

personal representatives of a deceased employer. See s. 13 of the Act.

(*t*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2.

(*u*) See *Richmond v. Nicholson*, 8 Scott, 134; *Powell v. Rees*, 7 A. & E. 426; and cases cited, *ante*, p. 704, notes (*d*) and (*e*).

—could not have been enforced against the personal representatives of the tort-feasor (*x*); and this, therefore, must still be the general rule in cases where, the tort having been committed more than six months before the tort-feasor's death, the above Act does not apply (*y*). Cases, however, occur in which a person whose property has been damaged may treat the injury either as a tort or as a breach of contract; and in these cases he has a remedy in assumpsit against the wrong-doer's executors, which is independent of the above Act (*a*): the general rule of the common law being that executors are liable for damage done by their testator to personal property if assumpsit can be brought in respect of such damage (*b*).

Liability of
innkeeper.

Where a guest at an inn lost his goods there *propter defectum hospitioris* (*c*), it was held that the guest could recover the value of the goods from the innkeeper's executors, as damages for a breach of contract; and it was laid down that "where a relation exists between two parties, which involves the performance of certain duties by one of them and the payment of reward to him by the other, the law will imply, or the jury may infer, a promise by each party to do what is to be done by him" (*d*).

Tort to
property.

Upon the question whether the common law of itself supplies any remedy by action against the personal representatives of a wrong-doer for a tort committed by him to

(*x*) See 1 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1845) 216 a, n. (1). Where chattels, wrongfully in the possession of the testator, continued *in specie* in the executor's hands, detainee was maintainable to recover the specific goods: Bro. Abr. "*Detinue*," pl. 19; *Le Mason v. Dixon*, W. Jones, 173, 174.

(*y*) The 30 Car. 2, st. 1, c. 7, and 4 & 5 W. & M. c. 24, s. 12, provide a remedy against the representatives

of an executor or administrator who committed waste; see *Huntley v. Russell*, 13 Q. B. 572; *Coward v. Gregory*, L. R. 2 C. P. 153.

(*a*) See *per* Ld. Mansfield, *Hamblly v. Trott*, Cowp. 375.

(*b*) See *per* Bowen, L.J., 24 Ch. D. 457.

(*c*) See *Calve's case*, 8 Rep. 32: 1 Smith, L. C.

(*d*) *Morgan v. Ravey*, 6 H. & N. 265, 276.

property, *Phillips v. Homfray* (e) may now be regarded as a leading case. In that case the wrongful act was a trespass to land by the secret use of certain underground ways without the landowner's knowledge, and the action was brought by the landowner against the trespasser to recover compensation for the trespass. While the action was pending, the trespasser died, and thereupon the landowner sought to continue the action against the executors of the trespasser on the ground that, as no way-leave had been paid for the use of the underground ways, the estate of the deceased wrong-doer had derived a profit from his wrong (f). The Court of Appeal, however, decided that the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, applied. The rule, laid down in the judgment delivered by Bowen, L.J., in this case, as to the general effect of the maxim, was as follows :—

“ The only cases in which, apart from questions of breach of contract, express or implied, a remedy for a wrongful act can be pursued against the estate of a deceased person who has done the act appears to us to be those in which property, or the proceeds or value of property, belonging to another, have been appropriated by the deceased person and added to his own estate or moneys. In such cases, whatever the original form of action, it is in substance brought to recover property, or its proceeds or value, and by amendment could be made such in form as well as in substance. In such cases the action, though arising out of a wrongful act, does not die with the person. The property or the proceeds or value which, in the lifetime of the wrong-doer, could have been recovered from him, can be traced after his death to his assets, and recaptured by the rightful owner there. But it is not every wrongful act by which a wrong-doer indirectly benefits that falls under this

Rule laid
down in
Phillips v.
Homfray.

(e) 24 Ch. D. 439 : 52 L. J. Ch. 833. under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2, was barred by lapse of time.

(f) The landowner's remedy

head, if the benefit does not consist in the acquisition of property, or its proceeds or value. Where there is nothing amongst the assets of the deceased that in law or equity belongs to the plaintiff, and the damages which have been done to him are unliquidated and uncertain, the executors of a wrong-doer cannot be sued merely because it was worth the wrong-doer's while to commit the act which is complained of, and an indirect benefit may have been reaped thereby" (*g*).

As regards torts to property, therefore, the rule of the common law, which equity also recognises, is that remedies for the wrongful acts "can only be pursued against the estate of a deceased person when property or the proceeds or value of property belonging to another have been appropriated by the deceased person and added to his own estate" (*h*).

Tort to the person.

For a tort committed to the person, such as battery or false imprisonment, the Civil Procedure Act, 1833 (*i*), gives no remedy against the personal representatives of the tort-feasor; and it is clear that, at common law, no action for a tort of this kind can be maintained against them (*k*). By our law an executor represents the debts and property, but not the person of the testator, and it seems to have been thought that there would be an injustice in making the executor stand in the place of the dead man when the causes of action were purely personal (*l*). Accordingly, the rule at common law is, that no action lies against executors for a tort committed by their testator for which unliquidated damages is the only remedy (*m*); and for that reason the estate of a deceased person cannot be made answerable to

(*g*) 25 Ch. D. 454, 455.

(*h*) *Per* Bowen, L.J., 20 Q. B. D. 504.

(*i*) 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42.

(*k*) 3 Blac. Com. 302.

(*l*) *Per* Bowen, L.J., 24 Ch. D.

456; see also *per* Ld. Ellenborough, 2 M. & S. 415: cited *per* Bowen, L.J., 20 Q. B. D. 505.

(*m*) *Per* Jessel, M.R., 21 Ch. D. 489.

a claim to recover damages for deceit (*n*), or defamation (*o*), or for damages for adultery awarded against a co-respondent (*oo*). Moreover, as damages of a vindictive and uncertain kind may be given for a breach of promise of marriage, the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, applies upon the promisor's death, except in so far as the plaintiff has suffered special damage to her estate, arising out of the breach of contract (*p*).

Upon a petition of right whereby compensation was claimed for damage to property occasioned by the negligence of the servants of the Crown in a preceding reign, Lord Lyndhurst inclined to the view that the maxim, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, was applicable. The main ground, however, of his decision against the claimant was that a petition of right does not lie for negligent or tortious acts of the Crown's servants (*q*).

Demise of
the Crown.

After some controversy, it seems to be now settled that a master cannot maintain an action for injuries to his servant by a wrongful or negligent act which caused the servant's immediate death, and that he cannot recover from the wrong-doer damages either for the loss of the servant's services or for expenses incurred in burying the servant; and that this rule obtains even if the servant was the master's own child (*r*). This rule rests mainly upon the statement of Lord Ellenborough at *nisi prius* (*s*) that "in a civil court the death of a human being could not be complained of as an injury"; or, as Bowen, L.J., said in a later case (*t*), "the killing of the deceased *per se* gives no

Action by
master whose
servant has
been killed
outright.

(*n*) *Re Duncan*, [1899] 1 Ch. 387: 68 L. J. Ch. 253.

(*o*) *Hatchard v. Mege*, 18 Q. B. D. 771: 56 L. J. Q. B. 397.

(*oo*) *Brydges v. Brydges & Wood*, [1909] P. 187: 78 L. J. P. 97.

(*p*) *Finlay v. Chinery*, 20 Q. B. D. 494, 504: 57 L. J. Q. B. 247.

(*q*) *Visc. Canterbury v. A.-G.*, 1 Phill. 306; see *ante*, p. 44.

(*r*) *Clark v. London General Omnibus Co.*, [1906] 2 K. B. 648: 75 L. J. K. B. 907, where the opinion of the majority of the Court in *Osborn v. Gillett*, L. R. 8 Ex. 88: 42 L. J. Ex. 53, was followed.

(*s*) *Baker v. Bolton*, 1 Camp. 493: 10 R. R. 734.

(*t*) *The Vera Cruz* (No. 2), 9 P. D. 36: 53 L. J. P. 33.

right of action at all, either at law or under Lord Campbell's Act."

Death caused
by breach of
contract.

It has, nevertheless, been decided that, in action for the breach of a warranty that an article was fit for consumption as human food, the damages recoverable may include the loss by the plaintiff of his wife's services, if she died of eating the article, and the expense of hiring some one else to perform those services after the wife's death (*u*). This decision was based upon the distinction between an action for breach of contract and an action of tort.

Duties to be
performed.

Notwithstanding the maxim *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, an action in respect of dilapidations to the buildings of a benefice lay at common law against the executors of a deceased incumbent at the suit of his successor or even of the executors of his successor (*v*); and the reason was that the omission to repair was considered not as a tort, but as the breach of a duty, analogous to an implied contract, with regard to the property (*x*). For the like reason, it appears that the maxim does not apply to a suit against executors in respect of their testator's breach of trust (*y*), or his breach of his duty to repair his copyhold tenement in accordance with the custom of the manor (*z*).

Statutory
duties.

The maxim has no application to statutory duties, such as the duty of an employer to pay compensation to the

(*u*) *Jackson v. Watson & Sons*, [1909] 2 K. B. 193; 78 L. J. K. B. 587.

(*v*) See *Bunbury v. Hewson*, 3 Exch. 558; *Ross v. Adcock*, L. R. 3 C. P. 655. By 34 & 35 Vict. c. 43, the cost of the repairs became recoverable as a debt; see *Re Monk*, 35 Ch. D. 583; 56 L. J. Ch. 809.

(*x*) See *per* Cotton, L. J., 36 Ch. D. 280, referring to *Sollers v. Lawrence*, Willes, 413, 421.

(*y*) *Concha v. Murrieta*, 40 Ch. D. 543, 553 (see S. C., [1892] A. C.

670); *Ramskill v. Edwards*, 31 Ch. D. 100, 111; 55 L. J. Ch. 81. See also *Re Sharpe*, [1892] 1 Ch. 154; 61 L. J. Ch. 193. Sequestration, issued to compel the performance of a duty, is not determined by the death of the person against whose estate it was issued; *Pratt v. Inman*, 43 Ch. D. 175; 59 L. J. Ch. 274.

(*z*) *Blackmore v. White*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 293; 68 L. J. Q. B. 951. See also *Battyhany v. Walford*, 36 Ch. D. 269; 56 L. J. Ch. 881.

dependants of a deceased workman under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. This duty may be enforced by the executors of a deceased dependant to whom compensation was payable at the time of her death (*a*). So too where an action was commenced by a manufacturer to compel a local authority to perform their statutory duty of making a sewer to enable the manufacturer to dispose of liquids proceeding from his factory, it was held that the cause of action, if any, survived to his executors on his death (*b*). There is, however, a decision to the effect that the extraordinary expenses of repairing a highway damaged by extraordinary traffic thereon cannot be recovered by the highway authority, under the Highways Act, 1878 (*c*), from the executor of the person by whose order the traffic was conducted (*d*). The claim was, it seems, treated as one to which Lord Mansfield's remark might be applied: "All private criminal injuries or wrongs, as well as all public crimes, are buried with the offender" (*e*).

In conclusion, the extent and limits of the common law doctrine, *actio personalis moritur cum personâ*, may be summed up thus: it was a rule of the common law that if an injury were done either to the person or property of another for which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person to whom or by whom the wrong was done: but this rule was never extended to such personal actions as were founded upon any obligation, contract, debt, covenant, or any other duty to be performed: for there the action survived (*f*).

General rule.

(*a*) *Darlington v. Roscoe & Sons*, [1907] 1 K. B. 219; 76 L. J. K. B. 371; *United Collieries Limited v. Simpson*, [1909] A. C. 383; 78 L. J. P. C. 129.

(*b*) *Peebles v. Oswaldtwistle U. D. C.*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 159; 65 L. J. Q. B. 499; but see *S. C.*, [1897] 1 Q. B. 625.

(*c*) 41 & 42 Vict. c. 77, s. 23: see 61 & 62 Vict. c. 29, s. 12.

(*d*) *Story v. Sheard*, [1892] 2 Q. B. 515; 61 L. J. M. C. 178.

(*e*) *Hambly v. Trott*, 1 Cowp. 374.

(*f*) 1 Wms. Saund. (ed. 1845) 216 a; see also *Williams on Executors*, 9th ed. 1593.

CHAPTER X.

MAXIMS APPLICABLE TO THE LAW OF EVIDENCE.

WE have in a previous chapter investigated certain rules of the law of evidence which relate peculiarly to the interpretation of written instruments; it is proposed, in these concluding pages, to state some few additional rules of evidence. Very little, however, has been here attempted beyond a statement and brief illustration of them; because it appeared desirable at once to refer the reader to treatises of acknowledged authority on the subject, from which, after consideration of the more important cases there indicated, a clear perception of the extensive applicability of the following maxims can alone be derived.

OPTIMUS INTERPRES RERUM USUS. (2 *Inst.* 282.)—*Usage is the best interpreter of things.*

Definition
custom—
usage.

Custom, *consuetudo*, is a law not written, established by long usage and the consent of our ancestors (*a*); and hence it is said that usage, *usus*, is the legal evidence of custom (*b*). Moreover, where a law is established by an implied consent, it is either common law or custom; if universal, it is *common law* (*c*); if particular to this or that

(a) Jacob, Law Dict., tit. "Custom."

(b) *Per* Bayley, J., 10 B. & C. 440.

(c) "In point of fact, the common

law of England, *lex non scripta*, is nothing but custom;" Judgm.,

Nunn v. Varty, 3 Curt. 363.

But the claim of any particular place to

place, then it is *custom*. When any practice was, in its origin, found to be convenient and beneficial, it was naturally repeated, continued from age to age, and grew into a law, either local or natural (*d*). A custom, therefore, or customary law, may be defined to be an usage which has obtained the force of law, and is, in truth, the binding law, within a particular district, or at a particular place, of the persons and things which it concerns (*e*): *consuetudo loci est observanda* (*f*).

There are, however, several requisites to the validity of a custom, which can here be but briefly specified. Custom,
when good.

First, it must be *certain*, or capable of being reduced to a certainty (*g*). Therefore, a custom that lands shall descend to the most worthy of the owner's blood, is void; for how shall this worth be determined? but a custom to descend to the next male of the blood, exclusive of females, is certain, and therefore good. And a custom to pay a year's improved value for a fine on a copyhold estate is good; for, although the value is a thing uncertain, yet it may at any time be ascertained (*h*).

Secondly, the custom must be reasonable in itself, or, rather, not unreasonable (*i*). A custom is unreasonable and

be exempt from the obligation imposed by the common law, may also be properly called a custom; Id.

(*d*) 3 Salk. 112. *Ex non scripto jus venit quod usus comprobavit; nam diuturni mores consensu utentium comprobati legem imitantur*; I. 1, 2, 9. *Consuetudinis jus esse putatur id quod voluntate omnium sine lege vetustas comprobavit*—Cic. de Invent. ii, 22.

(*e*) *Le Case de Tanistry*, Davys, R. 31, 32; cited Judgm., 9 A. & E. 421; and in *Rogers v. Brenton*, 10 Q. B. 26, 63.

(*f*) 6 Rep. 67: 10 Rep. 139. See *Busher v. Thompson*, 4 C. B. 48.

(*g*) *Bluett v. Tregonning*, 3 A. &

E. 554, 575 (where the custom alleged was designated by Williams, J., as "uncertain, indefinite, and absurd"); *Constable v. Nicholson*, 14 C. B. N. S. 230; *A.-G. v. Mathias*, 27 L. J. Ch. 761; *Padwick v. Knight*, 7 Exch. 854; *Wilson v. Willes*, 7 East, 121: 8 R. R. 604; *Broadbent v. Wilkes*, Willes, 360; S. C. (in error), 1 Wils. 63 (which also shows that a custom must be *reasonable*); with this case cf. *Rogers v. Taylor*, 1 H. & N. 706; *Carlyon v. Lovering*, Id. 784.

(*h*) 1 Blac. Com. 78; 1 Roll. Abr. 565; Davys, R. 33.

(*i*) 1 Blac. Com. 77.

bad if it conflicts with the general principles of the common law, such as a custom which would compel persons to alienate property without an exercise of free will (*j*). A custom, however, is not unreasonable merely because it is contrary to a particular maxim or rule of the common law, for *consuetudo ex certâ causâ rationabili usitata privat communem legem* (*k*): custom, when grounded upon a certain and reasonable cause supersedes the common law (*l*); in proof whereof may be instanced the customs of gavelkind and borough English (*m*), which are directly contrary to the general law of descent; or the custom of Kent, which is opposed to the general law of escheat (*n*). Referring to a peculiar custom respecting the descent of copyhold lands in a manor, Cockburn. J., observed that such "local customs are remnants of the older English tenures, which, though generally superseded by the feudal tenures introduced after the dominion of the Normans had become firmly established, yet remained in many places, probably in manors which, instead of passing into the possession of Norman lords, remained in the hands of English proprietors. These customs, therefore, are not merely the result of accident or caprice, but were originally founded on some general principle or rule of descent" (*o*).

Further, a custom is not necessarily unreasonable because it is prejudicial to the interests of a private man, if it be for the benefit of the commonwealth; as the custom to turn the plough upon the headland of another, which is upheld

(*j*) *Johnson v. Clark*, [1908] 1 Ch. 303; 77 L. J. Ch. 177.

(*k*) Co. Litt. 113 a; *Tyson v. Smith*, 9 A. & E. 406, 421.

(*l*) Litt. s. 169; Co. Litt. 33 b; 5 Bing. 298. It is of the very essence of a custom that it should vary from the common law; *per* *Ld. Kenyon*, 6 T. R. 764.

(*m*) See *Muggleton v. Barnett*, 2 H. & N. 653. The law takes notice

of the custom of borough English, and therefore, in pleading the custom, its nature need not be specially set forth; *Doe v. Clift*, 12 A. & E. 579. The same remark applies to the custom of gavelkind; see Co. Litt. 175 b.

(*n*) See 2 Blac. Com. 84.

(*o*) 2 H. & N. 681; cf. 1 Blac. Com. 74.

in favour of husbandry, or the custom to dry nets on the land of another, which is likewise upheld in favour of fishing and for the benefit of navigation (*p*). Similarly, the existence of a fair being treated as a matter of public convenience, a custom to erect stalls at a fair upon the highway may be reasonable, though the exercise of the custom causes a partial obstruction of the highway so long as the fair continues (*q*); and upon the ground that recreation is necessary (*r*), it has been held to be a good custom for the inhabitants of a parish, at all seasonable times of the year, to enter upon a close within the parish, and there to erect a maypole and dance round it, and otherwise to enjoy upon the close any lawful and innocent recreation (*s*). Again, in the interests of agriculture, it is a reasonable custom that a tenant shall have the way-going crop after the expiration of his term (*t*), and that a tenant, who is bound to use his farm in a good and tenantable manner and according to the rules of good husbandry, may, on quitting the farm, charge his landlord with part of the expense of draining land which needed drainage, though the drainage was done without the landlord's consent or knowledge (*u*).

(*p*) *Mercer v. Denne*, [1905] 2 Ch. 538 : 74 L. J. Ch. 723. Judgm., *Tyson v. Smith*, 9 A. & E. 421; Co. Litt. 33 b. See *Ld. Falmouth v. George*, 5 Bing. 286, 293 : 30 R. R. 597. There cannot be a custom for the inhabitants of a parish to have, as such, a profit à prendre in alieno solo; *Gateward's case*, 6 Rep. 60 b; see *Goodman v. Saltash*, 7 App. Cas. 633; *Neill v. Duke of Devonshire*, 8 Id. 135, 154; *Fitzhardinge v. Purcell*, [1908] 2 Ch. 139 : 77 L. J. Ch. 529.

(*q*) *Elwood v. Bullock*, 6 Q. B. 383; see *Simpson v. Wells*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 214.

(*r*) See 1 Lev. 176 : 2 H. Bl. 398.

(*s*) *Hall v. Nottingham*, 1 Ex. D. 1. A custom for the inhabitants of

a parish to train horses at all seasonable times of the year in a place outside the parish is not good; *Sowerby v. Coleman*, L. R. 2 Ex. 96; cf. *Edwards v. Jenkins*, [1896] 1 Ch. 308 : 65 L. J. Ch. 222.

(*t*) *Wigglesworth v. Dallison*, Dougl. 201 : 1 Sm. L. C., 10th ed. 528, and notes thereto.

(*u*) *Mousley v. Ludlam*, 21 L. J. Q. B. 64; *Dalby v. Hirst*, 1 B. & B. 224 : 21 R. R. 577. *Marq. of Salisbury v. Gladstone*, 9 H. L. Cas. 692 (followed in *Blewett v. Jenkins*, 12 C. B. N. S. 16), is an important case with reference to the reasonableness of a custom. See also *Phillips v. Ball*, 6 C. B. N. S. 811.

On the other hand, a custom, which is contrary to the public good, or prejudicial to the many and beneficial only to some particular person, is repugnant to the law of reason, for it could not have had a reasonable commencement. For example, a custom set up in a manor on the part of the lord, that the commoner cannot turn in his cattle until the lord has put in his own, is clearly bad, for it is injurious to the multitude and beneficial only to the lord (*x*). So, a custom is bad, that the lord of the manor shall have £3 for every pound-breach of any stranger (*y*), or that the lord of the manor may detain a distress taken upon his demesnes until fine be made for the damage at the lord's will (*z*). In these and similar cases (*a*), the customs themselves are void, on the ground of their having had no reasonable commencement,—as being founded in wrong and usurpation, and not on the voluntary consent of the people to whom they relate (*b*); for it is a true principle, that no custom can prevail against right, reason, or the law of nature. The will of the people is the foundation of that custom, which subsequently becomes binding on them; but, if it be grounded, not upon reason, but error, it is not the will of the people (*c*), and to such a custom the established maxim of law applies, *malus usus est abolendus* (*d*)—an evil or invalid custom ought to be abolished.

(*x*) Year Bk., 2 H. 4, fol. 24 B. pl. 20: 1 Blac. Com. 77.

(*y*) See 9 A. & E. 422, n. (*a*).

(*z*) Id., p. 422.

(*a*) *Douglas v. Dysart*, 10 C. B. N. S. 688. See *Phillips v. Ball*, 6 C. B. N. S. 811.

(*b*) Judgm., 9 A. & E. 422.

(*c*) See Taylor, Civ. Law, 3rd ed. 245, 246; Noy, Max., 9th ed., p. 59, n. (*a*); Id. 60.

(*d*) Litt. s. 212; 4 Inst. 274; *Hilton v. Earl Granville*, 5 Q. B. 701 (as to which case see *Gill v. Dickinson*, 5 Q. B. D. 159; *Love v.*

Bell, 9 App. Cas. 286: 10 Q. B. D. 547, 561; *Duke of Buccleugh v. Wakefield*, L. R. 4 H. L. 399). See, also, *Rogers v. Taylor*, 1 H. & N. 706; *Clayton v. Corby*, 5 Q. B. 415 (where a prescriptive right to dig clay was held unreasonable); cited by Ld. Denman, 12 Q. B. 845; *Gibbs v. Flight*, 3 C. B. 581; *Bailey v. Stephens*, 12 C. B. N. S. 91; *Constable v. Nicholson*, 14 Id. 230, 241. In *Lewis v. Lane*, 2 My. & K. 449, a custom inconsistent with the doctrine of resulting trusts was held to be unreasonable.

Thirdly, the custom must have existed from time immemorial (*e*); it is no good custom if it originated within the time of legal memory (*f*). But, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the immemorial existence of a custom should be inferred, as a fact, from an uninterrupted modern usage to observe it (*g*); and whenever it is found that a custom has existed immemorially, it is the duty of a Court of law to presume that it had a legal origin, if any legal origin is reasonably possible (*h*); for "it is a maxim of the law of England to give effect to everything which appears to have been established for a considerable time and to presume that what has been done has been done of right and not of wrong" (*i*); and "it is a most convenient thing that every supposition, not wholly irrational should be made in favour of long-continued enjoyment" (*j*).

Fourthly, the custom must have continued without any interruption; for any interruption would cause a temporary cessation of the custom, and the revival would give it a new

"The Superior Courts have at all times investigated the customs under which justice has been administered by local jurisdictions; and, unless they are found consonant to reason and in harmony with the principles of law, they have always been rejected as illegal;" *Judgm., Cox v. Mayor of London*, 1 H. & C. 358; S. C., L. R. 2 H. L. 239.

(*e*) Legal memory begins with the beginning of the reign of Richard I.; see *Litt. s.* 170.

(*f*) 1 Blac. Com. 76; *Simpson v. Wells*, L. R. 7 Q. B. 214. See also *Mounsey v. Ismay*, 3 H. & C. 484; and cf. *De la Warr v. Miles*, 17 Ch. D. 535. With regard, however, to usages of trade, "the custom may change, and a new custom may become notorious, so as to be incorporated into every contract, unless it be expressly excluded"; *per*

Channell, J., *Moult v. Halliday*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 130: 67 L. J. Q. B. 451.

(*g*) *R. v. Jolliffe*, 2 B. & C. 54: 26 R. R. 264; *Jenkins v. Harvey*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 877, 894: 2 Id. 393, 407; see *Shephard v. Payne*, 16 C. B. N. S. 132; *Bryant v. Foot*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 497; *Lawrence v. Hitch*, Id. 521; *Holford v. George*, Id. 639; *Mercer v. Denne*, [1904] 2 Ch. 534: 74 L. J. Ch. 71.

(*h*) *Goodman v. Saltash*, 7 App. Cas. 633; *A.-G. v. Wright*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 318: 66 L. J. Q. B. 834; see also *Foreman v. Free Fishers of Whitstable*, L. R. 4 H. L. 266, 280.

(*i*) *Per* Pollock, C.B., 2 H. & N. 623.

(*j*) *Per* Bramwell, B., 3 Ex. D. 299; see *Tilbury v. Silva*, 45 Ch. D. 98.

beginning, which must necessarily be within time of memory, and consequently the custom will be void. But this must be understood with regard to an interruption of the *right*: for an interruption of the possession only, for ten or twenty years, will not destroy the custom. As, if the inhabitants of a parish have a customary right of watering their cattle at a certain pool, the custom is not destroyed though they do not use it for ten years: it only becomes more difficult to prove; but, if the right be in any way discontinued for a single day, the custom is quite at an end (*k*).

Fifthly, the custom must have been *peaceably enjoyed* and *acquiesced in*, not subject to contention and dispute. For, as customs owe their origin to common consent, their being immemorially disputed, either at law or otherwise, is a proof that such consent was wanting (*l*).

Sixthly, a custom, though established by consent, must, when established, be *compulsory*, and not left to the option of every man whether or not he will use it. A custom that all the inhabitants shall be rated towards the maintenance of a bridge will be good; but a custom that every man is to contribute thereto at his own pleasure, is idle and absurd, and indeed no custom at all (*m*).

Seventhly, customs existing in the same place "must be *consistent with each other*; one custom cannot be set up in opposition to another. For if both are really customs, then both are of equal antiquity, and both established by mutual consent: which to say of contradictory customs is absurd" (*n*).

Eighthly, customs in derogation of the common law, or of the general rights of property, must be strictly construed (*o*).

(*k*) 1 Blac. Com. 77.

(*l*) Id.

(*m*) 1 Blac. Com. 78. This does not mean that a trade usage cannot be excluded by contract.

(*n*) 1 Blac. Com. 78.

(*o*) Id.; Judgm., 10 Q. B. 57; *per* Bayley, J., 2 B. & C. 839. See as to the above rule, *per* Cockburn, C.J., 2 H. & N. 680, 681.

Ninthly, if it is sought to attach a custom or usage to a written contract it must not be inconsistent therewith; therefore where by the terms of a charter-party a ship was to proceed to a certain port, or so near thereto as she could get, and there discharge her cargo as customary, it was decided that a custom of the port by which the charterer was bound to take delivery only at the port, and not at a place as near thereto as the vessel could safely get was excluded, as being inconsistent with the written contract (*p*).

Where, then, continued custom has acquired the force of an express law (*q*), reference must of course be made to such custom in order to determine the rights and liabilities of parties, arising out of transactions which are affected by it; *optimus interpret rerum usus*. This maxim is, however, likewise applicable to many cases, and under many circumstances, which are quite independent of customary law in the sense in which that term has been here used, and which are regulated by mercantile usage and the peculiar rules recognised by merchants.

The law merchant, it has been observed, forms a branch of the law of England, and those customs which have been universally and notoriously prevalent amongst merchants, and have been found by experience to be of public use, have been adopted as a part of it, upon a principle of convenience, and for the benefit of trade and commerce; and, when so adopted, it is unnecessary to plead and prove them (*r*).

Usage of
trade.

In cases, also, relating to mercantile contracts, courts

(*p*) *Hayton v. Irvin*, 5 C. P. D. 130: 41 L. J. Q. B. 661; *The Alhambra*, 6 P. D. 68; 50 L. J. P. 36; *Reynolds v. Tomlinson*, [1896] 1 Q. B. 586: 65 L. J. Q. B. 496.

(*q*) See Judgm., 9 A. & E. 425, 426.

(*r*) Judgm., 7 Scott, N. R. 327.

L.M.

See *Brandao v. Barnett*, 12 Cl. & F. 787; S. C., 3 C. B. 519; *Bellamy v. Marjoribanks*, 7 Exch. 389; *Jones v. Peppercorne*, 28 L. J. Ch. 158.

As to the mode of proving mercantile usage, see *Mackenzie v. Dunlop*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 22.

Mercantile
contracts.

of law will, in order to ascertain the usage and understanding of merchants, examine and hear witnesses conversant with those subjects; for merchants have a style peculiar to themselves, which, though short, yet is understood by them, and of which usage and custom are the legitimate interpreters (*s*). And this principle is not confined to mercantile contracts or instruments, although it has been more frequently applied to them than to others (*t*); but it may be stated generally, that where the words used by parties have, by the known usage of trade, by any local custom, or amongst particular classes, acquired a peculiar sense, distinct from the popular sense of the same words, their meaning may be ascertained by reference to that usage or custom (*u*). And the question in such cases usually is, whether there was a recognised practice and usage with reference to the transaction out of which the written contract between the parties arose, and to which it related, which gave a particular sense to the words employed in it, so that the parties might be supposed to have used such words in that particular sense. "The character and description of evidence admissible for that purpose" being "*the fact of a general usage and practice*

(*s*) 3 Stark. Ev. 1033; (*Id.* 4th ed. 701); cited 3 B. & Ad. 733: *per* Ld. Hardwicke, 1 Ves., sen., 459. See *Startup v. Macdonald*, 7 Scott, N. R. 269 (where the question was respecting the reasonableness of the time at which a tender of goods was made, in the absence of any usage of trade on the subject); *Coddington v. Paleologo*, L. R. 2 Ex. 193, 197.

Evidence of former transactions between the same parties is receivable for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the terms used in their written contract, if ambiguous; *Bourne v. Gatliff*, 11 Cl. & F. 45.

See, further, *Johnston v. Usborne*, 11 A. & E. 549; *Stewart v. Aberdeen*, 4 M. & W. 211, as to which case, see 1 Arnould, Mar. Insur., 5th ed. 203 n. (1).

(*t*) *Per* Parke, J., *Smith v. Wilson*, 3 B. & Ad. 733, where evidence was held admissible to show that, by the custom of the country the word *thousand*, as applied to rabbits, denoted *twelve hundred*. *Spicer v. Cooper*, 1 Q. B. 424, is also in point.

(*u*) Judgm., *Robertson v. French*, 4 East, 135: 7 R. R. 535. See *Carter v. Crick*, 4 H. & N. 412; *Birrell v. Dryer*, 9 App. Cas. 345.

prevailing in that particular trade or business, not the judgment and opinion of the witnesses, for the contract may be safely and correctly interpreted by reference to the fact of usage, as it may be presumed such fact is known to the contracting parties, and that they contract in conformity thereto; but the judgment or opinion of the witnesses called affords no safe guide for interpretation, as such judgment or opinion is confined to their own knowledge" (x).

The following examples must here suffice in illustration of the subject just adverted to, and in the notes will be found references to a few cases, showing the operation of the well-known rule stated above, that evidence of usage—mercantile or otherwise—cannot be admitted to vary a written contract (y).

In an action for the breach of a contract for the sale of a quantity of gambier, evidence was held admissible to show that by the usage of the trade a "bale" of gambier was understood to mean a package of a particular description, and, consequently, that the contract would not be duly performed by tendering packages of a totally different description (z).

(x) Judgm., *Lewis v. Marshall*, 8 Scott, N. R. 493; *Russian St. Nav. Co. v. Silva*, 13 C. B. N. S. 610.

As to mercantile words see also *Peek v. N. Staffordshire R. Co.*, 10 H. L. Cas. 543; *Sutton v. Ciceri*, 15 App. Cas. 144.

(y) In the under-mentioned cases, evidence of custom or usage was held inadmissible for construing a mercantile instrument; *Dickenson v. Jardine*, L. R. 3 C. P. 639; *Hall v. Janson*, 4 E. & B. 500; *Cockburn v. Alexander*, 6 C. B. 791; *Spartali v. Benecke*, 10 C. B. 212; distinguished in *Godts v. Rose*, 17 C. B. 229, 234, and in *Field v. Lelean*, 6 H. & N. 617; *Corturier v. Hastie*, 8 Exch. 40; 9 Id. 102; *Re Stroud*, 8 C. B. 502. See *Miller v. Telher-*

ington, 6 H. & N. 278; 7 Id. 954; *Symonds v. Lloyd*, 6 C. B. N. S. 691; *Foster v. Mentor Life Ass. Co.*, 3 E. & B. 48.

Parol evidence may be admitted to show that a person whose name appears at the head of an invoice as vendor, was not in fact a contracting party; *Holding v. Elliott*, 5 H. & N. 117; or to show that there never was any contract between the parties; *Rogers v. Hadley*, 2 H. & C. 227; *Kempson v. Boyle*, 3 Id. 763; *Hurst v. G. W. R. Co.*, 19 C. B. N. S. 310.

(z) *Gorrissen v. Perrin*, 2 C. B. N. S. 681. See *Devauz v. Conolly*, 8 C. B. 640. In the following cases evidence of mercantile usage has been admitted to explain words or

Difference between custom of merchants and usage of trade.

It is important when considering this question to bear in mind the difference between the general custom of merchants and the usage of a particular trade. The former is the established law of the land, it receives judicial notice and therefore does not require to be proved in the ordinary way by the evidence of witnesses. It has had its origin no doubt in the practice of merchants, which, having been uniformly observed for a long period of time, comes at length to be judicially noticed. It is not possible to say at what exact period of time, or by what precise means this change takes place, but probably after the custom has been frequently proved as a fact in and recognised by the Courts as a binding custom in a particular trade they will take judicial notice of it (*a*). Thus the custom for hotel-keepers to hire the furniture for their hotels has been so frequently proved that the Courts take judicial notice of it in questions arising on the reputed ownership clauses in the statutes relating to bankruptcy (*b*).

Where evidence of an established local usage—as on the stock exchange of a particular town (*c*)—is admitted to add to or to effect the construction of a written contract, it is admitted on the ground that the contracting parties are

phrases occurring in written contracts :—“ month,” *Simpson v. Margitson*, 11 Q. B. 27; “ net proceeds,” *Caine v. Horsfall*, 1 Exch. 519; “ wet,” as applied to palm-oil, *Warde v. Stuart*, 1 C. B. N. S. 88; “ in regular turns of loading,” *Leidemann v. Schultz*, 14 C. B. 38; cf. *Hudson v. Clementson*, 18 Id. 218.

(*a*) See the observations and cases collected in the notes to *Wigglesworth v. Dallison*, 1 Smith’s L. C.

(*b*) *Crawcour v. Salter*, 18 Ch. D. 30; *Ex p. Turquand*, 14 Q. B. D. 636; see *Whitfield v. Brand*, 16 M. & W. 282, where the Court appears to have judicially noticed the custom

for bookbinders to have in their shops books for sale on commission. See *Re Goetz*, [1898] 1 Q. B. 787; 67 L. J. Q. B. 577.

(*c*) *Bayliffe v. Butterworth*, 1 Exch. 425; *Pollock v. Stables*, 12 Q. B. 765; *Bayley v. Wilkins*, 7 C. B. 886; *Taylor v. Stray*, 2 C. B. N. S. 174; *Cropper v. Cook*, L. R. 3 C. P. 194, 198; *Viscount Torrington v. Lowe*, L. R. 4 C. P. 26; *Grissell v. Bristowe*, Id. 36; *Maxted v. Paine*, L. R. 4 Ex. 81, 203; *Davis v. Haycock*, Id. 373; *Kidston v. Empire Mar. Ins. Co.*, L. R. 1 C. P. 535, 2 Id. 357; *Chapman v. Shepherd*, 2 Id. 228.

both cognisant of the usage, and must be presumed to have made their agreement with reference to it; but it seems that a person who employs an agent to transact business for him in a particular market is bound by its usages, though he be ignorant thereof, provided the same are reasonable, and do not change the intrinsic nature of the employment, but merely regulate its performance (*d*).

There is also another extensive class of decisions in which evidence of usage is admitted to explain and construe ancient grants or charters, or to support claims not incompatible therewith (*c*). Nor is there any difference in this respect between a private deed and the king's charter (*f*), and in either case, evidence of usage may be given to expound the instrument, provided such usage is not inconsistent with, or repugnant to, its express terms (*g*). So, the immemorial existence of certain rights or exemptions, as a modus or a claim to the payment of tolls, may be inferred from uninterrupted modern usage (*h*).

Evidence of usage to explain deeds.

Generally, as regards a deed (as well as a will),—the

(*d*) *Robinson v. Mollett*, L. R. 7 H. L. 836; see *Perry v. Barnett*, 15 Q. B. D. 388; and for a case where one contracting party was bound by a custom of a port of which he was ignorant, see *King v. Hinde*, 12 L. R. Ir. 113.

(*e*) *Bradley v. Pilots of Newcastle*, 2 E. & B. 427; *Duke of Beaufort v. Mayor of Swansea*, 3 Exch. 413, 435; *A.-G. v. Drummond*, 1 Dru. & War. 353; 2 H. L. Cas. 837; *Shore v. Wilson*, 9 Cl. & F. 569.

(*f*) "All charters or grants of the Crown may be repealed or revoked when they are contrary to law, or uncertain or injurious to the rights and interests of third persons, and the appropriate process for the purpose is by writ of *scire facias*;" *Judgm., Reg. v. Hughes*, L. R. 1 P. C. 87.

(*g*) *Per* Ld. Kenyon, *Withnell v. Gartham*, 6 T. R. 398: 3 R. R. 218; *R. v. Salway*, 9 B. & C. 424, 435: 33 R. R. 230; *Stammers v. Dixon*, 7 East, 200: 8 R. R. 612; *per* Ld. Brougham, *A.-G. v. Brazenose Coll.*, 2 Cl. & F. 317: 37 R. R. 107; *per* Tindal, C.J., 8 Scott, N. R. 813. See *Re Nottingham Corporation*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 511, 512; *N. E. R. Co. v. Ld. Hastings*, [1900] A. C. 260.

(*h*) See *per* Parke, B., *Jenkins v. Harvey*, 1 Cr. M. & R. 894: 40 R. R. 769; *per* Richardson, J., *Chad v. Tilsed*, 2 B. & B. 409: 23 R. R. 482; *Foreman v. Free Fishers of Whitstable*, L. R. 4 H. L. 266, and cases there cited; *Earl of Egremont v. Saul*, 6 A. & E. 924; *Brune v. Thompson*, 4 Q. B. 543.

state of the subject to which it relates at the time of execution, may be inquired into; and where a deed is ancient, so that the state of the subject-matter or its date cannot be proved by direct evidence, evidence of the mode in which the property in question has been held and enjoyed is admissible. Thus, where the question was whether the soil or merely the herbage passed under the term "pastura" in an ancient admission as entered on the court rolls of a manor, evidence was received to show that the tenants had for a long series of years enjoyed the land itself (*i*), for *optimus interpres rerum usus* (*k*).

Statutes.

Lastly, evidence of usage is likewise admissible to aid in interpreting Acts of Parliament, the language of which is doubtful; for *jus et norma loquendi* are governed by usage. The meaning of things spoken or written must be such as it has constantly been received to be by common acceptation (*l*), and that exposition shall be preferred, which, in the words of Sir E. Coke (*m*) is "approved by constant and continual use and experience:" *optima enim est legis interpres consuetudo* (*n*). Thus, the Court was influenced in its construction of a statute of Anne, by the fact that it was that which had been generally considered the true one for one hundred and sixty years (*o*).

We shall conclude these brief remarks upon the maxim *optimus interpres rerum usus* in the words of Mr. Justice

(*i*) *Doe v. Bevis*, 7 C. B. 456; see Taylor on Ev., 9th ed., p. 791.

(*k*) *Per* Ld. Wensleydale, *Waterpark v. Furnell*, 7 H. L. Cas. 684; citing *Weld v. Hornby*, 7 East, 199; 8 R. R. 608; *Duke of Beaufort v. Swansea*, 3 Exch. 413; *A.-G. v. Parker*, 1 Ves. 43; 3 Atk. 576; *per* Ld. St. Leonards, *A.-G. v. Drummond*, 1 Dru. & W. 368. See the maxim as to *contemporanea expositio*, ante, p. 529. As to construing the rubrics and canons see *Martin v.*

Mackonochie, L. R. 2 A. & E. 195.

(*l*) *Vaughan*, R., 169; *per* Crowder, J., *The Fermoy Peerage*, 5 H. L. Cas. 747; *Arg., R. v. Bellringer*, 4 T. R. 819.

(*m*) 2 Inst. 18.

(*n*) D. 1, 3, 37; *per* Ld. Brougham, 3 Cl. & F. 354.

(*o*) *Cox v. Leigh*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 333; 43 L. J. Q. B. 123; and see Maxwell, *Interp. of Statutes*, 3rd ed., p. 423.

Story, who observed, "The true and appropriate office of a usage or custom is, to interpret the otherwise indeterminate intentions of parties, and to ascertain the nature and extent of their contracts, arising, not from express stipulations, but from mere implications and presumptions, and acts of a doubtful or equivocal character. It may also be admitted to ascertain the true meaning of a particular word, or of particular words in a given instrument, when the word or words have various senses, some common, some qualified, and some technical, according to the subject-matter to which they are applied. But I apprehend that it can never be proper to resort to any usage or custom to control or vary the positive stipulations in a written contract, and, *à fortiori*, not in order to contradict them. An express contract of the parties is always admissible to supersede, or vary, or control a usage or custom; for the latter may always be waived at the will of the parties. But a written and express contract cannot be controlled, or varied, or contradicted by a usage or custom; for that would not only be to admit parol evidence to control, vary, or contradict written contracts; but it would be to allow mere presumptions and implications, properly arising in the absence of any positive expressions of intention, to control, vary, or contradict the most formal and deliberate declarations of the parties" (p).

Remarks of Mr. Justice Story respecting usage.

CUILIBET IN SUA ARTE PERITO EST CREDENDUM. (*Co. Litt.* 125 a.)—*Credence should be given to one skilled in his peculiar profession.*

Almost all the injuries, it has been observed, which one individual may receive from another, and which lay the foundation of actions, involve questions peculiar to the trades and conditions of the parties; and, in these cases,

Necessity of rule.

(p) *The Schooner Reeside*, 2 Sumner (U.S.), R. 567.

the jury must, according to the above maxim, attend to the witnesses, and decide according to their number, professional skill, and means of knowledge. Thus, in an action against a surgeon for ignorance, the question may turn on a nice point of surgery. In an action on a policy of life insurance, physicians must be examined. So, for injuries to a mill worked by running water, if occasioned by the erection of another mill higher up the stream, mill-wrights and engineers must be called as witnesses. In like manner, it may be necessary for a jury to decide questions of navigation, as in the ordinary case of deviation on a policy of marine insurance, of seaworthiness, or where one ship runs down another at sea through bad steering (*q*).

Evidence as
to matters of
science, &c.

Respecting matters, then, of science or trade (*r*), and others of the same description, persons of skill may not only speak as to facts, but are even allowed to give their opinions in evidence (*s*), which is contrary to the general rule, that the opinion of a witness is not evidence. Thus the opinion of medical men is evidence as to the state of a patient whom they have seen; and even in cases where they have not themselves seen the patient, but have heard the symptoms and particulars of his state detailed by other witnesses, their opinions on the nature of such symptoms have been admitted (*t*). In prosecutions for murder, they have, therefore, been allowed to state their opinion, whether the wounds described by witnesses were likely to be the cause of death (*u*).

With respect to the admissibility in evidence of the opinion of a medical man as to a prisoner's state of mind,

(*q*) *Johnstone v. Sutton*, 1 T. R. 538, 539: 1 R. R. 269.

(*r*) The importance attached to the *lex mercatoria*, or custom of merchants, and the implied warranty by a skilled labourer, artizan, or artist, that he is reasonably com-

petent to the task he undertakes, may be referred to this maxim; see 1 Blac. Com. 75.

(*s*) 1 Stark. Ev., 3rd ed. 173, 175; Stark. Ev., 4th ed. 96, 273.

(*t*) 1 Phil. Ev., 10th ed. 521.

(*u*) *Ibid*.

the following question was proposed to the judges by the House of Lords (x) : " Can a medical man, conversant with the disease of insanity, who never saw the prisoner previously to the trial, but who was present during the whole trial and the examination of all the witnesses, be asked his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, or his opinion whether the prisoner was conscious, at the time of doing the act, that he was acting contrary to law, or whether he was labouring under any, and what, delusion at the time ? " To this question the majority of the judges returned the following answer, which removes much of the difficulty which formerly existed with reference to this, the most important practical application of the maxim under review, and must be considered as laying down the rule upon the subject : " We think the medical man, under the circumstances supposed, cannot, in strictness, be asked his opinion in the terms above stated, because each of those questions involves the determination of the truth of the facts deposed to, which it is for the jury to decide, and the questions are not mere questions upon a matter of science, in which case such evidence is admissible. But where the facts admitted are not disputed, and the question becomes substantially one of science only, it may be convenient to allow the question to be put in that general form, though the same cannot be insisted on as a matter of right."

Further, on the principle expressed by the maxim, Insurance. *cuiuslibet in sua arte perito est credendum*, ship-builders have been allowed to state their opinions as to the seaworthiness of a ship from examining a survey taken by others, at the taking of which they themselves were not present ; and the opinion of an artist is evidence as to the genuineness of a picture (y). But, although witnesses conversant with a

(x) *M'Naghten's case*, 10 Cl. & F. 211, 212.

(y) Phil. Ev., 10th ed. 522. So

evidence as to the genuineness of handwriting given by a witness possessing the requisite experience and

particular trade may be allowed to speak to a prevailing practice in that trade, and although scientific persons may give their opinion on matters of science, it has been expressly decided that witnesses are not receivable to state their views on matters of legal or moral obligation, nor on the manner in which others would probably have been influenced if particular parties had acted in one way rather than another (z). For instance, in an action on a policy of insurance, where a broker stated, on cross-examination, that in his opinion certain letters ought to have been disclosed, and that, if they had, the policy would not have been underwritten: this was held to be mere opinion, and not evidence (a). Whether the opinions of underwriters as to the materiality of facts and the effect they would have had upon the amount of premium, is admissible in evidence, has been the subject of considerable controversy, and the law on the subject cannot at present be considered in a satisfactory state. The learned author of this book (b) appears to have been of opinion that such evidence is generally inadmissible, founding his view apparently on the decisions in *Carter v. Boehm* (c) and *Campbell v. Richards* (d). On the other hand, there is authority for the affirmative

skill is admissible, although little or no weight has, by many judges, been thought to be due to such testimony. 2 Phil. Ev., 10th ed. 308; *Doe v. Suckermore*, 5 A. & E. 703; *Doe v. Davies*, 10 Q. B. 314. See *Brookes v. Tichbourne*, 5 Exch. 929, 931; *Newton v. Ricketts*, 9 H. L. Cas. 262.

By 28 & 29 Vict. c. 18, s. 8, "comparison of a disputed writing with any writing proved to the satisfaction of the judge to be genuine shall be permitted to be made by witnesses; and such writings, and the evidence of witnesses respecting the same, may be submitted to the Court and jury as evidence of the

genuineness, or otherwise, of the writing in dispute." See *Reg. v. Silverlock*, [1894] 2 Q. B. 766; 63 L. J. M. C. 233.

(z) *Judgm.*, 5 B. & Ad. 846. See, also, *Greville v. Chapman*, 5 Q. B. 731; as to this case see Taylor on Ev., 9th ed. 934.

(a) *Carter v. Boehm*, 3 Burr. 1905, 1913, 1914; *Campbell v. Richards*, 5 B. & Ad. 840; 39 R. R. 679; cf. *Richards v. Murdock*, 10 B. & C. 257; 34 R. R. 511; *Chapman v. Walton*, 10 Bing. 57; 38 R. R. 396.

(b) 5th ed., p. 935.

(c) 3 Burr. 1905.

(d) 5 B. & Ad. 840.

view of the proposition to be found in the cases cited below (e). It has been said that the differences to be found in these decisions is less upon any point of law than on the application of a settled law to certain states of facts, and that such evidence has only been rejected when it has been tendered in an inquiry, the nature of which is not such as to require any peculiar habits of thought or study in order to qualify a man to understand it (f). Whether or not this be the true solution of the difficulty, it seems that, as a matter of practice, the evidence of underwriters and brokers on such questions is being more and more resorted to without objection (g), and probably the view taken by the Common Pleas in the cases referred to would now be upheld as the correct one.

Where the fixing of the fair price for a contract to insure is a matter of skill and judgment, and must be effected by applying certain general principles of calculation to the particular circumstances of the individual case, it seems to be matter of evidence to show whether the fact suppressed would have been noticed as a term in the particular calculation. In some instances, moreover, the materiality of the fact withheld would be a question of pure science; in others, it is very possible that mere common sense, although sufficient to comprehend that the disclosure was material, would not be so to understand to what extent the risk was increased by that fact; and, in intermediate cases, it seems difficult in principle wholly to exclude evidence of the nature alluded to, although its importance may vary exceedingly according to circumstances (h). Thus, it has been said (i), that the time of sailing *may* be very material

(e) *Chapman v. Walton*, 10 Bing. 57: 38 R. R. 396; *Rickards v. Murdock*, 10 B. & C. 257: 34 R. R. 511.

(f) See notes to *Carter v. Boehm*, 1 Smith L. C.

(g) Arnould, *Mar. Ins.*, 5th ed.

581; *Ionides v. Pinder*, L. R. 9 Q. B. 531, 535: 43 L. J. Q. B. 227.

(h) 3 Stark. Ev., 3rd ed. 887, 888.

(i) *Per Story, J.*, delivering judgment, *M'Lanaham v. Universal Ins. Co.*, 1 Peters (U.S.), R. 188.

to the risk. How far it is so must essentially depend upon the nature and length of the voyage, the season of the year, the prevalence of winds, the conformation of coasts, the usages of trade as to navigation and touching and staying at ports, the objects of the enterprise, and other circumstances, political and otherwise, which may retard or advance the general progress of the voyage. The material ingredients of all such inquiries are mixed up with nautical skill, information, and experience, and are to be ascertained in part upon the testimony of maritime persons, and are in no case judicially cognisable as matter of law. The ultimate fact itself, which is the test of materiality, that is, whether the risk be increased so as to enhance the premium, is, in many cases, an inquiry dependent upon the judgment of underwriters and others who are conversant with the subject of insurance.

The Sussex Peerage Case offers a good illustration of the above maxim as it applies to the *legal* knowledge of a party, whose evidence it is proposed to take. In order to prove the law prevailing at Rome on the subject of marriage, a Roman Catholic Bishop was tendered as a witness, and was examined as to the nature and extent of the duties of his office in its bearing on the subject of marriage, with the view of ascertaining whether he had such a peculiar knowledge of the law relative to marriage as would render him competent to give evidence respecting it. It appeared from this examination that the witness had resided more than twenty years at Rome, and had studied the ecclesiastical law prevailing there on the above subject; that a knowledge of this law was necessary to the due discharge of an important part of the duties of his office; that the decision of matrimonial cases, so far as they might be affected by the ecclesiastical and canon law, fell within the jurisdiction of Roman Catholic bishops; and, further, that the tribunals at Rome would respect and act upon such decision in any particular case if not appealed from. It was held that

the witness came within the definition of *peritus*, and was receivable accordingly (*k*). In a later case it was held that the mercantile usage of a foreign country bearing on a particular subject may be proved by a witness who, though he has not been a lawyer by profession, and has never held any official appointment as judge, advocate, or solicitor, can yet satisfy the Court that he has had special and peculiar means of acquiring knowledge respecting such usage (*l*). Thus the Court has allowed the law of a foreign country to be proved by the evidence of a secretary to the embassy of that country (*m*).

Lastly, although in accordance with the principal maxim, a skilled witness may be examined as to mercantile usage, or as to the meaning of a term of art, he cannot be asked to construe (*n*) a written document, for *ad quæstionem legis respondent judices*.

OMNIA PRÆSUMUNTUR CONTRA SPOLIATOREM. (*Branch, Max., 5th ed., p. 80.*)—*Every presumption is made against a wrong-doer.*

The following case serves forcibly to illustrate this maxim. Example of rule.
An account of personal estate having been decreed in equity, the defendant charged the plaintiff with a debt as

(*k*) *Sussex Peerage*, 11 Cl. & F. 85. See, also, *Di Sora v. Philipps*, 10 H. L. Cas. 624; *per* Ld. Langdale, *Earl Nelson v. Ld. Bridport*, 8 Beav. 527; *Baron de Bode v. Reg.*, 8 Q. B. 208, 246, 250 *et seq.*; *Perth Peerage*, 2 H. L. Cas. 865, 874. "A long course of practice sanctioned by professional men is often the best expositor of the law;" *per* Ld. Eldon, *Candler v. Candler*, 1 Jac. 232.

(*l*) *Vander Donckt v. Thellusson*, 8 C. B. 812. See *Reg. v. Povey*, 22 L. J. Q. B. 19; *Dears v. C. C.* 32.

In *Bristow v. Sequeville*, 5 Exch. 275, a witness was held inadmissible to prove the law of a foreign country, whose knowledge of it had been acquired solely by study at a university in another country. This decision was followed in *Re Bonelli*, 1 P. D. 69; 45 L. J. P. 2; and *Cartwright v. Cartwright*, 26 W. R. 684.

(*m*) *Re Dost Aly Khan*, 6 P. D. 6; 49 L. J. P. 78.

(*n*) *Kirkland v. Nisbet*, 3 Macq. Sc. App. Cas. 766; *Bowes v. Shand*, 2 App. Cas. 455, 462.

due to the estate. It was proved that the defendant had wrongfully opened a bundle of papers relating to the account, which had been sealed up and left in his hands: that he had altered and displaced the papers: and that it could not be known what papers might have been abstracted. The Court, upon these facts, disallowed defendant's whole demand, although the Lord Chancellor declared himself satisfied, as indeed the defendant swore, that all the papers entrusted to the defendant had been produced; the ground of this decision being that *in odium spoliatoris omnia præsumuntur* (o).

Withholding
evidence.

Again, "if a man, by his own tortious act, withhold the evidence by which the nature of his case would be manifested, every presumption to his disadvantage will be adopted" (p). Where a party has the means in his power of rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, the omission to do so furnishes a strong inference against him (q). Thus, where a person who has wrongfully converted property will not produce it, it shall be presumed, as against him, to be of the best description (r). On the other hand, if goods be sold without any express stipulation as to price, and the seller prove their delivery,

(o) *Wardour v. Berisford*, 1 Vern. 452; S. C., Francis, M., p. 8. *Sanson v. Rumsey*, 2 Vern. 561, affords another illustration of the maxim. See, also, *Dalston v. Coatsworth*, 1 P. Wms. 731; cited Arg., *Ld. Melville's Trial*, 29 St. T. 1194; *Gartside v. Ratcliff*, 1 Chanc. Cas. 292.

(p) 1 Smith, L. C., 11th ed. 356; 1 Vern. 19. The maxim likewise applies to the spoliation of ship's papers; *The Hunter*, 1 Dods. Adm. R. 480, 486; *The Emilie*, 18 Jur. 703, 705.

(q) *A.-G. v. Windsor*, 24 Beav. 679.

(r) *Armory v. Delamirie*, 1 Stra. 504 (followed in *Mortimer v. Cra-*

dock, 12 L. J. C. P. 166; and applied by Ld. Cairns, *Hammersmith R. Co. v. Brand*, L. R. 4 H. L. 224). But "a person who refuses to allow his solicitor to violate the confidence of the professional relation" cannot be regarded in the same odious light as was the jeweller in the above case; *per* Ld. Chelmsford, *Wentworth v. Lloyd*, 10 H. L. Cas. 591. See, too, *Williamson v. Rover Cycle Co.*, [1901] 2 Ir. R. 615, where the maxim was held not to apply in a case where the defendants destroyed parts of a bicycle which the plaintiff had sent them for inspection *after they had been examined* by his own expert witnesses.

but give no evidence to fix their value, they are presumed to be worth the lowest price for which goods of that description usually sell; unless, indeed, it be shown that the buyer himself has destroyed the means of ascertaining the value, for then a contrary presumption arises, and the goods are taken to be of the very best description (s).

According to the same principle, if a man withhold an agreement under which he is chargeable, after a notice to produce, it is presumed, as against him, to have been properly stamped, until the contrary appear (t). Where a public officer, such as a sheriff, produces an instrument, the execution of which he was bound to procure, as against him it is presumed to have been duly executed (u). Moreover, if a person is proved to have defaced or destroyed a written instrument, a presumption arises, that, if the truth had appeared, it would have been against his interest, and that his conduct is attributable to his knowledge of this circumstance, and, accordingly, slight evidence of the contents of the instrument will usually be sufficient (x). A testator made a will, by which he devised an estate to A., and afterwards made another will, which was lost, and which the jury found, by special verdict, to have been different from the former will, though they did not find in what particular the difference consisted: the Court decided that the devisee under the first will was entitled to the estate; but Lord Mansfield observed, that, if the devisee under the first will had destroyed the second, it

(s) *Chunnes v. Pezzey*, 1 Camp. 8; followed *Lawton v. Sweeney*, 8 Jur. 964. See *Hayden v. Hayward*, 1 Camp. 180.

(t) *Crisp v. Anderson*, 1 Stark. N. P. C. 35: 18 R. R. 744. See *Marine Investment Co. v. Haviside*, L. R. 5. H. L. 624.

(u) *Scott v. Waithman*, 3 Stark. N. P. C. 168; *Plumer v. Brisco*, 11

Q. B. 52; *Barnes v. Lucas*, 1 Ry. & M. 264.

(x) 1 Phil. Ev., 10th ed. 477, 478, where various cases are cited exemplifying the maxim in the text; *Annesley v. Earl of Anglesey*, 17 Howell, St. Tr. 1430; 1 Stark. Ev., 3rd ed. 409; *Roe v. Harvey*, 4 Burr. 2484; *Ld. Trimlestown v. Kemmis*, 9 Cl. & F. 775.

would have been a good ground for the jury to find a revocation (*y*).

With reference to the cases in which a deed or other instrument, which ought to be in the possession of a litigant party, is not produced, the general rule is, that the law excludes such evidence of facts as, from the nature of the thing, supposes still better evidence in the party's possession or power. And this rule is founded on a presumption that there is something in the evidence withheld which makes against the party producing it (*z*). *Twyman v. Knowles* (*a*) may be referred to in connection with this part of the subject. That was an action of trespass *qu. cl. fr.*, at the trial of which the plaintiff relied upon his bare possession of the close, although it appeared that he had taken it under an agreement in writing which was not produced; the judge directed the jury that, having proved that he was in possession of the close at the time of the trespass, the plaintiff must have a verdict; but that to entitle himself to more than nominal damages, he should have shown the duration of his term. And this direction was upheld by the Court, Maule, J., observing that the plaintiff had the means of showing the quantum of his interest, and that "the non-production of the lease raised a presumption that the production of it would do the plaintiff no good."

Rule in
actions of
ejectment.

On the principle of this maxim rests the well-known rule in actions of ejectment that the plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title, not the weakness of his antagonist's, for no one can recover in ejectment who would not be entitled to enter without bringing ejectment; and any person entering on the possession of the tenant, unless he has a better title, is a wrong-doer.

(*y*) *Harwood v. Goodright*, Cowp. 86.

(*z*) As illustrating the nature and force of this presumption, see *Lumley v. Wagner*, 1 De G. M. & G. 604,

633, 634; *Braithwaite v. Coleman*, 1 Harrison, 223; *Mason v. Morley*, 34 L. J. Ch. 422.

(*a*) 13 C. B. 222; see 36 Ch. D. 119.

If the evidence alleged to be withheld is shown to be unattainable, the presumption *contra spoliatorem* ceases, and the inferior evidence is admissible. "If therefore, a deed be in the possession of the adverse party, and not produced, or if it be lost or destroyed, no matter whether by the adverse party or not, secondary evidence is clearly admissible; and, if the deed be in the possession of a third person, who is not by law compellable to produce it, and he refuse to do so, the result is the same, for the object is then unattainable by the party offering the secondary evidence" (b).

OMNIA PRÆSUMUNTUR RITE ET SOLENNITER ESSE ACTA.

(Co. Litt. 6 b : 332.)—All acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly.

Ex diuturnitate temporis omnia præsumuntur rite et solenniter esse acta (c). "Antiquity of time fortifieth all titles and supposeth the best beginning the law can give them" (d). "It is a maxim of the law of England to give effect to everything which appears to have been established for a considerable course of time, and to presume that what has been done was done of right, and not of wrong" (e). "It is a most convenient thing that every supposition, not wholly irrational, should be made in favour of long-continued enjoyment" (f). This maxim applies as well

Rule stated.

(b) Judgm., *Doe v. Ross*, 7 M. & W. 121; *Marston v. Downes*, 1 A. & E. 31; *Cooke v. Tanswell*, 8 Taunt. 450.

(c) Jenk. Cent. 185. *Roberts v. Bethell*, 12 C. B. 778, seems to offer an illustration of this presumption. See *Potez v. Glossop*, 3 Exch. 191; observed upon by Ld. Wensleydale, *Buller v. Mountgarret*, 7 H. L. Cas. 647; *Morgan v. Whitmore*, 6 Exch. 716.

(d) Hob. 257; *Ellis v. Mayor of Bridgnorth*, 15 C. B. N. S. 52.

(e) *Per* Pollock, C.B., 2 H. & N. 623; and in *Price v. Worwood*, 4 Id. 514, where he observed, "The law will presume a state of things to continue which is lawful in every respect; but, if the continuance is unlawful, it cannot be presumed."

(f) *Per* Bramwell, L.J., *Mayor of Penryn v. Best*, 3 Ex. D. 299. See also *Philipps v. Halliday*, [1891]

where matters are in contest between private persons as to matters public in their nature (*g*).

Rule applies
to private
rights.

For instance : A lease of a house contained a covenant by the lessee that, without the lessor's consent, he would not carry on any trade upon the demised premises, nor convert them into a shop, nor suffer them to be used for any purpose other than a dwelling-house. The house was converted into a public-house and grocery shop, and the lessor, with full knowledge of this fact, continued to accept the rent for more than twenty years. The plaintiff, having purchased from the lessor the reversion of the premises, brought an action of ejectment for breach of the covenant. It was held that user of the premises in their altered state for more than twenty years, with the knowledge of the lessor, was evidence from which a jury might presume that the alteration was made with his licence (*h*).

Where, indeed, a private right is in question, the presumption *omnia ritè esse acta*, may, as has been already stated, arise, under various and wholly dissimilar states of facts, *ex diuturnitate temporis*. Thus, the enrolment of a deed may be presumed ; where there has been a conveyance by lease and release, the existence of the lease may be presumed upon the production of the release ; and livery of seisin, the surrender of a copyhold estate, or a reconveyance from the mortgagee to the mortgagor, may be presumed (*i*). Where an attestation clause to a deed stated that the deed

A. C. 228, 231 ; *G. E. R. Co. v. Goldsmid*, 11 App. Cas. 927, 939 ; *Goodman v. Saltash*, 7 App. Cas. 633.

(*g*) See, *per* Pollock, C.B., *Reed v. Lamb*, 6 H. & N. 85—86 ; *per* Crompton, J., *Dawson v. Surveyor for Willoughby*, 5 B. & S. 924.

(*h*) *Gibson v. Doeg*, 2 H. & N. 615.

(*i*) *Per* Watson, B., 2 H. & N. 777 ; and cases cited, *Doe v. Gardner*, 12 C. B. 319. So a lease is presumed, in the absence of evidence

to the contrary, on production of the counterpart ; *Hughes v. Clark*, 10 C. B. 905. In *Avery v. Bowden*, 6 E. & B. 973, Pollock, C.B., observed that "where the maxim, *omnia ritè acta præsumuntur* applies, there indeed, if the event ought properly to have taken place on *Tuesday*, evidence that it did take place either on *Tuesday* or *Wednesday* is strong evidence that it took place on the *Tuesday*."

had been signed, sealed, and delivered, and commissioners before whom the deed had to be executed, certified that the parties had acknowledged the same, the Court presumed that the deed had been properly sealed, although upon its face there was no sign of the impression of a seal (*k*).

Upon the same principle proceeds the rule that deeds, wills, and other attested documents which are more than thirty years old, and are produced from the proper custody, prove themselves, and the testimony of the subscribing witness may be dispensed with, although of course it is competent to the opposite party to call him to disprove the regularity of the execution (*l*).

Ancient deeds.

Again, where acts are of an official nature, or require the concurrence of official persons, a presumption arises in favour of their due execution. In these cases the ordinary rule is, *omnia præsumuntur ritè et solenniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium* (*m*)—everything is presumed to be rightly and duly performed until the contrary is shown (*n*).

Rule applied to public and official acts.

(*k*) *Re Sandilands*, L. R. 6 C. P. 411. For a case where the presumption was rebutted and the onus shifted, see *Marine Ins. Co. v. Havaside*, L. R. 5 H. L. 624: 42 L. J. Ch. 173.

(*l*) Best on Presumptions, p. 81; see *Re Airey*, [1897] 1 Ch. 169: 66 L. J. Ch. 152. The date which appears on the face of a document is *prima facie* its true date, *Malpas v. Clements*, 19 L. J. Q. B. 435; *Laws v. Rand*, 3 C. B. N. S. 442.

(*m*) Co. Litt. 232; *Van Omeron v. Dowick*, 2 Camp. 44: 11 R. R. 656; *Doe v. Evans*, 1 Cr. & M. 461: 38 R. R. 579; *Powell v. Sonnett*, 3 Bing. 381, offers a good instance of the application of this maxim. Presumption as to signature, *Taylor v. Cook*, 8 Price, 653. The Court will not presume any fact so as to vitiate an order of removal: *per* Ld.

Denman, R. v. Stockton, 5 B. & Ad. 550. See *Reg. v. St. Paul, Covent Garden*, 7 Q. B. 232; *Reg. v. Warwickshire JJ.*, 6 Q. B. 750; *Reg. v. St. Mary Magdalen*, 2 E. & B. 809. As to an order of affiliation, see *Watson v. Little*, 5 H. & N. 472, 478. As to an award, see *per* Parke, B., 12 M. & W. 251; as to presuming an indenture of apprenticeship, *Reg. v. Fordingbridge*, E. B. & E. 678; *Reg. v. Broadhempston*, 1 E. & E. 154, 162, 163.

Quære whether the maxim applies to the performance of a moral duty, see *per* Willes, J., *Fitzgerald v. Dressler*, 7 C. B. N. S. 399.

(*n*) See *per* Story, J., *Bank of the United States v. Dandridge*, 12 Wheaton (U. S.), R. 69, 70 (where the above maxim is illustrated); *Davies v. Pratt*, 17 C. B. 188.

The following may be mentioned as general presumptions of law illustrating this maxim:—That a man, in fact acting in a public capacity, was properly appointed and is duly authorised so to act (*o*); that in the absence of proof to the contrary, credit should be given to public officers who have acted, *prima facie*, within the limits of their authority, for having done so with honesty and discretion (*p*); that the records of a court of justice have been correctly made (*q*), according to the rule, *res judicata pro veritate accipitur* (*r*); that judges and jurors do nothing causelessly and maliciously (*s*); that the decisions of a court of competent jurisdiction are well founded, and their judgments regular (*t*); and that facts, without proof of which the verdict could not have been found, were proved at the trial (*u*).

Besides the cases below cited (*x*), which strikingly illustrate

(*o*) *Per* Ld. Ellenborough, *R. v. Verelst*, 3 Camp. 432: 14 R. R. 775; *Monke v. Butler*, 1 Roll. R. 83; *McGahey v. Alston*, 2 M. & W. 206; *Faulkner v. Johnson*, 11 M. & W. 581; *Doe v. Young*, 8 Q. B. 63; *Reg. v. Essex*, Dears. & B. 369; *McMahon v. Lennard*, 6 H. L. Cas. 970. See the above maxim applied, *per* Erle, C.J., *Bremner v. Hull*, L. R. 1 C. P. 759.

(*p*) Judgm., *Earl of Derby v. Bury Imp. Commrs.*, L. R. 4 Ex. 226.

(*q*) *Reed v. Jackson*, 1 East, 355: 6 R. R. 283.

(*r*) D. 50, 17, 207; Co. Litt. 103, a.; Judgm., *Magrath v. Hardy*, 4 Bing. N. C. 796; *per* Alderson, B., *Hopkins v. Francis*, 13 M. & W. 670; *Irwin v. Grey*, L. R. 2 H. L. 20; *Smith v. Sydney*, L. R. 5 Q. B. 203.

A family Bible is in the nature of a record, and being produced from the proper custody, is itself evidence of pedigrees entered in it; *Hubbard v. Lees*, L. R. 1 Ex. 255, 258.

(*s*) *Sutton v. Johnstone*, 1 T. R. 503: 1 R. R. 257. See *Lumley v. Gye*, 3 E. & B. 114.

(*t*) *Per* Bayley, J., *Lyttleton v. Cross*, 3 B. & C. 327: 27 R. R. 370; *Reg. v. Brennan*, 16 L. J. Q. B. 289. See *Lee v. Johnstone*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. Cas. 426; *Morris v. Ogden*, L. R. 4 C. P. 687, 699.

(*u*) *Per* Buller, J., *Spieries v. Parker*, 1 T. R. 145, 146: 1 R. R. 165. If the return to a mandamus be certain on the face of it, that is sufficient, and the Court cannot intend facts inconsistent with it, for the purpose of making it bad; *per* Buller, J., *R. v. Lyme Regis*, 1 Dougl. 159. See *R. v. Nottingham Waterworks Co.*, 6 A. & E. 355.

(*x*) See, as to presuming an Act of Parliament in support of an ancient usage, Judgm., *Reg. v. Chapter of Exeter*, 12 A. & E. 532; the passing of a by-law by a corporation from usage, *Reg. v. Powell*, 8 E. & B. 377; in favour of acts of commissioners having authority by statute, *Horton v. Westminster Imp. Commrs.*, 7

the presumption of law under our notice, the following may be adduced :—

It is a well-established rule that the law will presume in favour of honesty and against fraud (*y*), and this presumption acquires weight from the length of time during which a transaction has subsisted (*z*). The law will moreover strongly presume against the commission of a criminal act : for instance, that a witness has committed perjury (*a*).

Other instances.—
Presumption against fraud, &c.

The law will also presume strongly in favour of the validity of a marriage, especially where a great length of time has elapsed since its celebration (*b*)—indeed the legal presumption as to marriage and legitimacy is only to be rebutted by “ strong, distinct, satisfactory and conclusive ” evidence (*c*) ; therefore where it was shown that the man and woman had gone through a form of marriage, and thereby indicated an intention to be married, it was held that those who claimed by virtue of the marriage were not bound to prove that all necessary ceremonies had been performed (*d*).

Where the claimant of an ancient barony, which has

Exch. 780 ; *Reg. v. St. Michael's, Southampton*, 6 E. & B. 807 ; an order of justices for stopping up a road, *Williams v. Eytton*, 2 H. & N. 771, 777 ; S. C., 4 Id. 357. See, also, *Woodbridge Union v. Colneis Guardians*, 13 Q. B. 269.

(*y*) *Middleton v. Barned*, 4 Exch. 241 ; *per Parke, B.*, Id. 243 ; and in *Shaw v. Beck*, 8 Exch. 400 ; *Doe v. Catmore*, 16 Q. B. 745, 747, with which cf. *Doe v. Palmer*, Id. 747. See *Trott v. Trott*, 29 L. J. P. 156.

(*z*) *Re Postlethwaite*, 70 L. T. 514, 520.

(*a*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, *McGregor v. Topham*, 3 H. L. Cas. 147, 148 ; *per Turner, L.J.*, 4 D. M. & G. 153.

(*b*) *Lauderdale Peerage*, 10 App. Cas. 692, 742, 755, 761 ; *Piers v.*

Piers, 2 H. L. Cas. 331 ; *Sichel v. Lambert*, 15 C. B. N. S. 781, 787, 788 ; *Harrison v. Mayor of Southampton*, 4 D. M. & G. 137 ; as to presuming consent to a marriage, see *Re Birch*, 17 Beav. 358.

(*c*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, 2 H. L. Cas. 373 ; citing, *per* Ld. Lyndhurst, *Morris v. Davies*, 5 Cl. & F. 265. See *Lapsley v. Grierson*, 1 H. L. Cas. 498 ; *Saye and Sele Peerage*, Id. 507 ; *per Erle, J.*, *Walton v. Gavin*, 16 Q. B. 58 ; *Harrison v. Mayor of Southampton*, 4 D. M. & G. 137, 153.

(*d*) *Sasty Velaidier v. Sembecutty*, 6 App. Cas. 364. See, also, *R. v. Jones*, 11 Q. B. D. 118 : 52 L. J. M. C. 96 ; *R. v. Cresswell*, 1 Q. B. D. 446 : 45 L. J. M. C. 77.

been long in abeyance, proves that his ancestor sat as a peer in Parliament, and no patent or charter of creation can be discovered, it is now the established rule to hold that the barony was created by writ of summons and sitting, although the original writ or enrolment of it is not produced (e). In *The Hastings Peerage case*, it was proved that A. was summoned by special writ to Parliament in 49 Hen. 3, but there was no proof that he sat, there being no rolls or journals of that period. A.'s son and heir, B., sat in the Parliament of 18 Edw. 1, but there was no proof that he was summoned to that Parliament, there being no writs of summons or enrolments of such writs extant from 49 Hen. 3 to 23 Edw. 1. It further appeared that B. was summoned to the Parliament of 23 Edw. 1, and to several subsequent Parliaments, but there was no proof that he sat. It was held, that it might be well presumed that B. sat in the Parliament of 18 Edw. 1 in pursuance of a summons, on the principle that *omnia præsumuntur legitime facta donec probetur in contrarium* (f).

As regards the acts of private individuals, the presumption, *omnia ritè esse acta*, forcibly applies where they are of a formal character, as writings under seal (g). Likewise upon proof of title, everything which is collateral to the title will be intended, without proof; for, although the law requires exactness in the derivation of a title, yet where that has been proved, all collateral circumstances will be

(e) *Braye Peerage*, 6 Cl. & F. 757; *Vaux Peerage*, 5 Cl. & F. 526.

(f) *The Hastings Peerage*, 8 Cl. & F. 144.

(g) See Arg. and Judgm., in *Ricard v. Williams*, 7 Wheaton (U.S.), R. 59; *Strother v. Lucas*, 12 Peters (U.S.) R. 452; S. P., 2 Id. 760; 2 Exch. 549; *D'Arcy v. Tamar R. Co.*, 4 H. & C. 463, 467—468.

As to presumption that a foreign bill of exchange was duly stamped at the time of its indorsement to plain-

tiff, see *Bradlaugh v. De Rin*, L. R. 3 C. P. 286.

As to presumption of evidence of probate, see *Doe v. Powell*, 8 Q. B. 576.

As to presumption that a will was duly executed, *Lloyd v. Roberts*, 12 Moo. P. C. C. 158, 165; *Trott v. Trott*, 29 L. J. P. 156; *Byles v. Cox*, 74 L. T. 222; *Harris v. Knight*, 15 P. D. 170, 179, where the will was lost.

presumed in favour of right (*h*) ; and, wherever the possession of a party is rightful, the general rule of presumption is applied to invest that possession with a legal title (*i*). No greater obligation, it has, indeed, been said (*k*), lies upon a court of justice than that of supporting long continued enjoyment by every legal means, and by every reasonable presumption ; this “doctrine of presumption goes on the footing of validity, and upholds validity by supposing that everything was present which that validity required ;” *omnia presumuntur ritè fuisse acta* is the principle to be observed.

In reference also to a claim by the rector of a parish to certain fees, founded on prescription, it has been judicially observed that “the true principle of the law applicable to this question, is that, where a fee has been received for a great length of time, the right to which could have had a legal origin, it may and ought to be assumed that it was received as of right during the whole period of legal memory, that is, from the beginning of the reign of Richard I. to the present time, unless the contrary is proved” (*l*).

On the same principle it is a general rule that, where a person is required to do an act, the not doing of which would make him guilty of a criminal neglect of duty, it shall be intended that he has duly performed it unless the contrary be shown—*stabit præsumptio donec probetur in contrarium* (*m*) ; negative evidence rebuts this presumption, that all has been duly performed (*n*). Thus, on

(*h*) 3 Stark. Ev., 3rd ed. 936 ; 2 Wms. Saund. 5th ed. 42, n. (7).

(*i*) Per Ld. Ellenborough, 8 East, 263. See *Simpson v. Wilkinson*, 8 Scott, N. B. 814 ; *Doe v. Thompson*, 7 Q. B. 897.

(*k*) Per Ld. Westbury, *Lee v. Johnstone*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. Cas. 435.

(*l*) *Bryant v. Foot*, L. R. 3 Q. B. 505 ; *Lawrence v. Hitch*, Id. 521.

(*m*) Wing. Max. 712 ; Hob. R. 297 ; per Sir W. Scott, 1 Dods. Adm. R. 266 ; *Davenport v. Mason*, 15 Tyng (U.S.), R., 2nd ed. 87. “It seems reasonable that presumption which is not founded on the basis of certainty, should yield to evidence which is the test of truth.” Id.

(*n*) Per Ld. Ellenborough, *R. v. Haslingfield*, 2 M. & S. 558, 561 : 15

an indictment for the non-repair of a road, the presumption, that an award, in relief of the defendants, was duly made according to the directions of an inclosure Act, may be rebutted by proof of repairs subsequently done to the road by the defendants; for, if the fact had been in accordance with such presumption, they ought not to have continued to repair (o).

Proceedings
of inferior
courts.

It is, however, important to observe, in addition to the above general remark, that, in inferior courts and proceedings by magistrates, the maxim, *omnia præsumuntur ritè esse acta*, does not apply to *give jurisdiction* (p).

Thus, the Mayor's Court, London, is an inferior Court, When therefore process had issued out of that Court against C. as a garnishee, and he declared in prohibition, it was held that jurisdiction was not sufficiently shown by a plea, which set up the custom of foreign attachment, but did not allege that the original debt, or the debt alleged to be due from the garnishee to the defendant, arose, or that any of the parties to the suit was a citizen or was resident, within the City (q).

Again, where the examination of a soldier, taken before two justices, was tendered in evidence to prove his settlement, but it did not appear by the examination itself, or by other proof, that the soldier, at the time when he was examined, was quartered in the place where the justices had jurisdiction, it was held not to be admissible (r). So, in the case of an order by justices, their jurisdiction must appear on the face of such order; otherwise, it is a nullity,

R. R. 350; recognising *Williams v. East India Co.*, 3 East, 192: 6 R. R. 589.

(o) *R. v. Haslingfield*, 2 M. & S. 558: 15 R. R. 350; *Manning v. E. Counties R. Co.*, 12 M. & W. 237; *Doe v. Gore*, 2 Id. 321; *Heysham v. Forster*, 5 Man. & Ry. 277. See *Rundle v. Hearle*, [1898] 2 Q. B.

83: 67 L. J. Q. B. 741.

(p) *Per Holroyd, J.*, 7 B. & C. 790. See *Reg. v. Inh. of Gate Fulford*, Dears. & B. 74; Best on Presumptions, p. 81.

(q) *Mayor of London v. Cox*, L. R. 2 H. L. 239.

(r) *R. v. All Saints, Southampton*, 7 B. & C. 785.

and not merely voidable (s); unless, indeed, the order follows a form authorised by statute. Where an examination before removing justices left it doubtful whether the examination had been taken by a single justice or by two, the Court stated that they would look at the document as lawyers, and would give it the benefit of the legal presumption in its favour; and it was observed, that the maxim, *omnia præsumuntur ritè esse acta*, applied in this case with particular effect, since the fault, if there really had been one, was an irregular assumption of power by a single justice, as well as a fraud of the two, in pretending that to have been done by two which was, in fact, done only by one (t).

In a case before the House of Lords some remarks were made in reference to this subject, which may be here advantageously inserted:—It cannot be doubted, that where an inferior court (a court of limited jurisdiction, either in point of place or of subject-matter) assumes to proceed, its judgment must set forth such facts as show that it has jurisdiction, and must show also in what respect it has jurisdiction. But it is another thing to contend that it must set forth all the facts or particulars out of which its jurisdiction arises. Thus, if a power of commitment or other power is given to justices of a county, their conviction or order must set forth that they are two such justices of such county, in order that it may be certainly known whether they constitute the tribunal upon which the statute they assume to act under has conferred the authority to make that order or pronounce that conviction. But although it is necessary that the jurisdiction of the inferior court should appear, yet there is no particular form in which it should be made to appear. The Court above,

(s) *Per Bayley, J.*, 7 B. & C. 790; *R. v. Hulcott*, 6 T. R. 583; *R. v. Helling*, 1 Stra. 8; *R. v. Chilverscoton*, 6 T. R. 178; *R. v. Holm*, 11 East, 381; *Reg. v. Totness*, 11 Q. B.

80; *Reg. v. Treasurer of Kent*, 22 Q. B. D. 603; 58 L. J. M. C. 71.

(t) *Reg. v. Silkstone*, 2 Q. B. 520, and cases cited, *Id.* p. 729, n. (p).

which may control the inferior court, must be enabled, somehow or other, to see that there is jurisdiction such as will support the proceeding; but in what way it shall so see it is not material, provided it does so see it (*u*). The rule, therefore, may be stated to be, that where it appears upon the face of the proceedings that the inferior court has jurisdiction, it will be intended that, the proceedings are regular (*x*); but that, unless it so appears,—that is, if it appear affirmatively that the inferior court has no jurisdiction, or, if it be left in doubt, whether it has jurisdiction or not,—no such intendment will be made (*y*). “The old rule for jurisdiction is, that nothing shall be intended to be out of the jurisdiction of the *superior* court but that which specially appears to be so; nothing is intended to be within the jurisdiction of an *inferior* court but that which is expressly alleged” (*z*). And again, “it is necessary for a party, who relies upon the decision of an inferior tribunal, to show that the proceedings were within the jurisdiction of the Court” (*a*).

Foreign court
of inferior
jurisdiction.

Where the District Court of Philadelphia at the suit of the defendant issued a writ of attachment against the plaintiff's ship, for the purpose of enforcing a debt which the defendant alleged that the plaintiff owed him, and the plaintiff afterwards sued the defendant in this country for

(*u*) *Per* Ld. Brougham, *Taylor v. Clemson*, 11 Cl. & F. 610, affirming the judgment, 2 Q. B. 978. In this case, and in *Mayor of London v. Cox*, L. R. 2 H. L. 239, many authorities as to the necessity of showing jurisdiction are collected and reviewed.

(*x*) A presumption in favour of regularity in official practice is often made. See (*ex. gr.*) *Barnes v. Keane*, 15 Q. B. 75, 82; *Re Warne*, 15 C. B. 767, 769; *Baker v. Cave*, 1 H. & N. 674; *Cheney v. Courtois*, 13 C. B. N. S. 634; *Robinson v. Collingwood*,

17 C. B. N. S. 777.

(*y*) *Per* Tindal, C.J., *Dempster v. Purnell*, 4 Scott, N. R. 39 (citing *Moravia v. Sloper*, Willes, 30, and *Titley v. Foxhall*, Id. 688); *per* Erle, J., *Barnes v. Keane*, 15 Q. B. 84.

(*z*) Arg., *Peacock v. Bell*, 1 Wms. Saund. 73; adopted in *Gosset v. Howard*, 10 Q. B. 453, and *Mayor of London v. Cox*, L. R. 2 H. L. 259. See, also, further in connection with the text, Id. 261 *et seq.*

(*a*) *Per* Alderson, B., *Stanton v. Styles*, 5 Exch. 583; *acc. Mayor of London v. Cox*, L. R. 2 H. L. 239.

trespass in seizing the ship, it was held that it must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the Court had jurisdiction to issue the process in question (b).

In the great case of *Gosset v. Howard* (c), the Exchequer Chamber held that the warrant of the Speaker of the House of Commons must be construed by the rules applied in determining the validity of warrants and writs issuing from a *superior* Court; and it was laid down that, with respect to writs so issued, it must be presumed that they are duly issued, that they have issued in a case in which the Court has jurisdiction, unless the contrary appear on the face of them, and that they are valid of themselves, without any allegation other than that of their issue, and a protection to all officers, and others in their aid, acting under them. Many of the writs issued by superior Courts recite upon their face the cause of their issuing, and show their legality—writs of execution for instance. Others, however, do not, and, though unquestionably valid, are framed in a form which, if they had proceeded from persons having a special jurisdiction unknown to the common law, would have been clearly insufficient, and would have rendered them altogether void. With regard to the Speaker's warrant, the Court held that it must be construed with at least as much respect as would be shown to a writ out of any of the Courts at Westminster; observing, in the language of Mr. Justice Powys (d), that "the House of Commons is a great Court, and all things done by them are intended to have been *rite acta*" (e).

*Gosset v.
Howard.*

(b) *Taylor v. Ford*, 29 L. T. N. S. 392.

(c) 10 Q. B. 411, where the cases with respect to the validity of warrants were cited in argument.

(d) *Reg. v. Paty*, 2 Ld. Raym. 1105, 1108.

(e) *Judgm., Gosset v. Howard*, 10 Q. B. 457. Cf. *Bradlaugh v. Gosset*, 12 Q. B. D. 271.

RES INTER ALIOS ACTA ALTERI NOCERE NON DEBET. (*Wing. Max.*, p. 327.)—*A transaction between two parties ought not to operate to the disadvantage of a third (f).*

Principle
rule.

Of maxims relating to the law of evidence, the above may be considered as one of the most important and most useful; its effect is to prevent a litigant party from being concluded or even affected, by the acts, conduct, or declarations of strangers (*g*). On a principle of good faith and mutual convenience, a man's own acts are binding upon himself, and are, as well as his conduct and declarations, evidence against him; yet it would not only be highly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorised strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, so neither ought their acts or conduct to be used as evidence against him (*h*).

The above rule, then, operates to exclude all the acts, declarations, or conduct of others as evidence to bind a party, either directly or by inference; so that, in general, no declaration, written entry, or affidavit made by a stranger is evidence against a man; nor can a person be affected, still less concluded, by any evidence (*i*), decree, or judgment to which he was not actually, or, in consideration of law, privy (*k*).

(*f*) *Res inter alios judicata neque emolumentum afferre his qui judicio non interfuerunt neque prejudicium solent irrogare*; Cod. 7, 56, 2.

(*g*) The maxim was much considered in *Meddowcroft v. Huguenin*, 3 Curt. 403 (where the issue of a marriage, which had been pronounced void by the Consistorial Court, attempted unsuccessfully to impeach that sentence in the Pre-rogative Court). S. C., 4 Moore, P. C., 386. See *Reg. v. Fontaine Moreau*, 11 Q. B. 1028, and cases *infra*.

(*h*) 1 Stark. Evid., 3rd ed. 58, 59; Stephen, Dig. Law of Evid., 1st ed. 138. See *Armstrong v. Normandy*, 5 Exch. 409; *Reg. v. Ambergate R. Co.*, 1 E. & B. 372, 381; *Salmon v. Webb*, 3 H. L. Cas. 510.

(*i*) See *Humphreys v. Pensam*, 1 My. & Cr. 580.

(*k*) "It cannot be doubted that a man's assertions or admissions, whether made in the course of a judicial proceeding or otherwise, and, in the former case, whether he was himself a party to such proceeding or not, may be given in

In a leading case (*l*), immediately connected with this subject, it was laid down by the judges, as a general principle, "that a transaction between two parties in judicial proceedings ought not to be binding upon a third; for it would be unjust to bind any person who could not be admitted to make a defence, or to examine witnesses, or to appeal from a judgment, which he might think erroneous; and, therefore, the depositions of witnesses in another cause (*m*) in proof of a fact, the verdict of a jury finding the fact, and the judgment of the Court upon facts found, although evidence against the parties and all claiming under them, are not, in general, to be used to the prejudice of strangers" (*n*).

Maxim applied to judicial proceedings.

As regards the parties to the earlier suit, it is stated in the same case, as being generally true, "first, that the judgment of a Court of concurrent jurisdiction (*o*), directly upon the point, is, as a plea, a bar, or, as evidence, conclusive (*p*),

evidence against him in any suit or action in which the fact so asserted or admitted becomes material to the issue to be determined. And in principle there can be no difference whether the assertion or admission be made by the party himself, who is and ought to be affected by it, or by some one employed, directed, or invited by him to make the particular statement on his behalf. In like manner a man who brings forward another for the purpose of asserting or proving some fact on his behalf, whether in a court of justice or elsewhere, must be taken himself to assert the fact which he thus seeks to establish;" *per* Cockburn, C.J., *Richards v. Morgan*, 4 B. & S. 661.

(*l*) See the *Duchess of Kingston's case*, 11 Howell, St. Tr. 261; 2 Smith L. C. See, also, *Needham v. Bremner*, L. R. 1 C. P. 583; *Natal Land Co. v. Good*, L. R. 2 P. C.

121; *Davies v. Lowndes*, 7 Scott, N. R. 141; *Doe v. Brydges*, Id. 333; *Ld. Trimlestown v. Kemmis*, 9 Cl. & F. 781; cited *Boileau v. Rutlin*, 2 Exch. 665, 677. The general rule stated in the text has, however, been departed from in certain cases; for instance, in questions relating to manorial rights, public rights of way, immemorial customs, disputed boundary, disputed modus, and pedigrees.

(*m*) See, for instance, *Morgan v. Nicholl*, L. R. 2 C. P. 117.

(*n*) See, also, *Judgm., King v. Norman*, 4 C. B. 898.

(*o*) Provided the judgment is not beyond the statutory jurisdiction of the Court giving it (*Toronto Railway v. Toronto Corporation*, [1904] A. C. 809; 73 L. J. P. C. 120).

(*p*) *I.e.*, if pleaded, there being an opportunity to plead it; for "if a party does not take the first opportunity which the pleadings afford

between the same parties (*q*), upon the same matter, directly in question in another Court; secondly, that the judgment of a Court of exclusive jurisdiction, directly upon the point, is, in like manner, conclusive upon the same matter, between the same parties, coming incidentally in question in another Court, for a different purpose. But neither the judgment of a concurrent or exclusive jurisdiction is evidence of any matter which came collaterally in question, though within their jurisdiction, nor of any matter incidentally cognisable, nor of any matter to be inferred by argument from the judgment" (*r*).

To the general principle, that a judgment is binding only as between the same parties and their privies (*s*), judgments *in rem* form an exception; for by a judgment *in rem* the subject-matter adjudicated upon is rendered, *ipso facto*, such as it is thereby declared to be, and the judgment, therefore, is of effect as between all persons whatever. For instance, a grant of probate by a Court of competent jurisdiction actually invests the executor with the character which it declares to belong to him, and such a grant, until its revocation, is conclusive against all the world (*t*). Amongst judgments which are considered to be *in rem* is the sentence

him of relying on an estoppel, he leaves the matter at large;" *Judgm., Feversham v. Emerson*, 11 Exch. 385; see 2 Sm. L. C., 11th ed. 767—773.

(*q*) But not in a proceeding in which the parties are not the same. Thus an order of quarter sessions quashing a hasty order is no estoppel in an action for seduction brought by the employer of the woman; *Anderson v. Collinson*, [1901] 2 K. B. 107; 70 L. J. K. B. 620.

(*r*) *Duchess of Kingston's case*, *supra*; see *per* Knight Bruce, V.-C., *Barrs v. Jackson*, 1 Y. & C. 585; *per* Ld. Selborne, *Reg. v. Hutchings*, 6 Q. B. D. 300, 304; *Priestman v.*

Thomas, 9 P. D. 70, 210; *A.-G. for Trinidad v. Eriché*, [1893] A. C. 518, 523; 63 L. J. P. C. 6; *N. E. Ry. v. Dalton Overseers*, [1898] 2 Q. B. 66; 67 L. J. Q. B. 715; and see also *Wakefield Corporation v. Cook*, [1904] A. C. 31; 73 L. J. K. B. 88.

(*s*) See, for instance, *Lady Wenman v. Mackenzie*, 5 E. & B. 447; *Mercantile Trust Co. v. River Plate Trust Co.*, [1894] 1 Ch. 578; 63 L. J. Ch. 366; *Young v. Holloway*, [1895] P. 87; 64 L. J. P. 55; *Beardsley v. Beardsley*, [1899] 1 Q. B. 746; 68 L. J. Q. B. 270.

(*t*) See *per* Buller, J., *Allen v. Dundas*, 3 T. R. 129; 1 R. R. 666; *Prosser v. Wagner*, 1 C. B. N. S. 289.

of a Court of competent jurisdiction, in a proceeding against a vessel for the purpose of forcing a maritime lien, whereby the ship is condemned to be sold, in order that the lien may be satisfied out of the proceeds of sale (*u*).

It must be noticed, however, that, as regards the matters upon which a judgment is conclusive, there is no distinction in principle between a judgment *in rem* and a judgment *inter partes*; neither is conclusive except upon the points actually decided thereby (*r*). For instance, a judgment of conviction on an indictment for forging a bill of exchange has the force of a judgment *in rem*, for it operates upon the *status* of the defendant, and makes him a convicted felon; but it is conclusive only as to the defendant's *status*, and is not even admissible evidence of the forgery in an action on the bill, although the conviction must have proceeded on the ground that the bill was forged (*w*). Similarly, a verdict of guilty and judgment thereon, on an indictment for a nuisance by obstructing a highway, is not conclusive evidence, on the question whether the way is public, in an action of trespass brought by the defendant against a private person for using the way (*x*).

Again, a decree of probate is conclusive evidence that the instrument proved was testamentary according to the law of this country, but it is not conclusive *in rem* as to the testator's domicile, even though it contain a finding thereon (*y*). It appears that the sentence of a prize court, condemning a vessel expressly on the ground of breach of neutrality, is conclusive evidence not only of the condemnation, but also of the fact that the vessel was not neutral; but this case must be regarded as exceptional (*z*).

(*u*) *Castrique v. Imrie*, 8 C. B. 2 Q. B. 66; 67 L. J. Q. B. 715.
N. S. 405, 412; L. R. 4 H. L. 414,
428; *Minna Craig Co. v. Chartered*
Merc. Bank, [1897] 1 Q. B. 55, 460:
66 L. J. Q. B. 339.

(*v*) *Ballantyne v. Mackinnon*,
[1896] 2 Q. B. 462; 65 L. J. Q. B.
616; *N. E. Ry. v. Dalton*, [1898]

(*w*) *Castrique v. Imrie*, L. R. 4
H. L. 414, 434, *per* Blackburn, J.

(*x*) *Petrie v. Nuttall*, 11 Exch. 569.

(*y*) *Concha v. Concha*, 11 App.
Cas. 541; 56 L. J. Ch. 257.

(*z*) *Judgm.*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 463.

It is requisite to notice the distinction which exists between the case in which a verdict or judgment *inter partes* is offered in evidence, with a view to establish the mere fact that such a verdict was given, or such a judgment pronounced, and that in which it is offered as a means of proving some fact which is either expressly found by the verdict, or upon the supposed existence of which the judgment can alone be supported. In the latter case, as has been already stated, the evidence will not, in general, be admissible to conclude a third party; whereas, in the former, the judgment itself is invariably not only admissible as the proper legal evidence to prove the fact, but is usually conclusive evidence for that purpose, since it must be presumed that the Court has made a faithful record of its own proceedings. Moreover, the mere fact that such a judgment was given can never be considered as *res inter alios acta*, being a thing done by public authority; neither can the legal consequences of such a judgment be ever so considered, for, when the law gives to a judgment a particular operation, that operation is properly shown and demonstrated by means of the judgment, which is no more *res inter alios* than the law which gives it force (*a*).

There is another qualification of the general rule as to *res inter alios* to be noticed.

Where acts
have a
direct legal
operation, &c.

Where the acts or declarations of others have any legal operation material to the subject of inquiry, they must necessarily be admissible in evidence, and the legal consequence resulting from their admission can no more be regarded as *res inter alios acta* than the law itself. For instance, where a question arises as to the right to a personal chattel, evidence is admissible, even against an owner who proves that he never sold the chattel, of a sale of the chattel in market overt; for, although he was no

(*a*) 1 Stark. Evid., 3rd ed. 252; *Drouet v. Taylor*, 16 C. B. 671; *King v. Norman*, 4 C. B. 884; *Boileau v. Rutlin*, 2 Exch. 665. *Thomas v. Russell*, 9 Exch. 764;

party to the transaction, which took place entirely between others, yet, as such a sale has a legal operation on the question at issue, the fact is no more *res inter alios* than the law which gives effect to such a sale. So, in actions against the sheriff, it frequently happens that the law depends wholly on transactions to which the sheriff is personally an entire stranger; as, where the question is as to the right of ownership in particular property seized under an execution; and in these cases all transactions and acts between others are admissible in evidence, which, in point of law, are material to decide the right of property (b).

In an action of assumpsit for making and fixing iron railings to the defendant's houses, the defence was, that the credit was given to A., by whom the houses were built under a contract, and not to the defendant. A., who had become bankrupt since the railings were furnished, was called as a witness for the defendant, and, having stated that the order was given by him, was asked what was the state of the account between himself and the defendant in reference to the building of the houses at the time of his bankruptcy. A.'s reply was, that the defendant had overpaid him by £350. On the part of the plaintiff it was insisted that the state of the account between A. and the defendant was not admissible in evidence; that it was *res inter alios acta*; and that the inquiry was calculated improperly to influence the jury. It was held, however, by the Court that the evidence was properly received; and Erle, J., remarked, that in an action for goods sold and delivered, a common form of defence is, that the defendant is liable to pay a third person, and that in such cases the jury usually conclude that the defendant in reality wants to keep the goods without paying for them; that the evidence went to show the *bonâ fides* of the defence by proving payment to such third person; and that it was

(b) 1 Stark. Evid., 3rd ed. 61.

not, therefore, open to the objection of being *res inter alios acta* (c).

Hearsay.

The well-known rule excluding hearsay evidence may here claim attention, more especially as its operation is not unfrequently confounded with that of the maxim "*res inter alios*." A leading authority (d) upon the law of evidence condemns the expression "hearsay evidence" as inaccurate and misleading, and the cause of general misconception as to the true nature of the rule. The same writer prefers the phrase "derivative or second-hand evidence." This is not receivable, the law requiring all evidence to be given under formal responsibility, *i.e.*, upon the direct testimony of a witness in open court, subject to the penalties with which perjury is attended. The rule therefore may be thus stated;—the fact that a statement was made, whether orally or in writing, by a person not called as a witness, is not admissible in evidence, except in certain exceptional cases. Some of these excepted cases, which effect a most important qualification of the rule, must now be noticed.

Exceptions
to rule—
1st. Declara-
tions against
interest.

The declaration or entry of a deceased person who had peculiar means of knowing the matter stated and no object in misrepresenting it, is admissible, if relevant to the issue, where such declaration or entry was opposed to the proprietary (e) or pecuniary (f) interest of the declarant (g). In such a case, when a written statement or entry is relevant, it is only necessary to prove the handwriting and death of the party who made it (h).

(c) *Gerish v. Chartier*, 1 C. B. 13, 17.

(d) *Best on Evidence*, 7th ed. 445 *et seq.* See *Stephen's Dig. Law of Ev.*, 1st ed. 22, 139.

(e) *R. v. Exeter*, L. R. 4 Q. B. 341; 38 L. J. M. C. 126.

(f) *Sussex Peerage case*, 11 Cl. & F. 85; *R. v. Overseers of Birmingham*, 1 B. & S. 763.

(g) *Per Bayley, B., Gleadow v. Atkin*, 38 R. R. 635; 1 Cr. & M. 423, adverting to *Middleton v. Melton*, 10 B. & C. 317; 34 R. R. 423; 1 Starkie, 3rd ed. 62; *Steph. Dig.* 35, 147; *Doe v. Webber*, 1 A. & E. 740; *Plant v. Taylor*, 7 H. & N. 238. See *Ex p. Edwards*, 14 Q. B. D. 415.

(h) *Per Parke, J.*, 3 B. & Ad. 889.

In the leading case on this subject, it was held, that an entry made by a man-midwife, who had delivered a woman of a child, of his having done so on a certain day, referring to his ledger, in which he had made a charge for his attendance, which was marked as "paid," was evidence upon an issue as to the age of such child at the time of his afterwards suffering a recovery (*i*). Here, it will be remarked, the entry was admitted, because the deceased party, by making it, discharged another, upon whom he would otherwise have had a claim. In another case, which was an action of trover by the assignees of a bankrupt, two entries made by an attorney's clerk in a day-book kept for the purpose of minuting his transactions, were held admissible, by the first of which the clerk acknowledged the receipt of £100 from his employer for the purpose of making a tender, and in the second of which he stated the fact of tender and refusal; for if an action had been brought by the official assignee of the bankrupt against the clerk for money had and received, the plaintiff could have proved by the first entry that the defendant had received the £100; and, by the second, he could have shown that the object for which the money was placed in the defendant's hands had not been attained. Consequently, the declaration might be considered as the entry of a fact within the knowledge of the deceased, which rendered him

Higham v. Ridgway.

(*i*) *Higham v. Ridgway*, 10 East, 109; 10 R. R. 235 (distinguished in *Doe v. Bevis*, 7 C. B. 456, 496, 509, 512; and in *Smith v. Blakey*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 326); *Bradley v. James*, 13 C. B. 822, 825; *Percival v. Nanson*, 7 Exch. 1; *Edie v. Kingsford*, 14 C. B. 759; *Doe v. Michael*, 17 Q. B. 276.

In *Higham v. Ridgway* there was evidence, apart from the entry, to show that the work for which the charge was made was actually done. It has been held that this is not

essential; *per* Jessel, M.R., in *Taylor v. Witham*, 3 Ch. D. 605, not following *Doe v. Vowles*, 1 M. & Rob. 261. See the question discussed in the notes to *Higham v. Ridgway*, 2 Smith L. C. It is not a valid objection to the admissibility of an entry, that it purports to charge the deceased, and afterwards to discharge him; for such an objection would go to the very root of this sort of evidence; *per* Ld. Tenterden, *Rowe v. Brenton*, 3 Man. & Ry. 267; 32 R. R. 524.

subject to a pecuniary demand (*k*). And generally, it may be observed, that the rule as to *res inter alios acta* does not apply to exclude entries made by receivers, stewards, and other agents charging themselves with the receipt of money; such entries being admissible, after their decease, to prove the fact of their receipt of such money (*l*).

The foregoing are illustrations of the rule as to declarations against *pecuniary* interest. The following remarks relate rather to declarations against proprietary interest. An occupier *proved to be in possession* (*m*) of a piece of land is, *primâ facie*, the owner in fee, and his declaration is receivable in evidence, when it shows that he was only tenant for life or years (*n*). So, in an issue between A. and B., to determine whether C. died possessed of certain property, her declaration that she had assigned it to A. was held admissible (*o*). But it is clear, that a person who has already parted with his interest in property cannot be allowed to divest the right of another claiming under him by any statement which he may choose subsequently to make (*p*), and, therefore, the declarations of a person who had conveyed away his interest in an estate by executing a settlement, and had subsequently mortgaged the estate, were, after the death of the mortgagor, held inadmissible, on behalf of the mortgagee, to show that money had actually been advanced upon the mortgage (*q*).

(*k*) *Marks v. Lahée*, 8 Bing. N. C. 408.

(*l*) *Per Parke, J., Middleton v. Melton*, 10 B. & C. 327: 34 R. R. 423.

(*m*) His possession must be proved; *La Touche v. Hutton*, 9 Ir. R. Eq. 166.

(*n*) *Judgm., Crease v. Barrett*, 1 C. M. & R. 931: 40 R. R. 779; *per Mansfield, C.J., Peaceable v. Watson*, 4 Taunt. 16: 13 R. R. 552; *Davies v. Pearce*, 2 T. R. 53: 1 R. R. 419; *Ld. Trimblestown v. Kemmis*, 9 Cl. &

F. 780. As to the extent to which a tenant for life may by his declaration affect a remainderman, see *Howe v. Malkin*, 40 L. T. 196: 27 W. R. 340.

(*o*) *Ivat v. Finch*, 1 Taunt. 141: 9 R. R. 390; cited, 13 Ch. D. 298.

(*p*) *Per Ld. Denman*, 1 A. & E. 740.

(*q*) *Doe v. Webber*, 1 A. & E. 733. As to declarations against interest, see, also, *Sussex Peerage*, 11 Cl. & F. 85; *Smith v. Blakey*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 326; *per Ld. Denman, Davis v.*

The declaration or entry of a deceased person if relevant to the issue is admissible where it was made in the ordinary course of business, or in the discharge of professional duty, near the time when the matter stated occurred and of the declarant's own knowledge (r).

2nd. Declaration made in course of business.

The case (r) usually referred to as establishing the above rule, was an action brought by a brewer against the Earl of Torrington for beer sold and delivered; and the evidence given to charge the defendant showed that the usual way of the plaintiff's dealing was, that the draymen came every night to the clerk of the brewhouse, and gave him an account of the beer they had delivered out, which he set down in a book kept for that purpose, to which the draymen signed their names; and that the drayman was dead whose name appeared signed to an entry stating the delivery of the beer in question. This was held to be evidence of a delivery.

Price v. Earl of Torrington.

In another important case on this subject, at the trial of an action of ejectment, it was proved to be the usual course of practice in an attorney's office for the clerks to serve notices to quit on tenants, and to indorse on duplicates of such notices the fact and time of service; that, on one occasion, the attorney himself prepared a notice to be served on a tenant, took it out with him, together with two others, prepared at the same time, and returned to his office in the evening, having indorsed on the duplicate of each notice a memorandum of his having delivered it to the tenant; and two of the notices were proved to have been delivered by him on that occasion. The indorsements so made were held admissible, after the attorney's death, to prove the service of the third notice (s).

Lloyd, 1 Car. & K. 276; *Taylor v. Witham*, 3 Ch. D. 605; *Blandy-Jenkins v. Dunraven*, [1899] 2 Ch. 121; and *Fountaine v. Amherst*, [1909] 2 Ch. 382; 78 L. J. Ch. 648 (entries in solicitor's books).

and notes to *Price v. Earl of Torrington*, 2 Sm. L. C.; *Malcomson v. O'Dea*, 10 H. L. Cas. 605; *Smith v. Blakey*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 329, 333.

(s) *Doe v. Turford*, 3 B. & Ad. 890; cited by Sir J. Romilly, *Bright v. Legerton*, 29 L. J. Ch. 852, 854;

(r) Steph. Dig., 1st ed. 33, 146,

It is necessary, however, that the particular entry be contemporaneous with the circumstance to which it relates; that it be made in the course of performing some duty (*t*), or discharging some office (*u*); that it was the duty of the deceased person to do the particular thing and to record the fact of having done it contemporaneously (*v*), and that the entry relate to facts necessary to the performance of such duty; for, if the entry contain a statement of other circumstances, however naturally they may be thought to find a place in the narrative, the entry will not be legal proof of those circumstances (*x*).

Other
exceptions.

Space will not permit of the other exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay evidence being here treated. The following extract from a judgment of Parke, B., well expresses the rule itself, and indicates many of the exceptions which qualify it.—One great principle in the law of evidence is, that all such facts as have not been admitted by the party against whom they are offered, or some one under whom he claims, ought to be proved under the sanction of an oath (or its statutory equivalent), either on the trial of the issue, or some other issue involving the same question, between the same parties, or those to whom they are privy. To this rule certain exceptions have been recognised, some from very early times, on the ground of necessity or convenience; such as the proof of the quality and intention of acts by declarations accompanying them,

Stapylton v. Clough, 2 E. & B. 933; *Eastern Union R. Co. v. Symonds*, 5 Exch. 237; *Doe v. Wittcomb*, 4 H. L. Cas. 425: 6 Exch. 601. See *Doe v. Skinner*, 3 Exch. 84; *Reg. v. St. Mary, Warwick*, 1 E. & B. 816, 820, 825; *Reg. v. Inhab. of Worth*, 4 Q. B. 132. See, also, *Poole v. Dicus*, 1 Bing. N. C. 649.

(*t*) See *Massey v. Allen*, 13 Ch. D. 558. A report made by a surveyor under contract does not come within the rule; *Mellor v. Walmesley*,

[1904] 2 Ch. 525: 74 L. J. Ch. 475.

(*u*) See *Polini v. Grey*, 12 Ch. D. 411: 49 L. J. Ch. 41.

(*v*) *Mercer v. Denne*, [1904] 2 Ch. 534: 74 L. J. Ch. 71.

(*x*) *Chambers v. Bernasconi*, 1 C. M. & R. 347: 40 R. R. 604; *per* Blackburn, J., *Smith v. Blakey*, L. R. 2 Q. B. 332; *per* Parke, J., 3 B. & Ad. 897, 898; *per* Pollock, C. B., *Milne v. Leister*, 7 H. & N. 795; *Trotter v. Maclean*, 13 Ch. D. 574.

of pedigrees and of public rights by the statement of deceased persons presumably well acquainted with the subject, as inhabitants of the district, in the one case, or relations, within certain limits, in the other; and another exception occurs, where proof of possession is allowed to be given by the entries of deceased stewards or receivers charging themselves, or proof of facts of a public nature by public documents (*y*).

There is one other topic, which may be adverted to as *Res gestæ*, qualifying both the rule which excludes evidence of *res inter alios actæ*, and also that as to hearsay evidence. Under the head of *res gestæ*, an expression which, according to Sir James Stephen (*z*), seems to have come into use on account of its convenient obscurity, facts and statements are frequently admitted in evidence, which upon the broad construction of one or other of the rules which have been noticed would be inadmissible. The doctrine of *res gestæ* was much discussed in the leading case of *Doe v. Tatham* (*a*). In delivering his opinion to the House of Lords in that case, Parke, B., said "Where any facts are proper evidence upon an issue, all oral or written declarations which can explain such facts may be received in evidence" (*b*). Where declarations accompany an act, they are frequently admissible in evidence as part of the *res gestæ*, or as the best and most proximate evidence of the nature and quality of the act; their connection with which either sanctions them as direct evidence, or constitutes them indirect evidence from which the real motive of the actor may be duly estimated (*c*).

Thus, an action was brought by a man on a policy of insurance, on the life of his wife, which was conditional *Aveson v. Lord Kinmaird*.

(*y*) *Per* Parke, B., 7 A. & E. 384, 385. For additional information as to the maxim respecting *res inter alios actæ*, the reader is referred to 1 Tayl. Evid., 9th ed. 229 *et seq.*, 366 *et seq.*, and Steph. Dig.

(*z*) Dig. L. of Ev., 1st ed., p. 134.

(*a*) 7 A. & E. 813.

(*b*) 4 Bing. N. C. 489.

(*c*) See *Ford v. Elliott*, 4 Exch. 78; *per* Pollock, C.B., *Milne v. Leister*, 7 H. & N. 796.

upon her being in a good state of health at the time when the insurance was effected. The question arose as to the admissibility of declarations, concerning the bad state of her health, made by the wife, when found lying in bed, apparently ill, a few days after she had obtained the medical certificate upon which the policy was subsequently issued. These declarations were made to the witness, whom the defendants called at the trial to relate the wife's own account of the cause of the witness finding her in bed at an unseasonable hour and with the appearance of being ill, and they were held admissible, on the same ground that inquiries of patients, by medical men, with the answers to them, are evidence of the state of health of the patient at the time; and it was further observed, that this was not only good evidence, but the best evidence which the nature of the case afforded (*d*).

So, where a bankrupt has done an equivocal act his declarations accompanying the act have been held admissible to explain his intentions; and, in order to render them admissible, it is not requisite that such declarations were made at the precise time when the act in question was done (*e*).

So, in cases of treason and conspiracy, it is an established rule, that, where several persons are proved to have combined together for the same illegal purpose, any act done by one of the party in pursuance of the plan originally concerted, and with reference to the common object, is, in the contemplation of law, the act of the whole party (*f*), though, where a question arises as to the admissibility of documentary evidence, for the purpose of

(*d*) *Aveson v. Ld. Kinnaird*, 6 East, 188: 8 R. R. 455; 1 Phill. Ev., 10th ed. 149. *Haigh*, 2 Bing. 99. See *Smith v. Cramer*, 1 Bing. N. C. 585.

(*e*) *Bateman v. Bailey*, 5 T. R. 512. *Per* Tindal, C.J., *Ridley v. Gyde*, 9 Bing. 352; *Rawson v.* 32 Howell, St. Tr. 7; *Reg. v. Blake*, 6 Q. B. 126. (*f*) *Per* Bayley, J., *Watson's case*,

implicating a party, and showing his acquiescence in such illegal purpose and common object, it will always be necessary to consider, whether the rule *scribere est agere* applies, or whether the evidence in question is merely the narrative of some third party of a particular occurrence, and therefore, in its nature hearsay and not original evidence.

NEMO TENETUR SEIPSUM ACCUSARE. (*Wing. Max.* 486.)—No man can be compelled to criminate himself (g).

This maxim expresses a characteristic principle of English Law (h). Hence it is, that, although an accused person may of his own accord make a voluntary statement as to the charge against him, a justice, before receiving his statement, is required, by the Indictable Offences Act, 1848 (i), to caution him that he is not obliged to say anything, and that what he does say may be given in evidence against him. Hence also arises the rule that evidence of a confession by the accused is not admissible, unless it be proved that such confession was free and voluntary (k).

Policy of our law.

It may be stated as a general rule that a witness in any proceeding is privileged from answering, not merely where his answer will criminate him directly, but also where it may have a tendency to criminate him (l). "The proposition is clear," remarked Lord Eldon in *Ex parte Symes* (m), "that no man can be compelled to answer what has any

(g) A man is *competent* to prove his own crime, though not *compellable*; per Alderson, B., *Udal v. Walton*, 14 M. & W. 256.

(h) As to the Scotch law on the subject, see *Longworth v. Yelverton*, L. R. 1 Sc. App. Cas. 218.

(i) 11 & 12 Vict. c. 42, s. 18.

(k) *Reg. v. Thompson*, [1893] 2 Q. B. 12: 62 L. J. M. C. 93.

(l) *Fisher v. Ronalds*, 12 C. B.

762; per Pollock, C.B., *Adams v. Lloyd*, 3 H. & N. 362; *R. v. Garbett*, 1 Den. C. C. 236. The cases supporting this proposition are collected in *Rosc. Law of Evidence in Crim. Cas.*, 12th ed., pp. 129 *et seq.* See *Ex p. Fernandez*, 10 C. B. N. S. 3; *Re Fernandes*, 6 H. & N. 717; *Bradlaugh v. Evans*, 11 C. B. N. S. 377.

tendency to criminate him,"—which proposition is, it seems, to be thus qualified, that the danger to be apprehended by the witness must be "real and appreciable with reference to the ordinary operation of law in the ordinary course of things, not a danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character having reference to some extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable man would suffer it to influence his conduct," for such a possibility should not be suffered to obstruct the administration of justice (*n*). And, although a party to a cause, who has been subpoenaed as a witness, cannot object to be sworn on the ground that any relevant questions would tend to criminate him (*o*), he may claim his privilege when such objectionable questions are put to him (*p*).

The protection does not extend to excuse a person from answering questions on the ground that the answers may establish or tend to establish that he owes a debt or is otherwise subject to a civil suit, either at the instance of the Crown or of any other person (*q*). As to whether a

(*m*) 11 Ves. 525.

(*n*) *Reg. v. Boyes*, 1 B. & S. 311, 330; *Re Reynolds*, 20 Ch. D. 294. See *Re Mexican & S. American Co.*, 28 L. J. Ch. 631.

(*o*) *Boyle v. Wiseman*, 10 Exch. 647.

(*p*) An objection to discovery, whether by affidavit of documents or sworn answer to interrogatories, on the ground that it may tend to criminate, can only be taken in the affidavit or answer itself; *Spokes v. Grosvenor Co.*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 124: 66 L. J. Q. B. 572, and cases there cited.

An objection to produce a document, on that ground, must be by oath; *Webb v. East*, 5 Ex. D. 23: 49 L. J. Ex. 250, where the C. A. declined to decide whether the objection is valid; but it seems that

it is. See *Pritchett v. Smart*, 7 C. B. 625.

Discovery is not granted in actions to recover penalties or enforce forfeitures; *Earl of Mexborough v. Whitwood U.D.C.*, [1897] 2 Q. B. 111: 66 L. J. Q. B. 637, and cases there cited.

Whether or not a witness is compellable to answer questions having a tendency to disgrace him, is ably discussed by Mr. Best, *Law of Evidence*, 2nd ed., pp. 163 *et seq.*, to which the reader is referred. A witness in any cause may be questioned as to whether he has been convicted of any felony or misdemeanor; see 17 & 18 Vict. c. 125, s. 25.

(*q*) 46 Geo. 3, c. 37, which was enacted to put an end to the doubts which had been expressed.

person is bound to answer a question the answer to which may criminate his or her wife or husband, the authorities are somewhat conflicting, though they tend to establish the privilege in such cases (*v*).

Where, however, the reason for the privilege of the witness or party interrogated ceases, the privilege also ceases (*s*); and therefore it ceases if the prosecution to which the witness might be exposed or his liability to a penalty or forfeiture is barred by lapse of time, or if the offence has been pardoned or the penalty or forfeiture waived (*t*).

The rule *nemo tenetur seipsum accusare*, which has been designated (*u*) "a maxim of our law as settled, as important and as wise as almost any other in it," is, however, sometimes trenchanted upon, and the privilege which it confers, is in special cases abrogated. Thus a bankrupt under examination before the Court of Bankruptcy (*x*) does not enjoy such privilege as regards any question touching his estate (*y*); though a witness, summoned for examination as to the bankrupt's affairs, may refuse to answer a question upon the ground that his answer might tend to criminate himself (*z*). And the legislature sometimes, on grounds of policy, extends indemnity—partial or entire—to a witness whose privilege is taken away (*a*). Thus the Larceny Act, 1861, c. 85 (*b*), enacts that nothing in any of the preceding ten sections of that Act, which relate to frauds by agents,

How rule is qualified.

(*r*) *R. v. Claviger*, 2 T. R. 263; *R. v. All Saints, Worcester*, 6 M. & G. 194, 200, *per* Bayley, J.; *Cartwright v. Green*, 8 Ves. 405; 7 R. R. 99; *R. v. Halliday*, Bell, 257.

(*s*) Wigr. on Discovery, 2nd ed., p. 83, where the equity cases upon the point are collected.

(*t*) See *Ex p. Fernandez*, 10 C. B. N. S. 3; *Reg. v. Boyes*, 1 B. & S. 311.

(*u*) *Per* Coleridge, J., Dears. & B. 61.

(*x*) See 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52, s. 17.

(*y*) *Reg. v. Erdheim*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 260; 65 L. J. M. C. 176; *Reg. v. Scott*, Dears. & B. 47; *Reg. v. Cross*, Id. 68; *Reg. v. Skeen*, Bell C. C. 97; *Reg. v. Robinson*, L. R. 1 C. C. 80, 85, 87, 90.

(*z*) *Ex p. Schofield*, 6 Ch. D. 230; *Ex p. Reynolds*, 20 Ch. D. 294.

(*a*) See, for instance, the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Prevention Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 51), s. 59.

(*b*) 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 85.

bankers, and factors, "shall enable or entitle any person to refuse to make a full and complete discovery by answer to any bill in equity, or to answer any question or interrogatory in any civil proceeding in any Court or upon the hearing of any matter in bankruptcy or insolvency; and no person shall be liable to be convicted of any of the misdemeanours in any of the said sections mentioned by any evidence whatever in respect of any act done by him, if he shall, at any time previously to his being charged with such offence, have first disclosed such act on oath in consequence of any compulsory process of any court of law or equity in any action, suit, or proceeding which shall have been *bonâ fide* instituted by any party aggrieved" (c).

The disclosure above referred to, in order to be available as a protection, must be made *bonâ fide*, and must not be a mere voluntary statement, made for the express purpose of screening the person making it from the penal consequences of his acts (d).

Answering
affidavit.

Lastly, in *Reg. v. Gillyard* (e), the facts were these. A maltster, suspected of having violated the excise laws, obtained a conviction against his servant for the purpose, as was charged, of relieving himself from penalties, by force of the 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 52, s. 46. In support of a rule *nisi* to quash the conviction the affidavits stated circumstances, showing that the conviction had been obtained by collusion, and no affidavit was made in opposition to the rule. On behalf of the maltster it was urged that he ought not (regard being had to the maxim now under consideration) to have been called upon to defend himself by affidavit on a charge which was virtually of a criminal nature (f). But the conviction nevertheless, was quashed as being "a

(c) With regard to disclosure upon the hearing of a matter in bankruptcy, see 53 & 54 Vict. c. 71, s. 27; *Reg. v. Erdheim*, [1896] 2 Q. B. 260: 65 L. J. M. C. 176.

C. C. 85: decided under the repealed 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 29, s. 52.

(e) 12 Q. B. 527.

(f) Citing *Stephens v. Hill*, 10 M. & W. 28.

(d) See *Reg. v. Strahan*, 7 Cox,

fraud and mockery, the result of conspiracy and subornation of perjury:" Coleridge, J., remarking that, "where the Court observes such dishonest practices it will interfere, although judgment has been given," and that "no honest man ought to think it beneath him or a hardship upon him to answer upon affidavit a charge of dishonesty made upon affidavit against him. If a man, when such a serious accusation is preferred against him, will not deny it, he must not complain if the case is taken *pro confesso*."

Upon the cognate subject of the competency of witnesses a few remarks must suffice. At one time it was the most important topic of the law of evidence; for formerly interest in a suit was considered to disqualify a person from giving testimony, the result being that the best evidence available was often excluded. At common law the parties, and their husbands or wives, were incompetent as witnesses in all cases. This incompetency was removed as to the parties in civil cases by the Evidence Act, 1851 (*g*), and as to their husbands or wives by the Evidence Amendment Act, 1853 (*h*). By both these Acts the rule of the common law was expressly preserved in criminal cases, and by the latter Act the incompetency of the parties, and their husbands or wives, was retained in proceedings instituted in consequence of adultery. By the Evidence Further Amendment Act, 1869 (*i*), however, the incompetency in such proceedings is removed, but no witness may be asked any question tending to show that he or she has committed adultery, unless such witness has already given evidence in the same proceeding in disproof of such adultery.

Competency
of witnesses.

With regard to the law of evidence in criminal cases, the year 1898 was marked by a great change, which for some years had been foreshadowed by the instances in which

(*g*) 14 & 15 Vict. c. 99, s. 2.

(*i*) 32 & 33 Vict. c. 68, s. 3.

(*h*) 16 & 17 Vict. c. 83, ss. 1, 2.

statutes creating new offences had expressly enabled a person charged therewith to be a witness on his own behalf. By the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (*k*), every person charged with an offence, as also the wife or husband of such person, is a competent witness for the defence at every stage of the proceedings, whether such person be charged solely or jointly with others (*l*); but such person may not be called as a witness except upon his own application (*m*); nor, as a general rule, may the wife or husband, except upon the application of the person charged (*n*). The husband or wife is not compellable to disclose communications made by the one to the other during marriage (*o*); but the person charged may be asked in cross-examination any question tending to criminate him as to the offence charged (*p*); though, not as a general rule, any question tending to show that he has committed another offence, or is of bad character (*q*). In respect of certain offences the wife or husband of the person charged may be called as a witness for the prosecution without the consent of that person (*r*); but, as has been already indicated, the maxim, *nemo tenetur seipsum accusare*, still holds good to this extent, that the person charged cannot be compelled to enter the witness-box against his will (*s*).

HAVING thus briefly touched upon some few rules relating chiefly to the admissibility of evidence, and having considerably exceeded the limits originally prescribed to myself, I now feel compelled reluctantly to take leave of the reader,

(*k*) 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36.

(*l*) S. 1.

(*m*) S. 1 (a).

(*n*) S. 1 (c); see s. 4.

(*o*) S. 1 (d).

(*p*) S. 1 (e).

(*q*) S. 1 (f). See *Rex v. Preston*,

[1909] 1 K. B. 568 : 78 L. J. K. B. 335.

(*r*) S. 4, and schedule.

(*s*) Except in proceedings instituted for the purpose of trying a civil right only; see 40 & 41 Vict. c. 14, s. 1; 61 & 62 Vict. c. 36, s. 6 (1).

trusting that, however slight or disproportioned this attempt to illustrate our legal maxims may appear, when compared with the extent and importance of the subject, I have yet, in the language of Lord Bacon, applied myself, not to that which might seem most for the ostentation of mine own wit or knowledge, but to that which might yield most use and profit to the student; and have afforded some materials for acquiring an insight into those conclusions of reason—those *legum leges*—essential to the true understanding and proper application of the law—whereof, though some may strongly savour of human refinement and ingenuity, the greater portion claim from us instinctively, as it were, recognition—and why? they have been “written with the finger of Almighty God upon the heart of man” (t).

(t) See *Calvin's case*, 7 Rep. 126.

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